2. People vs Teodoro, etc.

, 98 Phil 569
G.R. No. L-8079
February 29, 1956
Digested by: Christian Jake M. Pedrosa

Topic: Objection to Offer Evidence

PARTIES: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JOSE

TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Respondent.

FACTS: 

 This is an original action of certiorari against Judge Jose Teodoro, Sr. of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental to annul two orders issued by him in the course of
the trial of Criminal Case No. 3739, entitled People v. Ruperto Angudong. 

What transpired in said criminal case are as follows:

1. That sometime in 1947, in the City of Bacolod, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon.
Court, Dr. Angudong, the herein accused being then the temporary District Health Officer
of Negros Occidental, with official station in the City of Bacolod, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be prepared and issued a Certificate to the
effect that he had served as such Puericulture Center Physician of Himamaylan and
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental from 1932-1939  when in fact and in truth he did not.

2. That after having received such Certificate and full conscious of its untruthfulness and falsity, he
forthwith forwarded the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila, in order to qualify for
reinstatement and subsequent appointment as permanent District Health Officer of Negros
Occidental, and he did in fact qualify and was consequently appointed as such permanent District
Health Officer of Negros Occidental, on October 22, 1948, effective July 1, 1947, on the basis of
the aforementioned false certificate.

3. The false certificates used by defendant were evidently those documents, certified copies of
which were in the official records of the Bureau of Health and the Bureau of Civil Service. But the
offense charged is not the falsification of the certificates but the use thereof, by which defendant
must have secured his appointment.

 In this criminal case, the Fiscal attempted to identify the official records of service of the
defendant as preparatory to introducing them (the said records) as evidence. However,
the counsel for defense objected and Judge Teodoro sustained such objection issuing
two orders. 

a. In one order, Judge Teodor rejected an attempt of the assistant provincial fiscal to
identify a certified true copy of the service record of the defendant in the Bureau of Civil
 Service, one of the papers in said record being a certified copy of a certified true copy of
a certificate issued by one Dra. Rosario Abeto. A witness of the Fiscal from the Bureau
of Civil Service was testifying on and identifying the record, declaring that the original of
the certificate could not be found in the files of the Bureau, when upon objection that the
original certificate must be produced, the respondent judge ordered the whole testimony
to be stricken out.

b. In the second order, respondent judge also blocked a similar attempt on the part
of the Fiscal to identify a similar certified true copy of the service record of the
defendant in the Bureau of Health. Among the papers in the record was a
certified true copy of a certificate by one Mrs. Florentina Decena de Torres. Both
records were being identified as parts of public records when the court rejected
the attempt to identify them, on the objection of counsel for defendant that as
defendant in the criminal action was being accused of falsification, the original
documents falsified must be produced.

(In sum)
FISCAL: 

The Fiscal attempted to identify the official records of service of the defendant as preparatory to
introducing them (the said records) as evidence.

RESPONDENT’S REASON FOR OBJECTION:

The court rejected the attempt to identify them, on the objection of counsel for defendant that as
defendant in the criminal action was being accused of falsification, the original
documents falsified must be produced.

ISSUES: Whether Judge Teodoro erred in sustaining the objection of the counsel for defense
against the identification the official records of service of the defendant preparatory to
introducing them as evidence by the fiscal.
  
RULING: 

RULING ON THE RESPONDENT’S REASON FOR OBJECTION:

 
The contention of the respondent is incorrect. The false certificates used by defendant were
evidently those documents, certified copies of which were in the official records of the Bureau of
Health and the Bureau of Civil Service. Hence, it is to be noted that the defendant in the criminal
case is not being accused of falsifying or forging a certificate, but of using a false certificate
under Article 175 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING ON THE GENERAL ISSUE:

It must be noted that the Fiscal was only identifying the official records of service of the
defendant preparatory to introducing them (the said records) as evidence. That said official
records can be proved by certified copies, there can be no question (section 41, Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court). The time for the presentation of the records had not yet come; presentation was
to be made after their identification. For what purpose and to what end the Fiscal would
introduce them as evidence was not yet stated or disclosed. Said records would at least prove
that defendant’s appointment as District Health Officer of Negros Occidental was in part
occasioned by or related to the certificates. The objection of counsel for the defendant was,
therefore, premature, especially as the Fiscal had not yet stated for what purpose he would
introduce the said records, much less because he had not stated that he intended to prove the
false certificates by said records. So was the ruling of the respondent judge sustaining the
objection; both were premature and beside the point. In this connection, is invited to section 72
of attention Rule 123 of the Rules, which provides:

"The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

And the time for objecting to evidence is when the same is offered.

