No.

_________

(Writ of Mandate to Fourth Appellate District, Case No. G062830)

(Writ of Mandate to Fourth Appellate District, Case No. G062635)
(Orange County Superior Court, Case No. 14D000459)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTIENNE MEREDITH BLACK

Petitioner
v.
ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
Respondent

MAXIMILIAN ELIJAH BLACK

Real Party in Interest

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Gary L. Zerman SBN 112825

Law Office of Gary L. Zerman
23935 Philbrook Ave, Valencia, CA 91354-2625
Phone: 661-259-2570
Email: gzerman243@gmail.com
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................................4
PETITION FOR REVIEW ................................................................................5
ISSUE PRESENTED .........................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................5
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY................................7
REASONS TO GRANT REVIEW.....................................................................16
A. Review is Needed to Establish that the Superior Court Loses Jurisdiction
When Real Estate is Awarded to One Spouse as Sole and Separate Property 16
B. Review Is Needed to Establish That “Shall” Means “Mandatory” ......... 18
C. Review is Needed to Define the Scope of the Superior Court’s Post-
Judgment Enforcement Jurisdiction ................................................................ 20
1. An Unmet Condition Precedent Does Not Equal Jurisdiction to Re-Litigate20
2. Even If It Existed, a Clause Reserving Jurisdiction Would Be Severed and
Stricken as Illegal ................................................................................................... 22
3. Issues Over Which the Superior Court Contends It Still Has Jurisdiction .... 23
4. Reserved Jurisdiction to Calculate an “Equalizer Payment” Due Maximilian
is Irreconcilable with the Express Term that Maximilian Has No Insurable Interest
23
5. Reserved Jurisdiction to Calculate an “Equalizer Payment” Due Maximilian
is Irreconcilable with the Fact That Maximilian Already Received Fair
Compensation ......................................................................................................... 24
6. Reserved Jurisdiction to Sell the House is Irreconcilable with the Award of
the House to Christienne as her Sole and Separate Property ................................. 27
7. The Stipulated Judgment Disposed of the Issue That Maximilian Continues
to Nominally Remain a Borrower on the Mortgage ............................................... 28
8. Reserved Jurisdiction is Irreconcilable with Any Stipulation, Order and
Judgment “On Reserved Issues” ............................................................................ 29
D. Review is Needed to Establish That the Superior Court May Not Give
Contradictory Reasons for Repeatedly Rejecting the Filing of the Judgment. 30
OVERALL CONCLUSION ..............................................................................31
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE .........................................32

2
PETITION FOR REVIEW
5/25/2023 DENIAL OF WRIT .......................................................................33
7/7/2023 DENIAL OF WRIT .........................................................................34

3
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE SUPREME COURT CASES
Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 400............................................. 22

STATE CASES
Cty. of Orange v. Bezaire, 117 Cal. App. 4th 121, 122, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d
478, 480 (2004) ................................................................................................ 19
Eucasia Sch. Worldwide, Inc. v. DW August Co., 218 Cal. App. 4th
176, 177, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 622 (2013) ................................................... 24
Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App. 2d 468, 470 (1965) .................................... 25
Hoffman v. Connell, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1196, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272,
273 (1999) ........................................................................................................ 28
In re Marriage of Braud, 45 Cal. App. 4th 797, 810, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
179, 185-86 (1996) .......................................................................................... 17
In re Marriage of Buford (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 74, 78 [202 Cal.
Rptr. 20] ........................................................................................................... 17
In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 333 [108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 801] .................................................................................................... 26
In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1275 [255
Cal. Rptr. 488] ................................................................................................. 17
In re Marriage of Janes, 11 Cal. App. 5th 1043.................................................. 16
In re Marriage of McNeill (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 548, 565-566 [206
Cal. Rptr. 641] ................................................................................................. 17
Porter v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 793, 805 [141 Cal.
Rptr. 59] ........................................................................................................... 17
Robinson v. Robinson (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 118, 119 ..................................... 17
Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1489, 1490, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 268, 275 (2008).................................................................................. 22

STATUTES
Cal. Fam. Code § 12 ............................................................................................ 20
Cal. Gov. Code § 14 ............................................................................................ 20

OTHER AUTHORITIES
2 Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter
Group 1996) P 8:903, p. 8-213 ........................................................................ 18

4
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 PETITION FOR REVIEW
Respondent and Petitioner Christienne M. Black (“Christienne” or
“Petitioner”) respectfully petitions for review of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal’s denial of a Petition for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition or Other
Extraordinary Relief (“Writ”), case no. G062635, and a similar Petition brought
directly to this Court, case no. S280358. This Petition was transferred back to the
Court of Appeal, given case no. G062830, and denied. The Orders summarily
denying the Writs on 5/25/2023 and on 7/7/2023 respectively, are attached to this
petition.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Does the Superior Court violate a party’s due process rights by continuing
to assert jurisdiction over the disposition of a real property that was awarded to
that party as sole and separate property in a Stipulated Judgment? What remedy is
available to a party when the Superior Court refuses to file and enforce its own
Judgment?

INTRODUCTION
California Supreme Court review is urgently needed to resolve the conflict
created when the Superior Court refuses to file and enforce its own judgment,
instead asserting continued jurisdiction over the subject matter of that judgment.
This case presents an excellent opportunity for this Court to do so.
The matter concerns the real property located at 6 Eric Street, Ladera Ranch
CA, 92694 (“House”), presently the family residence of Christienne and the
Parties’ three children. Until 2014, the House was co-owned and shared with
Christienne’s (now ex) husband, Real Party in Interest Maximilian Elijah Black
(“Maximilian”).
It is undisputed that on July 17, 2016 the Superior Court approved a
Stipulation & Order, voluntarily signed by the Parties, expressly intended to
constitute a final Judgment, under which the House was awarded to Christienne as

5
PETITION FOR REVIEW
her sole and separate property, in exchange for Christienne giving up the right to
pursue significant reimbursements and support payments to which she would
otherwise have been entitled to collect from Maximilian.
In October 2019, water damage to the House caused Christienne to file an
insurance claim. Because he was still listed as an insured party, Maximillian was
able to interfere with the insurance claim, preventing Christienne from properly
repairing the damage, which damage included a dangerous mold condition. This
forced further litigation, and Parties reached a second Stipulation, augmenting the
first one. In particular, the Parties now explicitly agreed that Maximilian had “no
insurable interest” in the House. The Second Stipulation & Order incorporates and
references the first, both to be read as one integrated agreement.
It is undisputed that on October 16, 2020, the Superior Court granted
Christienne’s Motion under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 664.6 for an Order to Enter the
integrated Stipulation as a Judgment. The October 16, 2020 Order explicitly
states that it is to be entered as a judgment (hereafter, the “Stipulated Judgment”).
In addition to stating that the House was awarded to Christienne as her sole
and separate property, the Stipulated Judgment explicitly states that Maximilian
has “no insurable interest” in the House, and explicitly strikes Maximilian’s
handwritten attempt to insert a term entitling him to an undefined, yet-to-be-
calculated “equalization payment.”
The Superior Court ordered Christienne to file the Stipulated Judgment “as
soon as possible.” However, as detailed below, the Superior Court has rejected
the filing five times, giving contradictory, indeed impossible-to-comply-with
reasons for the rejections.
Meanwhile, the Superior Court continues to assert jurisdiction over the
House, contending that it still must calculate an “equalization payment” due to
Maximilian, and threatening to seize and sell the house to effectuate this.
The Superior Court’s position upsets well-settled law that the Superior
Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the separate property of the spouses, nor
may it retroactively modify a previously entered judgment.

