TR 1055 - 1

Governing document Gradering: Internal
Addendum to TR1055 Performance standards for safety systems and

barriers - Offshore
Health, safety, security and the environment (HSE)

Technical and professional requirement,TR1055, Final Ver. 2.01, valid from 2013-06-27
Owner: Chief Engineer Safety Technology
Gyldig for: DPN/Norway/Offshore

Governing document: Addendum to TR1055 Performance standards for safety systems and Gradering: Internal
barriers - Offshore
1 Objective, target and provision........................................................................................................................... 4

1.1 Objective .................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Target ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Provision .................................................................................................................................................... 4
2 Requirements to management of technical safety ........................................................................................... 4
3 Additional information ......................................................................................................................................... 4
3.1 Definitions and abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 4
3.2 Changes from previous version ................................................................................................................. 4
3.3 References ................................................................................................................................................. 4
PS 1 Containment .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
PS 1.4 Functional requirements ............................................................................................................................ 5
PS 2 Natural Ventilation and HVAC ............................................................................................................................. 5
PS 3 Gas detection ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
PS 4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) ............................................................................................................................. 6
PS 4.5 Survivability requirements ......................................................................................................................... 6
PS 5 Open Drain ............................................................................................................................................................ 7
PS 6 Ignition Source Control........................................................................................................................................ 7
PS 7 Fire Detection ........................................................................................................................................................ 8
PS 8 Emergency Depressurisation and Flare/Vent System ..................................................................................... 8
PS 9 Active Fire Protection .......................................................................................................................................... 8
PS 10 Passive Fire Protection ...................................................................................................................................... 10
PS 10.4 Functional requirements .................................................................................................................. 10
PS 11 Emergency Power and Lighting ....................................................................................................................... 11
PS 12 Process Safety .................................................................................................................................................... 11
PS 13 Alarm and Communication System for use in Emergency Situations ......................................................... 11
PS 14 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER) ........................................................................................................... 12
PS 15 Layout Design Principles and Explosion Barriers ......................................................................................... 12
PS 31A Offshore Cranes.................................................................................................................................................. 13
PS 16B Drilling Hoisting System .................................................................................................................................... 13
PS 17A Well Integrity for wells in operation ................................................................................................................. 13
PS17B Well Integrity, drilling and completion ............................................................................................................. 13
PS 18 Ballast Water and Position Keeping................................................................................................................. 13
PS 19 Ship Collison Barriers ........................................................................................................................................ 13
PS 20 Structural Integrity ............................................................................................................................................. 13
PS 21 Not applicable ..................................................................................................................................................... 14
PS 22 Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Alarm Management ............................................................................. 14
Health, safety, security and the environment (HSE), Technical and professional
requirement,TR1055, Final Ver. 2.01, valid from 2013-06-27
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barriers - Offshore
PS 23 Safety & Automation System Security ............................................................................................................. 14
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barriers - Offshore
1 Objective, target and provision
1.1 Objective
The purpose of this document is to describe the safety related design requirements for technical systems
and barriers for use on offshore hydrocarbon producing and processing installations and facilities on the
Norwegian continental shelf. Chapter layout follows the same structure as corporate TR 1055.
In case of any deviation from the requirements of this addendum, the dispensation shall be applied to this
document. Any deviation from the requirements laid down by reference to corporate TR1055 dispensation
shall be applied to the corporate document.
TR1055 corporate and this addendum substitute and fulfill the requirements of NORSOK S-001. The latter
shall not be applied in case of dispensation applications.
1.2 Target
No additional requirements beyond chapter 1.2 in corporate TR1055.
1.3 Provision
The document is provided for in the Performance Standards for Safety Systems and Barriers (TR1055).
2 Requirements to management of technical safety

There are no additional requirements to the corporate TR1055.
3 Additional information
3.1 Definitions and abbreviations