"Time of the objection. — ‘Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made at the
time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility shall
have become apparent; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived. ’ . . .." (3 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 555, citing the cases of Abrenica v. Gonda, 34
Phil., 739 and Marsh v. Hand, 35 Md. 123)

As the official records sought to be identified were not yet being presented, nor the
purpose thereof disclosed, the objection thereto and the ruling sustaining the objection
were both premature.

DISPOSITION: The writ is hereby granted, and the orders complained of annulled, and the
respondent judge ordered to proceed in accordance herewith. Costs shall be against the
defendant Ruperto Angudong in the criminal case. So ordered.

NOTES: EVIDENCE; OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE WHEN CONSIDERED PREMATURE. —

When official records sought to be identified are not yet being presented in evidence, nor the
purpose thereof disclosed, objection thereto and the ruling sustaining the same are both
premature.
3. Ty vs. CA
SYLVIA S. TY, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of ALEXANDER T.
TY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondents.

FACTS: ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondent, instituted on 16 December 1992 an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig against his daughter-in-law, petitioner Sylvia S. Ty.

He claimed that the properties were only placed in the name of his son Alexander T. Ty,
husband of petitioner, without any consideration, or were only acquired by Alexander through
the money of his father Alejandro thereby creating an implied trust in favor of the latter.

Petitioner included them in the proceedings concerning the settlement of the estate of
Alexander T. Ty. Subsequently, she filed therein a motion to sell and/or mortgage the properties
in order to raise money for estate taxes.

RESPONDENT’S PRAYER OF ENJOINING THE PETITIONER

Respondent prayed that petitioner be enjoined from selling, mortgaging or otherwise disposing
of the properties in question before final judgment.

On 26 February 1993 the trial court granted the prayer of respondent which held that:

…the status quo must be preserved and maintained, i.e., the subject propert(ies) must not be
sold, mortgaged or disposed of.

Respondent Alejandro, in reply to petitioner's amended answer, attached the income tax returns
of his son Alexander from 1980 to 1984 to show that he did not have the financial capacity to
acquire the properties

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

Petitioner moved to strike out the returns as violative of the rule on confidentiality and the
constitutional right to privacy of communication and correspondence

On 8 February 1994 the motion was denied since the trial court did not find any factual and/or
legal justification. The court however did not elaborate thereon.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

Respondent Alejandro B. Ty contends that the right to privacy of communication and

correspondence regulates only the relationship between individuals and the State hence it
cannot be invoked against private individuals. Moreover, according to respondent, the objection
to the admissibility of the returns is premature because they have not even been offered in
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the court a quo is correct in denying the petitioner’s motion to strike out the
income tax returns. (YES)
RULING: We likewise sustain the court a quo although based on a different ground, i.e.,
premature filing of the motion. Our rules of procedure are explicit. During the trial on the merits,
evidence must be formally offered by the parties otherwise the trial court will not consider it.

To be precise, insofar as pertinent to this case, documentary and object evidence are offered
after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence; such offer is done orally unless allowed
by the court to be done in writing.

An objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. An
offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In the instant case, respondent Alejandro has not offered his evidence and, understandably so,
because the proceedings were still at the pre-trial stage. It follows that the opportunity to object
to the returns had not yet come.

At the trial on the merits, respondent Alejandro may decide to formally offer the returns if he
believes they will advance his cause. Petitioner may then object. Or, respondent Alejandro may
decide not to offer them at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered
evidence nor can they be given any evidentiary value, in which case, there can be no occasion
for petitioner to interpose an objection.

The rationale of the rule is that it is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of facts and
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.

In light of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other arguments raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

4. MAUNLAD SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and VICTOR T. NUBLA, Respondents. [G.R. No. 114942. November 27, 2000.]
 
TOPIC: OBJECTION TO OFFER EVIDENCE

DIGEST BY: PAM

 
FACTS:
 
1.    Petitioner Maunlad Savings instituted a complaint for sum of money against private
respondent Victor T. Nubla and Vicente Nubla on the basis of a promissory note
allegedly executed by the Nublas to secure a loan amounting to P700K which, upon
maturity and despite repeated demands, the Nublas failed to pay and continuously
defaulted.
 