6
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 For the reason that follow, Petitioner asks this Court to grant review, and
ultimately to issue an Opinion holding that the Superior Court is obligated to
enforce a valid Judgment disposing of property, and that it violates the due process
rights of a party by continuing to assert jurisdiction (beyond enforcement) over the
disposition of the subject property.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The 6/17/2016 Stipulation & Order was Intended to be a Final
Judgment, Awarding the House to Christienne as Her Sole and
Separate Property
In June 2016, the parties completed a Mandatory Settlement Conference,
the result of which was a Stipulation and Order on Reserved Issues, resolving a
number of previously contested issues, including the disposition of the House. The
Parties agreed that the “terms contained herein shall be incorporated into final
Judgment.” [Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 14, (original § VI B.), bolding added].
The 2016 Stipulation & Order explicitly states that:
The family residence located at 6 Eric Street, Ladera Ranch,
California shall be awarded to Wife [Christienne].
[Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 11, (original § III A.)]
The 2016 Stipulation is a contract fully supported by an exchange of good
and valuable consideration. Under the express terms, while Maximilian gave up
his interest in the House, Christienne gave up:
• Spousal Support – “Both parties waive spousal support now and forever
and the Court's jurisdiction to award either party support is hereby terminated.”
[Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 11, (original II B i, line 4)]
• Interest in Petitioner’s retirement funds [Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 12, (original
III F, line 22)]
• Bank Accounts - “All bank accounts in each party's respective names
shall be awarded/confirmed to that respective party without offset. All accounts
jointly owned by the parties shall be closed forthwith. [Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 12,
(original III E, line 19)]

7
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 • Vehicles - Maximilian took two of the couple’s three cars, including
taking the much more expensive and latest-model vehicle among the three. [Exh.
1, Vol. 1, p. 12, (original, III D. line 16)].
• Reimbursement for credit card debt - Mother gave up the right to seek
reimbursement for her solely incurred credit card debt used to pay community
expenses [Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 13, (original III H, line 1)]
• All Other Reimbursements - Mother gave up numerous other rights to
seek reimbursement. [Exh. 1, Vol. 1, p. 13, (original III J, line 13)]
In addition to those items specifically delineated in the Judgment,
Christienne also gave up the following other rights and remedies as an inducement
to consummate the agreement:
• any responsibility to remedy the property’s structural issues discovered
during marriage and known to exist at the time of the stipulation;
• reimbursement for Christienne’s separate property funds, gifted to her by
her parents and used for the down payment of the property; and
• reimbursement for gifts of money from Christienne’s parents that were
used to make mortgage payments and pay other community expenses during
marriage.
[Exh. 19, Vol. 4 p. 731, (Dec. of Christienne, ¶¶ 7-8)]
Christienne is advised and believes that, had all of her reimbursement
claims been adjudicated, the net result would have been that Maximilian had no
financial interest in the House at all. [Exh. 19, Vol. 4 p. 731, (Dec. of Christienne,
¶¶ 7-8)]
At the signature line, Parties agreed that:
We have read the entire stipulation and agreement. We
understand it fully and request the court to make our stipulation
and agreement the Court's order. We understand that willful
failure to comply with the provisions of this order may be a
contempt of court. and may be punished by fine and
imprisonment. We waive all further notice of this order.
[Exh. 19, Vol. 4 p. 738 (original Stip. & Order p. 3 lines 6-9)]

8
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 Maximilian’s Refusal to Comply
Christienne complied fully with all her obligations under the Stipulation
and Order. While the Stipulation and Order do not explicitly obligate Maximilian
to sign a property deed, formally conveying his prior interest in the House to
Christienne is certainly implied. As it stands, the records at the Office of the Clerk-
Recorder conflict with the Judgment of the Superior Court, a legally intolerable
situation.
At all relevant times Maximilian refused to sign or notarize the deed
provided by Christienne’s attorney to Maximilian’s attorney. [Exh. 4, Vol. 1 p.
117].
The 2019 Water Damage to the House, and Maximilian’s
Interference with Christienne’s Insurance Claim
On October 28, 2019, the House suffered structural and other damage
because an exploded water pipe caused a flood. The water damage also caused
mold. The House is covered by Nationwide Insurance Company. Since
Maximilian’s name was still listed as insured, and since Maximilian still falsely
claimed an “insurable interest” in the House, Nationwide would only issue “multi-
party” checks, requiring Maximilian to remove himself from the policy.
Maximilian refused, leaving Christienne unable to repair the House [Exh. 3, Vol.
1 p. 68-72]
The 2019 Stipulation to Clarify That the House Was Awarded
to Christienne, and that Maximilian Has No Insurable Interest
On 12/17/2019, the Parties agreed to remedy Maximilian’s interference
with the insurance claim and to clarify the 2016 Stipulation by entering into
another Stipulation and Order. This new Stipulation incorporated the 6/17/2016
Stipulation, which was attached as Exhibit “A”.
In addition to re-affirming and incorporating the terms of the 2016
Stipulation, the new 2019 Stipulation explicitly states that Christienne “was
awarded the residence a 6 Eric Street located at 6 Eric Street, Ladera Ranch,
California 92694,” and provides a citation to the 2016 Stipulation and Order,
noting that language holding the House as Christienne’s sole and separate property

