1.) G.R. No.

L-6768             July 31, 1954

SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant.

David F. Barrera for appellant.

Jose P. Santillan for appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly allowance of
P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took
the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to the court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed.

The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned appear well narrated in the
decision of the court below which, for purposes of this appeal, are quoted hereunder:

On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized
by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already
begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938,
defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears
that he had joined the United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R.
Arca, defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because of
defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife, Salud R. Arca, who is from
(Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility
of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud
R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her residence to
(Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and
defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an
action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA,
docketed as civil case No. 14313 of that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a
copy of the complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca — answering the complaint
— alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940 although she was
directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud
R. Arca averred among other things that defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State
of Alabama, for the period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a
resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to relate here, is that
under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that
the cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United
States at that time and she was not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man
of the United States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her. She
further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he had always supported
her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments made by the Navy Department of the United
States Government. She denied, furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at
Naic, Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about 10,000
miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her
husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the
complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed.
However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by defendant
Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d), nevertheless the Circuit Court of Mobile County
rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage of Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting
the latter a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit
2(f). Thereupon, the evidence discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the
Philippines but went back to the United States.
 In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 — defendant
Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn,
New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for
reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant
Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in the
Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other
against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of
Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the
Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).

At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila on
July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13310 and marked Exhibit 2(a). However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the
charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila through Judge Alejandro J.
Panlilio, dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier
with Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff Salud R.
Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile
County, State of Alabama, USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant
Alfredo Javier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that defendant
Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of First Instance of Manila by Judge
Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no criminal intent in contracting a second or subsequent
marriage while his first marriage was still subsisting.

Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca, another Filipino citizen.
Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927
appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with
his service leaving behind his wife and child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit
Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of
the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of
Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was
abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then enlisted in
the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of
divorce on April 9, 1941.

The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction?

The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar nature in a number of
cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the
essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is
granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, 67 Phil., 207,
which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John Canson claimed not only
that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an American citizen,
although it was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and
so it has been held that "it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court,
but his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson acquired legal
residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on
the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their
matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person."

It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the
summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the
jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal
residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless
and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court over the case.
In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on the matter, but
precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court laid
down the following doctrines:

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of
the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188
U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)

It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of
the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to
another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence
there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially true where the cause
of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)"
(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)

But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the
matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in
West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either
personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)

At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence
acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in
which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had
acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was
then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to
that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where
he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is
shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a
house and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the
Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that
appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as
his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the court.

It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the present case for the reason
that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the course of the decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct,
for the Haddeck case was merely cited as authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem,
and the reversal did not necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire jurisdiction
over a divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be justified on another ground:
The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this
jurisdiction. Said the Court in the Canson case:

. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed:

. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has
usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or
 collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9
thereof reads as follows:

"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country."

"And Article 11, the last part of which reads

". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public
order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything
done or any agreements entered into a foreign country."

"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands,
will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of
the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce."

The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce
decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws.
That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court decide. (Barretto
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies
restricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the
matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court
(Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252; Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952;
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil.,
123; Gorayeb vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun
and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra).

The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private International Law
which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or
fundamental policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our
concept or moral values which has always looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually
crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to
eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to any
attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.
(Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code; Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy and consequently
she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has
already reached his age of majority, we do not need to consider it here, it appearing that these questions have
already been passed upon in G. R. No. L-6706.1 These questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

2.) G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was
then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil
register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her
clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was
already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he
does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22
March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters
when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged
(Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her
non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after
two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage
to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom
he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage,
which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is
nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or
one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to
do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to
note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage,
when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of
Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained
valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in
the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106,
subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where
the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused
through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil
Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned,
are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this
Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after
the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent
consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed
error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and
the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña
Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit
was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the
record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to
the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law
an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot
be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard
to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts
and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he
sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely
solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held
that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child
into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his
child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule
has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to
give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation
on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had
originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her
divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way
of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000
only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof
of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
3.) G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.   Prohibition would then lie since it would
1

be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.   Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
2

the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.   As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
3

the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx  4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,   only Philippine nationals are
5

covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law.   In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
6

the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
4.) G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by
a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.  1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.  2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No.
83-15866.  3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 
4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.   However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
5

approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner.   The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
6

Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.  7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.   A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
8

her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 
9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon.   As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-
10

52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for
the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review
then pending before the Secretary of Justice.   A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of
11

lack of jurisdiction,   which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
12

same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter
entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment.   Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 
13 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his
filing the criminal complaint." 
15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.  16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,   the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
17

cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.   While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
18

Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding   and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
19

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by
the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power
to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.   Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
20

Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 
21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time
he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity
to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.  22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned   in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
23

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,   after a divorce was granted by a United States court
24

between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
 It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,   since there would
26

thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended
to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab
initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was
consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal
action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The
same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case,
by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,   must suffer the same fate
27

of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of
the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
5.) G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to
a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children
and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño   which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
1

and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction,"   disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that
2

their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.   On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
3

marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children
had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987   only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
4

Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.  5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition
of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988   partial reconsideration was granted
6

declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.   Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was
7

stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed
by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995
it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed
the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.   On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 
8 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the
parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;   nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains
10

as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and
in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.   To this, petitioner replied that
11

Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.   Reading
12

between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well
as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.   that aliens may obtain
13

divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.   Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address
14

the issue on her citizenship.   The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
15

resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines."   It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
16

Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage
as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;   it did not merit enlightenment however
17

from petitioner.   In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
18

respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954.   Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
19

obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 
20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,   the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the
21

actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.   The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while
22

the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies
of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence
of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother
Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is DENIED.
6.) G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
1 

Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as
2 

co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957. 3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
7 

was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
13 

marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union
15 

produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament." 17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix
of his estate.
18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. 20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate
22 

in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary. 24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such
let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED." 27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him. Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
29 

illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED." 32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
34 

Hence, this petition. 35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, the issue is simple. Who are
36 

entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.  The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
1ªwph!1

possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no
39 

showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul
and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
40 

only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no
41 

longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
42 

Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce
43 

obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution."
(underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."
44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that
the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of
the Rules of Court.
7.) G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven
to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take
up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
 Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and
(2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code
requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x     x x x     x x x

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

x x x      x x x      x x x

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official
act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed
from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country
for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union
for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It
is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of
the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c)
Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4"
– Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at
the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner;
and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
8.) G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?s

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where
one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of
the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
9.) G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that
the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par.
2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence,
it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had
no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married
to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the
law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to
it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect
or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
10.) G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife
was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision
was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido;
he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving
him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon
C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No.
(EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between
the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse]
and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or
as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what
had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;
 (g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect. 1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries
in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that
the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
11.) G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV
1

No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora,
2

Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in
courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00

located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)

Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. ₱400,000.00

m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora

A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares ₱490,000.00

located at Maria Aurora, Aurora

A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00

3

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00

Maria Aurora, Aurora

USA

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly

City, California

$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)

Furniture and furnishings $3,000

 Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00

4

annuities

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a bank and
mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for
the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in
Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of
David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that
David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines.  David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid
5

balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005.  The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all
6

the couple’s properties in the USA. 7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the
same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner
to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which
also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both
parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity which
can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be
included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David
A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.
 4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales
proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the
property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive legitimes. 10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered
to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America
remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce
decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving
the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be
cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are
hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering the said
properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the
respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with
respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these properties, if any, shall
be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January
2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall give
them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in
her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as
the needs of the children require and his financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit
Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two
children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children shall be
deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal
from which shall only be made by them or by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of
Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of
this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of
this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.
11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personalstatus
are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of
their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the
parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for
liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and
custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute community of
property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant
to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall
under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties
cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for considering that she
already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated
the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held
that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint
Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the
appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision dated
December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to
read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby divided
equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her
minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted
to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount
of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler,
Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of
thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the
custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of
₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED. 12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California Judgment
which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the pleading presented and
offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties
by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in
the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the
court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed
a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between
the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,  we stated that:
13

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with
our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,  we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that
16

"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal
from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption  as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime
17

of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An
exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances
provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article
135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations
to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power;
and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor
absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis
supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation
of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of
returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to
give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria
Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the
respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them
worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by
the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial
court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year
and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed
that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up
his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once
confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form.  Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
20

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute
community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis
supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code.
For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63,
No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case
to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s
Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties
of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes,
which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.  While both claimed
1âwphi1

to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions
came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the
absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from
the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal
councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,
expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited
the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David
and Leticia should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is
AFFIRMED.
 12.) [ G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision[1] and October 12, 2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case
for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February
21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is
also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and
in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the
event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.[4]

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that
were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.[5]

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file
for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."[6]

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.[7] ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romillo, Jr.[8] where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
T

he OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[9] In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[10]
2. Consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.[13]
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.[14]
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[15]

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family
Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.[16] Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.[17] Aside
from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.[18] This provision was originally
deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino
signed E.O. No. 209.[19] As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.[20] It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.[21] Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.[22] Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.[23]
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.[24] The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.[25]

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:[26]

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[27]

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin[28] and Van Dorn[29] already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the
husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole
custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is
binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree
obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce
the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability.
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.[30]

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen,
against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right
to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.[31]

In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in
the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.[32] and Medina v. Koike.[33]

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's
family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of
bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported
"in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x[34]

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently,
she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.[35] and Garcia v. Recio,[36] the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute,
a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law,
but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. "
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.[37] "The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."[38]

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.[39] Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.[40] As held in League of Cities
of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:[41]

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.[42] Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in
the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.[43]

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.[44] The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.[45] When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.[46] If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.[47]

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.[48] It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.[49] On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.[50] It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public
safety or the general welfare.[51] It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights,
and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.[52]
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President, which
have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one
of the essential requisites[53] of the equal protection clause.[54] Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his
or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.[55]

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.[56] In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and
how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to prove. Second, We
adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,[57] that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts,[58] that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,[59] that acquiescence resulted from a belief that
the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,[60] that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,[61] and that the law has been obeyed.[62] It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular
or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take
judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims
or at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit,
to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.[63]
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.[64] Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.[65] Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition
so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution
of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.[66]

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute
divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.[67] On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce,
such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.[68] When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.[69] From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an
absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.[70]
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,[71] 1062,[72] 2380[73] and 6027[74] were filed in the House of
Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in
the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on
February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the
bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon
the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being
a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below
twenty-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is
filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity
was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transitions from one sex to another, the other
spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair,
despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and
their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or
teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.[75]
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establish a state religion.[76]
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.[77] While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.[78] It is in this aspect, bereft of any
ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.[79] It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.[80] To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in
order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262
("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity
of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.[81]
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to
hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article
XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying
State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.[82]
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions.[83] Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment
of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical
to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.[84] In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis[85] quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.[86]
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law.[87] A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.[88]
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis  to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.[89] The fact of divorce must still
first be proven.[90] Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[91]
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.[92]
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance
of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to
recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.[93]
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign
court.[94] As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.[95]
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.[96]
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
 13.) G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn,
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed
a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On
November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled
and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following
requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was consensual
in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a
Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of
Japan was fatal to her cause.6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO
THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF
AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY
THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by
Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of
divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and
instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted
abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not
prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of the
Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds application. In support of her
contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court
held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner
explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions of the
Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact that
she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she
went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued a
document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies
of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the potential problem in
the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the
facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a
Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for
divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree
dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines
and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila,
cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The
trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos
the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling
of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove him
from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word
"obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would
depart from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding.12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the
fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that
she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been
dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to
remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts
may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held
that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.13 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 2415 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce
decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
 14.) [ G.R. No. 227605, December 05, 2019 ]

IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO* TAKAHASHI AND JULIET
RENDORA MORAÑA,

JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 103196 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce Between Minuro Takahashi and Juliet
Rendora Moraña:

1. Decision2 dated July 5, 2016 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Juliet Rendora Moraña's petition
for recognition of foreign divorce decree in Japan; and

2. Resolution3 dated October 13, 2016 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On June 24, 2002, petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereafter, they moved
to live in Japan where they bore two (2) children, namely: Haruna Takahashi (born on January 5, 2003) and Nanami
Takahashi (born on May 8, 2006).4

Ten (10) years later, the couple got estranged. Petitioner alleged that her husband failed to perform his marital
obligations to her. He refused to give support to their two (2) children, and worse, started cohabiting with another
woman. Because of her persistent demand for financial support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so
the Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children and send them to school. Believing it was
for the good of their children, petitioner agreed to divorce her husband. Consequently, they jointly applied for divorce
before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, Japan.5

On May 22, 2012, the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and issued the
corresponding Divorce Report.6

On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court-Manila an action for recognition of the Divorce
Report. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12-128788 and raffled to Branch 29.

During the proceedings, petitioner offered the following exhibits:

"A" Petition for Recognition of Foreign Decree of Divorce

"B" Compliance dated January 5, 2013

"C" Letter addressed to the Office of the Solicitor General

"D" Letter to the Public Prosecutor

"E" OSG's Notice of Appearance and deputation letter

"F" Order dated January 24, 2013

"G" Affidavit of Publication

"H" April 29, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper

"I" May 6, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper

"J" Marriage Contract

"K" Printout of the Divorce Law of Japan and its English translation

"L" Divorce Report dated May 22, 2012 and its English translation

"M" Certificate of All Matters and its English translation

"N" Letter Request dated July 9, 2013 addressed to the Japanese Embassy

"O" Letter Request dated August 4, 2012 addressed to the Japanese Embassy

"P" Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit

"Q" Photocopy of petitioner's passport

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision7 dated December 23, 2013, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to present in evidence the
Divorce Decree itself. The trial court held that the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters cannot take the place
of the Divorce Decree itself which is the best evidence here. Besides, the authenticated Divorce Certificate issued
by the Japanese government was not even included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence aside from the fact that it
was a mere photocopy and was not properly identified nay authenticated in open court. Too, on cross, it appeared
that petitioner herself was the one who secured the Divorce Decree which fact is not allowed under Philippine laws.