3.2 Changes from previous version

The addendum has been changed from referring to NORSOK S-001 to be an addendum to corporate
TR1055 only. Necessary requirements to meet the intended safety level in S-001 have been included inn
the addendum.
3.3 References
Specific regional references:
 DNV OS-D101 – Marine and Machinery Systems and Equipment
 NORSOK R-002 – Lifting equipment, April 2010 Edition.
 TR1661 – Sikkerhetskrav til verksted for varmt arbeid klasse A
 WR1747 - Havovervåkning, DFU fartøy på kollisjonskurs.
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barriers - Offshore
PS 1 Containment
The following additional requirements to the corporate TR1055 apply on the Norwegian continental shelf:
PS 1.4 Functional requirements
PS 1.4.3 Mechanical connections
The following applies to the riser connection on the riser side of the ESD valve: Flanges shall not be used.
For flexible risers one mechanical connection, normally of compact flange type, may be accepted on the
riser side of ESD. SSIV shall be installed in this case, unless an equal safety level without SSIV can be
documented through safety analysis. The safety analysis shall specifically consider:
 differences in the PLL (potential loss of lives), and
 changes in frequency of loss of main safety function, and
 changes in frequency for material damage, and
 estimation of economical losses included lost production and environmental clean up
Compact flanges in risers shall be protected against accidental loads wich may expose the connection.
Compact flanges in risers above splash zone shall be according to Statoil specific requirements.
Instrument connections on the riser side of the ESD valve shall be subject to special safety considerations
if not possible to avoid.
In general mechanical connections shall meet the requirements in NORSOK L-005.
Mechanical connections for subsea applications shall be documented according to ISO 10423 annex F
Performance verification procedures.
PS 2 Natural Ventilation and HVAC

PS 2.4.4 Mechanical ventilation in non-hazardous areas with “openings” towards hazardous area
Use of flow measurement for monitoring of overpressure is judged to provide a tolerable level of safety
equivalent to direct pressure measurement considering implementation of measures such as;
 use of air lock including gas detection inside and delayed disconnection of power upon loss of flow
 if air lock is not included, use of self-closing and gas tight door together with disconnection of power
upon loss of ventilation/gas alarm from surrounding area.
Additional open door alarm as required by NORSOK S-001 is not assessed to be mandatory due to
insignificant risk contribution provided one of the measures above are implemented
PS 2.4.5 Ventilation inlets and outlets
All air inlets shall be located in non-hazardous areas, as far as practicable away from possible
hydrocarbon leakage sources, and minimum 3 m from any zone 2 boundaries.
The outlet air from hazardous spaces shall be routed through separate ducts to outdoor area which, in the
absence of the considered exhaust, is of the same or lesser hazard than the ventilated space.
The last paragraph shall be replaced by:

For mechanically ventilated classified areas, the ventilation intake and outlet may be located in a classified
area of equal or less hazardous zone.
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barriers - Offshore
PS 3 Gas detection

PS 3.4.4 Gas detection actions
S-001 clause 12.4.5 states that overridden or faulty detectors shall be treated logically as if in alarm (i.e,
indicating gas detection). The corporate TR1055 maintains an equivalent requirement, but permit in
addition, another solution to be applied which is considered to be equally safe given fulfilment of certain
prerequisites.
PS 4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD)

PS 4.4.1 Manual release stations (buttons)
It shall be possible to initiate immediate shut down from CCR during timer countdown.
See also specific requirements in PS 22.4.3 in corporate TR1055.
PS 4.4.2 ESD final elements
Valves on the liquid outlet of large vessels shall be categorized as ESD valves if an ignited liquid leak from
the separator will exceed the defined heat loads for the area.
PS 4.4.7 ESD independence
ESD functions shall be functionally and physically segregated from other systems/functions but the ESD
logic solver can be an integrated node in the overall SAS, i.e.:
 ESD units (logic solver) shall not be used for other than ESD functions;
 if applied for ESD, sensor accessories (e.g. process tapping, impulse lines, air supply branch-off and
power fuses) shall be separate from other functions such as process control devices and process shut
down devices.
The ESD can be realised in a common HMI and network arrangement (i.e. of the SAS) provided that any
failures in any systems connected within the same arrangement do not adversely affect the intended ESD
safety functions. This realisation shall be subject to given prerequisites as described in OLF Guideline No.
070.
PS 4.5 Survivability requirements
ESD valves shall be certified in accordance with recognized standard regarding fire resistance, and shall
preferably have metal-to-metal seats.
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PS 5 Open Drain
PS 6 Ignition Source Control

Electrical isolation is defined as disconnection of power feeder cable from distribution board, i.e. local
disconnection only is not regarded as electrical isolation.

