CHAPTER III

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1. The scope of Equal protection Clause

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the meaning and scope of equal protection:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws
is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

2. Requisites for a valid classification

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAYAT

Cayat, a native of Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio for, being a
member of the non-Christian tribes, receiving, acquiring and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one
bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Act No. 1639 reads:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

The government contends that the law is a practicable means of bringing about the advancement of Non-Christians in
civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not there the ACt violates the Equal Protection Clause.

HELD:It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area,
and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached
a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus
established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past that the
free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times
as long as those conditions exist

That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an
argument against the equality of its application.
2.1 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM, JULY 14, 1989

Association of Small Landowners Vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A.
No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972
to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted;
later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment
of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided
for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land
to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws
already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in
cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that
Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which
prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that
amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree.
The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not
needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go
to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The
agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if
all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money
hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

2.4 JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. (equal protection of law).
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There
is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction
and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
Discussion on procedure
PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality
may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Biraogo vs. THE PHIIPPINE TRUTHCOMMISSION OF 2010, GR NO. 192935

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued
that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like
the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the
“real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues
in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 6. Arroyo vs DOJ and COMELEC

Facts: Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of a
massive electoral fraud, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

On August 15, 2011, the COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
composed of officials from the DOJ and COMELEC. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation
of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to
be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information(s) for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel
Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, GMA, et al. assailed the validity of
the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court and further
contended that the said Joint Order is violative of the equal protection clause.

Issue: WON Joint Order No. 001-2011 issued by COMELEC and DOJ violates the equal protection clause.

Held: The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination
and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.

Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order
No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it
infringes the equal protection clause.

The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of investigating alleged graft and
corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 177 specifically referred to the “previous
administration”; while the Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election
offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.

Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election laws may be filed either with the
COMELEC or with the DOJ. The COMELEC may even initiate, motu proprio, complaints for election offenses. Pursuant to
law and the COMELEC’s own Rules, investigations may be conducted either by the COMELEC itself through its law
department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that
respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection
of the law is misplaced.
Hence, petitions are dismissed.

7. Quinto V. COMELEC
Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678
provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
 b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the
coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to
both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.

Issue: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied
with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently.
As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction
exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from
plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty
would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in
the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same
influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running
this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign.
 As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a
greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.

8. Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010

Facts: Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and
additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain
additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation.

Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated September 30,
1989,covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59
enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and
these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and
published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001,clarifying that only the exempt allowances
under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the
standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and
ICA, among others, which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the
national government followed suit.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that all Supreme Court rulings on
the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific
government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering the national government employees are
still pending with this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA,
remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and
other responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and benefits
already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other government employees
violates the equal protection clause

Held: Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police personnel under CCC 10 and NCC 59 to
the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of these
issuances, they are in fact attacking the very constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this provision which
allows the uniformed personnel to continue receiving their COLA over and above their basic pay, thus:
Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Integrated National Police shall be as prescribed in the salary schedule for these personnel in
R.A. 6638 and R.A. 6648. The longevity pay of these personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638, and R.A.
1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648: Provided, however, That the longevity pay of uniformed personnel of
the Integrated National Police shall include those services rendered as uniformed members of the police, jail and fire
departments of the local government units prior to the police integration.
All existing types of allowances authorized for uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and Integrated National Police such as cost of living allowance, longevity pay, quarters allowance, subsistence
allowance, clothing allowance, hazard pay and other allowances shall continue to be authorized.
 Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.

The Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other
national government officials run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national government officials. Being
in charge of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed
virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since
their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of
living in higher cost areas.

9. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs The Bureau of Internal Revenue

FACTS: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by P.D. No. 1067-A in 1977.
Obviously, it is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).
In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) became effective. Section 27 thereof provides that
GOCC’s are NOT EXEMPT from paying income taxation but it exempted the following GOCCs:
1. GSIS
2. SSS
3. PHILHEALTH
4. PCSO
5. PAGCOR
But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed. Section 1 thereof excluded
PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was subjected to pay income taxation. In September 2005, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue issued the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A. 9337. In the said IRR, it identified PAGCOR
as subject to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale of Services and Use or
Lease of Properties).
PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR. PAGCOR avers that the said provision
violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR argues that it is similarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH,
hence it should not be excluded from the exemption.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to income taxation.
HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress to exclude PAGCOR from the
exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income taxation.
PAGCOR’s contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal protection clause provides that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The general rule is, ALL GOCC’s are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes of GOCC’s may be exempt from
income taxation based on the following requisites for a valid classification under the principle of equal protection:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers when R.A. 8424 was being drafted,
the SC found out that PAGCOR’s exemption was not really based on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely
exempted PAGCOR from income taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A. 9337
was passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation.
Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped its authority. Nowhere in R.A.
9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact,
Section 109 of R.A. 9337 expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCOR’s charter exempts it from VAT.
To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT.

10. Roma Drug vs RTC

FACTS: The petitioner Roma Drug was among the 6 local drugstores in Pampanga raided by the joint NBI and BFAD
inspectors where various medicines were found and seized on the strength of a search warrant issued by the RTC of
Pampanga and upon the request of Glaxo Smith kline, a registered corporation and the authorized Philippine distributor of the
medicines seized from said drugstores. The NBI proceeded in filing a complaint against petitioner for violation of Section 4
(in relation to Sections 3and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga. The law prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which
include an "unregistered imported drug product". The term "unregistered" signifies lack of registration with the Bureau of
Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person. The seized
drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-registered counterparts. No claim was made that the drugs were adulterated
in any way or mislabeled atthe least.
Their classification as "counterfeit" is based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased from
Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs.
Petitioner Roma Drug challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD during the preliminary investigation but the provincial
prosecutors issued a resolution recommending that Rodriguez, the owner of Roma Drug, be charged with violation of Section
4 of the SLCD. Thus, Roma Drug filed a Petition for Prohibition before the Supreme Court questing the RTC-Guagua
Pampanga and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez, and that Sections3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the
SLCD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with
the trial against Rodriguez, and the BFAD, the NBI and Glaxo Smith kline from prosecuting the petitioners. Glaxo Smith
kline and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have opposed the petition. On the constitutional issue, Glaxo Smithkline
asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed constitutional. The OSG invokes the presumption of constitutionality of statutes
and asserts that there is no clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution presented by the SLCD.
ISSUE:WON RA 9502 impliedly abrogates the provisions of RA 8203 (SLCD) with which the petitioner is criminally
charged? Yes
HELD:(petition granted, writ of prohibition issued, TRO made permanent)
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 (Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008) did not expressly
repeal any provision of the SLCD. However, it is clear that the SLCD's classification of "unregistered imported drugs" as
"counterfeit drugs," and of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep.
Act No. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or otherwise use such
drugs.
Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502, clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate
a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect
. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation co-terminus with a prior statute cannot by any reasonable
construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the
two acts, the latest legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict. Irreconcilable
inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may exist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of
the earlier act, so that the latter loses all meaning and function.
Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant
For the reasons above-stated, the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the quested writ of prohibition should
accordingly be issued
11. People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56
FACTS:
January 8, 1934: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to
the lower court for a new trial.
· November 27, 1936: While awaiting new trial, Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation, alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
· June 18, 1937: Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
· Insular Probation Office denied the application for probation
· April 5, 1937: hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation
· Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
· The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation
of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if the law covers Manila, it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art
3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
HSBC filed contentions to the Act 4221 or The Probation Law stating that it goes against the
constitutional guarantees on equal protection of the laws and unduly delegate power.
ISSUE: Whether equal protection is violated when the probation law provides that “ only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer” may the probation system be applied.

HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a
probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces
where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law, which denies equal protection, and a law that permits such denial. A law may appear to
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.

Note: Does it deny equal protection of the laws?

Yes. Due to the undue delegation of legislative power, there could be arbitrary application of the law in the different
provinces. Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. It is possible that all the
provinces could choose to have a probationary officer, or all could choose not to have one, and then equal protection
would be maintained, but since this is just a likely outcome, and it is still possible that there could be obnoxious
discrimination based on each independent provincial board, the Supreme Court strikes Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 on this
level as well.

12. Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Imelda Marcos : charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 . The circular, which consolidated the various
rules and regulations promulgated by the CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions including those on gold and
silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms, associations, or corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the CB or without being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10
thereof all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports
of such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB department and to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the CB within 90 days from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular is punishable as a
criminal offense under Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).

CB cir no. : which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad
without permission from the Central Bank. Several information were filed against her.

-another circular was issued CB C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 or Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange
Regulation that allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad
however Imelda questioned these circulars on the basis that it violated her right to equal protection of laws because an
exception provided in the circulars contained in a saving clause.

XPN: circulars have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of
C.B. Circ. 960.
Marcos :
 1. filed a Motion to Quash the information filed against her based on the new circulars (The RTC denied the Motion
so did the CA hence the appeal)
2. Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was
purposely designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.
3. She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which allowed the Central Bank to issue
circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power because the said law allowed the Central Bank to legislate
(define crimes) penal laws and determine penalties therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are correct.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which allegedly
were committed by Imelda Marcos. These circulars are mere administrative regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to
have been violated by Marcos.

Equal protection

SC held that: “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her
and her co- accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the
text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove
petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to
pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage
therefor, and not at their present posture.”

13. Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines

FACTS: Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar,
Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975,
Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days
is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other
meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six
years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination
of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons
and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere
fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety
(90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil
liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial,
he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused
can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

14. PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and
does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the
bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling
is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720
or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring
that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except
in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e.,
in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be
deprived of the equal protection of laws."

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private
gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be
prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.

15. Mario Gumabon vs Director of the Bureau of Prisons

FACTS: Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code. Their offense
was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their
sentence had become final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion because murder, a regular crime, is
necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such complexion, the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua.
Gumabon asserted that a non-application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection. Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First Instance but they were
convicted for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted – (The law under which they
[Gumabon et al] were convicted is the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were convicted.) It had not and
has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow Gumabon et
al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is
the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it
nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be
made to suffer different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to
equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was
noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest.

16. Panfilo Lacson vs Secretary Hernando Perez

On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized
as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the time of the “rub out” was then the PNP Chief, among others, as
the ones responsible. They were accused of multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed
separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also known as “An Act To Strengthen The
Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended”.

They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal
accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank
of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was
authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as
it was made to precisely suit the situation in which Lacson’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving
the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution
to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA
7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against
those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of
that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory
provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them.

Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law.
Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law
(R.A. 8249).

17. Basco vs PAGCOR

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter – PD 1869 based on the following grounds:
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City
government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right
to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most
other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines”. PD 1869 was created to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy.
ISSUE: WON the legalization of gambling conducted by PAGCOR violates equal protection clause.
HELD: The legalization of PAGCOR – conducted gambling does not violate equal protection clause because there is a
substantial distinction between PAGCOR and the other establishments conducting gambling.
The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No.
89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of
government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned
P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's
income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and
charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of
P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide,
directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
 18.Tatad vs Secretary of Finance
FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. Francisco Tatad seeks annulment of Sec. 5 (b) of RA No. 8180, which
provides:
Section 5 b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed
and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of
seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided,
That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same:
Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.
Tatad argue that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three
existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their
own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.
The three existing oil refineries at that time were Petron, Shell, and Caltex. They are the only companies that could
import crude oil since they are the only ones with refineries. Since the deregulation, new players have entered but none of
them belong to the same class as Petron, Shell, and Caltex. These players were limited to importing refined petroleum
products since they do not have the same refineries as that of the big 3. Also, there is no showing that any of these new
players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete with these dominant oil companies. Hence, the big three oil
companies were the only ones subjected to the 3% tariff while the smaller companies were subjected to the 7% tariff.
ISSUE: WON RA 8180 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD: RA 8180 is unconstitutional and should be struck down.
Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the
market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation,
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government
with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where
competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players
belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

19. Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30, 1982

FACTS: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who
are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the
members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.

The Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which aims to phase out and replace old and
dilapidated taxis. This policy is intended, among other reasons, to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as
public conveyances and to assure the commuting public of their comfort, convenience, and safety. The BOT’s studies and
inquiries reveal that after six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made
reasonable profit for his investments. In the policy, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered to be withdrawn from
public service.
The taxi operators filed a petition with the BOT seeking to nullify the said memorandum or to stop its implementation; to
allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

The petitioners allege that the memorandum violates their right to equal protection because it is being enforced in Metro
Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. We have already discussed this in class. It is reasonable for the
BOT to enforce the policy in Metro Manila because taxis there are in continuous operation, practically 24 hours everyday in
three shifts of eight hours per shift. While in provincial areas, an example given by Atty. Gacayan, is in Baguio City where
taxis do not operate for 24 hours. Taxis in Baguio city could be fit for operation probably until ten years. Taxis in Metro
Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use.
ISSUE: Whether the taxi operators’ right to equal protection is violated.
HELD: Their right to equal protection is not violated. It must be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that
the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which
make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be
accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed

20. Bautista vs. Juinio

21. Dumlao vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot, and Alfredo Salapatan Jr. filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53. The petition states that Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya who has filed his candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. On the
other hand, Igot is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the bar while Salapantan is also a taxpayer, voter, and a
resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions section 4 of BP 52 which disqualifies any retired
elective provincial city or municipal official who has received retirement benefits and who shall be 65 years at the end of the
term of office from running to the same elective post he has retired from. He asserts that this provision is discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the constitution. On their part, Igot and Salapantan Jr. assails
the validity of Section 4 of BP 21, Sections 1,4, and 6 of BP 22, and the accreditation of some political parties by the
COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to Section 9(1) Art. XIIC of the Constitution. The said
section of the Constitution provides that bona fide candidates shall be free from any harassment and discrimination which
makes the accreditation unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not section 4 of BP 22 is discriminatory and contrary the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution.
HELD: No. Sec 4 of BP 22 is not contrary to the safer guard of due process and equal protection. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. In the case of 65-year old elective official, who
has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, the reason to disqualify him from running for the same office is the
need for new bloods. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for some government work. The purpose of the law is
to allow the emergence of the younger blood in the government. Thus, the provision does not deny equal protection since the
legal classification is not arbitrary and unreasonable.

22. Villegas vs. HIU

FACTS: On February 22, 1968, Ordinance No. 6537 entitled AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY
PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT
FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and was later signed by Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on March 27, 1968. Section
1 of said act prohibits aliens to engage in any occupation or business without first securing an employment permit from the
Mayor of Manila and paying P 50 00 as permit fee with the exception of persons in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and
those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders of congregations, sect or denomination, who
are not paid monetarily or in kind. Violations of this ordinance are punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three to six
months or fine of not less than P 100.00 but not more than P 200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.
Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition on May 4, 1968 with the
CFI of Manila, Branch 1 praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of the ordinance and for it to be declared null and void. He raised in the petition that the ordinance is null and
void since it is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity of taxation being a revenue measure imposed to
aliens. He also averred that it is a violation of the fundamental principles of the proper delegation of legislative power, of due
process and of the equal protection rule of the Constitution. Respondent Judge Francisco Arca then issued the writ on May 24,
1968 and rendered judgement declaring Ordinance No, 6537 as null and void and making the writ of preliminary injunction
permanent.
On March 27, 1969, Mayor Villegas filed a petition alleging that it cannot be declared null and void on the ground
that it is a violation of the rule of uniformity and taxation since it is not a tax or revenue measure but an exercise of the police
power of the state for being regulatory in nature.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ordinace No. 6537 is null or void.
2. Whether or not it violates the due process of law and the equal protection rule.
HELD:
1. Yes. Ordinance No. 6537 is null and void. The contention that it is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its
principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires aliens to secure permits
is regulatory in nature, the second part which requires the payment of P 50. 00 from aliens is an obvious revenue measure.
There is no logic in exacting said amount from aliens who have been cleared from employment which implies that its real
purpose is to raise money in the guise or regulation. Also, the P 50 00 is unreasonable because it fails to consider the
differences in situation among those who are required to pay. The same amount will be collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
Further, it has been held in the ruling case laws of Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization board and in
Primicias vs. Furgoso, that when an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or set-up any standard to guide or
limit the mayor’s action, it is then invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power.
2. Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and the equal protection rule. Requiring a person to secure a
permit before he can be employed is equivalent to denying him the basic right for livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of
life(involving livelihood) without due process of law. The shelter of protection should be given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.

