SCHOOL OF LAW

NAME: NAKUYA SHARITAH

REGISTRATION NO.: 2022/HDO9/4956U

STUDENT NUMBER:2200704956

COURSE: MASTER OF LAWS

COURSE: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

COURSE CODE: MLAW 7205

LECTURER: DR. DANIEL RUHWEZA

COURSEWORK ASSIGNMENT: RESEARCH PAPER

A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY OF AFRICAN STATES: CASE FOR UGANDA,
AND ZIMBABWE.

1
1.0. Introduction
The notion of military intervention in a constitutional democracy is a long-entrenched orthodoxy
in the constitutional democracy of African states. A constitutional democracy is a government in
which people vote for representatives or laws, and in which the laws are authorized and
constrained by a constitution.1 It relates to global justice in two ways. 2 First, justice requires a
uniform rule of law, in contrast to the arbitrary whims of powerful individuals. Secondly,
democracy needs constitutional limits in order to prevent the tyranny of the democratic majority.3
Democracy requires that each individual be free to participate in the political community’s
government. Looking at the nexus between Democracy and constitutionalism, it can be argued
that the overall concept of modern democracy has three principal parts; democracy,
constitutionalism, and liberalism.4 In a constitutional Democracy, the authority of the majority
should be limited by legal and constitutional arrangements in order to protect the rights of
minorities and individuals.5
Much of the literature either views military rule and democracy as inconsistent or considers the
military and repressive apparatuses of the state" a nonvintage "point from which to study
democratization.6 Studies on democratization in Africa tend to distinctly downplay or discount
military contribution to democratization.7 The military is the state “institution publicly
recognized by society and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation’s borders.8
Since 1956, Africa has recorded the highest number of military coups d’état, globally. Between
1956 and 2001, there were 80 successful coups d’état, 108 failed coup attempts, and 139 reported
coup plots across subSaharan Africa.1 From 2001 to 2019 approximately a dozen successful
coups occurred, mainly in authoritarian West and Central African countries.9
Phillip C Aka however argues that the above characterizations are unbelievably simplistic and
incomplete as they tell only one side of the story on the arguments against military intervention. 10

1
Fred E. Foldvary, ‘Democracy, Constitutional, https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4020-
9160-5_42 > accessed on 10th May 2023
2
Ibid
3
Ibid
4
Solomon Muchwa Asiimwe, ‘Constitutionalism, Democratization and Militarism in Uganda, Nkumba Business
Journal (NBJ) ISSN: 1564-068X, Volume 15, October 2016, Pp.179-194. < http://www.nkumbauniversity.ac.ug/ >
accessed on 15th May 2023
5
ibid
6
Philip C. Aka, ‘The Military and Democratization In Africa’, Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 16, No.1, Rhetoric
Versus Action: The Challenge of Policy Implementation (9Spring, 1999), pp. 71-86, < THE MILITARY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA On JSTOR
7
Author(s): Philip C. Aka , ‘The Military And Democratization In Africa, Journal of Third World Studies , SPRING,
1999, Vol. 16, No. 1, RHETORIC VERSUS ACTION: THE CHALLENGE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (SPRING, 1999), pp.
71-86
8
Ozan O. Varol, The Military as the Guardian of Constitutional Democracy,
9
https://watermark.silverchair.com/adz024.pdf?
token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAtgwggLUBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLFMIICwQ
IBADCCAroGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglgh
10
ibid