PS 6.4.2 Equipment in hazardous areas
All Ex-equipment in Group 2 shall be isolated from switchgear upon confirmed gas detection and/or ESD2.
Company note: this particular requirement shall be read as an ALARP measure and is most likely relevant
to implement as part of new design realisation, i.e., the intent is to minimise ignition risk by removing as
much as possible of electrically energised field equipment at an early stage of a gas leak even though
such equipment is explosion protected.
Anchoring equipment
Anchor handling winches should be located in non-hazardous area.
Seawater spraying (deluge) or other relevant measures for spark suppression should be considered.
Temporary equipment
Gas detection shall give signal to F&G nodes on the installation and relevant actions shall be initiated.
Fire detection and other alarms shall be given to CCR. This may be given as a single common alarm.
Relevant actions shall be initiated. This may be locally.
Ignition source control (ISC) independence and reliability

ISC shall be independent of power distribution control system and PSD.
All ISC signals from F&G/ESD shall be hardwired to the respective breakers.
The ISC shall be realized with as few breakers as possible to ensure sufficient reliability. The breakers
shall be fail-safe.
The electrical ignition sources, that are simultaneously isolated, should be fed by the same bus bar.
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barriers - Offshore
PS 7 Fire Detection
PS 7.4.4 Fire detection actions
S-001 clause 13.4.5 states that overridden or faulty detectors shall be treated logically as if in alarm (i.e.,
indicating fire detection). The corporate TR1055 maintains an equivalent requirement, but permit in
addition, another solution to be applied which is considered to be equally safe given fulfilment of certain
prerequisites.
PS 8 Emergency Depressurisation and Flare/Vent System

As opposed to NORSOK S-001, Statoil differentiates the LEL requirements from cold vents and
extinguished flares. The gas concentrations from cold vents shall not exceed 20% LEL in any area with
potential ignition sources. This is also to accommodate for health and working environment. An
extinguished flare is a failure mode of a safety system with a low probability. This is credited by raising the
allowed gas concentration limit to 50% LEL in any area with potential ignition sources. No more than 30%
LEL in helicopter flight path applies for both cold vents and flares. Exceedance of the maximum gas
concentration shall not occur with a frequency of more than 10-4 per year.
PS 9 Active Fire Protection

PS 9.4.1 Fire fighting strategy
Regarding reference to table C3 in ISO 13702:
 water density for wellhead area shall be 20 litres/minute/m2 if not dedicated spray of 400 litre/minute
per wellhead is used
 10 litres/minute/m2 is acceptable for the manifiold area
 helifuel tanks shall have deluge coverage.
 drill floor shall have deluge coverage.
PS 9.4.2 Firewater (FW) supply system
The FW supply shall be sufficient to cover the area with the largest FW demand plus the adjacent fire area
with largest demand including two hydrants.
The FW ring main shall be dimensioned for the demand of the largest fire area with one segment of the
ring main closed and for any FW pump configuration running, and for the demand of both the largest fire
area and the largest neighbouring area without any segments closed.
If needed, the FW ring main shall be equipped with two points (minimum 6 in) for connection to external
water supply as a compensating measure for lack of availability of firewater during commissioning or
during transit operations. SOLAS international shore couplings should be usedScreen at seawater inlet
and strainer shall be installed. The inlet arrangement shall be designed to ensure that the FW pumps also
can function at 150 % of rated capacity.
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Suction lines from sea chests shall be provided with two valves, and one of the valves remotely operated.
For material selection, see OLF Guideline No. 075.
The water supply system and level control arrangement in water filled structures shall meet the required
reliability.
PS 9.4.3 Firewater pump arrangement

