1.) G.R. No.

94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void. 1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess
a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"  and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his
2

marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet
Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract
as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son.
The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his
lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law
Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother
replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that
she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but
when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby
declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her
reappearance. 4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief
for such declaration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis
to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper
case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that
his wife is already dead."
6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,  the following crucial
7

differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.  Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil
8

Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391
of the Civil Code.  The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
9

is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.  10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied
with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas,   is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
12

case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith
belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain
the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife,
who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the
only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . .  13

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,   he secured another seaman's contract
14

and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?

A Yes, Sir.

Court:

How did you do that?

A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to
London to look for her I could not find her (sic).   (Emphasis supplied)
15

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:

. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between
London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place
in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks,
every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places
of destination does not appear to be fatal.  16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent   too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
17

The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims
were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence
cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility.   As noted before,
18

there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San
Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their
place of residence.   Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
19

authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,   the Court stressed that:

20

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It
is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they make. . . . .   (Emphasis supplied)
21

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave
the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In In Re Szatraw,   the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
22

dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in

accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,   the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
23

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
 The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. 24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
2.) G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven
to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take
up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
 Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and
(2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code
requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x     x x x     x x x

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

x x x      x x x      x x x

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official
act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. 31 The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. 39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It
is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of
the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. 46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c)
Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 55 (2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4"
– Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
3.) G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth
Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178 and the Resolution dated
1  2 

October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They
did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second
marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.
5  6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage
to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed
her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations. 7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their
knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to
petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
Santella that he was still single.
8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with
leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the
same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
accused. The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.
9  10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for
the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in
Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. When the Board denied the said motion in its Order
12 

dated July 16, 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the
13 

Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to
the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative
proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the
same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated
petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any
concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the
denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with
law. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his
15 

failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce
evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court
held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the
other action involved is a civil case.
17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL

[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot
and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling
precepts and rules. 20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
21 

suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the
23 

civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab
initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs.
Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
24  25 

a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article
states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In Landicho vs. Relova, we held
26  27 

that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law,
still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is
civil.
29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of
the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the
administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final
decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to
the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with
immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to
their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. The existence of these other charges
30 

justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to
evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the
first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract
between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and
there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original
copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said
contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony
participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In this case,
32 

the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of
the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner;
and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been
held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and
decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to
33 

adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in
view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he
is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the
demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. The RTC’s
35 

observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented
sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. Said declaration by the RTC should
36 

not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court
denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the
case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have
been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner
manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in
said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration
had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident
and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and
required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested
that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he
would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in
the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively
show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this
37  38 

Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a
judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound
discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules
of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The
test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial
trial. The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his
40 

counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s
motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to
support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by
unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

4.) G.R. No. 191425               September 7, 2011

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538.
The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:

"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO
O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not
been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and
agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a
plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not
guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and
defense entered the following stipulation of facts:

"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on
April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;

2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second marriage
to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-
Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the second marriage
is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter,
trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:

"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia
while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted
her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and
because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4,
2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she
secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in
CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to
which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private
complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when
she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and
introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a
friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby
losing income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral
damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts]
of committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped
when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is
not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of
₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private complainant and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she
was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI,
Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and
she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and the private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much
(TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:

"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant
Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way
back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim
convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a
Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad
Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic]
told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant
case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified
that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this
fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but
that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P.
Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since
the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage
to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh
Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the
Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who
was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the
application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of the instant
case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a
Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the
Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first
Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN,
October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim
faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he
should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the
second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he
advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration,
otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case
was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter
since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a
Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a
Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted
that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she
went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)." 5

The Trial Court’s Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of the Family Code, or
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential
Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which
provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more
than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law
and only in exceptional cases."

In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs.
Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain
requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain
circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir,
1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent
marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of
court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council
shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall,
subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the
above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both
marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken
belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that]
a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are
requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides
so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not
required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the
Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient
evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against
her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by
Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the
door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino
was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not
be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account,
proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon
him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail bond
pending appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11

The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his
Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious
beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil
laws.  Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence
1avvphi1

the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The
allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no
reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

The Court’s Ruling

Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14 (2)
Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora
admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; 15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang
Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa,
Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate 18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s
marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO
M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years
1973 to 2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

   
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his
religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a
certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:

(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and

(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.

Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of
the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may
contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.

x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in
marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent
witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting
parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;

 (b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize
marriage; or

(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge,
should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge,
office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the
parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-
musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so
fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social
standing of the parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim
and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s
religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of
bigamy.21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s
religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs
of Nollora’s liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these
omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]

Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic
Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr.
Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with
Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage
contract?

[NOLLORA:]

A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place any Catholic there.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with your co-
accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said
that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena
Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my
Balik-Islam, that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to
marry another, that’s why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.

Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]

Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you
were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?

xxx

[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic]
because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.

xxx

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the permission of
your first wife to get married?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always
very mad, ma’am.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino.  Nollora may not
1avvphi1

impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening
the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated
on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the
accessory penalties provided by law.
5.) G.R. No. 165545             March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the
Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC
Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents
and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted
marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted by the SSS on
April 6, 1998.14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before
the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three
marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the
documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February
13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as
early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage between
Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much alive." 16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P.
Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, 17 he further attesting in a sworn
statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the
SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of
payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to
her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that
she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the
amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring the
first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not become final.
The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the
deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to
Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate
the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable
marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and
Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly
pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI
Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of
monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October
12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release
of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon
designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to file
a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to
monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000
representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake." 28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one
Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of
Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not
true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in
Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her
even after their separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore,
she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate
spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death
benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the
funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the
demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS
Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that
the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th
Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad faith. This
Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9,
1999,32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente
Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud
upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased member the right to marry
anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955
to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties
thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning
spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased
member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of
Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she received from the SSS for the
period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente
Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
benefit.33 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration 34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for
review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order
of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now
RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more importantly, whether or not the
respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the
latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare
the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that
"the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by a
person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision
of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular courts under the
pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the
soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC
to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of
doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence for and her
behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no
longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital bond between
Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is there a second marriage
to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the
authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and
subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom,
between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the Social Security
Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in
her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the
present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the
existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to
the death benefits."41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is
no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts
of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through
fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and
Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not
give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine
the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.42

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of
the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases
rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first
marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had
not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant
from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance
of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a
case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42
thereof provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person,  with due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will
not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of
law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration
but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of
valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in
annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of
the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the
Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties
involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. 54 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 55 Upon the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior
to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6.) G.R. No. 187512               June 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 issued by
1  2 

the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric
Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at
the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition was
raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-
0530.

On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts
to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order
dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the
Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She
argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death
3 

under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April
2009. 4

Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.

Issues

1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
 2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented

Our Ruling

1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the
5 

purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code.
The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is
unavailing.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed
thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of
6 

respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was
an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory."

x x x           x x x          x x x

But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the
RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision
of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc, issued a few months later.
7 

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for
the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial
court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court, a record on appeal is required
8 

to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this
Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls
under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to
enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article
41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this
action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA.

We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its
ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."

At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary
proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango: 9

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with
the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because
the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the
RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final
and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented

Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic
v. Nolasco, United States v. Biasbas and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro as authorities on the subject.
10  11  12 

In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the
Philippines soon after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer.
Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his
"well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling
thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the
Civil Code. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or
13 

that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the
absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas, which it found to be instructive
14 

as to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts
of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only
basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.

Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling
affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground
that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead.
The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of
a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The
law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia
sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.  It may be proved by direct evidence or
1âwphi1

circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so
far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic]
evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring
supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse,
she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can
no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and
3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
 7.) G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an
action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person
declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on� June
15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2 chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June
18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4 chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her
to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.8chanrobleslaw

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired
about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.11 chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left.� He believed that she had passed away.12 chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.13 chanrobleslaw

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment14 before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring
her presumptively dead.18 chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac.� She also never left and worked as a domestic
helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left
their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to
cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to
support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.24 chanrobleslaw

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26 chanrobleslaw

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition
for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals,
the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance
in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.28 chanrobleslaw

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28,
2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5,
2009.30chanrobleslaw

Hence, this petition was filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would
be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place.32 She
insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive
death is obtained fraudulently.33 chanrobleslaw

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death.34 chanrobleslaw

In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper
remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always
file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of
Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the
appropriate remedy.

The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner."36 chanrobleslaw

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.37 This court
defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38 chanrobleslaw

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic
when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. 39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely
claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death
were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's
petition.44 chanrobleslaw

These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with
the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than
two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from
her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year
period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46
chanrobleslaw

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the
fraud perpetrated on her.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47 chanrobleslaw

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement  of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact
of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination.� Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse
will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming,
such fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.48 The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw

This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent
marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54 chanrobleslaw

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was
absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.� However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead.
The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the
valsid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from
an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.58 chanrobleslaw

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.59 chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent
marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."60 chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of
the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived
before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. 62 Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.63 chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify
the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife."64� This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not
available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
8.) G.R. No. 210580

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

Nature of the Petition

Challenged before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
1

Resolutions  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3, 2013   and December 6,
2 3

2013.  The assailed Resolutions denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for failure to file a motion for
4

reconsideration.

Likewise challenged is the Decision  dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan,
5

Branch 11, declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's (private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag (Shanaviv),
as presumptively dead.

The Antecedent Facts

Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each
other as husband and wife. Their union begot two (2) children named Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A.
Catubag, both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001, respectively. 6

In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent took work overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv
stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the needs of their children. 7

On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized
by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan. 8

Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to acquire a housing unit located at Rio del
Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to continue his work. While
abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family. 9

On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their
house and never returned. In the meantime, private respondent's relatives took care of the children.  10

Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his children, private respondent took an
emergency vacation and flew back home. Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail.
He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but they too
could offer no help. Private respondent travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still
could not locate her.11

Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, one of the more well-known radio
networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance. Moreover, private respondent
searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no avail.  12

On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his
wife declared presumptively dead.  13

On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. The dispositive portion of the decision which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG is hereby adjudged
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD only for the purpose that petitioner LUDYSON C. CATUBAG may contract a marriage
subsequent to what he had with SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without prejudice to the reappearance of the
latter.

SO ORDERED.  14

On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC
to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner's main contention is
that private respondent failed to establish a "well-founded belief' that his missing wife was already dead.  15

In its Resolution  dated September 3, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition because no motion for reconsideration
16

was filed with the court a quo. The CA ruled that such defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 17

On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution   dated December 6, 2013. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
18

Court.

The Issues

The petitioner anchors its plea for the annulment of the assailed resolutions and the denial of private respondent's
petition to declare his wife presumptively dead on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PREVIOUSLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] ON
THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ATTACH THERETO COPIES OF ALL PERTINENT AND
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS.

III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A WELLFOUNDED BELIEF THAT HIS WIFE IS
PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.

IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE HIS INTENTION TO RE-MARRY.  19

In sum, the instant petition rests on the resolution of two issues: (1) whether or not petitioner's resort to a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the decision of the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was
proper; and (2) whether or not private respondent complied with the essential requisites of a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies available. Hence,
a party aggrieved by an action of a court must first correctly determine the nature of the order, resolution, or
decision, in order to properly assail it.
20
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration of presumptive death, the relevant provisions of
law are Articles 41, 238, and 253 of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide that actions for
presumptive death are summary in nature. Article 41 provides:

Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Article 238 in relation to Article 253, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, of the Family Code provides:

Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.

xxxx

Article 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis Supplied)

Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code because by express mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final and
executory.  As explained by the Court in Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-Lorino,  citing Atty. Veloria vs.
21 22

Comelec: 23

[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since,
by express mandate of Article 24 7 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein.
The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. 24

Further, it is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land.  25

While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal, in a petition for declaration
of presumptive death, they may challenge the decision of the court a quo through a petition for certiorari to question
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 26

In Republic vs. Sarenogon, Jr.,   the Court outlined the legal remedies available in a summary proceeding for the
27

declaration of presumptive death. If aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then filing with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any subsequent decision by the CA may then be elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.  28

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
challenge the RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.

Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging the RTC's Order, the Court shall now proceed to
tackle the issue of whether or not private respondent has sufficiently complied with the essential requisites in a
petition for declaration of presumptive death.
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code that
must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper: first, the absent spouse has been
missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code.  Second, the present spouse wishes to
29

remarry. Third, the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present spouse
files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.  30

In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse who has the burden of proving that all the
requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. In the instant case, since it is private respondent who
asserts the affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same. He who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegations will not suffice.
31

Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied with the first, second, and fourth requisites. Thus,
what remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully discharged the burden of establishing
a well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.

The Court in Cantor,  pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief' has no exact definition under the law. In fact,
32

the Court notes that such belief depends on the circumstances of each particular case. As such, each petition must
be judged on a case-to-case basis.  33

This is not to say, however, that there is no guide in establishing the existence of a well-founded belief that an
absent spouse is already dead. In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva,  the Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided
34

that such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort
on the part of the present spouse to locate the missing one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt
by the present spouse to locate the former, will not suffice. The Court expounded on the required diligence, to wit:

The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any
news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which can only be discharged upon a
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.  (Citations omitted)
35

Furthermore, jurisprudence is replete with cases which help determine whether belief of an absent spouses' death is
well-founded or not.  A perusal of the cases of Republic vs. Granada,  Cantor,  and Orcelino-Villanueva  reveal the
1âwphi1
36 37 38

circumstances which do not meet the Court's standards in establishing a "well-founded belief."

In Granada,  the present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in locating her absent spouse by inquiring from the
39

latter's relatives regarding his whereabouts. The Court ruled against the present spouse and stated that the mere
act of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by law. It pointed out that the present spouse did
not report to the police nor seek the aid of mass media. Even worse, the present spouse did not even bother to
present any of the absent spouses' relatives to corroborate her allegations. 40

Similarly in Cantor,  the present spouse alleged that she exerted "earnest efforts" in attempting to locate her missing
41

husband. She claimed that she made inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and friends as to his whereabouts.
She even stated that she would take the time to look through the patient's directory whenever she would visit a
hospital.
42

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise. It held that the present spouse engaged in a
mere "passive-search" Applying the "stringent-standards" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence, the
Court pointed out four acts of the present spouse which contradict the claim of a diligent and active search,   to wit:
43

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients' directory therein were unintentional. She did not
purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed
to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to
seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her
efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As
held in Nolasco, the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse's
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent
search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's whereabouts.  (Citations omitted)
44

The foregoing conduct of the present spouse led the Court to conclude that her efforts in searching for her absent
spouse were insincere. Ultimately, the Courts considered these attempts insufficient to comply with the requirement
of conducting a reasonable, diligent, and active search. 45

In Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court likewise ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that she had a well-founded
belief that her absent spouse was already dead. In said case, the present spouse began her "search" by returning
home from her work overseas to look for her missing husband. She then inquired from her in-laws and common
friends as to his whereabouts. The present spouse even went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse
was born. Additionally, the present spouse claimed that fifteen (15) years have already lapsed since her husband's
disappearance. 46

In that case, the Court held that the factual circumstances were very similar to the two aforementioned cases. It
further held that it was erroneous for the lower courts to grant the petition for declaration of presumptive death. The
Court explained why the present spouse's allegations should not have been given credence, to wit:

Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to
satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.

Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions
without any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about
the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from whom she learned the disappearance
of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to
locate her husband.   (Citations omitted)
47

Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the existence of a "well-founded belief," the
Court now shifts focus to the specific circumstances surrounding the current case. In the case at bar, private
respondent first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates and returned to the Philippines to
search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in
Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known radio station, regarding
the fact of disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in
Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities. 48

Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor,  Granada,  and Orcelino-Villanueva,  the Court
49 50 51

finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:

First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts from both friends and
relatives. Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in the place where
his wife was born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives
to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous
cases, failure to present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a
diligent search.

Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies, namely, the local police
authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-
founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid
of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the
present spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse.  52

Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his "well-founded belief'
on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's bare
assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded
belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv,
are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence
which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions.
Again, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.

Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's alleged disappearance
through a known radio station was corroborated.  This act comes nowhere close to establishing a well-founded
53

belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she abandoned
the family.

To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal approach in complying with the requisite
of establishing a well-founded belief that the missing spouse is dead. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),  the Court cautioned against such a liberal approach. It opined that to do so would allow easy circumvention
54

and undermining of the Family Code. The Court stated:

There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry
knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot
have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the
Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.

Stated otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by simply agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in
evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse. A lenient approach in applying the
standards of diligence required in establishing a "well-founded belief' would defeat the State's policy in protecting
and strengthening the institution of marriage. 55

On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that
the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the RTC should have denied private respondent's petition for declaration of
presumptive death.

In fine, having determined the propriety of petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari and private respondent's
failure to meet the stringent standard and degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support his claim of a
"well-founded belief' that his wife, Shanaviv, is already dead, it is proper for the Court to grant the petition.
Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the
petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared
presumptively dead is DENIED.
9.) G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal  assailing the Decision  dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution  dated March 20, 2017 of the
1 2 3

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).  The allegations of
4

the petition read:

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave street, Zone B.
San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya, Pampanga since
August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone
B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to
again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was
already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her] beloved husband
[Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of
him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than
three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially with a
meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully
belong to her in order to survive;

10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least declaration of
presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638
as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of
the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of the Philippines
(Republic).5

On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision  in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition. The dispositive
6

portion of the Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming financial
benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.

8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside
the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE,
and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC).
Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the presumption of death
established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The
RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a
person is dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an authorized
suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code

A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's petition by declaring
Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression that the petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.  This is
9

wrong.

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have warranted
the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for
the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a
prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated
that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended. 10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code  as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule
11

regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was
misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner
was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the
Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition
whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a
valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai
Szatraw.  In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death  is merely one of the evidence that-
12 13

while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that a person had
been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in
a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right ti be
enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a
prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does
not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's
situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory, would be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact,
out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
decree, then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or
upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v. Republic  and Gue v.
14

Republic  in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and,
15

implicity, also those based on the Civil based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).

Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the considerations why a
petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz: 16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court or a tribunal
to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively
to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual
controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to
be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil
Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the same only confirms tha
existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that-like the one
filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.  Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's
17

petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception that a court
declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death
benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.  This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her
18

misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to
unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine
Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception may have been
peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been
requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before processing
the death before processing the death benefits of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following guidelines-culled from
relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with
claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:

1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the
claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such claims, the
PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant,
whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation
of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said articles are
established.  Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in order to establish the
19

presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter. 20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate
office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"  which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing
21

for such number of years and or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the claimant and
determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil
Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence
submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay
the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the
presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant may file an
appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43
of the Rules of the Court.  And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with
1avvphi1

the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing
guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March
20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial
decision of a court of law that a person is presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans'
Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
 10.) [ G.R. No. 212726, June 10, 2020 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LEILANIE DELA CRUZ FENOL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 28, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated May 26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan De Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05084[MIN]
affirming in toto the Decision4 dated April 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 41
(RTC) in Spl. Proc. No. 09-22 declaring Reneto Alilongan Suminguit (Reneto) presumptively dead under Article 41
of the Family Code.

The Antecedents

On July 8, 2000, Leilanie Dela Cruz Fenol (respondent) married Reneto in Kidapawan City. Out of this union, they
begot a child named Loren Jade Fenol Suminguit.5

Sometime in January 2001, Reneto left the conjugal dwelling in Malayan, M'lang, Cotabato and went to Manila to
apply for work abroad. Since then, he has not come back to his family and his whereabouts have been unknown for
a continuous period of more than eight years. Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of Reneto Alilongan Suminguit dated November 16, 2009 before the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato.6

In the petition, respondent alleged that she exerted earnest efforts to locate the whereabouts of her husband. She
went to Manila sometime in 2002 and stayed there for seven months to find Reneto, but the same proved futile. She
also proceeded to Reneto's relatives in Cayawan, Davao del Norte only to find out that they have no knowledge of
his whereabouts either. Sometime in 2004, she applied for employment abroad and worked overseas, but she still
failed to find Reneto until she returned to the Philippines in 2008.7

The RTC Ruling

On April 15, 2011, the RTC declared Reneto presumptively dead subject to the restrictions and conditions imposed
in Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC reasoned:

Taking into consideration the circumstances of the absence of the [respondent]'s husband, the Court is convinced
that he may be declared as presumptively dead. From the time [respondent]'s husband left the conjugal dwelling for
Manila in January of 2001, purposely to apply for work abroad, his whereabouts became unknown. From the time
the whereabouts of [respondent]'s husband became unknown since he left the conjugal dwelling in 2001, up to the
time that the [respondent] testified in 2010, the [respondent]'s husband has been absent for more than nine (9)
years and his whereabouts unknown. And for purposes of re-marriage, a period of only four (4) years is required by
law. The loss of a loved one is saddening but what is more saddening is a loved one whose whereabouts has been
unknown for a long time. His absence or his presence cannot be determined, to the extent that the family left could
not move on with their lives, as in this case.

In sum, the well-founded belief being required of under the Family Code has been preponderantly established by
the [respondent] because although there were no concrete documentary evidences presented by her in Court to
justify the declaration of [Reneto] as presumptively dead, the circumstances of the case would point to the fact that
the [respondent]'s husband has already been absent for more than nine (9) years. And to allow the [respondent] to
wait a little longer, to await her husband's return, without certainty, would be unfair to the [respondent] and to her
daughter, who already have suffered so much when the [respondent]'s husband left them way back in 2001.8

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), moved for reconsideration of the
RTC Decision, but the same was denied in an Order dated May 31, 2012.

The CA Ruling
In its Decision dated November 28, 2013, the CA denied the OSG's appeal. It held that respondent exerted efforts to
locate Reneto, but she still failed to find him. It agreed with the RTC that respondent was able to prove a well-
founded belief that Reneto was already dead. It enunciated that the Decision of the RTC is already final and
executory and can no longer be modified or reversed since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code.9

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision which was denied in a Resolution dated May 26,
2014.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

The OSG claims that the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.  It 1avvphi1

maintains that while the Decision of the RTC is immediately final and executory and not appealable, it may still be
reviewed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It argues that, contrary to the findings of the
courts below, the efforts of respondent in locating her husband were not sufficient to form a well-founded belief that
he is already dead.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

The OSG raises procedural and substantive issues in its petition. Procedurally, it imputes error on the part of the CA
for dismissing its petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy. Substantively, it questions the factual bases of
the RTC in granting respondent's petition. It asserts that respondent's efforts did not generate a well-founded belief
that her husband Reneto was already dead.

The procedural aspect of the case is governed by Article 41 in relation to Articles 238, 247 and 253 of the Family
Code. The provisions read:

ART. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx

TITLE XI

SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING

IN THE FAMILY LAW

Chapter 1. Scope of the Application

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for
in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner, without
regard to technical rules.

Chapter 2. Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife

xxxx

ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Underscoring supplied)

Nothing could be clearer from the above legal provisions than that a petition for declaration of presumptive death of
an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
involves a proceeding that is summary in nature, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.10 Consequently, a judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be a proper subject of an appeal and
the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is a procedural misstep which warrants an outright
denial or dismissal. The final and executory nature of the judgment in a petition for declaration of presumptive death
renders the court's dispositions and conclusions therein immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties,
but even as against the courts.11 Hence, except for correction of clerical errors, the courts are barred from
modifying or altering a definitive final judgment, such as the one assailed in the case, even if the modification is
intended to correct erroneous conclusion of fact or law.12

But the losing party in a summary court proceeding is not left without a legal recourse. When the present spouse
successfully obtains a judicial declaration of his/her spouse's presumptive death, the OSG may properly bring an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as it actually did in this case, before the appellate
court on the ground that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it rendered its judgment. In declaring that the OSG resorted to a wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari,
the CA had been unmindful of our consistent pronouncement that "certiorari lies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code."13 We held in Republic v. Narceda:14

As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal,
but a petition for certiorari, to wit:

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because
the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal. (Underscoring supplied)

There is, thus, no doubt that the OSG availed of the correct remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA.

Going into the merits of the case, we find that the respondent failed to satisfy the "well-founded belief" requirement
in Article 41 of the Family Code.

In Republic v. Tampus,15 the Court clarified the scope and extent of the present spouse's duty before he/she can
obtain a judicial declaration of spouse's presumptive death, viz.:

The "well-founded belief" in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack
of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead. (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, it is not enough that the present spouse holds a firm conviction that his/her spouse is already dead and
alleges the same in his/her petition. Belief is a state of the mind which may only be established by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence that tends, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth.16 At the same time, the law does not demand positive certainty of the absent spouse's
death, for to do so would run counter to the very essence of a petition for declaration of presumptive death. Thus, to
meet the requirement of the law, the present spouse must allege and prove that his/her belief is the result of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to locate the absent spouse and determine whether he/she is still alive
or not. The term "proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts" is tantamount to diligent and reasonable
inquiries and search to ascertain the absent spouse's whereabouts.

In this case, the RTC and the CA were in unison in holding that the efforts exerted by the respondent are adequate
to substantiate her belief that Reneto was already dead. But a careful examination of the records proved otherwise.