2
The author argues that African soldiers need to leave the government and secure themselves
permanently in army barracks, they may in some countries, even have to, as some researchers
pointedly suggest consider controlling their self-liquidation. 11 Nonetheless, soldiers play a role in
the ongoing process of democratization in Africa, and this role needs acknowledgment in the
literature in the interest of analytic candor and correct theory building.12
Some literature has also emphasized that the ideal level of military involvement in a new
democracy is not always zero and that certain militaries can play, and have played, a democracy-
promoting role in the initial phases of a transition from autocracy to constitutional democracy. 13
The conventional constitutional theory, which assumes that all militaries are hegemonic and
praetorian institutions that must be completely disconnected from the civilian realm, has
restrained innovative thinking on this important and timely topic.14
Military intervention in African politics and constitutional democracy has been so remarkable
that today, over three-quarters of African countries are ruled by men from barracks. 15 A plethora
of literature has argued that even in the presence of constitutional democracy, for example in
Zambia and Zimbabwe, these appear to be merely cosmetic civilian governments that ultimately
rely on the barrel of the gun for their survival. 16 With a large part of Africa under the iron hand of
the military, with others increasingly depending on the military, it becomes imperative to
examine why the army has all of a sudden decided to interfere in the normal process of
government.17
In this article, I analyze the extent to which the military plays a role in the constitutional
democracy of African states with a comparative discussion of the situation in Uganda and
Zimbabwe. Whilst it is appropriate to draw some comparisons between the two states, the
intention of this paper is to discuss the arguments surrounding military and constitutionalism in
the two states and show whether there are approaches by the Zimbabwe government that Uganda
needs to draw lessons.
The study proceeds in four sections parts, the first section discusses the historical background
and state of the relationship between the Military and Constitutional Democracy in Uganda and
Zimbabwe, the second section delves into the arguments for and against the role of military
intervention in a constitutional democracy, the third part of this study provides an empirical
evaluation of the impact of the military intervention in the Constitutional Democracy of African
states and the last part concludes with an overall summary and analysis of the literature viz avi

11
ibid
12
ibid
13
Ozan O. Varol, ‘The Military as the Guardian of Constitutional Democracy, 50 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law __ (forthcoming Summer 2013), < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161013 > accessed on 10th
May 2023
14
ibid
15
P.G. Okoth, ‘History of Military Intervention in Ugandan Politics, < https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328635 >
accessed on 18th May 2023
16
Ibid
17
ibid

3
my opinion with respect to keeping the military independent from constitutional democracy of
African states.

Section I
1.1. Historical Background and State of Military Intervention in Uganda and Zimbabwe
1.1.1. Case for Uganda
The relationship between the military and Constitutionalism in Uganda since 1962 has been one
of turmoil. Political dynamics that had been built up during the colonial era since 1894 when
Uganda was declared a British protectorate became stumbling blocks to; a peaceful transfer of
power to Ugandans and to mark a solid foundation for democratization.18
The boycott of the 1961 elections led to negotiations between the Buganda kingdom, and the rest
of the main political actors, including the leaders of the main political parties, the Uganda
People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) led to a compromise that resulted into
the promulgation of the independence constitution in 1962.19 Uganda’s constitutionalism was
anchored in group/individual compromises other than on democratic principles and national
interests.20
Perhaps one of the developments which had an important bearing on military intervention was
the Uganda mutiny in 1964 and one of the causes for its formation was the Africanization of the
army.21 The 1964 Uganda mutiny forced politicians suspicious of the army and this forced and
led to the creation of the General Service Unit in 1964 under a close associate of the Prime
Minister and its role was to counter-insurgency.22
To control the Army, the Government decided to transfer from its headquarters to Kampala, and
according to literature, this meant two things, first, there would be henceforth greater
coordination between the army and the political establishment and second perhaps, more
importantly, transferring the army to the seat of government exposed soldiers to the place
intrigues and how vulnerable the political establishment.23
In 1965, it had become clear that the future of civilian authority in Uganda heavily depended
upon who succeeded in winning the confidence of security forces. 24 This ultimately resulted in
the rapid expansion of the army and its resulting importance in political affairs. After suspending
18
Solomon Muchwa Asiimwe, Constitutionalism, Democratization and Militarism in Uganda, <
https://ir.umu.ac.ug/bitstream/handle/20.500.12280/1243/Asiimwe_SASS_ARTICLE_2016.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed on 8th May 2023
19
ibid
20
ibid
21
P.G Okoth, History of Military Intervention in Ugandan Politics, Trans African, Vol. 22 (1993), pp. 35-54
(20 pages)
< https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328635 > accessed on 10th May 2023
22
ibid
23
ibid
24
ibid