The FW pump system configuration shall at least be equal to 4 x 50 % of the largest fire area with respect
to capacity and availability. Alternatively a 3 x 100 % pump system configuration is acceptable.
Start batteries for the FW pump engines and batteries for the diesel control system shall be located within
the same enclosure as the engines. The batteries shall be easily accessible and located above floor level.
A manual isolation switch/valve (car sealed) between the starter motor and the start battery/air bank shall
be provided.
The FW pump engine start batteries shall be charged by the FW engine generator while running and in
addition charged from main power supply.
The FW pump engine cooling water and/or oil preheat function for diesel engines shall be in accordance
with NFPA 20 requirements and supplier’s recommendations.
It shall be possible to operate FW pump engines when ventilation to the enclosure has been shut off.
PS 9.4.4 Deluge system

Deluge shall be automatically released upon confirmed gas detection in areas where effective for
explosion mitigation.
Deluge valves shall be provided with manual bypass including flow restriction (if necessary) to match flow
through the valve. The bypass line shall be taken from another section of the ring main ensuring FW
supply at all times, including maintenance situations.
For manned installations resetting of deluge, monitor and sprinkler control valves shall for normally
manned platforms only be possible local to the valves.
Fixed or oscillating monitors may be used as an alternative to deluge coverage for the turret protection if
adequate performance can be achieved.
Company note: Fixed or oscillating monitors are also considered to be a suitable alternative for use with
open process areas if adequate performance can be documented.
PS 9.4.5 Sprinkler system

Priming of wet pipe sprinkler systems with fresh water should be evaluated.
Adequate venting facilities with valves shall be provided for wet pipe sprinklers.
For dry pipe sprinkler systems the sprinkler valve arrangement shall be fitted with an accelerator.
The sprinkler heads should be of the frangible bulb type, set to burst at 68 °C, in general areas. However,
a higher temperature limit should be selected for areas where high ambient temperatures might be
expected.
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barriers - Offshore
PS 9.4.6 Foam system

Centralised foam systems shall have a total foam concentrate capacity sufficient for minimum 30 min
simultaneously supply to the largest fire area and the largest neighbouring area requiring foam.
For local foam systems the total foam concentrate capacity in each local holding tank shall be sufficient for
30 min supply to the applicable deluge valve skid.
The centralised foam concentrate pump system shall comprise of two pump systems and be powered from
dedicated drivers or from the firewater diesel drivers. If the pumps are connected to firewater diesel
generator, it shall also be possible to run the pumps from main power in order to run/test pump without
starting the FW diesel generator.
PS 9.4.8 Helideck fire fighting system
The helicopter deck shall be equipped with adequate fire protection equipment and with sufficient drainage
capacity to enable escape and fire fighting in the event of helideck related fires. This shall be achieved by
complying with the following sub-requirements:
 a DIFFS (deck integrated fire fighting system) shall be the preferred means of active fire protection and
shall comply with:
 the water-foam mix shall be applied with a minimum spray height corresponding to the top of the
applicable helicopter bodies in calm conditions. This to ensure a safety margin with respect to safe
escape, including windy conditions;
 the water density shall be minimum 10 (l/min)/m2 for the helideck;
Foam monitors (normally not required when DIFFS is installed) shall, when installed, comply with:
 one monitor to be located at each of the three access ways;
 the foam monitor fire fighting system shall be capable of delivering foam on the helicopter deck
maximum 20 s after activation at a rate of minimum 1 500 l/min per monitor at 7 barg (0.7 MPa)
nozzle pressure;
 foam monitors shall always start with water spray in the fog position automatically;
 it shall be possible to start monitors in preset oscillation or fixed position from both local and remote
protected position;
 risk assessment justifying the use of monitors as an alternative to DIFFS.
Two dual agent hose reels (combined water/foam and dry chemical hose reel) shall be provided and have:
 sufficient powder for discharge at a rate of 2 kg/s to 3 kg/s for minimum 100 s;
PS 10 Passive Fire Protection