Respondent's so-called "earnest efforts" only consisted of two instances: (1) from Cotabato, respondent went to
Manila and stayed there for seven months to look for Reneto; and (2) respondent went to Davao del Norte, Reneto's
birthplace, to inquire about her husband's whereabouts from his family and relatives. When Reneto's family
members denied knowing his whereabouts, respondent took it as gospel truth without even bothering to inquire from
the neighbors or other disinterested persons as to the veracity of their narrative. She heavily relied on the
uncorroborated and naturally biased statement of her husband's relatives. Interestingly, respondent did not present
Reneto's family and relatives who could have attested that she personally inquired from them about Reneto's
whereabouts and that she exerted active efforts to ascertain his location and status. Time and again, we have held
that the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends or from the relatives of his absent spouse
about the latter's whereabouts is insufficient especially when the names of the persons from whom he made
inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses,17 as in this case.

It bears stressing that other than the above "earnest efforts," respondent made no further attempt to find her
husband. The fact that respondent worked abroad does not even bolster her claim that she extended her search for
Reneto since it cannot be determined from her allegations that she purposely went to the country where her
husband was deployed to look for him. All that she stipulated in her petition was that she went abroad in 2004 and
returned in the Philippines in 2008 without any information as to Reneto's whereabouts.

Furthermore, it perplexes the court that notwithstanding Reneto's absence for years, respondent never reported the
matter to the local police or local government unit and sought its help in looking for her husband. When she was still
working abroad, respondent did not coordinate with the Philippine consul office to express her serious concern for
the safety and welfare of her missing husband and ask for its assistance. Respondent did not even offer plausible
explanation as to why she failed to secure the assistance of the authorities which a person of ordinary prudence
would have done under a similar circumstance.

A claim of a diligent search cannot be given credence sans evidentiary support. Basic is the rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence;18 thus, respondent should prove her
allegation that she exercised the degree of diligence required for the search of her missing husband. Lamentably,
respondent failed to discharge this burden.

There being no basis of respondent's "well-founded belief" that Reneto is already dead, the petition for declaration
of presumptive death must perforce be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated May
26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 05084[-MIN] are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petition of respondent Leilanie Dela Cruz Fenol to have her husband, Reneto Alilongan Suminguit,
declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
11.) G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said
marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely
voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present
evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties
of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following
Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent
she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration   of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
1

the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner
and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
12.) A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully

evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving
from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of
employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the
complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan
Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against
him" in the instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968;
that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and
that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in
good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with
Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth
Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had
given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had
done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to
be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred;
by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant
Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The
Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do
so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should
he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not
appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have
waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were
given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986.
Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation"
to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows:
she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates
in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito
Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital
status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing
happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to
Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at
the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it
since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was
void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage
license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to
court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares
of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17);
Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p.
18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting
from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance
until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit
C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the
City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of
the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986,
p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem
with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was
found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an
administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic
when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having
gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre
contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over
the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol,
Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that
his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a
judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that
his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other
circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported
by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his
law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a

member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a
trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's
moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after
she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe
delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will
correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land
13.) G.R. No. 138509             July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25,
1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the
first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
Family Code. 2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
3 

with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves
4 

facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
5 

intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not
the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
6  7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a
single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through
a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not
8 

the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of
its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. 9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may
even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
Relova: 10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner,
on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license.
More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this case is limited to the existence of
11 

a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may,
suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment
of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." [] Hence, parties
12 

should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious,
13 

manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to.
That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as
ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
14 

marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage,
we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
15 

ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The 16 

contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a
17 

matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law?
If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests
upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should
18 

be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil
action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has
been discussed above, this cannot be done. 1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
19 

the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal
20 

backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot
be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
14.) G.R. No. 137110               August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1 

CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime
of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen
(15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against accused." 2

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan
got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused
was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused
was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate
issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10,
1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between
accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium,
Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against
said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office,
accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,
and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been
legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage
ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time
validly married to his first wife."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second
marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the
crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former
marriage has been legally dissolved." 4

Hence, this Petition. 5

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt." 6

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity." 7

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint
for bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he 8 

concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis
9 

Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge.
But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting." In People v. Mendoza, a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times,
10  11 

the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage
during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then
charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had
been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal,
the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit
bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which 12 

involved substantially the same facts.

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the
13 

Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second
wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
14 

necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor
of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an
15 

action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her
first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence,
the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this
Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."

Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need
16 

for such declaration of nullity.

In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery
17 

and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family
Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for
a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy." 18

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the
basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:

"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the
marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages." 19

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the
Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary.
Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of
the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null
and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS,
37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance,
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033)."20

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is
now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an administrative
21 

Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a
second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the
Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view
on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: 22

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure
a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant
had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution
of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees. 23

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative
relief from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this
24 

point, which we quote hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent
victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt
said testimonies.

x x x           x x x          x x x
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief,
especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the
plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then
already living with another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of
her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they
are of her own willful making."
25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
15.) G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
1 

CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
2 

Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition
is the resolution of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
3 

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
4 

Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the
declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of
5 

Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is
8 

not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held that the court of a
9 

country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to
10 

know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became
final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought
to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
12 

marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
13 

to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
14 

rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis
15 

for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the denial was by a split
16 

vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria,
joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was
validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH
AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT. 17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held
18 

that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the
19 

Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was
aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy
20 

thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

 (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the
RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage
entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED. 21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
22  23 

simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the
law, never married." The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
24 

No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial
25 

declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot
and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000,
denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.
16.) G.R. No. 150758             February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second
or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union. 7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her
to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. 9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN
THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE
CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD
BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four
of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document,
was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National
Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated
February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in
itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7,
1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda
B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that
a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a
marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes
by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications
issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February
3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration 20 of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime
of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as
the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar
as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and
3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
17.) G.R. No. 181089               October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,

vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order dated September 24, 2007 of
1 

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which
dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
2 

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the
3 

subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001,
4 

respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates
on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
5 

executory on October 13, 2003. 6

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as
7 

Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
8 

August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to
9 

reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information for Bigamy was filed
10 

against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL. The Information reads:

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract
a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with
SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities. 11

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information
(and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void
12 

ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983;
that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its
Comment arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
13 

declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while
the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.

In its Order dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the
14 

declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two
valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan where we held:
15 

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant
had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. x x x 16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage
indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of
the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription
has not yet set in.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since
17 

respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was
granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code
cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a
declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
18 

Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the
information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e.,
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the
unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it
declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second
marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City
in 2003.

Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution
dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of
respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all,
and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.

Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:

I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for
entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy?

II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first
marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent
marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.
19

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed
by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government
in all judicial proceedings filed before us.
20

Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, the
21 

offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others,
that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory
counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number
of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and
said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a
criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x

Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we
opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition,
as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its
own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) 22

Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the petition
be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.

As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
bigamy filed against respondent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
23 

marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. 24

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage
with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the
Information, she alleged, among others, that:

xxxx

2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared
void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said
decision was never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.

3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already
been declared void from the beginning.

4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one
marriage.

5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. 25

Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in
2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of
the Information for bigamy filed against her.

We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
26 

immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
27 

subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the
first marriage was annulled. 29

In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
30 

psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment. 31

And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy,
32 

ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet
been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of
the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
33 

came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the
information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts
34 

a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. 35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right
to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.

We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were
36 

entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act
3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
37 

void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
"Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court
went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the
Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy. 38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.
18.) G.R. No. 183805               July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley
G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in
the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted
by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to
wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004
had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043
(entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity
of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision
is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in
the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of
the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second
marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[ 7]
dated July 24, 2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING

JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE
ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS
BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING
AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO,
IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND
THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON
WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND
FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY
TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO

EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO
LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING
 NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON
DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise
in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus,
the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
19.) G.R. No. 183896               January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM,
and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4,
Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground
for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the
resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they
were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at
2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that
he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy
of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he
had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a
marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any
other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez,
Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that
he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of
Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses
were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been solemnizing
marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez
gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by
his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the
mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for
the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He attended the wedding ceremony on
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by
the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was
present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of
Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to
take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same
person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then
gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified
that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at
the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she
could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their
signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and
asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage
license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if
said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was
Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a
resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of
the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a
valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was
void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as
follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas is hereby annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no
property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to
appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered
that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after
Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order
dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family
Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are
Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
 (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is
exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution
of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage
contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining
a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was
to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly
issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the
serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A
certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and
indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that
particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on
the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could
not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec.
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the
records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why
the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took
no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license.
Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them
applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of
her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license
were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been
secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, 47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid,
and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the
alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married.
To quote the CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing
officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in
the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas,
who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said
Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January
2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it
says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner.
The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.
20.) G.R. No. 191566               July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case follow:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor
A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On
February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in
June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with
Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for Bigamy committed as follows:

That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Contrary to law.10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to
support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the
quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. 12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the
facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such
marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of
bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability
has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated
February 20, 2009.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 16 before the
CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina
was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. 17

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27,
Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve
the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and held that there is cogent basis in
looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was
indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. 20 The appellate court further
held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering
that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA
thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information,
considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense. 22

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION
DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.

II.

THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID
NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID
JUDGMENT.23

The petition is meritorious.

The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v.
People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26

In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on
January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14,
2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the
information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void
ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December
10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma
null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June
8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime
charged.

In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent
contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first
marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an
information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone
and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense
of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different
conclusion.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the
facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined
by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to
quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured
by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is
given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the information is quashed on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. 31

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein
to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:

(1) That the offender has been legally married;

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the
beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary
to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second
marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.34 It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by respondent. 35 With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to
the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.

Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and
void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations
in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his
criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v.
People36 where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In
said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the
second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.  A declaration of the
1âwphi1

absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we
cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.42

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that
facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his
omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
21.) G.R. No. 204169               September 11, 2013

YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA)
AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision 2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.

The antecedents follow:

Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines.
Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became close
to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November
28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.4

In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the
Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received
news that her previous husband passed away.5

Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. 6 This prompted petitioner to file
a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage
is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued by
the National Statistics Office (NSO):

(1)

Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;

(2)

Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit
"B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;

(3)

Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of
the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and

(4)

Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office
pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private respondent in fact contracted
 two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to
petitioner on November 28, 2002.

The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due
execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial. 12

On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
prove private respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the
certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage.
The RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage
certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that
petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of
said document.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 16,
2012.

Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the
authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight.

Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are considered self-
authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites Article 410 of
the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial
prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents.

The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in accord with law and established
jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status,
and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from records and entries made by the civil
registrar and categorically declared them as public documents. Being public documents, said documents are
admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness and consequently, there
was no need for the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on
them. The OSG further contends that public documents have probative value since they are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the
public documents presented by petitioner, considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.

In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated that she is not against her husband’s
petition to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she contracted marriage
with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She
further admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married petitioner without telling the latter that
she was previously married. Private respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo
passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to petitioner about her previous marriage.
Thereafter, she and petitioner have separated.

We grant the petition.

There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents.  As provided
1âwphi1

in the Civil Code:

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did
not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, 16 which is void from the beginning as provided in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly
prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2)
that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City;
(3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and
subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16,
2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and
VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are hereby ORDERED to make proper
entries into the records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
22.) G.R. No. 184621               December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari  before us assails the decision  dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
1 2

(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order  dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
3

(RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor,
respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before
the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25.
She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from
her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the
hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.

The Ruling of the RTC

After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead
since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any news about the latter or his
whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively
dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor. 5

The Ruling of the CA

The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated
December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 7

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner contends that
certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of
trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and
executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not
subject to review on certiorari.

The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her
husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her
missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding
the case, particularly, the degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict
standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Issues

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Court’s Judgment in the Judicial

Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.

Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]

With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and
conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against
the courts.  Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
8

executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the
Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,  the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article
9

247 of the Family Code, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course
to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately
final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part
of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the
right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no
appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that transpired.

As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,  the fact that a decision has become final does not automatically
10

negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or
processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a
procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,  wherein we held that:
11

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW,
establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules."

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the
same title. It states:

"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with
the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.

b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

The Essential Requisites for the

Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden

of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code
are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13

Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation
in Republic v. Nolasco,  where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article
14

83 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there
is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of
the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The
Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee
is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. 15

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement,
the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant
cases is warranted:

i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) 16

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to
17

prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His
efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that he
failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the
OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.

The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article
41 of the Family Code:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse. 18

ii. Republic v. Granada 19

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother
had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not
report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
20
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse,
she failed to explain these omissions.

iii.Republic v. Nolasco 21

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been
missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the
present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled
that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

iv.The present case

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate
Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to
find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for
the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.  It can be inferred from the records that her
1âwphi1

hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not
purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed
to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed,
under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to
seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her
efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As
held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the
testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent
search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view
that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-
laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to
form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals (Tenth Div.),  "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
22

spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  we emphasized that:
23

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41
of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx
summary nature of its proceedings.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect
and strengthen the institution of marriage.  Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation  and since it is the
24 25

state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution,  marriage should not be permitted to
26

be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to
uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals  reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
27

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.

Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a
stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she
would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good
faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes
sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.  Thus,
28

for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse
judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration
of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of
the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the
strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
23.)
24.) G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.  The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the
1

Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232   convicting her of bigamy.
2

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,   Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos
3

faced an Information   for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal
4

suit. 
5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,   asked 6

petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
"without responsibility."  7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy,
because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this
case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.  She
1âwphi1

alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August
and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known
of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a
person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with
Santos long before the celebration of their marriage."  Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 
9 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes
against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six
( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement
of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband
and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:  11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without
a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of
her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have
been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot
declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of
Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the
testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain
attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy. 12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not
aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid
second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara,   she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
13

license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She
alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993.
Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment   filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the
14

instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage.
As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible
testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano,   this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

15

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.   instructs that she
16

should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla   likewise states that the
17

knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:  18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only
if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in
the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances:   (1) 19

when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval
of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang,
who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so
in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.  20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC,
which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla   holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime
21

of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in
criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to
another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy."   Therefore, her
22

conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is
prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of
petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree,   prision23

correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and
one day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,   petitioner shall
24

be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity.   If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she
25

can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case.   In this
26

case, petitioner has consistently  questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
27

marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.  28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on
the validity of the marriage.  The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
1âwphi1

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts,   and given that an appeal in
29

a criminal case throws the whole case open for review,   this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a
30

quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a
marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which
reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment
to the marriage. 31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996   and that after six
32

months of courtship,  she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner
33

testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never
cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,  and her children from her previous marriage
34

disliked him.  On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she
35

first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not
show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the
two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage,   in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
37

marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them
that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein
petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.  In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,  we
38 39

had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same
breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.  40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded."   If the cause of action
41

appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted
by the courts.   As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable,
42

unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.  43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,  petitioner married Santos while knowing
44

full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family
Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape
criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the
second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara
married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage
license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage
license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second
marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used
this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De
Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State."   It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
45

contracting parties.   in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner
46

for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified,
petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an
accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four
years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
25.) G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first
marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy
regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  dated July 18, 2012 and
1 2

Resolution  dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision  of Branch 25 of the
3 4

Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
5

and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. 6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with
bigamy.  The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
7

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married
to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which
second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL
knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the
said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law. 8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila
Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]"  She 11

eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal
Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987.  "After 13

much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"  with his
15

college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.  Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that
16

they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had
three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a
married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour. 18
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer
also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina,
Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the
Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated
July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25,
dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously
sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3,
23

2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment  to which Norberto filed a Reply.
25 26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.  He presents as evidence a
27

Certification  from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the
28

marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an
essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first
marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that
requirement.  Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused[,]"  Norberto prays for
30 31

his acquittal. 32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced
by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with
Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage
with Alice; and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of
the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s
first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect.
Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages
are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more than seven (7) years before his second
marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case
was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the
municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married
to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987.
This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988.  Consequently, provisions
35

of the Civil Code of the Philippines  govern the validity of his first marriage.
36

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage
void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.  The marriage license represents the state’s "involvement and participation in
38

every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested." 39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." 40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:
[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance
available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No.
8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987. 41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does
not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and
his first wife, Gina.  The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the
43

existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as
44

to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro  was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.  As
46 47

part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as
said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s] records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." 49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil
registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties."50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case
involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having
been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation,
the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other
evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage
license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued.
Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words.
That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage
licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest
when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.  In Cariño, the marriage contract between
51

Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.  In addition, the local civil
52

registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.  This 53

court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily
signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was
celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven
(7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was
presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect.
The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a
second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due
execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The
burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that
the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage
license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.  There is no evidence to show
55

that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no
proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil
registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would
have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have
contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the
civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just
discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This
presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was
issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by
petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the
civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise
be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of
liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will
use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the
issuance of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a
document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can
easily be created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge
evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb
the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner
remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina
judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.  The second element of the crime of bigamy is,
56

therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.  that 57

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family
Code: 59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article
349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first."  Further, "[a] party
60

may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void."
61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner
insists.
62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice
G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.  As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the
63

essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner
subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged. 1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the
other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the
range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances
are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.  The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision
66

correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;  hence, the minimum penalty can be any
67

period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The ranges of the
minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed
was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness[,]’"  we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
68

correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012
and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
26.) G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision   in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution  that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
1 2

Decision  dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
3

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that
respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that
respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for
this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,  praying that his
4

marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as
they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged. 5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003,
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision  declaring that Lea's first marriage to
6

Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the
Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory.  7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence  claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
8

insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
Opposition,   petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of
9

the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the
time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied
respondent's demurrer in its Order   dated 8 March 2005.
10

In a Decision   dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
11

void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code.   The dispositive
12

portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between
RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen
Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous
marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code.  13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January
1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain
a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.  14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned.   His motion,
15

however, was denied by the RTC in its Order  dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner  and
16 17

Respondent  filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

18

In a Decision  dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the
19

validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in
1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable
law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.  Furthermore,
20

the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution  dated 16 September 2009.
22

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment  praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in
23

toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,  petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
24

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of
its celebration.  In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
25

children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the
Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80,  81,  82,  and 83 (first paragraph);  and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
26 27 28 29

paragraph),  85  and 86.

30 31 32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot
be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children
by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the
invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,   People v. Aragon,   and Odayat v. Amante,   that the Civil Code contains no express
34 35 36

provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.  37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was
contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death
of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second
marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void
from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents.
In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage.   A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
38

considered bigamous and void.   In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of
39

this requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it
as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective
with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no
legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as
diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution,
an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of
the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to
everyone.  (Emphases supplied)
40
1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero  and Ty v. Court of Appeals,   the requirement of a judicial
41 42

decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that
those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a
second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his
first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to
petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment
of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes
that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void
ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009
and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
27.) G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer.
She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied
and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and
Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony
of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus,
ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship,
and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to
a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for
the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of
the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties
had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not
a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract;
and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if
they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest
is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only
to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid. 23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found
the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of
the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence
of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way
of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of
any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of
being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.  Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
1âwphi1

intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter
into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children,
to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such
as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for
the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure
of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of
the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured
or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be
declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in
the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should
not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
28.) G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo  and the Court
1

of Appeal,  Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
2

private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when
and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express
resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate,
or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In
his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that
they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former
only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of
marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this
is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he
did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing
for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his
point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the
lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage,
which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is
eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a
voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be
no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to
annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is
no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea
in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest
after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
 "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are
they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,  which reads:
9
 Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,   giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has
10

been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause
of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
 incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from
giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to
be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility
of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy   cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
11

Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

 Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family,
and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

29.) G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals  its 1

decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for
four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist
at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
 The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain
his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it
can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2)
that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still
a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza,
Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff
with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-
coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in
actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment
of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence
was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that
no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
(Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and
the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-
depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders"
because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
— why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has
never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason
for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his
wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.  Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
5

perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same
bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted
his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p.
330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
 go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny
and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at
a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
30.) G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts
have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the
context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to
be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision  of the Court
1

of Appeals  in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
2

Trinidad,  Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
3

initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church  in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
4

born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle
their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;
 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist
of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1."
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied  heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
5

marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it
sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of

mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in
the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals  this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
6

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,  Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
7

antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it

is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure
to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative,
homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,  Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
9

Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,   a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
10

occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,   recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
11

marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code   echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
12

inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,   nevertheless such root cause must be
13

identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified
psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.  14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
31.) G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29

November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of
age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall,
and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via
Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other
people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried
to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme
jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect
that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act
of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders
Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the
company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed
held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious.
Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together
with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself
conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from
respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not
the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying
about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled
the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down
in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court
of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as
a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as
a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of
their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity
was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound
mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce
on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind"
was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of
the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound
mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr.
Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical
thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful
in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent.
There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of
canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by
the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the
Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely
persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on
lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not
a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article
XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration
of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand
or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
 disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart
from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and
certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who
testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both
courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish
the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-
public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged
in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially
telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things
that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and
over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I
think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that
the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner
and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on
her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair
with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the
basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a
world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature
of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation,
she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of
capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability
to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would
be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust
and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s
consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the
Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the
part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had
the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion,
the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by
this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s
condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there
was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice
to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability.
It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if
not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-
case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any
lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue
emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on
legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a
desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No
costs.
32.) G.R. No. 161793               February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated—free in
form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering
organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close
friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. 3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.4

However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance
fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded
to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning
him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. 5

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she,
20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave
Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get
his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. 8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid
him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways. 10

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720. 11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)
of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. 12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and
assist it in the scheduled hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. 14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the
following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at
Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is
married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in
the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers
himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long
in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to
isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to
have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives.
From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea
of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so
they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able
to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find
any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the
parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to
go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and
when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent
acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea
of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s
uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when
the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going
home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.
Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not
inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred
for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead
to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that
she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can
start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with
his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided
to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also
does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money
anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The
break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Draw A Person Test

Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test

Sach’s Sentence Completion Test

MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to
their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself
to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is
not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is
seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the
reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is
seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow
weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law.
In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is
apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take. 15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. 17 The
Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal. 18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and
set aside the trial court’s ruling. 20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent.
The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by
petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22 The CA faulted
the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the
OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. 23 The CA later denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. 24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 25

In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no
statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The
purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina29 were not satisfied.30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.31

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article
36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the
draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married
person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss
the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as —

‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and
the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind
of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’

‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on
the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly. 34

In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:

"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was
explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a
lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even
comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh
winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage"
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate
the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required
persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at
least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category)
required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’
Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding
and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out
the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. 36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. 38

Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second
and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat
banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both
of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal
with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks
its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph
deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing
a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he
elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to
marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity
different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which
arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there
sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these
persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal,
either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by
church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the
object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible
impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes
that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would
be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But
this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely
what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party
is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this
tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one
hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually
understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of
consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it
is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to
make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes
that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have
no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies
and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified
as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to
the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the
principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of
initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-
centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone
how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony.
Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic
good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are
general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood,
on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of
his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision.
And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was
in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium
in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume
the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his
irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are
taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right
to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give
rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to
be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object
of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the
more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is
not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full
sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer
from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and
intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because
he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only
when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that
one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given
one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one
which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. 42

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party
to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. 44

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the
Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower
court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.
Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should
be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina,46 thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.47

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the
Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court.
First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant,
and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies
but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out
the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to
a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions,
on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held
to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity
of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of
due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost
always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into."581avvphi1

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are
no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule,
however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained,
inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with
interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the
way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with
personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such
traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types.
Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and
passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was
thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.  However, later researchers have
lawphil.net

found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low
cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a
past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for
many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals

who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.64

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable
to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations
imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that
masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent
in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior
to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning. lawphil.net

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.
1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic.66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is
null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a
first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account
her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency
to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
33.) G.R. No. 180668               May 26, 2009

MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007, 1 and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007. 2

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they
got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church, Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner
was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no
children.

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.

Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of this,
the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was collusion between the
parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002, Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between
the parties.

On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines
and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the State’s behalf under the
supervision and control of the Solicitor General.

In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally
immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of a husband.

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for
financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta
home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment. She even bought him a
newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an age limit and that he had
no clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even
gave him money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was
overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of his
parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered that her husband didn’t actually get a job and
the money he gave her (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about
the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would
stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can support their needs. Petitioner
claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.

Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically
violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and
petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it
should not be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.
Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near
his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow
her. But he did not.

During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993,
Ramos, the niece of Rodolfo’s father, was living with Rodolfo’s family. She corroborated petitioner’s testimony that
Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given
by his mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondent’s mother who was paying the rentals for the room
where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mother’s house in
business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he has a job but in truth he had none. She also
stated that respondent was still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.

Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner
for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent, very responsible, focused and has
direction and ambition in life. She also observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that
based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.

She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary
way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make
his own decisions and dependency on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem
was a cross-identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s
father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began during the early stages in his
life but manifested only after the celebration of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also
severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was
incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.

Based on petitioner’s evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of
respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B. Azcuata is hereby declared
null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.

The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3

On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision 4 to correct the first name of Rodolfo which was
erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original Decision.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based
solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was
no showing that the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects
were grave, permanent and incurable.

Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the
psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed prior to the marriage and was
grave and incurable. In setting aside the factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:

The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and over-dependence on his
mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above explained.

xxx xxx xxx

Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellee’s failure to prove that respondent’s supposed psychological malady
existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the parties were living in harmony in the first few
years of their marriage and were living on their own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his
mother for financial support may be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to
the family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-appellee likewise stated
that respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have one. However
this is not at all a manifestation of irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a full grasp of
reality and completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed. The only
problem besetting the union is respondent’s alleged irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother,
which was not proven in this case to be psychological-rooted.

The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional immaturity which by
themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At
all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca
vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme Court:

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13,
2007).

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween
petitioner-appellee Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID. 5 (emphasis ours)

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly ruled that the "totality
of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouse’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.

We grant the petition.

Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 6 Our family law is based on the policy
that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find
no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 7

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina 8 stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 11 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 13

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina,
there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.14 Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift
from the Molina doctrine.

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to
warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.

First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband.

The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, highlights the lack of personal examination of
Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctor’s reliance on petitioner’s version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon
which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. 18 Significantly, petitioner’s narration of facts was
corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court
to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or
lack thereof.19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witness. 20

Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.

The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite
pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from the choice of the
family abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couple’s inadequate sexual
relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to
his mother.1avvphi1

These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical
causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience from the field of psychology in general and
psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the
psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the eldest, she is expected to be
the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the
line. But on the other hand, she developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with
the first opportunity, she’ll get out of the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1 ½ months after they
met, without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession to leave her family was her primary reason at that
time and she did not exercise good judgment in her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital
relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of
loving, caring, protection, financial support and sex.

On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be weak, and his two elder
brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his mother’s needs, became an easy
prey, easily engulfed into her system. The relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal
dependence to his mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the
reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave dependency. Apparently, all the
boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting.
Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an unconscious guilt
feelings of defying the mother’s love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and the mother,
so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle, and
crippled him psychologically.

Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible and is psychologically capacitated to
perform the duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in
handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with a parent of the
opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation crippled his psychological
functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage,
but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent
and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his
personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustment.21

These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony, the relevant portion of
which we quote below:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your psychological evaluation?

A: I’ve found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured, independent, very responsible,
focused, she has direction and ambition in life and she work hard for what she wanted, ma’am, and
therefore, I concluded that she is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
marriage, ma’am.

Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological evaluation with regards to the
respondent?

A: Based on my interview, I’ve found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage suffering from a psychiatric classification
as Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings,
ma’am.

Q: In layman’s language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do you mean by Dependent
Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response to ordinary way of life are
ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to
make his own decision, quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, ma’am.

Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of respondent, Rodolfo
Azcueta?

A: Very much, ma’am.

Q: Why?

A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a husband and
as a father, ma’am.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this psychological problem?

A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the mother who is the dominant
figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the authority in the family while the father was a seaman
and always out of the house, and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and
passive to the authority of the wife, ma’am.

Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind of psychological
problem manifested?

A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his early stages in life, ma’am.

Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the respondent
in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with the…that the manifestation came
too late?

A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very mild, no stresses,
no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that he already finished college degree of Computer
Science, there is no demand on himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, ma’am.

Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?

A: Yes ma’am.

Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?

A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is expected of a married
person, ma’am.

Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?

A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became so deeply ingrained into
his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured at this stage, ma’am.
 Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?

A: It is permanent in nature, sir.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological problem as far as the
marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?

A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard expectation is, the
husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course, to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a
husband to the wife, but in this case, early in their marriage, they had only according to the wife,
experienced once sexual relationship every month and this is due to the fact that because husband was so
closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in defying the
mother’s love when they will be having heterosexual relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be
able to distinguish between the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory
according to expectation, ma’am.22

In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 23

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce
here for emphasis:

With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent totally failed in his
commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he
has no showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of
the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.

The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make his own decision and
cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to comply with his marital
obligations.

Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on the account of
respondent’s severe and incurable psychological incapacity.

Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CA’s finding that the parties lived harmoniously and independently in the
first few years of marriage, witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be sure,
these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage
being rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life.

Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The Court is wary of the CA’s bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this point. The CA’s
reasoning that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to his
embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was his
"responsible" realization that he should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is
no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not substitute
their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where the findings of the trial
court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of his marriage to petitioner, he
was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his
abnormal behavior.

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality disorder and how one
afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, to wit:

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. 24

Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means
an exact science and the medical cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different
in their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its evaluation of the
facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same before
declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.

Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he cannot make
his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to
support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic
and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional
well-being of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36.

Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was
supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.

At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when
it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply them to situations and people
in a society in flux. With respect to the concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only
developments in science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of
traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the financial and
material support of their families. This, however, does not change the ideal that the family should be an
"autonomous" social institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and
well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a
cohesive unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the essential duties of
marriage.

This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code is proper under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
34.) G.R. No. 165424               June 9, 2009

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner,

vs.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioner’s petition
for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004
decision1 and September 24, 2004 resolution2 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null
and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke." After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately
thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was
only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held
that petitioner’s personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. 3

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It
was denied.

The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CA’s decision and
resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to
be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented,
especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the
trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, 4 this Court reiterated that courts should
interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-to-case basis — guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines
and by decisions of church tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.5
In this case, the testimony6 of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder. Thus:

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this
court your findings [and] conclusions?

A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-
defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a]
dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.

Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the
essential obligations of marriage?

A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive
decision. I don’t think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death,
and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xx xx xx

Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack
of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?

A. xx xx I don’t think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the
moment decision that they should get married xx xx I don’t think they truly considered themselves married.

xx xx xx

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and
respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage.
During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem
also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder 7 as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments.
At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable
to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned. 1avvphil

In her psychological report,8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. 9 Petitioner’s mother
even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that
his marriage to respondent was for real.10

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner
typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude
encouraged other people to take advantage of him. 11 This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be
dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots 12 and, later, by respondent who was as domineering
as his father.13 When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. 14

Dr. Dayan traced petitioner’s personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit: 15

Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lester’s family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very
domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have
been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not
having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a
husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner’s personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent
at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. 16

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and
had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable
personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. 17 Particularly, personality
disorders are "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others."18

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and
the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
 35.) [G.R. NO. 164817 : July 3, 2009]

DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and
respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by
Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.2 They
are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage as shown by the following facts:

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division
of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough
effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioner's
elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through
the Intercrew Shipping Agency.

(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and
she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989,
when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused
her of having an affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner
into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered "unprintable words" against her. He would go
out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every
year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he
smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he
inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his
attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She was
treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.

(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his
mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.

Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole
administrator of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered
(1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the
alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family
Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and respondent and
the forfeiture in

favor of petitioner of respondent's share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2)
of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by
publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the
petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low
morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his
sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P45,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.

On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.

On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that
after conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.5 The initial
hearing of the case was held on November 23, 1998.

Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana;
psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a
government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by
their marriage contract.6 At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was
employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a
monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was petitioner's brother who helped respondent find a job as a
seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as
a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he
went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home,
he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed
that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned home,
he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in
drugs.7

In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they
constructed a house on the lot.8

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioner's
sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home
at around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the
ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She
asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she
was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied.
When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her.
However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on
different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went
out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she
had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her
hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus
and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and
proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went
home.9

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing
about 300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order
to open the door. She found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated
Teller Machine card and jewelry.10

Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment
from him.12

Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondent's parents were
separated. Respondent's brothers were also separated from their respective wives.13

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent.14

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was
abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are
rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated
from Respondent's father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging
from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he
both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an
offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve
his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline
Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his
marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najera's
psychological impairment as traced to his parents' separation, aggravated by the continued meddling
of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause
irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is
recommended that parties' marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part
of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-
Najera.15

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent's psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal - -
referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and
marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.16

Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3,
1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the
influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried
to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.17

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the
petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo

Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint
Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.18

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated May 2, 2000.

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.20

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
August 5, 2004.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent
Eduardo Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the
same set of facts established by petitioner's evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore
the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in
Psychology.21

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioner's evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.22

Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

x   x   x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - - subject to our
law on evidence - - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - - shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."24 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.25 In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.27

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates' conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on
her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and
unreliable.28 Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist
Cristina Gates' testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder.
[D]id you find any organic cause? cralawred

A No, sir.

Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?
cralawred

A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondent's family] background, there was
strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondent's family? cralawred

A No, sir, but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).

x   x   x

Q Have you [seen] the respondent? cralawred

A He is not in the country, sir.

Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly
affected, is this curable? cralawred

A The chances are nil.

Q But it is curable? cralawred

A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.

Q What is this organic damage? cralawred

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.

Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)? cralawred

A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline
personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and
self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable impulses.

Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard? cralawred

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the
physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent's
abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
separation30 only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February
11, 2004, twelve days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended
that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law
on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal's decision in its Resolution dated
August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the
Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly
held that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded
to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law
of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment,
thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child,
he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and
on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and
alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later
very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his
mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he
continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his
wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon
Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-
appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-
appellant's mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R.
Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994
wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the
hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant's sister-in-law and friends of
the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the
latter's testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
ςηαñrοblεš  νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that
the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However,
the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law
on evidence - what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different
set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented
before the court (Manzano v. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record,
We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31

Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-
respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the
nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon
Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by
the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore,
erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological
incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053,
dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED
36.) G.R. No. 185286               August 18, 2010

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.

In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological
incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution 1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable
social institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity,
trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its
hapless partners for life.

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No.
897612 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854.3

First, we unfurl the facts.

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly
developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. 4 Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university.

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples
their age who were restricted by a university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the
latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By
1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and respondent
got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.

Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his salary.

When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A
year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this,
the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game
plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat
Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-
laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make
ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another
attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner
sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’ relationship was the
indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to
bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s mother.
But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent
was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later,
respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how
the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means
to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with
another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent’s business
ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner
as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift to
her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was,
more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the
removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached
respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondent’s siblings waved the white flag on respondent.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner
and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine
benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and
did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.

At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their
house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.

Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to
petitioner and father to their children.

After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist,
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between
the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted
on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void
under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.

Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are
already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies,
are free to decide for themselves.

The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment
shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.

Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no
properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.

The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by
the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the
parties have properties.

The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon
City.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public
Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon
City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.

SO ORDERED.6

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent,
affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of
his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the
parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the
majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated
July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.7

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
BINDING ON IT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE
PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT
MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE, WHICH IS
UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE
INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY
THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.

VIII

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED
TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from
the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support."

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles
220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.

Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the
Court on a case to case basis.

xxxx

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the
totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and
outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the
psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception
has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively
function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually
observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short,
there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from
personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being
professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as
credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists
before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s
impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply
because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief,
he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In
short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law
and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally
constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were
unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this
stand of his siblings.

xxxx

The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires
surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as
a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not
create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system
and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them.

The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra.
Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized
with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist
while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by
the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their
inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though
their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave,
incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and
orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party
aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological
incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor.
Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this
reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could
no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond
the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain. 9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from
the findings of the RTC in this wise:

On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis-à-vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical
psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be
suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong
sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place
whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with
the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor
psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].

Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific
and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never
personally examined the [respondent] himself.

xxxx

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of [respondent] is
not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to
Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable
fact is that based on Dayan’s personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used,
behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the
conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling
sessions.

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular
support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still
falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

xxxx

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family,
sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business
pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs,
etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] "defects" were not
present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived
comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the
situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter,
[respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed
with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

xxxx

As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what
was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between
the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.

xxxx

What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is
jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due
to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

While [petitioner’s] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy,
however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage
and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render
the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify
a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling that the
psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the
marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and
(3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. 12

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:

1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE

[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status, intellectual
achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials
(sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to
assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic).
Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.

Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community services,
she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form
of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches
of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or
depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to
reasons.

Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is organized,
planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But
emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a
superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The
above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband,
who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets
(sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband
would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for
[respondent’s] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end,
[petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).

On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic), where there
were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the
favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested
clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual
potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who
adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and
differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings
he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite
his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).

His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family
employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became
the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his
negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you
are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with emotional
attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it
work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business.
But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was
too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and
motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according
to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.

His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed to feel
more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an
unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son
relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic)
demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.

For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.

Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies
along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a
great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a
Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings
and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of
adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety,
is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are
external factors to boost his ego.

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious
mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings.
He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision
making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his
mother was not resolved (sic).

It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It
is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore
became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]’s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent has
not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of
bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic)
that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He
likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that he’d be more responsible and
try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job.
[Respondent]’s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed
things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown
tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers
think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it
for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that
he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart.
He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also
mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of
most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so he’d rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt
anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.

xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data

A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

xxxx

B. Vocational Preference

xxxx

C. Socio Emotional Functioning

xxxx

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent]
exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior
and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to
anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social
involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from
interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to
follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone.
He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very
angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondent’s] strong need for social approval, which could
have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make
extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still
tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite

his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments
are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety. He is
prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is
preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for]
goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he can’t accomplish
anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is further aggravated by the
lack of support from significant others.

Diagnostic Impression

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]

Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Severe

He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give
priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning – Fair (Emphasis supplied) 14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion

From the evidence available from [petitioner’s] case history and from her psychological assessment, and despite the
non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the
information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to
provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in

this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is very
shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married RRR even
when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity)

Severity: 4-severe

Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)

Severity: 4 (severe)

xxxx

One has to go back to [respondent’s] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by
his grandmother. [Respondent’s] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother.
Unfortunately, [respondent’s] mother grew up believing that she was not her mother’s favorite child, so she felt "api,
treated like poor relations." [Respondent’s] mother’s reaction to her perceived rejection was to act out—with poor
impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly,
his mother became [respondent’s] role model.

However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his
charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear
(esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In
the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship
with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent’s] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro
and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just
"come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress
because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all
the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress
and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested
whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent
personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life,
and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive
sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent
and stable over time.

From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null
and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied) 15

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, 16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one
spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case,
the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception
of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-
in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. 17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.

The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important
areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as
indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing
acts that are grounds for arrest

(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure

(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor
financial obligations

(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another

B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode. 20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on
a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily
have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses,
does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan’s findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of
respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are
given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds
of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should undergo
therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations. 22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the
ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina: 23

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the
person’s entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

… [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the
all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business
attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s
or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting,
and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological
incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found
in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals 27 must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between
the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse
testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological
tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.

xxxx

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as
a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical
features:

Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their
histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts,
fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood.
x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the
complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened
sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence.

x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any
conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear
to lack a conscience.28

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

On the issue of the petitioner’s purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CA’s ruling thereon:

A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x

At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] Amended Petition was indeed amended to conform to the
evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage.  In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a
1avvphi1

glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to
provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’
psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to
reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no
less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. 29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:30

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to
conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time
of his marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is
REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is
REINSTATED. No costs.
37.) G.R. No. 166357               January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,  the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of
1

the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality
and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their
mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing.
The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the
children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee
and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that
shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings
to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties,
but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof
psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,  the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what
3

constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three
expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to
deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to
assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked
up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had
drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family
Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision
"with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application."  Illustrative of
4

the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any
examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law. 5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,  the deliberations of the Family Code
6

Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage
have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." 7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,  the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of
8

Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
 Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church —
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. 9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code
must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its
enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."
10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the
opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts. 11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological
incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses
and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.  In every situation where the findings of
12

the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should
restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.  It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by
13

the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution  only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can
14

be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. 15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the
sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more
strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.  The position and role of the
16

trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but
should be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s
version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a
merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described
the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and
affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s
factual premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews
of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under
such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took
into consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had
analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must
accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of
the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the
issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se
invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos  that there is no requirement for
19

one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is

important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed
as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.  Indeed, an expert opinion on
21

psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in
the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.  This is so, considering that any ruling that brands
22

the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear
that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.  In that context, Dr.
23

Gates’ expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the
expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,  Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent
24

tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she
likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not
be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain
distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways.
She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a
bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love,
constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-
dependent. 25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test  conducted on the
26

respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness,
to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores
wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and
compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered
as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that
the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr.
Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less,
could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-
centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a
vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume
the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings
against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards
Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that
Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in
her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a
script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is
a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I
was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of
fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of
Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of
this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for
attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother. 28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.  Hence, we should weigh and consider the
29

probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese
and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s
expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed
by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even
by canonical thought, and by experience.  It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
30

incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with
regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you
read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility
with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running
through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and
then her being a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became
an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of
the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children.
She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were
the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted.
The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage
withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the
myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her
own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting
respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which
she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very
serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time
or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the
marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show
that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and
she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in
her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such
fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say,
almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her
job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the
family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting
the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.
31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded
respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’
psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of
the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would
advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds
for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both
grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies
but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to
a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
`other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the
capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions,
on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held
to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity
of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of
due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost
always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise
cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as
Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes
a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in
Molina,  the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of
34

marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should
be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the
Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from
the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as
aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least
that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when
these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.  (Emphasis
36

supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro
Kalaw  – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his
37

mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice
which your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch
then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought
you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself. 38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect
of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing
her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act
of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and
Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline,
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation
and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
 (6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that
both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,  whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from
39

psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the
petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that
they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because
she is also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even
those kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr.
Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of
marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was
not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger
years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the
thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions
is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission
that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity
to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to
Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that
the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated. 40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the
defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless
of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both
of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and
void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted
and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already
beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche
of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then
force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for
all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.  It is not, in effect,
1âwphi1

directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit
relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is
denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and
towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court
should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions
for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not
a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article
XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration
of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage.
Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.  (Emphasis supplied)
42

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
38.) G.R. No. 192718               February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20,
2009 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN,
1

which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de
Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent
Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23,
Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this
judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed
the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family
Code."  The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from
3

RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its
essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when
Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial.
Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was
already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged,
Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz
had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he
who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared
their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at
the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters
reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain
Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II
of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment
with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on
the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of
Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG
argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real
cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in
the nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,  granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision,
4

including the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted
by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x.

xxxx

In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing
the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her]
of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels
Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,  stating that the
6

arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed out by
him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION
OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE
LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.

III

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To
bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of
discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in
marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she failed to
function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying
with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of
sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a
mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to
support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that
at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only
given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was
based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors
other than psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the
strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the
March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the
collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of Testimony
was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American.
This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:

xxxx

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present recourse,
when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a
"Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears
stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s
complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of
the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying
for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus
vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x

The Court’s Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations
to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 8

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,  the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in
9

resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,  based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
10

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x
x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

x x x.

xxxx
 (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than
his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no
other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no
serious value as evidence.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and
sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning
the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors,
was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the
parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.  Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
11

incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. 12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute
grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual
indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person,
which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no
other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,
and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article
36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,  the Court ruled that the
13

respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records
that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The
finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided
by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although
it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  the Court stated that interpretations given by
14

the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered
during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.

Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature
similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually
given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the
respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court
– and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent
demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact,
her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her
immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.

WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the
Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the
nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage
Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the
part of the woman Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) 15

In Santos v. Santos,  the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
6

Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out
to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which
reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,  the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an annulment by the
17

NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT
decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and
only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues
now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It
stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court
only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right
to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral
certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave
lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was
dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have
broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom
he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this
affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded
even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very
drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant
offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny
de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses
testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on
the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s
sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and
veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically]
invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is
offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We
have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based
on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the
evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent
portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral
certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave
lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the
psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist
Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original;
Underscoring supplied)

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of
psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is
covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready
reference reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also
be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other
religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if
not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the
bench.  As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
1âwphi1
20

Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,  it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family
21

as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable
institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented
clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by
reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing
evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is
without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this
disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and
consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated
November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
39.) G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review  filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the
1

Court of Appeals Decision  and Resolution  dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV.
2 3

No. 76243, which reversed the Decision  dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of
4

Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at
the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. 5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's
Office.  Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued employment at his
6

family's printing press business.7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy.  She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
8

excelled in their studies and careers.9

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria
Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April 6, 1986. 10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria
Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk her.  Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that
11

he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his
cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. 12

In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.  At 13

times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.  During
14

sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke her with things.  Rodolfo also suggested that
15

they invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.  Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.  Whenever Maria Teresa
16 17

refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel. 18

Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she thought could help her
and Rodolfo.  Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but Rodolfo
19

refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan". 20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair.  In the 21

heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow,
left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that,
and she supported their children by herself. 22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage  before the Regional Trial Court
23

of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a responsive pleading.  Maria Teresa
24

moved for the revival of the Petition.  The trial court granted the motion and referred the case to the Office of the
25
City Prosecutor for collusion investigation.  Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
26

recommended the trial of the case on the merits. 27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.  The pre-trial conference was declared
28

closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence. 29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert
witness.  Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her
30

family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.  Dr. Lopez 31

also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend. 32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from
any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional impairment.  Although Dr. Lopez
33

found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe enough to
constitute psychological incapacity. 34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail.  After two (2) months, Rodolfo
35

contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez
explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala
kayong pakialam sa akin." 36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his
emotional coldness and severe immaturity." 37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than
the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.  Dr. Lopez explained that
38

Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic parental model.  Rodolfo's family39

background showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic
contamination called double insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.  Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's
40

disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia. 41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to
perform his marital obligations. 42

Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading.  He likewise did not appear during
43

the pre-trial conference.  He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still failed to appear.  he trial court
44 45

eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence. 46

On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's
formal offer of evidence.  The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification.  The Office
47 48

of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for
decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. 49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision  granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
50

marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as they
were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held that the marriage between Maria
Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave,
serious and incurable."  The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
51

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA
FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of
properties acquired by the parties, no pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;

(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They
shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.

(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability of the
respondent to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;

(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the
marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

52

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.  The Office of the Solicitor
53

General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts
of stenographic notes.  It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of
54

cases it was handling. 55

On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
is hereby deemed moot and academic.

This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3,
1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case. 56

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.  It argued that the trial court erred a)
57

in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General,  and b) in giving
58

credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was
based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. 59

The Court of Appeals granted  the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.
60

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court
should not have given it weight.  The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's
61

behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. 62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief
that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years before getting married, showed that they
were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological
defect existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage.  The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
63

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

64

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration  but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution  dated May
65 66

25, 2009.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. 67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion
was needed to prove psychological incapacity.  Petitioner further argued that for as long as the trial court had basis
68

in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion should be upheld. 69

Rodolfo filed a Comment  stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that
70

there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married." 71

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,  agreed that a physician was not required to declare a person
72

psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the
presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable
to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged psychological incapacity. 73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was
based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not
name the two (2) common friends in the report.  Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed
74

petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report.  The Office of the Solicitor General
75

insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely
on information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez. 76

The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals  was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for
77

determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."  Furthermore, the
78

incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage[.]"79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  provided the guidelines to be followed when
80

interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.  (Emphasis in the
81

original)

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no
chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.
The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,  where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological
82

incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts."  The Court of Appeals then
83
ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party."
84

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes  states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
85

hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation
and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." 86

Marcos v. Marcos  emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her
87

to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party's
psychological condition.88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts
of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial
court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the
psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different behaviors he manifested
during the time that he and petitioner were living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual,
he found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe
doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his
resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of
disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than the other personality
disorders like the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he
investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient
such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double insanity.
This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and
even couples who are close to one another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that
surprisingly, the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder
started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the
patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that there is something wrong with
them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather
than cooperate with them.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner.  He recommends that the marriage be
1âwphi1

annulled.  (Emphasis supplied)

89

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, [courts] must give due
regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered
from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological disorder probably started during his
late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic
parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial.
Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often follow
her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.  She believed that he would change after they got
91

married;  however, this did not happen. Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that
92

these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head. 93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and
that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent
repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples
counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but
the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of
him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to
intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms
of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due
to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked
a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner
through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic
deprivation.  Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been
94

recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent
truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to
believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the
pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin: 95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law
speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to
children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of
society.  The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
1âwphi1

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not
only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential
marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application of
the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions."  Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the
97

perversion of the family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente
and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829
is REINSTATED.
 40.) [ G.R. No. 209031. April 16, 2018 ]
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, PETITIONER, VS. MARCO DAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision[2] and August 29, 2013 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,[4] respectively,
thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP- 07-
0155.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan - an Italian national - met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet"[6] sometime in
May, 2005. They soon became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them emotionally closer to each
other"[7] even though petitioner was in the Philippines while respondent lived in Italy.

In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January
23, 2006.

Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together
in Italy.

On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for declaration of nullity of her marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-
0155with the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines
opposed the petition.

On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on the ground mat petitioner's evidence failed to adequately
prove respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit  x x x petitioner stated that sometime in May 2005, she chanced upon the respondent, an Italian, in
the internet x x x and they became regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat messages and letters, she found respondent to
be sweet, kind and jolly, He made her feel that he really cared for her. He was romantic, x x x [A]lthough at times, respondent was
impatient and easily got irritated, x x x.

xxxx

On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines and x x x they got married on 23 January 2006 x x x. During their honeymoon,
petitioner noticed that the respondent was not circumcised, x x x [Respondent [also] asked her where to find marijuana since he had to
sniff some. This made petitioner angry and she quarrelled with him. Respondent apologized later.