4
the constitution, arresting dissident UPC ministers and taking the powers of the presidency for
his own, Obote announced the promulgation of a new constitution abolishing the autonomy of
the kingdoms guaranteed by the former federal system. When the Baganda protested, President
Obote sent the army under Amin to attack the palace of the kabaka who eventually fled for
England.
The 1966 appeared to have strengthened Obote’s authority but in an actual sense, the survival of
civilian democracy became more precarious.25 The role the army had played in coercing the
parliamentarians, in driving out Mutesa and quelling down the hatred of the Buganda populace,
made the army assume such a public posture that the soldiers began to imagine they were
indispensable.26 The intellectual imbalance between the army and the Government in the post-
independence phase only led to a more difficult power transition and the struggle which
instigated the 1971 coup de tat by Amin. Amin deposed Obote, and overthrew any semblance of
constitutional order and established militarism in Ugandan politics.27 His rule that spanned nine
years was characterized by caprice and underscored the power of the people in the constitutional
scene of Uganda. There was no separation of powers, and the president enacted laws by decree
and implemented them. The judiciary was too emasculated to guarantee the rights and freedoms
of the people.28
In 1979, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), an alliance of various rebel groups that
were against Amin’s rule, overthrew him with the help of the Tanzanian army. 29 The UNLA
administration once again saw the struggle to win over the military by political leaders over the
will of the people and the protection of the Constitution. After Amin’s departure, the UNLF
attempted to reorganize Uganda, and to return the country to civilian rule and to a constitutional
order. In the transition period, they created NCC, which exercised legislative power and
appointed civilian presidents.30
In May, 1980, Binaisa was also removed. 31 The military commission headed by Paul Muwanga
governed Uganda for 6 months leading to the national elections of December 1980, which were
won by Milton Obote.32 The 1980 elections were disputed and Yoweri Museveni led the national
resistance army/national resistance movement (NRM) to fight a guerrilla war, which culminated
in the capture of state power in 1986 by yet another military arrangement.33
The NRA’s official view of its political role was put to the Constitutional Commission in
November 1991 when agreeing to recognize any constitution democratically evolved and
approved by the people of Uganda, one that preserves unity and peace in the country and

25
ibid
26
ibid
27
ibid
28
ibid
29
ibid
30
ibid
31
ibid
32
ibid
33
ibid

5
provides representation for the army in parliament. 34 In 1993, the commission emphasized the
need for a professional army that would serve national, not partisan interests; vested overall
command in the president advised by an Armed Forces Council.35
Ugandan’s constitutional history shows that military power has always been used to destroy
democratic institutions and at the same time, it has been at the center of fighting autocratic
governments help in the transition process.
1.1.2. The Case for Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe experienced its first-ever coup in November 2017. 36 This demonstrated that coup
risks persist, even in countries without a coup precedent. The coup saw the 93-year-old Robert
Mugabe resign as Zimbabwe’s president, ending 37 years of his rule after military generals
staged an unconstitutional action called Operation Restore Legacy on 14 November.37
Zimbabwe is currently under the de facto control of a group of generals who refer to themselves
collectively as the “Joint Operations Command.”38 The generals are a cabal of high-ranking
military and security officers, one of which is Mugabe’s probable successor. Each member of this
unit has played a substantial role in Zimbabwe’s history of military violence.39
There was a semblance of professionalism in the military in the country’s early years of
independence when the military was largely confined to the barracks, over time the use of the
military as a political tool to intimidate and vanquish opponents, enable looting, and gain control
of key economic sectors has transformed the country into a military dictatorship…

34
ibid
35
ibid
36
Blessing-Miles Tendi, ‘The Motivations And Dynamics Of Zimbabwe’s 2017 Military Coup’, 28 October 2019,
Oxford University Press, < https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/119/474/39/5607894 >accessed on
18th May 2023
37
ibid
38
Jeremiah I. Williamson, ‘Seeking Civilian Control: Rule of Law, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in
Zimbabwe’, : Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies , Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 389-411, <
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.2979/gls.2010.17.2.389.pdf?refreqid=excelsior
%3A51047c1cdc46b736f4ed3306daf7b268&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 > accessed on 18th
May 2023
39
ibid