9
PETITION FOR REVIEW
is found at “page 7, section III., line 7” of that document. [Exh. 2, Vol.1, p. 20
(original Para. 5. Page 3 at lines 2-5)]
The 2019 Stipulation and Order further states:
Due to leaks at the residence located at 6 Eric Street, Ladera
Ranch, CA 92694, Insurance payments have been issued and will
continue to be issued to pay for the repairs to the damage. The
checks are made payable to “Dustin Zanck” [Maximilian’s prior
name] and “Christienne Zanck”. Both parties agree that the
insurance proceeds to repair the residence should be made
payable to “Christienne Black only and not “Dustin Zanck” or
“Christienne Zanck”
[Exh. 2, Vol.1, p. 20]
Importantly, the 2019 Stipulation & Order states that:
Maximilian Black (formerly known as “Dustin Zanck”) stipulate
that I no longer hold an insurable interest in the real property
residence as listed herein.
[Id, bolding added]
Lest there be any question whatsoever about Christienne’s sole ownership
of the House vesting on June 17, 2016, the 2019 Stipulation & Order states:
The parties stipulate that the insurance proceeds should be paid
only to “Christienne Black” as she received the residence as her
sole and separate property.
[Id, bolding added]
Maximilian’s Surreptitious Attempt to Add an “Equalization
Payment” Term
However, when it came time for Christienne to sign the 2019 Stipulation,
she noticed that Maximilian had not only signed the document, but also covertly
hand-written in an additional term which was not agreed to, and which contradicts
the terms of the 2016 Stipulation & Order. Maximilian hand-wrote:
This Stipulation and Order does not effect [sic] the equalization
payment owed to [Maximilian] by [Christienne]. The amount of
equalization payment is still to be determined.
[Exh. 2, Vol.1, p. 99, (originally at handwritten ¶ 6, line13)]
Unsurprisingly, Christienne would not sign the Stipulation with
Maximilian’s “equalization payment” term added in.

10
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 The Superior Court’s 10/16/2020 Judgment Affirming the
House Was Awarded to Christienne as her Sole and Separate
Property, Stating Maximilian Has No Insurable Interest, and
Striking the Handwritten, Undefined “Equalization Payment”
Term
On September 29, 2020, Christienne filed a motion to enforce the integrated
Stipulated Judgment (without Maximilian’s attempted hand-written term), and to
have it all entered as a final judgment. Christienne states in her declaration, eleven
months after the flood:
All the reimbursement checks have expired because ... at every
turn, [Maximilian] has refused to cooperate with the Insurance
Company to give the Insurance Company the information it
needs, frustrating the process and putting the lives of myself and
our three children in danger [because of mold, inter alia].
[Exh. 17 Vol. 4, p. 573, (original, paras 9, 10)] & [Exh. 17, Vol. 4, p. 583 (see
reimbursement checks)]
On 10/16/2020, the Court (Hon. Salvatore Sarmiento) ordered that “the
Court grants Respondent’s Motion to enter Judgment pursuant to the terms of the
12/17/2019 Stipulation & Order, without the handwritten additional language.”
[Exh. 6, Vol. 1, p. 201]
The Stipulation & Order referenced in Judge Sarmiento’s 10/16/2020
Judgment explicitly states that “Pursuant to the Stipulation & Order filed on June
17, 2016 and attached hereto as EXHIBIT ‘A’, the Respondent/Wife, Christienne
Meredith Black, was awarded the family residence located at 6 Eric Street, Ladera
Ranch, California, 92694, on page 7, section III, line 7.” [Exh. 2, Vol. 1, p. 30, (§
III., bolding added)]
The reference to page 7, section III, line 7 refers to the June 17, 2016
Stipulation & Order, which explicitly states that “The family residence located at
6 Eric Street, Ladera Ranch, California shall be awarded to [Christienne].” [Exh.
2, Vol. 1, p. 30, (original § III. at Section A.)]
The Stipulation & Order referenced in Judge Sarmiento’s 10/16/2020
Judgment contains a sworn statement where Father states, “Maximilian Black
(formerly known as ‘Dustin Zanck’) stipulate that I no longer hold an insurable

11
PETITION FOR REVIEW
interest in the real property residence as listed herein.” [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 20,
(original at ¶ 5)]
The Stipulation & Order referenced in Judge Sarmiento’s 10/16/2020
Judgment explicitly states that “all insurance proceeds to repair the residence
should be made payable to ‘Christienne Black’ only, and not ‘Dustin Zanck.’”
[Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 20, (original at ¶ 4)]
The Stipulation & Order referenced in Judge Sarmiento’s 10/16/2020
Judgment explicitly states that “The parties stipulate that the insurance proceeds
should be made paid only to ‘Christienne Black’ as she received the residence as
her sole and separate property.” [Exh. 5, Vol.1, p. 21, (original para 5), bolding
added]
The Stipulation & Order referenced in Judge Sarmiento’s 10/16/2020
Judgment explicitly states that “Either party may file an ex parte application with
the Court…to enforce or protect their respective interests in the residence.” [Exh.
5, Vol. 1 p. 12, (original Item III A v., line 3-7)]
The “handwritten additional language” which is explicitly stricken and
excluded from the Judgment relates to Maximilian’s assertion that he is owed an
“equalization payment” of undetermined amount. [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 99,
(originally at handwritten para 6, line13)]
Christienne’s Diligent Efforts to File the Judgment
Later that day, 10/16/2020, by and through attorney Lisa Salisbury,
Christienne submitted a proposed judgment. [Exh. 7, Vol. 1, p. 204-208]
Judge Sarmiento rejected the Judgment as follows:
The provisions of the Judgment may be stated on pleading or by
completing the appropriate Judicial Council form attachments.
The Judgment must stand on its own. Attaching copies of a
previous stipulation and/or order is not acceptable. The Judgment
may not refer to other agreements or orders.
[Exh. 7, Vol. 1, p. 219]
On 12/2/2020, again through attorney Salisbury, Christienne submitted a
second Judgment attached as an exhibit to an ex parte application seeking

12
PETITION FOR REVIEW
sanctions related to Maximilian’s unrelenting use of aliases. [Exh. 9, Vol. 2, p.
223.]
Judge Sarmiento rejected the Judgment:
Request [to file Judgment] denied. Judgment is not properly
prepared. Please see rejection letter previously sent/filed
11/17/2020.
[Exh. 9, p. 223]
On 12/22/2020, Christienne’s attorney Salisbury filed a third Judgment
[Exh. 10, Vol. 2, p. 331-335], which was hand-delivered to the Court. [Id].
However, The Superior Court claims it never received the third Judgment
despite the professional courier service stamped copy. [Exh. 10, Vol. 2, p. 331]
On 2/16/2021, Christienne tried for the fourth time to file the 10/16/2020
Judgment, this time by and through attorney Christian Conrad. Judge Sarmiento
again rejected the Judgment. The rejection states:
It appears that there is no stipulation on file dated 12/17/2019 or
1/16/2020 as referenced in the10/16/2020 minute order. Please
resubmit with a copy of the stipulation, at least 2 copies of all
documents and one self-addressed stamped envelope for each
party.
Exh. 11, Vol. 1, p. 337]
Maximilian’s Surreptitious Attempt to Sell the House
In about 2020 Father stealthily moved to Texas. He changed his name
(again), this time to “Max Zanck.” In a covert attempt to sell Christienne’s House,
Maximilian, operating as “Max Zanck, Trustee,” in an undated document, secretly
entered into an agreement with his employer - Redfin Realty - under their “Buy It
Now” program, accepting a written offer of $1,160,000 for the House, with an 8.9
% commission to be paid to Redfin. [Exh. 12, Vol. 2, p. 340]
Christienne’s Renewed Effort to File the Judgment
On 9/22/2022, Christienne once again attempted and failed to file the
Judgment, as evidence by a Proof of Service of FL-180 Judgment and attachment
to Judgment, FL-190 Notice of Entry of Judgment. [Exh. 15, Vol. 4, p. 358] It is