On 29 January 2006, x x x respondent flew back to Italy and on 26 February 2006, x x x petitioner left to join respondent in Italy, x x x
After a few days, respondent started displaying traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom she had known thru the
internet. He was immature, childish, irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his mother to do or to decide things for him. It was
even his mother who decided where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When they transferred to a separate house, it
was respondent's mother who managed the household.

Respondent was also addicted to video games. During work days, playing video games was always the first thing he does when he
wakes up and the last thing he does before retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole day. There was never a
quality times he spent with her, the kind of time that a responsible husband would spend with his wife.

Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household chores. He also has extremely poor hygiene. He
seldom takes a bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able to take, a bath, petitioner would literally push him to the bathroom or
hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his underarms for he would not do it himself.
He refused circumcision.

Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house while using marijuana. When confronted, he got mad and pushed her [hard] and
hit her in the arm, [and told] her to go back to the Philippines. x x x

In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another house. Living in a separate house from his mother did not improve their marital
relationship. His addiction to video games worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want to be disturbed while playing
games. His addiction to drugs likewise worsened. He would often invite his friends to their house for pot sessions, x x x to her extreme
fright and discomfort.
xxxx

On 18 April 2007, she flew back to the Philippines. x x x Since then, there was no communication between them. x x x Petitioner took
this as lack of interest on his part to save their marriage, reason why she decided to file this petition (TSR August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).

xxxx

She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her money for food. He spent most of his income for video games. If they ran out of
food, it was her mother-in-law who supported them.

xxxx

Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical psychologist, who testified x x x in her direct-examination that petitioner x x x was
subjected to a series of psychological tests, written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the petitioner to clarificatory
analysis x x x.

In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of major psychological incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent is suffering from a
x x x Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude, allowing other people to be the handler
of his own personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow distorted the notion on how to handle marital obligations in terms
of mutual understanding, communication and emotional intent. She was able to arrive at these findings on respondent although he did
not submit himself for the same psychological tests, through the clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and
the description of the petitioner's mother regarding how she perceived the respondent.

On cross-examination, x xx [s]he described respondent x x x as "Mama's Boy", which attitude can be narcissistic because of his
attachment to the mother. He can do whatever he wants because the mother will always be at his back. She likewise stated that the
respondent is an unhygienic person and the reason why he opted to lure herein petitioner to be his wife was because he wanted her to
be an extension of his maternal needs to sustain his own desire.

On clarificatory questions of the Court  x x x Ms. Tayag testified that she was able to describe the respondent x x x because of the
description made by the petitioner and her mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by the petitioner, she (petitioner)
was not able to have a bonding or to know well the respondent because more often than not the respondent was always in the
company of the mother that a pathological symbiotic relationship developed between the mother and son.

Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the mother of herein petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was adopted as
her direct-testimony, which was entirely in corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan,

On cross-examination x x x. She testified that respondent had not assumed his responsibilities as a married man, his dependency on
drugs, his dependency on his mother with regard to their finances were just told by her daughter, petitioner herein, during their
conversations in the internet and therefore she has no personal knowledge to what happened to her daughter, petitioner herein.

xxxx

Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration of marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,  (240 SCRA 20, 24) declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and. (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found respondent to be suffering from x x x Dependent Personality Disorder with
underlying Anti-social traits, x x x which x x x is 'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment'. x x x

xxxx

The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion were derived from her interviews of petitioner and her mother. However, from
petitioner's Judicial Affidavit x x x, it was gathered that respondent's failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal,
not incapacity to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. How she arrived at the conclusion that respondent was totally dependent [on] his mother, his
propensity [with] illegal substance, his instability to maintain even his personal hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities
as a husband, Nedy Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that petitioner and respondent were chatmates in 2005 and contracted
marriage in 2006 when respondent was already 35 years old, far removed from adolescent years.

Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and respondent met in a chat room in the internet. Respondent was very sweet, kind and
jolly. He was romantic. He made her feel that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered important occasions and he would
always send her sweet messages and funny jokes x x x which revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple before their marriage.
From this, it can be inferred how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his obligations as a boyfriend. During marriage,
respondent was working and giving her money though not enough as she said (TSN, August, 11, 2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is
therefore safe to conclude that no matter how hard respondent would try to show his best, to show his capability as husband to
petitioner, she would always find reason to say otherwise.

As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x x it was admitted by no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag that in a
country like Italy wherein the weather is different from the Philippines, the people there do not bathe regularly x x x. With respect to
circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not common in European countries. You cannot compel respondent to undergo
circumcision since it is against their culture. However, respondent expressed his willingness to be circumcised, but later on, changed
his mind.

As to her allegation that respondent was a drug dependent, petitioner never showed, that she exerted effort to seek medical help for
her husband. Undeniably, drug addiction is curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of
psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

With regard to the dependency of respondent to his mother, it was not well established by the petitioner, x x x What is clear was that
respondent's mother was all out in helping them since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient to sustain their needs.

All told, the Court cannot see how the personality disorder of respondent would render him unaware of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him. At the most, the psychological evaluation of the parties proved only
incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, considering also their culture differences, which cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity. Along this line, the aforesaid psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is unfortunately one sided [and] based only on
the narrations made by petitioner who had known respondent only for a short period of time and too general to notice these specific
facts thereby failing to serve its purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just resolution of this case.

In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner in support of her petition is miserably wanting in force to convince this Court
that her marriage with respondent comes and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the Family Code and hence unable to
discharge completely her burden of overcoming the legal presumption of validity and the continuance of her marriage with respondent,
declaration of nullity of same marriage is not in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and
accordingly, the same petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.[9]

Petitioner moved to reconsider,[10] but in an April 28, 2010 Order,[11] the RTC held its ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 95112. In its assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however,
the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:

x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage x x x null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Thus, the court a quo correctly denied the petition for annulment of marriage x x x.

xxxx

In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina  and laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:

xxxx

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the
continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. [Insofar] as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and
applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious
eases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have
been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 x x x does not really dissolve a
marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
was to assume or had assumed.

In the present case, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove respondent-appellee was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of respondent-appellee as irresponsible,
childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage, are not enough. These traits do not equate to an inability to perform
marital obligations due to a psychological illness present at the time the marriage was solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be
more titan just a "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance, of some marital obligations. It is not enough the respondent-
appellee, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations - must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal, or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of the spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be shown to be
incapable of performing marital obligations, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Respondent-appellee's condition or personality disorder has not been shown to be a malady rooted on some incapacitating
psychological condition.

It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer psychological tests on respondent-appellee. The conclusion in the psychological
report of Ms. Tayag that respondent-appellee was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with underlying Anti-Social traits, was
based merely on information supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta (mother of the petitioner-appellant).

Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. The court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e.,  that
there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's findings as conclusive, as she did not
conduct an actual psychological examination on respondent-appellee. The information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-
appellee's psychological condition. The methodology employed (i.e., gathering information regarding respondent-appellee from
petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without interviewing respondent-appellee himself), simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.

Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, and to establish the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. The psychological report, was based entirely on petitioner-appellant's assumed knowledge of
respondent-appellee's family background and upbringing, Ms. Tayag was not able to establish with certainty that respondent-appellee's
alleged psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the inability of the respondent-appellee to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of respondent-
appellee's alleged disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag came to the conclusion that respondent-appellee's condition was
incurable; and how it related to the essential marital obligations that respondent-appellee failed to assume.

In this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that respondent-appellee is psychologically incapacitated, is his allegedly being
irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had poor hygiene, and his
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 x x x contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by petitioner-appellant failed to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband x x x. Therefore, there is no basis to declare their marriage null and void x x x.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity,

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4 January 2010,
in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12] (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant
Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly contends that –

THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND
SATISFIED THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT.[13]
Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition,
and proved by adequate evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, and that the same is medically permanent, incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability of respondent to
assume his obligations in marriage; and that as a consequence, respondent is incapable of fulfilling his duties as a husband under the
obligation to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to her.

Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of nullity are specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as
diagnosed by Dr. Tayag, which diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the evidence in the case; that such
diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert determination, which sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity; that Dr.
Tayag has adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave, incurable, and existed prior to and at the time of his marriage to
petitioner; that respondent has been suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred
him from appropriately discharging his duties and responsibilities as a married man; that despite considerable efforts exerted by
petitioner, respondent remained true to his propensities and even defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence; that no amount of therapy -
no matter how intensive can possibly change respondent, but rather he would always be in denial of his own condition and resist any
form of treatment; and that respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative years - a product of faulty child-rearing
practices and unhealthy familial constellation that altered his emotional and moral development.

Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal examination of respondent be conducted in order that he may be
diagnosed or declared as psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v. Marcos[14] and Antonio v. Reyes,[15] as well as
the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[16] in which latter case it was held that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is not necessarily mandatory, but merely desirable, as it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes
estranged relations between the parties. She suggests instead that pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te,[17] "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts"[18] and that
courts "should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines x x x."[19]

The State's Arguments

In its Comment[20] praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the CA dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal
have been raised in the Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even admitted that incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working, and
giving money to her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and drug addiction are uncorroborated, and her failure to seek medical
treatment therefor in behalf of her husband must be considered against her; that such addictions are curable and could not be the basis
for a declaration of psychological incapacity; that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity, and over-dependence on his mother do not
automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage –
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the spouse of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond one is about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent
was based on one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother – which renders the same of doubtful credibility; and that
while personal examination of respondent is indeed not mandatory, there are instances where it is required - such as in this case,
where the information supplied to the psychologist unilaterally comes from the side of the petitioner, which renders such information
biased and partial as would materially affect the psychologist's assessment.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to
sufficiently prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time. They held that while petitioner
alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her
testimony, which is insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know respondent very well enough - having
been with, him only for a short period of time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is practically one-sided for the latter's failure to
include respondent in the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr.
Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The
determination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since
respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.

This is insufficient.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to
her; that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent enjoyed a harmonious
relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial and appellate
courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture
and upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to
video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and
petitioner has not shown that she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to
respondent.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition."[21] "[T]he complete
facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage"[22] such that "[i]f the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."[23]

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental –
not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[24]

With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to
Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself
- but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.

x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side — the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism
of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to
the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-
centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' . . . .

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was realty incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
— i.e.,  that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave.and incurable' — is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[25]

Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects -are entitled to respect and finality. The same
being correct, this Court finds no need to disturb them.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not
the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again fee evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a
well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save
for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.[26]

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved."[27] Finally, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner.
x x x Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the
petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.[28]

With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts
below.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision and August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 are AFFIRMED.
 41.) [ G.R. No. 210518. April 18, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER AND
MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of
Appeals' (CA) Decision[2] dated July 10, 2013, and Resolution[3] dated November 28, 2013, rendered in relation to CA-G.R. CV No.
98015. In these assailed issuances, the CA reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, which dismissed the
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier (Martin) against respondent Michelle K.
Mercado-Javier (Michelle) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002.[4]
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under
Article 36 of the Family Code.[5] Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.[6] He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child,
Amanda M. Javier.[7]
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf,[8] and presented the psychological findings of Dr.
Elias D. Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle).[9]
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.[10] Likewise, Dr.
Adamos concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same disorder.[11] Their disorder was
considered grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr.
Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological Impression
Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente).[12] He was
unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological evaluation.[13]
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision[14] dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to establish a sufficient basis for the declaration of
nullity of the respondents' marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed [Martin] to be afflicted with a narcissistic personality disorder, which rendered him
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations of observing love, trust and respect. [Martin's] testimony is found by the
Court to be not supportive of such finding and vice-versa. In fact, on the basis of [Martin's] declarations, the Court came up with an
impression that [Martin] is a man gifted with a lot of patience; that he was righteous, that he laudably performed his role as husband and
father, and that in spite of [Michelle's] alleged wrongdoings, he still exerted his best efforts to save their marriage.
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds [Martin's] testimony to be self-serving and Dr. Adamos' findings
to be without sufficient basis.

Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court finds no sufficient basis for granting the relief prayed for in the petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[15]
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18, 2011.[16] Finding the arguments in the motion unmeritorious, the
RTC denied the motion in its Order[17] dated September 7, 2011:
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for making a finding that either petitioner or respondent or both were afflicted with
a psychological disorder within the contemplation of existing law and jurisprudence. Such being the case, there was no need to resort
to Dr. Adamos' findings.

Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason to set aside its March 10, 2011 Decision.

Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his petition to the CA.[19] In his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it
is not necessary for the psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated spouse, or Michelle in this case, before the court may rule
on the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[20] He also argued that, at the very least, there was sufficient evidence to support his
own diagnosis of psychological incapacity.[21] Martin thus claimed that the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing that there was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's
psychological incapacity, the Republic asserts that there was no independent proof to establish this claim. Fm1hermore, the Republic
argued that Martin supported his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with self-serving testimonies and hearsay evidence.[22]
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision[23] dated July 10, 2013, the CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 07.
2011, respectively, issued by the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 261, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage
between [Martin] and [Michelle] is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim that he is psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated
the RTC's ruling by referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his tendency to impose his own unrealistic standards on
Michelle.[25] In its challenged decision, the CA likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was adequately supported by the narrations of
Martin and Jose Vicente.[26]
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's Decision dated July 10, 2013.[27] The CA denied the motion in
its Resolution[28] dated November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its earlier arguments.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. It argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially m relation to Dr. Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. According to the Republic, there
were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who could have testified on Michelle's behavior.[29]
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the
Court discussed in Santos v. CA, et al.[30] as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[31]
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos[32] that for purposes of establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not
required that a physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is enough that the totality of evidence is
strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In such case, however, the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving
the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other spouse's psychological incapacity.[33]
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v. Molina,[34] these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all
fours with another.[35]

Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
He testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. In particular, he stated that Michelle was
confrontational even before their marriage.[36] He alleged that Michelle always challenged his opinions on what he thinks is proper,
which he insisted on because he witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his biological father.[37] He also thought that
Michelle was highly impressionable and easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that Michelle acted recklessly
and without consideration of his feelings.[38]

The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos,
Michelle suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of childhood trauma and defective child-rearing practices.[39] This
disorder was supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin, who she constantly lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological
Impression Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.[40]

The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of Michelle was the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente.
Jose Vicente was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to each other before their marriage.[41] Jose Vicente was
also allegedly a regular confidant of Michelle.[42]

While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was
incorrect in ruling that Dr. Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with Martin.[43] Even if that were the case, the findings of
the psychologist are not immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Because a marriage necessarily involves only two persons, the
spouse who witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to the psychologist.[44]

This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot
absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other independent evidence establishing the root
cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand
observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history.
The records do not show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to
Michelle during their adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known
about her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family.[45] Without a credible source of her supposed
childhood trauma, Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is
suffering from a chronic and persistent disorder that is grave and incurable.

The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua[46] judiciously discussed the dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-
spouse to the psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid
and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
xxxx
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
– i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[47] (Citations omitted and
emphasis Ours)

It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr.
Adamos diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.[48] Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal
interviews of Martin, who underwent several—or to be accurate, more than 10—counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to
2009.[49] These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.

In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference
towards ideal love and ideal marriage."[50] Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the
feelings of Michelle.[51]

As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism.[52] Dr. Adamos concluded from
the tests administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having
grown up around a violent father who was abusive of his mother.[53] This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he formed
unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree
with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her.[54] Other manifestations include excessive
love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-centeredness.[55]

These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As
such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring the
marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances obtaining in this specific  case warrant the declaration that Martin is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to Michelle. This is neither a
relaxation nor abandonment of previous doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family Code. The guidelines in Molina still apply to all
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court does not lose sight of the constitutional protection to the institution
of marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological
incapacity of respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated July 10, 2013 and Resolution dated November
28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent that the marriage of the respondents on
February 8, 2002 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
 42.) G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) asking the Court to
reverse and set aside the April 25, 2017 Decision1 and January 11, 2018 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105873, which affirmed the May 8, 2015 Decision3 and September
16, 2015 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC) declaring
the marriage of Liberato P. Mola Cruz (respondent) and Liezl S. Conag (Liezl) void ab initio.

The Antecedents

Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Their dating relationship
began when Liezl's sister gave Liezl's mobile phone number to respondent so they could become
textmates. In the course of their relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6)
months. The couple got married after Liezl returned home. They lived for some time in Manila where
respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl again secured a contract as an entertainer
and respondent found work as a construction worker. It was while living in Japan when respondent
noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent's permission and
started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at respondent for no
reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due to
overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her romantic affair with a
Japanese man. Despite the confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused
respondent such stress that he was hospitalized. Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive
Liezl but she chose to walk away from their marriage.

The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One day, however,
respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house. To respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him
to her lover as her elder brother. Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl to share
her bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their home. Liezl went on with her partying ways,
and continued working in a Manila nightclub despite respondent's offer for her to start a business.

Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time. Respondent tried to move on
and left for Singapore to work in 2008. Though abroad, he continued to woo his wife back, but found
out that Liezl already cohabited with her lover.

Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The public prosecutor assigned to the case reported, submitted a written report to the
RTC, stating, among others, that the filing of the petition was not a result of collusion between the
spouses.5 Thereafter, pre-trial was held and trial on the merits ensured.

The RTC's Decision

The RTC granted respondent's petition, and declared respondent and Liezl's marriage void ab
initio and their property regime dissolved.

The RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr.
Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Based on the evaluation and assessment procedure she followed, Dr.
Tudla found that Liezl was afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior
characterized by excessive emotionality and attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be
perceived by others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable; seeking immediate gratification; over-
reactive to even minor provocations; suggestible; and lacking in analytical ability.

Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl's disorder: going out without her husband's
knowledge or permission; coldly treating her husband, verbally and sexually; quick anger at the
slightest provocation or for no reason; arrest in Japan due to overstaying; admission to an affair;
insensitivity towards her husband's feelings, as shown by introducing her husband as her brother to
her Japanese lover; threats of leaving if her ideas are not agreed to; unabashed declaration of having
no feelings for her husband; maintaining a night life with friends; and choosing to work in a nightclub
instead of engaging in a decent job.

Dr. Tudla found that Liezl's psychological incapacity existed prior to the marriage because she grew
up irritable, hard-headed and more fond of friends than family. She despised advice or suggestion
from her elders, and would rebel when her demands were not met. This personality aberration was
determined by Dr. Tudla as rooted on Liezl's poor upbringing - Liezl's father resorted to corporal
punishment to instill discipline, while her mother tolerated her whims. Liezl also tended to skip house
and spend nights with her friends to avoid her father's spanking. According to Dr. Tudla, the irregular
treatment she received from her parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable behavioral patterns.

Aside from the existence of Liezl's psychological incapacity prior to the marriage, Dr. Tudla found her
incapacity too grave that it seriously impaired her relationship with her husband, and caused her
failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage which resulted in its breakdown. Her incapacity
was also found incurable because it was deeply ingrained in her personality. Further, Dr. Tudla found
Liezl unconscious of her personality disorder and, when confronted, would deny it to avoid criticism.
The disorder was also permanent as it started during her adolescence and continued until adulthood.
Treatment was also deemed ineffective as lack of any indication that behavioural or medical therapy
would play a significant role, considering Liezl's unawareness of her disorder. Only the people around
her noticed her maladaptive behavior.

The RTC found that Liezl was largely responsible for the failure of her marriage. Her moral
bankruptcy, coupled with respondent's weakness in character inconsistent with what is expected of
the head of a family, left the marital union bereft of any mutual respect. According to the RTC, the
marriage was wrong from the very beginning.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and argued that Dr. Tudla's findings were based on hearsay
because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts on which her evaluation was anchored; and that
the hopelessness of the parties' reconciliation should not mean that their marriage should be
declared void ab initio.

In its Order,6 the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals' Decision

On appeal, petitioner raised the sole issue of whether respondent was able to prove Liezl's
psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations. It claimed that respondent failed to do so,
and that witness Dr. Tudla only made a sweeping statement that Liezl's condition was grave and
permanent. Petitioner questioned Dr. Tudla's report as it lacked details regarding Liezl's condition and
how Liezl was unable to comply with her marital obligations. Petitioner contended that the change in
Liezl's behavior was only caused by her illicit relationship and not because of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner asserted that sexual infidelity, indulgence and abandonment can only be
grounds for legal separation as they do not constitute psychological incapacity.

In its decision, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC's decision. It
reasoned that:
What matters in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis of experts.

In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by petitioner's witness Pacita P.
Tudla. Ph.D concluded [that] respondent is suffering from histrionic personality disorder. From
interviews of said psychologist with petitioner, respondent and her sister, it was revealed how her
psychological disorder resulted in the failure of their marriage. At the time the parties were living in
Japan, respondent had an affair with a Japanese national which she admitted to petitioner.
Furthermore, her attitude towards her husband had changed ever since she met her Japanese lover,
giving him the cold treatment and getting angry at him at the slightest provocation. She likewise
refused to have sexual intercourse with petitioner. Respondent preferred to work at a nightclub over
a decent business offered to her by petitioner. Worst, she let her Japanese boyfriend visit the
conjugal home she shared with petitioner and introduced the latter as her older brother to her lover.
Petitioner was forced to keep silent because she threatened to leave him. And ultimately, Liezl left
Liberato and cohabited with her Japanese boyfriend.

According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has antecedence since it already
existed long before she married petitioner. Growing up, Liezl was irritable, hard-headed and was fond
of her group of friends. She did not know how to accept advice and suggestion from elders.

Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to be grave, permanent

and incurable. Liezl's histrionic personality disorder seriously impaired the quality of her relationship
with her husband and caused her failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage - love,
respect, concern, support and fidelity to her husband. Further, she is unconscious of her personality
disorder and if confronted about it, she would deny it in her attempt to protect herself from
criticisms.

Ms. Tudla said in her report that Liezl's psychological incapacity is permanent because it started in
the adolescent stage of her life and continued to manifest as she grew up into adulthood. Thus, it is
already ingrained in her personality make-up and no treatment will be effective.7
The CA described Liezl's acts of allowing her lover to stay in the conjugal home and introducing her
husband as her brother as extreme perversion and depravity. It then concluded that, in dissolving
marital bonds on account of psychological incapacity, the court is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The Present Appeal

Petitioner now questions whether the totality of the evidence adduced by respondent proves Liezl's
psychological incapacity, thus warranting the declaration of their marriage as null and void under Art.
36 of the Family Code.

Using the guidelines set forth in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
(Molina),8 petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's findings because there was no
sufficient evidence to prove that Liezl is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations. Dr. Tudla's assessment, based only on the information given by respondent, Liezl and
her sister, must be weighed strictly and with due care. Petitioner avers that there must be a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the couple to obtain a conclusive diagnosis of psychological
incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable. Information retrieved from Liezl's interview does not
necessarily enhance Dr. Tudla's conclusion because the details Liezl conveyed were wanting. There is
also no independent collateral informants, which made Dr. Tudla's evaluation fallible. Therefore, Dr.
Tudla's findings should not be accepted without question.
For petitioner, Liezl's purported actuations were not proven to have existed prior to the marriage; nor
was it alleged in respondent's petition that she showed abnormal and peculiar character and behavior
prior to the celebration of the marriage that would support a conclusion that she is suffering from any
psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that the CA observed nothing peculiar about the spouses
that would insinuate that they are suffering from psychological incapacity, and that the finding that
Liezl was suffering from a psychological disorder was merely based on incidents that occurred after
the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner, thus, avers that Liezl's incapacity is merely conjectural
since there was no mention or proof that her incapacity manifested, or at least was hinted at, before
the celebration of the marriage.

Petitioner also claims that the CA failed to detail how Liezl's disorder could be characterized as grave,
deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. There should be a causal connection between the
failure of the marriage and the psychological disorder. Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty", a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Petitioner
maintains that sexual infidelity and abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and not for
the declaration of nullity of marriage. The change in the spouses' feelings toward each other could
hardly be described as a psychological illness.

Issue

Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was sufficiently
established by the totality of evidence presented by respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court explained psychological incapacity as follows:

"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. x x x.10
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them x x x."11

Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating psychological incapacity cases

set in Molina. We quote the fairly recent iteration of the guidelines in Republic v. Pangasinan12 for
reference:
x x x [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the disposition
of psychological incapacity cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expe1ts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital� obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non�-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential obligations, as the
case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is
incurable and shown to have existed at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof
may only be evident after marriage. x x x.13

In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be viewed as a stringent
code which all nullity cases on the ground of psychological incapacity should meet with exactitude, in
consonance with the Family Code's ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological incapacity on a
case-to-case basis and "to allow some resiliency in its application" as legally designed.14Ngo Te v. Yu-
Te15 predicated, thus:

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.16

In the case at hand, petitioner is again assailing the CA's affirmance of the RTC's conclusion that Liezl
is psychologically incapacitated to carry out her marital obligations to respondent (1) by attacking the
reliability of expert witness Dr. Tudla's medical conclusions on the ground that they were based only
on interviews of Liezl and her sister; (2) by claiming that Liezl's actions manifesting her disorder
occurred after the celebration of the marriage; and (3) because the CA failed to detail why it found
Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. These issues were resolved by
the CA by affirming the factual findings earlier made by the RTC as regards the histrionic personality
disorder suffered by Liezl, all of which were deemed binding to the Court. The Court is so bound "x x
x owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of
the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts."17 A sharper pronouncement on the
respect accorded to the trial court's factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was
made in Kalaw v. Fernandez (Kalaw):18

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party's
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In
every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and
evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own
judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard
marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal existence.19

The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's psychological report confirms,
contrary to petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla personally interviewed both spouses regarding their
personal and familial circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage. Information
gathered from the spouses was then verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez's youngest
sister,20 a close relation privy to Liezl's personal history before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla
then based her psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the information she gathered. Her
findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the parties as
individuals and as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an independent informant.
The courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and utilized it as an aid in determining
whether Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated to meet essential marital functions. Clearly,
petitioner has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla's psychological findings as wanting evidentiary support.

Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple will not perforce result to
the expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner advances. In Kalaw, a case also involving a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage wherein the expert witnesses declared the respondent
spouse therein as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder without personally examining the
latter albeit with the support of the medical findings of the respondent spouse's own clinical
psychologist. In said case, the Court had the occasion to re-emphasize that such lack of personal
examination does not per se invalidate the experts' findings of psychological incapacity.
Citing Marcos v. Marcos,21 the Court emphasized the importance of the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the inessentiality of a physician's
personal examination to have a party declared psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on
the point, as follows:

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that
a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert's findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so, considering that any ruling that
brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties' upbringing
and psychodynamics.22

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA and the RTC did
not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition,
sufficiently established the link between Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to
understand and perform her marital obligations and her histrionic personality disorder. The Court
respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired before and
during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."23 In addition,
Dr. Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her psychological
evaluation of both spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description of
histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's behavior
from her formative years through he course of her marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's
report and testimony enjoy such probative force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to
the courts to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based.24

The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the marriage was
celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological incapacity to speak of.
As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,25 psychological incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration
of the marriage even if it already exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly, Art. 36 of the
Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by a psychologically incapacitated party is also treated
as void even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage was celebrated.26

Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the reasons why it found Liezl's
disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable.

To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.27 The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.28 "There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to the marriage� which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity."29

The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge
her marital obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to her husband. The CA
also narrated how the disorder was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated,
starting from when she and petitioner lived together in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by
appreciating the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was unable to accommodate the
fact that she was already married into the way she wanted to live her life, and essentially treated
petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to her desires.
It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital responsibilities.

The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well
into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness
of her disorder. Together with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA came to
agree with the expert findings that any medical or behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove
ineffective.

Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and abandonment are only grounds
for legal separation and cannot be used as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio. According to
petitioner, Liezl cheated on and abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and not because
she is psychologically incapacitated.

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It may be noted,
however, that the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of
her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and
egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.30 These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's
highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the
marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done
under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the
marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who reasonably understand the
principle and responsibilities of marriage.

The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab initio, even as it is clear
from the records how much petitioner must love his wife to endure the pain and humiliation she
callously caused him in the hope that their relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not
recognize the marital responsibilities that came when she married petitioner. The severance of their
marital vinculum will better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of marriage and
family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2017 Decision and January 11, 2018 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA�-G.R. CV No. 105873 are AFFIRMED.
43.) G.R. No. 230443

MARY CHRISTINE C. GO-YU, Petitioner

vs.
ROMEO A. YU, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision  and the
1

Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017, respectively, in CA-
2

G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the following: (1) the June 20, 2013
Order  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 12, in Civil Case No. 33,083-09, which denied herein
3

respondent Romeo A. Yu's Demurrer to Evidence in the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property which petitioner Mary Christine C. Go-Yu filed against
respondent; and (2) the July 31, 2013 Order  of the RTC denying respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
4

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 21, 2009, herein petitioner filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 12, a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property  against herein respondent, alleging that:
5

she was a child who was well provided for and taken care of by her parents; she grew up to become a self-assured,
independent and confident person; after finishing college at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver,
Canada, she came back home to the Philippines, worked in various companies, eventually joined their family
business where she started as a secretary and worked her way to become the Senior Vice President who is in
charge of the day-to-day operations of the company which has in its employ at least 700 personnel; she and
respondent were casually introduced by the former's mother; several months after their first meeting, respondent
asked her out on a date and, after a few months of dating exclusively, they got married on June 11, 1999; thereafter,
they stayed at respondent's family home where petitioner had to contend with the constant meddling of her mother-
in-law, as well as the latter's intrusion into their privacy; when she complained, respondent promised her that they
will eventually move out; however, his promise was never fulfilled; petitioner had to make a lot of adjustments which
entailed a lot of sacrifice on her part; she gave up some of the luxuries she had gotten used to when respondent's
financial resources dwindled; she limited her social life and became withdrawn, maintaining only a small circle of
friends; she took on the responsibility of single-handedly running their household and making all decisions as
respondent was too busy in his involvement with his personal and social activities outside their house; after their
wedding, the parties' sexual activity decreased considerably; petitioner was unable to conceive and even tried to
convince respondent that she undergo in vitro fertilization but the latter refused; as a result, the parties grew apart
as a married couple leading them to live separate lives even though they stay under the same roof; petitioner was
eventually diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist before the parties' marriage;
and the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees nothing wrong with it or the need to change
renders treatment improbable. Petitioner sought the dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties
claiming that their marriage is governed by the provisions of the Family Code and that they did not enter into any
prenuptial agreement.

In his Amended Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent denied the material allegations of
petitioner's Petition and contended that: he offers his love and affection for petitioner and he desires for them to
reconcile and save their marriage in the spirit of love, forgiveness and Christian values on marriage; and petitioner is
not suffering from psychological incapacity and personality disorder, instead, her problem is behavioral in the sense
that she has difficulty adjusting to married life and in dealing with respondent's relatives, especially his mother. As to
the dissolution of the parties' absolute community of properties, respondent claimed that the properties adverted to
by petitioner in her Petition are not properties of the parties' absolute community as these are merely held by
respondent in trust for his siblings and relatives; in fact, petitioner had executed an attestation admitting that the
properties she mentioned in her Petition are owned by respondent's siblings and other relatives.

Subsequently, the case proceeded to trial where petitioner presented her documentary and testimonial evidence,
the latter consisting of the testimonies of petitioner, her friend, her secretary, and the psychiatrist who examined her.
After petitioner has rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence  claiming that petitioner's alleged
6

Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which supposedly renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations, is not supported by clear evidence.

In its Order  of June 20, 2013, the RTC denied respondent's Demurrer to Evidence by holding that petitioner has
7

adduced substantial evidence to show that she is suffering from a personality disorder and that there is, therefore, a
need for respondent to adduce controverting evidence. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration  but the same
8

was denied in the Order  of the RTC dated July 31, 2013.
9

Respondent then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Orders of the RTC which denied his Demurrer to Evidence and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. 10

In its assailed Decision dated January 13, 2017, the CA reversed and set aside the June 20, 2013 and July 31,
2013 Orders of the RTC and granted respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, thereby dismissing the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property filed by petitioner.

The CA held that the evidence presented by petitioner, through the psychological report and all supporting
testimonial evidence, failed to establish any proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital obligations. The CA further ruled that, if at all, what
petitioner has admitted to be afflicted of or materially manifesting in her marriage with respondent is an obvious
refusal, if not neglect, to perform her marital obligations. The CA concluded that it was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge to have denied the demurrer to evidence and require respondent to controvert petitioner's
evidence which is patently lacking and, thus, unduly impose unwarranted burden on respondent and his resources,
and, most especially, the docket of the courts.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated March 6, 2017.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY HAVE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT FAILED, OR REFUSED, TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING NEW AND SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THAT:

A. RESPONDENT'S PETITION WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH
IT GRANTED IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION, HAS IN FACT ALREADY BEEN MOOTED AND OVERTAKEN BY
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION, AFTER RESPONDENT HAD
SUBMITTED HIS OWN CONTROVERTING EVIDENCE AND RESTED HIS CASE.

B. CONTRARY TO ITS RULING WHICH ADMITTEDLY WAS BASED ONLY ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
THUS FAR AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WAS NOT AT ALL "PATENTLY LACKING" AS IN FACT IT HAS
SATISFACTORILY SUPPORTED THE CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, AND WHICH
WAS NOT EVEN EFFECTIVELY CONTROVERTED BY RESPONDENT'S OWN EVIDENCE.

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS TO RULE THAT
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME. 11

The petition lacks merit.

In her first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent's petition for certiorari filed with the CA was rendered
moot by reason of the continuation of the proceedings before the RTC where respondent was able to present his
own controverting evidence and rested his case. Petitioner also argues that, contrary to the assailed ruling of the
CA, the totality of evidence she presented before the trial court was not patently lacking but, in fact, has satisfactorily
supported the case for declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an original action,
independent from the principal action, and not a part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of
the judgment complained of.  It "is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
12

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."  As a consequence, "a petition for certiorari pending before a higher court does not
13

necessarily become moot and academic by a continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin."  Hence, in the
14

instant case, the special civil action for certiorari which respondent filed with the CA is independent from the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner. Being independent from the principal action, the petition
for certiorari may not, thus, be rendered moot by the mere continuation of the proceedings in the RTC.

It is true that under Section 7,  Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of
15

the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. However, despite the absence of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction which enjoins the RTC from further proceeding with the case, it appears that
the RTC has chosen to follow the rule on judicial courtesy. Indeed, while the RTC continued in holding trial and, in
fact, allowed the parties to complete the presentation of their evidence, it stopped short of rendering its decision on
the petition even if the same has been submitted for resolution as early as July 1, 2015.

In this regard, this Court has noted instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its
proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v.
Court of Appeals: 16

Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from
taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting respondents' motion to expunge from the
records the petitioner's motion to dismiss and denying the latter's motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of
the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily
limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-
mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have
prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case
and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court[.] 17

In the subsequent cases of Go v. Judge Abrogar  and Rep. of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.),  this Court
18 19

has qualified and limited the application of the principle of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court by holding that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong probability
that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court. Thus, the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the
rule.

In the instant case, the Court finds that the RTC correctly adhered to this principle because there is a strong
probability that the issue raised before the CA - of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, which issue ultimately lies in the determination of whether or not
petitioner's evidence is patently and utterly insufficient to prove her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage -
would be rendered moot as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.

Petitioner further insists that the issue of the presence or absence of psychological, incapacity on the part of
petitioner is a factual matter which requires the examination and determination of the totality of evidence presented
and, as such, the trial court should have primacy in the determination thereof.

It bears to remind petitioner, however, of the nature of a demurrer to evidence.

"A demurrer to evidence is defined as 'an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out
his case or sustain the issue.' The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."  Moreover,
20

"[t]he grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." 21

As to whether or not a trial court's denial of a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this Court, in the case of Ong, et al. v. People of the
Philippines,  held as follows:
22

Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's interlocutory order denying
a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had
presented its evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not
appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])."

However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to evidence), appeal in due time is the proper
remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority."

Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari. This exception was explicitly recognized by the Court in Cruz v.
People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where we stated that:

The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge (the denial of the demurrer to
evidence) may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued
with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.

Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that "the rule is not absolute and admits
of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order
of denial on certiorari."

The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy of certiorari, the trial court judge
having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners'
demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain.a verdict. The
court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. 23

In the instant case, consistent with petitioner's contention, the trial court was given the opportunity and the primacy
in the determination of the merits of respondent's demurrer to evidence. In other words, the RTC was given
precedence in determining whether petitioner's evidence was enough to sustain the issue. In fact, the RTC has
ruled in petitioner's favor by denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that petitioner has adduced
substantial evidence to show that she is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Hence, petitioner may not
claim that, in ruling against respondent's Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC was not given the chance to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case, albeit sans the evidence presented by respondent. But again, as
previously discussed, in a demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict.

In the present petition, this Court is confronted with the main issue of whether or not the CA correctly held that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied herein respondent's motion to dismiss on demurrer to
evidence. Stated differently, this Court has to rule whether herein petitioner was able to produce sufficient evidence
before the trial court to make out her Case or to sustain a verdict.
In her petition filed with the RTC, petitioner contends that her marriage to respondent is null and void from the
beginning by reason of her psychological incapacity. However, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Demurrer to Evidence because petitioner was unable
to present sufficient evidence to show that she has the right to the relief she seeks.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition and reiteration of settled jurisprudence in Castillo v. Rep. of the Phils., et
al.,  on what constitutes psychological incapacity as construed under the law, is instructive, to wit:
24

Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave
and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage,
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, this Court laid down the more definitive guidelines in the
disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:

xxxx

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
xxx

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x

xxxx

The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not
on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.

As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to
the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however,
did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments
not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings. 25

In the instant case, this Court quotes with approval the discussion made by the CA with respect to the merits of the
psychiatric evaluation made by petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Agnes S. Borre-Padilla, pertinent portions of which
read as follows:

x x x A close scrutiny of Dr. Padilla's seventeen (17) page psychological report (Annex "F") would show that she
devoted a mere one (1) page discussion, if it could be called that, of the purported Narcissistic Personality Disorder
of [herein petitioner] Go-Yu. The supposed discussion part of the report was in actuality nothing but an
incomprehensible enumeration of the manifestations of an alleged disordered behavior with nary an explanation or
detailed factual narration of events in the life of [petitioner] Go-Yu to support the good doctor's questionable
observations.

Also, it would appear that the good psychiatrist mainly relied on the accounts as relayed to her by [herein petitioner]
Go-Yu herself even if she had the good sense to state through a belated one (1) sentence footnote at the very end
of her report that she ostensibly interviewed a variety of sources. However, it could never be deduced from the
report from who did the psychiatrist actually obtain any particular information as the report is full of generalizations
detailing only the life story of the estranged couple.

The Supreme Court has on several occasions spoke of credibility or reliability gaps when it comes to expert opinion
evidence in petitions for nullity of marriage cases. In the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the High Court ruled that "other
than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist's report and the testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito's purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder
as chronic, grave, and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the
Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony."

As previously stated, the psychological report in this case is wanting in material facts, acceptable discussion and
analysis, to support the supposed expert opinion of the psychiatrist that one of the parties is suffering from a
narcissistic personality disorder. As ruled in the Suazo v. Suazo case, the methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as a
basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

What makes matters worse is the fact that it is the [herein petitioner] Go-Yu herself who claims to be the person
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Hence, whatever she had to say was inherently
self-serving and should be held to the strictest standard of scrutiny. Towards this end, [herein petitioner] Go-Yu
miserably failed.26

The Court likewise notes and agrees with the observations and accompanying discussions of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in its Comment to petitioner's petition for certiorari filed with the CA, to wit:
What is clearly patent in the Petition for certiorari is that [herein petitioner] Go-Yu has made several allegations in
her petition for nullity of marriage that she claims to prove her psychological incapacity. The evidence she presented
however fails to persuade (sic) the existence of a narcissistic personality disorder that is in fact incurable and which
exists even prior to her marriage with [herein respondent] Yu. What is baffling is that despite the many positive and
admirable traits raised by [herein petitioner] Go-Yu in her petition to describe herself, these same characteristics had
been the basis of her witness, Dr. Padilla, to conclude that she is suffering from a psychological disorder.

Apart from the opinion raised by Dr. Padilla, there appears to be no other competent and credible proof that the
alleged disorder is in fact grave enough to bring about the disability and that said disorder is permanent or clinically
incurable. The testimony of Dr. Padilla, who is supposed to be the expert witness of [herein petitioner] Go-Yu, at
large, merely established that the parties are having great marital difficulties, which, however, do not warrant a
declaration of nullity of marriage. Worse, the [bases] for Dr. Padilla's conclusion were mere interviews with several
Individuals, including [herein petitioner] Go-Yu, who was never even referred to any psychological testing for a
clearer and more reliable evaluation. 27

Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claim that she is psychologically incapacitated to perform the ordinary duties and
responsibilities of a married woman, the Court agrees with the observation of the OSG, as well as the respondent,
that petitioner's documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence prove otherwise — that she is, in fact, fully aware
of and has performed the essential obligations of a married individual. The following instances prove such
capacity: first, petitioner expressed concern over the decrease in their sexual activity after their wedding, that she
also has needs and that, unlike her and respondent, it is normal for married couples to have a healthy sexual
relationship;  second, she wanted to have a baby with respondent because she believes and understands that one
28

of the purposes of marriage is procreation  and she also thought that having a baby could somehow save their
29

marriage;  third, she made adjustments and sacrifices by giving up luxuries she had gotten used to when her
30

husband's financial resources started to dwindle;  and fourth, she helped her husband manage their finances and
31

run their household.  During her cross-examination, she testified thus:

32

Q So, is it fair to say that when you noticed that there was a decrease in sexual activity, that something was wrong
with your marriage with Romeo Yu?

A Yes because it's really not normal.

Q So, in a way you fully understand that as husband and wife there must be a healthy sexual relationship?

A Yes, now, I know that now.

Q And you mentioned that you confronted Mr. Yu about that?

A I discussed with him?

Q Yes you discussed it with him?

A Yah.

Q And how did you discuss it with him?

A Oh I would bring it up and say that this is not normal, I also have my needs. That's it.

Q And what is the response of Mr. Yu?

A He would go to sleep.

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q Now, do you agree Ms. Witness that one of the expression of love is the sexual activity?
WITNESS:

A Do I believe that?

Q Yes?

A Yah.

Q In fact during your marriage with Mr. Yu, you also wanted to have a baby?

A No, no, no, I think you got it wrong. I said at the last year or something, I said maybe we should give it a try but I'm
not saying that the whole time I wanted to have a baby.

Q So, during that moment when you said that both of you must have at least give it a try, you mean at that point in
time you wanted to have a baby from your husband of course?

A Obviously.

Q So, you also fully understand that wanting to have a baby is part of the purpose of marriage which is to procreate,
is that, correct? Procreation is one of the purposes of marriage?

A Do I understand?

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q Do you [agree] with that?

WITNESS:

A Do I believe in it?

Q Yes, that one of the purposes of marriage is procreation?

A Yes, I believe it's right.

Q So when you say right, [w]hat do you mean right?

A When you read all the books, when you talk to all the priest, yes it's right, but some people get married mot just to
have a child.

Q Apart from the other purposes of marriages you will agree with me that, apart from all purposes of marriage, one
of which is somehow to have a child with your husband?

A No.

Q So, what was then your intention when you said that you wanted to give it a try to have a baby with your
husband?

A Because I thought it would give him focus because there was no focus. He was having his own life. He was too
busy having his own life. I thought that somehow, maybe, just maybe having a child would somehow save what we
have, would get us together again and give us focus.

Q When you say to save what we have, you mean to save your marriage, is that correct?

A Yes, perhaps.
xxxx

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q And in fact in paragraph 18 [of your affidavit], you stated that and I quote: "I then found myself having to make a
lot of adjustments which entailed a lot of sacrifice on my part," is that correct?

WITNESS:

xxxx

A Ah yah.

Q You also stated that "I gave up some luxuries I had gotten used to when his financial resources started to
dwindle", correct?

A Yes.

Q You also stated that "I limited my social life and became withdrawn, maintaining only a small circle of friends, you
stated that, correct?

A Yes.

Q "I took on the responsibility of single-handedly running the household and making all decisions, you stated that in
your affidavit?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q So, is it fair to say that you shared some responsibilities with your husband with respect to these matters?

A It was not responsibility, it was just work.

xxxx

Q But is it not a fact Ms. Witness that in paragraph 18 of your affidavit you said that "I took on the responsibility of
single-handedly running the household and making all decisions", is that correct?

A Yes, the household.

Q And in fact you said and I quote: "I also took over all his financial concerns", is that correct?

A Yes.

xxxx

A When I mean I took over all his financial concerns, there was a period that he didn't have any money. The price of
coconut was down. So he would go to my office practically every week he would borrow money from me just to fund
his account. He borrowed from my own money.

Q And you also lent him of course?

A I lent him. Yes because he was begging, his brothers wouldn't lend him.
Q Next question. Did you get frustrated with all these sacrifices like taking all the responsibilities, and single-
handedly running the household and making all decisions? Did it frustrate you during your marriage?

A Partially.

xxxx

Q You did not think that Mr. Romeo Yu was performing his duties as partner to a marriage?

A As the man in the house.

Q When you say man in the house, what do you mean?

A The man in the house is the one suppose to face the problem first not me. face his problem. The man in the
house, you know in the old days, he is supposed to go fishing and the wife is suppose to cook the fish[.] I'm not
supposed to do the fishing.

ATTY. POLINAR:

Q Can you tell the court what is the role of the wife, in the marriage?

WITNESS:

A She is suppose to cook the fish, and if she happens to be the fisherman herself then well and good. Then there is
more fish in the house but I don't believe the guy should stop fishing and stick from the wife's fish that she earn.

Q Now, in paragraph 19, you stated that and I quote: "After our wedding, our sexual activity considerably decreased
in frequency."

A Yes.

Q You also stated that respondent and I quote "did not seem to want to be intimate with me anymore", is that
correct?

A Gradually.

xxxx

Q Now, you said x x x that you were partially frustrated having to take over some of the responsibilities, household
responsibilities. Is it not a fact that because of your frustrations with him that you do not want anymore [to] live with
him, with Mr. Romeo Yu?

A Am I driven by frustrations?

Q Yes?

A What's the question?

Q Did your frustrations somehow reached the point that you cannot live with him anymore?

A Live with as [i]n[?]

Q One house with him?

A In the same house?

Q Yes as couple?

A As a couple in a marriage?

Q Yes.

A No, it is. not just frustration, it's discovering that you don't have anything in common at all. 33

All the foregoing clearly show that petitioner unquestionably recognizes both spouses' obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render mutual help and support, provide for the support of the family, and
manage their household. The fact that she gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward her husband and their marriage is not a sufficient ground to have such marriage declared null
and void.

Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which is defined as a mental condition in
which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and admiration,
troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others.  The psychiatrist who examined petitioner confirmed this
34

definition by stating that in layman's terms, a person who is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder is one
"who is self-centered and [who] has prioritized [his/]her needs over the other or significant person."  Based on the
35

above definitions alone, how can petitioner claim that she is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder when,
as previously discussed, through her own statements and admissions in her petition and in her testimony in court,
she has displayed full knowledge and understanding of her and her husband's obligations and has, in fact,
committed positive acts towards building and sustaining a family?

As to petitioner's contention that respondent admitted in his original Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses
the allegations in the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, suffice it to say that respondent's original Answer
has been amended. Settled is the rule that "pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their
status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions."  "Where an amended answer is complete in itself, it
36

supersedes the original answer, which no longer remains a part of the record."  Moreover, even granting that
37

respondent admitted that petitioner was indeed suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, such admission may
not be used as basis for the court's judgment because under Article 48 of the Family Code, in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of mairiage, "no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment." Stated differently, notwithstanding any admission made by respondent, it is still incumbent
upon petitioner to prove the nullity of their marriage by evidence other than such admission. Having failed to do so,
this Court agrees with the CA in ruling that:

Indeed, it was capricious for [the RTC] to deny the demurrer to evidence and require [herein respondent] to
controvert evidence totally wanting and unduly impose unwarranted burden on the part of the [respondent] and his
resources and most especially to the docket of the courts. 38

The Court understands and commiserates with petitioner's frustration over her marital woes.  However, "[t]o be tired
1âшphi1

and to give up on one's situation and on one's [spouse] are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither
can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is x x x a
limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation — a relationship where no marriage could have validly
been concluded because the parties, or [where] one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could
not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent
remedy." 39

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Resultantly, it has always been held that mere
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. 40
Lastly, our Constitution "set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot
be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie."  This is the case here.
41

Finally, having ruled that the CA did not err in reversing and setting aside the assailed June 20, 2013 Order of the
RTC and in consequently dismissing petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the
Absolute Community of Property, the Court no longer finds any need to discuss the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on January 13, 2017 and March 6, 2017, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 05780-MIN
are AFFIRMED.
 44.) G.R. No. 200182, March 13, 2019

ANACLETO ALDEN MENESES,* PETITIONER, v. JUNG SOON LINDA LEE-MENESES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Is a spouse who considers money and material needs as the essence of marriage psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations to warrant a declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) assailing the Decision2 dated July 19, 2011 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated January
12, 2012 (Assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95614.

The Assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed the Decision4 dated October 20, 2009 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-05-58783 dismissing the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by petitioner Anacleto Alden Meneses (Anacleto).

The Facts

The facts, as narrated by the CA, are as follows: cralawred

[Anacleto] and [respondent Jung Soon Linda Lee-Meneses (Linda)] met during their college years in
the United States of America (USA). They became involved romantically after fifteen (15) months of
courtship. A year after, they decided to get married.

On August 9, 1981, [Anacleto] and [Linda] were married at Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On June 3, 1983, Linda Monique L. Meneses, their only child[,] was born.

During the first few years of married life, they lived with [Anacleto's] family in Houston[,] Texas,
USA. [Linda] [would] always complain of not having enough money as she wanted to live on their
own, away from her parents-in-law. She would always nag [Anacleto] to look for a higher paying job
so that she could get ahead in life. [Linda] wanted a luxurious life and she only appreciate [d] her
husband when he [bought] her expensive gifts and [took] her out to fancy expensive restaurants.

After ten (10) years of living in Houston[,] Texas, USA, they decided to relocate their business to
Korea. For a couple of years, they lived with [Linda's] parents. When their business failed, they
decided to return to the Philippines.

During their marriage, they always fought about not having enough money. The constant fighting
and nagging caused [Anacleto] humiliation[;] [h]e lost self-esteem and suffered an erectile disorder.
[Linda] even ridiculed [Anacleto's] inability to have an erection. She even accused him of having an
extra-marital relationship.