6
 Section II
2.1. Arguments for and Against Intervention of the Military in Constitutional
Democracy.

2.2.1. The Army in Parliament

The question here is; does the military have a role to play in the parliament of a democratic state?
In Uganda, Article 78(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 provides for the
Army as part of the special interest groups under the composition of parliament. Army
representation in Uganda stems way back in the 1994 parliament. National Resistance Council
(NRC) at the time consisted of 38 Historical Members of the National Resistance
Movement/National Resistance Army. It was the Fifth Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.40
The issue of the army in parliament attracted great attention with the case of Muyambi Ellady
Vs Attorney General.41 In this case, one of the arguments laid before the constitutional court by
the petitioner was that Article 78(1) c of the Constitution violates Articles 208 and 79 of the
Constitution. Article 208 of the Constitution requires the Uganda People’s Defence Forces to be
non-partisan. In other words, the army could only be part of parliament during the movement
system of government. Having the Army in parliament violates the role of parliament stipulated
under Article 209 of the Constitution.
The Respondent argued that the framers of the constitution incorporated army representation in
parliament fully aware of the above stipulated provisions. He relied on the case of Kasozi
Robinson & Others Vs Attorney General and Others 42 where the court recognized that the army
could choose its representatives to parliament without engaging in any political activity.
The court relied on the recommendations contained in a report of the Uganda Constitutional
Commission that was chaired Mr. Justice Benjamin J Odoki, where it was observed that if the
new constitution is to be safeguarded, then it was important that the army is fully committed to
it. The army was best able to learn to work in partnership with civilian authorities if its
representatives were sufficiently involved in major-decision making processes, it would then
understand and be committed to both processes and the decisions made. Thus, the constitutional
court adopted the recommendation of the commission to provide for army representation by ten
serving officers elected by the army council.
The court further noted that it did not see how the presence of the army in parliament affected
was inconsistent with the constitution ‘simply because Uganda adopted a multi-party system in
2005’. e judges did not agree. Under the constitution, the armed forces were to be ‘nonpartisan’,
and the AHRM had not shown how the presence of the army in parliament infringed on that
section.43
40
https://www.parliament.go.ug/page/history-parliament
41
Constitutional Court of Uganda at Kampala, Constitutional Petition No. 26 of 2011
42
[2015]UGSC 4
43
ibid

7
The debate revolving around the Army in Parliament was justified by the legal and parliamentary
Affairs on the parliamentary election which highlighted comparative examples of states with this
kind of provisions take for instance Myanmar, Thailand, China, Russia, and Indonesia which
have since catered for military representatives in parliament. 44 However, it has been argued that
what is notable about these states is the strong interference of the military in politics and or the
lack of democracy.45
However, the above states which have a military presence in their parliaments tend not to be
democratic or are in transition from a militaristic style of government to a democracy.46
Myanmar’s military first seized power in a coup in 1962 and a transition to democracy began in
2008 under the new constitution drafted by the military and nationwide it retained 25% of
parliamentary seats for the military.47 The military also holds one of two vice-president positions,
and permanent control of three key ministries: Defence, Border, and Home Affairs. In addition to
this formal political power, the military maintained its influence by controlling parts of the
economy including lucrative sectors such as mining.48
Fox Odoi, another NRM lawmaker, made the following remarks in support of the army in
parliament;
The framers of the 1995 constitution were basically dealing with persistent coups that had become a
hallmark of African politics," the Ugandan constitution attempted to cure this by making
soldiers part of the legislative process – and they are still very relevant," Uganda is no
stranger to coups and military takeovers the most memorable – and successful – coup took
place in 1979 when the army seized control while then-President Milton Obote was attending
a Commonwealth conference in Singapore. The army then appointed Major-General Idi
Amin Dada as head of the new military government. MP Odoi further argued that; “based
on previous military and violent takeovers the country has seen, "you can't deny the
presence of the army as a contributor to the relative stability that we have enjoyed in the
last 30 years."49
D. Kalinge Nyango argues that Uganda is a country under a military control and civilian
participation model of public administration where there is a degree of civilian participation for
44
Bore L, ‘Army Representation in Uganda’s Multiparty Parliament- A Critical Review, CEPA Policy Series Papers
Number 7 of 2016, Kampala,<
https://cepa.or.ug/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/ArmyRepresentationinParliament.pdf
45
Ibid
46
Bore L, ‘Army Representation in Uganda’s Multiparty Parliament- A Critical Review, CEPA Policy Series Papers
Number 7 of 2016, Kampala,<
https://cepa.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmyRepresentationinParliament.pdf > accessed on 18th May
2023
47
House of Commons Library, Myanmar: Military takeover and international response, Tuesday, 16 February 2021,
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/myanmar-military-takeover-and-international-response/ > accessed on 18th
May 2023
48
ibid
49
Halima Athumani, ‘Uganda’s army MP’s Vanguard of democracy or time boom?, 22 nd May 2015, <
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/ugandas-army-mps-vanguard-of-democracy-or-time-bomb/44753 > accessed on
18th May 2023