13
PETITION FOR REVIEW
worth noting that Maximilian, at all times represented by counsel, has never
objected to the form or substance of the Stipulated Judgment.
Christienne’s Full Compliance with Her Rights and Duties
Under the Stipulated Judgment
Since June 2016, Christienne has at all times complied fully with her rights
and duties under the Stipulated Judgment. She has paid the mortgage, and obtained
the “Wrap Around” mortgage, as contemplated in the Stipulation. In accordance
with the terms, she has not pursued her right to seek spousal support or to seek
reimbursement for, among other things, the down payment money gifted to her by
her parents, and the payoff of the community’s HOA bill. Absent the Stipulated
Judgment, Christienne most certainly would have pursued those claims.
Judge Waltz’s 10/18/2022 Ruling on Submitted Matter
On 10/18/2022, Judge Waltz made a Ruling on Submitted Matter, after first
ordering the parties to brief and argue the issue of whether the House is Res
Judicata. The 10/18/2022 ruling states, in relevant part:
1. Ruling:
a. Except for the parties agreeing the Ladera Ranch property was
awarded to Respondent/wife as her sole and separate property, all
other issues related to the Ladera Ranch home were reserved to
time of trial, now set to commence on January 24, 2023.
i. Per code, the former family residence will be valued as of time
of trial.
ii. The court reserves over jurisdiction to order the sale of the
former family residence as and for enforcing the 2016
stipulation/order mixed question of law and fact.
2. Reasons:
a. Within the stipulation/order dated 6/17/2016, the Ladera Ranch
residence was awarded to respondent/wife. See also the 2019
stipulation/order.
b. Other issues relating to the former family residence were not
addressed nor resolved within the 2016 stipulation/order, nor the
2019 stipulation/order, such as the determination of value, the
calculation of any equalization payment due petitioner/husband,
property debt (currently both parties remain borrowers under the

14
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 extant mortgagee) and credits and reimbursements related to
Ladera Ranch home.
i. No judgment was entered [sic] as and for the 2016
stipulation/order. 1
[Exh. 16, Vol. 3, p. 561]
1/23/2023 – New Water Damage and Mold Disaster
On 1/23/2023, the House suffered another water damage disaster when the
plumbing connected to the water heater exploded. This likely is related to the 2019
disaster not being repaired properly. The result is more structural damage, and
mold growing conspicuously inside the walls. The estimate is $107,000 to remedy.
[Exh. 14, Vol. 3, p. 545]. Maximilian remains “primary insured” on the
homeowner’s policy, and, as before, refuses to cooperate in allowing the
homeowner’s insurance to pay.
This Court should take judicial notice of the fact (not reasonably subject to
dispute) that certain molds can cause serious illness and even death.
Christienne’s 4/12/2023 Cal. Fam. Code § 290 RFO to Enforce
Judgment and Appoint Elisor
On 04/12/2023, under Cal. Fam. Code § 290, Christienne brought to Judge
Marshack an ex parte Request for Orders to Enforce Judgment and to Appoint
Elisor to Sign Deed. [Exh. 19, Vol. 4, p. 712] The papers included a Request for
Judicial Notice, asking that Judge Marshack take judicial notice of each important
term of the Stipulated Judgment at issue presently. [Exh. 19, Vol. 4, p. 720]
Lodged with Judge Marshack were proposed orders granting the RFO [Exh.
19, Vol. 4, p. 761-775], and seeking individual rulings on each Request for Judicial
Notice. The specific request check sheet filed was inexplicably missing when
returned to Christienne. [Exh. 19, Vol. 4, p. 719].
Judge Marshack denied the Request for Order, reasserting the Superior
Court’s purported continuing jurisdiction over the House, and finding that

Judgment was entered by Judge Sarmiento on 10/16/2020. Judgment has not been filed, despite
Christienne’s five attempts to do so, by and through licensed attorneys.

15
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Maximilian’s purported entitlement to an equalizer payment is still at bar [Exh.
20, Vol. 4, p. 802]
No rulings were issued by Judge Marshack on the Requests for Judicial
Notice.
Denial of Petition for Writ of Mandate to Court of Appeal
On or about 4/28/2023, Christienne filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate
(“Writ”), seeking relief from the Superior Court’s refusal to file and enforce the
Stipulated Judgment. On 5/25/2023, the Writ was summarily denied. [See denial,
attached hereto].
Petition for Writ of Mandate to California Supreme Court
On 6/6/2023, Petitioner filed an original Petition for Writ of Mandate in the
California Supreme Court, case no. S280358, again seeking relief from the
Superior Court’s refusal to file and enforce the Stipulated Judgment. On
6/30/2023, citing Hagan v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 767, this Court
transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal.
Denial of Second Petition for Writ of Mandate to Court of
Appeal
The transferred Petition for Writ of Mandate was given case no. G062830.
On 7/7/2023 the Court of Appeal denied the Writ. [See denial, attached hereto].

REASONS TO GRANT REVIEW

A. Review is Needed to Establish that the Superior Court
Loses Jurisdiction When Real Estate is Awarded to One
Spouse as Sole and Separate Property
Precisely because the June 17, 2016 Stipulation & Order was dispositive on
the House (and various other issues, see infra), the Superior Court lost jurisdiction
over the House on June 17, 2016, the instant that it approved the Stipulation &
Order under which the House was awarded to Christienne as her sole and separate
property. [See e.g. In re Marriage of Janes, 11 Cal. App. 5th 1043, 1050, “once a
marital dissolution judgment has become final, the court loses jurisdiction to
modify or alter it.”]