By Order8 dated June 30, 2014, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.9

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed through its assailed Decision10 dated July 5, 2016. It emphasized that
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized in the Philippines, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity with the foreign law allowing it. This was not complied with here. Too,
petitioner failed to offer in evidence the foreign Divorce Decree itself which she purportedly obtained in Japan. The
Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters cannot substitute for the Divorce Decree contemplated by the rules.
More, petitioner failed to prove the existence of the foreign law allowing the divorce in question.

In any case, a foreign Divorce Decree cannot be recognized under Section 26 of the Family Code when the same
was obtained by the Filipino spouse. Records showed that the Divorce Decree was not obtained by Minoru alone,
but by petitioner, as well.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration11 was denied under its assailed Resolution dated October 13, 2016.12

The Present Appeal

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the dispositions of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and set aside.

Petitioner argues that equity and substantial justice merit the grant of the petition. If Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applied in this case, an absurd situation would arise wherein she is still considered married to her husband,
while her husband is no longer legally married to her.
She asserts it was not she who voluntarily secured the divorce decree. It was her husband who encouraged her to
apply for a divorce decree so that the Japanese government would support and send their children to school. When
she testified that she secured the divorce papers, she actually meant it was she who requested copies of the
Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters. She and her husband jointly applied for divorce. She could not have
applied for divorce on her own since she is not well versed in the Japanese language and characters.

She further avers that only the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters were issued to her by the Japanese
government. These documents are equivalent to the Divorce Decree itself. In any case, there is no difference
between a "Divorce Decree" and the "Divorce Report" she presented in court. The Divorce Report itself bears the
fact that she and her husband obtained a divorce in Japan. More, although the Divorce Report and Certificate of All
Matters are mere photocopies, the same were duly authenticated by the Japanese Embassy.

As for the Divorce Certificate, the Court of Appeals said that the same was not properly offered as it was submitted
to the court merely via a Manifestation. The Court of Appeals, however, failed to consider the fact that the Divorce
Certificate was given to her counsel by the Japanese Embassy only after she had presented her evidence and after
she had gone back to Japan to care for her children. The belated availability of the Divorce Certificate was,
therefore, beyond her control. In any event, the trial court all admitted her evidence sans any objection from the
State. Also, neither the public prosecutor nor the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) challenged the divorce she
and her husband obtained in Japan.

The OSG, on the other hand, posits that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere rehash of the arguments which
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals had already resolved in full.13

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the dismissal of the petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree?

Ruling

While Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce, Article 26 of the Family Code allows a Filipino married to a
foreign national to contract a subsequent marriage if a divorce decree is validly obtained by the alien spouse
abroad, thus:

Article 26. x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.14

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a me1nber of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the idea is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. The
aim was to solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to
their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national
laws and perhaps have already married again.15

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas16 and Garcia v. Recio,17 the Court held that in any case involving recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment, both the Divorce Decree and the applicable national law of the alien spouse must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence.

Here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition for recognition of foreign decree of
divorce on three (3) grounds, viz.:
 1. A divorce decree obtained by a Filipino abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines because
Philippine law does not allow divorce;

2. The Divorce Decree was not presented and proved in evidence; and

3. The existence of the Japanese law on divorce was not proved.

The Court does not agree.

A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized

in the Philippines although it was the Filipino
spouse who obtained the same

Republic v. Manalo18 emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who initiated and obtained the divorce
decree, the same may be recognized in the Philippines, viz.:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. x x x

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et al.:

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absu1rd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. x x x Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. x x x

x x x Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. x x x

x x x In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal
protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

x x x there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a
Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine
and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in (an) alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed,
the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to
first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of
such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of
the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. x x x it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. x x x it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.

Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. x x x

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. (Emphasis supplied)

Racho v. Tanaka19 further enunciated that the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will
not be protecting our own nationals. Verily, therefore, even. though it was petitioner herself or jointly with her
husband who applied for and obtained the divorce decree in this case, the same may be recognized in our
jurisdiction. So must it be.

The next question: Were the Divorce Decree itself and the Japanese law on divorce sufficiently proved in this case?

Divorce Decree

Petitioner identified, presented, and formally offered in evidence the Divorce Report20 issued by the Office of the
Mayor of Fukuyama City. It clearly bears the fact of divorce by agreement of the parties, viz.:

Husband Wife

Name MINORU TAKAHASHI JULIET MORAÑA TAKAHASHI

Date of Birth September 13, 1975 July 26, 1978

Address 82-2 Oaza Managura, Ekiya-cho, 1-13-15-403 Minato Machi,

(Registered Address) Fukuyama City Fukuyama City

Name of Householder: Name of Householder:

Tadashi Takahashi Juliet Moraña Takahashi

Permanent Domicile 82-2 Oaza Managura, Ekiya-cho, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture
(For foreigner, write only
the Nationality) Head of family Nationality of Wife
Minoru Takahashi Republic of the Philippines

Name of Parents and the Father of Husband: Tadashi Father of Wife: Cesar Moraña,
Relationship Takahashi Jr.
 Mother: Tomoe Mother: Zosima Moraña

Relationship: Second Son Relationship: Daughter

Type of divorce: _/_Divorce by Agreement ____Settlement Arranged on

____Mediation Date: ____Approval of Request Date:
____Arbitration Date: ____Court Decision Date:

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, declined to consider the Divorce Report as the Divorce
Decree itself. According to the trial court, the Divorce Report was "limited to the report of the divorce granted to the
parties."21 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the Divorce Report "cannot be considered as act of an
official body or tribunal as would constitute the divorce decree contemplated by the Rules."22

The Court is not persuaded. Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to
petitioner and her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak of because the
divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City
in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce
Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce
obtained by petitioner and her former husband.

Notably, the fact of divorce was also supported by the Certificate of All Matters23 issued by the Japanese
government to petitioner's husband Minoru Takahashi, indicating the date of divorce, petitioner's name from whom
he got divorced and petitioner's nationality as well, thus:

[Date of Divorce] May 22, 2012

Divorce [Name of Spouse] Juliet Moraña Takahashi

[Nationality of Spouse] Republic of the Philippines

More, petitioner submitted below a duly authenticated copy of the Divorce Certificate24 issued by the Japanese
government.25 The fact alone that the document was submitted to the trial court without anyone identifying it on the
stand or making a formal offer thereof in evidence does not call for dismissal of the petition.