8
practical or symbolic reasons which masks the fact that the military is really pulling the strings
behind the scenes. He further argues that the major institution upon which the current
government rests is the army and the military high command could be the ultimate decision
maker with other institutions being called when convenient or appropriate.50
In my opinion, Army representation in parliament offends the pillars of constitutionalism and
democratic participation. The army is expected to show complete neutrality on civil governance
matters and this can be difficult to maintain once it participates in the parliament. Involvement of
the Army in the legislature has had a trail in past experiences characterized by the overthrow of
governments, and human rights abuse. The army’s involvement in civilian governance did not
stop Obote from overthrowing the ruling government in 1980 and the 1985 coup staged against
Obote’s government.
Zimbabwe’s constitution is one the constitutions that have tried to separate the military from
other arms of government and put in place avenues for its control which Uganda should draw
some lessons. On 28th December 2005, the then president of the main opposition party, the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai wrote a letter to the then
President Robert Mugabe, the letter addressed the constitutional provisions and relevant Acts of
Parliament governing the conduct and operations of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) and
the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) which forbid the participation of the army in matters of
civil governance. For the purposes of democracy and the canons of constitutionalism,
Tsvangirai’s letter was viewed as vital because it directly tried to protect the constitution as the
supreme governing instrument in Zimbabwe. Secondly, it alluded to the importance of separating
military and civilian issues.51 Thirdly and more importantly, it raised some concerns about the
danger of creating a conducive environment for a military junta in Zimbabwe.52
It is imperative to note that letting the Army have a seat in Parliament interferes with the will of
the people and consent to determine how they should be governed since the army is bound to be
manipulated by the ruling government. Retaining their seats in parliament technically could
mean that they can at any time be a barrier to democratic changes to the constitution once it is
not in their favor.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe allocates parliament the authority to provide for the organization,
administration and discipline of the armed forces, as well as the appointment and removal of
officers. The Parliament controls the military budget. 53 In contrast to the situation in Uganda the
military sits in parliament to monitor its activities and report to its own rank and file what is
required is for the concept to be turned on its head and for the legislature to have far greater
knowledge into what is happening in the military.54 It has been shown that civil-military relations

50
Omar D-Kalinge Nnyago, Ugandans Soldier Politicians Open Democracy, <
https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa_democracy/uganda > accessed on 18th May 2023
51
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe, JUNE 25,
2006, , < https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCnationalist-military-alliance-and-the-fate-of-
democracy-in-zimbabwe/ > accessed on 18th May 2023
52
Ibid
53
Zimbabwe’s Constitution of 2013

9
improve when there is more hands-on strategic oversight of the military by the legislature and
civil society.55
Thus, Uganda needs to adopt the model approach of the exclusion of the army from the
parliament of Zimbabwe. removal of armed forces from partisan politics makes the military more
professional in the execution of its national duties and such separation makes the government
more democratic. The army should be kept away from parliament and be firmly grounded under
the executive. The Ugandan parliament like it is in Zimbabwe should only be left to monitor the
administration of the activities of the army but not the army being part of it as in the end
continuing to have the army in parliament undermines the whole notion of constitutionalism and
democracy in Uganda.
2.1.2. Role of the Army in Transition periods.
Ozan O. Varol argues,56 that not all militaries are of the praetorian model. The author justifies her
position on two grounds; first is that Some militaries also known as “interdependent” militaries
are more capable of providing institutional support to an emerging democracy. In brief, an
interdependent military is ordinarily composed of citizen-soldiers, responsive to international
democratic norms, and focused on external, not internal, threats.
The Second ground is that, the conventional thinking that rejects any constitutional role for the
military in a post-authoritarian society neglects the unfortunate reality that democratic regimes
emerging from a long period of authoritarianism are fragile and prone to breakdown. 57 Political
actors in many nascent democracies are unwilling or unable to promote the conditions necessary
for the development of constitutional democracy. 58 New democracies tend to lack an ethos of
political pluralism, stable legal and political institutions necessary to support a competitive
democracy, and effective enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure that political actors do not
misbehave.59
Literature in support of military intervention in a constitutional democracy has further justified
their proposition and asserted in the absence of institutions designed to preserve and promote
democracy and stability over a lengthy transition period, the danger that powerful groups will
use the newly established democratic processes to undermine democracy is all too great.60