PS 10.4.1 Separation of main areas and fire divisions
CCR, FW pump systems, emergency power supply with related distribution equipment and fuel tank shall
be protected from the surroundings by minimum Class A-60 fire divisions. Cementing units and associated
equipment required for emergency operation (kill function) shall be protected from fire events to which they
can be exposed.
Generators (including prime mover), transformers, major distribution panels, rooms for ventilation
equipment and equipment used for storage of flammable commodities or easily ignitable material shall be
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separated from the surroundings of at least Class A-0 fire divisions.Structural elements, beams and piping
shall be fireproofed on either side of a fire division between hydrocarbon areas.
PS 10.4.2 Load bearing structures and resistance against fire

No account shall be taken from possible cooling effect from fire fighting equipment.
PS 10.4.3 Vessels and piping

On turrets, production or export/gas injection risers shall be protected against fires in the turret by passive
means, such as conductors or coating. At riser termination end the riser connector and first ESD valve
shall be protected by passive means.
PS 11 Emergency Power and Lighting

PS 11.4.2 Emergency power consumers
Typically the following equipment and systems have a function during an emergency situation and shall
have emergency power supply:
 SAS;
 active smoke control ventilation system(s);
 charging of UPS and lifeboat batteries;
 emergency lighting;
 auxiliary equipment (e.g. ventilation fans) required for run down of turbines and generators after a shut
down;
 electrical deck cranes (power capacity required for operation of one crane);
 well related equipment for securing the well as specified in NORSOK D-001;
 purging systems;
 Firewater and foam systems (when emergency generators supply firewater/foam pumps, the
requirements for firewater pump prime mover apply to emergency generators);
 other fire fighting systems as required by the safety strategy;
 helicopter landing and warning lights;
 PAGA, alarm and emergency communication systems;
 navigation aids;
 bilge and ballast pump(s).
PS 12 Process Safety
PS 13 Alarm and Communication System for use in Emergency Situations

PS 13.4.1 Alarm and Communication System for use in Emergency Situations
Location, number, type and effect from alarm systems/equipment/signal shall be easily recognised in any
area where distribution of the alarm is required.
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An alarm system with announcer in the galley and a push button in each refrigerating room shall be
installed. The main purpose of this system is to provide an alarm in case personnel is trapped within
refrigerated areas.
This system shall be fed by emergency power (UPS). The alarm shall also be routed to CCR and F&G
mimic.
PS 14 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER)

PS 14.4.3 Evacuation systems
As means of evacuation in respect of evacuation to sea, free-fall lifeboats supplemented by escape chutes
and associated life rafts shall be used.
In the vicinity to any lifeboat embarkation area at least one escape chute with minimum capacity of the
largest lifeboat shall be included.
PS 15 Layout Design Principles and Explosion Barriers

PS 15.4.1 Main design principles
Safety systems shall be located or protected to ensure operation during relevant emergency condition.
Lifting and lay down:

 Considerations shall be given to sidewise movement of load.
 Lifting above high voltage equipment and cables shall be assessed, and protection shall be considered
installed.
 Crane software should give alarm in crane when lifting restriction boundaries are exceeded.
 Location of lay down areas shall be assessed regarding possible negative effects on technical barriers
(e.g. F&G detection, firewater system, natural ventilation), explosion risk and explosion relief (panels).
PS 15.4.2 Storage and handling of explosives

The storage location for explosives shall allow for emergency dumping to sea.
Company note: additional dumping of explosives to sea as required by NORSOK S-001 is not assessed to
be mandatory due to insignificant risk contribution provided measures in TR1055 PS15.4.6 are
implemented.
PS 15.4.7 Floating installations