For one, the State did not question the existence of the Divorce Report, Divorce Certificate, and more importantly
the fact of divorce between petitioner and her husband. As Republic v. Manalo26 pronounced, if the opposing party
fails to properly object, as in this case, the existence of the divorce report and divorce certificate decree is rendered
admissible as a written act of the foreign official body.

For another, petitioner explained that despite repeated prompt requests from the Japanese Embassy, the latter
released the Divorce Certificate quite belatedly after petitioner had already terminated her testimony and returned to
Japan to care for her children.27

Still another, the Divorce Report, Certificate of All Matters, and Divorce Certificate were all authenticated by the
Japanese Embassy. These are proofs of official records which are admissible in evidence under Sections 19 and
24, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, to wit:

Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation (in) evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxxxxxxxx

Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Finally, the Court has, time and again, held that the court's primary duty is to dispense justice; and procedural rules
are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice. On several occasions, the Court relaxed procedural
rules to advance substantial justice.28 More so here because what is involved is a matter affecting the lives of
petitioner and her children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance of the Divorce Certificate was not due to
petitioner's fault; and the relaxation of the rules here will not prejudice the State.29

True, marriage is an inviolable social institution and must be protected by the State. But in cases like these, there is
no more "institution" to protect as the supposed institution was already legally broken. Marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.30

Law on divorce in Japan

This brings us to the next question: was petitioner able to prove the applicable law on divorce in Japan of which her
former husband is a national? On this score, Republic v. Manalo31 ordained:

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as
her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are
not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese law on divorce
and its English translation.32 There was no proof at all that these printouts reflected the existing law on divorce in
Japan and its correct English translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a printout from a website to prove a
foreign law. In Racho,33 the Japanese law on divorce was duly proved through a copy of the English Version of the
Civil Code of Japan translated under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation
Committee. At any rate, considering that the fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of
substantial justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the Japanese law on divorce,
with the end view that petitioner may be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party.
In Manalo,34 the Court, too, did not dismiss the case, but simply remanded it to the trial court for reception of
evidence pertaining to the existence of the Japanese law on divorce.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 5, 2016 and Resolution dated October 13,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 103196 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court – Branch 29, Manila for presentation in evidence of the pertinent
Japanese law on divorce following the procedure in Racho v. Tanaka.35 Thereafter, the court shall render a new
decision on the merits.
 15.) January 22, 2020

G.R. No. 243722 (Formerly UDK-16060)

CYNTHIA A. GALAPON, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the
Decision2 dated February 27, 2017 (assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated September 29, 2017 (assailed
Resolution) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), Eleventh Division and Former
Eleventh Division, respectively.

The assailed Decision and Resolution reversed the Decision4 dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-417, which recognized the
foreign divorce decree obtained by Cynthia A. Galapon (Cynthia) and her spouse Noh Shik Park (Park), a Korean
national.

The Facts

The antecedents, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

[Cynthia], a Filipina, and [Park], a South Korean national, got married in the City of Manila, Philippines on [February
27, 2012. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in South
Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on [July 16, 2012 by the Cheongju Local Court, [Cynthia] filed before the
[RTC] a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce [(Recognition Petition)].

The [RTC], finding the [Recognition] Petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an Order dated [November 11,
2014 setting the case for hearing. The said Order was then published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in The Daily Tribune. Meanwhile, the Office of [the] Solicitor General [(OSG)] filed a Notice of Appearance as
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija was also deputized to assist the OSG.

During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon [(Abigail)], [Cynthia's] sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in
court. Abigail identified and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the contents thereof and her signature thereon.
Furthermore, Abigail averred that [Cynthia] could not personally testify because the latter's Korean visa expired
upon her divorce with Park. Nevertheless, Abigail [alleged that she] has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in
the [Recognition] Petition and claimed, among other things, that Park intended to many his former girlfriend [and
that Cynthia] was forced to agree to the divorce because Park made a threat to her life x x x.5

RTC Ruling

On July 3, 2015, the RTC issued a Decision6 granting the Recognition Petition. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the [Recognition Petition] is hereby GRANTED and the Divorce Decree obtained in
Seoul, Korea between [Cynthia] and [Park] on [July 16, 2012 is hereby RECOGNIZED. The Civil Registrar General
and [the] Office of the Manila Civil Registrar are hereby DIRECTED to RECORD the said divorce decrees (sic) upon
presentation of a duly authenticated copy thereof and payment of appropriate fees, if any. [Cynthia] is now legally
capacitated to remarry under Philippine Laws pursuant to [Article] 26, [Paragraph] 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija,
the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office, the Office of the Civil Registrar of the City of
Manila and the Embassy of the Philippines in Seoul, Korea through the Department of Foreign Affairs.

SO ORDERED.7

The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The arguments therein, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:

1. The [Recognition Petition] should [have been] filed in the RTC of Manila because the marriage was
celebrated and was recorded in the City Civil Registry of Manila. Citing the case of Fujiki vs. Marinay8 x x x,
the (OSG] argued that [the recognition] of foreign divorce judgments may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the
venue of such proceedings is laid on the appropriate RTC where the civil registry is located;

2. Absolute divorce is not allowed in this jurisdiction. Considering that the divorce x x x was obtained not by
the alien spouse alone but by both spouses, x x x [Cynthia] is not qualified to avail of the benefits provided
by [Article] 26 of the Family Code.9 (Italics supplied)

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC through its Resolution10 dated March 17, 2016.

Foremost, the RTC held that while the Court, in Fujiki v. Marinay,11 ruled that the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree may be made in a special proceeding, the use of the permissive word "may" was intentional so as not to
foreclose the option of seeking such recognition through a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, as in the case of Republic v. Orbecido III12 (Orbecido).13 Expounding further, the RTC held that
since there are no specific rules governing petitions for recognition of foreign divorce, it applied by analogy Section
2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which requires personal actions to be filed at the place where either the
plaintiff or defendant resides.14

In addition, the RTC found that the requisites for the application of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
[Article 26(2)] concur.

First, there was a valid marriage celebrated between Cynthia and Park, as shown by the Certificate of Marriage
issued by the National Statistics Office.15

Second, a valid divorce was obtained abroad by Park capacitating him to remarry, as shown by the
Certification16 issued by the Cheongju Local Court stating that he and Cynthia were divorced on July 16, 2012.
While the RTC recognized that the divorce decree in question was obtained by mutual agreement, it ruled that such
fact does not preclude its recognition in this jurisdiction since the testimony of Abigail Galapon (Abigail) confirms that
Park merely coerced Cynthia to agree to the divorce.17

Not satisfied, the OSG appealed to the CA via Rule 41.