16
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 The Superior Court contends that jurisdiction over the disposition of the
House was reserved. This conflicts with law holding precisely the opposite:
[T]he superior court in a divorce proceeding has no jurisdiction
to deal with the separate property of the spouses.
[In re Marriage of Braud, 45 Cal. App. 4th 797, 810, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 185-86
(1996), bolding added, citing Robinson v. Robinson (1944) 65 Cal. App. 2d 118,
119, and see also 2 Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The
Rutter Group 1996) P 8:903, p. 8-213; In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.
App. 3d 1260, 1275 [255 Cal. Rptr. 488], citing In re Marriage of Buford (1984)
155 Cal. App. 3d 74, 78 [202 Cal. Rptr. 20]; In re Marriage of McNeill (1984) 160
Cal. App. 3d 548, 565-566 [206 Cal. Rptr. 641]; Porter v. Superior Court (1977)
73 Cal. App. 3d 793, 805 [141 Cal. Rptr. 59]].

As the following passage from Braud explains, it is legally impossible for

the House to have been awarded to Christienne as her sole and separate property,
while at the same time having the Superior Court retain jurisdiction over the
House:
[I]t is well settled in California that the court's jurisdiction over
the parties' separate property is quite limited. One highly regarded
family law treatise states the traditional rule as follows: “The
court may characterize disputed assets and liabilities as being
separate or community, may confirm separate property to the
owner spouse and, to the extent permitted by statute, may order
reimbursement from the community to a party's separate estate or
to the community from a party's separate estate. . . . But unless the
parties otherwise agree, the court's jurisdiction over separate
property extends no further . . . .”
[Id]
As the preceding quote from Braud makes clear, the Superior Court had
jurisdiction to characterize the House. The Superior Court properly exercised that
jurisdiction on June 17, 2016 when it approved the Stipulation & Order, awarding
the House to Christienne as her sole and separate property. The Superior Court had
jurisdiction to award an equalization payment to Maximilian regarding the House.
There is no question that the Superior Court had (past tense) jurisdiction to
adjudicate the issues around the House. But if, in June 2016, the Superior Court

17
PETITION FOR REVIEW
believed that Maximilian was entitled to an equalization payment, or that
consideration was inadequate, despite the Stipulation voluntarily signed by the
Parties, then it could have chosen not to approve it.
However, on June 17, 2016 the Superior Court most certainly did approve
the Stipulation & Order awarding the House to Christienne as her sole and separate
property. The only plausible argument for why the Superior Court’s jurisdiction
over the House terminated any time after June 17, 2016 relates to the fact that in
2019 Christienne was forced to negotiate a new Stipulated Judgment clarifying the
original Stipulation, this after Maximilian interfered with the insurance claim using
alias identities, and in 2020 Christienne was forced to bring a motion under Cal.
Code Civ. Pro. § 664.6 for an order to enter the Judgment. [Supra, and see Exh.
17. Vol. 4. p. 561; Exh. 5, Vol. 1; and Exh. 6, Vol. 1]
By filing that paper, it could possibly be argued that Christienne consented
to the Court’s continued jurisdiction over the House. That argument is a stretch,
because the only purpose of the new Stipulated Judgment and the § 664.6 Motion
was to clarify and enforce the 2016 Stipulated Judgment. In any event, the 2019
Stipulation was litigated, and the Superior Court approved it and ordered it to be
entered as Judgment on 10/16/2020, the absolute latest date at which the Superior
Court could even arguably assert jurisdiction.
Therefore, this Court should grant review to resolve the conflict between
the Superior Court’s continued assertion of jurisdiction over the disposition of the
House, versus the body of law holding that the Superior Court loses jurisdiction
upon granting a judgment awarding the subject property to one spouse in a Family
Law case.

B. Review Is Needed to Establish That “Shall” Means

“Mandatory”
On 01/21/2021, three months after he issued the 10/16/2020 Judgment, and
four years after he approved the 06/17/2016 Stipulation & Order, all of which
expressly state that the House “shall be awarded” to Christienne as her sole and
separate property, Judge Sarmiento took up the matter again. While citing nothing

18
PETITION FOR REVIEW
from the Stipulation, Order and Judgment in question, Maximilian’s lawyer Keith
Dolnick argued:
Mr. Dolnick: Again, the key component here, though, is that the
Court continues to reserve jurisdiction over the house and the sale
[of the House].
[Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 825, (original 22:8-15)]
In response, Judge Sarmiento materially misstated the Stipulation, Order
and Judgment:
The Court: I don’t disagree…When I reviewed the stipulation, it
says, “To be awarded,” and it's not. And then the Court did retain
jurisdiction over the sale.·
[Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 825, (original 22:21-25)]
This is a material misstatement because jurisdiction to sell the house is
triggered only “in the event [Christienne] is unable to make a timely
[mortgage] payment for the Residence.” [Exh. 2, Vol. 1, p. 31 (bolding added)].
Nevertheless, Judge Sarmiento stated:
The Court: I reviewed the stipulation back from 2016. The
language of the stipulation, it reads something like, “The family
residence shall be awarded.” It doesn't say, “is awarded.” It says,
“shall be,” so it hasn't happened, so [Christienne] has not been
awarded the home. It just is “shall be.”
[Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 824 (original 01/21/2021 RT, 21:18-22)]
Such a tortured semantic construction not only defies common sense, it
defies statutory, black-letter law: “Shall” is mandatory and “may” is permissive.
[Cal. Fam. Code § 12, and see also Cal. Gov. Code § 14]
In addition to the Legislature encoding the definition of “shall” into the
statutes, there is a considerable case law history around the meaning of the word
“shall,” with consistent results. For example, in 2004 the Court explained:
[T]he word “shall” connotes a mandatory or directory duty.
[Cty. of Orange v. Bezaire, 117 Cal. App. 4th 121, 122, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 480
(2004), bolding added.]

19
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 Later at the 01/21/2021 hearing, Judge Sarmiento adopted his own
misinterpretation of the word “shall,” as if it had been expressed, and thus
materially misstated the Stipulation, Order and Judgment:
The Court: When I reviewed the stipulation, it says, “To be
awarded,” and it's not.
[Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 825 (original 22:21-25)]
With all due respect to the Superior Court, the language in the 2016
Stipulation & Order does not say “to be awarded,” it says “shall be awarded.” [Exh.
2, Vol. 1, p. 30]. Furthermore, the 2019 Stipulation, Order and Judgment states
that Christienne “was awarded” the House, and that the parties stipulate that
Christienne “received the residence as her sole and separate property.” [Exh.
2, p. 21 (bolding added)]
It matters not whether Judge Sarmiento was disingenuous or simply
mistaken. What is important now is that Judge Sarmiento’s stating that the House
was not awarded to Christienne is categorically false. For Judge Sarmiento in
January 2021 to change his Order and Judgment from one in which the House was
awarded to Christienne into one in which the House was not awarded to
Christienne would substantively alter the Judgment actually rendered on October
16, 2020, and would substantively alter the Order made on June 17, 2016.
To add to the confusion, which this Court’s review would resolve, later at
the same hearing, Judge Sarmiento conceded that the Superior Court had lost
jurisdiction over the House. [Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 837 et. seq. (original 34:1-36:6)]
Therefore, this Court should grant review to resolve the conflict between
the Superior Court’s interpretation of the word “shall” as permissive, and the body
of statutory and case law holding that “shall” means “mandatory.”