2.    The Nublas filed their Answer admitting that they executed the promissory note but
denied any liability thereunder, alleging that they did not receive any value out of the
transaction and claimed that the said document did not reflect the real agreement
between the parties and that the transaction sued upon was actually the obligation of
Ever-Realty and Development Corporation. The said Answer was not under oath.
 
3.    Petitioner Maunlad Savings presented its evidence relying on the admission by the
Nublas of the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note. The
Account Officer, testified on and produced in open court the Offering Ticket stipulating
the material agreements of the loan transaction.  Upon the request of the counsel for the
Nublas, the offering ticket was marked as their Exhibit “1”
 
4.    Another witness, Noli T. Lipio, testified and presented a Deed of Assignment which
showed that Maunlad applied the proceeds of the loan to another account.  This deed of
assignment was marked as Exhibit “3” for the Nublas.  After the completion of the
presentation of its evidence, it formally offered in evidence its documentary exhibits.
 
5.    The Nublas commenced the presentation of their evidence.  Private respondent Victor T.
Nubla testified that the loan documents and the promissory note did not embody the real
agreement of the parties because they signed blank documents on the understanding
that they were signing as representatives of Ever-Rise, and not in their personal
capacity. 
 
6.    At the same time, they also filed a motion for the remarking of their exhibits.  The trial
court granted the motion for remarking.  
 
7.    The Nublas filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer seeking to introduced the following
amendments, (1) the failure to type the name of Ever-Rise as the real obligor in the
promissory note; (2) the failure to reflect in the loan documents that the Nublas were
mere representatives of Ever-Rise; (3) the absence of any agreement that the Nublas
made themselves personally liable for the obligation; and (4) the fact that P477,777.78 of
the loan proceeds was not released either to Ever-Rise or the Nublas, but was applied to
another account without the conformity of Ever-Rise or the Nublas.  In seeking
admission of their amended answer, the Nublas cite Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court which allows the amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence.
8.    The Trial Court denied the motion, the court held that, the Rules of Court, the court
cannot consider evidence not formally offered.
 
9.    Nubla interposed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals contending that the trial court’s denial of his twin motions amounted to grave
abuse of discretion, the CA granted the petition. Thus,  Maunlad Savings filed the
present petition contesting that the CA erred in granting the motion.
 
 
ISSUE
 
Whether the CA erred in not declaring that the amendment of the private respondent’s
answer to the complaint,  after he had already formally offered his evidence, allegedly to
conform to the evidence presented during the trial, will alter his defense, much to the
prejudice of the petitioner? (NO)
 
Whether the CA erred in not declaring that the Private respondent should not be allowed to
remark his documentary exhibits after he had already formally offered them in evidence?
(NO)
 
 
RULING
 
1.    In the instant case, while the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath
and thus gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
contents of the promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able to put
in issue and present parol evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory note,
which are essentially the bedrock of his defense.  The presentation of the contrariant
evidence for and against imputations of genuineness and due execution undoubtedly
cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the pleadings or
vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented in the original answer.
 
The record shows that petitioner Maunlad Savings made no timely objection when
private respondent introduced parol evidence to explain the circumstances behind the
execution and issuance of the promissory note.  The rule is that objections to evidence
must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. In the
case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable
question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such
evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and complete evidence
and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from
the evidence. Thus, the objections of petitioner Maunlad Savings, amounted to no more
than a belated attempt to remedy its neglectful act of prior implied consent to the
presentation of parol evidence on the terms of the agreement between the parties.
Hence, the amended answer should have been admitted by trial court, pursuant to Sec.
5, Rule 10 which allows amendments to conform to the evidence presented.
2.     The Offering Ticket and Deed of Assignment  were presented before the court by two of
the respondent association’s witnesses.  Clearly, these documents were duly identified
by the said witnesses’ testimonies which were duly recorded as part of the proceedings. 
While it may be that there was no verbatim recital of the contents of the two documents
in the records of this case, the respondent court cannot totally disregard the fact that the
Offering Ticket is a document which contains the material agreements between the
parties.  For a thorough and fair appreciation of the merits of this case, respondent court
 must study the stipulations in the Offering ticket so that the respective rights and
obligations of the opposing parties can be determined.  
The respondent court cannot just pretend that the Offering Ticket does not exist even
after it had been properly presented and identified, just because its contents were not
incorporated in the records of the proceedings.  The same goes for the Deed of
Assignment which is the petitioner’s proof that a sizable portion of the loan proceeds
was released to a third party without the authority or consent of the Nublas or Ever-Rise
Realty.  
Considering the not inconsiderable amount involved, should the stipulations in the Deed
of Assignment prove to be conclusive, it would be a grave injustice to exclude the deed
of assignment from the respondent court’s consideration. The petitioner’s defense rests
on the stipulations contained in these two documents.  A proper determination of the
merits of this case therefore necessitates the admission and consideration of the two
documents.
 
 
 
 
DISPOSITIVE
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent appellate court committed
no error in reversing the challenged orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision and
resolution dated July 9, 1993 and April 4, 1994, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 30344 are hereby AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners.
 
Notes:
 
The amended answer should have been admitted by trial court, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10,
quoted below, which allows amendments to conform to the evidence presented, thus:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. – When issues
not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.  Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.  If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.  The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made.

5. People vs Sanchez || 308 SCRA 264

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CESARIO SANCHEZ @ "SATUR", REMEGIO JOSE, @ "OSING", RODRIGO ABAYAN @
"LUDRING", FEDERICO ROBIÑOS @ "RICO", GAUDENCIO CONTAWE @ "GODING",
accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 118423 
June 16, 1999

Topic: Objection to Offer of Evidence 

Facts: 
1. The five (5) appellant's, Cesario Sanchez, Remegio Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico
Robiños, and Gaudencio Contawe, are all farmers and residents of Villasis, Pangasinan.
They are townmates of the victim, Hilario Miranda, who was the incumbent barangay
captain at the time of the stabbing incident.
2. Hilario Miranda, together with Rene Alegre, Jessie Pajimola, Romulo Marquez, Freddie
Miranda, Eladio Miranda and several others, went to his fishpond to celebrate the
birthday of his daughter, Grace. At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Hilario Miranda
and his companions headed home to Barangay Villanueva, Bautista, Pangasinan.
3. When the group reached the provincial road at Barangay Villanueva, appellant Sanchez
blocked the middle of the road while the other appellants Jose, Contawe, Abayan,
Robiños, and Callo were some twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) meters behind him.
Contawe, Robiños, and Callo were holding their bolos; Jose had his bolo sheathed on
his shoulder, while Abayan was holding two (2) first- size stones.
4. Appellant Sanchez confronted Hilario Miranda about his accusation that Sanchez was
stealing ipil-ipil wood and fish. Thereafter, an argument ensued. Renato Alegre,
Miranda's son-in-law, tried to pacify Miranda by saying "that is enough, Manong."
Sanchez moved back towards his companions Jose, Callo, Robiños,Contawe and
Abayan, who then encircled the group of the victim in such a way that nobody could
move. 
5. Freddie Miranda, the victim's son, asked Abayan who was then holding two stones  "why
are you stoning us?" Abayan replied, "You from the east are boastful." Jose went near
one of the victim's companions (Jessie Pajimola) and told her in the Ilocano dialect
"Saan kayo nga makiramraman" ("Dont interfere"). Jose passed by the back of Hilario
Miranda and nodded at Sanchez. Upon seeing the signal, appellant Sanchez pulled a
knife from the sleeve in his left arm and stabbed the victim in the stomach. Freddie
Miranda, the son of the victim, tried to chase Sanchez but he (Freddie) was blocked by
appellant Jose who was holding his bolo in a striking position and who told him "Saan
mo nga itutuloy ta sica ti sumaruno" (Don't continue or else you will be the next)."
6. During trial, the prosecution presented six (6) witnesses: (1) Dr. Nestor C. Pascual,
Municipal Health Officer of Bautista, Pangasinan; (2) Cpl. Abdiel Agustin of the INP of
Bautista, Pangasinan; (3) Freddie C. Miranda, the victim's son; (4) Romulo T. Marquez;
(5) Jessie C. Pajimola; and (6) Mrs. Rufina C. Miranda, the victim's widow.
7. Appellant Jose and Contawe contend that the uniformity of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Romulo T. Marquez and Freddie C. Miranda indicate that their
testimonies were coached and should be disbelieved. 
8. They further contend that since the judge who rendered the decision was not the one
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, said judge was not in a position to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and their manner of testifying and therefore, not in a
position to gauge their credibility.
ISSUE: 
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Romulo Marquez, Freddie Miranda and Jessie Pajimola.
(NO)
II. Even assuming that these witnesses are credible, whether or not the trial court
erred in considering their testimonies as these were not offered in the manner
required by the Rules of Court. (NO)
Ruling:
I.Appellant Jose and Contawe contend that the unformity of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Romulo T. Marquez and Freddie C. Miranda indicate that their
testimonies were coached and should be disbelieved. 
On the contrary the court found the testimonies of these witnesses straightforward, credible, and
replete with details of the commission of the crime, as shown in several sketches of the
respective positions of the assailants at the time of the incident. These witnesses never
wavered in the face of rigorous cross-examination by the respective counsels of the appellants.
Furthermore, the material points of their testimonies, particularly the identities of the assailants,
were corroborated by the testimony of prosecution witness Jessie Pajimola.

