De La Salle University

Mathematics in the Modern World – Z23

Game Theory Part 3
Group 5:
Albano, Sean Vincent
Guintivano, Ethan Rafael
Perez, Michael Gerhard D.
Sison, John Carlo

1.  Item #6 on page 219

Prisoners have been trying to escape from jail. Most of the attempts involve climbing over
perimeter walls or digging from under their cells. To discourage more attempts, the
warden can either post guards on the walls or conduct regular inspections of cells but not
both.
(a) Express this game in normal form.

1.If both choose walls: Post guard & inspection (-10, -10) ⇒ The prisoner is caught
and punished, and the warden has to deal with the consequences.

2.If both choose cell: Inspection & dig tunnel = (-10, -10) ⇒ The prisoner is caught
and punished, and the warden has the reporting and clean-up.

3.If Warden chooses walls and prisoner chooses dig: (10, 10) ⇒ The prisoner
escapes, but the warden didn’t allocate resources to prevent this.

4.If Warden chooses dig, and prisoner chooses wall: (10, 10) ⇒ The prisoner
escapes and the warden didn’t allocate resources correctly.
(b) Express this game in extensive form, assuming that a prisoner and the warden make
their decisions at the same time.

(c) Express this game in extensive form, assuming that the warden makes his/her decision
first, and the prisoner knows the warden's decision when he/she chooses the strategy.

  2.  Item #9 on page 219

Consider the following payoff table for a two-player game.

X Y Z
X 60, 50 50, 110 70, 90
Y 100, 60 30, 30 110, 100
Z 110, 70 100, 110 40, 40

(a) Does this game have Nash equilibria? If so, what strategies?

It shows that when player A chooses strategy Y and player B chooses strategy X ,
neither player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy.
Player A gets 100 and they would get smaller payoff by switching to either X or Z .
Similarly, player B gets 60 and they would get less by switching to either Y or Z .
Thus, (Y, X) is a Nash Equilibrium.
Similarly, (Z ,Y ) is also a Nash Equilibrium because if Player A chooses Z and Player
B chooses Y, neither player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their
strategy.

Therefore, the Nash equilibria of this game are (Y ,X ) and (Z , Y ).

(b) Which strategies do you predict Player A and Player B will choose?

Referring to our table, it shows that when player A chooses strategy Y and player B
chooses strategy X , neither player can improve their payoff by unilaterally
changing their strategy.

Thus, (Y, X) is a Nash Equilibrium.

Corresponding, should Player A chooses Z and Player B chooses Y, neither player

can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy. Z, Y is also a Nash
Equilibrium.

Therefore, the Nash equilibria of this game are (Y ,X ) and (Z , Y ).

  3.  Item #11-12 on page 220

#11) The following payoff table involves two players each of whom has three possible
moves.

L M N
L 30, 15 45, 35 55, 25
M 25, 35 20, 20 30, 50
N 15, 35 35, 40 15, 15

(a) Are there any dominant strategies in the game? No dominant strategy for both rows
and column.
(b) Is there any dominant strategy equilibrium? Since there is no dominant strategy for any
player, therefore there is no dominant strategy equilibrium. ,
(c) Are there Nash equilibria? If so, determine how many and state which strategies. Yes
there is 1 Nash equilibrium and it is ( L , N).
#12) Solve No. 11 using IESDS.

Because for either player of the game there is no dominant strategy, this would mean we
cannot apply IESDS as we could not further eliminate any strategy.

(Row L and Column N) is the Nash equilibrium of the game. This has been determined in
item no. 11.

4.  Consider the table on item #11, page 220.  Solve for the maximin strategy of each
player.  Does this game have a maximin solution? Justify your answer.

because they are the best of the worst for row and column.
  5.  Item #24 on page 224
Solving the subgames at the last stage in each branch to reduce the game into a smaller
one. We repeat until all subgames have been solved.

Answer: Backward induction solution is (8,9)