C. Review is Needed to Define the Scope of the Superior

Court’s Post-Judgment Enforcement Jurisdiction
1. An Unmet Condition Precedent Does Not Equal
Jurisdiction to Re-Litigate
The Stipulated Judgment does contain a reservation of jurisdiction clause,
stating:

20
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 In the event [Christienne] is unable to make a timely
[mortgage] payment for the Residence the residence shall be
immediately listed for sale and stay on the market until sold, or
by further agreement of the parties in writing.
The Court retains the broadest Jurisdiction as it pertains to the
residence including, but not limited to, the sale of the residence,
and executory provisions as stated above.
[Exh. 2, Vol. 1, p. 31 (bolding added)]
The question is what that reservation of jurisdiction language means. It will
become clear that it means only that the Superior Court has continuing jurisdiction
to enforce the expressed and implied terms of the Judgment, and that continuing
jurisdiction to dispose of extrinsic issues regarding the House was not intended,
and would violate well-settled law even if it had been intended.
If the Court were to only consider the second of the two above paragraphs
in isolation, it might appear to reserve jurisdiction over all the extrinsic issues the
Court and Maximilian now assert. In context, however, it is crystal clear that that
the above reservation of jurisdiction only authorizes the Superior Court to enforce
the terms of the Judgment - and specifically refers to enforcing Christienne’s duty
to make the mortgage payments - but not to adjudicate extrinsic issues excluded
from the Judgment as written.
The California Supreme Court has explained that a Stipulated Judgment is
“a judgment entered by a court under the authority of, and in accordance with, the
contractual agreement of the parties,” and thus is governed under the law of
contract. [Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 400]
In contract terms, the portion of the Judgment authorizing jurisdiction over
“the sale of the residence” is explicitly premised on a condition precedent:
“In the event [Christienne] is unable to make a timely [mortgage]
payment…”
[Id]
Thus, the correct interpretation is that Christienne’s failure to make
mortgage payments would constitute a material breach of contract, triggering the
Court’s authority to sell the house.

21
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 What the Judgment does not say is that Superior Court may seize and sell
the House even if Christienne does timely make all the mortgage payments, and
does fully comply with all her other many obligations under the Stipulated
Judgment. There is no allegation that Christienne has missed mortgage payments.
Thus, the condition precedent is not met.
Likewise, the Judgment does not say that the Superior Court has jurisdiction
to calculate an “equalizer payment” due to Maximilian. Indeed, the very idea is
absurd, given that an equalizer term where Maximilian was to receive $180,000
was contemplated, then stricken from the Stipulated Judgment. [Exh. 2, Vol. 1, p.
32].
2. Even If It Existed, a Clause Reserving Jurisdiction Would
Be Severed and Stricken as Illegal
Even if the Stipulated Judgment had attempted to reserve jurisdiction over
the extrinsic issues of the House (it did not, supra), such a term would be severable,
and would necessarily be stricken for conflicting with a great body of law. [Braud,
supra 45 Cal. App. 4th 797 at 810]
Removing such language would not disturb the clear intent of the Parties.
Since the “illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal
provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction,
then such severance and restriction are appropriate.” [Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v.
Hyon, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1489, 1490, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 275 (2008)]
Therefore, this Court should find that it was the intent of the Parties to
authorize the Superior Court to enforce the Stipulated Judgment, including by
forcing the sale of the House, but only if such became necessary to effectuate the
object of the agreement.
Even if this Court somehow interprets the intent of the Parties to include
the Superior Court’s reserved jurisdiction over the extrinsic issues around the
House, such provision must be stricken as violative of well-settled law holding
that the Superior Court in a divorce case has no jurisdiction over one spouse’s
separate property. [Braud, supra]

22
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 3. Issues Over Which the Superior Court Contends It Still
Has Jurisdiction
Judge Waltz apparently abandoned Judge Sarmiento’s prior and clearly
erroneous opinion that the House was not awarded to Christienne, finally
confirming that the “parties agree the Ladera Ranch property was awarded to
[Christienne] as her sole and separate property.” [Exh. 5, Vol.1, p. 160]
However, Judge Waltz has adopted and amplified on the remainder of
Judge Sarmiento’s error, finding that the Superior Court “reserves over
jurisdiction to order the sale of the former family residence,” with such purported
jurisdiction to be applied to “the determination of value [of the House]”, the
“calculation of any equalization payment due [Maximilian]”, and “property debt
(currently both parties remain borrowers under the extant mortgagee)” and “credits
and reimbursements related to Ladera Ranch home.” [Exh. 16, Vol. 3, p. 561-563].
4. Reserved Jurisdiction to Calculate an “Equalizer
Payment” Due Maximilian is Irreconcilable with the
Express Term that Maximilian Has No Insurable Interest
The Parties contemplated but ultimately struck out a term under which
Maximilian would receive $180,000 as an equalizer payment. [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p.
146] This is because Maximilian received fair and just consideration in other
forms, which was fully litigated on October 8, 2020 and October 16, 2020 The
decision resulted in Judge Sarmiento granting of Motion to Enter Judgment
pursuant to CCP § 664.6 on October 16, 2020. [See infra]
The Stipulated Judgment expressly holds that Maximilian no longer has an
insurable interest in the House. [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 181, see “Maximilian Black
(formerly known as ‘Dustin Zanck’) stipulate that I no longer hold an insurable
interest in the real property residence as listed herein.”]
Furthermore, in granting Christienne’s motion for a Judgment, Judge
Sarmiento struck out Maximilian’s hand-written attempt to surreptitiously insert
an undefined, yet-to-be calculated “equalizer payment” term. [see Exh.6, Vol. 1,
p. 201, “without the additional handwritten additions”].