Appellants Jose and Contawe contend that since the judge who rendered the decision
was not the one who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, said judge was not in a
position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their manner of testifying and
therefore, not in a position to gauge their credibility. Appellants then proceeded to
invoke our ruling in People v. Bautista which states that: 
It is obvious that these are factual conclusions of the trial court which are ordinarily
respected on appeal owing to the position of the trial judge who personally saw and
heard the witnesses testify. This rule, however, need not apply in us full rigor to the
case at bench, where two judges conducted the trial and the decision was
eventually written by a third.

However, appellants conveniently overlooked the succeeding paragraph of the same decision
wherein we affirmed the factual findings of the lower court, stating thus:

Still, Judge Dizon-Capulong, while recognizing this handicap, concluded that the
trial was properly conducted by her predecessors and that the prosecution was
able to sufficiently establish the culpability of the accused-appellant

Indeed, while the incumbent judge of the trial court did not hear Romulo Marquez,
Freddie Miranda and Jessie Pajimola testify, there is nothing in their testimonies as
recorded in the transcript of stenographic notes which would render their testimonies
suspicious and unbelievable. On the other hand, we find their testimonies to be consistent
with, and corroborate, each other in respect of the main incident and the identities of all the
accused. A thorough and careful review of the entire records of the case has not convinced us
to depart from the factual findings of the lower court.

II.Appellants Abayan and Robiños further contend that the trial court should have
disregarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses since these were not offered at
the time when the witnesses were called to testify, as required by Section 34 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Sec. 25 of the same Rule further requires that the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify. Thus —
Sec. 25. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be
done in writing.

Appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not formally
offered as required by the Rules, and therefore should not have been considered by the
trial court.
Indeed, a perusal of the transcript of the stenographic notes will show that no formal offer of
testimonial evidence was made prior to or after the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
However, the transcripts also reveal that in spite of the lack of formal offer of the testimonial
evidence, and even subjected the prosecution witnesses to a rigorous cross-examination.

For evidence to be considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. This is
necessary because a judge has to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the
evidence formally offered by the parties at the trial. 

Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective
on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the
trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the invocation , the court is put on notice whether
the witness to be presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would
be testifying on irrelevant matter or on facts already testified to by other witnesses and should
therefore, be stopped from testifying further.

However, notwithstanding the fact that a testimony was not formally offered, when its
presentation was not objected to either, the same may be given credence. Section 36 of
the aforementioned Rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination
of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become reasonable
apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.

Thus, the failure of the defense to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of the
prosecution's testimonial evidence results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility
thereof. Appellants' belated invocation of the strict interpretation of the Rules of Evidence to suit
their purposes is clearly misplaced.

6. People vs. Mariño

No. L-34247. July 25, 1984.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. EDGARDO MARIÑO Y PARENTO, defendant- appellant.

Digested by: Mikko Solis

 FACTS:
Enrique was alleged to have been stabbed to death by the members of the “Bahala na Gang.”

The police, after several days of surveillance of his hiding place, was able to arrest herein
appellant, Edgardo Mariño. He was brought to the police precinct for investigation. 

Thereafter, Mariño was investigated by Patrolman Carag who took down his statement (Exhibit
“G”) following which he was brought before Fiscal Ramon Mabutas at the latter’s residence in
San Andres, Manila. 

Fiscal Mabutas talked to Marino who admitted that he had read and confirmed the truth of the
contents thereof, and that the signatures appearing therein are his. Likewise, he
acknowledged to the Fiscal that the sketch of a knife (Exhibit “G”-1”) was drawn by him. 

He then signed Exhibits “G” and “G-1” again before Fiscal Mabutas after the latter had taken his
oath. This was followed by the Fiscal signing his name in said documents.