General:
For floating installations the following shall apply:
 process area shall be separated from FPSO hydrocarbon storage tank top by air gap of minimum 3 m
and plated deck;
 the effects of “green sea” shall be carefully evaluated and means of protection arranged;
Turret:
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barriers - Offshore
 The turret arrangement design shall aim at achieving open naturally ventilated areas and minimising
explosion pressure.
 Enclosed mechanically ventilated areas should be restricted to LER/LIR with control or special
equipment that requires special protection or cannot be located in outdoor environment. Such
enclosed premises shall have over pressure ventilation, with air taken from and exhausted to a non-
hazardous area. Location of the premises themselves as well as their ventilation inlets shall take into
account the prevailing wind directions.
PS 16A Offshore Cranes

PS 16B Drilling Hoisting System

PS 17A Well Integrity for wells in operation

PS17B Well Integrity, drilling and completion

PS 18 Ballast Water and Position Keeping

PS 18.4.1 Ballast and bilge system
The ballast and bilge system shall comply with the requirements in
NMD Regulations No.879 concerning ballast systems on mobile offshore units,
NMD Regulations No.123 for mobile offshore units with production plants and equipment.
When any of the ballast pumps are inoperable, e.g. flooding of pump room, the ballast system shall be capable of
restoring the unit to an upright position and acceptable draught as regards strength, after damage, within 3 hours.
PS 18.4.4 Position keeping system
In addition the need for quick re-positioning of the installation in case of specific emergency situations shall
be evaluated. Important factors in this evaluation are number and types of risers, riser pressures, SSIVs
and mooring arrangement.
PS 19 Ship Collison Barriers

There are no additional requirements to the corporate TR1055
PS 20 Structural Integrity
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PS 21 Not applicable
PS 22 Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Alarm Management

PS 22.4.6 Critical action panel (CAP) control functions
The CAP shall include the following control functions:
 selection of FW/foam pumps for standby/duty;
 ignition source isolation by relevant levels;
 emergency stop of ballast pumps and valves;
 A function disconnecting power to the ESD logic solvers shall be included allowing activation upon
failure of programmable logic.
PS 23 Safety & Automation System Security

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Governing document Gradering: Internal

Addendum to TR1055 Performance standards for safety systems and

Health, safety, security and the environment (HSE)

Owner: Chief Engineer Safety Technology

Gyldig for: DPN/Norway/Offshore

1 Objective, target and provision........................................................................................................................... 4

PS 23 Safety & Automation System Security ............................................................................................................. 14

1 Objective, target and provision

2 Requirements to management of technical safety

3.1 Definitions and abbreviations

3.2 Changes from previous version

In general mechanical connections shall meet the requirements in NORSOK L-005.

PS 2 Natural Ventilation and HVAC

The last paragraph shall be replaced by:

PS 3.4 Functional requirements

PS 4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD)

PS 6 Ignition Source Control

PS 6.4 Functional requirements

Ignition source control (ISC) independence and reliability

PS 8 Emergency Depressurisation and Flare/Vent System

PS 9 Active Fire Protection

PS 9.4.3 Firewater pump arrangement

PS 9.4.4 Deluge system

PS 9.4.5 Sprinkler system

PS 9.4.6 Foam system

PS 10 Passive Fire Protection

PS 10.4.2 Load bearing structures and resistance against fire

PS 10.4.3 Vessels and piping

PS 11 Emergency Power and Lighting

PS 13 Alarm and Communication System for use in Emergency Situations

PS 14 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER)

PS 15 Layout Design Principles and Explosion Barriers

Lifting and lay down:

PS 15.4.2 Storage and handling of explosives

PS 15.4.7 Floating installations

PS 16A Offshore Cranes

PS 16B Drilling Hoisting System

PS 17A Well Integrity for wells in operation

PS17B Well Integrity, drilling and completion

PS 18 Ballast Water and Position Keeping

PS 19 Ship Collison Barriers

There are no additional requirements to the corporate TR1055

PS 22 Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Alarm Management

PS 23 Safety & Automation System Security

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