23
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 Nevertheless, the Superior Court contends that it reserved jurisdiction over
and must adjudicate a “determination of value [of the House]” and the perform a
“calculation of any equalization payment due [Maximilian].” The defined
($180,000) equalization term was struck by agreement of the Parties prior to June
17, 2016. [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 146] The surreptitious attempted adding of an
undefined equalization terms was struck by the Superior Court in the 10/16/2020
Ruling on Submitted Matter. [Exh. 6, Vol. 1, p. 201]
Even if an “equalization payment’ term had not been stricken (it was,
twice), such a term is irreconcilable with the explicit term of the Stipulated
Judgment under which Maximilian has no insurable interest, because
“interpretation of a contract must be fair and reasonable, not leading to absurd
conclusions.” [Eucasia Sch. Worldwide, Inc. v. DW August Co., 218 Cal. App. 4th
176, 177, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 622 (2013)]
Obviously, if Maximilian is due an equalization payment that is calculated
based on the valuation of the House, then it logically follows that Maximilian must
presently own some share of the equity in the House. And since the entire purpose
of homeowner’s insurance is to protect the value of an owner’s equity, the
inescapable conclusion would be that Maximilian presently has an insurable
interest in the House. Maximilian cannot have an insurable interest and also not
have an insurable interest at the same time. That would be patently absurd.
Therefore, this Court must find that the Superior Court’s contention that
Maximilian is due an equalizer payment based on a valuation of the House is in
fatal conflict with the express term of the Stipulated Judgment holding that
Maximilian does not have an insurable interest in the House.
5. Reserved Jurisdiction to Calculate an “Equalizer
Payment” Due Maximilian is Irreconcilable with the Fact
That Maximilian Already Received Fair Compensation
It is true that parties contemplated an equalizer payment in the process of
negotiating the Stipulation. [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 146 (original Section V A.)]
However, as can be plainly seen, this entire section of the document was stricken,

24
PETITION FOR REVIEW
and thus is of no force and is not even arguably included in the Stipulated
Judgment.
It is axiomatic that to be valid, a “contract must be just and reasonable and
must be supported by adequate consideration.” [Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 468, 470 (1965)]. In continuing to seek an “equalization payment,”
Maximilian is implying that he did not receive adequate consideration for
relinquishing his ownership interest in the House. Nothing could be further from
the truth.
First, Maximilian has not challenged the Stipulated Judgment. If he actually
believed that he was due an equalizer payment, clearly this would call the entire
Stipulation into question. If this were the case, then Maximilian – at all times
represented by counsel - would have long ago sought to void the 2016 Stipulation,
asserting that it was unconscionable, or that he signed it under duress, or that he
didn’t understand it, or that he didn’t receive the consideration he bargained for,
or that he didn’t actually sign it, or something. He has asserted none of those.
Moreover, Maximilian had a renewed opportunity to challenge the
sufficiency of consideration in 2019-2020, when he forced Christienne to re-
litigate the Stipulated Judgment. Maximilian had surreptitiously hand-written a
term into the new Stipulation reading:
This Stipulation and Order does not effect [sic] the equalization
payment owed to [Maximilian] by [Christienne]. The amount of
equalization payment is still to be determined.
[Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 181]
If Maximilian and his attorney had a good faith belief that he was owed an
equalization payment, this would go directly to the core issue of adequate
consideration in the agreement itself.
Logically, either Maximilian’s hand-written attempted term constituted a
legal challenge to the sufficiency of consideration, or else it did not. Either way,
Maximilian loses the argument. If it is construed to have been a legal challenge,
then Maximilian lost that challenge on 10/16/2020 when the Superior Court ruled
to exclude the handwritten language from the Judgment. [Exh. 6, Vol. 1, p. 201]

25
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 And, if the hand-written attempted term is construed to have not been a
challenge to the sufficiency of consideration, then Maximilian has waived any
right he may have had to challenge it, under the equitable doctrine of laches. [See
In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 333 [108 Cal. Rptr. 2d
801], “[L]aches is defined as an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right,
causing prejudice to an adverse party.”]
In an abundance of caution, to leave no stone unturned, and to set the matter
to rest, it is worth listing the value that Christienne gave up in exchange for
Maximilian giving up his interest in the House. As set forth in the Judgment,
Christienne gave up:
• Spousal Support – “Both parties waive spousal support now and forever
and the Court's jurisdiction to award either party support is hereby terminated.”
[Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p. 144 (original II B i, line 4)]
• Interest in Petitioner’s retirement funds [Exh.5, Vol. 1, p. 145, (original
III F, line 22)]
• Bank Accounts - “All bank accounts in each party's respective names
shall be awarded/confirmed to that respective party without offset. All accounts
jointly owned by the parties shall be closed forthwith. [Exh. 5, Vol.1, p. 145,
(original III E, line 19)]
• Reimbursement for credit card debt - Mother gave up the right to seek
reimbursement for her solely incurred credit card debt used to pay community
expenses [Exh. 5, Vol. 1, p.146, (original III H, line 1)]
• Vehicles - Maximilian took two of the couple’s three cars, including
taking the much more expensive and latest-model vehicle among the three. [Exh.
5, Vol.1, p. 145].
• All Other Reimbursements - Mother gave up numerous other rights to
seek reimbursement. [Exh. 5, Vol.1, p. 146, (original III J, line 13)]
Furthermore, in addition to those items specifically delineated in the
Judgment, and which clearly constitute good and valuable consideration in
exchange for Father having given up whatever financial interest Father had in the

26
PETITION FOR REVIEW
property, if any, Mother also gave up the following other rights and remedies as
an inducement to consummate the agreement. Christienne waived all rights against
Maximilian and released him from:
• any responsibility to remedy the property’s structural issues discovered
during marriage and known to exist at the time of the stipulation;
• reimbursement for Christienne’s separate property funds used for the
down payment of the property; and
• reimbursement for huge gifts of money from Christienne’s parents that
were used to make mortgage payments and pay other community expenses during
marriage.
[Exh. 19, Vol. 4 p. 731, (Dec. of Christienne, ¶¶ 7-8)]
Christienne is advised and believes that, had all of her reimbursement
claims been adjudicated, the net result would have been that Maximilian had no
financial interest in the House at all. [Exh. 19, Vol. 4, p. 731, Dec. of Christienne,
¶¶ 7-8]
While he appears to have later changed his mind, Maximilian signed the
Stipulation believing that he had received good and valuable consideration in
exchange. Likewise, if the Superior Court thought for any reason that the June 17,
2016 agreement was not supported by adequate consideration, it could have chosen
not to approve it.
Therefore, this Court should find that the Parties agreed that Maximilian
received good and valuable consideration in exchange for whatever financial
interest he may have had remaining in the House.
6. Reserved Jurisdiction to Sell the House is Irreconcilable
with the Award of the House to Christienne as her Sole and
Separate Property
The Superior Court asserts jurisdiction to order the sale of the House,
regardless of whether Christienne has made the mortgage payments or not.
[Supra].

27
PETITION FOR REVIEW
 Logically, either the property was awarded to Christienne as a final
judgment or the Court reserved jurisdiction to sell the House out from under her.
Both cannot be true. If the Superior Court retained jurisdiction to sell the House,
then this clearly means that Christienne is not presently allowed to sell the House.
If she is not allowed to sell it, then it is not her sole and separate property, by
definition. [see e.g. Hoffman v. Connell, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1196, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 272, 273 (1999) “The rights to transfer and to exercise control over
property are … indicia of ownership.”]
The Superior Court’s contention that it retained jurisdiction to sell the
House (irrespective of whether Christienne breached the agreement by failing to
timely pay the mortgage) is in fatal conflict with the express term of the Stipulated
Judgment holding the house was awarded to Christienne as her sole and separate
property.
7. The Stipulated Judgment Disposed of the Issue That
Maximilian Continues to Nominally Remain a Borrower on
the Mortgage
In asserting continued jurisdiction over the House, the Superior Court
points out that Maximilian remains a borrower under the extant mortgage on the
House. [Supra]. The Superior Court completely ignores the salient fact that the
Stipulated Judgment resolved that issue.
Under the Stipulation, in order to extinguish Maximilian’s rights and duties
regarding the finance of the House, Parties agreed that Christienne will either
refinance the property, or will obtain a “Wrap Around” mortgage (where the new
owner assumes all payments). As sole owner since June 2016, Christienne is solely
responsible to pay the mortgage. [Exh. 5, Vol.1, p. 144 (original line 9-11)].
Since the Judgment plainly states that the document is intended by the
Parties to function as a final judgment, it is only reasonable for this Court to find
that a forced sale of the House would only be necessary in the event Christienne
failed to pay the mortgage. This would constitute a material breach, voiding the
agreement, and triggering the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the contract by selling

28
PETITION FOR REVIEW
the house. However, in the January 21, 2021 hearing, Judge Sarmiento realized in
the 1/21/2021 hearing that he lost jurisdiction and was making contradictory
orders. [Exh. 21, Vol. 4, p. 837 (original 34:1-36:6)]
However, Christienne has faithfully fulfilled her duties under the Stipulated
Judgment, and there is no allegation otherwise. [Supra] So long as Christienne
continues to pay the mortgage, as she did for more than nine (9) years, and to
comply with all her obligations under the Stipulated Judgment, then the Superior
Court’s jurisdiction to sell the House is not triggered.
Therefore, this Court must find that the Superior Court’s contention that
Maximilian’s continued presence as a named borrower on the first mortgage
somehow invokes jurisdiction over the House (irrespective of whether Christienne
has timely paid the mortgage) is in fatal conflict with the express term of the
Stipulated Judgment holding the house was awarded to Christienne as her sole and
separate property, and requiring Christienne to pay the mortgage.
8. Reserved Jurisdiction is Irreconcilable with Any
Stipulation, Order and Judgment “On Reserved Issues”
The Parties explicitly intended the Stipulated Judgment to be a final
judgment, dispositive of the issues intrinsic to the document, i.e. the House. [Exh.
2, Vol. 1, p. 33]. Even had the Parties not explicitly fashioned a final judgment,
this conclusion could nevertheless be reasonably inferred from the document title,
“STIPULATION AND ORDER ON RESERVED ISSUES.” [Exh. 5. Vol. 1, p.
147]
While the Superior Court wishes to somehow interpret the Stipulated
Judgment to reserve jurisdiction to adjudicate issues related to the House, the
Stipulated Judgment speaks for itself and says the exact opposite – that it is the
resolution of what had been reserved issues.
Therefore, this Court should find the Superior Court’s assertion of reserved
jurisdiction over the House is in fatal conflict with this Stipulated Judgment, which
Stipulated Judgment by its expressed and implied terms is dispositive of all issues
related to the House. [Exh 5, Vol. 1, p. 160] & [Exh. 2, Vol. 1, p. 18-35]

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PETITION FOR REVIEW
 D. Review is Needed to Establish That the Superior Court
May Not Give Contradictory Reasons for Repeatedly
Rejecting the Filing of the Judgment
The Superior Court’s 10/16/2020 Ruling states that Christienne is to “file
Judgment, as ordered, as soon as possible.” [Exh. 6, Vol. 1, p. 201] In total,
Christienne’s attorneys submitted the judgment five times. [Supra].
On 10/18/2022, the Superior Court asserts as one of its purported bases for
continued jurisdiction over the House the fact that, to date, “No judgment was
entered [sic] as and for the 2016 stipulation/order.” 2 [Exh. 16, Vol. 3, p. 562]
As set forth and documented above within Facts and Procedural History,
subsection “G” and “I”, Christienne has exercised due diligence in attempting to
file the judgment. By and through her attorneys, she attempted to file the Judgment
no less than five times – on 10/16/2020, 12/2/2020, 12/22/2020, 2/16/2021, and
9/22/2022. [Supra]
As to the 10/16/2020 submission of the Judgment, the Superior Court
rejected it because:
Attaching copies of a previous stipulation and/or order is not
acceptable. The Judgment may not refer to other agreements or
orders.
[Exh. 8, Vol. 1, p. 219, bolding added]
As to the 2/16/2021 submission of the Judgment, the Superior Court said
the opposite, now rejecting it because:
It appears that there is no stipulation on file dated 12/17/2019 or
1/16/2020 as referenced in the10/16/2020 minute order. Please
resubmit with a copy of the stipulation, at least 2 copies of all
documents and one self-addressed stamped envelope for each
party.
[Exh. 11, Vol. 2, p. 337 (bolding added)]
Thus, the Superior Court, at different times, rejected the Judgment both
because it included the Stipulation, and because it did not. Therefore, this Court
should find that the Superior Court violated Christienne’s due process rights by

2
Judgment was entered, but not filed.

30
PETITION FOR REVIEW
creating a situation under which it was impossible for Christienne to file the
Judgment, and that this is the reason why the Judgment has not been filed.
Review is needed to establish that the Superior Court may not create, ad
hoc, contradictory rules making the filing of a judgment impossible.

OVERALL CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, this Court should Grant Review, finding that there
exists an urgent need to resolve the conflict between the Superior Court’s assertion
of post-judgment jurisdiction over the subject property versus a great body of law
holding that jurisdiction is surrendered upon the entry of judgment awarding sole
property. Ultimately, this Court should opine that Christienne’s due process rights
are infringed by the Superior Court’s conduct described throughout.

Dated: July 17, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________
Gary L. Zerman, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner Christienne M. Black

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PETITION FOR REVIEW
 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this Petition for Review contains 8,310 words,
according to the word count function in the software application, and not counting
caption pages, tables or this certificate. I declare under penalty of perjury under
the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: July 17, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________
Gary L. Zerman, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner Christienne M. Black

32
PETITION FOR REVIEW
5/25/2023 DENIAL OF WRIT

33
PETITION FOR REVIEW
7/7/2023 DENIAL OF WRIT

34
PETITION FOR REVIEW