Accused-appellant denied the voluntary execution of his statement claiming that he was
maltreated into giving the same and alleged that the trial court erred:

(1) in admitting the extra-judicial confession (Exhibit “E”) of Antonio Madlangbayan as evidence
against him; and 

(2) in admitting his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit “G”) and in finding him guilty of the offense
charged on the basis thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the confession as evidence.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court found no merit in the claim that the lower court erred in admitting the
confession (Exhibit “E”) of Antonio Madlangbayan as evidence against herein appellant. 

While it is true that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is not admissible against herein
appellant, it nevertheless serves as strong indication that said appellant was participant in the
crime because the contents thereof interlocked with those contained in his statement, Exhibit
“G”. 

There being no proof of collusion and being identical with each other in their essential details,
and corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero, a Medical Examiner of the Manila
Police Department, and the post-mortem report (Exhibit “C”), it is admissible to prove
conspiracy.

Besides, records show that when the extra-judicial confession of Antonio Madlangbayan
was presented in court, thru Patrolman Carag, appellant did not object. 
It has been repeatedly held as a rule of evidence that objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper time and that if not so made it will be understood to
have been waived. 

When is the proper time to object?

The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof the
inadmissibility of evidence is, or may be, inferred (Abrenica vs. Gonda, 34 Phil. 739).

The Rules of Court provides that “an extra-judicial confession made by an accused shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.” 

With respect to the claim that the extra-judicial confession (Exhibit “G”) was obtained
thru force and intimidation, the same is belied by the abundance of evidence showing
that his confession was voluntarily given. 

In the first place, the statement is replete with details which only the accused could have known
and which could not have been concocted by the police; his movements prior to the commission
of the crime are well narrated in said document. Second, Fiscal Ramon Mabutas, who
administered the oath of appellant in his confession, propounded questions to him and he
admitted that the contents thereof are his and that the signatures appearing thereon were made
voluntarily. In fact, he signed his name again before the said administering officer.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was correctly appreciated by the
trial court. However, for lack of the necessary votes, We have to impose the next lower penalty
which is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
herein appellant Edgardo Mariño y Parento is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua
and the indemnity is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
7. People vs Manolo Carpio || G.R. No. 88942 || March 25, 1992
FACTS:
1. The accused appellant was selling marijuana.
2. The police entrapped and arrested him. He was charged with violation of Section 4,
Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 
3. Gargaritano, member of the team who conducted the entrapment operation was to pose
as the buyer and for this role was provided with two five-peso bills to be used in the
sham purchase. The serial numbers of the bills were recorded in the police blotter by
Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra
4. During Carpio’s investigation by the inquest fiscal later that night, he denied ownership
of the marijuana and the two five-peso bills. His statement was corroborated by his wife,
his mother and a neighbor.
5. RTC finds the accused MANOLO CARPIO Y SUBARAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended.
6. The defense questions the credibility of Gargaritano for certain alleged inconsistencies,
as when he said he gave Carpio a ten-peso bill when the exhibits offered consisted of
two five-peso bills; gave the serial numbers of these bills as KH845177 and KC592187
when they were actually KH695187 and KC842177; and testified that he wrote an "X"
 inside the letter "O" in the word PISO on the said bills when the mark thereon was not an
"X" but a dot.
7. The record shows that all these inconsistencies were satisfactorily explained by
Gargaritano. He did mis-state the serial numbers earlier, but as he testified on re-direct
examination, this was because he gave these figures from memory only and without
consulting his records.
8. Significantly, the serial numbers of the bills submitted in evidence did coincide with the
numbers Buenaobra said he noted in the police blotter.
9. The defense also contends that the joint affidavit of Lumabas, Valdoz and Marte should
not have been admitted in evidence because it was not signed by Marte. The Court
notes, however, that it was signed by Valdoz, who identified and affirmed it on the stand.
The document was therefore admissible as part of his own testimony even if the other
signatories were not presented at the trial.

Issue: Whether failure to object to the evidence presented constitutes a waiver.

Ruling: Yes.
The SC held that the non-submission of the police blotter where the serial numbers of the
marked bills were recorded was fatal to the prosecution. If the defense felt that the bills were not
the best evidence of the money used for the operation, there is no reason why it should not
have objected to their admission on that ground. Not having done so, it is deemed to have
waived this objection and cannot now raise it at this late hour. At any rate, if the defense felt that
the logbook was vital to its cause, what it should have done was demand its production at the
trial through a subpoena duces tecum for use as its own evidence.