In May 2005, after living together for almost [21] years, [Linda] left [Anacleto] to live in Korea. Later
on, she lived in the USA with their daughter x x x. [Linda] informed [Anacleto] that she [would] x x x
come back [only] if he [could] give her a better life financially.5
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On September 8, 2006, Anacleto filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition)
before the RTC.6

Linda failed to file her responsive pleading Respite service of summons through publication. Thus, the
RTC referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor to determine whether there was collusion
between the parties.7 Finding that no such collusion exists, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Report recommending that the case proceed to trial.8

Trial on the merits ensued.9

Anacleto presented the testimony of Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychiatrist. Based on
interviews conducted with Anacleto, his office secretary Marife Davi (Marife) and the parties' family
driver Ronilo Reol (Ronilo), Dr. Lopez concluded that Linda suffers from narcissistic personality
disorder with borderline personality disorder features that render her incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.10

The RTC summarized Dr. Lopez's findings as follows: cralawred

Dr. Lopez testified that the root cause of [Linda's] personality disorder can be traced back
to her dysfunctional familial pattern and psychological development. She was [7] years old
when her parents separated and she was raised by her mother who was controlling, strict and
disciplined. When [Linda] misbehaved, her mother abused her verbally and spanked her using her
hand, a belt, or a golf iron rod. In fact, because of her meddling in the private lives of her daughters,
[Linda's] sister also separated from her husband. Dr. Lopez alleges that [Linda's] stepfather also
[abused] her physically. There were instances [when] [Linda's] stepfather dank her head in the water
because she was naughty. Because of the way [Linda] was treated by her parents, she became a
rebel teenager and developed hatred towards her stepfather. In order to succeed in life, [Linda's]
parents sacrifice[d] a lot[;] they [saw] money as the key to have a successful life. With this mindset,
[Linda] grew up whose (sic) main concern in life [was] to have all the material things she wanted.
She became demanding and domineering towards the opposite sex and used the resentment and
hatred she had towards her stepfather as her revenge towards him.

Dr. Lopez concluded that [Linda's] psychological incapacity is an integral part of her
personality, which has its juridical antecedence having existed even prior to the marriage.
It is grave, permanent and incurable and which incapacitated her from performing her
essential marital obligations.11 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Dr. Lopez found that while Anacleto was emotionally affected and disturbed by
the nature of his marital life with Linda, he showed no indication that he too suffers from
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.12

RTC Ruling

On October 20, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: cralawred

In sum, the totality of the evidence presented does not show psychological incapacity on
the part of [Linda]. As discussed in [Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina13] x x x "the burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Anacleto]. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and confirmation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."

With the above findings, the Court does not find sufficient ground to declare the marriage null and
void.

WHEREFORE the [RTC Petition] is denied. The above entitled case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC found the evidence on record insufficient for purposes of establishing the gravity and
juridical antecedence of Linda's personality disorder.15

Anacleto filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied for lack of merit in its
Resolution16 dated July 6, 2010.

Aggrieved, Anacleto filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules, assigning this lone error: cralawred

THE [RTC] ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS OF [DR. LOPEZ],
[ANACLETO'S] EXPERT WITNESS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
[LINDA] IN FULFILLING HER MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.17
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CA Ruling

The CA denied Anacleto's appeal through the Assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads: cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The [RTC Decision] in
Civil Case No. Q-05-58783 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18
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The CA accorded weight and respect to the findings of fact of the RTC. The CA conceded that while
the standards set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina19 may be considered strict, they
remain in line with the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage
and the indissolubility of marital ties.20

Anacleto filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the CA in the Assailed
Resolution.21

Anacleto received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on January 19, 2012. Subsequently, he filed the
present Rule 45 Petition on February 3, 2012.22

On April 16, 2012, the Court issued a Minute Resolution23 denying the Petition. It reads in part: cralawred

x x x Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the [Petition] of the [Assailed
Decision and Resolution] of the [CA] in CA G.R. CV No. 95614, the Court resolves to DENY the
petition for failure of [Anacleto] to sufficiently show that the [CA] committed any reversible error in
the [Assailed Decision and Resolution] as to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.24
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

Thereafter, Anacleto filed a motion for reconsideration insisting on the weight and credibility of Dr.
Lopez's findings.25

In the Resolution26 dated August 13, 2012, the Court resolved to grant Anacleto's motion for
reconsideration and reinstate the Petition. Accordingly, the Court required Linda to file her comment
thereto within ten (10) days from notice.27 Since the Resolution was returned unserved, the Court
directed Anacleto to disclose Linda's address within ten (10) days from notice. In his
Manifestation28 dated March 19, 2013, Anacleto averred that he had lost communication with Linda
when she left their conjugal home in May 2005, and that he no longer knows where she resides.

Upon the Court's directive, Anacleto later manifested his willingness to submit the Petition for
resolution through his Compliance and Manifestation29 dated November 5, 2013.

The Issue

The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the lower courts erred in dismissing Anacleto's
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of insufficient evidence.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

Article 36 of the Family Code states: cralawred

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that psychological incapacity under Article 36 must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.30

To warrant a declaration of nullity on the basis of Article 36, the incapacity "must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved."31

Anacleto insists that Linda's psychological incapacity warrants the nullification of their marriage. His
assertions remain hinged on the findings of Dr. Lopez who found Linda to be afflicted with
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Borderline Personality Disorder Features," characterized by a
"pervasive pattern of grandiosity and lack of empathy[,] x x x instability of interpersonal
relationship[s] x x x and marked impulsivity."32 He also stresses that according to Dr. Lopez, Linda's
disorder can be traced back to her "psychologically unhealthy childhood."33

Hence, contrary to the lower courts' findings, Anacleto argues that Dr. Lopez's findings sufficiently
show that Linda's incapacity is grave, permanent, incurable and has juridical antecedence.34

The Court disagrees.

As stated, Anacleto's arguments stem from the findings of Dr. Lopez which, in turn, are based on
interviews he conducted with Anacleto, his secretary Marife and the parties' family driver, Ronilo.35

In turn, Dr. Lopez based his findings on the factors which purportedly confronted Linda during her
childhood. As narrated in Dr. Lopez's Judicial Affidavit: cralawred

20. [Question]: You said that [Linda] is suffering from personality disorders. What were the root
causes of these?

[Answer]: The root cause of such could be traced back to her psychologically unhealthy childhood
due to her pathogenic family.
21. [Question]: What made you say that [Linda] has an unhealthy childhood due to her pathogenic
family?

[Answer]: At the age of seven [7] years old, her parents separated. Her mother raised her and her
sibling. It is known that her mother was loving, however, strict and had disciplined her
inappropriately. For instance, when Linda has misbehaved or has committed a sin, her mother
subjected her to verbal abuse [and] spanked her using her hand, a belt or a golf iron rod. Linda also
suffered the same from her stepfather when he punished her. As a matter of fact, many times, her
stepfather dunked her head in the water when she would misbehave. This has made Linda rebel
against her parents when she became a teenager. She also developed hatred towards her stepfather
because she felt that he was only a second father to her and did not have the right to punish her in
that manner.

Moreover, Linda's parents struggled through life and made a lot of sacrifices to [attain] financial
success. They saw money as the key to success in life and the answer to satisfy one's needs. This
has made Linda prioritize the satisfaction she would derive from material things and would do
anything to get what [she] wants. On the other hand, Linda's resentment and lack of love and
attention from her father has resulted to her demanding and domineering ways towards the opposite
sex x x x. All these has (sic) made her display narcissistic and borderline behaviors.

xxxx

24. [Question]: Based on your expert opinion, when did [Linda's] psychological disorders start to
develop?

[Answer]: It x x x started to develop during her growing up years x x x and before her
marriage.36 (Emphasis omitted)

While Dr. Lopez attributes the gravity of Linda's disorder to her alleged unhealthy childhood, none of
the informants whom he interviewed claims to have known Linda since childhood. Moreover, neither
Marife nor Ronilo appear to have known Linda prior to the marriage in question. This significantly
impairs the weight of Dr. Lopez's findings, insofar as they are based on the informants' narration of
Linda's childhood events and circumstances which they appear to have no personal knowledge of.

In any case, the Court is not a trier of facts. It is well established that the uniform findings of the
lower courts should be accorded great weight in cases where, as here, they are supported by the
evidence on record.37

The Court's ruling in Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris38 is on point: cralawred

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It
is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts x x x.39
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Verily, none of the foregoing exceptions that warrant a review of factual findings is present in this
case.
The Court commiserates with Anacleto's plight. The denial of the present Petition may be viewed as a
sentence to a lifetime trapped in a "loveless" marriage characterized by failed expectations and lost
hopes. Unfortunately, however, marriage recognized in this jurisdiction stands beyond love and
personal emotions; it is a matter of law. Thus, in actions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
Court is bound to dispense justice not on the basis of its own determination on the existence of love
or lack thereof, but on the basis of law and the evidence on record. While the Court recognizes that
there may very well be grounds to nullify the marriage of Anacleto and Linda, the existence of these
grounds has not been sufficiently shown by the evidence presented in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 19, 2011 and Resolution
dated January 12, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95614 are AFFIRMED.
45.) G.R. No. 226907

GERARDO A. ELISCUPIDEZ, Petitioner
vs.
GLENDA C. ELISCUPIDEZ, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision  dated May
1

31, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103268, and the Resolution  dated September 2, 2016
2

which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the CA reversed and set aside the Decision  of3

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 163 of Taguig City, dated November 5, 2013, which declared the marriage
between petitioner Gerardo A. Eliscupidez (petitioner) and respondent Glenda C. Eliscupidez (respondent) void ab
initio on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.

Petitioner and respondent first met in 1986. They eventually became lovers, maintaining an "on-and-off" relationship
as respondent would still entertain her other admirers, until they finally exchanged marital vows on November 20,
1990. They begot two children. 4

On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed before the RTC of Taguig City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Attempts to personally serve summons on the respondent failed as she could
not be located in her last known address. On petitioner's motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
publication.

In compliance with an Order  of the RTC dated August 3, 2012, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
5

determine if there was collusion between the parties and found that there was none.

During trial, petitioner presented the following testimony which was adopted by the trial court: petitioner and
respondent, while living with petitioner's parents in Manila so as to save money, would have frequent fights, with
respondent having a habit of throwing things at petitioner; respondent allegedly tried to avoid getting pregnant, with
her repeatedly asking their househelp to buy abortifacient medicines and to accompany her to a manghihilot, with
respondent eventually suffering a miscarriage with their supposed first child; respondent forbade petitioner from
looking at other females, from meeting up with his friends and relatives, and from wearing nice clothes, so that he
could not flirt with other women; respondent asked petitioner to resign from his work to avoid meeting other people;
on one occasion, respondent allegedly hit petitioner with a knife, injuring his right arm, just because respondent did
not want him to attend to his assigned work project; petitioner was once admonished by his superior after
respondent, thinking that petitioner was having an affair, went to his office, made a scene in front of his colleagues;
respondent would often insult and berate the petitioner because of the latter's meager income, but despite the
petitioner giving the respondent all his salary, respondent still incurred debts from their co-workers, the employees'
cooperative, and from her credit cards; while petitioner was working in Milan, Italy, respondent neglected her
responsibilities to their children; respondent engaged in an illicit affair with another man, with whom she lived
together and begot two children; to save their marriage, petitioner repeatedly asked respondent to live with him, but
the latter refused; in 2002 or 2003, respondent worked overseas where she had another affair with a married man. 6

Petitioner presented as his witness Irene V. Oro (Oro) who worked as kasambahay for him and respondent when
the two of them were still living together. Oro confirmed petitioner's testimony that respondent was irritable, was a
"war freak," and that whenever petitioner and respondent would quarrel, respondent would throw things at the
petitioner. Oro further claimed that the couple had a heated argument when petitioner found out that respondent had
taken abortion pills. Oro added that the petitioner would be hurt whenever the couple fought with each other. She
was, thus, forced to leave her work out of fear for her life, as petitioner and respondent's quarrels were becoming
more frequent. 7

Petitioner, likewise, presented the Psychological Evaluation Report (Report) of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag. Dr. Tayag conducted her psychological evaluation of petitioner through personal examination while her
assessment of the psychological behavior of respondent was based on her interviews of petitioner, Oro, and Vilma
Cascabel Viernes (Viernes), the respondent's sister.  A portion of the Report reads:
8

REMARKS:

After a careful assessment of the data presented, along with the results of the psychological tests administered, the
undersigned psychologist arrives to a firm opinion that the collapse of the marriage between the herein couple was
triggered by the psychological incapacity of the Respondent to assume and properly discharge her essential roles
and obligations in marriage. Meanwhile, Petitioner, Gerardo, had shown a strong-willed and committed approach to
his marital and family life with his spouse, child and in-laws so that he was able to fulfill his share of obligations and
duties, which are essential to make his marriage a lasting one. He was likewise able to perform his gender role so
that he was perceived as a good family man to his wife and child. Even upon exposure to the challenges and
demands of being a career-oriented man and at the same time Head of his family, he had shown patience and
understanding as well as extreme tolerance towards his irresponsible and abusive wife. For the sake of his child, he
continuously strives to uphold his duties and responsibilities[,] thus, enabling him to meet the essential requirements
of marriage and family life.

On the other hand, Glenda, respondent was seen to be harboring traits of a personality deficit classified as
HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti Social Personality Traits. She manifests a colorful, dramatic,
extroverted behavior. She is usually adventurous so that she is too involved with her friends and the opposite sex to
the extent of neglecting her family. She is also excitable and emotional because she allows her emotions to overrule
her decisions such that she is impulsive when it comes to her decisions and actions. She may at times exaggerate
while expressing her thoughts and feelings to the extent of being abusive and temperamental to her spouse, thus,
humiliating him in front of other people with her nagging ways, fabricated stories and indiscretions. Similarly, she is
known as hysterical for she easily reacts to people and situations even with trivial matters and setbacks since she is
also prone to insecurities and aggressive outbursts of emotions. She has a high degree of attention-seeking
behavior and prefers an extravagant way of life since she is pleased whenever she becomes the center of others'
attention and support[,] and also tends to display tantrums and tears whenever she fails to get what she wants or
when she experiences problems within [her] marriage. More so, she endlessly needs reassurance from other
people. She always attempts to gain her husband's forgiveness and continued loyalty even though she continuously
betrayed his trust. Meanwhile, she is basically irresponsible and consistently fails to honor her sexual roles and
obligations within their marriage such as taking care of her spouse and remaining faithful to their relationship. She
also lacks remorse such that she never was truly guilty of what she did and up to present continues with
irresponsible disposition against her spouse since she engaged in extra-marital relations since she wants to
maintain her lifestyle of being single. She also abandoned her family in order to cohabit with her paramour.

Evidently, Respondent's flawed personality is a result of the lack of sufficient guidance and discipline from her
upbringing as well as poor role models such as her parents and siblings' faulty lifestyle and relationships so that
within the family, there was insufficient bonding, closeness and support. Hence, she has a greater need for
reassurance, security and affection from others so that she learned to use her charm/good looks and assets in order
to obtain such. x x x.

xxxx

The psychological incapacity of the Respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence, as it already existed long
before she entered into marriage with the Petitioner. Since it started early in life, it has been deeply embedded
within her system and becomes an integral part of her personality structure, thereby rendering such to be
permanent and irreversible.

As based on the context mentioned above, the undersigned recommends that their marriage be declared null and
void. 
9

On November 5, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.  It disposed, thus:
1âшphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations.

2. Ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Oriental Mindoro as well as the National Statistics Office to cancel from their
Book of Marriages the entries on the marriage of petitioner and respondent.

The Decree of Absolute Nullity shall be issued by the Court only after the Entry of Judgment shall have been
registered with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Oriental Mindoro where the parties' marriage was celebrated and
with the LCR of Taguig City, conformably with Section 22 of A.M. 02-11-10-SC.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor and the herein parties with a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.  10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied its motion in an Order dated
June 24, 2014. 11

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. It argued that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed
to prove that the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. It added that the reliance of the RTC on
the findings and conclusions of Dr. Tayag was without merit considering that her psychological evaluation of
respondent was based only on the information given to her by petitioner, Oro, and Viernes.  12

In its assailed Decision, the CA found merit in the appeal of the OSG.

The CA held that the sexual infidelity, irresponsibility, and other negative traits cited by the petitioner were not
sufficient grounds to categorize respondent's condition as grave and serious so as to render her incapable of
performing her essential marital obligations.  13

The CA found that according to the records, Oro, the couple's former househelp who provided Dr. Tayag information
on the latter's data gathering process with respect to behavioral, social, and emotional characteristics of the
respondent, was only hired after the celebration of the marriage. The CA emphasized that while Viernes may be
considered competent to provide information on the early life of the respondent, it had not been conclusively
established that the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent existed early in her life given the general
information provided by Viernes. Thus, the CA held that Dr. Tayag's finding of "lack of sufficient guidance and
discipline" and "poor role models" as root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity appear to be without
factual basis.   It added that the psychological impression provided by Dr. Tayag failed to explain in detail how the
14

condition of the respondent could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity.   The appellate court found that the methodology used by Dr. Tayag did not meet the
15

required standard of depth and comprehensiveness of examination needed to evaluate a party who is allegedly
suffering from a psychological disorder.   The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
16

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the trial court dated 05 November 2013
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner
Gerardo Eliscupidez under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED; and the marriage of the parties remains
valid and subsisting. SO ORDERED. 17

Petitoner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its assailed September 2, 2016 Resolution.  18

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of whether the CA committed an error of law in reversing the Decision of
the RTC which granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by
the petitioner. 
19

Petitioner argues that the findings of the RTC as regards the existence or non-existence of the psychological
incapacity of a party should be final and binding. He also claims that his expert witness has concomitantly identified
the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of such psychological incapacity, and that he has presented
independent evidence as to the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity and that the totality of evidence
presented had duly proven the same. 20
The OSG, in its Comment,  reiterated its arguments below, stressing that the conclusion stated in Dr. Tayag' s
21

Report could not be inferred from the statements of Viernes. The OSG maintained that the findings of "lack of
sufficient guidance and discipline" and "poor role models" were, on respondent's part, contradictory to Viernes'
description of her mother as strict, noting that it was stated in the Report that according to Viernes, it was because
of their mother that she and respondent "were disciplined and molded to be dedicated to their studies." 22

We deny the petition.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws; hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the
marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.  No less than
23

Section 2, Article XV, of the 1987 Constitution imposes upon the State the duty to protect the sanctity of marriage as
a social institution and as the foundation of the family.   Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as
24

legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. 25

Given this constitutional inviolability of the institution of marriage, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the
same under Article 36  of the Family Code should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
26

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  It must be a
27

malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.  28

This Court has reiterated in a number of cases  the landmark doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals,   "that
29 30

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved."

Thereafter, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al.,   this Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the disposition
31

of psychological incapacity cases, including "(t)he root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists." 32

To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the
time of the marriage.  In this case, this Court agrees with the OSG that the totality of the evidence presented by the
33

petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

We agree with the refusal of the CA to give credence and weight to the Report of Dr. Tayag. As found by the CA, Dr.
Tayag declared in her Report that her professional services were engaged by petitioner in connection with the
petition for nullity of his marriage with respondent, and that the persons who provided her with information as
regards her data gathering with respect to the behavioral, social, and emotional characteristics of the respondent
were the petitioner himself, their former househelp Oro, and respondent's sister Viernes.  This leads to the
34

conclusion that findings in the same were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and
characterizations of respondent rendered by petitioner and his witnesses.

Moreover, the conclusion of Dr. Tayag that respondent's psychological incapacity existed early in her life were
merely based on the information provided by Viernes that she and respondent were their father's second family, and
that respondent was very manipulative. Dr. Tayag merely generalized her explanations as to the reason behind and
the extent of respondent's alleged personality disorder. The CA correctly pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report failed
to explain in detail how respondent's condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within
the doctrinal context of "psychological incapacity." Said the CA:

x x x It was arrived at only on the basis of the information gathered from the petitioner, whose bias in favor of his
cause cannot be discounted, and the very limited information from the respondent's sister. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely [on] as basis for the
conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. Verily, although expert opinion furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the court, the existence of
psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. 35

This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived
solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.   Verily, the
36

guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals  do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
37

psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition.  For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
38

psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 39

In the present case, however, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner fails to convince this Court that
respondent suffered from a psychological incapacity that is permanent or incurable, and that has existed at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Although respondent was said to have exhibited "dramatic, extroverted behavior"
who was "prone to insecurities and aggressive outbursts of emotions," these characterizations fell short of proving
that she was psychologically incapacitated to assume her marital responsibilities. Thus, while this Court
commiserates with petitioner's predicament, the evidence on record does not square with the existence of
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. Petitioner and respondent's marriage cannot
therefore be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 31, 2016 and the
Resolution dated September 2, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 103268 are AFFIRMED.
 46.) [ G.R. No. 196359. May 11, 2021 ]

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships, Article 36 of the Family Code on
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage was intended to be humane and evolved
on a case-to-case basis, but resilient in its application. However, diametrically opposed to this intent, this Court's
interpretation of the provision—beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals1 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina2—has proven to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on our rights to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity.

It is time to restate the current doctrine in light of the evolution of science, subsequent cases, and other
contemporary circumstances.

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision4 and
Resolution5 The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court that voided the
marriage between Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal due to psychological incapacity. The trial court
likewise awarded the sole custody of the parties' daughter, Ma. Samantha, to Rosanna.

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995 at the Saints
Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati City.7 On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only
child of the parties.8 The family lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna's parents living in the other half of
the duplex.9

After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000.10 Rosanna has since kept the sole custody
of Ma. Samantha.11

On December 18, 2001, Mario filed a Petition12 for custody of Ma. Samantha before the Regional Trial Court.
Mario argued that he and his wife had equal rights to the custody of Ma. Samantha, thus praying that he be allowed
to exercise parental authority over his daughter.13

On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition14 for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.

The Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecutor to report on the parties' possible collusion in filing the
Petition.15 In a February 18, 2004 Report,16 Prosecutor Gil V. Savedia declared that he found no signs of collusion
between Mario and Rosanna.

The cases for custody and declaration of nullity were then consolidated in a September 2, 2004 Order.17

According to Rosanna, she first met Mario in 1975 through the Legion of Mary at the Saints Peter and Paul
Parish in Makati.18 They wrote each other letters until 1978, when they lost contact with each other.19

The parties reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna through their childhood friends.20 When they
finally met again, Mario was in the Philippines for a two-month vacation from his work in Italy.21  He then persisted in
asking out Rosanna for a date. As Mario was set to leave in June 1995, Rosanna agreed to have dinner with him.22

Mario then courted Rosanna, declaring that he had been in love with her for the past 20 years.23 Rosanna
eventually fell in love with Mario and agreed to be his girlfriend.24

Mario did not leave for Italy in June, giving him more time to spend with Rosanna.25 On June 17, 1995, Mario
proposed and Rosanna agreed to marry him in December that year.26
 While they were together, Rosanna noticed that there were times when Mario "would be unaccounted for a
whole night or an entire day[.]"27 When asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he was working.28

Mario also kept postponing his trip back to Italy. When asked why, Mario would either say that he was with
friends or that he was "preparing for [his and Rosanna's] future."29 Since Mario was allegedly affectionate whenever
they were together, Rosanna believed him.30

According to Rosanna, Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship to get back at a Taiwanese national who
had cheated on his friend in a business deal.31 Rosanna first thought that Mario had been joking, but when Mario
appeared serious about his plan, she said that she did not want to get involved in any of his "shady deals."32

In July 1995, Mario finally left for Italy, promising Rosanna that he would be back by November for their
December wedding.33 However, Mario was back by September, barely two months after he had left. It turned out
that Mario had quit his job.34

After Mario's return, Rosanna noticed that Mario always went out at night and would come back home at dawn,
either alone or with his friends.35 He also had difficulty in managing his finances, with his siblings allegedly calling
Rosanna and telling her that their brother was financially incapable of supporting a family.36 However, Rosanna
was already deeply in love with Mario, so she told his sisters that she accepted Mario for who he was.37

Nevertheless, there were times when Mario would allegedly be extremely irritable and moody, causing Rosanna
to have second thoughts about marrying him.38 However, by November 1995, Rosanna was already pregnant with
their child.39 When Rosanna told Mario about it, he became more eager to marry her. He even gave Rosanna
US$1,000.00, the only money he had, before their wedding.40

Instead of spending the US$1,000.00 for their wedding, Rosanna returned the money to Mario and encouraged
him to open a current account for his personal expenses. Mario accepted the money back.41 The parties eventually
married on December 16, 1995.42

Since Mario had no work, Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the construction firm she
had set up before she married Mario. She also introduced Mario to firm clients and brought him with her to client
meetings.43

Mario, however, continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological
imbalance."44 He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he
returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days.45 Mario was also "hyper-active"46 late at night.

Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna's shock, Mario admitted that he was using
marijuana, although he claimed that he was not addicted and that he could stop anytime. He then promised to stop
using it.

Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with his drug use.

The day after Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna. He left her in the
hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only returned to
the hospital later that evening to sleep.

When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of paranoia.
He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out
to hurt them.51

Mario would also take large cash advances from Design and Construction Matrix every week.52 Rosanna only
learned of Mario's numerous cash advances when an accounting personnel informed her that the firm could no
longer pay the construction workers' salaries.53
 Rosanna eventually got tired of Mario. She left him, brought Ma. Samantha with her, and stayed in an inn. She
called up Mario to tell him of her and Ma. Samantha's whereabouts. Mario followed them to the inn and pleaded
Rosanna to give him another chance. After Mario's pleas, Rosanna returned home with Ma. Samantha.54

Later, an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that the employee allegedly found among
Mario's office belongings. When she checked, Rosanna herself found packets of shabu among Mario's
possessions.55

When Rosanna again confronted Mario about his drug use, he explained that it was the only way he could
normally function due to the heavy pressures of work at the firm.56

In October 1998, Ma. Samantha had dengue fever and had to be confined at the hospital. Mario was not home
and could not be reached. He arrived at the hospital only later that evening. He would then run around the different
floors of the hospital, checking the medications prescribed to other dengue fever patients. He would also prevent the
nurses from administering the prescribed medications to Ma. Samantha. When Ma. Samantha vomited, Mario, who
was just sleeping by his daughter's side, would not clean her up. He would instead ignore the ill child, turn to the
other side, and continue sleeping.57

Having had enough of Mario, Rosanna drove him out of the house. After several days, Mario returned home and
pleaded Rosanna for another chance. Rosanna accepted Mario back, but kept a close eye on him.58

Later in November, Mario allegedly asked one of their helpers to prepare some clothes, feeding bottles, and
milk for Ma. Samantha. Ma. Samantha's nanny noticed the helper fixing the bag, so she asked Rosanna where they
would take the child. Rosanna, who was then working in their home office, rushed to Mario and asked him where he
was bringing Ma. Samantha. Mario replied that he would only bring the child to Manila Memorial Park.59

Rosanna prohibited Mario from bringing Ma. Samantha out. She then called up Mario's siblings for help. Mario
got furious, threatened everyone in the house, and left without returning home.60

After he had left, Mario made purchases using his supplementary credit card. Rosanna discovered that Mario
used up the P10,000.00 credit limit of his Citibank Mastercard and the P8,000.00 credit limit of his Bank of the
Philippine Islands card. Mario also purchased an P11,000.00 necklace at the Landmark Department Store in
Makati.61

Several days after he had left home, Mario tried to return, but Rosanna turned him away. Mario banged the
door, shouting, "Buksan niyo ito kundi sisirain ko ito!"62 Fearing Mario, Rosanna called her parents and beeped
Mario's sisters for help. When Rosanna's parents and Mario's sisters arrived, however, Mario had already left.63

Later that day, Mario was found loitering near the house. With him were some travel documents, cash, and a
checklist of European countries with the respective visa requirements for entry of a child for each country.64

After the door-banging incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the Medical City for detoxification. On November
29, 1998, Mario was committed for treatment at the Medical City for 14 days. After conducting tests on Mario, the
doctors found him positive for drug use. Mario's siblings were then advised to commit him to a drug rehabilitation
center for treatment. However, defying the doctor's orders, they had him discharged from the hospital without
bringing him to a drug rehabilitation facility.65

Rosanna eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to financial losses. Mario's access to the
company funds for his drug use allegedly used up the funds.66 To sustain her and her family's needs, Rosanna
searched for a job and eventually worked as an executive assistant at the Government Service Insurance System
Financial Center.67

Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Parañaque City that her aunt, Rita M. Tan, had donated on
August 25, 1998.68 Rosanna, Mario, and Ma. Samantha would live in one apartment, and Rosanna's parents would
live in the other apartment.69
 To save rent on the Makati apartment where they used to live, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved into
the unfinished Parañaque duplex. At first, Mario hesitated to move in, but he eventually agreed and asked that a
four-square meter room at the back of the duplex be constructed. The small room would allegedly be Ma.
Samantha's playroom. Rosanna opposed Mario as the room would be too small to be a playroom, but Mario insisted
on its construction.70

The four-square meter room was eventually constructed, and Mario had an air conditioning unit installed inside.
He also brought in a television set, a computer table, and some personal belongings into the room. He would then
spend days in the room alone and, at times, would even bring Ma. Samantha with him. He even tinkered with the
electrical wires of the duplex.71

In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the small room. He found
Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not quite smell of cigarettes. The electrician
informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that Mario relapsed into his drug use.72

Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him to get treated. However, Mario got furious and Ma. Samantha,
who saw her parents fighting, started crying. To protect Ma. Samantha, Rosanna brought the child to her parents on
the other side of the duplex.73

Mario followed them to his parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in to get Ma. Samantha. Rosanna had to call
for police assistance to pacify Mario.74

Mario eventually calmed down when the police arrived. The police then searched Mario, finding packets
of shabu in his person. They were about to bring Mario to the police station for detention when Rosanna pleaded
with them not to take Mario. The police agreed, but they released Mario to his sister, Ma. Socorro.75

The next day, Rosanna tried to call Ma. Socorro to ask about Mario, but her calls were unanswered. Rosanna
later learned that Mario had escaped from Ma. Socorro's house earlier that morning.76

It was after these incidents that Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court to voluntarily commit Mario for drug
rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually, at the
Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls).78

On February 14, 2000, Mario escaped from Seagulls,79 returning home and pleading with Rosanna to take him
in again. Rosanna took her husband in, but Mario would again relapse into his drug use. He was also jobless and
could not support his family.80

In June 2000, Ma. Samantha had to be rushed to the hospital for frequent vomiting. Mario, who was at home,
did nothing, and Rosanna had to absent herself from work to rush the child to the hospital. Rosanna, who had no
money with her that time, had to borrow money from Ma. Samantha's nanny. Rosanna's parents and siblings also
shared in the child's hospital bills.

In August 2000, Ma. Samantha again had severe upper respiratory tract infection and frequent vomiting. When
her nanny was about to give her medicine, Mario prevented the nanny from doing so, saying that mangoes would
cure Ma. Samantha.

Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma. Samantha to Makati Medical Center. Rosanna suggested that
they instead bring Ma. Samantha together the next day, which was a Saturday. Mario suddenly yelled
out, "Magnanakaw!" Rosanna, already exasperated, drove Mario out of the house. Mario, however, dashed to the
second floor, still yelling, "Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!"83

Police officers later arrived at their home, having been called by Rosanna and Mario's neighbors who had heard
the screams coming from their house. Rosanna explained that it was her husband who was yelling and that he was
a drug dependent who failed to complete his rehabilitation program. The police then brought Mario to the police
station for questioning.84
 Ma. Samantha saw her father screaming and the police taking him with them. The child cried and had to be
brought to her grandparents' house to be pacified.85

Already at a loss with what to do, Rosanna phoned the director of Seagulls, who recommended that Mario be
recommitted to the rehabilitation center to complete his rehabilitation program.86

Thus, Rosanna informed the trial court of Mario's relapse, causing the trial court to order  Mario's recommitment
to Seagulls. Mario remained confined there until December 24, 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario
without completing his rehabilitation program.88

Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's premature release from the rehabilitation center.89 Since Mario's
release on December 24, 2000, Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to
give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.90

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality
disorder "deeply rooted within [Mario's] adaptive system."91 She thus prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage
and that she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the
duplex built on it.92

To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a
physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness.

In her Judicial Affidavit,93 Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed Rosanna and gathered data on Rosanna's
family, educational, and employment history. She likewise conducted mental status examinations on Rosanna.

For data on Mario's social, sexual, and marital history, Dr. Garcia interviewed Rosanna, Ma. Samantha, and
Jocelyn Genevieve L. Tan (Jocelyn Genevieve), Rosanna's sister.94

After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations."95 According to Dr. Garcia, Rosanna "has adequate social, interpersonal and occupational
functioning."96

As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse
disorder with psychotic features. Dr. Garcia characterized the disorder as:

... an abnormality in behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity in fantasy or

behavior, need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early childhood. People suffering
from this disorder may have a grandiose sense of self-importance or may be preoccupied with
fantasies of unlimited success and power. They likewise believe that they are special and can be
understood or should associate with high-status people. They also require excessive admiration,
have a sense of entitlement and are envious of others or believe that others envy them.97

Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical
antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality disorder was grave and "deeply rooted"
in his character.98 Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality disorders are "impermeable to any form
of psychiatric therapeutic modality"99 because of "the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of
the person [suffering from the disorder]."100

As to the juridical antecedence of Mario's personality disorder, Dr. Garcia said that Mario "does not have
enough ego strength to effectively self-regulate and face the marital task and relational stressors"101 and "there
were substrates in [Mario's] development which made him feel inadequate and bitter."102 Mario allegedly "[needed]
to have power over others to save face."103 Dr. Garcia thus recommended that the trial court void Mario and
Rosanna's marriage due to Mario's psychological incapacity.
 On cross-examination, Dr. Garcia admitted that the data she gathered all came from Rosanna, Ma. Samantha,
and Jocelyn Genevieve. She likewise admitted diagnosing Mario without interviewing him,104 because, despite
several invitations from Dr. Garcia, Mario did not appear for an interview.105

Countering Rosanna, Mario contended that it was she who was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.

Mario alleged that he had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy before returning to the Philippines in April
1995. In May 1995, he was issued a Canadian visa set to expire in September that year.106

While on vacation in the Philippines, he met his childhood friend, Rosanna, whom he had not seen in 17 years.
They then frequently went out, dining and drinking in bars, and would go to Rosanna's office afterward to "spend the
night and share intimate moments[.]"107

In August 1995, Mario went back to Italy to resign from his job as he had already decided to work in
Canada.108

When Mario returned to the Philippines a month later, Rosanna told him that she was pregnant and was
planning to abort their child. Mario believed her, as Rosanna allegedly had an abortion in 1991. To prevent Rosanna
from undergoing abortion, he proposed to her. They were married on December 16, 1995.109

The spouses then loaned P500,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan Foundation to increase the capital of Design and
Construction Matrix, a one-year-old construction firm under Rosanna's name. Part of the loaned amount was used
as down payment for a Mitsubishi FB L300 van.110

By January 1996, the spouses were already frequently fighting. According to Mario, Rosanna would box and
kick him whenever they argued. To avoid any untoward incident, Mario would leave the house to keep his cool.111

In 1997, Rosanna allegedly became uncontrolloble. She would bang her head on tables, doors, concrete walls,
and closets, and would even inflict corporal punishment on Ma. Samantha.112

Opposing Rosanna's claim, Mario said that he worked to support the family. He worked as the operations
manager of Design and Construction Matrix, and his duties included hiring and supervising firm employees, and
procuring construction materials, tools, and equipment. Because of his hard work at the firm, he and Rosanna were
able to pay their P500,000.00 loan and save money for the construction of their conjugal home.113

Mario claimed that he always went home and never slept out, except that one time in December 1998, when he
and Rosanna had a big fight. Mario maintained that he was a good father to Ma. Samantha such that, when the
child was confined in the hospital for dengue fever, he took care of her. One time, when the nurse on duty failed to
replace Ma. Samantha's empty dextrose bottle, Mario voluntarily asked the nurse to replace it with a new one. He
and Ma. Samantha would also spend quality time together, going to malls and visiting relatives.114

Sometime in 1998, Mario, Rosanna, and Rosanna's parents jointly loaned P2,500,000.00 from 1he Elena P.
Tan Foundation. They deposited the amount in Metrobank-Legaspi Branch in Makati under the name of Rosanna
and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The loaned amount would serve as funds for the construction of the duplex house in
Parañaque.115

In December 1998, Mario and Rosanna fought again and this time, Rosanna drove Mario out of the house.
Since he had no cash with him, Mario used up the credit limits of his credit cards totaling P40,000.00. When he
returned home, Mario allegedly returned the P40,000.00 to Rosanna.116

By 1999, when the duplex was semi-finished, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved in. Since construction
was still ongoing, Mario insisted that a four-square meter room be constructed to protect Ma. Samantha from
construction dust and debris.117
 Mario denied that he was ever a threat to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha. He voluntarily committed himself for
detoxification at the Medical City and completed his six-month rehabilitation in Seagulls. When he returned home,
however, Rosanna remained violent and would always drive Mario out of the house.118

Between him and Rosanna, Mario argued that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations to him. Rosanna insisted on living with her parents despite having her own
family, resulting in her parents constantly intruding into their marital life.119

As to the parcel of land allegedly donated by Rita M. Tan, Mario claimed that the donation was a "manipulative
device" to make it appear that Rosanna exclusively owned the lot.120

In sum, Mario prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to her psychological incapacity, and
that the properties they had acquired during their cohabitation be divided equally between them. He, however,
prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.121

In its May 9, 2007 Decision,122 the Regional Trial Court found that Rosanna discharged the burden of proving
Mario's psychological incapacity:

It was clearly shown from [Mario's] actuations that he never really cared about the well-being of his
family. He never commiserated with [Rosanna] during her difficult times. Despite [Rosanna's efforts]
to keep the marriage intact, [Mario] showed no interest in mending his ways. These acts, to the
mind of the Court, manifested [Mario's] total disregard of the basic tenets of marriage.123

The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna,
with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and
absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built. The dispositive portion of the May 9, 2007
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit to the petition, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring null and void ab initio the marriage between ROSANNA L. TAN-

ANDAL and MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL solemnized on DECEMBER 16, 1995 in
Makati City on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent;

2. Ordering the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and the National Statistics Office to
cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in
their respective Registry of Marriage;

3. Allowing petitioner to resume the use of her maiden name;

4. Awarding petitioner the absolute custody of the parties' only child, Ma. Samantha T.
Andal, with visitation rights given to the respondent; and

5. Declaring the petitioner to be the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land with
improvements covered by TCT No. 139811.

On the matter of suspension of respondent's parental authority over Ma. Samantha T. Andal,
the Court holds that there is no sufficient ground in granting the same.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and
Para[ii]aque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General
(National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Para[ñ]aque City.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis in the original)

Mario moved 125 for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its August 29, 2007 Order.126
 Reversing the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be
"unscientific and unreliable"127 since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side."128

On the trial court's finding that Rosanna exclusively owned the house and lot in Parañaque, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial court violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." To the Court of Appeals, the trial court did not state the facts and the law on which it based its ruling that
Rosanna solely owned the house and lot.129

Thus, the Court of Appeals declared Mario and Rosanna's marriage valid and subsisting. The dispositive portion
of its February 25, 2010 Decision130 reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed May 09, 2007 decision is SET
ASIDE, and the marriage between Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan-Andal is hereby
declared as VALID and SUBSISTING.

SO ORDERED.131 (Emphasis in the original)

Rosanna moved132 for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its April 6, 2011 Resolution.133

On May 25, 2011, Rosanna filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari134 before this Court. Mario filed his
Comment,135 to which Rosanna filed her Reply.136

In the August 20, 2019 Resolution,137 this Court resolved to set the case for oral arguments. However, the oral
arguments were postponed indefinitely,138 and the parties were instead ordered to file their respective
memoranda.139 Further, Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, M.D., Ph.D.,140 Dean Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr.,141 and
Fr. Adolfo Dacanay, S.J.,142 were appointed amici curiae, and they were all required to submit their amicus
curiae briefs.143

The parties144 and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,145 have
all filed the required Memoranda. The amici curiae, to whom this Court is grateful for their expertise and invaluable
insights on the important issues for resolution here, have each submitted their respective Amicus Curiae Briefs.

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity.
Subsumed in this issue are the following:

a. Whether or not the guidelines for deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity, as laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,146 violate the
right to liberty, personal autonomy, and human dignity of Filipinos;

b. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos v. Court of Appeals,147 psychological incapacity

has juridical antecedence and its root cause medically or clinically identifiable at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. If it is so identifiable, then:

i. should it be grounded on a particular psychological illness;

ii. may it be established without a psychological assessment or clinical

diagnosis;

iii. may it be established on the basis of testimonial evidence attesting to the

behavioral pattern of the spouse with the psychological incapacity during the
marriage;
 c. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos, psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If it is,
must it be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable to warrant a declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code;

d. Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code is violative of the separation of Church and
State;

e. Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's psychological incapacity is competent

evidence if it is solely based on collateral information from the other spouse;

f. Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal separation precludes a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses;

g. Whether or not psychological incapacity may be relative to each couple.

Second, whether or not half of the duplex and the lot on which it is situated are community properties of Mario
and Rosanna; and

Third, whether or not Ma. Samantha's custody was rightfully awarded to Rosanna.

Rosanna maintains that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the trial court's Decision, claiming that
the totality of evidence she presented was sufficient to prove Mario's psychological incapacity. With respect to Dr.
Garcia's findings, Rosanna claims that they are reliable, having been subjected to cross-examination by Mario's
counsel and were based on documents written by Mario himself, among others.148 Citing Suazo v.
Suazo,149 Rosanna adds that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be personally
interviewed by the clinician or psychiatrist for a court to nullify the marriage. So long as the totality of evidence
presented proves that the spouse is psychologically incapacitated, as in this case, she insists that a decree of nullity
of marriage should be issued.150

Rosanna concedes this Court's good intention behind imposing the Molina guidelines, which was to prevent
parties from filing frivolous or capricious petitions for declaration of nullity. However, Rosanna argues, the guidelines
have unintentionally made "it complicated and burdensome for a party to be released from a marriage that has
legitimately broken down."151 For Rosanna, the State's protection of the institution of marriage "should not be
ruthless nor unjustifiably intrude into a person's rights to autonomy and human dignity."152

Psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular psychological illness, argues Rosanna, as this is
allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being a "liberal ground"153 for nullifying marriages. She
cites cases154 where this Court held that competent evidence, not necessarily expert opinion, may establish
psychological incapacity, and that what matters is the totality of evidence presented.

Rosanna adds that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For
her, incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the psychologically
incapacitated spouse.155

As to whether Article 36 violates the Constitution on the separation of Church and State, Rosanna argues that
the provision does not. She cites Molina, where this Court explained that the provision is meant to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of the majority of Filipinos.156

Rosanna submits that even if solely based on collateral information, expert opinion on a spouse's psychological
incapacity may be considered as competent evidence. An expert "does not accept the information relayed by a party
about his/her spouse 'as is'."157 A psychological evaluation is only made after a "verification process is conducted
by the psychologist/psychiatrist," assuring that the expert opinion is reliable.158

Rosanna adds that the existence of grounds for legal separation does not preclude a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses. Citing Republic v. Mola Cruz,159 she demonstrates that a
ground for legal separation may be considered a symptom or manifestation of psychological incapacity.160
 With respect to psychological incapacity being relative, Rosanna again cites Molina, where this Court said that
the "incurability [of the psychological incapacity] may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex."161

On the duplex that served as the family home, Rosanna argues that the house, though it may be considered
community property, should still be exclusively retained by Rosanna as Mario made no contribution for its
construction. As for the lot on which the duplex was built, Rosanna maintains that it is her exclusive property, having
been donated solely to her.162

Countering Rosanna, Mario maintains that she failed to prove that his past drug use was a manifestation of a
personality disorder which rendered him psychologically incapacitated.163 Mario argues that his past drug use is, at
best, only a ground for legal separation,164 not for nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.165

As to whether Article 36 of the Family Code can be violative of the right of Filipinos to liberty, personal
autonomy, and human dignity, Mario failed to respond to this specific issue. However, echoing this Court's
pronouncement in Molina, Mario argues that psychological incapacity is truly incurable, which means it is medically
or clinically permanent.166

In addition, Mario submits that Article 36 is not violative of the separation of Church and State. For him, Article
36 is "an example of the government pursuing an important state policy, i.e. protection of the family."167

Like Rosanna, Mario argues that the expert opm10n on a party's psychological incapacity may be considered as
competent evidence even if based solely on collateral information. Citing Marcos v. Marcos168 and Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua,169 Mario submits that in proving psychological incapacity, what is essential is the totality of evidence
presented.170 Similarly, he argues that the existence of a ground for legal separation does not preclude a finding of
psychological incapacity if the ground is shown to be a "manifestation of some other serious psychological illness
which ... renders the party unable to comply with his [or her] essential marital obligations."171

Mario contends that psychological incapacity is absolute, consistent with it being incurable. He submits that "a
party's incapacity should relate not only to the present relationship with his [or her] spouse but should also continue
to any relationship he [or she] may subsequently enter into."172

Considering that the Court of Appeals found his marriage to Rosanna valid and subsisting, Mario argues that
the house and lot in Parañaque is community property, having been acquired during the marriage.173

This Petition must be granted. With clear and convincing evidence, Rosanna proved that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Their marriage is void ab initio.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for voiding marriages is provided in Article 36 of the Family Code:

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos v. Court of Appeals,174 a case where the wife, after three years of
marriage, left for the United States, never to return to her husband and son. Despite the wife's abandonment of the
family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after outlining the history of the provision and defining the
term "psychological incapacity."

This Court initially noted how the Family Code Revision Committee (Code Committee) deliberately refused to
define psychological incapacity "to allow some resiliency"175 in applying the provision. Article 36 provides no
examples of psychological incapacity so that "the applicability of the provision [would not be limited] under the
principle of ejusdem generis."176
 After reviewing the Code Committee deliberations, this Court determined that psychological incapacity should
mean "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."177 It added that
"psychological incapacity" must refer to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."178

In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it being derived from the New Canon Law, this Court cited the
work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Dr. Veloso), a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. Dr. Veloso was of the opinion that psychological incapacity "must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."179

Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina180 in
1997. Molina involved a wife who, after five years of marriage, filed a case for declaration of its nullity due to her
husband's psychological incapacity. In her petition, she alleged that her husband preferred to spend his time and
money on his friends, failing to support the family. If the husband had any money, it was because he allegedly
depended on his parents for aid. The husband eventually left her and their child when she had to resign from work.

It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36. In formulating
the guidelines, this Court invited two amici curiae: Rev. Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial or Presiding Judge of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Philippine Catholic Church; and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member
of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Molina guidelines are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State
and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.181 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent cases.182 Since Molina's promulgation in 1997 until 2008,

only Antonio v. Reyes183 was found to have satisfied all the requirements of Molina.184 Antonio involved a wife
whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting from the application of the Molina guidelines, this Court
pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te v. Yu-Te185 that "jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed," a view that is "totally inconsistent with the way the
concept was formulated[.]"186 In Ngo Te, this Court remarked that the Molina guidelines worked like a "strait-jacket"
in which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
[Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have
to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and
be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.187 (Citations omitted)

In its 2015 Resolution in Kalaw v. Fernandez,188 this Court made a similar statement:

 The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the
clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable
"some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."189 (Citation omitted)

This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the tendency to rigidly apply

the Molina guidelines continued. Apart from Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,190 Antonio v. Reyes,191 Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te,192 and Kalaw v. Fernandez,193 only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic,194 Halili v. Santos-
Halili,195 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,196 Aurelio v. Aurelio,197 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente,198 Republic v.
Javier,199 and Republic v. Mola Cruz200 were granted a decree of nullity by this Court via a signed decision or
resolution since the Family Code was signed into law.201 That only a few cases were found to have satisfied
the Molina guidelines is, supposedly, in accordance with the Constitution on the inviolability of marriage,202 to the
extent that this Court often reversed the factual findings of psychological incapacity by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.203

II

It is time for a comprehensive but nuanced interpretation of what truly constitutes psychological incapacity.

II (A)

The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a claim must prove it
Specifically, in psychological incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who proves the existence of psychological
incapacity.204

Molina, however, is silent on what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases. While there is opinion that a
nullity case under Article 36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of evidence,205  we now hold that the
plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof that
requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.206

The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity of marriages. As was held in the 1922 case
of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:207

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every internment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No.
28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.208 (Citation omitted)

As with any presumption—such as the presumption of regularity in the issuance of public

documents,209 regularity in the performance of duty,210 of good faith,211 or of sufficient consideration212—it can
only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.

In any case, inasmuch as the Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family, courts must not hesitate to void marriages that are patently ill-equipped due to psychic causes inherent
in the person of the spouses. In the past, marriages had been upheld solely for the sake of their permanence when,
paradoxically, doing so destroyed the sanctity afforded to the institution. Courts are reminded of Antonio, where this
Court said:

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and
lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of
the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family
and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of
the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for
the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.213 (Emphasis supplied)

Reflecting a similar sentiment, this Court in Ngo-Te214 said:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it
be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.215 (Citations omitted)

In the Kalaw Resolution,216 this Court said that "[i]n declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, ... the Courts
really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of
our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid."217

Further, as the "basic autonomous social institution,"218 the family should be protected under the
Constitution regardless of its structure. This means that a family can be founded, whether or not the parents choose
to marry or subsequently choose to dissociate, and this arrangement should be equally entitled to State protection.
The right to choose our intimate partners is part of our right to autonomy and liberty, an inherent part of human
dignity. Ultimately, should the State interfere with these choices, it should do so only when public interest is
imperiled:

The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does not go as far as reaching into the
choices of intimacy inherent in human relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by
the liberty and human dignity clauses. Human dignity includes our choices of association, and we
are as free to associate and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.

Our choices of intimate partners define us — inherent ironically in our individuality.

Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage
governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications,
privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should
not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.219 (Citations omitted)

II (B)

To recall, the term "psychological incapacity" was first defined by this Court in Santos as a "mental (not
physical) incapacity"220 to comply with the essential marital obligations. The term was confined to "the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."221 This characterization became the basis of the second Molina guideline, where
parties to a nullity case are required to present evidence of the root cause of the psychological incapacity. In
particular, this root cause must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts.

By equating psychological incapacity to a "mental incapacity" and to "personality disorders," this Court went
against the intent behind Article 36. The Code Committee was clear that psychological incapacity is not a mental
incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision on psychological incapacity included "mentally
incapacitated,"222 and "mentally" is obviously absent in the present Article 36. This means that for the Code
Committee, "mental" is not synonymous with "psychological."

The reason for deleting "mental" was given by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, a member of the Code Committee.
He said that "mental" would give the wrong impression of psychological incapacity being a vice of consent.223 If
psychological incapacity was to be an acceptable alternative to divorce,224 as was intended by the Code
Committee, it cannot be a mere vice of consent. Psychological incapacity must consist in a lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage, making the marriage void ab initio.

Psychological incapacity is also not a personality disorder, as explained by amicus curiae Dean Sylvia Estrada-
Claudio (Dean Estrada-Claudio). Psychological incapacity cannot be found in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), the authoritative listing of various
mental, including personality, disorders recognized by the scientific community.225

Yet, to comply with the second Molina guideline, psychologists and psychiatrists, when serving as expert
witnesses, have been forced to assign a personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse.226 This cruelty could not have been the intent of the Code Committee.

It took time before this Court, in the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,227 declared that "a medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to."228 Instead, as this Court said, "the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity[.]"229

This pronouncement seemed to do away with the requirement of expert opinion on the root cause of the
psychological incapacity, but this Court was not categorical with this. It even said in Marcos that the "root cause may
be 'medically or clinically identified'"230—implying that although medical opinion may be done away with, a clinical
identification, which is still expert opinion, must nevertheless be presented.

For this reason, this Court was inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity cases. Not
all cases promulgated after Marcos required the totality of evidence rule. Even as recent as 2019, this Court
dismissed a nullity case because "[t]he root cause of [the respondent spouse's] alleged psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently proven by experts[.]"231

In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological
incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion.
There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality
structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's
personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or
her essential marital obligations.

Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been
present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have
consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these
behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.

In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled. Furthermore, there
will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of nullity. A psychologically
incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized for what could have been a simple mistake in one's
choice of intimate partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees through rose-colored glasses. A person's
psychological incapacity to fulfill his or her marital obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity, because
it could very well be that he or she did not know that the incapacity existed in the first place.

II (C)

Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence because it
is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that the psychological incapacity must be existing "at the time
of the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." This
distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or
otherwise, that may have developed after the marriage celebration.

According to Dean Estrada-Claudio, "it is an accepted principle of all major and recognized theoretical schools
within psychology that a person's behavior is determined by the interaction of certain genetic predispositions and by
his or her environment, working in iterative loops of influence."232 From this, proof of juridically antecedent
psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated
spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. For instance, violence against one's spouse and children
can be a manifestation of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that the violent spouse
grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic relationships before the marriage.

The same can be said for child abuse. Trauma research shows that our past, if not properly healed, heavily
affects our present.233 As such, evidence of the juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of
testimony on the spouse's past experiences that may have led him or her to become a child abuser.

Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured.
And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable. Dean Estrada-
Claudio explained that true mental disorders follow a probable course or outcome, called "prognosis," that can either
be self-limited or remain "stable across time and consistent in situations."234 If self-limited, the disorder is, in
layperson's terms, "curable." If it has poor long-term prognosis, the disorder is said to be "incurable."235

That psychological incapacity is "incurable," but in a legal sense, is evident in the deliberations of the Code
Committee. This was explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, when he said that "'incurable' has a different
meaning in law and medicine."236

Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, in his concurring opinion,237 added that characterizing psychological
incapacity as "incurable"238 is antithetical, because the law does not prohibit a person whose former marriage had
been nullified under Article 36 to remarry. If psychological incapacity were truly incurable, then remarriage should
not be allowed as it would only result in another void marriage.239
 Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold that
the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but in the
legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring
and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective
personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable
and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present,
loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a
psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."240

With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological incapacity must be
shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts"241 are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty,
much less ill will."242 In other words, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause.

II (D)

Molina provides that the essential marital obligations are "those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221[,] and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children."243 These provisions are reproduced below for reference:

ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in
the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
Article 70.

....

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect
to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
 (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians.

ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.

....

ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case
of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where
the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where
the property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and
issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this
Article shall be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case
the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.

Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) makes an enlightening point in her opinion that the
essential marital obligations are limited to those between the spouses, as these are the only provisions "relevant to
the finding of a spouse's psychological incapacity [with respect to] to his or her specific partner."244 She cites the
legal definition of marriage, which is primarily a contract between a man and a woman. Therefore, according to her,
if a marriage is to be declared void "due to psychological incapacity, it must be so primarily due to the failure to
assume the essential marital obligations as a spouse, and only incidentally, as a father or mother."245

It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but its cause remains to be the
establishment of not just conjugal but also family life. The Constitution treats marriage as the foundation of the
family.246 Furthermore, Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the spouses are jointly responsible for the
support of the family. As such, once the parties decide and do have children, their obligations to their children
become part of their obligations to each other as spouses.

This interpretation is more consistent with the canonical concept of marriage and psychological incapacity from
which Article 36 of the Family Code was drawn. For Article 36 to be a true accommodation,247 as Justice Perlas-
Bernabe submits,248 the State, through this Court, might as well consider "the theoretical and operational system
which ... is inextricably and inherently ... part of [the concept of psychological incapacity] – the Canon Law on
Marriage."249

Under Christian doctrine, specifically the teachings of St. Augustine, marriages embody three traditional values
or bonum matrimonii: (1) bonum fidei, or "the faithful exclusiveness of the marital commitmment";250 (2) bonum
savramenti,251 which refers to the permanence of marriage; and (3) bonum prolis,252 that is, that marriage is
primarily for procreation or, at the very least, openness to having children. The Family Code definition of marriage
reflects all of these Christian values, specifically, the exclusivity of a marital relation between "a man and a woman,"
the characterization of marriage as a "permanent union," and its purpose being "for the establishment of conjugal
and family life."253

Both under canon and secular law, bonum prolis is as essential as bonum fidei. This only shows that the
spouses' obligations to their children, once children are conceived, is as much a part of the spouses' obligations to
each other. Failure to perform these obligations to their children may be a ground to nullify a spouse's marriage.

But not all kinds of failure to meet their obligations to their children will nullify the vinculum between the spouses.
In each case, it must be clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature that it reflects on the capacity of one of the
spouses for marriage. The easy cases are when one of the spouses sexually abuses one of their children; or, when
unknown to the other spouse, a child is subjected to domestic violence; or when due to the spouse's refusal to go
through counseling or rehabilitation, his or her substance abuse puts a child through a situation of neglect or outright
danger. As in all cases, the context of the whole case, shown by clear and convincing evidence, should be taken
into consideration.

II (E)

The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is retained.254 Without prejudice to
the ponente's view on the separation of Church and State, the inescapable reality is that Article 36 of the Family
Code was lifted from canon law, specifically, Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law.256 As such, Canon 1095
should be taken into account in interpreting Article 36 and in deciding psychological incapacity cases.

Canon 1095 provides:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1) those who lack the sufficient use of reason;

2) those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be handed over and accepted;

3) those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of marriage for causes of a
psychic nature.257

This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic Church had already voided the canonical
marriage, because it is the explicit intent of the Code Committee to solve "the problem of marriages already
annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law."258 In Antonio, this Court even reproached the
Court of Appeals for failing to consider the prior church annulment of the parties' marriage as indicative of the void
nature of the secular marriage. This Court even called the error a "deliberate ignorance."259

It is true that the wording of Article 36 of the Family Code was lifted almost verbatim from the third paragraph of
Canon 1095, and there are views that only those decisions on canonical marriages voided under this paragraph
should be considered persuasive by our secular courts.

A review of the deliberations of the Code Committee, however, reveals that lack of due discretion under the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 is actually a part of the concept of psychological incapacity as envisioned by the
Joint Committee. This was the subject of the article, Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An
Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent (Exegesis).260

A canonical marriage, like a secular marriage, is special, albeit for a different reason. Under the teachings of the
Catholic Church, a contract of marriage requires a special kind of consent, called "matrimonial consent," to be
valid.261

The New Code of Canon Law characterizes the "matrimonial covenant" as "a partnership of the whole
life."262 Catholics believe that in marriage, the spouses "are no longer two, but one flesh"263  and "render mutual
help and service to each other through an intimate union of their persons and their actions."264 Hence, it is said that
the subject and object of a contract of marriage are one and the same: the very persons of the spouses.265 It is this
concept of mutual self-giving for the establishment of a conjugal and family life that a party to a canonical marriage
consents to.

Matrimonial consent, in turn, consists of three elements: (1) the cognitive element, which corresponds to
truth;266 (2) the volitive element, which corresponds to freedom;267 and (3) the psychosomatic element, which
corresponds to maturity.268 Canon 1095 refers to the psychosomatic or psychological element of matrimonial
consent. The absence of any of these three elements renders a canonical marriage void.

The first paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to those who lack the sufficient use of reason due to a mental
illness.269 The second paragraph on lack of due discretion refers to "the lack of capacity to bind oneself to the
rights and obligations of marriage."270 A person who lacks due discretion "[gives] the appearance of enjoying full
use of his [or her] faculties, but ... by reason of some psychic defect he [or she] may not be capable of assuming the
obligations of marriage, even if he [or she] may have a notional and conceptual understanding of them."271  Lastly,
the third paragraph on lack of due competence contemplates a situation where the person, while having intellect
and ordinary capacity to consent, cannot deliver the object of the marital consent—his or her very person.272 The
incapacity, like in the second paragraph, is due to psychic causes, which is:

... something in the psyche or the psychic constitution of a person which impedes his [or her]
capacity to assume three (3) general obligations of marriage: (1) consortium of whole life between a
man and a woman; (2) a consortium which is directed towards the good of the spouses; and (3)
towards the procreation and upbringing of children.273

From this discussion, the concept under the first paragraph of Canon 1095 is explicitly outside the realm of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as envisioned by the Code Committee. To recall, the
Code Committee did not view psychological incapacity as a mental disorder.

However, psychological incapacity under Article 36 is actually closer, concept-wise, to lack of due discretion
under the second paragraph of Canon 1095, rather than lack of due competence contemplated in the third
paragraph. This is strange, because while Article 36 of the Family Code is similarly worded to the third paragraph of
Canon 1095, its meaning is similar to that embraced in the second paragraph.

To add to the confusion, and as was previously discussed, this Court's conceptualization of psychological
incapacity became medically oriented, discussing psychological incapacity in terms of mental disorders that have to
be medically or clinically identified. This is the concept of lack of sufficient use of reason under the first, not the third,
paragraph of Canon 1095.

Therefore, while Article 36 of the Family Code is similarly worded to the third paragraph of Canon 1095,
canonical decisions based on the second paragraph should likewise have a persuasive effect in secular decisions
on psychological incapacity, if we are to avoid anomalous situations where canonically void marriages remain valid
under civil law.

The above discussions notwithstanding, canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding
on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage, but
ultimately, the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.
 To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of
understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a
medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion is not required.

As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that
was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

III

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations.

Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing
evidence of Mario's psychological incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario's personality structure and how
it was formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences, well before he married Rosanna. In addition to
Rosanna's testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity
and lack of genuine remorse, lack of empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations:

In summary, there is a Partner Relational Problem (code V61.1), which is secondary to

the psychopathology of Mario Victor M. Andal who gravely failed in providing his family the
love, support, dignity, understanding and respect. He has the essential features of a
personality disorder as per criteria set in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV).

His psychopathology has its root causes. There were childhood and adolescent precursors
which had led to the development of his psychological deficits.

Mario, the youngest in a brood of eight was born on December 7, 1961. His sedate father, a
known businessman died when Mario was 6 years old. His mother, (sic) had to take over the family
business; however, she was unable to cope so they had to sell the company. She became a top
performer as a sales executive. She migrated to the U.S. His maternal grandmother, who lived with
Mario and his siblings, played favorites and was very obvious about it.

His eldest brother, Alfonso the favored grandson was dominant and opinionated. Alfonso had to
quit schooling due to his father's death. Alfonso was supposed to take charge of the family business
but he was heavy on alcohol intake. He possessed a temper that would lead to the physical abuse
of the two youngest siblings (Mario and Alberto). Another brother was also physically aggressive
like Alfonso, (sic) was unable to complete college because of his heavy alcohol intake. The
intelligent, generous and the talented Socorro stood as the mother to the younger siblings. Alberto,
who was unable to complete his college degree in UST, is a substance user who is jobless and
irresponsible.

The older siblings had difficulty coping with the change from a relatively prosperous life to a life
of near poverty and difficulty coping with major responsibilities like running a company which they
were not prepared for. Mario was their baby. His sisters were extra loving and patient with him.
Mario is athletic and excels in swimming, football/soccer, and basketball. But[,] he is an
introvert[,] i.e.[,] he wasn't vocal about his innermost feelings. He was the obedient son who was
made to do errands. He adores his mother and is demonstrative of his affections towards her.

Mario, (sic) is an "electronics [whiz]" whose intelligence matches the eldest brother's. He
completed his primary and secondary education with the highest honors. But he messed up his third
year in UP. He had very few friends in his college days. He hang (sic) around with a buddy who was
heavy into drugs and alcohol even when he was still in high school. He could not concentrate on his
 job; although there were periods when he worked as a technician in a wire company in Switzerland.
He was heart-broken when he returned to Manila in 1995.

To sum up, Mario does not have enough ego strength to effectively self-regulate and face the
marital the (sic) tasks and relational stressors. Indeed, there were substrates in his development
which made him feel inadequate and bitter; thus[,] the need to have power over others to save face.

Mario has a narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. He exhibits chronic irresponsibility,

impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, Jack of empathy and a sense of entitlement. In addition, he
has the propensity to be emotionally constricted and evasive. Superimposed on his personality
disorder is substance use disorder with psychotic features (paranoid delusions and bizarre
behavior) and aggression against people in his environ[ment]. While he may have
satisfactorily endeared himself to his lone child, be miserably failed to comply with his vital
marital obligations.274 (Emphasis in the original)

Dr. Garcia reiterated these findings in her Judicial Affidavit,275 with Mario's counsel cross-examining her on her
statements.

It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion—which, we reiterate, is no longer required but is considered
here given that it was offered in evidence—without having to interview Mario. Even Dr. Garcia herself admitted
during cross-examination that her psychiatric evaluation would have been more comprehensive had Mario
submitted himself for evaluation.276 However, the Court of Appeals erred in discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's
expert opinion because her methodology was allegedly "unscientific and unreliable."277

Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have personal knowledge of the matters they testify on,278 expert
witnesses do not testify in court because they have personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The credibility of
expert witnesses does not inhere in their person;279 rather, their testimony is sought because of their special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training280 that ordinary persons and judges do not have.281 Rule 130, Section 49
of the Rules of Court on the opinion of expert witness provides:

SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring

special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio.282 In Tortona, a parcel of land
was extrajudicially partitioned based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the thumbmark of the purported seller. The
seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery because the seller, allegedly illiterate, could not have executed
it without the knowledge and assistance of her children. As evidence, they presented the expert opinion of
fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez) of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the
thumbmark on the deed of absolute sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.

In their attempt to discredit Gomez and his competence, the buyer's heirs contended that the examiner was "just
an ordinary employee"283 in the National Bureau of Investigation who collected fingerprints from applicants for
clearance and took the fingerprints of those involved in crimes. In other words, Gomez allegedly lacked the
necessary skill, experience, or training to be an expert on fingerprints.284

The trial court nevertheless relied on the expert testimony of Gomez, declaring the deed of absolute sale a
forgery.285 However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the seller's heirs failed to overcome
the presumption of regularity accorded to the deed.286 It highlighted that the deed was a notarized document and,
therefore, should be presumed genuine, and its execution due and voluntary.287

In reinstating the trial court's decision, this Court gave credence to Gomez and his expert opinion. We first
discussed opinions in general. According to this Court, opinions are products of personal interpretation and belief
and, therefore, inherently subjective and generally inadmissible in evidence.288 Thus, to qualify as an expert and
the opinion admitted as expert opinion, the witness must be shown to possess a special knowledge, skill, or training
relevant to the matter they are testifying on, and that the opinion was rendered on the basis of any of these special
criteria.289 This is apart from the requirement that the testimony, in itself, must be credible; that is, it must be based
on "common experience and observation . . . as probable under the circumstances."290

This Court in Tortona went on to discuss the standards for evaluating expert opinion in the United States.
In Frye v. United States,291 James Alfonso Frye (Frye) was charged with second-degree murder. During trial, he
offered as evidence expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, or the polygraph
test, to which he was subjected before trial. The prosecution objected to the offer, and it was sustained by the trial
court. On appeal, Frye maintained that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the expert testimony offered in
evidence. 1âшphi1

The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that the systolic blood
pressure test was not "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs":292

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.293

For a time, the general acceptance test in Frye had been the standard for admitting expert opinion, until 1993,
when it was overturned in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.294 Daubert involved minors Jason and Eric
Daubert who, assisted by their parents, sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a prescription anti-
nausea drug called Bendectin. According to them, they were born with serious birth defects caused by the drug,
which their mother ingested while pregnant with them.295

After discovery, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved for summary judgment, submitting in evidence expert
opinion saying that Bendectin does not cause malformation in fetuses. The expert, a well-credentialed
epidemiologist specializing in risks from exposure to chemical substances, arrived at his conclusion by reviewing all
the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects.296 The Dauberts opposed the motion, presenting as evidence
the testimony of eight experts who were likewise well-credentialed. These experts were of the contrary opinion that
Bendectin actually caused human birth defects, conducting in vitro and in vivo animal studies that showed a link
between Bendectin and malformations.297

The District Court granted summary judgment. Applying the Frye test, it held that in vitro and in vivo animal
studies have not been generally accepted by the scientific community as scientific procedures for determining
causation between the ingestion of Bendectin and birth defects in humans. It thus rejected the expert opinion
offered by the Dauberts.298 The District Court's ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.299

Reversing the lower courts' judgments, the United States Supreme Court held that the Frye test, introduced in
1923, has been overturned by the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by the legislature in 1975.300  Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.301

The United States Supreme Court noted how Rule 702 does not require general acceptance for admissibility of
expert opinion. Instead, the rule requires the following: first, the "knowledge" testified on must be "scientific," that is,
it must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation";302 second, the specialized knowledge must be
of such character that the trial judge is "able to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue";303  and
third, the trial judge, like a "gatekeeper," must take a firsthand look on "the scientific validity ... [or] the evidentiary
relevance and reliability ... of the principles that underlie"304 the testimony being offered as expert opinion. "The
focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."305
 On hearsay, Daubert echoed the rule in our jurisdiction that such evidence is generally inadmissible. However, if
"the expert opinion [is] based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, [it is] to be admitted only if the facts or date are 'of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject.'"306 The United States Supreme Court thus remanded the case "for further proceedings consistent with [its]
opinion"307 in Daubert.

After discussing the standards for admitting expert opinion, this Court in Tortona ultimately held that Gomez
qualified as an expert and his testimony, necessarily, as expert opinion. According to this Court, his work as a
fingerprint examiner at the National Bureau of Investigation qualified him as an expert on fingerprints. Further, his
conclusion—that the seller's fingerprint in the deed of absolute sale and that appearing on the specimen documents
were different—was arrived at using a three-part examination done for determining whether a thumbmark was
impressed by the same person.308 The methodology he used was not shown to be unscientific and unreliable; thus,
this Court relied on his expert opinion that the thumbmark on the deed did not belong to the purported seller.

Applying Tortona here, we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently qualified as an expert in psychiatry. She
possesses the special knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and special
education.309 She has been practicing her profession as a physicianpsychiatrist since 1990, including working at
the Philippine Mental Health Association as a psychiatrist for 11 years.310

On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she conducted a
psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise interviewed Ma. Samantha
and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination remain to
be the principal techniques in diagnosing psychiatric disorders.311 While ideally, the person to be. diagnosed
should be personally interviewed, it is accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on
collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated.312 This is usually done if the
patient is not available, incapable, or otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case.

In any case, it cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on collateral
information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten by Mario himself while
staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."313

At any rate, this Court said in Marcos314 that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a declaration of [nullity of marriage due to] psychological
incapacity."315 So long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity of
one or both316 of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued.317

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario
did not appear for psychiatric evaluation.

That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation318 will not prevent this Court from voiding the marriage in
this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each other without severing their
marriage bond,319 but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the marriage is valid.320 Therefore, it is possible
that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses, with the incapacity manifested in
ways that can be considered as grounds for legal separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that
the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this should be
enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario's drug abuse
was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of marriage is accepting a person for who
they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario's case, his persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated,
even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter
disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but to his child.

We agree with the trial court that Mario failed to render mutual help and support to his wife, failing to find gainful
employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his
drug use. He failed to exercise his rights and duties as a parent to Ma. Samantha. In the words of the trial court:
 ... [Mario] is incapable of performing his marital obligations, particularly to observe love and
respect for his wife and to render mutual help and support. [Mario] had shown utter disregard for his
wife. Throughout their life together, it was [Rosanna] who mostly provided for the needs of the
family. [Mario] hardly contributed to their expenses because he never bothered to look for a job.
[Mario] was also using prohibited drugs. A responsible husband would not commit acts which will
bring danger, dishonor or injury to [his spouse or to his family]. (Art. 72, Family Code of the
Philippines). The safety and security of the family at all times is a primordial duty of the spouse.321

Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did so after separating from Rosanna. This
confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that his psychological incapacity was enduring relative to his long-estranged
wife322 and can manifest again if he is forced to stay with her.

All told, we find that Rosanna proved with clear and convincing evidence that Mario was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Their marriage, therefore, is void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

IV

Void marriages are no marriages. Thus, the provisions of the Family Code on property relations between
husband and wife—the systems of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, and separation of property—
do not apply in disposing of properties that may have been acquired during the parties' cohabitation.323 Instead, the
property regime of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code,
depending on whether the parties have no legal impediment to marry.324 Article 147 provides:

ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendant, each vacant share shall belong to
their respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

On the other hand, Article 148 provides:

ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
 party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

On what "capacitated" in Article 147 means, this Court in Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon
City325 said:

The term "capacitated" in [Article 147 (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.326  (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)

Article 37327 refers to incestuous marriages, while Article 38328 refers to void marriages due to public policy.

Here, Mario and Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to psychological incapacity. When they were
married in 1995, Mario was 33 years old while Rosanna was 31. There is no showing that the marriage was
incestuous or void due to public policy. They likewise lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife until
they separated in 2000. Being capacitated to marry each other and having lived exclusively with each other albeit
under a void marriage, Article 147 of the Family Code governs their property relations.

Under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by the parties during their cohabitation shall be equally divided
between them. This is regardless of who worked to earn the wage or salary.

With respect to properties acquired during their cohabitation, the rules on co-ownership under the Civil Code
govern.329 Therefore, a property acquired during the parties' cohabitation shall be presumed to have been acquired
through the parties' joint efforts. For purposes of Article 147, "joint efforts" includes a party's care and maintenance
of the family and of the household. With this presumption, the parties are deemed to own the property in equal
shares.

However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party's effort, work, or industry, and there is proof
that the other did not contribute through the care and maintenance of the family and of the household, the property
acquired during the cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party who actually worked to acquire the property.330

In this case, there is proof that the Parañaque lot was not obtained by Mario and Rosanna's joint efforts, work,
or industry. Rita M. Tan, Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square meter lot to Rosanna and her father, Rodolfo M.
Tan. The Deed of Donation331 dated August 25, 1998 provides that Rita M. Tan donated 157.50 square meters to
"Rodolfo M. Tan, married to Josefina G. Leaño"332 and to "Rosanna L. Tan-Andal, married to Mario
Andal"333 each. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139811 covering 157.50 square meters of the Parañaque lot is
under the name of "Rosanna L. TanAndal, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mario Andal."334 In Salas, Jr. v.
Aguila,335 this Court held that "married to" only refers to the civil status of the property's registered owner.336

Thus, Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter Parañaque lot. Mario has no share in this
property because he did not care for and maintain the family and the household.

As for the half of the duplex house that served as the parties' family home, there is evidence that the funds used
to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts. In a promissory
note337 dated July 13, 1998, Rosanna and her father jointly loaned P2,400,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan
Foundation for the construction of a house on the Parañaque lot. Although Mario signed the promissory note to give
"marital consent" to Rosanna, he has no proof that he participated in acquiring the funds. He cannot be deemed to
have contributed jointly in acquiring the funds since he did not care for and maintain the family and the household.

As the funds to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts, and Mario
did not care for and maintain the household, he has no share in the duplex.

V
 In resolving issues of custody of minors whose parents have separated, Article 213 of the Family Code
governs.338 It states:

ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.

In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto,339 this Court held that the "separation of parents" contemplated in Article 213
may either be legal separation or separation in fact.340 In deciding cases involving custody of a minor, the courts
must consider, among others, "the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious
background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; [and] the [child's] emotional and
educational needs."341

Here, Mario and Rosanna have been separated in fact since 2000. Between them, Rosanna showed greater
care and devotion to Ma. Samantha. Even when they still lived together, Rosanna had been more available to her
child. She raised Ma. Samantha on her own since she and Mario separated. Mario has not supported both mother
and child since he separated from Rosanna, even after he had claimed that he has been living "drug-free."

With these considerations, the trial court did not err in awarding Ma. Samantha's custody to Rosanna, without
prejudice to Mario's right to visit his daughter.

Nonetheless, Rosanna's parental authority over Ma. Samantha was already terminated in 2014342 when the
child reached the age of majority.343 Ma. Samantha is now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life344 and,
therefore, is at liberty to choose how to relate with her father.

VI

Love is founded on a promise: to seek beyond ourselves in order to enable and ennoble the other to continue to
become the best version of themselves.

Being in love can be carried on the wings of poetry, announced publicly through each other's gazes. It is made
real and felt with every act of unconditional care and comfort that the lover provides. Love can be beyond labels.

Marriage is not compulsory when in love; neither does it create love. Nonetheless, it remains an institution
designed to provide legal and public recognition that may be well deserved not only for the couple, but also for their
families existing or yet to come.

To be clear, our collective hope is that one who chooses marriage realizes that the other deserves more caring,
more compassion, more kindness in the daily and banal grind of their relationship. It is in these same values of
sacrifice and empathy that we will have the chance to evolve into a society that is more humane and, eventually,
more just.7!ᕼdMᗄ7

Yet, we are not blind to the reality that a person may be truly psychologically incapable for the other from the
beginning. Should there be grave need to part for the reasons we have stated, courts can lead the way to make
parting less bitter, minimize animosity, and make lives more forward-looking for those most affected. Parting is
already a sorrow. It need not be more than what it already is.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'

February 25, 2010 Decision and April 6, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90303
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 9, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Cases 01-0228 and 03-0384 is REINSTATED.
47.)