CA Ruling

On February 27, 2017, the CA issued the assailed Decision18 granting the OSG's appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant [a]ppeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated [July 3, 2015 and
Resolution dated [March 17, 2016 issued by Branch 88, [RTC] of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, [are] REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Petition filed by [Cynthia] is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.19

The CA found no merit in the OSG's contention that the RTC erred when it acted on the Recognition Petition since
venue was improperly laid. While Section 1, Rule 108 requires petitions for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
decrees to be filed with the RTC where the civil entry of the marriage in question is registered, the CA held that
courts cannot motu proprio dismiss an action on the ground of improper venue.20 Hence, the CA found that the
RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the Recognition Petition since the OSG failed to move for its dismissal on
the ground of improper venue at the first instance.21

Nonetheless, the CA held that the divorce decree in question cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as
Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement.22 Said the CA:

To be sure, it is crystal clear from pertinent law and jurisprudence that the foreign divorce contemplated under the
second (2nd) paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code must have been initiated and obtained by the foreigner
spouse. Thus, the Supreme Court had made it also clear that in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

There can be no dispute that [Cynthia] was a Filipino citizen when she obtained the divorce decree with her foreign
spouse and, in fact, remains to be so up to the present. Clearly, since the divorce under consideration was jointly
applied for and obtained by a Filipino and a foreigner spouse, it was incorrect for the [RTC] to apply the provision of
the second (2nd) paragraph, Article 26 of the Family Code. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, Philippine nationals, like [Cynthia], are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.

Notably, the [RTC] took as gospel truth the assertion of Abigail that [Cynthia] was merely acting under duress when
she agreed to the demand of Park to sever their marriage, lest something bad would happen to her. Said allegation
was used by the [RTC] as basis to conclude that the divorce was initiated by Park alone and that there was actually
no divorce by mutual agreement that took place.

This was obviously a serious error on the part of the [RTC].

For one, the very evidence relied upon by [Cynthia] clearly show that the divorce between [Cynthia] and Park was
obtained by mutual agreement, in accordance with Section 5, Article 834 of the Korean Civil Code. If [the CA
follows] the [RTC's] conclusion, then it is with more reason that the [Recognition] Petition should be denied since it
becomes evident that the divorce obtained by Park is contrary to, nay in violation of, [the Korean Civil Code], which
clearly requires a divorce by mutual agreement. It is not amiss to point out x x x that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines only when the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

For another, [Cynthia] herself was not presented in court while her sister, Abigail, testified on matters not derived
from her own perception but from what [Cynthia] allegedly told her. x x x Verily, the personal knowledge of a witness
is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. x x x23

On September 29, 2017, the CA denied Cynthia's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration through the assailed
Resolution.24

Cynthia received the assailed Resolution through counsel on October 10, 2017.25

On October 24, 2017, Cynthia filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review with Application for
Authorization to Litigate as Indigent Party.26 Therein, Cynthia moved for an additional period of thirty (30) days, or
until November 24, 2017 to file her petition for review. In addition, Cynthia alleged that she remains in Korea "under
questionable alien status," and is suffering from an illness which requires immediate medical attention. Because of
these circumstances, Cynthia prayed that she be granted authorization to litigate as an indigent party, for while her
counsel on record has agreed to continue handling her case pro bono, she has no sufficient means to pay the
required filing fees.27

Cynthia filed the present Petition on November 20, 2017.

On January 31, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution28 granting Cynthia's prayer for extension, and requiring
Cynthia to submit proof of her indigency within five (5) days from notice. The Court also directed the OSG to file its
comment on the Petition.
Upon submission of the required proof, the Court granted Cynthia's application to litigate as an indigent party.29

Meanwhile, the OSG filed its Comment30 on the Petition on April 26, 2018. In turn, Cynthia filed her Reply31 on
September 25, 2018.

In this Petition, Cynthia avers that this case calls for the exercise of the Philippine courts' power of "limited review"
over a foreign judgment. Cynthia argues that by reversing the RTC Decision, the CA erroneously delved into the
merits of the divorce decree in question, and substituted its judgment for the judgment of the Korean courts with
respect to matters relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of Park who is a Korean national.32 Further,
Cynthia claims that the assailed Decision and Resolution would result in the unjust situation Article 26(2) is meant to
prevent.33

In her Reply, Cynthia further argues that all doubts as to the application of Article 26(2) to foreign divorce decrees
obtained by mutual consent of the Filipino citizen and the alien spouse have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Republic v. Manalo34 (Manalo).35

The Issue

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree
obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is granted.

The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26(2) as applied to divorce decrees obtained jointly by
the foreign spouse and Filipino citizen.

Article 26 of the Family Code states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

In Orbecido, the Court laid down the elements for the application of Article 26(2), bearing in mind the spirit and intent
behind the provision as reflected in the Committee deliberations. The Court held:

x x x [The Court states] the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
Here, the CA anchored the assailed Decision on the absence of the second element set forth in Orbecido.
According to the CA, the fact that the divorce decree had been obtained by mutual agreement of Cynthia and Park
precludes the application of Article 26(2), since the language of the provision requires that the divorce decree be
obtained solely by the foreign spouse.

Adopting the same view, the OSG argues that the divorce decree in question is not one "obtained x x x by the alien
spouse alone[,] but [one obtained] at the instance of both [spouses]."37 Hence, the OSG insists that Article 26(2)
simply cannot apply to Cynthia.38 In this connection, the OSG claims that Abigail 's testimony to the effect that
Cynthia had been merely forced to agree to the divorce should not be given credence for being hearsay.39

The CA and OSG are mistaken.

In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of Article 26(2) to even cover instances where
the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court's ruling states, in part:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce valid l y
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or
her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is
in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.40 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i)
obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the
Filipino spouse.

Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South
Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the
governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient
to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in question:
x x x [T]he records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the original and translated foreign divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. She also offered into evidence a copy of the Korean Civil
Code, duly authenticated through a Letter of Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to establish the
authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged couple abroad but [the CA agrees] with the OSG
that the divorce cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as [Cynthia] is concerned since it was obtained by
mutual agreement of a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and probative value of Abigail's testimony
claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent to the divorce. As confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree
obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits recognition
in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2017 and
Resolution dated September 29, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and Former Eleventh
Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-417 is REINSTATED. By virtue of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code and the Certification of the Cheongju Local Court dated July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A. Galapon is
declared capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
 16.) [ G.R. No. 223628, March 04, 2020 ]

EDNA S. KONDO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LUZVIMINDA S. PINEDA, PETITIONER, V. CIVIL

REGISTRAR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated March 16, 2016
in CA-G.R. CV No. 103150 which affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion for New Trial.

Antecedents

On March 15, 1991, petitioner Edna S. Kondo and Katsuhiro Kondo, a Filipina and Japanese national, respectively,
were married before the Head of Hirano Ward in Japan.3 They registered their Marriage Certificate of even date
with the National Statistics Office4 in the Philippines. But on July 3, 2000, after around nine (9) years of marriage,
they obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan for which they were issued a Report of Divorce.5

On November 7, 2012, Edna, through her sister and Attorney-in-Fact Luzviminda S. Pineda, filed a petition for
judicial recognition of the divorce decree,6 citing Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, viz:

xxxx

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Edna essentially alleged that the divorce capacitated Katsuhiro to remarry under Japanese laws. She sought formal
recognition of the divorce decree and asked the trial court to direct the Civil Registrar to annotate the same in her
Marriage Certificate. Docketed as Civil Case No. 12-128981, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-
Branch 4, Manila.