23. CENIZA V COMELEC

FACTS:Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars
voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities,
and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other
hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of
20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or
Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political
and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They
contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the
provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter.
Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only
basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units
to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it
has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on 21 June 1969.The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their
regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of
existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the
city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.The petitioners also contend that the voters
in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion
which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

24. UNIDO V. COMELEC

FACTS:In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite
for the people’s approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While the NO vote was being
advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that
there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos
campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations
and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as
Marcos has pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal
protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the
considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12,
1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under
the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall
determine the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the
political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV
stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with
these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense.

25. RUFINO V. NUÑEZ vs SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Nunez was accused of falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-
accused, all public officials, in several cases. He filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC because he says
that the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan (PD 1486) is unconstitutional and violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
ON EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS:
Nunez says the creation of the Sandiganbayan violated the equal protection clause because, while other estafa indictees can
appeal on both the matter of law and facts on two appellate courts (Court of Appeals and SC), public servants like Nunez can
only appeal once (Supreme Court), and said appeal is limited only to questions of law.

Issue: Does PD 1486 violate the equal protection clause?

HELD: NO, there is valid classification. In People v Vera, “valid classification "must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot
be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. A different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as
petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It has been held
in Chiong v Cuaderno that the Bill of Rights must give way to a specific provision, and that is one “reserving to Filipino
citizens of the public services or utilities”.

J. MAKASIAR’S DISSENTING OPINION:

YES, it violates the equal protection clause and due process of law. The Constitution merely authorizes the creation of the
Sandiganbayan with limited jurisdiction over public servants of the government. The Bill of Rights still restricts the power of
the lawmaker in creating PD 1486, hence has no right to limit the right of appeal as stated in the Bill of Rights. By
limiting the right to appeal, the right to due process is also violated.

26. Sison vs Ancheta 130 SCRA 654

FACTS: Antero Sison assails the validity of Section I of BP 135, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on
(a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank
deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e)
dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income.

Sison says, this violates the equal protection clause, as well as due process and Art VI Sec 7(1) on uniformity of taxation
because he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the
exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.
ISSUE: Does Sec. I BP 135 violate the equal protection clause?
HELD: NO, it does not. There is constant reiteration of the SC of the view that classification, if rational in character, is
allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz v Araneta, the court went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent
in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation”. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. As clarified by Justice Tuason in Manila Race Horse Trainers Assoc. v. De la Fuente, where "the
differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."

29. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
February 17, 1968
FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on
any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50
and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer,
Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under
Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is
authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
ISSUES: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause
HELD: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
(Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it
is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of
the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance is discriminatory, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax.
As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise

30. ROQUE FLORES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NOBELITO RAPISORA

G.R. No. 89604 April 20, 1990
FACTS: The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the highest number of
votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679. He was
voted punong barangay during the elections, a separate position as that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito
Rapisora, protected the result and filed a protect before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the ballot, which only indicated
Flores´, should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to them.
In his defense, the petitioner argued that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes
should be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the
same full name and one of them is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is counted in favor
of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent and subsequently declared him as the
punong barangay.
Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal
protection of the law since he is also an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he should be entitled by the
rule.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule?
HELD: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec, Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for
the office of Kagawad, which is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it
stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his
position as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot thus then be applied to the
petitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not within the same
class as that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7
candidates for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be regarded as running for the same office.
The court maintained that the position of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad. A kagawad assumes a
position that is legislative in nature, whereas a Punong Barangay is mainly an executive officer. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot insist that he was running for punong barangay when in truth, what was stated in his certificate of candidacy was for
kagawad and not for punong barangay. As a result, the 4 votes in question cannot be counted in his favor on the erroneous
grounds that he was still the incumbent punong barangay at the time of the election. It then follows that the petitioner losses
the title of being the incumbent punong barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits of equity-of-the-
incumbent rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes were considered stray, declaring the private respondent as the
punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum, Abra for garnering the highest number of votes for a kagawad position. Petition is
dismissed.