54
Bore L, ‘Army Representation in Uganda’s Multiparty Parliament- A Critical Review, CEPA Policy Series Papers
Number 7 of 2016, Kampala,<
https://cepa.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmyRepresentationinParliament.pdf > accessed on 18th May
2023
55
Ibid
56
Ozan O. Varol Lewis & Clark Law School, ‘Military As The Guardian Of Constitutional Democracy’, 50 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law __ (forthcoming Summer 2013) , < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2161013 > accessed on 18th May 2023
57
ibid
58
ibid
59
ibid
60
Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy, in Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives 47, 61 (Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead eds
1986) < https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/22003 > accessed on 18th May 2023

10
The constitutional savior of these failed democracies may therefore lie somewhere outside the
familiar institutions in Montesquieu’s tripartite scheme of the executive, legislative, and
judiciary.61 In some post-authoritarian nations, the interdependent military may be the only stable
and legitimate institution capable of serving as the arbiter between competing political groups
and providing the much-needed jump-start to emerging democracy.62
Huntington sees the military as the solution to severe political and social instability. 63 The
military possesses the strength to seize power and the capacity to facilitate a transition of
power.64 He further argues that the military establishment stands as the only institution, that
serves politicians that can rule as the clergy, students, and workers do not have the capacity.
While these groups affect politics in several ways, which include strikes and demonstrations,
they do not have the strength to gain power.65 Hence, a military coup d’état as a means of dealing
with dictatorship becomes ideal.
The argument of transition is best suited in the case of Zimbabwe. The country went through all
the seven traits of a democratic coup d’état, the Mugabe-led government was disposed of
through a militarily-assisted intervention.66 The support given to the army by the many citizens
who marched against Mugabe on 18 November 2017 eventually led him to resign, thereby
handing over power to the former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa. 67 The gathering of
citizens indicated a shared will for democratic processes, a will that was denied to citizens during
the electoral process.68
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces relied on the preamble to the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe to
justify intervention in politics, they indicated that people who had participated in the liberation
struggle were targeted by counter-revolutionary elements and hence the Zimbabwe African
Union-Patriotic Front purges signed disrespect for liberation struggles and violated the
constitution.69
Whereas the military plays a role in a path to democratic transition, this should only be
accommodated for a short period of time. It has been argued for the case of Zimbabwe that
sufficient guidance to set Zimbabwe on the path to objective civilian control and, thus, to set the
stage for a democratic society ruled by law in other words there must be legal controls set on the
civil-military relations so as to appraise constitutionalism as opposed to autocracy.
61
ibid
62
ibid
63
Anna Rudo Motsi and 2 Jeffrey Kurebwa, Military Intervention as a Means of Dealing with Dictatorship: THE
Zimbabwean Experience,’ Vol. 8(4), pp. 137-148, April 2020, <
https://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/PDF/2020/April/Motsi%20and%20Kurebwa.pdf > accessed on
16th May, 2023
64
ibid
65
ibid
66
ibid
67
ibid
68
ibid
69
Bore L, ‘Army Representation in Uganda’s Multiparty Parliament- A Critical Review, CEPA Policy Series Papers
Number 7 of 2016, Kampala,<
https://cepa.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ArmyRepresentationinParliament.pdf

11
 Varol argues that after a democratic coup, elections must be held within a reasonable time. He
states that that the military is determined to transfer power to democratically elected leaders so
that it escapes from the unknown business of governing a country and returns to what it knows
best - defending the country from external threats. For instance, the Turkish and Portuguese
militaries, which staged coups in 1960 and 1974, both returned the country to civilian rule within
two decades.
Unlike Zimbabwe’s current state of democratic transition, the argument of the transition period
in support of military interventionism cannot be supported in Uganda’s case. Uganda’s
constitutional history as discussed above shows that whereas was at the center of
Constitutionalism and the rule of governments, it was often times used as a political tool to
intimidate and vanquish opponents and overthrow democratic governments.
Uganda has since ceased to be in such a state in 1985 when NRM took over power from an
autocratic government. Whereas there are still incidents of rebellions and insecurities within the
country, it should not be a reason to keep the military in the public life of citizens as it is often
argued that the military must be out to maintain national security.
When we are to use transitioning as a justification for military intervention, it undermines the
constitutional notion of the will of the people who shall be governed in accordance with the
Constitution as enriched under Article 1(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.
Militarism continues to be present in the country even to date because the leadership assumes
that the military is more effective than other institutions however is feared that may not only
undermine other state institutions that the current dispensation had started to rebuild but may be
a way of attracting the military beyond their sphere.70