In compliance with the trial court's order dated May 28, 2013, Edna duly established the trial court's jurisdiction over
her petition7 which was unopposed, except by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, Luzviminda testified8 that in June 2000, Edna informed her that Katsuhiro will be divorcing her to
marry a Japanese woman. She (Luzviminda) was able to confirm this with Katsuhiro himself.

Luzviminda presented, among others, the Report of Divorce and Katsuhiro's authenticated Family Register record,
both with English translation, stating that he and Edna divorced by agreement on July 3, 2000. She offered the
following exhibits in evidence:9

"A" Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Decree of Divorce

"B" Order of the Court dated December 18, 2012

"C" Copy of summons dated January 11, 2013

"D" Compliance dated January 25, 2013

 "E to E-1-A" Copy of Affidavit of Publication dated January 25, 2013; Copy of Police Files Tonite newspaper
issue dated January 24, 2013

"F to F-4" Authenticated Special Power of Attorney dated July 2, 2012

"G to G-1" Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese Language

"H to H-1" English translation of the Report of Divorce

"I to I-4" Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro

"J to J-1" Authenticated copy of marriage certificate of petitioner and Katsuhiro

"K to K-4" Judicial Affidavit of Luzviminda S. Pineda

Luzviminda withdrew her offer though to present additional evidence, including an authenticated English translation
of Articles 763 to 769 of the Japanese Civil Code on divorce by agreement.10 By Order dated December 3, 2013,
the trial court allowed the reception of additional evidence, citing no objection on the part of the State.11 On the
other hand, the Republic did not present its own evidence. Thus, the case was submitted for decision.

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision12 dated April 10, 2014, the trial court denied the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the relief sought by the petitioner is DENIED. The above-captioned petition
is DISMISSED.

Following Section 9 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and considering publication was required by this court in is Order
dated December 18, 2012, counsel for petitioner is directed to cause the publication of this Decision in a newspaper
of general circulation once within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let copy of this Decision be sent to petitioner as well as to her counsel for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

It noted that under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the foreign divorce should have been obtained by the alien
spouse, not by mutual agreement, as here. More, the provisions of the Japanese Civil Code, as presented to the
trial court, did not show that Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry upon obtaining a divorce.

On May 20, 2014, Edna filed a Motion for New Trial,13 alleging she had newly discovered evidence which could
alter the result of the case - a copy of Katsuhiro's Report of Divorce, allegedly indicating that he had already married
a certain Tsukiko Umegaki. She requested for thirty (30) days to secure a duly authenticated English copy of the
document to prove its contents.

She emphasized that an absurd situation would occur if the trial court would not admit the second Report of Divorce
to prove Katsuhiro's second marriage. For she would still be deemed married to Katsuhiro even though he had
already remarried on May 30, 2001.

By Resolution14 dated June 30, 2014, the RTC denied Edna's Motion for New Trial for failure to file an Affidavit of
Merit, as required under Rule 37, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.15 Further, the Report of Divorce was not sufficient
to establish that Katsuhiro contracted a subsequent marriage, unauthenticated as it was. Her failure to present a
duly authenticated copy during trial was by no means excusable.

As for the applicability of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the trial court ruled that Edna's divorce from Katsuhiro
was by mere agreement and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the provision, which requires the divorce to have
been obtained by the foreign spouse.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, Edna assailed the trial court's Resolution16 dated June 30, 2014 before the Court of Appeals. In
her Brief,17 she faulted the trial court for (1) not allowing her to introduce evidence to prove Katsuhiro's subsequent
marriage and (2) finding that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code was inapplicable simply because the divorce was
obtained by mutual agreement.

Meanwhile, the OSG through Assistant Solicitor General Eric Remegio O. Panga and Senior State Solicitor Maricar
S.A. Prudon-Sison defended the trial court's ruling.18 It argued that the second Report of Divorce cannot be
considered "newly discovered" and the evidence on record was not sufficient to warrant the grant of Edna's petition.

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

Through its Decision19 dated March 16, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It emphasized that Rule 37, Section 2
(2) of the Rules of Court required supporting evidence by way of affidavits of witnesses or duly authenticated
documents. But Edna appended a mere photocopy of Katsuhiro's records and asked for relaxation of technical
rules.

Too, the Court of Appeals did not consider the second Report of Divorce as newly discovered evidence as Edna
could have easily presented it during the trial. Despite the trial court's earlier Order dated December 3, 2013
allowing Edna to present additional evidence, she still failed to adduce the necessary documents in support of her
case.

Be that as it may, it disagreed with the trial court's ruling on the supposed inapplicability of Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, citing the rationale behind the law - it is a corrective measure to prevent the anomalous situation
where the foreign spouse is free to contract a subsequent marriage while the Filipino spouse cannot do so.

The Present Appeal

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court for the disposition of the Court of Appeals to be reversed and
the case remanded to the trial court.20 She, too, begs the indulgence of the Court to allow her to present additional
evidence to establish her case.

Petitioner admits to lapses on her part due to logistical and financial difficulties. She claims that although the divorce
and remarriage took place in 2000 and 2001, respectively, it was only in November 2012 when she secured the
adequate financial capacity to institute the petition before the trial court. Hence, the delayed acquisition and
presentation of documentary evidence.

In its Comment,21 the OSG maintains that the appeal does not raise a question of law. More, the Court of Appeals
was correct in affirming the denial of Edna's Motion for New Trial as the second Report of Divorce was not newly
discovered evidence within the contemplation of the Rules of Court.

Although it agrees with the rulings of the courts below, the OSG submits to the Court's sound discretion on the
possibility of relaxing the rules, considering Edna's predicament. Further, the denial of a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment pertaining to a person's status is never barred by res judicata. Thus, the rulings below would
simply force Edna to refile the petition, clogging the trial court's docket and wasting the time of both parties.

Issue

Should the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of additional evidence?

Ruling

We grant the petition.

Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court sets forth the grounds for a motion for new trial, viz:
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an
appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for
one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages
awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or
final order is contrary to law. (1a) (Emphasis supplied)

For the court to grant a new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence, the following requirements must be met:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the
alleged newly discovered evidence could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, it cannot be considered newly discovered.22

We find the first and second requirements sorely missing.

Here, Edna herself did not deny, as she in fact admitted that the second Divorce Report was already existing during
the proceedings below. To be sure, Katsuhiro allegedly married Tsukiko as early as May 30, 2001. If this were true,
she should have promptly secured and presented a copy of the document during the trial. The Divorce Report could
not therefore be deemed as newly discovered evidence. More so, since the trial court gave her an additional
opportunity to present evidence through its Order dated December 3, 2013, but she still failed to present the second
Divorce Report.

