Jorge Luis Fernández | 1

Tarea 4
1. (Encontrando equilibrios de Nash perfectos de subjuegos). Encuentra los
equilibrios de Nash perfectos de subjuegos de los juegos descritos en los
siguientes diagramas de árbol.
[Sugerencia. Recuerda que una caracterización completa de cualquier
Equilibrio de Nash Perfecto de Subjuego especifica lo que sucede tanto en el
camino del equilibrio como fuera de él.]

Juego A

𝑆 ∗= {𝐵; 𝐹(𝐷(𝐴))}

Juego B

𝑆 ∗= {𝐴(𝐹(𝐷)); 𝐶(𝐵)}
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Juego C

𝑆 ∗= {𝐷𝐺(E); 𝐸(C)}
Juego D

𝑆 ∗= {𝑈; 𝐵(𝐶(𝐷))}

2. Drawing a game tree. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a two-player
extensive game with perfect information in which (i) the terminal histories are (C;
E), (C; F ), (D; G) and (D; H); (ii) the player function is given by P (?) = 1 and P
(C) = P (D) = 2; and (iii) Player 1 prefers (C; F ) to (D; G) to (C; E) to (D; H), and
Player 2 prefers (D; G) to (C; F ) to (D; H) to (C; E). You are free to build any
utility capturing the preference relations over outcomes; for example: to player 1,
u1(C; F ) = 4; u1(D; G) = 3; u1(C; E) = 2; u1(D; H) = 1, etc.

Player 1 – Preference Relationship

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(𝐶, 𝐹) ≻ (𝐷, 𝐺) ≻ (𝐶, 𝐸) ≻ (𝐷, 𝐻)

Player 2 – Preference Relationship

(𝐷, 𝐺) ≻ (𝐶, 𝐹) ≻ (𝐷, 𝐻) ≻ (𝐶, 𝐸)

Utility Function
(2,1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = (𝐶, 𝐸)
(4,3) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = (𝐶, 𝐹)
𝑢(𝑥) =
(3,4) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = (𝐷, 𝐺)
{ (1,2) if x = (D, H)

Game tree

S* = {C; F(G(D))}

3. Dividing a cake fairly. Two players use the following procedure to divide a cake.
Player 1 divides the cake into two pieces, and then player 2 chooses one of the
pieces; player 1 obtains the remaining piece. The cake is continuously divisible and
each player likes all parts of it. Suppose that the cake is perfectly homogeneous, so
that each player cares only about the size of the piece of cake she obtains. How is
the cake divided in a subgame perfect equilibrium?
Game tree

S* = {Cortar igual; (Pedazo grande (Cortar desigual))}

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4. Voting by alternating veto. Two people select a policy that a

ects them both by alternately vetoing policies until only one remains. First person
1 vetoes a policy. If more than one policy remains, person 2 then vetoes a policy. If
more than one policy still remains, person 1 then vetoes another policy. The
process continues until only one policy has not been vetoed. Suppose there are
three possible policies, X, Y , and Z, person 1 prefers X to Y to Z, and person 2
prefers Z to Y to X. Consider the following questions:
a. Model this situation as an extensive game in a tree diagram.
b. Find the subgame perfect equilibria.

Person 1 - Preference Relationship

X≻Y≻Z
Person 2 – Preference Relationship

Z≻Y≻X
Utility Function

(3,1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = X
𝑢(𝑥) = { (2,2) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = Y
(1,3) if 𝑥 = Z

Tree diagram

S* = {Veta Z; Veta X, Veta Y(Veta X), Veta X(Veta Y)}

5. Choosing the voting timing. The political figures Rosa and Ernesto each has to take a
position on an issue. The options are Berlin (B) or Havana (H). They choose
sequentially. A third person, Karl, determines who chooses first. Both Rosa and
Ernesto care only about the actions they choose, not about who chooses first. Rosa
prefers the outcome in which both she and Ernesto choose B to that in which they
both choose H, and prefers this outcome to either of the ones in which she and
Ernesto choose different actions; she is indifferent between these last two
outcomes. Ernesto's preferences differ from Rosa's in that the roles of B and H are
reversed. Karl's preferences are the same as Ernesto's.
Consider the following questions:
a. Model this situation as an extensive game in a tree diagram.
b. Find the subgame perfect equilibria.
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Rosa - Preference Relationship

(B, B) ≻ (H, H) ≻ (B, H)~(H, B)

Ernesto & Karl – Preference Relationship

(H, H) ≻ (B, B) ≻ (H, B)~(B, H)

Utility Function

(3,2,3) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = (H, H)
𝑢(𝑥) = { (2,3,2) 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = (B, B)
(1,1,1) if 𝑥 = (B, H) ∨ (H, B)

Tree diagram

s* = {Ernesto begins; H; H}