70
Solomon Muchwa Asiimwe, ‘Constitutionalism, Democratization and Militarism in Uganda’, <
https://ir.umu.ac.ug/bitstream/handle/20.500.12280/1243/Asiimwe_SASS_ARTICLE_2016.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed on 18th May 2023

12
 Section III
3.1. Legal implications of intervention of the Army in an established democracy
Solomon Muchwa Asiimwe,71 argues that reliance on militarism could also be an indication of
democratic immaturity and Uganda should avoid being labeled as such. Where democracy has
emerged the intervention of the military establishment in domestic politics becomes limited and
its influence should only be felt mainly in the conduct of external defense policies. Democracy
always implicitly presumes civilian supremacy over the command of the armed forces anything
short of that defines an incomplete democracy.
Constitutionalism and democratization can guarantee the protection of human rights but the
involvement of the military in managing civilian activities has tended to undermine this and the
protection of human rights in the country.72
A plethora of literature has made observations that it is true that some armies have decided to
challenge dictatorship and become the agent of democratic transition.73 But where democracy
exists in a stable form, its survival depends not only on the willingness of those with guns to
allow civilians to rule but also on the ability of civilian rulers to settle their differences without
resorting to armed power.74 Military power in Uganda has been used to destroy democratic
institutions, while armed struggle has also been used to defeat autocracy, and is now directly
involved in the creation of constitutional arrangements designed to neutralize the military as a
political force.75
In a strong democratic political culture, legitimately elected civilians authorities are fully
responsible for managing public and political affairs while the military are the neutral servants of
the state and the guardians of the society, the military is not supposed to represent or support any
political viewpoint or ethnic and social group and its loyalty is to the larger ideals of the nation,
to the rule of law and to the principle of democracy itself.76

71
Ibid
72
ibid
73
E. A. Brett, ‘Neutralizing the Use of Force in Uganda: The Role of the Military in Politics’, The Journal of Modern
African Studies , Mar., 1995, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 129-
152<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/161549.pdf?refreqid=excelsior
%3A48b2e56c9ccf7f91727dbd9c96e73336&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator= > accessed on 18th May 2023
74
ibid
75
ibid
76
ibid

13
 Section IV
4.1. Way Forward
Bore L, argues that Defence is a public service, and as such the public deserves to know how and
why its funds are spent by the military. 77 As corruption and mismanagement in the military have
far-reaching implications for national security and confidence in the entire government, thus
strengthening parliamentary controls over defence can improve the internal governance of
militaries and may go a long way towards resolving the problem of accountability of
parliament.78
Zimbabwe provides an example of how to set an effective military framework and its relations
with constitutional democracy. The removal of armed forces from partisan politics pursuant to
the Zimbabwe constitution made the military more professional in its execution of national
duties and as such, if Uganda is to draw a lesson from this set up it will resolve the persistent
conflicts between military relations and the notion of constitutional democracy, it will make the
government more democratic as well.
Uganda may also consider returning the army to barracks and building on their training by
involving them in international peacekeeping missions. The government of Ghana while it was in
the process of incremental transition to democracy, symbolized by Jerry Rawling’s recognition
from the military and ceasing to wear a military uniform, the government also embarked on a
purge of the most corrupt and politicized ranks within the military thus rendering them less likely
to intervene in democracy.79
4.2. Conclusion
In summary, the absence of a coup or threats to peace in Uganda does not justify the participation
and intervention of the military in a constitutional democracy. This paper in making a
comparative analysis of the military interventionism in Uganda and Zimbabwe has shown that
involvement of the military has one way or another other contributed to the overthrow of
democratic and or autocratic governments and human rights abuse. The paper has also noted that
having the Army in parliament has continued to undermine the will of the people to freely
participate in their political governance under the notion of constitutionalism.

77
Bore L, ‘Army Representation in Uganda’s Multiparty Parliament- A Critical Review, CEPA Policy Series Papers
Number 7 of 2016, Kampala,<
https://cepa.or.ug/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/ArmyRepresentationinParliament.pdf > accessed on 16th May
2023
78
ibid
79
ibid

14
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