Be that as it may, what is at stake is not merely Edna's status, but also her actual marital and family life. In fact,
Edna addressed a handwritten letter,23 dated April 22, 2017, to this Court stating she had been anxiously worried
for years about the possible repercussions that Philippine laws may have on her because she, too, had remarried in
Japan in November 2014. Considering the recent jurisprudence on mixed marriages under Article 26 of the Family
Code, the trial court should have been more circumspect in strictly adhering to procedural rules. For these rules are
meant to facilitate administration of fairness and may be relaxed when a rigid application hinders substantial
justice.24

The landmark case of Republic v. Manalo25 is instructive. Respondent therein offered the following in evidence: 1)
Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by
Petitioner and the Japanese national. The Court found though that the Japanese law on divorce was not duly
established. It noted, nonetheless, that the existence of the divorce decree was not denied, jurisdiction of the
divorce court was not impeached, nor the validity of the foreign proceedings challenged. Thus, the Court exercised
liberality and remanded the case for further proceedings, specifically for reception of evidence to prove the relevant
Japanese law.

In Racho v. Tanaka,26 therein petitioner was divorced by her Japanese husband. She obtained an authenticated
Divorce Certificate from the Japanese embassy which the trial court deemed insufficient to prove the divorce
decree. The Court, nonetheless, ruled that the Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once it is
proven that the foreign divorce was validly obtained and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the
dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute. For it would be unjust to insist, as the OSG did, that petitioner
should still be considered married to her foreign husband. The Court noted that justice would not have been served
if petitioner was discriminated against by her own country's law. 1âшphi1

In the recent case of Moraña v. Republic of the Philippines,27 therein petitioner offered mere printouts of pertinent
portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English translation from a website, sans any proof of its correctness.
The lower courts denied her action for recognition of divorce report because she did not present an authenticated
Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese government. The Court acknowledged that petitioner duly proved the
fact of divorce but failed to prove the Japanese law on divorce. Relying on Racho28 and Manalo,29 the Court
nonetheless relaxed procedural requirements and granted the petition. It likewise remanded the case to the trial
court for presentation of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce for a new decision on the merits.

In Garcia v. Recio,30 the Court could not determine if respondent, a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
recapacitated to remarry despite the evidence already offered which included: Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia; and Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate, among others.
Hence, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence to show respondent's legal capacity to
remarry.

Indeed, the Court has time and again granted liberality in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to
Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a marriage in which they are the sole remaining party. In the
aforementioned cases, the Court has emphasized that procedural rules are designed to secure and not override
substantial justice, especially here where what is involved is a matter affecting lives of families.

The Court sees no reason why the same treatment should not be applied here. Consider:

First. Edna presented an Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese Language; an English translation of the
Report of Divorce; and an Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro. Too, she actively
participated throughout the proceedings through her sister and attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda, despite financial and
logistical constraints. She also showed willingness to provide the final document the trial court needed to prove
Katsuhiro's capacity to remarry.

Second. As the OSG noted, the present case concerns Edna's status. Hence, res judicata shall not apply and Edna
could simply refile the case if dismissed. This process though would be a waste of time and resources, not just for
both parties, but the trial court as well.31 In RCBC v. Magwin Marketing Corp.,32 the Court surmised that there was
no substantial policy upheld had it simply dismissed the case and required petitioner to pay the docket fees again,
file the same pleadings as it did in the proceedings with the trial court, and repeat the belabored process. This
reenactment would have been a waste of judicial time, capital, and energy.

Third. In its Comment, the OSG did not object to Edna's prayer to have the case remanded, viz:

Hence, the OSG interposes no objection if this Honorable Court remands this case to the trial court and allows
petitioner to present evidence to prove her case bearing in mind that only this High Court can relax its own rules for
compassionate justice.

Finally. The present case stands on meritorious grounds, as petitioner had actually presented certified documents
establishing the fact of divorce and relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the State.33

Verily, a relaxation of procedural rules is in order.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 16, 2016 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 103150 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court - Branch 4,
Manila for presentation in evidence of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce and the document proving Katsuhiro
was recapacitated to marry.
 17.) [ G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021 ]

CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND ROSITA
ANABAN-BARISTO, PETITIONERS, VS. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated July 24, 2019 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154216 affirming the nullity of the bigamous marriage between Pedrito Anaban
(Pedrito) and Pepang Guilabo (Pepang) and petitioners Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban,
Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo's status as illegitimate children of Pedrito and must inherit
only as such.

Antecedents

In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with the native customs
of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children, i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler,
Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.3

In 1947, however, the council of tribe elders took notice of Virginia's insanity and based thereon approved the
couple's divorce and allowed Pedrito to remarry.4

In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs. They begot eight
(8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and respondents Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban,
Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.5

Upon Pedrito's death on September 2, 2004, respondents sued for summary settlement or judicial partition of the
intestate estate of their father Pedrito.6 They named as respondents their half-siblings, petitioners Cristita Anaban,
Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-Baristo.

Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito acquired from
his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new
certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his
marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate
children of their father Pedrito.7

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with their mother
Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the Ibaloi Tribe customs and
their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married
their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage
pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in
accordance with that tribe's customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce
between Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed valid.8

Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)

By Decision9 dated September 28, 2015, the MCTC ruled that, first, the marriage between Pedrito and Virginia was
validly dissolved in accordance with the customs of the Ibaloi tribe; and second, petitioners are the legitimate
children of Pedrito who must succeed in equal proportion with respondents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering that:

1. The entire intestate estate of Pedrito Anaban consists of his exclusive property described as the parcel of
land with an area of 1.8 hectares located at Calot, Sablan, Benguet and registered in the name of Pedrito
Anaban under TCT No. T-14575;

2. Petitioners Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban and Marcelo (Billy) Anaban and respondents Teodoro
Anaban, Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Monina Anaban, Crese[n]cia (Esterlita)
Anaban-Walang and Rosita Anaban-Baristo are the true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left [by] the said deceased;

3. Said true and lawful heirs of the late Pedrito Anaban shall divide the subject parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-14575 into ten equal shares of 1,800 square meters each;

4. Within 30 days from [the] finality of this Decision, Administratrix Betty Alfiler is ordered to prepare a project
of partition of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban for [purposes] of distribution and delivery to the
heirs their corresponding shares, the identification of which should be mutually agreed by the heirs. In the
event that identification of the location of the specific shares will not be agreed upon mutually, the same
shall be identified through draw lots; and

5. Administratrix Betty Alfiler is likewise hereby ordered to render her final accounting of her administration
of the intestate estate of the late Pedrito Anaban also within 30 days from finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.10

It held that since the tribe elders approved Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. Subsequently, the tribe elders also
approved Pedrito and Pepang's marriage in accordance with the Ibaloi customs. Thus, Pedrito's marriage with
Pepang was as valid as his marriage to Virginia. Petitioners, therefore, are also Pedrito's legitimate children.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On appeal, RTC-Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet, by Decision12 dated October 10, 2017, declared as bigamous
the marriage of Pedrito and Pepang, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is partially GRANTED.

The Decision of the court a quo declaring that the intestate estate of the decedent consists only of that parcel of
land with an area of 18,574 square meters, registered in the name of the decedent under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-14575 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court finds the marriage between the decedent, PEDRITO ANABAN and Pepang Guilabo bigamous and VOID.
Respondent-appellees are, therefore, illegitimate. Necessarily, Petitioner-appellants, as legitimate children, shall
equally divide the entire one-half of their father's estate, while Respondent-appellees, as illegitimate children, shall
equally divide the other half thereof. Thus, assuming that no creditor's claim may be deducted upon finality of this
judgment, each of Petitioner-appellants shall be entitled to a share of 3,095.66 square meters. The other one-half
remaining portion shall be apportioned equally between and among Respondent-appellees. Thus, also assuming
that no creditor's claim may be deducted, Respondent-appellees will get a share of 1,326.71 square meters each
from their father's estate. The Decision of the court a quo stating the contrary is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Prior to distribution, the court a quo should ensure that the required publication of the notice of hearing of the
petition and the notice to creditors be complied with and the claims of creditors, if any, are disposed of.

SO ORDERED.13

It held that customs and traditions cannot supplant existing laws unless specifically provided under said laws. Under
the Civil Code, a subsisting marriage may be dissolved only by death of either spouse or when the marriage is
annulled or declared void. True, Article 78 of the old Civil Code recognizes the validity of marriages performed in
accordance with the couple's customs, rites, or practices, but this recognition is limited to the solemnization of
marriage and does not extend to its dissolution. Thus, Pedrito's purported divorce from Virginia cannot be legally
recognized. It follows, therefore, that Pedrito's marriage to Pepang was bigamous, hence, void. In the eyes of the
law, his marriage to Virginia subsisted. Consequently, petitioners are illegitimate children of Pedrito.14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision15 dated July 24, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal – it only referred to celebration of
marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also intended to include the validity of divorce
decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As the statute is clear, its literal meaning must be
applied without attempt at any further interpretation.16

More, Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371 (RA 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of
marriages to those solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and customs. It does not mention anything
about the State recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-Christian practices.17

It is true that the State has permitted divorce between Muslim Filipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws; but not divorce in other local tribes.18

The Court of Appeals opined that while it commiserated with the plight of petitioners and the rest of those non-
Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly believing that their previous marriages had already been
dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs, the court cannot do anything as the matter is for the
exclusive consideration of the legislature and not of the judiciary. 19

The Present Petition

Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside. They maintain that
Pedrito’s marriage with Virginia had already been legally dissolved before he got married to their mother Pepang. As
marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and rites are recognized by the State, the subsequent
dissolution of these marriages in accordance with the same customs and rites must also be recognized.20

Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved according to customs, rites, or
practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the framers of the law intended to recognize all the existing
customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else would a marriage solemnized in accordance with non-
Christian's customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also accordance with the same customs, rites, or
practices?21

The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the
recognition of customary laws and practices of the indigenous people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities
(ICCs). It is a policy of the State to maintain the cultural integrity of the ICCs and IPs.22

This is precisely the reason why the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) now applies Administrative Order No. 3
(AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and guidelines for the effective civil registration, among others, of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of
marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by
established customary laws or practices after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple.
This was what happened to the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia. The Ibaloi council of elders decreed their
separation and thereafter allowed their father to marry their mother.23

In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due Course24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the petition be
denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to furnish their (respondents) counsel with a copy of the petition.
Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their counsel in violation of Section 5, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service must be made to counsel if the adverse party is
represented by one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of the petition should have been made
on their counsel.

The State, on the other hand, through Assistant Solicitor General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State Solicitor
Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores, avers25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is
void. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply over and above existing laws unless otherwise allowed by
these laws. The old civil code which was in effect at the time Pedrito and Pepang got married simply stated that
marriages may be performed in accordance with the parties' customs, rites, or practices. It did not state that
marriages may be dissolved according to these customs, rites, and practices. Nothing therein implied that the
lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices.26

More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here, petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if any,
governing divorce. They did not present evidence that conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from
Virginia was in accord with their customs. They similarly failed to present any ruling or decision rendered by the
council of elders supposedly approving the dissolution of Pedrito's marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to
prove that Pedrito and Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion of the divorce process. In fine, it
cannot be safely assumed that Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly terminated.27

Issue

Is Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi
customs be recognized under our laws?

Ruling

We answer in the negative.

At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should
succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and
Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28 the Court decreed:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises,
a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the
Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
(Empahsis supplied)

Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later
on validly dissolved by the divorce decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed
Pedrito to remarry.

The question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized
as to make Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid.

All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of
the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly
divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the
divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5 of which stated:29

Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the
contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied)

This was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

For purposes of determining whether divorce was contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito
and Virginia allegedly obtained their own divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage
starting from the Spanish regime.

During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage
subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took
effect on March 11, 1917. Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads:

Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law
when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943, however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710
was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141) was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943.

Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on
the life of one spouse by the other; (c) a subsequent marriage by either party before the previous one was
dissolved; (d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted by either spouse; (e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g)
repeated bodily violence by one against the other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other.

Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as colonizers again of the
Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on ground of concubinage and
adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia were granted divorce by
the Ibaloi council of elders in 1947.

Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the
reason for Pedrito and Virginia's divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's
alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

The issue of whether divorce based on customs and practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act
No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu.31 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's
divorce from Moro Halid in accordance with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot
be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with
those formalities which the state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained:

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine
whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to
which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted
only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that (of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband.
In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were
married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the
same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan
religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally
divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed
in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting
of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those
causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage
relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for
the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J.,
20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

As the trial court in Bitdu held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot
be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this
time.

Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were
still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to
petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs in the solemnization of
marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are
contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same
conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided:

Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed
in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor
shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article 92.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly worded:

Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an inviolable social
institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions and practices
shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized community elders or authorities of
traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of marriage for purposes of registration. x x x

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition to "marriages performed"
in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices. There is no mention of the recognition of
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.32 The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to
divorce. Notably, its applicability clause states:

Article 13. Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.

At present, there is no similar law explicitly recognizing the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi
Tribe.ℒαwρhi ৷

Even if we are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of
indigenous divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i)
the culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a
central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central cultural
practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modern forms; and (iv) the contents of and procedures
for this central cultural practice, if any.

The lead government agency for this determination – in the words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of
customary law as a fact – is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could
answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means
to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of
marriages between members of the IP communities, sans any supporting evidence.

Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of
births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners,
AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for
causes sanctioned by established customary law or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation
between the couple.

But, AO 3 only took effect in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi
council of elders to Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively.

Besides, AO 3 is only a procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where
the substantive law already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights
because the role of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to
issue laws on how to obtain or confer status.

All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was
not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedrito's subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from
the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as
Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED.