University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
Questions Asked More Than Once
(QuAMTO 2018)

*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as

suggested by UPLC and other distinct luminaries in the academe, and
updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2018 Bar Exams.
*Bar questions are arranged per topic in accordance with the bar
syllabus released by the Supreme Court and were selected based on their
occurrence on past bar examinations from 1987 to 2017.
LEGAL ETHICS

Q: What do you understand by Legal Ethics? Discuss its

importance and state its sources.

A: Legal ethics is that branch of moral science which treats of the

duties that an attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues, in
the profession, and to society.

The sources of legal ethics are the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
some particular provisions of statutes, the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Judicial decisions.

Legal ethics is important in order to maintain a high moral

standard for the lawyer in performing his duties as an officer of the
court, his duties to his client, to the members of the legal profession as
well as to society. Lawyers wield so much power and influence in society.
Unless their acts are regulated by high norms of ethical conduct they are
likely to abuse them.

Notes:
Legal ethics is that branch of moral science which treats the duties of
an attorney to the court, to his client, to his colleagues, to the society and
in the profession. (CCCSP)

PRACTICE OF LAW (RULE 138)

Definition of the practice of law

Q: Atty. Yabang was suspended as a member of the Bar for a period

of one (1) year. During the period of suspension, he was permitted by his
law firm to continue working in their office, drafting and preparing
pleadings and other legal documents, but was not allowed to come into
direct contact with the firms’ clients. Atty. Yabang was subsequently sued
for illegal practice of law.

Would the case prosper? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law as any

activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 [1991]). Based on
this definition, the acts of Atty. Yabang of preparing pleadings and other
legal documents would constitute practice of law. More so, if his
activities are for the benefit of his law firm, because the employment of a
law firm is the employment of all the members thereof. The case against
him will prosper.

Notes:
In the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, it was held that practice of law is
any activity in and out of the court, which requires the application of law,
legal principle, practice or procedure, and call for legal knowledge,
training and experience. Thus, drafting of pleadings requires the
application of legal knowledge. Hence, a lawyer who is suspended cannot
draft pleadings for clients.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The traditional concept of practice of law requires the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship as a requisite. Pursuant to this concept, inasmuch
as Atty. Yabang was not allowed by his law firm to come into direct
contact with the firm’s clients during the period of his suspension, he
cannot be considered as having engaged in illegal practice of law. The case
against him will not prosper.

Q: Evelyn, Luisa. Myra, Josefina, Pamela and Rose are bona fide
members of the Philippine bar. They agree to form a close corporation to
be named LEGALCARE the principal purpose of which is “to provide
clients legal services, research and advice as well as trial advocacy for a
fee." The services shall be rendered not only by these enterprising pioneers
of LEGALCARE but also by lawyers to be employed by the projected
corporation on regular monthly salary basis.

May LEGALCARE be legally incorporated? Discuss fully. (1995

Bar)

A: A corporation cannot engage in the even by hiring lawyers to

perform legal work. It has been held that only a natural person can engage
in the practice of law. A lawyer is burdened with peculiar duties and
responsibilities. A corporation cannot take an oath of office, be an officer
of the court or subjected to court discipline: it cannot engage in law
practice directly, it cannot evade the requirements by employing
competent lawyers to practice for it (Matter of Cooperative Law Co.,
N.Y. 579). Hence, LEGALCARE cannot be legally incorporated
because the principal purpose involves the practice of law.
Notes:
Under the law, only natural person can engage in the practice of law.
Thus, a corporation cannot engage in the practice of law.

Practice of law is a privilege, not a right

Q: Is the practice of law a right or a privilege? Discuss fully.

(1995 Bar)

A: The practice of law is basically a privilege because it is limited to

persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified (5 Am. Jur. 270). Thus, only those persons who
are allowed to practice law, who by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science. Attorneys
are the court’s constituency - to aid it in the administration of justice
(Dodge v. State, 38 NE 745).
Notes:
In the case of Dodge v. State, it was held that practice of law is a
privilege, and not a right because only persons who are of good moral
character and who acquired proper education are allowed to engage in
the practice of law.

Law as a profession, not a business or trade

Q: Why is law a profession and not a trade? (2006 Bar)

A: Law is a profession and not a trade because its basic ideal is to

render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. The
gaining of a livelihood is only a secondary consideration.

Notes:
Practice of law is a profession, and not a business because the basic
ideal is to render public service and secure justice who seeks therefor.

Q: You are the managing partner of a law firm. A new foreign

airline company, recently granted rights by the Civil Aeronautics Board at
the NAIA, is scouting for a law firm which could handle its cases in the
Philippines and provide legal services to the company and its personnel.
After discussing with you the extent of the legal services your law firm is
prepared to render, the general manager gives you a letter-proposal from
another law firm in which its time-billing rates and professional fees for
various legal services are indicated. You are asked to submit a similar
letter-proposal stating your firm's proposed fees. The airline company's
general manager also tells you that, if your proposed fees would at least be
25 per cent lower than those proposed by the other firm, you will get the
company's legal business.

How would you react to the suggestion? (1997 Bar)

A: I will emphasize to the General Manager that the practice of

law is a profession and not a trade. Consequently, I will not propose a
lower fee just for the sake of competing with another firm, because such
practice smacks of commercialism. Moreover, Rule 2. 04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not charge rates
lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so
warrant. I will charge fees that will be reasonable under the
circumstances.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed. Thus, I will tell the
general manager that I cannot lower the rate than those customarily
prescribed because it is against professional ethics and lowering the fees
smacks of commercialism.

Q: As a new lawyer, Attorney Novato started with a practice limited

to small claims cases, legal counseling, and notarization of documents. He
put up a solo practice law office and was assisted by his wife who served
as his secretary/helper. He used a makeshift hut in a vacant lot near the
local courts and a local transport regulatory agency. With this strategic
location, he enjoyed heavy patronage assisting walk-in clients in the
preparation and filing of pleadings and in the preparation and notarization
of contracts and documents, and charges a reasonable fee for the service.
He draws electric power from an extension wire connected to an adjoining
small restaurant. He put up a shingle that reads: “Atty. Novato, Specialist
in Small Claims, Fastest in Notarization; the Be stand Cheapest in Copier
Services.”

Is Atty. Novato’s manner of carrying out his professional practice

–i.e., mixing business with the practice of law, announcing his
activities via a shingle and locating his office as above-described – in
keeping with appropriate ethical and professional practice? (2013
Bar)
 A: No. Atty. Novato’s manner of carrying out his professional
practice is not in keeping with appropriate ethical and professional
practice. He has degraded the law profession, which may result to loss of
respect to lawyers as a whole.

The use of a makeshift hut standing alone would create the

impression that the lawyer does not have a permanent address which is
required to be stated in all pleadings he signs as well as required to be
shown in documents he notarizes.
His shingle shows that he has considered the law profession as a
business. He should have a separate shingle for his copier services
business.

When he included in his shingle the phrases “Specialist in Small

Claims” and “Fastest in Notarization, ”he has transgressed the rule that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only dignified
information or statement of facts (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 3). So also the norm that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any misleading, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services (Ibid., Canon 3, Rule 3.01).
The use of the phrases “Specialist in Small Claims”and “Fastest in
Notarization”is misleading advertisement because they are likely to create
an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer can achieve or
implies that the lawyer can achieve results by improper means (ABA
Model Rule 7.1.b).

Notes:
Under the law, a lawyer shall have a permanent address of his office
which is required to be stated in all pleadings he signs. Thus, Atty. Novato
cannot use a makeshift where he can perform notarial act engage in the
practice of law.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, in making known his

legal services, a lawyer shall use only dignified information or statement
of facts. Thus, a lawyer cannot put on a shingle that he has the fastest
service in notarization.

Q: Cite some of the characteristics of the legal profession which

distinguish it from business. (2015 Bar)
 A: The primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from a business are:
1. a duty of public service of which emolument is a by-product and
in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;

2. a relation as officer of the court to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues characterized by candor, fairness and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their, or dealing directly with their clients (In Re Sycip,
92 SCRA 1).

Notes:
The primary characteristics of legal profession which distinguish it
from a business are:

1. an attorney has a duty of public service which emolument is a by-

product.
2. an attorney is an officer of the court who helps in the
administration of justice;
3. an attorney has a duty to client in the highest degree of
fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues characterized by candor, fairness and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their, or dealing directly with their clients

Qualifications for admission to the Bar

Q: Upon learning from newspaper reports that bar candidate Vic
Pugote passed the bar examinations. Miss Adorable immediately lodged a
complaint with the Supreme Court, praying that Vic Pugote be disallowed
from taking the oath as a member of the Philippine Bar because he was
maintaining illicit sexual relations with several women other than his
lawfully wedded spouse. However, from unexplained reasons, he
succeeded to take his oath as a lawyer. Later, when confronted with Miss
Adorable’s complaint formally, Pugote moved for its dismissal on the
ground that it is already moot and academic.

Should Miss Adorable’s complaint be dismissed or not? Explain

briefly. (2004 Bar)
 A: It should not be dismissed. Her charge involves a matter of good
moral character which is not only a requisite for admission to the Bar,
but also a continuing condition for remaining a member of the Bar. As
such, the admission of Vic Pugote to the Bar does not render the
question moot and academic.

Notes:
Under the law, the good moral character of a lawyer is a
requirement for admission to the bar and for his continuing
membership in therein. Thus, a lawyer who was allowed to take the bar
because his immoral act was not made known at that time may not be
allowed to take an oath because such question does not become moot and
academic despite of the fact that he was allowed to take the bar
examinations.

Q: Miguel Jactar, a fourth year law student, drove his vehicle

recklessly and hit the rear bumper of Simplicio Medroso’s vehicle.
Instead of stopping, Jactar accelerated and sped away. Medroso pursued
Jactar and caught up with him at an intersection.

In their confrontation, Jactar dared Medroso to sue, bragged about his

connections with the courts, and even uttered veiled threats against
Medroso. During the police investigation that followed, Medroso learned
that Jactar was reviewing for the Bar examinations.

Under these facts, list and justify the potential objections that can
be made against Jactar’s admission to the practice of law. (2013 Bar)

A: The potential objection that can be made against Jactar’s

admission to the practice of law is the absence of good moral character
(Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 2). Jactar’s bragging about his connection
with the courts and uttering veiled threats against Medroso are indications
of his lack of good moral character. His acts are contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals (In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 276). He has
acted in a manner that has violated the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man
(Tak Ng v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13017, 106 Phil. 730, December 23,
1959).

NOTE: Any answer which explains the nature of absence of good

moral character should be given full credit.

The following additional objection should not result to a deduction

nor should an absence of the additional objection also result to a deduction.
 a. If light threats would be filed against him, then another potential
objection would be the pendency of charges against him, involving
moral turpitude (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 2).

b. The question states, “Under these facts, list and justify the potential
objections that can be made against Jactar’s admission to the practice of
law.”

c. The question requires that an assumption be made that Jactar has

passed the Bar Examination and is about to take his oath as an attorney. It
is suggested that the better question should have been: “Under these facts,
list and justify the potential objections that can be made against Jactar’s
being admitted to take the Bar Examination.”

Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, an applicant for admission to the bar must
posses a good moral character; an act of bragging that he has a good
connection with a judge is contrary to good morals. Thus, Jactar may
not be admitted to the practice of law.

Q: Prior to his admission to the freshman year in a reputable law

school, bar examinee A was charged before the Municipal Trial Court with
damage to property through reckless imprudence for accidentally
sideswiping a parked jeepney. The case was amicably settled with A
agreeing to pay the claim of the jeepney owner for P1,000.00. In his
application to take the 1997 Bar Examinations, A did not disclose the
above incident.

Is he qualified to take the Bar Examinations? (1997, 2005 Bar)

A: Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

“a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar”. In the case of In Re: Ramon Galang, 66 SCRA 245,
the respondent repeatedly omitted to make mention of the fact that there
was a pending criminal case for slight physical injuries against him in
all four (4) applications for admission to take the bar examinations. He
was found to have fraudulently concealed and withheld such fact from
the Supreme Court and committed perjury. The Supreme Court cited
the rule that “the concealment of an attorney in his application to take
the bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law.”
 A’s failure to disclose that he had been charged with damage to
property through reckless imprudence in his application for admission to
the bar examinations disqualifies him. It does not matter that the offense
charged does not involve moral turpitude or has been amicably settled.
When the applicant concealed a charge of a crime against him but which
crime does not involve moral turpitude, this concealment nevertheless will
be taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not the
commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become
a lawyer (In Re: Ramon Galang, A.C. No. 1163, August 29, 1975).

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement in connection with his
application for admission to the bar; likewise, he is answerable for
suppressing a material fact in connection therewith. Thus, A is not
qualified to take the Bar Examinations because he concealed the fact that
he was charged with a crime in the MTC. It is the concealment the makes
him morally unfit to become a lawyer.

Q: Does the legislature have the power to regulate admission to

the bar and the practice of law? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar)

A: Congress under the 1987 Constitution has no power to regulate

admission to the Bar and the practice of law. Unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution no longer provides for the power of
the legislature to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court. Under the 1935 Constitution, the legislature had the
power to repeal, alter the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
although the power and the responsibility to admit members of the bar
resides in the Supreme Court (In Re: Cunanan, 50 OG 1602). Under the
1987 Constitution however, the Supreme Court has the exclusive power to
promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights, pleadings and
practice and procedures of all courts and the admission to the practice of
law (See Art. 8. Section 5, subpar. 3-5).

Notes:
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to bar and the practice
of law. Thus, legislature has no power to regulate admission to the bar and
the practice of law.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Agpalo has pointed out that the legislature, in the exercise of police
power, may enact laws regulating the practice of law to protect the public
and promote public welfare, but it may not pass a law that will control the
Supreme Court in the performance of its function to decide who may be
admitted into the practice of law (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 5th Edition, p. 5).
Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin C. Bemas also submits that the
matter stays as if the 1935 and 1973 provisions had been re-enacted
(Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 1992 ed., Vol.
II. p. 293).

APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
Law student practice rule (Rule 18-A)

Q: Enumerate the instances when a law student may appear in

court as counsel for a litigant. (2006 Bar)

A: a. Under the Student Practice Rule, a law student who has

successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme court, may
appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school, under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines if he appears in a Regional Trial Court, and without
such supervision if he appears in an inferior court (Bar Matter 730,
June 10, 1997);

b. When he appears as an agent or friend of a litigant in an inferior

court (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court);

c. When he is authorized by law to appear for the Government of

the Philippines (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court);

d. In remote municipalities where members of the bar are not

available, the judge of an inferior court may appoint a non-lawyer who is a
resident the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to aid the
defendant in his defense (Sec. 4, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court);

e. A law student may appear before the National Labor Relations

Commission or any Labor Arbiter if (a) he represents himself, as a
party to the case, (b) he represents an organization or its members with
written authorization from them, or (c) he is a duly-accredited member
of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter (Art.
222, Labor Code;Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v. NLRC,
279 SCRA 337 [1997]); and
 f. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer may represent a claimant
before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 8, Act No.2250).

Notes:
A law student may appear as counsel for the litigant if he has
completed a third year of the four-year law curriculum. The litigant must
be indigent who is accepted by a legal clinic of the law school. The law
student must be under the supervision of a member of the bar if he
appears before the RTC, and without such supervision if he appears
before the inferior court.

A law student may appear for the claimant before a cadastral

court because a non-lawyer may appear therein.

He may appear as a friend or agent to aid defendant in his defense

before an inferior court.

He may appear with the approval of the Judge before an inferior

court in a remote area where no member of the bar is found therein.

Q: What is the student practice rule? (2009 Bar)

A: The Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) is the Rule authorizing a

law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school’s clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, to appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal or board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school,
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the IBP
accredited by the law school.

Notes:
The Student Practice Rule refers to the rule which authorizes a law
student to appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal or board or officer, to
represent indigent clients who are accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school, under the direct supervision and control of a member of the IBP
accredited by the law school. The law student must have completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year law curriculum.
 Moreover; this rule finds application in certain cases where a non-
lawyer is allowed to appear like in cadastral court, in inferior court in
remote area, in National Labor Relation Commission, among others.

Non-lawyers in courts

Q: Generally, only those who are members of the bar can appear
in court. Are there exceptions to this rule? Explain (1996 Bar)

A: The exceptions to the rule that only those who are members of the
bar can appear in court are the following:

a. In the municipal trial court, a party may conduct his litigation in

person or with the aid of an agent or friend (Sec. 34. Rule 138).

b. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally

(Id.)

c. In criminal proceedings before a municipal trial court in a

locality where a duly licensed member of the bar is not available, the
court may in its discretion admit or assign a person, resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability, to aid the defendant in
his defense, although the person so assigned is not a duly authorized
member of the bar (Sec. 4. Rule 116).

d. Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance

with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all
the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or indirect (Sec. 33. Rule
138).

e. A senior law student who is enrolled in a recognized law

school’s clinical education program approved by the Supreme Court may
appear before any court without compensation to represent indigent
clients accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school (Rule 138-A).
f. Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter if
they represent themselves or their labor organization or members thereof
(Art. 222, Labor Code).

g. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant

before the Cadastral Court (Sec. 9. Act. 2259).

Q: A, a mere high school graduate, with the aid of a friend who is a

college undergraduate, filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money in
the amount of Four Thousand (P4, 000.00) Pesos in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of his town. The Clerk of Court told A that his complaint might be
dismissed for insufficiency as to form because neither he nor his friend
who is assisting him is a lawyer.

Is the Clerk of Court correct? (1999 Bar)

A: The Clerk of Court is not correct. In the Justice of the Peace courts
(now known as Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts or
Metropolitan Trial Court), a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, in inferior courts, a party may conduct
his litigation in person with the aid of a friend. Thus, the Clerk of Court
is not correct when he said that the complaint may be dismissed because it
is not sufficient in form since it was not made by a lawyer.

Q: A, a law graduate but has not passed the bar examination, filed a
Complaint in the Regional Trial Court for recovery of Fifty Thousand
(P50, 000.00) Pesos owed him by B. At the hearing of the case after
Answer was filed, A appeared by himself alone and without counsel to
prosecute his case. The defendant pointed out to the Court that A was not a
member of the bar and suggested that for his own protection, A should
engage the services of a counsel duly accredited as a member of the Bar.
The Judge intimated his willingness to reset the hearing of the case to
another day to enable plaintiff to engage the services of counsel. Plaintiff
replied he could manage to prosecute his own case, it being but a simple
case for collection of sum of money.

If you were the Judge, will you allow A to continue prosecuting

his case by himself alone? (1999 Bar)

A: Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that in a

Regional Trial Court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or
by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar. Hence, if I were the Judge, I
will allow A to continue prosecuting his case alone, but I will warn him
about the risks involved in his doing so because of his lack of
knowledge of law and legal procedure.
Notes:
 Under the Rules of Court, in inferior courts, a party may conduct his
litigation in person with the aid of a friend. Thus, if I were the Judge, I
would not allow A to continue prosecuting his case by himself alone
because he is not filing his complaint with the inferior court which may
allow him to conduct his litigation in person.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. If I were the Judge, I will not allow A to prosecute his case.
Although he is a law graduate, it does not appear that he is familiar with
procedural law, having filed the case with the RTC which has no
jurisdiction over the case in view of the amount involved. The judge is
duty bound to see to it that there is no miscarriage of justice.

b. No. I shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the
amount of P50.000.00 is within the jurisdictional ambit of the Municipal
Trial Court. Consequently, A could not continue prosecuting the case.

Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals

Q: Raul Catapang, a law graduate and vice-president for labor

relations of XYZ Labor Union, entered his appearance as representative of
a member of the union before the Labor Arbiter in a case for illegal
dismissal, unpaid wages and overtime pay. Counsel for the Company
objected to Raul’s appearance and moved for his disqualification on the
ground that he is not a lawyer.

If you were the Labor Arbiter, how would you resolve the
motion? Why? (2002 Bar)

A: I will deny the motion to disqualify Raul. Article 222 of the Labor
Code authorizes non-lawyers to appear before the National Labor
Relations Commission or any Labor Arbiter in representation of their
organization or members thereof.

Notes:
Under the Labor Code, a non-lawyers are authorized to appear before
the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter in representation of their organization or
members thereof. Thus, if I were the Labor Arbiter, I would deny the
motion to disqualify Raul to appear.

SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE WITHOUT

AUTHORITY

Lawyers without authority

 Q: A. The Supreme Court suspended indefinitely Atty. Fernandez
from the practice of law for gross immorality. He asked the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge of his town if he can be appointed counsel de
officio for Tony, a childhood friend who is accused of theft. The judge
refused because Atty. Fernandez’s name appears in the Supreme Court’s
List of Suspended Lawyers. Atty. Fernandez then inquired if he can appear
as a friend for Tony to defend him. If you were the judge, will you
authorize him to appear in your court as a friend for Tony?

B. Supposing Tony is a defendant in a civil case for collection of

sum of money before the same court, can Atty. Fernandez appear for
him to conduct his litigation? (2006 Bar)

A: A. I will not authorize him to appear as a friend of Tony. The

accused in a criminal case is entitled to be represented by legal counsel,
and only a lawyer can be appointed as counsel de officio. Although a
municipal trial court may appoint a person of good refute to aid the
accused as counsel de officio in his defense, this is applicable only where
members of the bar are not present (Sec. 4, Rule 116, Revised Rules of
Court). Necessarily, the friend referred to one who is not a lawyer. Atty.
Fernandez is a lawyer but under indefinite suspension. He should not be
allowed to practice law even as a counsel de officio.

Notes:
Under the law, a lawyer who is under suspension shall not be allowed
to engage in the practice of law. Thus, Atty. Fernandez cannot be
appointed as a friend to represent Tony because appearance in court as a
friend is tantamount to engage in the practice of law which Atty.
Fernandez is prohibit in the meantime.

B. Even if Tony is a defendant in a civil case, Atty. Fernandez cannot

be allowed to appear for him to conduct his litigation; otherwise, the judge
will be violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that "a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Notes:
A lawyer who is under suspension is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law. Otherwise, he is liable for unauthorized practice of law.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERSTO 1 AND 2:

Yes, if Atty. Fernandez was appointed by Tony. Even if Atty.
Fernandez was suspended indefinitely, he may appear as an agent or friend
of Tony, the party litigant in the Municipal Trial Court, if Tony appoints
him to conduct his case (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr., 126 SCRA 190 [1983]).

Q: Atty. E entered his appearance as counsel for defendant F in a case

pending before the Regional Trial Court. F later complained that he did not
authorize Atty. E to appear for him. F moved that the court suspend Atty.
E from the practice of law.

May the judge grant the motion? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: The judge may grant the motion. Unauthorized appearance is a

ground for suspension or disbarment (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended if
he appears in a case for a party who did not give him the authority to do
so. Thus, Atty. E may be suspended.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. A lawyer’s appearance for a party without the authority of
the latter must be willful, corrupt or contumacious in order that he may be
held administratively liable therefor. But if he has acted in good faith, the
complaint for suspension will fail (Garrido v. Quisumbing, 28 SCRA 614
[1969]).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys

Q: Atty. Herminio de Pano is a former Prosecutor of the City of

Manila who established his own law office after taking advantage of the
Early Retirement Law. He was approached by Estrella Cabigao to act as
private prosecutor in an estafa case in which she is the complainant. It
appears that said estafa case was investigated by Atty. de Pano when he
was still a Prosecutor.

Should Atty. de Pano accept employment as private prosecutor in

said estafa case? Explain. (1992 Bar)

A: Atty. de Pano should not accept the employment as private

prosecutor as he will be violating Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Notes:
 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer should not
accept any employment in connection with any matter which he intervened
when he was in the government service.

Ex: If a prosecutor had investigated a case for estafa filed by A, he

cannot be employed by A as the private prosecutor for the same case when
he retired from the government service because he intervened with this
matter when he was in the government service.

Q: Lawyer U, a retired Tanodbayan prosecutor, now in the private

practice of law entered his appearance for and in behalf of an accused in a
case before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved for his
disqualification on the ground that he had earlier appeared for the
prosecution in the case and is knowledgeable about the prosecution's
evidence, both documentary and testimonial. U contended that he merely
appeared at the arraignment on behalf of the prosecutor assigned to the
case who was absent at the time. Decide. (1991 Bar)

A: Lawyer U should be disqualified from entering his appearance in

this case even only for arraignment of the accused. His appearance is
deemed to be appearing for conflicting interest.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Canon 36 provides that a lawyer, having once held public office or
having been in public employ, should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ. The contention of U that he merely
appeared at the arraignment on behalf of the absent prosecutor, is not
enough. As a former Tanod-bayan prosecutor, he certainly had occasion to
obtain knowledge about the prosecution’s evidence.

Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, a lawyer, having once held public office or
having been in public employ, should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.

Public officials who cannot practice law or can practice law with
restrictions

Q: A town mayor was indicted for homicide through reckless

imprudence arising from a vehicular accident.

May his father-in-law who is a lawyer and a Sangguniang

Panlalawigan member represent him in court? Reason. (2000 Bar)
 A: Yes, his father-in-law may represent him in court. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160), members of the Sanggunian may engage
in the practice of law, except in the following: (1) they shall not appear as
counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party; (2) they shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (3) they shall
not collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
including the local government unit of which he is an official; and (4) they
shall not use property and personnel of the Government except when the
Sanggunian member concerned is defending the interests of the
government. In this case, the town mayor was indicted for homicide
through reckless imprudence, an offense that is not related to his office.

Notes:
Under the Local Government Code, members of the Sanggunian may
engage in the practice of law. Thus, his father-in-law who is a lawyer and a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member may represent him in court.
However, he cannot appear as counsel before any court in a civil case
if the adverse party is the government, local government, its
instrumentality, office or agency; he cannot appear as counsel in any
criminal case if an employee or officer of the government is the accused in
connection with the offense committed in relation to his office.

Q: In a civil case before the Regional Trial Court between Mercy

Sanchez and Cora Delano, Sanchez engaged the services of the Reyes Cruz
& Santos Law Offices. Delano moved for the disqualification of the Reyes
Cruz & Santos Law Offices on the ground that Atty. Cruz is an incumbent
senator. Rule on the motion with reasons. (1990 Bar)

A: As a judge, I will require that the name of Atty. Cruz, an

incumbent Senator, be dropped from any pleading filed in court or from
any oral appearance for the law firm by any other member of the law firm,
and should the law firm refuse, I will disqualify the law firm. My reasons
are as follows:

Article VI, Sec. 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of Justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies." What is prohibited is
personal appearance of the Senator Atty. Cruz, and for as long as the
Senator does not personally appear in court for Mercy Sanchez, the
prohibition does not apply. Personal appearance includes not only
arguing or attending a hearing of a case in court but also the signing
of a pleading and filing it in court. Hence, the Senator should not allow
his name to appear in pleadings filed in court by itself or as part of a law
firm name, such as Reyes Cruz and Santos Law Offices, under the
signature of another lawyer in the law firm, nor should he allow the firm
name with his name therein to appear as counsel through another lawyer,
without indirectly violating the constitutional restriction, because the
signature of an agent amounts to a signing by the Senator through
another lawyer is in effect his appearance, the office of attorney being
originally one of agency, and because the Senator cannot do indirectly
what the Constitution prohibits directly. The lawyer actually appearing
for Mercy Sanchez should drop the name of Atty. Cruz from any pleading
or from any oral appearance in court, otherwise the law firm could be
disqualified. Moreover, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in government from using his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, and the Senator’s
name appearing in pleadings or in appearances by other lawyers in the law
firm may be misconstrued as indirectly influencing the judge to decide
the case in favor of the law firm’s client, which can only be avoided by
dropping the name of the Senator from the firm name whenever it appears
in court.
Notes:
Under the Constitution, a Senator or Member of the HOR shall not
appear before any court including Electoral Tribunal and administrative
bodies. Signing a pleading and filing it in court is not personal appearance.
Thus, if Atty. Cruz appears before any tribunal, he shall not be allowed.
However, if his participation is limited to the preparation of a pleading, he
is allowed because he does not need to appear before any tribunal.

What is prohibited is personal appearance. The prohibition includes

signature of the government officials in the pleadings.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. The motion to disqualify the Reyes Cruz and Santos Law Offices
may not prosper as Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution prohibits a
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives to personally appear
as counsel in any court of justice. If Attorney Cruz who is a Senator
personally appears, he may be disqualified.

Notes:
Signing a pleading may not be considered personal appearance which
is prohibited by the Constitution.
 b. I will deny the motion. The Constitution prohibits personal
appearance by a member of Congress before the Courts but does not
totally prohibit law practice. As long as the Senator does not personally or
physically appear in court, there is no disqualification.

Lawyers who are authorized to represent government

Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should it be

mandatory that the public prosecutor be present at the trial of a
criminal case despite the presence of a private prosecutor? (2001 Bar)

A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial of the criminal

case despite the presence of a private prosecutor in order to see to it that
the interest of the State is well-guarded and protected, should the private
prosecutor be found lacking in competence in prosecuting the case.
Moreover, the primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to
see to it that justice is done (Rule 6.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility). A private prosecutor would be naturally interested only in
the conviction of the accused.

Q: Prosecutor Coronel entered his appearance on behalf of the State

before a Family Court in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage, but
he failed to appear in all the subsequent proceedings. When required by the
Department of Justice to explain, he argued that the parties in the case
were ably represented by their respective counsels and that his time would
be better employed in more substantial prosecutorial functions, such as
investigations, inquests and appearances in court hearings.

Is Atty. Coronel’s explanation tenable? (2017, 2006 Bar)

A: Atty. Coronel’s explanation is not tenable. The role of the State’s

lawyer in nullification of marriage cases is that of protector of the
institution of marriage (Art 48, Family Code). “The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro forma compliance" (Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin, 355 SCRA 285 [2001]). This role could not be left to the- private
counsels who have been engaged to protect the private interests of the
parties.
Notes:
Under the Family Code, the prosecutor shall appear in nullification of
marriage cases to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.

In the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, it was held that the participation

of the prosecutor in annulment cases must be zealous and vigilant and not
just a mere pro forma. Thus, the argument of Atty. Coronel that he is not
obliged to participate during the entire proceeding is not meritorious.

LAWYER’S OATH

Q: The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligation and its violation is

a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action.
State in substance the Lawyer’s Oath. (2015, 2009 Bar)
Answer:
“I, ____________________________________________, having been
permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the law as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God.”

Notes:
The duties of a lawyer imposed by the lawyer’s oath are:
1) A lawyer must maintain his allegiance to the RP;
2) He must uphold the Constitution;
3) He must obey the laws and legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities;
4) He must conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to court and his client;
5) He must not do falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same;
6) He must not promote unlawful, groundless or false suit nor
consent the doing of the same;
7) He must not delay a case for money;
8) He must impose upon himself these obligations without mental
reservation or purpose to avoid them.
 Q: What is the significance of lawyer's oath? (1996, 2003 Bar)

A: “The significance of the oath is that it not only impresses upon the
attorney his responsibilities but it also stamps him as an officer of the court
with rights, powers and duties as important as those of the judge
themselves. The oath of a lawyer is a condensed code of legal ethics. It
is a source of his obligation and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action" (Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 5th ed., p.59).

Notes:
The importance of the lawyer’s oath is that it instills in the attorney
that he has duties and responsibilities to the society, to the court, and to
the clients and that their violation is a ground for his suspension or
disbarment.
Q: Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates nine (9)
duties of attorneys. Give at least three (3) of them. (2000, 2007 Bar)

A: Under Section 20, Rule 138, it is the duty of an attorney:

1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
3. To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear
to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law;
4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any Judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secret of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client’s business except from him with his
knowledge and approval;
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of
an action or proceeding or delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt
motive or interest;
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed; and
9. In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of
the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that
no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Q: State the duties of a lawyer imposed by the Lawyer’s oath

(2016 Bar)

A: The following are the duties of a lawyer imposed by the lawyer’s

oath:
1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
2. To support its Constitution;
3. To obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities;
4. To do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same in any
court;
5. Not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit nor to give nor to consent to the doing of the same;
6. To delay no man for money or malice;
7. To conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts as to his
clients; and
8. To impose upon himself that voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Notes:
The duties of a lawyer imposed by the lawyer’s oath are:
1) A lawyer must maintain his allegiance to the RP;
2) He must uphold the Constitution;
3) He must obey the laws and legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities;
4) He must conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to court and his client;
5) He must not do falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same;
6) He must not promote unlawful, groundless or false suit nor consent
the doing of the same;
7) He must not delay a case for money;
8) He must impose upon himself these obligations without mental
reservation or purpose to avoid them.

The Code of Professional Responsibility

TO SOCIETY (CANONS 1-6)
Respect for law and legal processes
 THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

Q: Atty. Doblar represents Eva in a contract suit against Olga. He is

also defending Marla in a substantially identical contract suit filed by
Emma. In behalf of Eva, Atty. Doblar claims that the statute of limitations
runs from the time of the breach of the contract. In the action against
Marla, Atty. Doblar now argues the reverse position – i.e. that the statute
of limitation does not run until one year after discovery of the breach.

Both cases are assigned to Judge Elrey. Although not the sole issue in
the two cases, the statute of limitations issue is critical in both.

Is there an ethical/professional responsibility problem in this

situation? If a problem exists, what are its implications or potential
consequences? (2013 Bar)

A: Yes. There is an ethical/professional responsibility problem that

results from the actuation of Atty. Doblar in arguing the reverse
positions.

The signatures of Atty. Doblar on the pleadings for Eva and for
Marla, constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleadings; that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support them; and that the pleadings were not interposed for delay
(Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 3, 2nd par.). Atty. Doblar could not claim he
has complied with the foregoing requirement because he could not take a
stand for Eva that is contrary to that taken for Marla. His theory for
Eva clearly contradicts his theory for Marla. He has violated his
professional responsibility mandated under the Rules of Court.

He has likewise violated the ethical responsibility that his

appearance in court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion on
his honor that in his opinion his client’s case is one proper for judicial
determination (Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 30, 2nd par., last
sentence).

In counseling on the contradictory positions, Atty. Doblar has

likewise counseled or abetted activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.02) because conflicting opinions may
result arising from an interpretation of the same law.
 Atty. Doblar could not seek refuge under the umbrella that what he
has done was in protection of his clients. This is so because a lawyer’s
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his
client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics (Ernesto Pineda,
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 211 [1999], citing Maglasang v.
People, G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990).

Any means, not honorable, fair and honest, which is resorted to by

the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is
condemnable and unethical (Ibid.).
Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, any means which are not honorable, fair
and honest which are resorted to by a lawyer are condemnable and
unethical even though they are done because of his devotion to the cause
of his client.

Moreover, a lawyer must not do falsehood. Thus, Atty. Doblar cannot

change his position involving the same question of law because it amounts
to doing falsehood.
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a notary public, notarized a document
already prepared by spouses Roger and Luisa when they approached him.
It is stated in the document to Roger and Luisa formally agreed to live
separately from each other and either one can have a live-in partner with
full consent of the other.

What is the liability of Atty. Asilo, if any? (1998 Bar)

A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for violating Rule

1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility - a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. An agreement between two spouses to
live separately from each other and either one could have a live-in partner
with full consent of the other, is contrary to law and morals.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
counsel aimed at the defiance of the law. Thus, Atty. Asilo cannot notarize
the document which allows the spouses to live separately and to have live-
in partner because this is adultery or concubinage.
 Q: Atty. XX rented a house of his cousin JJ on a month-to-months
basis. He left for a 6-month study in Japan without paying his rentals and
electric bills while he was away despite JJ’s repeated demands.

Upon his return to the Philippines, Atty. XX still failed to settle his
rental arrearages and electric bills, drawing JJ to file an administrative
complaint against Atty. XX.

Atty. XX contended that his non-payment rentals and bills to his

cousin is a personal matter which has no bearing on his profession as a
lawyer and, therefore, he did not violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Is Atty. XX’s contention in order? Explain. (2010 Bar)

A: No. In a case involving the same facts, the Supreme Court held
that having incurred just debts, a lawyer has a moral duty and legal
responsibility to settle them when they become due. “Verily, lawyers
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the court and to their clients. As part of their duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations” (Wilson Cham v. Atty. Eva Pata-Moya, 556
SCRA 1 [2008]).

Notes:
In the case of Wilson Cham v. Atty. Eva Pata-Moya, it was held that
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the court and to their clients. Thus, Atty. XX may be penalized for
nonpayment of his just debt.

True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal

services

Q: A lone law practitioner Bartolome D. Carton, who inherited the

law office from his deceased father Antonio C. Carton, carries these
names:“Carton & Carton Law Office.”

Is that permissible or objectionable? Explain. (2001, 1996, 1994

Bar)

A: Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as

follows: “In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed
name shall be used; the continued use of the name of deceased partner
is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications
that the partner is deceased.” Since Atty. Antonio C. Carton is a solo
practitioner, it is improper for him to use the firm name “Carton & Carton
Law Office”, which indicates that he is and/or was in partnership with his
father. Even if he indicates in all his communication that his father is
already dead, the use of the firm name is still misleading because his
father was never his partner before. A lawyer is not authorized to use in
his practice of profession a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys.

Notes:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that in the choice of
a firm name, a lawyer shall not use false, misleading name. Thus, Atty.
Antonio C. Carton cannot use the firm name “Carton and Carton Law
Office” because his father was never his partner before.
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a lawyer, Atty.
A argues that although the calling card of his businessman friend
indicates his law office and his legal specialty, the law office is located
in his friend’s store. Decide. (2001 Bar)

A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition on

improper advertising. There is no valid reason why the lawyer’s
businessman friend should be handling out calling cards which
contains the lawyer’s law office and legal specialty, even if his office is
located in his friend’s store. What makes it more objectionable is the
statement of his supposed legal specialty. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant.

Q: A Justice of the Supreme Court, while reading a newspaper

one weekend, saw the following advertisement:

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Competent Lawyer
Reasonable Fee
Call 221-2221

The following session day, the Justice called the attention of his
colleagues and the Bar Confidant was directed to verify the advertisement.
It turned out that the number belongs to Attorney X, who was then directed
to explain to the court why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
the improper advertisement. Attorney X, in his answer, averred that (1) the
advertisement was not improper because his name was not mentioned in
the ad; and (2) he could not be subjected to disciplinary action because
there was no complaint against him.

Rule on Attorney X’s contention. (2017, 2003, 1998 Bar)

 A: The advertisement is improper because it is a solicitation of legal
business and is tantamount to self-praise by claiming to be a “competent
lawyer”. The fact that his name is not mentioned does not make the
advertisement proper. His identity can be easily determined by calling
the telephone number stated. In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,
223 SCRA 378, the Supreme Court found a similar advertisement to be
improper in spite of the fact that the name of a lawyer was also not
mentioned.
A complaint is not necessary to initiate disciplinary action against a
lawyer. In Sec. 1,Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, disciplinary action
against a lawyer may be initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio.
Notes:
In the case of Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., it was held that even though
the name of the lawyer is not written in a shingle as the one referred to as
competent lawyer, he is still administratively liable if his cellphone
number appeared thereon. A lawyer is not allowed to advertise his skill
because practice of law is not a business but a profession.

Moreover, proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio. Thus, a
lawyer may be disbarred by the Supreme Court on its own initiative.
Q: Determine whether the following advertisements by an attorney
are ethical or unethical. Write “Ethical” or “Unethical”, as the case may
be, opposite each letter and explain.

a. A calling card, 2x2 in size, bearing his name in bold print, office,
residence and e-mail address, telephone and facsimile numbers.

b. A business card, 3’’x4’’ in size, indicating the aforementioned data

with his photo, 1’’x1’’ in size.

c. A pictorial press release in a broadsheet newspaper made by the

attorney showing him being congratulated by the president of a client
corporation for winning a multi-million damage suit against the company
in the Supreme Court.

d. The same press release made in a tabloid by the attorney’s client.

e. A small announcement that the attorney is giving free legal advice

on November 30, 2017 published in Balita, a tabloid in Filipino. (2017,
2002 Bar)
 A: a. Ethical – A lawyer, in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3). For solicitation to
be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer or to the bar (Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p.55).
b. Unethical – The size of the card and the inclusion of the lawyer’s
photo in it smacks of commercialism. It is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant.

c. Unethical – A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 3.04). A lawyer should not resort to indirect advertisements such as a
pictorial press release in a newspaper to attract legal business.

d. Ethical – A lawyer cannot be held liable for the action of his client,
provided he had no knowledge of the client’s act. However, it would be
unethical if the lawyer knew of the client’s intention to publish but
nonetheless failed to prevent it.

e. Ethical– The proffer of free legal services to the indigent, even

when broadcast over the radio or tendered through circulation of printed
matter to the general public, offends no ethical rule. The rule prescribing
advertising or solicitation of business is aimed at commercialization of the
profession and has to do with the effort to obtain remunerative business. It
was never aimed at a situation in which a group of lawyers announce that
they are willing to devote some of their time and energy to the interests of
indigent citizens (Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 8th Ed., p. 123).

Notes:
a. A calling card, 2x2 in size, bearing his name in bold print, office,
residence and e-mail address, telephone and facsimile numbers is ethical
because a lawyer may make known his legal service by using a true,
honest, fair or dignified information or statement of facts.

b. A business card, 3’’x 4’’ in size, indicating the aforementioned

data with his photo, 1’’x1’’ in size is unethical because it smacks of
commercialism; it is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skills as a merchant.
 c. A pictorial press release in a broadsheet newspaper made by the
attorney showing him being congratulated by the president of a client
corporation for winning a multi-million damage suit against the company
in the Supreme Court is ethical provided he did not pay a representative of
the media for the publication of his success to attract legal business.

d. The same press release made in a tabloid by the attorney’s client

ethical provided the attorney was not aware of the press release.

e. A small announcement that the attorney is giving free legal advice

on November 30, 2017 published in Balita, a tabloid in Filipino is ethical
as ruled by the Supreme Court in one case that this action does not offend
any ethical rule.

Q: A sign was posted at the building where the law office of Atty.
RedentorWalang-Talo is located. The sign reads:
Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo
Chairman, IBP Legal Aid Committee
Makati City IBP Chapter
Free conciliation, mediation and court representation
Suite 210, Galaxy Building, J.P. Rizal Street, Makati City

a. Does the posting constitute solicitation?

A: There is nothing wrong with the advertisement. The statement that

he is the chairman of the IBP Legal Aid Committee is factual and true.
Canon 27 of the Code of Professional Ethics states that “memberships and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof” may be included in a
lawyer’s advertisement. The statement that he gives free consultation,
mediation and court representation services is for the purpose of promoting
the IBP Legal Aid Committee.
b. Suppose the sign reads:

Atty. Redentor A. Walang-Talo

Attorney and Counsel-at-Law
General Practitioner
(Accepts pro bono cases pursuant to the IBP Legal Aid Program)

Does the posting constitute solicitation? (2016 Bar)

 A: On the other hand, this advertisement is for the benefit of the
lawyer alone and constitutes solicitation.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
This does not constitute solicitation. The lawyer does not claim to be
a specialist, but only a “general practitioner.” The statement that he accepts
pro bono cases is not for the purpose of promoting his “business’’, as ”pro
bono” means “for free.
”INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(RULE 139-A) Membership and dues
Q: Not paying the annual IBP dues. (2008 Bar)
A: It is the duty of every lawyer to support the activities of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Canon 7, CPR). Default in payment of
IBP dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership to the
Integrated Bar, and default to make such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys (In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 [1978]).

Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession

Q: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank's valued clients. In

recognition of his loyalty to the bank, he was issued a gold credit card with
a credit limit of P250,000.00. After two months, Atty. Kuripot exceeded
his credit limit, and refused to pay the monthly charges as they fell due.
Aside from a collection suit, Town Bank also filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Kuripot.

In his comment on the disbarment case, Atty. Kuripot insisted that he

did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, since his
obligation to the bank was personal in nature and had no relation to his
being a lawyer.

Is Atty. Kuripot correct? Explain your answer. (2017, 2005 Bar)

A: No. Atty. Kuripot is not correct. A lawyer should act according to

the standards of the legal profession even in his personal acts. A lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely affects his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 7.03).

Notes:
 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely affects his fitness to practice law;
whether in public or private life, he shall not behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Thus, Atty. Kuripot is still
liable for his private act which discredited the legal profession.

Q: Sonia, who is engaged in the lending business, extended to Atty.

Roberto a loan of P50, 000.00 with interest of P25, 000.00 to be paid not
later than May 20, 2016. To secure the loan, Atty. Roberto signed a
promissory note and issued a postdated check. Before the due date, Atty.
Roberto requested Sonia to defer the deposit of the check. When Atty.
Roberto still failed to pay, Sonia deposited the check which was
dishonored. Atty. Roberto ignored the notice of dishonor and refused to
pay.

a. Did Roberto commit any violation of the CPR? Explain.

b. Can he be held civilly liable to Sonia in an administrative case

for suspension or disbarment? (2016 Bar)

A: a. Atty. Roberto committed a violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01,

Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 in issuing a bouncing check. He should very well
know that the issuance of a bouncing check is an unlawful act, a crime
involving moral turpitude. (Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, January 28,
1998)

b. No. The sole issue in an administrative case is the determination of

whether or not a lawyers is still fit to continue being a lawyer. The
Supreme Court will not order the return of money which is not intimately
related to a lawyer-client relationship (Wong v. Moya, A.C. 6972, October
17, 2008; Sps. Concepcion v. Atty. De La Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, Feb. 3,
2015).

Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific performance

against DEV. Inc., a subdivision developer which is represented by Atty.
L. Your client believes that the president of DEV, Inc., would be willing to
consider an amicable settlement and your client urges you to discuss the
matter with DEV. Inc., without the presence of Atty. L whom he
considered to be an impediment to an early compromise.

Would it be all right for you to negotiate the terms of the

compromise as so suggested above by your client? (1997 Bar)
 A:No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer." Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Ethics is more particular, "a lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of the controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him but should deal only with his counsel." In the case of
Likong vs. Liin, 235 SCRA 414, a lawyer was suspended for negotiating a
compromise agreement directly with the adverse party without the
presence and participation of her counsels.

Q: After the pre-trial Atty. Hans Hilado, counsel for plaintiff Jennifer
Ng, persuaded defendant Doris Dy to enter into a compromise agreement
with the plaintiff without the knowledge and participation of defendant’s
counsel, Atty. Jess de Jose. Doris acceded and executed the agreement.
Therein Doris admitted her obligation in full and bound herself to pay her
obligation to Jennifer at 40% interest per annum in ten (10) equal monthly
installments. The compromise agreement was approved by the court.
Realizing that she was prejudiced, Doris Dy filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Hilado alleging that the latter prevented her from
consulting her lawyer Atty. de Jose when she entered into the compromise
agreement, thereby violating the rules of professional conduct. Atty.
Hilado countered that Doris Dy freely and voluntarily entered into the
compromise agreement which in fact was approved by the court.
Was it proper for the judge to approve the compromise
agreement since the terms thereof were just and fair even if counsel
for one of the parties was not consulted or did not participate therein?
Explain. (1995 Bar)

A: It was not proper for the Judge to approve the compromise

agreement without the participation of the lawyer of one of the parties,
even if the agreement was Just and fair. Even if a client has exclusive
control of the cause of action and may compromise the same, such right is
not absolute. He may not, for example, enter into a compromise to defeat
the lawyer’s right to a just compensation. Such right is entitled to
protection from the court.

Q: Gretel’s residence in Makati village was foreclosed by Joli Bank.

Armed with a writ of possession issued by the lower court, the sheriff and
Joli Bank’s lawyers evicted Gretel and padlocked the house. A restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals which Gretel showed the sheriff was
disregarded. Gretel requested Hansel, an attorney who lives in the same
village, to assist her in explaining the restraining order, since Gretel’s
counsel of record was out of town. The discussion on the restraining order
was conducted on the sidewalk along Gretel’s house. The village security
guards were attracted by the commotion brought about by the discussion,
so they called the Makati Police and the CAPCOM who responded
immediately. The CAPCOM colonel, who arrived at the scene with his
troop took it upon himself to open the house and declare Gretel as the
rightful possessor. The colonel invited Gretel and Hansel to enter the
house. Five days later, Hansel was made a co-respondent (together with
Gretel) in a complaint for trespass to dwelling filed by Joli Bank’s lawyers
before the Makati Fiscal’s office.

Discuss the propriety of the act of Joli Bank’s lawyers,

considering that all lawyers are mandated to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their professional colleagues and
to avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (1989 Bar)
A: Considering that there was a restraining order issued by the Court
of Appeals, it was proper for Gretel to take steps to maintain possession of
his residence with the assistance of Hansel as lawyer.
It was not proper for the Joli Bank’s lawyers to file an action of trespass to
dwelling against Gretel and lawyer Hansel. Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself
with fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

Q: You had just taken your oath as a lawyer. The secretary to the
president of a big university offered to get you as the official notary public
of the school. She explained that a lot of students lose their Identification
Cards and are required to secure an affidavit of loss before they can be
issued a new one. She claimed that this would be very lucrative for you, as
more than 30 students lose their Identification Cards every month.
However, the secretary wants you to give her one-half of your earnings
therefrom.
Will you agree to the arrangement? Explain. (2017, 2005 Bar)

A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal service with persons not licensed to practice law".
The secretary, not being a lawyer, is not licensed to practice law and not
entitled to a share of the fees for legal services rendered, particularly in
notarizing affidavits.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a person who is not
licensed to practice law has no right to the fee for legal service. Thus, a
lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal service with such person.
 Q: Atty. Monica Santos-Cruz registered the firm name “Santos-Cruz
Law Office” with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single
proprietorship. In her stationery, she printed the names of her husband and
a friend who are both non-lawyers as her senior partners in light of their
investments in the firm. She allowed her husband to give out calling cards
bearing his name as senior partner of the firm and to appear in courts to
move for postponements.

Did Atty. Santos-Cruz violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility? Why? (2010 Bar)

A: Yes, she did. In the case of Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio (434

SCRA 288 [2004]), which involves the same facts, the Supreme Court held
that a lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself
as a lawyer and to practice law, is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide as follows:
“Canon 9. A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.”

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a person who is not
licensed to practice law cannot engage in the practice of law. If he does, he
is liable for unauthorized practice of law. Thus, a lawyer who indirectly
assist such person like making him a partner in a law firm is guilty of
assisting him in the unauthorized practice of law.

“Rule 9.01. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unauthorized person

the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the bar in good standing.”

TO THE COURTS
Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts

Q: In a pending labor case, Atty. A filed a Position Paper on behalf of

his client, citing a Supreme Court case and quoting a portion of the
decision therein which he stated reflected the ratio decidendi. However,
what he quoted was not actually the Supreme Court ruling but the
argument of one of the parties to the case.

May Atty. A be faulted administratively? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: Yes, he may be faulted administratively. A lawyer owes candor,

fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Conduct expressly provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not has been proved. To cite an argument
of one of the parties as a ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court decision
shows, at least, lack of diligence on the part of Atty. A (Commission on
Election v. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254).
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court. Thus, a lawyer shall be faulted
administratively if he knowingly misquotes the decision of the Supreme
Court because he should always be in good faith to the court.

Q: Atty. Billy, a young associate in a medium-sized law firm, was in

a rush to meet the deadline for filing his appellant’s brief. He used the
internet for legal research by typing keywords on his favorite search
engine, which led him to many websites containing text of Philippine
jurisprudence. None of these sites was owned or maintained by the
Supreme Court. He found a case believed to be directly applicable to his
client’s cause, so he copied the text of the decision from the blog of
another law firm, and pasted the text to the document he was working on.
The formatting of the text he had copied was lost when he pasted it to the
document, and he could not distinguish anymore, which portions were the
actual findings or rulings of the Supreme Court, and which were quoted
portions from the other sources that were used in the body of the decision.
Since his deadline was fast approaching, he decided to just make it appear
as if every word he quoted was part of the ruling of the Court, thinking that
it would not be discovered.

Atty. Billy’s opponent, Atty. Ally, a very conscientious former editor

of her school’s law journal, noticed many discrepancies in Atty. Billy’s
supposed quotations from the Supreme Court decision when she read the
text of the case from her copy of the Philippine Reports. Atty. Billy failed
to reproduce the punctuation marks and font sizes used by the Court.
Worse, he quoted the arguments of one party as presented in the case,
which arguments happened to be favorable to his position, and not the
ruling or reasoning of the Court, but this distinction was not apparent in his
brief. Appalled, she filed a complaint against him.

a. Did Atty. Billy fail in his duty as a lawyer? What rules did he
violate, if any?
b. How should lawyer quote a Supreme Court decision? (2015,
1994 Bar)
 A: A. Atty. Billy has violated Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which provide as follows:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND

GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.

Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent

the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of the opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert
as a fact that which has not been proved.

B. They should be verbatim reproductions of the Supreme Court’s

decisions, down to the last word and punctuation mark (Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244).
Notes:
A) Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
misrepresent the decision of the Supreme Court. Thus, a lawyer failed in
his duty when he misquoted the decision of the Supreme Court.
B) In the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., it was held that when
quoting the decision of the Supreme Court, it should be reproduced
verbatim, down to the last word, including the punctuation marks.
 Q: Atty. X was retained by E in a case for violation of BP 22 filed by
B. Before the scheduled hearing, Atty. X assured B that E would pay the
value of the dishonored check. Elated at the prospect of being paid, B
wined and dined Atty. X several times. Atty. X convinced B not to appear
at the scheduled hearings. Due to non-appearance of B, the estafa case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. B, however, was never paid. Thus, she
filed a case for disbarment against Atty. X.
Does the conduct of Atty. X constitute malpractice? Explain. (1996
Bar)
A: Yes, the conduct of Atty. S constitutes malpractice. A lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood
or shall not mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. He owes
loyalty to his client. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court
found that the lawyer concerned obstructed the administration of justice
and suspended him for two years (Cantome v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 20)
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not do
falsehood or consent to the doing of the same. Thus, the act of a lawyer in
misleading the complainant not to appear during the trial because the
defendant is, according to him, willing to pay the plaintiff which led to the
dismissal of the case constitutes malpractice.
In the case of Cantome v. Ducusin, it was held that such act does not
only constitute malpractice but it obstructs the administration of justice.
Thus, the lawyer shall be suspended.
Respect for the courts and judicial officers

Q: Atty. Luna Tek maintains an account in the social media network

called Twitter and has 1,000 followers there, including fellow lawyers and
some clients. Her Twitter account is public so even her non-followers could
see and read her posts, which are called tweets. She oftentimes takes to
Twitter to vent about her daily sources of stress like traffic or to comment
about current events. She also tweets her disagreement and disgust with the
decisions of the Supreme Court by insulting and blatantly cursing the
individual Justices and the Court as an institution.

a. Does Atty. Luna Tek act in a manner consistent with the Code
of Professional Responsibility? Explain the reasons for your answer.
 b. Describe the relationship between a lawyer and the courts.
(2015 Bar)

A: a. Atty. Luna did not act in a manner consistent with the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Canon 11 of the Code provides that “a
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct with others.” As an
officer of the court, a lawyer should set the example in maintaining a
respectful attitude towards the court. Moreover, he should abstain from
offensive language in criticizing the courts. Atty. Luna Tek violated this
rule in insulting and blatantly cursing the individual Justices and the
Supreme Court in her tweets. Lawyers are expected to carry their ethical
responsibilities with them in cyberspace (Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia
L. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014).

b. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, he is much a part of the

machinery of justice as a judge is. The judge depends on the lawyer for the
proper performance of his judicial duties. Thus, Canon 10 enjoins a lawyer
to be candid with the courts; Canon 11 requires him to show respect to
judicial officers; and Canon 12 urges him to exert every effort and consider
it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
maintain respect due to the courts and judicial officer. Thus, Atty. Luna
Tek acted in a manner not consistent with the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he insulted and blatantly cursed the individual Justices
and the Supreme Court in her tweets.

Q: Atty. Y, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision

rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), alleged
that there was connivance of the NLRC Commissioners with Atty. X for
monetary considerations in arriving at the questioned Decision. He insulted
the Commissioners for their ineptness in appreciating the facts as borne by
the evidence presented.
Atty. X files an administrative complaint against Atty. Y for using abusive
language. Atty. Y posits that as lawyer for the down-trodden laborers, he is
entitled to express his righteous anger against the Commissioners for
having cheated them; that his allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration
are absolutely privileged; and that proscription against the use of abusive
language does not cover pleadings filed with the NLRC, as it is not a court,
nor are any of its Commissioners Justice or Judges.
 Is Atty. Y administratively liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain. (2010 Bar)

A: Atty. Y “has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and is administratively liable. A lawyer shall
not in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper” (Rule 8.01, CPR). A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts
(Rule 11.03, CPR).

In the case of Johnny Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (507 SCRA 465

[2006]), which involves the same facts, the Supreme Court held that the
argument that the NLRC is not a court, is unavailing. The lawyers remains
a member of the Bar, an “oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct
ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.”

The Supreme Court also held that the argument that labor practitioners
are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not
deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members
of the bar.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
improper. The same law provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Thus, Atty. Y is administratively liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he alleged that there was connivance of the NLRC
Commissioners with Atty. X for monetary considerations in arriving at the
questioned Decision and insulted the Commissioners for their ineptness in
appreciating the facts.
 Q: Having lost in the Regional Trial Court and then in the Court of
Appeals, Atty. Mercado appealed to the Supreme Court. In a minute
resolution, the Supreme Court denied his petition for review for lack of
merit. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. After
the judgment had become final and executory, Atty. Mercado publicly
criticized the Supreme Court for having rendered what he called an unjust
judgment, even as he ridiculed the members of the Court by direct insults
and vituperative innuendoes. Asked to explain why he should not be
punished for his clearly contemptuous statements, Atty. Mercado sets up
the defense that his statements were uttered after the litigation had been
finally terminated and that he is entitled to criticize Judicial actuations. Is
Atty. Mercado's contention tenable? Explain. (1993 Bar)
 A: Atty. Mercado’s contention is not tenable. While he is free to
criticize the decision itself, he is not at liberty to call said judgment as
unjust judgment and to ridicule the members of the court. It is one thing to
analyze and criticize the decision itself, which is proper, and it is another
thing to ridicule the members of the court, which is wrong. The right of a
lawyer to comment on or criticize the decision of a judge or his actuations
is not unlimited. It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and judges on the other. A publication in or outside the
court tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering Justice in a pending suit, or to degrade the courts, destroy
public confidence in them or bring them in any way into disrepute, whether
or not there is a pending litigation, transcends the limits of fair comment.
Such publication or intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the lawyer’s duty to respect the courts. It is a misconduct that subjects him
to disciplinary action.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not in
his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
improper. Thus, Atty. Mercado can be administratively faulted when he
publicly criticized the Supreme Court for having rendered what he called an
unjust judgment, and ridiculed the members of the Court by direct insults.

Q: Atty. Harold wrote in the Philippine Star his view that the decision
of the Supreme Court in a big land case is incorrect and should be re-
examined. The decision is not yet final. Atty. Alfonso, the counsel for the
winning party in that case, filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Harold for violation of sub judice rule and Canon 11 of the CPR that a
lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts.

Explain the sub judice rule and rule on the disbarment case. (2016
Bar)

A: The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining

to pending judicial proceedings, not only by participants in the pending
case, members of the bar and bench, litigants and witnesses, but also to the
public in general, which necessarily includes the media, in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for
indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The
specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence;
that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies. (Marantan v. Diokno, 716 SCRA 164, Feb. 12, 2014) After a
case is decided, however, the decision is open to criticism, subject only to
the condition that all such criticism shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety.

A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action
(In Re Almace, G.R. L-27654, February 18, 1970).

In this case, the published comment of Atty. Harold was made after
the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered, but the same was not yet
final. The case was still pending. Hence, the publication of such comment
was inappropriate, and Atty. Harold may be penalized for indirect contempt
of court.
Notes:
Sub judice means under the judge. It means that the case is under trial.
Under the sub judice rule, cases under trial cannot be the subject of
comment or discussion to avoid influencing their result which may obstruct
the administration of justice.
However, when the decision is final and executory, it is open to
criticism subject to the condition that it is made in good faith and will not
spill over the wall of decency and propriety. What is prohibited is
intemperate and unfair criticism because it is a violation of the duty of
maintaining respect for the court.
Atty. Harold may be penalized when he wrote in the Philippine Star
his view that the decision of the Supreme Court in a big land case is
incorrect and should be re-examined because he failed to maintain respect
due to the Supreme Court.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Although the comment of Atty. Harold was made while the case was
technically pending, it was made after a decision was rendered, and the
comment made is within the grounds of decency and propriety. Hence, the
lawyer does not deserve punishment for the same.

Q: The Code of Professional Responsibility is to lawyers, as the Code

of Judicial Conduct is to members of the bench.

How would you characterize the relationship between the Judge

and a lawyer? Explain. (1996 Bar)

A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to

observe and maintain respect for judicial officers (Canon 11). On the other
hand, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judge to be patient, attentive
and courteous to lawyers (Rule 3). In a word, lawyers and judges owe each
other mutual respect and courtesy.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a. The relationship between a judge and a lawyer must be based on
independence and self-respect. He must neither be a mindless fawning
slave of the judge, nor must he take an attitude of hostility towards the
Judge. The lawyer must maintain toward the court a respectful attitude and
to uphold and protect the dignity of the court.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers shall maintain
and observe respect towards the court.

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must be patient, courteous

and attentive to lawyers. In other words, they owe mutual respect to each
other.

b. Being an officer of the court, the first and foremost duty of the
lawyer is to the court. He is bound to obey lawful orders and decisions of
the court. Like the court itself, the lawyer is an instrument to advance the
ends of justice. Should there be a conflict between the duty to his client and
that of the court, he should resolve the conflict against his client and obey
the lawful orders of the court. On the other hand, judges should be
courteous and impartial to counsel. To maintain impartiality, the judge
should not associate too much with lawyers.

Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

Q: The Supreme Court issued a resolution in a case pending before it,

requiring the petitioner to file, within ten (10) days from notice, a reply to
the respondent's comment. Attorney A, representing the petitioner, failed to
file the reply despite the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Court’s resolution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for non-
compliance with its resolution. Attorney A timely moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition, claiming that his secretary,
who was quite new in the office, failed to remind him of the deadline
within which to file a reply.

Resolve Attorney A's motion. (2003 Bar)

A: Attorney A’s motion is not meritorious. He has violated Rule 12.03

of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer
shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so”. His claim that it was the fault of his
secretary is not sufficient. He cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of
his secretary because the latter is not a guardian of the lawyer’s
responsibilities (Nidua v. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581 [1989]).

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, a lawyer shall file such pleading
without allowing the extended period to lapse. If he cannot submit, he has
to offer an explanation for his failure to do so.

Q: Atty. Cua wins a case involving a donation mortis causa.

Afterwards, she discovers, and is convinced, that the Deed of Donation was
falsified, and that it was her client who did the falsification.

If you were Atty. Cua what would you do? Explain. (1993 Bar)

A: If I were Atty. Cua., I would resign as his lawyer. The question as

to whether the attorney should disclose the falsification to the court or to
the prosecuting attorney involves a balancing of loyalties. One ethical rule
states that “counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been
committed owes it to the profession and the public to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities". Another ethical rule provides
that when “a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which is unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should
endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his client refuses
to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained,he should promptly inform the
injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps". A
literal application of these ethical injunctions requires the disclosure of the
falsification. On the other hand, the attorney’s duty to keep inviolate the
client's confidence demands that he refrain from revealing the client’s
wrong-doing, the same being a past offense. Resigning as a lawyer will
enable the lawyer to observe such loyalties. If the decision is already final,
as a lawyer, I would advise my client to withdraw any claim on the
donation mortis causa and have the property be given to the rightful owner
of the property the subject matter of the donation.

This action is in compliance with my duty as a lawyer to assist in the

administration of justice and in compliance of my oath: “I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; that I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false and or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same”.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer who receives
information that his client perpetrated fraud against the court or a person,
he must call upon his client to rectify it. If his client fails to do so, he must
resign as the lawyer of that client.

Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety

which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influence upon the
courts

Q: Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother, Judge Patron, to

introduce him to Judge Apestado, before whom he has a case that had
been pending for sometime. Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge
Apestado, acceded to the request, telling the latter that Atty. Hermano is his
fraternity “brod” and that Atty. Hermano simply wanted to ask for advice
on how to expedite the resolution of his case. They met, as arranged, in the
fine dining restaurant of a five-star hotel. Atty. Hermano hosted the dinner.

Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge Apestado commit any
ethical/administrative violation for which they can be held liable? (2013
Bar)

A: Yes, the three (3) of them committed ethical/administrative

violations for which they can be held liable. For hosting the dinner, Atty.
Hermano acted in contravention of ethical standards. A lawyer should
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or give the
appearance of influencing the court (Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 13, Rule 13.01). A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with judges
(Ibid., Canon 13, Rule 13.01). Marked attention and unusual hospitality on
the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations on the
parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstruction of motive
and should be avoided (Canons of Professional Ethics, canon 3, 2nd par.,
1st sentence). Even if the purpose of the meeting was merely to “ask advice
on how to expedite the resolution of his case,” Atty. Hermano still acted
outside of the bounds of ethical conduct. This is so because a lawyer
deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a
judge a special personal consideration or favor (Ibid., Canon 3, 2nd par.,
2nd sentence).

Both judge patron and Judge Apestado may be held liable for having
the dinner meeting with Atty. Hermano. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of
a reasonable observer (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
Canon 2, Sec.1). Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities (Ibid., Canon 4, Sec. 1). Their having
dinner with Atty. Hermano, a practicing lawyer, could be construed as
appearance of impropriety.

Judge Patron for having allowed himself to be used as a “bridge” by

Atty. Hermano, his fraternity “brod”, to meet with Judge Apestado
exhibited judicial misconduct in the following manner: Judges shall refrain
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 3). Furthermore, in
allowing Atty. Hermano to take advantage of his fraternity bond, Judge
Patron allowed the prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interests of others, conveyed or permitted hos fraternity “brod” to convey
the impression that he is in a special position to influence the judge (Ibid.,
Canon 1, Sec 4, 2nd sentence).

The specific violations of Judge Apestado were committed when he

allowed himself to be convinced by Judge Patron to have the dinner
meeting with Atty. Hermano to discuss how the case may be expedited. In
performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent form judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently (Ibid., Canon 1, Sec. 2). Finally, in having dinner meeting
with Atty. Hermano who has a pending case with his sala, Judge Apestado
has exhibited an appearance of impropriety in his activities (Ibid., Canon 4,
Sec 1).
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall refrain
from any impropriety which serves to influence or give the appearance of
influencing the court.
 Moreover, a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to judges; he shall not seek opportunity for cultivating
familiarity with them.

Under the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Moreover, judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the

outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court.

Thus, lawyers and judges violated the ethical standard when they took
dinner which was hosted by a lawyer who has a pending case with the sala
of the judge.

Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal sponsor at the wedding

of his son. Atty. J met Judge K a month before during the IBP-sponsored
reception to welcome Judge K into the community, and having learned that
Judge K takes his breakfast at a coffee shop near his (Judge K's) boarding
house, Atty. J made it a point to be at the coffee shop at about the time that
Judge K takes his breakfast.

Comment on Atty. J's acts. Do they violate the Code of Professional

Responsibility? (2000 Bar)
A: Yes, his actions violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 13 of the said Code provides that a lawyer shall rely upon the merits
of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 of the same Code
provides that a lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality
to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with Judges. Atty. J
obviously sought opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judge K by
being at the coffee shop where the latter takes his breakfast, and is
extending extraordinary attention to the judge by inviting him to be a
principal sponsor at the wedding of his son.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall refrain
from any impropriety which serves to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court. Thus, the action of Atty. J to be at the coffee shop at
the time when Judge K takes his breakfast would cultivate familiarity with
the Judge; it appears that Atty. J is influencing the Judge so it violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
 Q: After a study of the records and deciding that plaintiff was entitled
to a favorable Judgment, Judge Reyes requested Atty. Sta. Ana, counsel for
the plaintiff, to prepare the draft of the decision. Judge Reyes then reviewed
the draft prepared by Atty. Sta. Ana and adopted it as his decision for
plaintiff. Judge Reyes saw nothing unethical in this procedure as he would
ask the other party to do the same if it were the prevailing party.

Please comment on whether Judge Reyes' approach to decision-

writing is ethical and proper. (1994 Bar)

A: This procedure of Judge Reyes is unethical because the judge is

duty bound to study the case himself; he must personally and directly
prepare his decisions and not delegate it to another person especially a
lawyer in the case (Section 1. Rule 36, Rules of Court).

Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, a judgement or final order shall be
personally prepared and signed by the judge rendering such judgement.
Hence, the approach of Judge Reyes in requesting Atty. Sta. Ana, counsel
for the plaintiff, to prepare the draft of the decision and adopted it as his
decision for plaintiff is unethical because Judge Reyes himself should be
the one to prepare and sign his decision.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In the case of Lantoria vs. Bunyi, 209 SCRA 528, a lawyer was
suspended for preparing drafts of decisions for a judge. The Supreme Court
held that this violated Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide that:

“CANON 13. – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his case and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court."
“Rule 13.01 – A lawyer should not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with the
judge." Conversely, therefore, a judge should not ask lawyers of parties to a
case before him to draft his decisions. “A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary." (Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct)

Notes:
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges shall behave at all time in
a manner as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
 Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to appear before
Judge B who is A’s relative, compadre and former office colleague.

Is A ethically compelled to refuse the engagement? Why? (2001

Bar)

A: There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer appearing before a

judge who is a relative, compadre or former office colleague as long as the
lawyer avoids giving the impression that he can influence the judge. On the
other hand, the judge is required by the Code of Judicial Conduct not to
take part in any proceeding where his impartiality may be reasonably
questioned (Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.12). Among the grounds for
mandatory disqualification of the judge is if any of the lawyers is a relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree.
Notes:
A judge shall not sit on a case when the counsel of a party is his
relative within the 6th degree of consanguinity or affinity. Thus, if Atty. A is
a relative of the Judge within that degree, Judge B shall inhibit himself.

Q: Rico, an amiable, sociable lawyer, owns a share in Marina Golf

Club, easily one of the more posh golf courses. He relishes hosting parties
for government officials and members of the bench.

One day, he had a chance meeting with a judge in the Intramuros golf
course. The two readily got along well and had since been regularly playing
golf together at the Marina Golf Club.

a. If Atty. Rico does not discuss cases with members of the bench
during parties and golf games, is he violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain.

b. How about the members of the bench who grace the parties of
Rico, are they violating the Code of Judicial Conduct? Explain. (2010
Bar)

A: a. Yes. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or

hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with judges
(Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 13.01). Moreover, he should
refrain from any impropriety which gives the appearance of influencing the
court (CPR, Canon 13). In regularly playing golf with judges, Atty. Rico
will certainly raise the suspicion that they discuss cases during the game,
although they actually do not. However, if Rico is known to be a non-
practicing lawyer, there is not much of an ethical problem.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to judges; he shall not seek
opportunity to cultivate familiarity with them. Thus, Atty. Rico violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he was always hosting parties for
government officials and members of the bench because he extended
extraordinary attention to Judges.

b. Members of the bench who grace the parties of Atty. Rico would be
guilty of violating Sec. 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which provides that “judges shall, in their personal
relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to
the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality”. It has been held
that “if a judge is seen eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer
who has cases pending in his or her sala, public suspicion may be aroused,
thus tending to erode the trust of litigants in the impartiality of the judge”
(Padilla v. Zantua, 237 SCRA 670). But if Atty. Rico is not a practicing
lawyer, such suspicion may not be aroused.

Notes:
In their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, judges shall avoid
situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance
of favoritism or partiality. Thus, Judges who graced the parties hosted by
Atty. Rico violated the Code of Judicial Conduct because they did not
abstain from a situation that gives appearance to favoritism.

In the case of Padilla v. Zantua, it was held that if a judge is seen

eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in
his or her sala, it may arouse public suspicion, thus tending to erode the
trust of litigants in the impartiality of the judge.

THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

TO THE CLIENTS
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION

Services regardless of a person’s status

 Q: M was criminally charged with violation of a special law. He tried
to engage the service of Atty. N. Atty. N believed, however, that M is
guilty on account of which he declined.

Would it be ethical for Atty. N to decline? Explain. (2000, 1996

Bar)

A: It would not be ethical for Atty. N to decline. Rule 14.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility provides that’ a lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex,
creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of
said person. It is for the judge, not the lawyer, to decide the guilt of the
accused, who is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt by procedure recognized by law.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person because of his own opinion concerning the
guilt of said person. Thus, it is unethical for Atty. N to decline because of
his belief that M is guilty of the crime he is charged with.

Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as defense counsel in

a lawsuit. In the course of the proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr.
BB was an agnostic and a homosexual. By reason thereof, Atty. DD filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel without Mr. BB’s express consent.

Is Atty. DD’s motion legally tenable? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)

A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no valid cause
to terminate his services. His client, Mr. BB, being an agnostic and
homosexual, should not be deprived of his counsel’s representation solely
for that reason. A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status in life or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 14,Rule 14.01).

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s sex or creed.
Thus, Atty. DD cannot decline to represent Mr. BB just because the latter is
agnostic and homosexual.
 Q: Your services as a lawyer are engaged by John Dizon to defend
him from the charge of malversation of public funds before the
Sandiganbayan. John confessed to you that he actually misappropriated the
amount charged but he said it was out of extreme necessity to pay for the
emergency operation of his wife.

Will you agree to defend him? State your reason. (1990 Bar)

A: I will agree to defend him, notwithstanding his confession to me

that he actually misappropriated the amount. Rule 14.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not decline to
represent a person because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of the
person. One of the duties of an attorney is that he should, in the defense of
a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means regardless of
his personal opinion as to guilt of the accused, present every defense that
the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life liberty
but by due process of law. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution
and if the prosecution fails to discharge such burden, the lawyer can always
invoke the presumption of innocence for the acquittal of his client. If the
prosecution proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
lawyer can strive to lower the penalty by presenting mitigating
circumstances, for he is not necessarily expected to sustain the client’s
innocence. A lawyer is an advocate, not a judge, and if he has rendered
effective legal assistance to his client as allowed by law, he can rightfully
say that he has faithfully discharged his duties as a lawyer, even if the
accused is found guilty by the court.

Notes:
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
not decline to represent a person because of his own opinion regarding the
guilt of the person. Thus, I will agree to defend John although he confessed
to me that he actually misappropriated the amount charged because I cannot
decline to represent him on account of my belief that he is guilty of the
crime charged.

Services as counsel de officio

Q: May a lawyer decline an appointment by the court as counsel

de oficio for an accused because he believes, and is fully convinced that
the accused is guilty of the crime charged? (1991 Bar)
 A: A lawyer may not decline an appointment as counsel de oficio even
if he is convinced that the accused is guilty. It is his obligation to at least
protect his rights. He might even have him acquitted or at least reduce his
penalty depending on the evidence presented during the trial.

Q: In a homicide case, Atty. M was appointed by the Court as

counsel de oficio for F, the accused. After trial, F was acquitted. Atty.
M sent F a bill for attorney’s fees.

a. Can F be compelled to pay? Explain.

b. Can F employ a counsel de parte to collaborate with Atty. M, his

counsel de oficio? Explain. (1996 Bar)

A: a. No, F may not be compelled to pay attorney’s fees. A counsel de

officio is a lawyer appointed to render professional services in favor of an
indigent client. In the absence of a law allowing compensation, he cannot
charge the indigent litigant for his professional services. One of the
obligations which the lawyer assumed when he took his oath as a lawyer is
to render free legal services when required by the law to do so. The Rules
of Court provides a token compensation for an attorney de officio to be paid
by the state.

Notes:
Under the law, a counsel de oficio is a lawyer appointed by the court
to defend an indigent defendant in a criminal case. The lawyer designated
as counsel de officio cannot charge the indigent litigant for his professional
services. In a sense, there is no contract for legal services between him and
the defendant. Thus, Atty. M cannot claim compensation for services he
rendered upon F because he was appointed as counsel de oficio.

b. He may do so, but if he can afford to employ a counsel de parte,

then he is no longer indigent and will not need a counsel de officio. The
latter can withdraw as his counsel if he chooses to.

Q: Atty. Aguirre, as counsel de oficio for Boy Batongbakal, was able

to win an acquittal for Boy who was charged with robbery in band. A year
later, Atty. Aguirre discovered that Boy in fact had a lot of money which he
had been bragging was part of the loot in the crime for which he was
acquitted. Knowing that Boy could no longer be prosecuted on the ground
of double jeopardy, Atty. Aguirre sent him a bill for his services as his
counsel de oficio.
 Please give your reasoned comments on the ethical considerations
involved, if any, in the above case. (1994 Bar)

A: A counsel de oficio is a lawyer appointed by the court to defend an

indigent defendant in a criminal case. The lawyer designated as counsel de
officio cannot charge the indigent litigant for his professional services. In a
sense, there is no contract for legal services between him and the defendant.
In the absence of an express or implied contract, there is no obligation to
compensate. Suing his client for attorney’s fees might also involve a
violation of the confidential nature of a lawyer-client relationship.
Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law practitioner, has a
cattle ranch in the remote municipality of Caranglan, Neuva Ecija. He
attends to his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays,
and spends the rest of the week in his cattle ranch riding horses and
castrating bulls. In a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial
Court of Caranglan, the only other licensed member of the Bar is
representing the private complainant. The accused is a detention prisoner.
The judge wants to expedite proceedings.

a. What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?

b. If Attorney Vidal is appointed to act as counsel de oficio for the

accused, could he refuse by saying that in the province, he does not
want to do anything except ride horses and castrate bulls? Explain.
(1993 Bar)

A: a. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de oficio in order

to expedite the proceedings. This is especially because the accused is a
detention prisoner who is presumed to be indigent and cannot retain a paid
counsel.

b. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as counsel de

oficio. While it is true that he stays in the province to rest during the latter
part of the week as lawyer, he must comply with his oath to assist in the
administration of justice. Precisely one of the objectives of the Integrated
Bar is to compel all lawyers in the active practice of law to comply with
their obligation to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall assist
the court in the administration of justice. Thus, a lawyer cannot decline to
be appointed counsel de oficio to represent an indigent accused.
Valid grounds for refusal to serve
 Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel de oficio be
justified on grounds aside from reasons of health, extensive travel abroad,
or similar reasons of urgency? Support your answer. (2001 Bar)

A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de oficio are:

a. Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer (People v. Daeng,
49 SCRA 222);
b. Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
c. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently (supra);
d. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public
office which prohibits appearances in court; and
e. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell
prejudice to the new clients.
Notes:
Valid grounds for refusal of a lawyer to act as counsel de oficio are:
1) The attorney is sick of a disease that is contagious;
2) He is not in a position to give competent and effective
representation;
3) He has too many de oficio cases;
4) He is holding an office which disallows him to appear before any
tribunal;
5) He cannot represent the client because of conflict of interest; and
6) He is on extensive travel.

Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by B. A sought free

legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and Atty. C was
assigned to handle his case. After reviewing the facts as stated in the
complaint and as narrated by A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.

a. May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and ask to be

relieved? Explain fully.

b. In problem (a), if the lawyer is counsel de parte for the accused and
he learns later after accepting the case and while trial is ongoing that his
client was indeed the perpetrator of the crime, may the lawyer withdraw his
appearance from the case? Why or why not? (2014 Bar)

A: a. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that a lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of the said person. It is not the duty of a
lawyer to determine whether the accused is guilty or not, but the judge’s.
Besides, in a criminal case, the accused is presumed innocent, and he is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The role of the lawyer is to see to it that his constitutional right to due
process is observed.

b. He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance with procedure

in Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Rule 19.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer who has
received information that his client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which, he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.”

CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY TO CLIENTS

Privileged communications

Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for misappropriating funds

entrusted to him by B, consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention
of engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A could not afford to
pay the fee that Atty. C was charging him, A engaged the services of
another counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for the estafa against A, the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next witness was Atty. C,
whom he was calling to the witness stand. Counsel for A, Atty. D,
vigorously opposed the prosecutor’s move on the ground Atty. C may not
be called as witness for the prosecution as he might disclose a would-be
client’s confidence and secret. Asked by the presiding Judge what would be
the nature of Atty. C’s testimony, the prosecutor said it has something to do
with how A obtained from B the funds that the latter received from the
former but failed to account for. Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed
the prosecutor’s motion. If you were the Judge, how would you rule on the
matter? (1999 Bar)

A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the witness
stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a lawyer-client
relationship was established between them. It does not matter that A did not
eventually engage his services because of his fees; such relationship has
already been created (Hilado v. David,84 Phil 569). A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect to matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 15.02). The rule on privileged communication provides
that an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him (Rules of Court, Rule 130,
Sec. 21 [b]). The prosecutor has announced that Atty. C will be asked about
how A obtained from B the funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C’s
knowledge of such matter could have come only from A.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect to matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client. Thus, Atty. C cannot be allowed to
testify on matters disclosed to him by A because when the latter consulted
Atty. C about his case, a lawyer-client relationship was established between
them, so Atty. C cannot be examined without the consent of A.

In the case of Hilado v. David, it was held that attorney-client relation

is created the moment a person consulted such attorney concerning a
particular case. In case, the client employed another lawyer, the attorney
cannot be made to testify because he will violate the Privilege
Communication Rule.

Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty. Holgado who has

always been his counsel in business deals, Simon bragged about his recent
sexual adventures with socialites known for their expensive tastes. When
Atty. Holgado asked Simon how he manages to finance his escapades, the
latter answered that he has been using the bank deposits of rich clients of
Banco Filipino where he works as manager.

Is Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado covered by the Attorney-

client privilege? (2006 Bar)

A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered by the lawyer-

client privilege. In the first place, it was not made on account of a lawyer-
client relationship, that is, it was not made for the purpose of seeking legal
advice. In the second place, it was not made in confidence (Mercado v.
Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1). In the third place, the attorney-client privilege does
not cover information concerning a crime or a fraud being committed or
proposed to be committed.

Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect to matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
In the case of Mercado v. Vitriolo, it was held that attorney-client
relationship is not established when a person reveals to a lawyer during a
drinking spree on how he managed to finance his escapades by using the
bank deposits of rich clients of Banco Filipino where he works as manager.
 Q: Maria and Atty. Evangeline met each other and became good
friends at zumba class. One day, Maria approached Atty. Evangeline for
legal advice. It turned out that Maria, a nurse, previously worked in the
Middle East. So she could more easily leave for work abroad, she declared
in all her documents that she was still single. However, Maria was already
married with two children. Maria again had plans to apply for work abroad
but this time, wished to have all her papers in order. Atty. Evangeline,
claiming that she was already overloaded with other cases, referred Maria’s
case to another lawyer. Maria found it appalling that after Atty. Evangeline
had learned of her secrets, the latter refused to handle her case.
Maria’s friendship with Atty. Evangeline permanently turned sour
after Maria filed an administrative case against the latter for failing to
return borrowed jewelry. Atty. Evangeline, on the other hand, threatened to
charge Maria with a criminal case for falsification of public documents,
based on the disclosures Maria had earlier made to Atty. Evangeline.

Was the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline considered

privilege? (2015 Bar)

A: The consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline is considered

privileged. The moment the complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship
evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day not inclined to
handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment too, is
the fact that no formal professional engagement follows consultation. Nor
will it make any difference, that no contract whatsoever was executed by
the parties to memorialize the relationship (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No.
6711, July 3, 2007).

Notes:
In the case of Hadjula v. Madianda, it was held that the moment a
person seeks legal advice from a lawyer, attorney-client relationship is
established. Thus, the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline is
considered privileged because the former sought legal advice from the
latter on how to show in his paper that she is single although the fact is that
she is married.
 Conflict of Interest
Conflict of interest refers to a situation which a lawyer, in serving the
interest of a new client, will work against the interest of the old client.

Q: St. Ivan’s Hospital, Inc. (St. Ivan’s) and allied Construction Co.
(Allied) separately retained the legal services of Tomas and Benedicto
Law Offices. St. Ivan’s engaged the service of Allied for the construction
of a new building but failed to pay the contract price after the completion of
the works. A complaint for sum of money was filed by Atty. Budoy, a
former associate of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, on behalf of
Allied against St. Ivan’s. St. Ivans, lost the case and was held liable to
Allied.

Thereafter, St. Ivan’s filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.

Budoy. It claimed that while Atty. Budoy has established his own law
office, an arrangement was made whereby Tomas and Benedicto Law
Offices assign cases for him to handle, and that it can be assumed that
Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices collaborate with Atty. Budoy in the
cases referred to him, creating a conflict of interest.

Rule on the complaint with reasons. (2016 Bar)

A: I will rule in favor of St. Ivan’s and against Atty. Budoy. St. Ivan’s
was a client of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, of which Atty. Budoy
was an associate attorney. As such, St. Ivan’s was also his client, because
of the principle that when a party hires a law firm, he hires all the lawyers
therein. Moreover, Atty. Budoy was in a position to know the information
transmitted by St. Ivan’s to the firm. “There is conflict of interest if the
acceptance of a new retainer will require the lawyer to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his new client in any matter in which he
represents him, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired during their relation”
(Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, July 01, 2003).

“As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose

interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste” (Anglo v. Atty.
Valencia, A.C. No. 10567, Feb. 25, 2015).

Notes:
In the case of Hornilla v. Salunat, it was held that when a person hires
a law firm, he hires all the lawyers therein; the member of that law firm
who went on a solo practice cannot handle the case which was handled by
the law firm when he was still a partner even though he was not actually the
one who handled such case. Thus, Atty. Budoy, a former associate of
Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, cannot file a case against St. Ivan’s
because the contract was established when Atty. Budoy was still an
associate of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, and at that time, St. Ivan’
and Allied were clients of the law firm. This is so because of conflict of
interest.

Q: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for legal advice by

your good friend in connection with the matron’s jewelry business. She
related to you the facts regarding a sale on consignment of pieces of
jewelry to someone she did not name or identify. Since she was referred to
you by a close friend, you did not bill her for the consultation. Neither did
she offer to compensate you. Six months later, Mrs. G, the wife of the
general manager of a client company of your law firm, asked you to defend
her in a criminal case for estafa filed by Mrs. F.

Would you agree to handle her case? (1997 Bar)

A: First, I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by Mrs. F against the
wife of the general manager is the same matter concerning which Mrs. F
consulted me six months before. If it is a same matter, I will not be able to
handle the case for the general manager’s wife, because of a conflict of
interests. When Mrs. F consulted me and I give her professional advice, a
lawyer-client relationship was created between us, regardless of the fact
that I was not compensated for it. It would involve a conflict of interests if I
will handle the case for the opposite party on the same matter (Hilado v.
David, 84 Phil. 571).

Notes:
In the case of Hilado v. David, it was held that when a person
consulted a lawyer who gave his professional advice, an attorney-client
relationship is established between them even if the lawyer is not paid.
Thus, I will not agree to handle the case of Mrs. G against Mrs. F because
of conflict of interest; when Mrs. F consulted me about the estafa case, an
attorney-client relationship was established between me and Mrs. F.

Q: Explain your understanding of “Conflict of Interests” under the

Code of professional Responsibility. (2009, 1997, 1993 Bar)

A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests.

There is conflict of interests within the context of the rule when, on behalf
of client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contend for that which his duty to
another client requires him to oppose. Another test is whether the
acceptance of a new lawyer-client relation will prevent a lawyer from
discharging fully his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to another client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.

It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against

his present client even in a totally unrelated case. With regard to former
client, the traditional rule is to distinguish between related and unrelated
cases. A lawyer may not represent a subsequent client against former client
in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client,
otherwise, he may. However, in the case of Rosacia vs. Atty.B. Bulalacao,
248 SCRA 665, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer may not accept a
case against a former client, even on an unrelated matter.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not in
the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit
afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client
under the pretext that the other case. It behooves respondent not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

Notes:
In the case of Rosacia vs. Atty. B. Bulalacao, it was held that clients
are encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers in the administration
of justice. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a case against a former client,
even on an unrelated matter because of conflict of interest.

Q: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the Rosales Law Office

which is representing Corporation X before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Atty. Montes who is now practicing on his own, entered her
appearance as counsel for Corporation Y in a suit between said
corporation and Corporation X. Atty. Montes claims that since she did not
personally handle the case of Corporation X when she was still with the
Rosales Law Office she will not be representing conflicting interests. Is
such argument valid? Explain. (1992 Bar)

A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be appearing for conflicting

interests if she appears for Corporation Y against Corporation X.
 This question is similar to the case of Philippine Blooming Mills vs.
Court of Appeals. In said case, the Philippine Blooming Mills was the
retainer of the ACCRA Law Office. Three lawyers of the ACCRA Law
Office separated from said law firm and established their own law office.
The three lawyers were disqualified from appearing for a corporation
against the Philippine Blooming Mills.

The rule which prohibits appearing for conflicting interests applies to

law firms. Employment of one member of a law firm is considered as an
employment of the law firm and that the employment of a law firm is
equivalent to a retainer of the members thereof.

Notes:
In the case of Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Court of Appeals, it was
held that employment of a law firm is employment of all the lawyers
therein. So a lawyer who is now on his own in the practice of law cannot
accept a case against the clients of the firm when he was still a partner.

Q: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch. One day,

his balik bayan compadre, B, consulted him about his unclaimed deposits
with the said branch of ABC Bank, which the bank had refused to give to
him claiming that the account had become dormant. R agreed to file a case
against the bank with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. B lost the
case, but upon the advice of R, he no longer appealed the decision. B later
discovered that R was the retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch.

Does B have any remedy? Discuss the legal and ethical

implications of the problem. (2014 Bar)

A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against representing conflicting

interests (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). B may file an
action to set aside the judgment on the theory that if a lawyer is disqualified
from appearing as counsel for a party on account of conflict of interests, he
is presumed to have impropriety and prejudicially advised and represented
the party in the conduct of the litigation from beginning to end. He may
also file an action for damages against Atty. R, aside from an
administrative complaint due to his misconduct. He was prejudiced by the
adverse decision against him, which he no longer appealed upon the advice
of Atty. R.

Q: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased person. Your wife
is a practicing Certified Public Accountant. She was asked by her client to
prepare and submit an itemized claim against the estate you are
representing. She asks for your advice on the legal propriety of her client’s
claim.

What advice would you give her? Explain. (2003 Bar)

A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her to handle her
client’s claim against the estate. As a counsel for the estate, it is my duty to
preserve the estate. Her client’s claim seeks to reduce the said estate. If she
will handle such claim, I can be suspected of representing conflicting
interests. The interests of the estate and of its creditors are adverse to each
other (Nakpil v. Valdez, 288 SCRA 75). Even if she is a different person, the
fact that she is my wife will still give rise to the impression that we are
acting as one.

Notes:
In the case of Nakpil v. Valdez, it was held that a wife of a lawyer
cannot handle a case against the client of her husband because of conflict of
interest. Thus, I would advise her that it will be improper for her to handle
her client’s claim against the estate.

Q: You are the lawyer of Mr.”H”, the plaintiff, in a civil case for
rescission of contract. The prospects for an amicable settlement look bright.
Impressed by your ability, Mr. “I”, the defendant, would like very much
to retain you as his defense counsel in a criminal case for homicide
through reckless imprudence. Mr. “I” wants you to forthwith enter your
appearance, the arraignment already having been scheduled. Would you
accept the offer? (1997 Bar)

A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide through reckless

imprudence is against Mr. “H”, I cannot accept the same for that will
involve a conflict of interest, although it is an unrelated case. But if it will
not involve Mr. “H”, I can accept the same. However, to avoid suspicion
and misunderstanding, it would be better if I inform Mr. “H” about the
offer and secure his conformity to my handling the same.

Q: Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He also acted as

counsel for D against C in another civil case. When D lost his case against
C, he filed an administrative complaint against Atty. B for conflict of
interests. Decide. (1991 Bar)

A: If the case of C in the first case is entirely different and not related
with the case of D against C, there is no conflict of interests. If the two
cases however are related wherein the attorney has knowledge of the
evidence of C then there is conflict of interests. Rule 15.01 provides that: A
lawyer in conferring with a prospective client shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client
or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.03 further provides that: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

Notes:
Here, there is a conflict of interest only when the matter or case is
related. However, in the case of Rosacia v. Bulalacao, it was held that a
lawyer cannot represent a person who has a claim against his former client
because of conflict of interest.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, there is conflict of
interest when the matter involved is the same.
Q: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has an existing and
current retainership agreement with XYZ Corporation and ABC
Company, both of which were pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation
discovered that a number of its patented drugs had been duplicated and sold
in the market under ABC Company’s brand names. XYZ Corporation
turned to the law firm and asked it to bring suit against ABC Company for
patent infringement on several counts.
What are the ethical considerations involved in this case and how
are you going to resolve them? (1994 Bar)

A: A counsel de oficio is a lawyer appointed by the court to defend an

indigent defendant in a criminal case. The lawyer designated as counsel de
officio cannot charge the indigent litigant for his professional services. In a
sense, there is no contract for legal services between him and the defendant.
In the absence of an express or implied contract, there is no obligation to
compensate. Suing his client for attorney’s fees might also involve a
violation of the confidential nature of a lawyer-client relationship.

Notes:
The suggested answer is not correct. It does not refer to conflict of
interest.

Q: Atty. Vidal, a semi-retired Metro Manila law practitioner, has a

cattle ranch in the remote municipality of Caranglan, Neuva Ecija. He
attends to his law office in Manila on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays,
and spends the rest of the week in his cattle ranch riding horses and
castrating bulls. In a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial
Court of Caranglan, the only other licensed member of the Bar is
representing the private complainant. The accused is a detention prisoner.
The judge wants to expedite proceedings.

a. What must the judge do to expedite proceedings?

b. If Attorney Vidal is appointed to act as counsel de oficio for the

accused, could he refuse by saying that in the province, he does not
want to do anything except ride horses and castrate bulls? Explain.
(1993 Bar)

A:
a. The judge may appoint Atty. Vidal as counsel de oficio in order to
expedite the proceedings. This is especially because the accused is a
detention prisoner who is presumed to be indigent and cannot retain a paid
counsel.

b. Atty. Vidal cannot validly refuse the appointment as counsel de

oficio. While it is true that he stays in the province to rest during the latter
part of the week as lawyer he must comply with his oath to assist in the
administration of justice. Precisely, one of the objectives of the Integrated
Bar is to compel all lawyers in the active practice of law to comply with
their obligation to assist the courts in the administration of justice.

Valid grounds for refusal to serve

Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel de oficio be

justified on grounds aside from reasons of health, extensive travel abroad,
or similar reasons of urgency? Support your answer. (2001 Bar)

A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de oficio are:

a. Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer (People v. Daeng,
49 SCRA 222);
b. Conflict of interest (Rule 14.03, CPR);
c. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently (supra);
d. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public
office which prohibits appearances in court; and
e. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell
prejudice to the new clients.
 Q: A is accused of robbery in a complaint filed by B. A sought free
legal assistance from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and Atty. C was
assigned to handle his case. After reviewing the facts as stated in the
complaint and as narrated by A, Atty. C is convinced that A is guilty.

a. May Atty. C refuse to handle the defense of A and ask to be

relieved? Explain fully.

b. In problem (a), if the lawyer is counsel de parte for the accused and
he learns later after accepting the case and while trial is ongoing that his
client was indeed the perpetrator of the crime, may the lawyer withdraw his
appearance from the case? Why or why not? (2014 Bar)

A:
a. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of the said person. It is not the duty of a
lawyer to determine whether the accused is guilty or not, but the judge’s.
Besides, in a criminal case, the accused is presumed innocent, and he is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The role of the lawyer is to see to it that his constitutional right to due
process is observed.

b. He may withdraw his appearance but in accordance with procedure

in Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Rule 19.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer who has
received information that his client has, in the course of the representation,
perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which, he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.”

CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY TO CLIENTS

Privileged communications

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for misappropriating funds

entrusted to him by B, consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention
of engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A could not afford to
pay the fee that Atty. C was charging him, A engaged the services of
another counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for the estafa against A, the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next witness was Atty. C,
whom he was calling to the witness stand. Counsel for A, Atty. D,
vigorously opposed the prosecutor’s move on the ground Atty. C may not
be called as witness for the prosecution as he might disclose a would-be
client’s confidence and secret. Asked by the presiding Judge what would be
the nature of Atty. C’s testimony, the prosecutor said it has something to do
with how A obtained from B the funds that the latter received from the
former but failed to account for. Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed
the prosecutor’s motion. If you were the Judge, how would you rule on the
matter?

A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the witness
stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a lawyer-client
relationship was established between them. It does not matter that A did not
eventually engage his services because of his fees; such relationship has
already been created (Hilado v. David,84 Phil 569). A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect to matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 15.02). The rule on privileged communication provides
that an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him (Rules of Court, Rule 130,
Sec. 21 [b]). The prosecutor has announced that Atty. C will be asked about
how A obtained from B the funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C’s
knowledge of such matter could have come only from A.

Notes:
In the case of Hilado v. David, it was held that when a client consulted
a lawyer, an attorney-client relationship is established. Thus, such lawyer
cannot testify against that person because of Privilege Communication
Rule; it does not matter that the lawyer was not retained because of
disagreement concerning his fees.

Q: In the course of a drinking spree with Atty. Holgado who has

always been his counsel in business deals, Simon bragged about his recent
sexual adventures with socialites known for their expensive tastes. When
Atty. Holgado asked Simon how he manages to finance his escapades, the
latter answered that he has been using the bank deposits of rich clients of
Banco Filipino where he works as manager. Is Simon’s revelation to Atty.
Holgado covered by the Attorney-client privilege? (2006 Bar)
 A: Simon’s revelation to Atty. Holgado is not covered by the lawyer-
client privilege. In the first place, it was not made on account of a lawyer-
client relationship, that is, it was not made for the purpose of seeking legal
advice. In the second place, it was not made in confidence (Mercado v.
Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1). In the third place, the attorney-client privilege does
not cover information concerning a crime or a fraud being committed or
proposed to be committed.

Q: Maria and Atty. Evangeline met each other and became good
friends at zumba class. One day, Maria approached Atty. Evangeline for
legal advice. It turned out that Maria, a nurse, previously worked in the
Middle East. So she could more easily leave for work abroad, she declared
in all her documents that she was still single. However, Maria was already
married with two children. Maria again had plans to apply for work abroad
but this time, wished to have all her papers in order. Atty. Evangeline,
claiming that she was already overloaded with other cases, referred Maria’s
case to another lawyer. Maria found it appalling that after Atty. Evangeline
had learned of her secrets, the latter refused to handle her case.

Maria’s friendship with Atty. Evangeline permanently turned sour

after Maria filed an administrative case against the latter for failing to
return borrowed jewelry. Atty. Evangeline, on the other hand, threatened to
charge Maria with a criminal case for falsification of public documents,
based on the disclosures Maria had earlier made to Atty. Evangeline.

Was the consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline considered

privilege? (2015 Bar)

A: The consultation of Maria with Atty. Evangeline is considered

privileged. The moment the complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship
evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day not inclined to
handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment too, is
the fact that no formal professional engagement follows consultation. Nor
will it make any difference, that no contract whatsoever was executed by
the parties to memorialize the relationship (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No.
6711, July 3, 2007).
Conflict of Interest
 Q: St. Ivan’s Hospital, Inc. (St. Ivan’s) and allied Construction Co.
(Allied) separately retained the legal services of Tomas and Benedicto Law
Offices. St. Ivan’s engaged the service of Allied for the construction of a
new building but failed to pay the contract price after the completion of the
works. A complaint for sum of money was filed by Atty. Budoy, a former
associate of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, on behalf of Allied against
St. Ivan’s. St. Ivans, lost the case and was held liable to Allied.

Thereafter, St. Ivan’s filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.

Budoy. It claimed that while Atty. Budo has established his own law office,
an arrangement was made whereby Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices
assign cases for him to handle, and that it can be assumed that Tomas and
Benedicto Law Offices collaborate with Atty. Budo in the cases referred to
him, creating a conflict of interest. Rule on the complaint with reasons.
(2016 Bar)

A: I will rule in favor of St. Ivan’s and against Atty. Budoy. St. Ivan’s
was a client of Tomas and Benedicto Law Offices, of which Atty. Budoy
was an associate attorney. As such, St. Ivan’s was also his client, because
of the principle that when a party hires a law firm, he hires all the lawyers
therein. Moreover, Atty. Budoy was in a position to know the information
transmitted by St. Ivan’s to the firm. “There is conflict of interest if the
acceptance of a new retainer will require the lawyer to perform a act which
will injuriously affect his new client in any matter in which he represents
him, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired during their relation”
(Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, July 01, 2003).

“As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose

interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste” (Anglo v. Atty.
Valencia, A.C. No. 10567, Feb. 25, 2015).

Q: Mrs. F, a young matron, was referred to you for legal advice by

your good friend in connection with the matron’s jewelry business. She
related to you the facts regarding a sale on consignment of pieces of
jewelry to someone she did not name or identify. Since she was referred to
you by a close friend, you did not bill her for the consultation. Neither did
she offer to compensate you. Six months later, Mrs. G, the wife of the
general manager of a client company of your law firm, asked you to defend
her in a criminal case for estafa filed by Mrs. F. Would you agree to handle
her case? (1997 Bar)
 A: First, I will inquire if the case for estafa filed by Mrs. F against the
wife of the general manager is the same matter concerning which Mrs. F
consulted me six months before. If it is a same matter, I will not be able to
handle the case for the general manager’s wife, because of a conflict of
interests. When Mrs. F consulted me and I give her professional advice, a
lawyer-client relationship was created between us, regardless of the fact
that I was not compensated for it. It would involve a conflict of interests if I
will handle the case for the opposite party on the same matter (Hilado v.
David, 84 Phil. 571).

Q: Explain your understanding of “Conflict of Interests” under the

Code of professional Responsibility. (2009, 1997, 1993 Bar)

A: A lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests.

There is conflict of interests within the context of the rule when, on behalf
of client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contend for that which his duty to
another client requires him to oppose. Another test is whether the
acceptance of a new lawyer-client relation will prevent a lawyer from
discharging fully his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to another client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against his
present client even in a totally unrelated case. With regard to former client,
the traditional rule is to distinguish between related and unrelated cases. A
lawyer may not represent a subsequent client against former client in a
controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client, otherwise, he
may. However, in the case of Rosacia vs. Atty.B. Bulalacao, 248 SCRA
665, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer may not accept a case against a
former client, even on an unrelated matter.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not in
the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit
afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client
under the pretext that the other case. It behooves respondent not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

Q: Atty. Belle Montes is a former partner in the Rosales Law Office

which is representing Corporation X before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Atty. Montes who is now practicing on his own, entered her
appearance as counsel for Corporation Y in a suit between said corporation
and Corporation X. Atty. Montes claims that since she did not personally
handle the case of Corporation X when she was still with the Rosales Law
Office she will not be representing conflicting interests. Is such argument
valid? Explain. (1992 Bar)

A: Atty. Belle Montes will be deemed to be appearing for conflicting

interests if she appears for Corporation Y against Corporation X.
This question is similar to the case of Philippine Blooming Mills vs.
Court of Appeals. In said case, the Philippine Blooming Mills was the
retainer of the ACCRA Law Office. Three lawyers of the ACCRA Law
Office separated from said law firm and established their own law office.
The three lawyers were disqualified from appearing for a corporation
against the Philippine Blooming Mills.
The rule which prohibits appearing for conflicting interests applies to law
firms. employment of one member of a law firm is considered as an
employment of the law firm and that the employment of a law firm is
equivalent to a retainer of the members thereof.

Q: R is a retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch. One day, his

balik bayan compadre, B, consulted him about his unclaimed deposits with
the said branch of ABC Bank, which the bank had refused to give to him
claiming that the account had become dormant. R agreed to file a case
against the bank with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. B lost the
case, but upon the advice of R, he no longer appealed the decision. B later
discovered that R was the retained counsel of ABC Bank-Ermita Branch.

Does B have any remedy? Discuss the legal and ethical implications of
the problem. (2014 Bar)

A: Atty. R clearly violated the rule against representing conflicting

interests (Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). B may file an
action to set aside the judgment on the theory that if a lawyer is disqualified
from appearing as counsel for a party on account of conflict of interests, he
is presumed to have impropriety and prejudicially advised and represented
the party in the conduct of the litigation from beginning to end. He may
also file an action for damages against Atty. R, aside from an
administrative complaint due to his misconduct. He was prejudiced by the
adverse decision against him, which he no longer appealed upon the advice
of Atty. R.
 Q: You are the counsel for the estate of a deceased person. Your wife
is a practicing Certified Public Accountant. She was asked by her client to
prepare and submit an itemized claim against the estate you are
representing. She asks for your advice on the legal propriety of her client’s
claim. What advice would you give her? Explain. (2003 Bar)

A: I would advise her that it will be improper for her to handle her
client’s claim against the estate. As a counsel for the estate, it is my duty to
preserve the estate. Her client’s claim seeks to reduce the said estate. If she
will handle such claim, I can be suspected of representing conflicting
interests. The interests of the estate and of its creditors are adverse to each
other (Nakpil v. Valdez, 288 SCRA 75). Even if she is a different person, the
fact that she is my wife will still give rise to the impression that we are
acting as one.

Q: You are the lawyer of Mr.”H”, the plaintiff, in a civil case for
rescission of contract. The prospects for an amicable settlement look bright.
Impressed by your ability, Mr. “I”, the defendant, would like very much to
retain you as his defense counsel in a criminal case for homicide through
reckless imprudence. Mr. “I” wants you to forthwith enter your appearance,
the arraignment already having been scheduled. Would you accept the
offer? (1997 Bar)

A: It depends. If the criminal case for homicide through reckless

imprudence is against Mr. “H”, I cannot accept the same for that will
involve a conflict of interest, although it is an unrelated case.
But if it will not involve Mr. “H”, I can accept the same. However, to avoid
suspicion and misunderstanding, it would be better if I inform Mr. “H”
about the offer and secure his conformity to my handling the same.

Q: Atty. B acted as counsel for C in a civil case. He also acted as

counsel for D against C in another civil case. When D lost his case against
C, he filed an administrative complaint against Atty. B for conflict of
interests. Decide. (1991 Bar)
A: If the case of C in the first case is entirely different and not related
with the case of D against C, there is no conflict of interests. If the two
cases however are related wherein the attorney has knowledge of the
evidence of C then there is conflict of interests. Rule 15.01 provides that: A
lawyer in conferring with a prospective client shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client
or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.03 further provides that: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
 Q: The law firm of Sale, Santiago and Aldeguer has an existing and
current retainership agreement with XYZ Corporation and ABC Company,
both of which were pharmaceutical firms. XYZ Corporation discovered
that a number of its patented drugs had been duplicated and sold in the
market under ABC Company’s brand names. XYZ Corporation turned to
the law firm and asked it to bring suit against ABC Company for patent
infringement on several counts. What are the ethical considerations
involved in this case and how are you going to resolve them? (1994 Bar)

A: A lawyer may refuse to accept the representation of a client if he

labors under conflict of interests between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and the prospective client (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 14, Rule 14.03). It is unprofessional for a lawyer to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after full disclosure of the fact (Canons of Professional Ethics,
Canon 6). A lawyer cannot accept a case against a present client either in
the same case or in a totally unrelated case.

Q: Atty. Juan Cruz, a practicing lawyer, was employed by Pilipinas

Bank as its bank attorney and notary public in three of its branches in
Manila. While thus employed, Maria del Rio, who was unaware of Atty.
Cruz’s employment in the bank, engaged Atty. Cruz’s services as a lawyer
in a case that was filed by Pilipinas Bank for collection of sum of money
involving one of its branches in Quezon City which Atty. Cruz accepted.
The Quezon City Regional Trial Court, after due proceeding and hearing,
rendered judgment in favor of Pilipinas Bank and against Maria del Rio
who wanted to appeal the adverse judgment. But upon advice of Atty. Cruz,
the adverse judgment was not appealed. Thereafter, Maria del Rio learned
Atty. Cruz was employed by Pilipinas Bank as one of its attorneys. She
now consults with you and asks you to take legal steps against Atty. Cruz
for his apparent misconduct. What do you think of what Atty. Cruz did? Is
there a valid and legal basis to discipline him? (2006, 1999 Bar)

A: In agreeing to represent Maria del Rio in a case which Pilipinas

Bank filed against her, Atty. Cruz violated the rule against representing
conflicting interests. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. It is
improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client, even in an unrelated case
(Philippine National Bank v. Cedo, 243 SCRA 1). It does not matter that the
Pilipinas Bank branch in Quezon City is not one of the branches he services
in Manila. The bank itself is his client. This constitutes malpractice for
which Atty. Cruz can be disciplined.

Q: Huey Company and Dewey Corporation are both retainer clients of

Atty. Anama. He is the Corporate Secretary of Huey Company. He
represents Dewey Corporation in three pending litigation cases. Dewey
Corporation wants to file a civil case against Huey Company and has
requested Atty. Anama to handle the case. What are the options available to
Atty. Anama? Explain your answer. (1993 Bar)

A: The options available to Atty. Anama are:

1. To decline to accept the case because to do so will constitute

representing conflicting
interests. It is unethical for a lawyer to represent a client in a case against
another client in the said case.

2. To accept to file the case against Huey Company, after full

disclosure to both retained clients and upon their express and written
consent. The written consent may free him from the charge of representing
conflicting interests, because written consent amounts to a release by the
clients of the lawyer’s obligation not to represent conflicting interests.

Q: Atty. Japzon, a former partner of XXX law firm, is representing

Kapuso Corporation in a civil case against Kapamilya Corporation whose
legal counsel is XXX law firm. Atty. Japzon claims that she never handled
the case of Kapamilya Corporation when she was still with XXX law firm.
Is there a conflict of interests? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: There is a conflict of interests when a lawyer represents

inconsistent interests. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection (Santos vs.
Beltran, 418 SCRA 17). Since Atty. Japzon was a partner of the XXX law
firm which has Kapamilya Corporation as its client, she cannot handle a
case against it as such will involve conflict of interests. The employment of
a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of the members thereof. It does not
matter if Atty. Japzon never handled a case of the Kapamilya Corporation
when she was still with the XXX law firm.
 Representation with zeal within legal bounds

Q: Winnie retained the services of Atty. Derecho to file a collection

case against Carmen. Winnie paid Atty. Derecho a sizeable retainer’s fee
which the latter accepted. Later, in the process of determining the amount
of debt to be collected from Carmen, Atty. Derecho noticed that of the total
claim of 8.5 Million, certain invoices covering 3.5 Million appeared to be
irregular. Winnie while admitting the irregularity assures her lawyer that
there would be no problem as Carmen was by nature negligent in keeping
her records and would not notice the mistakes anyway. Atty. Derecho tried
to convince Winnie to exclude the amount of 3.5 Million but Winnie
refused. As a consequence Atty. Derecho terminated their relationship and
withdrew from the case. Was Atty. Derecho right in terminating their
relationship and withdrawing from the case? How about the fact that he had
already accepted a sizeable retainer’s fee from his client? Discuss fully.
(1995 Bar)

A: Atty. Derecho was right in terminating the lawyer-client

relationship and withdrawing from the case. Rule 22.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer may withdraw his
services when the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling, or when the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of the canons and rules. Rule 15.07
provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness. While he owes his client warm zeal, it
should always be within the bounds of the law (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 19). The fact that Atty. Derecho had already
accepted a sizeable retainer’s fee should make no difference on his decision
to withdraw. Moreover, he may retain the fees he has already received, his
withdrawal being justified (Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994 edition,
p. 223), unless the same is unconscionable.

Q: What are the three (3) tests to determine conflict of interest for
practicing lawyers? Explain each briefly. (2009 Bar)

A:
1. When in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight
for an issue or claim, but is also duty bound to oppose it for another client;

2. When the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to

perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or when called
upon in a new relation to use against the first client any knowledge
acquired through their professional connection;
 When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty (Northwestern University v. Arquillo, 415 SCRA
513 [2005]).
Notes:
The test to determine conflicting interest are:
1) A lawyer is required to fight for a claim for one client and he is also
required to oppose such claim for another client.

2) He accepts a new retainer which requires him to perform an act

which is injurious to the old client.
This is not allowed to prevent double-dealing in the performance of a
duty. This is against public policy and good taste.

CLIENT’S MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

Fiduciary relationship

Q: A lawyer charged his client P10, 000.00 for filing fees pertaining to
the complaint he filed in court. He actually spent only P1, 000.00. He did
not account the balance. May his client charge him for misconduct as a
member of the Philippine bar? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar)
A: The client may charge his lawyer with misconduct for not
accounting for the balance on P9, 000.00. It is well-settled that where the
client gives his lawyer money for a specific purpose, such as to pay the
docket fees for the filing of an action in court, so much of the money not
used for the purpose belongs to the client and the lawyer holds in it trust for
him. And it is the lawyer’s duty to promptly account for all money received
from his client. For this reason, the lawyer’s failure to account for the
balance of the money not spent for filing fees will render him liable for
misappropriation, which is a ground for disbarment.

Client’s moneys and properties; Fidelity to client’s cause

Q: C engaged the services of attorney D concerning various

mortgage contracts entered into by her husband from whom she is
separated fearful that her real estate properties will be foreclosed and of
impending suits for sums of money against her. Attorney D advised C to
give him her land titles covering her lots so he could sell them to enable her
to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his
favor without any monetary or valuable consideration, to which C agreed
on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her
creditors. Later on, C came to know that attorney D did not sell her lots but
instead paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles
registered in his name. Did attorney D violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility? Explain. (2009, 2007 Bar)

A: The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hernandez v. Go

(450 SCRA 1) is squarely applicable to this problem. Under the same set of
facts, the Supreme Court held the lawyer to have violated Canons 16 and
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide as follows:

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

The Supreme Court further held that the lawyer concerned has
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts, which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession, consequently, the Court
disbarred him.

Notes:
In the case of Hernandez v. Go, it was held that a lawyer was
disbarred because of his failure to account the proceeds of the parcels of
land which were sold for the payment of the debts of his client. The lawyer
cannot register the land in his name and pay the debt of his client using his
money because that was not the agreement; he owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

Delivery of Funds

Q: D was charged with estafa by C before the barangay for

misappropriating the proceeds of sale of jewelry on commission. In
settlement of the case, D turned over to the barangay captain, a lawyer, the
amount of P2,000.00 with the request that the barangay captain turn over
the money to C. Several months passed without C being advised of the
status of her complaint. C contacted D who informed her that she (D) had
long before turned over the amount of P2, 000.00 to the barangay captain
who undertook to give the money to her (C). C thus filed a case against the
barangay captain who at once remitted the amount of P2,000.00 to C. May
the barangay captain be faulted administratively? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers

who are in the government service. As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his office as a government official.
However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he
may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground (Dinsay v.
Ctoco, 264 SCRA 703 [1996]). In the case of Penticostes v. Ibanez, 304
SCRA 281 [1999], a barangay captain who failed to remit for several
months the amount given to him for payment of an obligation, was found to
have violated the Code of Professional Conduct.

Notes:
In the case of Penticostes v. Ibanez, it was held that a Barangay
Captain who is a lawyer at the same time may be administratively
disciplined if he failed to give the amount given to him for the payment of
the debt of a party in a settlement before him.

Q: Marlyn, a widow engaged the services of Atty. Romanito in order

to avert the foreclosure of several parcels of land mortgaged by her late
husband to several creditors. Atty. Romanito advised the widow to execute
in his favor deeds of sale over the properties, so that he could sell them and
generate funds to pay her creditors. The widow agreed. Atty. Romanito did
not sell the properties, but paid the mortgage creditors with his own funds,
and had the land titles registered in his name. Atty. Romanito succeeds in
averting the foreclosure. Is he administratively liable? Reasons. (2009 Bar)

A: Yes, Atty. Romanito is administratively liable. The basic facts in

this case are the same as the facts in Hernandez v. Go (450 SCRA 1
[2005]), where the Supreme Court found the lawyer to have violated
Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and disbarred
him. The Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s acts of acquiring for himself
the lots entrusted to him by his client are, by any standard, acts constituting
gross misconduct. The lawyer in that case was disbarred.

FIDELITY TO CLIENT’S CAUSE

Competence and diligence
a. Adequate protection

Q: X was indicted for murder. As he had no counsel on arraignment,

the trial court appointed Atty. A as his counsel de oficio. When Atty. A
asked X what was his stand, X said he was guilty. X thereupon pleaded
guilty. Trial was thereafter conducted. When the turn of the defense to
present evidence came, Atty. A manifested that he was not presenting any
and that he was submitting the case for decision, praying that X’s plea be
considered mitigating. Did Atty. A’s assistance or conduct approximate the
competence and diligence which the Code of Professional Responsibility
expected of him? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: No. It is the duty of defense counsel when his client desires to enter
a plea of guilty to fully acquaint himself with the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case, advise his client of his constitutional rights and
the full import of a plea of guilty, see to it that the prescribed procedure is
observed, present evidence, including possible mitigating circumstances, so
that the precise degree of his client's culpability is established and the
appropriate penalty is imposed, and thus leave no room for doubt that there
was a mistake or misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges to which
his client has pleaded guilty. Atty. A has fallen short of this required
conduct.

Notes:
It is the duty of a lawyer to fully acquaint his client of the consequence
of his plea of guilty; he must see to it that the prescribed procedure is
observed; he must advise his client of his constitutional rights; he must
present evidence including the possible mitigating circumstances.

b. Negligence

Q: Nene approached Atty. Nilo and asked him if it was alright to buy
a piece of land which Maneng was selling. What was shown by Maneng to
Nene was an Original Certificate of Title with many annotations and old
patches, to which Nene expressed suspicion. However, Atty. Nilo, desirous
of pushing through with the transaction because of the high notarial fee
promised to him, told Nene that the title was alright and that she should not
worry since he is an attorney and that he knew Maneng well. He notarized
the Deed of Sale and Nene paid Maneng P 108,000.00. It turned out that
Maneng had previously sold the same property to another person. For the
injustice done to Nene, may Atty. Nilo be disciplined? (1998 Bar)
A: Yes. Atty. Nilo is guilty of gross negligence in protecting the
interests of his client. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable
(Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility). Worse, he was negligent
because he placed his own interest in receiving a high notarial fee over and
above the interest of his client. In the case of Nadayag v. Grageda, 237
SCRA 202, which involves similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the
lawyer "should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice
permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been
engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the
Bar."
Q: May a lawyer be held liable for damages by his client for the
lawyer’s failure to file the necessary pleadings to prosecute the client’s case
and as a result of which the client suffered damages? (2014 Bar)

A: Yes, he may be held liable. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.” But attorney-client relationship, want of reasonable care and
diligence, and injury sustained by the client as the proximate result thereof,
are the prerequisites to the maintenance of an action for damages against a
lawyer.

Q:

a. State the rule on whether a client is bound by the mistake of his

counsel.

b. On account of his mistake, is counsel liable to his client for

damages? Explain. (2002 Bar)

A:
a. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer [Cabales v. fiery, 94
SCRA 374 (1979); Valerio v. Secretary of Agriculture, 7 SCRA 719(1963)].
However, when the lawyer has practically sold his client down the river or
when the negligence is so gross that the client was deprived of due process,
the client is not bound by the negligence of the lawyer [PHHC v. Tiongco,
12 SCRA 471(1964); San Miguel Corp. v. Laguesma, 236 SCRA
595(1994)].
 b. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall make him liable (Rule 18.03,
Code of Professional Responsibility). A client who suffers prejudice by
reason of his counsel’s inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his duty
may file an action for damages against him. However, there must be a
showing that had the lawyer exercised due diligence, the client under the
facts and the law would have succeeded in recovering from the adverse
party or in resisting the claim of the latter.

c. Collaborating counsel

Q: May a client hire additional counsel as collaborating counsel over

and above the objection of the original counsel? (2014, 1989 Bar)

A: Yes, the client is entitled to have as many lawyers as he can afford.

Professional courtesy, however, demands that a lawyer retained as a
collaborating counsel should at least communicate with the original counsel
before entering his appearance. On the part of the original counsel, he
should not look at the employment of a collaborating counsel as a loss of
confidence in him.

Q: Atty. A objects to the collaboration of Atty. B as proposed by

Client C in a pending case. How would A, B and C handle the situation?
(2001 Bar)

A: A, B, and C may handle the situation in the following manner:

a. "A" can offer to withdraw his services. Rule 22.01(c) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility allows a lawyer to withdraw his services if his
inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of his
client. Here, by objecting to the collaboration of Atty. B, Atty. A foresees
his inability to work with the former. “A” may with withdraw to give his
client a free hand in protecting his interest.

b. "B" should refuse to accept the case, otherwise, he may be

encroaching on the professional employment of another lawyer. A lawyer
should decline association as colleague if it is objectionable to the original
counsel, but if the lawyer first retained is relieved, another may come into
the case (Canon 7, Canons of Professional Ethics).

c. "C" the client must choose only one of the lawyers. If he wants
Atty. B as his lawyer, he should formally terminate the services of "A" so
"B" can formally enter his appearance in the case.
 REPRESENTATION WITH ZEAL WITHIN LEGAL BOUNDS

Use of fair and honest means

Q: Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law."
How far, in general terms, may a lawyer go in advocating, supporting and
defending the cause of his client in a criminal case filed against the latter?
(2003, 1997 Bar)
A: The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is simply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of
the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement
by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedure, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds
substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to
his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. (People v. Bemas,
306 SCRA 293 [1999], cited in People v. Sta. Teresa, 354 SCRA 697
[2001]). However, a lawyer shall employ only honorable and honest means
in the maintenance of his client’s cause. (Section 20, Rule 128).

Client’s fraud

Q: Atty. A discovered his client's fraud against the adverse party.

What steps should he take so that his client will secure only that which is
legally and justly due him? (2001 Bar)

A: A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal,
shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he
shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the
Rules of Court (Rule 19.02, Code of Professional Conduct).

Notes:
When a lawyer has received information that his client perpetrated
fraud upon a person or tribunal, he shall call upon the client to rectify it; if
the latter refuses, the former shall terminate their relationship.

Attorney’s Fees

a. Contingency fee arrangements

 Q: For services to be rendered by Atty. Hamilton as counsel for
Gener in a civil case involving the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with an area of 5,000 square meters, the two
of them agreed on a success fee for Atty. Hamilton of P50,000.00 plus 500
square meters of the land. The trial court ultimately rendered judgment in
favor of Gener, and the judgment became final and executory. After
receiving P50,000.00, Atty. Hamilton demanded the transfer to him of the
promised 500 square meters of the land.

Instead of complying, Gener brought an administrative complaint

charging Atty. Hamilton with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code for demanding the
delivery of a portion of the land subject of the litigation.

Is Atty. Hamilton liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility

and the Civil Code? Explain your answer. (2017, 2010 Bar)

A: No. Atty. Hamilton is not liable for violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and the Civil Code. The agreement on a success
fee of P50,000.00 and 500 sq. m. of the land involved in the case is valid.
The parties entered into a contingent fee contract that is allowed under
Canon 20, Rules 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Ethics.

A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because

the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after
the finality of a favorable judgment (Director of Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No.
L-26096 February 27, 1979).

Notes:
An agreement which allows the client to give something to his lawyer
when he won in a case is valid; it is a contingency fee which is allowed
under the Code of professional Responsibility.

Q: The spouses Manuel were the registered owners of a parcel of land

measuring about 200,000 square meters. On May 4, 2008, the spouses
Manuel sold the land for P3,500,000.00 to the spouses Rivera who were
issued a certificate of title for said land in their names. Because the spouses
Rivera failed to pay the balance of the purchase price for the land, the
spouses Manuel, through Atty. Enriquez, instituted an action on March 18,
2010 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for sum of money and/or
annulment of sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1111. The complaint in Civil
Case No. 1111 specifically alleged that Atty. Enriquez would be paid
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees on contingent basis. The RTC subsequently
promulgated its decision upholding the sale of the land to the spouses
Rivera. Atty. Enriquez timely filed an appeal on behalf of the spouses
Manuel before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found for the
spouses Manuel, declared the sale of the land to the spouses Rivera null and
void, and ordered the cancellation of the spouses Rivera’s certificate of title
for the land. The Supreme Court dismissed the spouses Rivera’s appeal for
lack of merit. With the finality of judgment in Civil Case No. 1111 on
October 20, 2014, Atty. Enriquez filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution.
Meanwhile, the spouses Rivera filed on November 10, 2014 before the
RTC a case for quieting of title against the spouses Manuel, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2222. The spouses Manuel, again through Atty. Enriquez,
filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2222 on the ground of res judicata
given the final judgment in Civil Case No. 1111.

Pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.

2222, the RTC granted on February 9, 2015 the motion for issuance of a
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1111 and placed the spouses Manuel in
possession of the land. Atty. Enriquez, based on a purported oral
agreement with the spouses Manuel, laid claim to ½ of the land, measuring
100,000.00 square meters with market value of P1,750,000.00, as his
attorney’s fees.

Atty. Enriquez caused the subdivision of the land in two equal

portions and entered into the half he appropriated for himself. Based on the
professional and ethical standards for lawyers, may Atty. Enriquez claim ½
of the land as his contingency fee? Why? (2015 Bar)

A: Atty. Enriquez may not claim ½ of the land as his contingency fee.
In the first place, a lawyer cannot charge his client a contingent fee or a
percentage of the amount recovered as his fees in the absence of an express
contract to that effect (Corpus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40424, June
30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424). There is no such contract in this case. As a matter
of fact, the claim of a purported oral agreement for a contingency fee of ½
of the land is contradicted by the allegation in the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 1111 for a contingency fee of P200,000.00 only.

Moreover, the amount claimed as contingent fee appears to be

excessive and unreasonable. The issue involved in the case was simple and
did not require extensive skill, effort and research on the part of Atty.
Enriquez.
 Furthermore, Atty. Enriquez caused the division of the land and
appropriate one half thereof, pending resolution of the motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 2222. This constitutes a violation of Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code, because the case in which the property is involved has not
yet been terminated (The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouse Cadavedo v.
Victorino T. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014).
Q: Atty. CJ handled the case for plaintiff GE against defendant XY in
an action for damages. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff GE. When a
writ of execution was issued, the sheriff levied on a 400 square meter lot of
defendant XY. Pursuant to their contingent fee contract, plaintiff GE
executed a deed of assignment in favor of Atty. CJ of one-half of the lot.
Atty. CJ accepted the assignment.

Is the contract for contingent fee valid? Explain. (2002 Bar)

A: Contract for contingent fee is a contract wherein the attorney’s fee,

usually a percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to
depend upon the success of the lawyer in enforcing or defending his
client’s right. It is a valid contract, unlike a champertous contract which is
invalid because the lawyer undertakes to shoulder the expenses of the
litigation. However, the amount of the fee agreed upon may be reduced by
the courts if it should be unconscionable. Fifty percent (50%) of what the
client might recover may or may not be unconscionable depending on the
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's
fee.
Notes:
A contract of contingency fee which depends upon the success of the
lawyer in enforcing or depending the right of his client is valid under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Q: Atty. A’s services as a lawyer were engaged by B to recover from

C certain construction materials and equipment. Because B did not have the
means of defray the expenses of litigation, he proposed to Atty. A that he
(A) shoulders all expenses of the litigation and he (B) would pay him (A) a
portion of the construction materials and equipment to be recovered as
compensation for his professional services.

May Atty. A correctly agree to such arrangement? (1999 Bar)

A: No, Atty. A may not correctly agree to such an agreement.

Such an arrangement would constitute a champertous contract which is
considered void due to public policy, because it would make him acquire a
stake in the outcome of the litigation which might lead him to place his
own interest above that of the client (Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151).
A champertous contract is one in which a lawyer undertakes to prosecute a
case, and bear all the expenses in connection therewith without right of
reimbursement, and will be paid his fees by way of a portion of the
property or amount that may be recovered, contingent on the success of his
efforts. It is different from a contingent fee contract, which is valid, in
which the lawyer will also be paid depending on the success of his efforts,
but he does not undertake to shoulder all the expenses in the case. He may
advance such expenses but always subject to reimbursement by his client.

Notes:
A contract of contingency fee is valid under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. However, in the case of Bautista v. Gonzales, it was held
that a champertous contract which the lawyer will be the one to bear all
expenses with the right of reimbursement and will share in the outcome of
the case is not valid because the lawyer may place his interest above the
interest of his client.

Q: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a sizeable parcel of

land in Quezon City against a well-known property developer on a
contingent fee basis. Laarni asked for 15% of the land that may be
recovered or 15% of whatever monetary settlement that may be received
from the property developer as her only fee contingent upon securing a
favorable final judgment or compromise settlement. Chester signed the
contingent fee agreement.

Assume the property developer settled the case after the case was decided
by the Regional Trial Court in favor of Chester for P1 Billion. Chester
refused to pay Laarni PI50 Million on the ground that it is excessive. Is the
refusal justified? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A: The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A contingent fee is
impliedly sanctioned by Rule 20.01 (f) of the CPR. A much higher
compensation is allowed as contingent fees in consideration of the risk that
the lawyer will get nothing if the suit fails. In several cases, the Supreme
Court has indicated that a contingent fee of 30% of the money or property
that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover, although the developer
settled the case, it was after the case was decided by the Regional Trial
Court in favor of Chester, which shows that Atty. Laarni has already
rendered service to the client.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Chester’s refusal to pay Atty. Laarni P150 million as attorney’s fees on the
ground that it is excessive, is justified. In the case of Sesbreno v. Court of
Appeals (245 SCRA 30 [1995]), the Supreme Court held that “contingent
fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in
order that clients may be protected from unjust charges” and that “its
validity depends on a large measure on the reasonableness of the stipulated
fees under the circumstances of each case.” Also, “stipulated attorney’s
fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud
perpetuated against the client.” Considering the circumstances that the case
was decided by settlement of the property developer, the attorney’s fee of
P150 Million would be unconscionable.
b. Attorney’s Liens

Q: M engaged the services of Atty. D to prosecute his annulment of

marriage case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After a long-drawn trial,
Atty. D was able to secure a favourable judgment from the court.
Unfortunately, M failed to pay in full the stipulated attorney’s fees of Atty.
D. How can Atty. D collect his fees from M? Discuss fully. (2014 Bar)
A: He can collect his fees either by filing a motion in the annulment of
marriage case that he handled, and to order M to pay the same, or he can
file a separate action for the recovery of his attorney’s fees. Of the two, the
first is preferable because the judge in the annulment case will be in a better
position to evaluate the amount and value of his services. In the meantime,
he may avail of the retaining lien, which is to retain the moneys and
properties of M in his possession until he is paid for his services, or a
charging lien, which is to charge the money judgment in the case for the
payment of his fees.
Q:Define an attorney's retaining lien. (2000, 1998 Bar)
A: A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the funds,
documents, and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his
possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and to
apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof (Sec. 37, Rule 38, Rules of
Court).
Q: Upon being replaced by Justice C, Atty. B, the former counsel of the
parents of the victims of the OZONE Disco tragedy, was directed to
forward all the documents in his possession to Justice C. Atty. B refused,
demanding full compensation pursuant to their written contract. Sensing
that a favorable Judgment was forthcoming, Atty. B filed a motion in court
relative to his attorney’s fees, furnishing his former clients with copies
thereof.
Is Atty. B legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn over the
documents and in filing the motion? Explain. (1998 Bar)
A: Atty. B is legally and ethically correct in refusing to turn over the
documents. He is entitled to a retaining lien which gives him the right to
retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come to his possession until his lawful fees and disbursement have been
paid (Sec. 37, Rule 138. Rules of Court. Rule 16.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Likewise, he is legally and ethically correct in filing a
motion in court relative to his fees. He is entitled to a charging lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when the records of the court rendering such judgment or
issuing such execution (ibid.)
Q: Harold secured the services of Atty. Jarencio to collect from various
debtors. Accordingly. Atty. Jarencio filed collection cases against the
debtors of Harold and in fact obtained favorable Judgments in some. Atty.
Jarencio demanded from Harold his attorney’s fees pursuant to their
agreement but Harold refused. When one of the defendants paid his
indebtedness of 20,000.00 through Atty. Jarencio, the latter refused to turn
over the money to Harold; instead, Atty. Jarencio applied the amount to his
attorney’s fees having in mind the provisions of the Civil Code on legal
compensation or set-off to justify his act.
Was Atty. Jarencio correct in refusing to turn over to his client the amount
he collected? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar)
A: A lawyer has a retaining lien which entitled him to retain
possession of a client’s document,
money or other property which come into the hands of the attorney
professionally, until the general balance due him for professional services
is paid. Under Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the attorney
cannot be compelled to surrender the documents in his possession without
prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied.
However, Atty. Jarencio here cannot appropriate the sum of 20,000.00. If
there is a dispute between him and Harold as to the amount of the fees that
he can collect, what he should do if Harold disputes the amount of the fees
he is entitled, he must file an action for the recovery of his fee or record a
charging lien so that the court can fix the amount to which he is entitled.

Q: The vendor filed a case against the vendee for the annulment of
the sale of a piece of land. Assume the vendee obtained a summary
judgment against the vendor. Would the counsel for the defendant vendee
be entitled to enforce a charging lien? Explain. (2008 Bar)

A: A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for payment of

attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua nona judgment for money
and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by
the attorney in favor of his client (Metropolitan Bankv. Court of
Appeals,181 SCRA 367 [1990]). A summary judgment against the vendor
in this case only means that his complaint was dismissed. This is not a
judgment for payment of money, hence, a charging lien cannot attach.
However, if the judgment should include a money judgment in favor of the
vendee on his counterclaim, a charging lien can properly be enforced.
Notes:
If a lawyer is not paid of his lawful fees by his client, he has the right
to a charging lien upon all judgement to satisfy his money claim against
his client.

Q: Differentiate “retaining lien” from “charging lien” (2016 Bar)

A: A retaining lien gives the lawyer the right to retain the funds,
documents and papers of the client which have lawfully come into his
possession, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid. A
charging lien is a lien upon all judgments for payment of sum of money
and executions thereof, to ensure payment of his fees and disbursements in
the said case.

A retaining lien is a passive lien; the lawyer is not required to perform

any act except to hold on to the client’s funds, documents and papers, until
his fees and disbursements are paid. A charging lien is an active lien; the
lawyer is required to file a motion in court, with copy served on the
adverse party, to have a statement of his claim to such fees and
disbursements charged or attached to the decision in such case and
executions thereof.

A retaining lien is general lien; it may be resorted to in order to

secure payment of the lawyer’s fees in all the cases he has handled and
services he has rendered to the client. A charging lien is a special lien; it
can be utilized for the purpose of collecting only the unpaid fees and
disbursements of the lawyer in the case where the judgment for a sum of
money may be secured.
Notes:
A retaining lien is the right of a lawyer who was not paid of his lawful
fees by his client to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client
until his lawful fees are paid.

On the other hand, a charging lien is the right of a lawyer who is not
paid of his client to have a lien upon all judgments for the satisfaction of
his lawful fees.

Q:
a. Explain the doctrine of quantum meruit in determining the amount
of attorney’s fees.

b. Identify the factors to be considered in determining attorney’s fees

on a quantum meruit basis.

c. Fees and controversies with clients (Quantum Meruit) (2015, 2014,

2007, 1998 Bar)

A:
a. Quantum meruit means as much as the services of a lawyer are
worth. Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is
authorized when (1) there is no express contract for the payment of
attorney’s fees; (2) although there is a contract for attorney’s fees, the fees
stipulated are found unconscionable by the court; (3) the contract for
attorney’s fees is void due to formal defects of execution; (4) the lawyer
was not able to finish the case for justifiable cause; (5) the lawyer and the
client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; and (6) the client
dismissed his counsel or the latter withdrew therefrom, for valid reasons.

b. The factors are those set in Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), as follows:

i. the time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
ii. the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
 iii. the importance of the subject matter;
iv. the skill demanded;
v. the probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
vi. the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees
of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
vii. the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;
viii. the contingency or certainty of compensation;
ix. the character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
x. the professional standing of the lawyer.

Notes:
Quantum meruit means what one has earned or as much as he has
earned. In simpler terms, it refers to the actual value of the services
rendered or performed.

Quantum meruit can be determined by knowing the following factors:

1) The lawyer has a good standing:
2) The case demands skill;
3) The question involved is difficult;
4) The charge should be based on the customary charge or schedule of
fees of the IBP;
5) The charge should be based on the time spent.

Champerty

Q: Define champerty. (2017, 2000 Bar)

A: Champerty is any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation

in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the
judgment. It is contrary to public policy as it violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client (Spouses Cadavedo v.
Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014).

Notes:
Champerty is a contract between a client and a lawyer who agrees to
pay all expenses of litigation and receives share from the proceeds of the
judgement. It is not valid because it encourages litigation.
Moreover, it is contrary to public policy.
Q: A inherited a parcel of land situated in Batasan Hills which is
occupied by informal settlers. He wants to eject the occupants, but he has
no financial means to pursue the ejectment case. He contracted the services
of Atty. B, who agreed to defray all the expenses of the suit on the
condition that he will be paid one-half (1/2) of the property to be recovered
as his compensation.

What is the kind of attorney’s fees? Can Atty. B enforce this contract
against A? What are the respective remedies relative to the collection of
attorney’s fees, if any, of A and Atty. B against each other? (2014, 2010,
1988 Bar)

A: This is a champertous fee agreement because Atty. B agreed to

defray all the expenses of the action and will be paid only if he is
successful in recovering A’s property. Atty. B cannot enforce it because it
is contrary to public policy and the ethics of the legal profession. The
remedy of A is to file an action to have the agreement declared null and
void, or simply to refuse to pay attorney’s fees to Atty. B on the basis of
the said agreement. On the other hand, Atty. B will still be entitled to
collect attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. He may bring an action
to collect such fees.

Q: Discuss the propriety of a lawyer filing a suit against his client

concerning his fees. (1998 Bar)
A: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer shall avoid controversies with his clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.” The legal profession is not a money-making trade but a
form of public service. Lawyers should avoid giving the impression that
they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish Union and National Insurance Co.,
76 Phil. 325). It might even turn out to be unproductive for him for
potential clients are likely to avoid a lawyer with a reputation of suing his
clients.

Concepts of Attorney’s fees

Extraordinary concept

Q: A real estate company, elated over the decision in a case

regarding a dispute over a personal matter between its top sales
representative and his neighbor, gifted Atty. O, who represented its sales
representative in the litigation, with a 240-square-meter lot in its newly
developed subdivision. The case handled by Atty. O had nothing to do
with the sales representative in the litigation, with a 240 square-meter lot
in its newly developed subdivision. The case handled by Atty. O had
nothing to do with the sales representative's work for the real estate
company. The latter's offer of the lot, which Atty. O accepted, was in
consideration of its sales representative’s being the firm's Number One
salesman. Was there a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by Atty. O when he accepts the 240 square-meter lot? (1997 Bar)

A: Rule 20.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that a lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the
client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interests, rebate of
forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.

There should be no room for suspicion on the part of the client that
his lawyer is receiving compensation in connection with the case from
third persons with hostile interests (Report of IBP Committee, p. 112).
Even if the secret compensation comes from a friendly person, if the act is
discovered, it is bound to create dissension in the client-lawyer
relationship. Worse, the lawyer will be able to enrich himself by receiving
more than what is due him as attorney’s fees (Pineda. Legal & Judicial
Ethics, 1995 ed. p. 243).
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
receive any fees or compensation except from his client. However, if his
client consents, then he can accept such compensation or gift. The purpose
of this prohibition is to prevent suspicion.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The gift of the real estate company does not come from the adverse
party, hence, there is no violation of the lawyer is duty of loyalty to his
clients. The property given was not his client's property involved in the
litigation. Hence, it does not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code. The
lawyer's acceptance of the gift is proper. However, it would be better if he
informs his client.

Q: Deciding a case for malicious prosecution, Judge Sales awarded

attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, in addition to exemplary
damages, to the plaintiff.

a. Did the judge act within his discretion in awarding attorney's fees?

b. As counsel for the plaintiff, are you entitled to receive the

attorney's fees thus awarded in addition to your stipulated legal fees? (1994
Bar)

A:
 a. A party may recover attorney's fees in cases of malicious
prosecution against him in an action for damages against the party
responsible therefore (Art. 2208 (3), Civil Code). But he must prove not
only that he was acquitted in the criminal action, but that the person who
charged him knowingly made a false statement of facts to induce the
prosecutor to prosecute or that the institution of the criminal action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate him and to cast upon him
dishonor and disgrace.

b. No. Attorney’s fees in the concept or as an item of damages is an

indemnity for damages sustained by the client, and belongs to him.
Notes:
When is a person entitled to Attorney’s fees?
Under the Civil Code, in cases of malicious prosecution, the judge
may award attorney’s fee. But such fees belong to the client, and not to the
lawyer.

Q: A, after taking his oath as a lawyer in 1985, was maliciously

charged with the crime of seduction by Amor, his former girlfriend. Her
parents instigated the filing of the case. A appeared for and defended
himself. In the decision acquitting him, the court explicitly stated that he
was a victim of malicious prosecution. A then filed a complaint for
damages and attorney’s against Amor and her parents. A likewise appeared
for himself in the case. Can her recover attorney’s fees? (1991 Bar)

A: No. Attorney A is not entitled to attorney's fees. He may, however,

be entitled to attorney’s fees in the form of damages upon proof of bad
faith of the defendant and a definite ruling be made by the court on the
claim.

Notes:
The Civil Code explicitly provides that a person can recover
attorney’s fees in a criminal case of malicious prosecution. The court has
explicitly stated that the attorney is victim of malicious prosecution.
Therefore, Attorney A can recover attorney’s fees.

OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE SECRETS AND CONFIDECES OF

CLIENTS
PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
Prohibited disclosures and use
Q:
A. Brando & Luzon Law Office had a retainer agreement with
Gregory, a businessman with shady connections. Gregory was recently
charged in the RTC in Manila with money laundering in relation to an
illegal drugs syndicate using Cable Co., his holding company, as its
money-laundering conduit. The members of the Brando & Luzon Law
Office assigned to handle Gregory's account, including yourself, were
implicated in the money laundering case for their role in the incorporation
of Cable Co. and in the active management of its business affairs.

In a bid to fortify the case against Gregory and the others, the public
prosecutor approaches you (as the least guilty person who will qualify for
a discharge as a state witness) and offers to make you a state witness.
Should you accept the offer? Explain your answer.

B. Under the facts of the preceding question, assume that you had
resigned from the Brando & Luzon Law Office prior to the filing of the
money laundering case against Gregory and the others, and that you were
not implicated in the case. However, you had assisted in handling the
Cobra Co. account during your time with the law firm. Cobra Co. was
largely owned by Cable Co.

The public prosecutor handling the case against Gregory and the
others asks you, as a former member of the Brando & Luzon Law Office,
to help strengthen the case for the Government, and hints that you may be
implicated in the case if you do not cooperate. What is your legal and
ethical course of action? Explain your answer. (2017, 2013 Bar)

A:
A. No. The information acquired involving the criminal case against
Gregory is covered by the privileged communications rule. Rule 15.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.” There being a lawyer-client
relationship between the parties, the lawyer cannot serve as a state witness
and disclose the information obtained from his client.

B. Decline to testify against the defendants and to provide evidence in

the case as the attorney-client privilege lasts even beyond the termination
of the relationship.

The duty of a lawyer to preserve his client’s secrets and confidence

outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues
even after the client’s death (Mercado v. Vitriolo, A.C. No. 5108, May 26,
2005).
Notes:
What is a privilege communication and when does it last?
Under the Rules of Court, a privilege communication is a
communication, among others, between a client and a lawyer who is
prohibited from divulging the same without the consent of his client.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privilege communication with respect to matter
disclosed to him by his client.
In the case of Mercado v. Vitriolo, it was held that a lawyer has a
duty to preserve the secrets and confidence of his client until the death of
the latter.
Q: A, who is charged in Court with estafa for misappropriating funds
entrusted to him by B, consulted Atty. C about the case with the intention
of engaging his services as defense counsel. Because A could not afford to
pay the fee that Atty. C was charging him, A engaged the services of
another counsel, Atty. D. At the trial of the case for estafa against A the
prosecutor announced in open court that his next witness was Atty. C.
whom he was calling to the witness stand.
Counsel for A. Atty. D, vigorously opposed the prosecutor's move on the
ground that Atty. C may not be called as a witness for the prosecution as
he might disclose a would be client's confidence and secret. Asked by the
presiding Judge what would be the nature of Atty. C's testimony, the
prosecutor answered it has something to do with how A obtained from B
the funds that the latter received from the former but failed to account for.
Thereupon, Atty. A vigorously opposed the prosecutor's motion. If you
were the Judge, how would you rule on the matter? (1999 Bar)

A: If I were the judge, I will not allow Atty. C to take the witness
stand. When A consulted Atty. C about his case, a lawyer-client
relationship was established between them. It does not matter that A did
not eventually engage his services because of his fees; such relationship
has already been created (Hilado v. David, 84 Phil 569). A lawyer shall be
bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect to matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client (Rule 15.02 Code of Professional
Responsibility). The rule on privileged communication provides that an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him (Sec. 21 [b], Rule 130, Rules of
Court). The prosecutor has announced that Atty. C will be asked about
how A obtained from B the funds that he failed to account for. Atty. C's
knowledge of such matter could have come only from A.

COMMENT: There seems to be a typographical error in the last

sentence which refers to Atty. A. Perhaps, the examiner intended to refer
to simply A or to his counsel Atty. D. It is recommended that the use by
the candidate of Atty. A should not detract from the appreciation of his
answer.

Q: Christine was appointed counsel de oficio for Zuma, who was

accused of raping his own daughter. Zuma pleaded not guilty but thereafter
privately admitted to Christine that he did commit the crime charged. Can
Christine disclose the admission of Zuma to the court? Why or why not?
(2008 Bar)

A: Christine cannot disclose the admission of Zuma to the Court. If

she does so, she will violate her obligation to preserve confidences or
secrets of her client (Canon 21, Rule 21.02, CPR). The privileged
communication between lawyer and client may be used as a shield to
defend crimes already committed.

Q: When Atty. Romualdo interviewed his client, Vicente, who is

accused of murder, the latter confessed that he killed the
victim in cold blood. Vicente also said that when he takes the witness
stand, he will deny having done so. Is Atty. Romualdo obliged, under his
oath as lawyer, to inform the judge (a) that his client is guilty? (2009 Bar)

A: Atty. Romualdo cannot reveal to the judge that Vicente is guilty.

He is bound to keep what Vicente told him in confidence, because that is
an admission of a crime already committed.

Disclosure, when allowed

Q: When Atty. Romualdo interviewed his client, Vicente, who is

accused of murder, the latter confessed that he killed the victim in cold
blood. Vicente also said that when he takes the witness stand, he will deny
having done so. Is Atty. Romualdo obliged, under his oath as lawyer, to
inform the judge that (b) his client will commit perjury on the witness
stand? Explain. (2009 Bar)

A: Atty. Romualdo can reveal to the judge that Vicente will commit
perjury on the witness stand. This is already a revelation of a crime still to
be committed, and that lies outside the mantle of privileged
communication.
Notes:
 A privilege communication rule between a client and his lawyer does
not preclude the latter to reveal the matter communicated by the client if it
involves a crime to be committed.

Q: Atty. Serafin Roto is the Corporate Secretary of a construction

corporation that has secured a multi-million infrastructure project from the
government. In the course of his duties as corporate secretary, he learned
from the company president that the corporation had resorted to bribery to
secure the project and had falsified records to cut implementing costs after
the award of the project.

The government filed a civil action to annul the infrastructure contract

and has subpoenaed Atty. Roto to testify against the company president
and the corporation regarding the bribery. Atty. Roto moved to quash the
subpoena, asserting that lawyer-client privilege prevents him from
testifying against the president and the corporation.

Resolve the motion to quash. (2013 Bar)

A: Motion denied. The motion should be denied because Atty. Roto

did not learn of the bribery and falsification in connection with a lawyer-
client relation. Being a corporate secretary does not create a lawyer -
client relation because membership to the Bar is not a requirement to
perform the functions of a corporate secretary. Consequently, Atty. Roto
does not owe any obligation of confidentiality to the corporation.

Atty. Roto may be compelled to testify. As an officer of the court, a

“lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice” (Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 12). Furthermore, “a lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court” (Ibid., Canon 10).
Notes:
The information was not acquired by virtue of attorney-client
relationship. Thus, Atty. Roto may be compelled to testify because he is
obliged to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Motion Granted.It is true that being a corporate secretary does not
necessarily constitute a lawyer-client relationship. However, Atty. Roto
may be considered in the practice of law if part of his duties as a corporate
secretary is to give legal advice to or prepares legal documents for the
corporation. Thus a lawyer-client relationship may have been constituted
between Atty. Roto and the corporation. Consequently, it is his duty as an
attorney “to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client” (Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Sec. 24, par. b, paraphrasing and arrangement supplied).

Atty. Roto learned from the company president of the bribery and
falsification, while Atty. Roto was in the course of his performance of his
duties as corporate secretary. Thus, he could not be examined on that
matter without the consent of his client. [Ibid., Rule 130, Sec. 24(b)].
Notes:
The answer in the alternative is misplaced.
Q: A mayor charged with Homicide engaged your services as his
lawyer. Since there is only one witness to the incident, the mayor disclosed
to you his plan to kill the lone witness through a contrived vehicular
accident.

a. What are the moral and legal obligations of an attorney to the

mayor and to the authorities?

b. Should the killing push through and are you certain that the mayor
is the one responsible, are you under obligation to disclose to the
authorities what was confided to you? Is this not a privileged
communication between client and attorney? (1998 Bar)

A:
a. It is the duty of an attorney to divulge the communication of his
client as to his announced intention to commit a crime to the proper
authorities to prevent the act or to protect the person against whom it is
threatened.

b. Public policy and the lawyer's duty to counsel obedience to the law
forbid that an attorney should assist in the commission of a crime or permit
the relation of attorney and client to conceal a wrongdoing. He owes it to
himself and to the public to use his best efforts to restrain his client from
doing any unlawful act and if, notwithstanding his advise, his client
proceeds to execute the illegal deed, he may disclose it or be examined as
to any communication relating thereto. There is privileged communication
only as to crimes already committed before its communication to the
lawyer.
Notes:
A lawyer shall assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Thus, the lawyer in this case is obliged to reveal to the authorities
about the contrived killing to be perpetrated by his client.

Q: In a prosecution for murder against a ranking army officer, the

latter engaged the services of Atty. Carlos Malilin, a well-known trial
lawyer, to whom the officer in one of their conferences disclosed a plan to
“eliminate” or “salvage”— i.e., kill or otherwise cause to disappear— the
only witness, a fellow military officer, through a contrived traffic or
highway accident.

a. What are the legal and moral obligations of Atty. Carlos Malillin to
his client and to the authorities, under the given circumstances?

b. Should the planned “accident” take place and the only witness for
the prosecution be killed as a result, is Atty. Carlos Malillin under any
obligation to disclose to the authorities the plan that his client had
mentioned to him as above mentioned? Reasons. (1988, 1987 Bar)

A:
a. Attorney Malillin has the moral and legal obligation to advise the
army officer not to execute his plan. If the accused army officer does not
abide by his advise, Atty. Malillin should withdraw from the case.

b. Atty. Malillin has the obligation to testify in said case if he is called

upon by the Court to do so. The obligation of the lawyer to keep the
secrets of his client obtained in the course of his employment covers only
lawful purposes.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is obliged to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Withdrawal of services

Q: Give three instances when a lawyer is allowed to withdraw

his/her services. (2015, 1997, 1988 Bar)

A: (Any three of the following:)

1. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is handling;
2. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of
these canons and rules;
3. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the
best interest of the client;
4. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it
difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively;
5. When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or
fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
6. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.
7. Other similar cases.
Notes:
 The grounds that allow lawyers to withdraw his services are:
1) The client would like to pursue immoral or unlawful conduct in
relation to the matter which the lawyer is handling;
2) The client does not pay the lawyer of his lawful fees;
3) The client would like to pursue conduct which is violative of the
Canons, Code of Professional Responsibility, among other.
4) The physical and mental condition of the lawyer will render him
ineffective to handle the case;
5) The lawyer is elected or appointed to public office which disallows
him to engage in the practice of law.

Q: B hired Atty. Z to file a replevin case against C for an agreed

acceptance fee of P30,000.00 which was evidenced by a written contract.
After the complaint was filed by Atty. Z, B terminated his services and
hired a new lawyer for the same amount of attorney’s fees. How much
attorney’s fees is Atty. Z entitled? (2014 Bar)

A: Atty. Z is entitled to the entire amount of the attorney’s fees agreed

upon because his services were terminated by the client without just cause
(Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, a client may terminate the services of a
counsel at will. But if he terminates the services of a lawyer without
justifiable cause, he shall be liable to the full compensation of the lawyer if
the contract of employment is reduced to writing.
Q: Atty. Bravo represents Carlos Negar (an insurance agent for
Dormir Insurance Co.) in a suit filed by insurance claimant Andy Limot
who also sued Dormir Insurance. The insurance policy requires the
insured/claimant to give a written notice to the insurance company or its
agent within 60 days from the occurrence of the loss.

Limot testified during the trial that he had mailed the notice of the
loss to the insurance agent, but admitted that he lost the registry receipt so
that he did not have any documentary evidence of the fact of mailing and
of the timeliness of the mailed notice. Dormir Insurance denied liability,
contending that the timely notice had not been given either to the company
or its agent. Atty. Bravo’s client, agent Negar, testified and confirmed that
he never received any notice.

A few days after Negar testified, he admitted to Atty, Bravo that he

had lied when he denied receipt of Limot’s notice, he did receive the notice
by mail but immediately shredded it to defeat Limot’s claim.
If you were Atty. Bravo, what would you do in light of your client’s
disclosure that he perjured himself when he testified? (2013 Bar)
 A: If I were Atty. Bravo, I shall promptly call upon Carlo Negar, my
client, to rectify his perjured testimony by recanting the same before the
court.

Should he refuse or fail to do so, I shall then terminate my

relationship with him (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 19,
Rule 19.02) stating that with his having committed perjury, he pursued an
illegal conduct in connection with the case (Ibid., Canon 22, Rule 22.01).
Since my client Limot refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained
as a result of his perjury, I should promptly inform the injured person or
his counsel, so that they may take the appropriate steps (Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 41).

Finally, as part of my duty to do no falsehood, nor consent to the

doing of any in court (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 10,
Rule 10.01, and the Attorney’s oath). I shall file a manifestation with the
court attaching thereto the notice of termination as Limot’s counsel.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer who has
received an information that his client has perpetrated fraud against a
person or tribunal shall call upon his client to rectify the fraud. If his client
fails to do so, he shall terminate his services with such client. Moreover,
this obligation stems from the lawyer’s oath which states that a lawyer
shall do no falsehood or consent to the doing of the same in any court.

Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception of evidence for
the defense, the defendant and his counsel had a conference where the
client directed the lawyer to present as principal defense witnesses two (2)
persons whose testimonies were personally known to the lawyer to have
been perjured. The lawyer informed his client that he refused to go along
with the unwarranted course of action proposed by the defendant. But the
client insisted on his directive, or else he would not pay the agreed
attorney’s fees.

When the case was called for hearing the next morning, the lawyer
forthwith moved in open court that he be relieved as counsel for the
defendant. Both the defendant and the plaintiffs counsel objected to the
motion.

Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer legally justified in

seeking withdrawal from the case? Why or why not? Reason briefly. (2004
Bar)
 A: Yes, he is justified. Under Rule 22.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw his services "if the client insists
that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules". The
insistence of the client that the lawyer present witnesses whom he
personally knows to have been perjured, will expose him to criminal and
civil liability and violate his duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.

Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance as counsel for

the accused Y after the prosecution rested its case. The reason for the
withdrawal of Atty. X was the failure of accused Y to affix his conformity
to the demand of Atty. X for increase in attorney’s fees. Is the ground for
withdrawal justified? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01 (e) of
the Code of Professional responsibility provides that a lawyer may
withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for
his services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement. In this case, the
client has not failed to pay the lawyer’s fees or to comply with the retainer
agreement. He has only refused to agree with the lawyer’s demand for an
increase in his fees. It is his right to refuse; that is part of his freedom of
contract.

Notes:
It can be argued that for failure of the client to agree to the demand of
increase in compensation, the mental condition of the lawyer renders him
ineffective to pursue the cause of his client. Therefore, he should be
allowed to terminate his services.

Q: Atty. Jessa was the counsel for Mr. Nolan, a cantankerous

millionaire, in the latter's personal case. Soon after the case was submitted
for decision, Mr. Nolan withdrew the files from Atty. Jessa and informed
her that he was engaging another lawyer. On that same day, a copy of the
decision in the case was received by Atty. Jessa but she did not do
anything anymore with the decision. She did not also file a withdrawal of
her appearance. Mr. Nolan's new counsel did not file any notice of his
appearance. By the time Mr. Nolan found out about the adverse decision,
his period to appeal had lapsed. Was the service of the decision on Atty.
Jessa still effective? Explain your answer. (2017, 2012 bar)

A: Yes. The service of decision to Atty. Jessa is still effective. Atty.

Jessa is still considered the counsel of record until his withdrawal of
appearance has been actually filed and granted.
Notes:
 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall cease to
be come the counsel of his client if his withdrawal of appearance has been
filed and approved. Before such approval, he is still the counsel of his
client so the service of decision upon that lawyer is effective.

Q: State the rule on (a) the right of the client to dismiss his lawyer
and (b) the prerogative of a lawyer to withdraw as counsel. (1998,1994,
1989 Bar)

A:
a. A client has the right to dismiss his lawyer at any time, with or
without just cause. The existence or non-existence of just cause is material
only for determining the right of the lawyer to compensation for services
rendered. The client's right to terminate the lawyer's services springs from
the strictly personal and highly confidential nature of the relationship
between the lawyer and the client. Once the client loses confidence in his
lawyer, he has the right to dismiss him.

b. On the other hand, the lawyer does not have an unqualified right to
withdraw as counsel. As an officer of the court, he may not withdraw or be
permitted to withdraw as counsel if such withdrawal will work injustice to
a client or frustrate the ends of justice. A lawyer may withdraw at any time
with his client's written consent. Without such consent, he may withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances (Canon 22, Code of Professional Responsibility).
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause. If the client and his lawyer is
always in disagreement with regards to the case at hand, the mental
condition of the lawyer may render him ineffective to defend the cause of
his client. Thus, he should be allowed to terminate his services.

SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

(RULE 139-B, RULES OF COURT)
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS

SUI GENERIS

Sui generis means of its/his/her/their own kind- unique.

 Q: Is the defense of Atty. R in a disbarment complaint for
immorality filed by his paramour P that P is in pari delicto material or
a ground for exoneration? Explain. (2010 Bar)

A: The defense of in pari delicto is immaterial in an administrative

case which is sui generis. The administrative case is about the lawyer’s
conduct, not the woman’s (Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 [1956]; Po
Cham v. Pizarro, 467 SCRA 1 [2005]; Marjorie F. Samaniego v. Atty.
Andrew V. Ferrer, 555 SCRA 1 [2008]).

Q: Arabella filed a complaint for disbarment against her estranged

husband Atty. P on the ground of immorality and use of illegal drugs.

After Arabella presented evidence and rested her case before the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, she
filed an Affidavit of Desistance and motion to dismiss the complaint, she
and her husband having reconciled for the sake of their children.

You are the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP. Bearing in mind

that the family is a social institution which the State is duty-bound to
preserve, what will be your action on Arabella’s motion to dismiss the
complaint? (2010 Bar)

A: I would still deny the motion to dismiss. The general rule is that
“no investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same unless the Supreme
Court motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with
the proceedings. An administrative investigation of a lawyer is sui generis,
neither a civil nor criminal proceeding. An affidavit of desistance has no
place in it.

Q: A proceeding for disbarment is considered sui generis, explain

briefly, giving at least five (5) reasons in support of your answer. (2002
Bar)

A: A disbarment proceeding is sui generis or a class by itself, because

of the following reasons:

a. It Is neither a civil nor a criminal proceeding;

b. Double jeopardy cannot be availed of as a defense

 c. It can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or by the
IBP;
d. It can proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant;
e. It is imprescriptible;
f. It is confidential;
g. It is in itself due process.

Q: Alleging that Atty. Malibu seduced her when she was only sixteen
(16) years old, which resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a baby girl,
Miss Magayon filed a complaint for his disbarment seven years after the
alleged seduction was committed.

Atty. Malibu contended that, considering the period of delay, the

complaint filed against him can no longer be entertained much less
prosecuted because the alleged offense has already prescribed.

Is Atty. Malibu’s contention tenable or not? Reason briefly. (2017,

2004 Bar)

A: No. Atty. Malibu’s contention is not tenable. The ordinary statute

of limitations has no application to disbarment proceedings (Calo v.
Degamo, A.C. No. 516, June 27, 1967). Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. They are neither civil nor criminal proceedings. Its
purpose is not to punish the individual lawyer but to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard of their oath of office proves them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Unlike
ordinary proceedings, it is not subject to the defense of prescription.

Q: C filed a verified administrative complaint against Atty. D. In the

course of the investigation, C presented an affidavit of desistance which
she identified on the witness stand. What course of action should the
investigator take? Explain. (2000 Bar)

A: The investigator should continue with the investigation. A

disbarment proceeding is sui generis, neither a civil nor criminal action. As
such, a desistance by the complainant is unimportant. The case may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant
(Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]). If the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred regardless of the
desistance of the complainant. Of course, if the complainant refuses to
testify and the charges cannot then be substantiated, the court will have no
alternative but to dismiss the case.
Notes:
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, desistance of the
complainant shall not interrupt or terminate the investigation for
disbarment because it is sui generis.

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT

Q: What are the grounds for disbarment or suspension from

office of an attorney? (2015 Bar)

A: Under Sec. 27, Rule 138, the grounds for suspension or disbarment
of a lawyer are “any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party or to a cause without authority to do
so.” The practice of soliciting cases for the purposes of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers constitutes malpractice.

Q: Atty. Forma is a member of the Philippine Bar. He went to New

York City, took the New York State Bar, and passed the same. He then
practiced in New York City. One of his American clients filed a case for
disbarment against him for pocketing the money which was entrusted to
him as payment for the filing fee and other incidental expenses of his
damage suit. Atty. Forma was later disbarred for dishonesty. Disheartened,
Atty. Forma came back to the Philippines and practiced as a lawyer.

Will his disbarment in New York be used against him for

purposes of disbarment proceedings here in the Philippines? (2014,
2006, 2002 Bar)
A: Atty. Forma may be disbarred in the Philippines if the ground for
his disbarment in New York is also a ground for disbarment in this
country. But he is still entitled to due process of law, and the foreign
court’s judgment against him only constitutes prima facie evidence of
unethical conduct as a lawyer. He is entitled to be given an opportunity to
defend himself in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule
139 of the Revised Rules of Court (In Re: Suspension from the Practice of
Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon Maquera, B.M. 793, July 30,
2004; Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
Notes:
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer may be disbarred in
the Philippines if he was disbarred in a foreign country provided the
ground for disbarment is the same in both countries. Thus, Atty. Forma
may be disbarred in the Philippines because the crime of qualified theft is
also a ground for disbarment in the Philippines because it involves moral
turpitude.

Q: Cliff and Greta were law school sweethearts. Cliff became a

lawyer, but Greta dropped out. One day, Cliff asked Greta to sign a
marriage contract. The following day, Cliff showed Greta the document
already signed by an alleged solemnizing officer and two witnesses. Cliff
then told Greta that they were already married and Greta consented to go
on a honeymoon. Thereafter, the couple cohabited and begot a child. Two
years later, Cliff left Greta and married a Venezuelan beauty. Incensed,
Greta filed a disbarment complaint against Cliff. Will the case prosper?
Explain. (2009 Bar)

A: The disbarment case will prosper. In the case of Cabrera v.

Agustin (106 Phil. 256 [1959]), a lawyer who deceived a woman to
believe that they were already married after they had signed an application
for a marriage license, and afterwards took advantage of her belief to
satisfy his lust, until she bore him a child, was considered by the Supreme
Court to be lacking in integrity and good moral character to remain a
member of the bar.
Q: Atty. Walasunto has been a member of the Philippine Bar for
twenty (20) years but has never plied his profession as a lawyer. His
sole means of livelihood is selling and buying real estate. In one of his
transactions as a real estate broker, he issued a bouncing check. He
was criminally prosecuted and subsequently convicted for violating
B.P. Big. 22. In the disbarment proceedings filed against him, Atty.
Walasunto contended that his conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22
was not a valid ground for disciplinary action against a member of the
bar. He further argued that his act in issuing the check was done in
relation to his calling as a real estate broker and not in relation to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer.
Are the contentions of Atty. Walasunto meritorious or not? Reason.
(2004, 1992 Bar)
A: No. His contentions are not meritorious. In the first place, a ground for
disbarment is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court), and the violation of B.P. 22 is considered to be
a crime involving moral turpitude (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692
[1990]). In the second place, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.” Additionally, Rule 1.01 of the same Code provides that
“a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Q: The agreement between the estranged husband and wife provided
for, among others, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains,
custody of the children, and support for thechildren. In the same
agreement, the couple waived the right to prosecute each other for
bigamy, adultery, concubinage and whatever acts of infidelity. There
was also a condonation provision. The agreement was prepared and
notarized by a lawyer who was the best man at the wedding. What are
the liabilities, if any, of this lawyer? Explain your answer. (1989 Bar)
A: The document executed by the spouses is immoral and contrary to law.
The lawyer who drafted and notarized all said documents committed
malpractice and can be disbarred or suspended. Although the principal
duty of the notary public is to ascertain the identity of the parties and the
voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to
guard against any illegal or immoral agreement.
Proceedings
Q: A disbarment complaint against a lawyer was referred by the
Supreme Court to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court for
investigation, report and recommendation. On the date set for the
hearing of the complaint, the Judge had the case called for trial in
open court and proceeded to receive evidence for the complainant.
What would you have done if you were the counsel for the respondent-
lawyer? Why? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: I would object to the holding of a trial in public. Disciplinary
proceedings against an attorney are confidential in nature until its
termination. The professional success of a lawyer depends almost entirely
on his good reputation. If that is tarnished, it is difficult to restore the same
(Ibanez v. Vina, 107 SCRA 607 [1981]). To avoid the unnecessary ruin of
a lawyer’s name, disbarment proceedings are directed to be confidential
until their final determination (Sec. 18, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).
Q: Atty. D was required by Judge H of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for shouting invectives at the opposing counsel and
harassing his witness. Assuming that there was sufficient cause or
ground, may Judge H suspend Atty. D from the practice of law? If
Judge H finds that the actuations of Atty. D are grossly unethical and
unbecoming of a member of the bar, may Judge H disbar Atty. D
instead?
Explain your answer. (2014 Bar)
A: Under Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a Regional Trial
Court may suspend a lawyer from the practice of law for any of the causes
provided in Section 27, until furtheraction of the Supreme Court. But it
may not disbar him, for only the Supreme Court can disbar a lawyer
pursuant to its constitutional power to admit persons to the practice of law.
Q: Atty. Hyde, a bachelor, practices law in the Philippines. On long
weekend, he dates beautiful actresses in Hong Kong. Kristine, a
neighbor in the Philippines, filed with the Supreme Court an
administrative complaint against the lawyer because of sex videos
uploaded through the internet showing Atty. Hyde’s sordid dalliance
with the actresses in Hong Kong. In his answer, Atty. Hyde (1)
questions the legal personality and interest of Kristine to institute the
complaint and(2) insists that he is a bachelor and the sex videos relate
to his private life which is outside public scrutiny and have nothing to
do with his law practice.
Rule on the validity of Atty. Hyde’s defenses. (2009 Bar)
A:
a. The legal personality and interest of Kristine to initiate the complaint for
disbarment is immaterial. A disbarment proceedings is sui generis, neither
a civil nor a criminal proceeding. Its sole purpose is to determine whether
or not a lawyer is still deserving to be a member of the bar. In a real sense,
Kristine is not a plaintiff; hence, interest on her part is not required.

b. Atty. Hyde’s second defense is untenable. His duty not to engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01 of the
CPR, as well as his duty not to engage in scandalous conduct to the
discredit of the legal profession under Rule 7.03, is applicable to his
private as well as to his professional life.

Q: Y hired Attorney X to represent him in a collection case he filed

against Z. The parties later on agreed to settle the case and Z turned
over to Attorney X the amount of P25,000.00 as partial settlement of
his obligation. Attorney X kept the money. Y, upon learning of
Attorney X’s action, filed a disbarment case against the latter before
the Supreme Court, which in turn, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP Commissioner tasked to investigate the case reviewed all the
pleadings submitted by Y and Attorney X and their respective
witnesses, and promptly made a report recommending that Attorney
X be suspended for six months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Attorney X
assailed his suspension on the ground of an impingement on his right
to due process. Is Attorney X's contention sustainable? Explain. (2003
Bar)
A: There is no impingement on Attorney X’s right to due process. The IBP
Commissioner tasked to investigate the case reviewed all the pleadings of
the parties and their respective witnesses. This implies thatAtty. A was
given an opportunity to present his side. Due process has been satisfied.
This is especially true if the principle of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
(However, it may be noted that the IBP Board of Governors is not
authorized to impose the penalty of suspension).
Q: A engaged the services of Atty. B to defend him in a case for
collection of sum of money that was brought against him in the
Municipal Trial Court by D. Despite notice of the scheduled dates of
hearing, Atty. B failed to appear much less to inform A about it. The
case was decided against A. It was only when the adverse judgment
was being executed against him that A learned he had lost the case.
When he went to see counsel, Atty. B put up the excuse that he was
busy attending to his cases which were more important than A's.
Before whom can A seek redress against Atty. B who apparently was
negligent in attending his case? (1999 Bar)
A: He may file a verified complaint against Atty. B, asking that he be
administratively disciplined, with either the Supreme Court, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), or the EBP
Chapter to which Atty. B belongs (Sec. 1, Rule 139-B).
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
He may also file a complaint against Atty. B before a Regional Trial Court
or Municipal Trial Court, depending on the amount involved, for damages
he may have sustained due to the latter's negligence.
Q: When Atty. Aldrin received copy of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion for reconsideration using intemperate and
disrespectful language with a subtle threat that “knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment is punishable under the Revised Penal Code."
The Court of Appeals ordered him to explain why he should not
be cited in contempt of court. Instead of complying, he submitted to
the Court of Appeals his Petition to Retire from the practice of law
which he immediately filed with the Supreme Court after receiving the
citation for contempt. May he be allowed to retire from the practice of
law? (1998 Bar)
A: No.A practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice
of law which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him
for contempt (Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234). Q: Ben filed
proceedings for disbarment against his lawyer, Atty. Co, following the
latter’s conviction for estafa for misappropriating funds belonging to
his client (Ben). While the proceedings for disbarment was pending,
the President granted absolute pardon in favor of Atty. Co. Atty. Co.
then, moved for the dismissal of the disbarment case.
Should the motion be granted? (1998 Bar)
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to wipe out the
conviction as well as the offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is a
bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if such proceeding is based
solely on the fact of such conviction (In Re: Parcasion, 69 SCRA 336). But
where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct
involved in the transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect
of the pardon is only to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act
and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as
the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does
not possess good moral character (In Re: Lontoc, 43 Phil. 293).
Q: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Cruz
who was accused of misappropriating funds belonging to the
complainant. The matter was referred to the IBP which forthwith
conducted an investigation through its local chapter. During the
pendency of the investigation, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Desistance claiming that Atty. Cruz had already reimbursed him for
the funds which he had accused him of unlawfully spending for his
own use. Atty. Cruz moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
As the hearing officer, how will you act on the motion of Atty. Cruz?
(1994 Bar)
A: The desistance of a complaint in a disbarment proceedings or his
withdrawal of the charges against a lawyer does not deprive the court of
the authority to proceed to determine the matter. Nor does it necessary
result in the dismissal of the complaint, except when, as a consequence of
withdrawal or desistance, no evidence is adduced to prove the charges.
Since a disbarment proceeding is neither a civil nor a criminal action but
one presented solely for public interest, thefact that the complainant and
the respondent have considered the case closed, is unimportant.
As hearing officer, I will deny the motion of Atty. Cruz and continue the
hearings.
Q: A lawyer charged his client P 10,000.00 for filing fees pertaining to
the complaint he filed in court. He actually spent only P1,000,00. He
did not account for the balance.
Suppose that the lawyer should be charged, how and where should the
complaint be filed? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar)
A: The client may file a verified complaint for disbarment against his
lawyer. His verified complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of person or persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. The client may file the
complaint directly with the Supreme Court, in which case at least 18
copies thereof shall be filed, and the Supreme Court may refer the
complaint to the IBP Board of Governors for appropriate action, such as
assigning the complaint to an investigator, or to the Solicitor General or
court officer or judge for investigation when the interest of justice requires.
The clientmay, however, file his complaint, in six copies, with the IBP
Board of Governors, which will then assign the case to an investigator for
investigation, or with the Secretary of a local chapter of the IBP, which
will in turn transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator (Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court).
Q: How may a proceeding for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys be instituted? (1989 Bar)
A: A proceeding for disbarment, or suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the Regional
Trial Court, on its own motion, or upon complaint under oath of another in
writing. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines may investigate the matter
and recommend to the Supreme Court the disbarment and suspension from
the practice of law of the erring lawyer.
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD
Q: Atty. Perez was admitted as a member of the New York Bar. While
in Manhattan, he was convicted of estafa and was disbarred.
Does his disbarment in New York a ground for his automatic
disbarment in the Philippines? (2006 Bar) A: The disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be primafacie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (pars. 2 & 3, Section 27, Rule 138, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution, dated February 13,1992).

Thus, the disbarment of Atty. Perez in New York for estafa is a ground
for his disbarment in the Philippines. However, such disbarment in the
Philippines is not automatic. Atty. Perez is still entitled to due notice and
hearing (In Re Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of
Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, 435 SCRA 417 (2004]).

Q: Atty. LA is a member of the Philippine Bar and the California Bar

in the United States. For willful disobedience of a lawful order of a
Superior Court in Los Angeles, Atty. LA was suspended from the practice
of law in California for one (1) year.
May his suspension abroad be considered a ground for disciplinary action
against Atty. LA in the Philippines? Why? (2002 Bar)

A: The suspension of Atty. LA from the practice of law abroad may

be considered as a ground for disciplinary action here if such suspension
was based on one of the grounds for disbarment in the Philippines or shows
a loss of his good moral character, a qualification he has to maintain in
order to remain a member of the Philippine Bar.

READMISSION TO THE BAR

LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED

Q: Atty. Queliza was convicted of qualified seduction. He was

subsequently disbarred at the initiative of the IBP. Before he could
complete the service of his sentence, he was given an absolute pardon by
the President. He thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for reinstatement
to the practice of law as a legal and logical consequence of the absolute
pardon.
Is he entitled to reinstatement? (1994 Bar)

A: An absolute pardon granted to a lawyer who has been previously

disbarred for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not
automatically entitle him to reinstatement. The matter of his reinstatement
is still subject to the discretion of the Supreme Court. He should still show
by evidence aside from the absolute pardon that he is now a person of good
moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law (In Re Rovero, 101
SCRA 797).
 Q: The Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines pleaded for compassion on behalf of Atty. Juan Santos. The
Supreme Court had earlier found Atty. Santos guilty of grave professional
misconduct and imposed upon him “an indefinite suspension, leaving it to
him to prove at some future and opportune time that he shall have once
again regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an
officer of the court."
Is the plea of the Faculty for Atty. Juan Santos well taken? Explain. (1993
Bar)

A: The plea of the Faculty of Law of the University of the Philippines

asking compassion on behalf of Atty. Juan Santos is not well taken. In
order that a lawyer who was disbarred can be reinstated, he must show with
convincing proof that he has good moral character acquired through
positive efforts, honorable dealings and moral reformation as to be fit to
practice law again. Mere allegation of compassion for a lawyer is not
sufficient. In one decision of the Supreme Court, in order that a disbarred
lawyer can be reinstated, he must prove his good moral character as if he is
applying for admission to the bar.

LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED

Q: Atty. Repatriated, a law school classmate, approached you on your

25th Class Reunion, with questions on how he can resume the practice of
law in the Philippines. He left the country in 1977 after two (2) years of
initial law practice, and migrated to the United States where he was
admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York. He asks that you
give him a formal legal opinion on his query.

Outline briefly the steps and the supporting legal reasons you would
state in your legal opinion on what Atty. Repatriated should do to resume
his Philippine practice. (2013 Bar)
A: Atty. Repatriated must prepare a sworn petition to reacquire the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He should manifest in his
petition his desire to resume his law practice in the Philippines, and he is
not disqualified to practice law. The “right to resume the practice of law” is
not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to
practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. It cannot be
overstressed that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both the
power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Adherence to rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice of law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients
repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege” (In
Re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in the Philippines,
Epifanio B. Muneses, B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012).
He should file the petition with the Supreme Court, through the Bar
Confidant accompanied by the original or certified copies of the following
documents:
1. Showing that he is still a Filipino citizen. ”The Court reiterates that
Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law” (In Re: Petition to Re-
acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines, B.M. No. 2112,
supra). Having retained Philippine citizenship could be evidenced by the
Philippine passport, the U.S. Green card showing Philippine citizenship and
U.S. residency or other authentic documents which the Supreme Court may
require.

On the other hand, if Atty. Repatriar has lost his Philippine citizenship, he
must submit the following:
a. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
b. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
c. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
d. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration.

The loss of Filipino citizenship means termination of Atty. Repatriar’s

membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of anothercountry and later re-acquires his
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar (B.M. No. 2112, In re: Petition to re-acquire the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines, supra).
2. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual
membership dues;
3. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
4. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office. (Ibid.)
5. A certificate of good moral character attested to by at least three (3)
members of the bar; and
6. A certification from the State Bar of New York that Atty. Repatriar does
not have any previous or pending disciplinary action filed against him
before that body.

Q: After passing the Philippine Bar in 1986, Richards practiced law

until 1996 when he migrated to Australia where he subsequently
became an Australian citizen in 2000. As he kept abreast of legal
developments, petitioner learned about the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225), pursuant to which
he reacquired his Philippine citizenship in 2006. He took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen at the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia. Jaded by the laid back life in the outback, he returned to the
Philippines in December 2008. After the holidays, he established his
own law office and resumed his practice of law.
Months later, a concerned woman who had secured copies of Atty.
Richards’ naturalization papers with consular authentication, filed
with the Supreme Court an anonymous complaint against him for
illegal practice of law.
Is respondent entitled to resume the practice of Law? Explain. (2010
Bar)

A: Yes, as long as he observes the procedure laid down in Petition for

Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M. Dacanay (B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 424), to wit:
a. Updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
b. Payment of the professional tax; c. Completion of at least 36 credit hours
of mandatory continuing legal education; and, d. Pre-taking of the lawyer’s
oath.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC, AS AMENDED)
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS
Q: Enumerate the instances when a Notary Public may authenticate
documents without requiring the physical presence of the signatories.
(2010 Bar)
A:
1. If the signatory is old or sick or otherwise unable to appear, his
presence may be dispensed with if one credible witness not privy to the
instrument and who is known to the notary public, certifies under oath or
affirmation the identity of the signatory.

2. If two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,

not known to the notary public but can present their own competent
evidence of identity, certify under oath or affirmation to the identity of the
signatory.

3. In case of copy certification and issuance of certified true copies.

Q: What are the powers and duties of a notary public? (1995 Bar)

A: Every notary public shall have power to administer all oaths and
affirmations provided for by law, in all matters incidents to his notarial
office, and in the execution of affidavits, depositions, and other documents
requiring an oath; to receive the proof or acknowledgment of all writings
relating to commerce or navigation, such as bills of exchange, bottomries,
mortgages, and hypothecations of ships, vessels, or boats, charter parties or
affreightments, letters of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers and
assignments of land or buildings, or an interest therein, and such other
writings as are commonly proved or acknowledged before notaries; to act
as a magistrate in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make
declarations and certify the truth thereof under his seal of office,
concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his office (Sec. 241,
Notarial Law).
Notes:
Every notary public shall have the power to administer oath in all
matters incident to his notarial office; he shall likewise have the power to
administer oath in the execution of affidavits, depositions and all other
documents requiring an oath.

The duties of the notary public are:

1) He shall keep a notarial register;
2) He shall make proper entries in the notarial register concerning his
notarial acts;
3) He shall send the copy of the entries to the clerk of court every 10 th
day of the month.
 4) He shall acknowledge the date of the expiration of his notarial
commission.
5) He shall forward his notarial register to the clerk of court.

The duties of a notary public are the following:

1. To keep a notarial register;
2. To make the proper entry or entries in the notarial register touching
his notarial acts in the manner required by the law;
3. To send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of court within
the first 10 days of the month next following;
4. To affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his
commission, as required by law;
5. To forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of
court;
6. To make report, within a reasonable time, to the proper judge
concerning the performance of his duties, as may be required by such
judge;
7. To make the proper notation regarding residence certificates (Sec.
247, Rev. Adm. Code).

Q: Comment on the propriety of the acts of the municipal judge

who prepared and notarized the following documents:

a. a deed of absolute sale executed by two of his friends;

b. an extrajudicial settlement of estate of his cousins;
c. a memorandum of agreement between a building contractor
and a neighboring municipality;
d. a memorandum of agreement between another private
contractor and the municipality where he sits as judge. (1995 Bar)

A: Municipal Judges may not engage in notarial work except as

notaries public ex-officio. As notaries public ex-officio, they may engage
only in notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their
judicial functions. They may not as such notaries public ex-officio,
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyance, which bear no relation to the
performance of their functions as judges.

However, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still
municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries public, the Supreme
Court ruled that MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or
circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notaries
public ex-officio, perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account
of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer and (2)
certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public of such municipality or circuit (Balayon, Jr. vs.
Ocampo, 218 SCRA 13).

On the basis of the foregoing, I would say that the propriety of the
actuations of the municipal judge in this problem depends on whether or
not there are notaries public available in his community. If there are
notaries available, his acts are improper. Otherwise they are proper,
provided that the two conditions mentioned above are complied with.

Notes:
The general rule is that judges cannot notarize documents except those
connected with their judicial function.
However, in the case of Balayon, Jr. vs. Ocampo, it was held that
judges of inferior court may be allowed to notarize documents when there
is no notary public in their station provided that the payment for such
notarization is collected in favor of the government and such payment shall
be turned over to the municipal treasurer.

JURISDICTION OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND PLACE OF

NOTARIZATION

Q: Atty. Sabungero obtained a notarial commission. One Sunday,

while he was at the cockpit, a person approached him with an affidavit that
needed to be notarized. Atty. Sabungero immediately pulled out from his
pocket his small notarial seal, and notarized the document. Was the
affidavit validly notarized? Explain. (2009 Bar)

A: Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides

that a Notary Public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular
place of work, except in few exceptional occasions or situations, at the
request of the parties. Notarizing in a cockpit is not one of such exceptions.
The prohibition is aimed to eliminate the practice of ambulatory
notarization. However, assuming that the cockpit is within his notarial
jurisdiction, the notarization may be valid but the notary public should be
disciplined.
Notes:
Under the Rule on Notarial Practice, a notary public shall not perform
a notarial act outside his regular place of work. Ambulatory notarization is
prohibited.
 Q: What is the extent of the jurisdiction of a notary public? (1995
Bar)

A: The Jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-

extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City
of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction (Sec.
240, Rev. Adm. Code).
Notes:
The jurisdiction of the notary public in a province shall extend over
the whole province; the same rule is applicable in case of a city.

Q: Atty. Z, a notary public commissioned in Quezon City, attended a

wedding at Makati. B requested Z to notarize a deed of sale executed
between X and Y who were both in Baguio City. Atty. Z who has a
portable notarial seal, notarized the document. Subsequently, X assailed the
document alleging that his signature thereon was falsified. X filed a case
for disbarment against Atty. Z.

Will the complaint prosper? Explain. (1996 Bar)

A: Atty. Z may be held criminally liable for violating Article 171

(Falsification by Public Officer) of the Revised Penal Code, by making it
appear that X and Y appeared and acknowledged having executed the deed
of sale before him, when in fact they did not so appear or acknowledged.
He may also be administratively liable for not obeying the laws of the land
(Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Moreover, his jurisdiction
as notary is only in Quezon City.

Notes:
A notary public shall be held liable for the crime of Falsification by
Public Officer if he notarizes a document without the presence of the one
who executed it because he is making it appear that latter appeared and
acknowledged the document when in fact he did not so appear or
acknowledge.

Q: Jojo, a resident of Cavite, agreed to purchase the lot owned by

Tristan, a resident of Bulacan. Atty. Agaton, Jojo’s lawyer who is also a
notary public, prepared the Deed of Sale and Jojo signed the document in
Cavite. Atty. Agaton then went to Bulacan to get the signature of Tristan.
Thereafter, Atty. Agaton went back to his office in Cavite where he
notarized the Deed of Sale. Is the notarization legal and valid? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
 A: The Notarization is not legal and valid. Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a person shall not perform a
notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document is not personally in the notary’s presence at the time of
notarization. Tristan was not in Atty. Agaton’s presence when the latter
notarized the deed of sale in his office in Cavite; moreover, Tristan signed
in Bulacan which is outside the Atty. Agaton’s territorial jurisdiction.

Notes:
Under the Rules on Notarial Practice, a notary public shall not perform
a notarial act on a document if its signatory is not present at the time of the
notarization.

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Q: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, what is the

principal obligation of a lawyer towards:

a. The legal professional and the Integrated Bar?

b. His professional colleagues?
c. The development of the legal system?
d. The administration of justice?
e. His client? (2004 Bar)

A:
a. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar (Canon 7,
Code of Professional Responsibility).

b. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor

towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel (Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility).

c. A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of the legal system by

initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration of
justice (Canon 4, Code of Professional Responsibility).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

a. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in

continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence
(Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility).

b. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice (Canon 12, Code of
Professional Responsibility).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

a. A lawyer shall participate in the improvement of the legal system by

initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the administration of
justice (Canon 4, Code of Professional Responsibility).

b. A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his

dealings and transactions with his client (Canon 15, Code of Professional
Responsibility).

JUDICIAL ETHICS

Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

Q: In a land registration case before Judge Lucio, the petitioner is
represented by the second cousin of Judge Lucio’s wife.

a. Differentiate between compulsory and voluntary disqualification

and determine if Judge Lucio should disqualify himself under either
circumstances.

b. If none of the parties move for his disqualification, may Judge

Lucio proceed with the case? (2015 Bar)

A:

a. In compulsory disqualification, the judge is compelled to inhibit

himself from presiding over a case when any of the ground provided by the
law or the rules exist. Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court, no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case (1) in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or (2) in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or (3) in which he has
been executor, administrator, trustee or counsel, or (4) in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without consent of all parties in interest and entered upon the
record.
Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary adds the following grounds:

a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;

b. The judge has previously served as a lawyer or was a material

witness in the matter under controversy.
Notes:
Under the Rules of Court, a judge shall not sit in a case if: 1) he, his
wife, or his child is an heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; meaning he is
monetarily interested in the case; 2) he is related to a party within the 6th
degree of consanguinity or affinity; 3) he was the executor, administrator,
trustee of the estate under consideration, or counsel of the case; 4) he was
the judge in the inferior court who handled the case which is now on appeal
before him; 5) he was a witness in the controversy; 6) he has personal
knowledge of the evidentiary facts in which he might have bias or prejudice
concerning a party.

In voluntary disqualification, a judge may inhibit himself in the

exercise of his discretion. Paragraph 2, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that “a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other
than those mentioned above”. The New Code of Professional Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary adds that “judges shall disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the
matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that
they are unable to decide the matter impartially.”
Notes:
Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings for just and valid reasons; at their discretion, they can
disqualify themselves if they are unable to decide the case with
impartiality.

There is no mandatory ground for Judge Lucio to disqualify himself.

The second cousin of his wife, a sixth degree relative, is appearing not as a
party but as counsel.
b. If none of the parties moves for his disqualification, Judge Lucio may
proceed with the case. All the more so if, without the participation of the
Judge, the parties and their lawyers execute a written agreement that Judge
Lucio may proceed with the same, and such agreement Is signed by them
and made a part of the records of the case.

Q: Rebecca’s complaint was raffled to the sala of Judge A. Rebecca is

a daughter of Judge A’s wife by a previous marriage. This is known to the
defendant who does not, however, file a motion to inhibit the Judge.
Is the Judge justified in not inhibiting himself from the case?
(2010 Bar)

A: The judge is not justified in not inhibiting himself. It is mandatory

for him to inhibit if he is related to any of the parties by consanguinity or
affiant within the sixth civil degree (Sec. 3 [f] Canon 3, New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary). Judge A, being the
stepfather of Rebecca, is related to her by affinity by just one degree.
“Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceeding in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may
appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter
impartially” (Id., Sec. 5, Canon 3). The fact that Rebecca is a daughter of
Judge A’s wife is liable to make a reasonable observer doubt his
impartially.

Q: RTC Judge Q is a deacon in the Iglesia ni Kristo church in San

Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. R, a member of the same religious sect
belonging to the same INK community in San Francisco del Monte, filed a
case against S who belongs to the El Shaddai charismatic group. The case
was raffled to Judge Q's sala. The lawyer of S filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Q on the ground that since he and the plaintiff belonged to the same
religious sect and community in San Francisco del Monte, Judge Q would
not possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judge Q denied the
motion on the ground that the, reason invoked for his disqualification was
not among the grounds for disqualification under the Rules of Court and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Was Judge Q’s denial of the motion for
inhibition well founded? (1997 Bar)

A: The fact that Judge Q and Litigant R both belong to the Iglesia Ni
Kristo while Litigant S belongs to the El Shaddai group, is not a mandatory
ground for disqualifying Judge Q from presiding over the case. The motion
for his inhibition is addressed to his sound discretion and he should
exercise the same in a way the people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. He should reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the Judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of Justice against him (Dimacuha vs.
Concepcion. 117 SCRA630). Under the circumstances of this case, where
the only ground given for his disqualification is that he and one of the
litigants are members of the same religious community, I believe that his
denial of the motion for his disqualification is proper. In Vda. de Ignacio v.
BLT Bus Co., 34 SCRA 618, the Supreme Court held that the fact that one
of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal
ground for the disqualification of the judge.

Notes:
In the case of Vda. de Ignacio v. BLT Bus Co., it was held that a judge
is not obliged to inhibit himself from the proceedings although one of the
counsels was his classmate.

Likewise, even though a party and a judge belong to the same religion,
the judge is not obliged to inhibit.

Q: Lawyer W lost his ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court. He

appealed the decision to the RTC which V, the judge thereof, affirmed
through a memorandum decision. He filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the RTC should state the facts and the law on which its
decision is based. Judge V denied his motion. Instead of filing a Petition for
Review, lawyer W filed an administrative complaint against Judge V for
breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What is the liability of Judge V,
if any? (1991 Bar)

A: There is no breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct committed by

the RTC Judge. The memorandum decision rendered in an appeal from the
Municipal Court in its original jurisdiction carries with it the statement of
facts found by the Municipal Court which are deemed affirmed by the RTC
judge. Memorandum decisions are allowed on appeal.

Notes:
Memorandum decision rendered in an appeal from the MTC which
stated the fact and the law in its decision is allowed on appeal. The RTC
does not need to state the fact and the law found by it because it adopted
the decision of the inferior court. The judge who does a memorandum
decision is not violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Q:
1. Discuss briefly the grounds for disqualification or inhibition of
judges to try a case.
 2. A judge rendered a decision in a criminal case finding the accused
guilty of estafa. Counsel for the accused filed a motion for reconsideration
which was submitted without arguments. Later, another lawyer entered his
appearance for the accused. The judge issued an order inhibiting himself
from further sitting in the case because the latter lawyer had been among
those who recommended him to the Bench. Can the judge's voluntary
inhibition be sustained? (1989, 1988 Bar)

A:
1. Under Rule 137 Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a judge is
disqualified to sit in every case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heirs; legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the
rules of civil law or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. This
rule enumerates the grounds under which a judge is legally disqualified
from sitting in a case, and excludes all other grounds not specified therein.
The judge may, however, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

Under said rule, the judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from sitting
in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned in the rule.
2. The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself by the mere fact that
a lawyer recommended him to the Bench. In fact, the appearance of said
lawyer is attest as to whether the judge can act independently and
courageously in deciding the case according to his conscience. Inhibition is
not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of
a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a
case. “Utang na loob”, per se, should not be a hindrance to the
administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value in
Philippine society prevent the performance of one’s duties as judge, xxx
(Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M; 155 SCRA 78-79).
However, in order to avoid any suspicion of partiality, it is better to the
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself.

Notes:
In one case, the Supreme Court held that a classmate, friend, associate,
or patron who appears before the sala of a judge is not a ground to oblige
the judge to inhibit himself. Likewise, utang na loob is not a ground for the
judge to inhibit; the recognition of this value should not prevent the
administration of justice.

However, in order to avoid any suspicion of partiality, it is better for

the judge to voluntarily inhibit himself.

Q: Judge L is assigned in Turtle Province. His brother ran for

Governor in Rabbit Province. During the election period this year, judge L
took a leave of absence to help his brother conceptualize the campaign
strategy. He even contributed a modest amount to the campaign kitty and
hosted lunches and dinners.
Did Judge L incur administrative and/or criminal liability?
Explain. (2010 Bar)

A: Judge L incurred administrative liability. Rule 5.18 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct (which is applicable in a suppletory character to the New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) provides that “[A] Judge is
entitled to entertain personal views on political questions, but to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political
speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political activities.”

He may also be held criminally liable for violation of Section 26 (I) of

the Omnibus Election Code, which penalizes any officer or employee in the
civil service who, directly or indirectly, intervenes, in any election
campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to
preserve public order.

Notes:
Under the Omnibus Election Code, officers of employees in the civil
service shall be held criminally liable for engaging in any partisan political
activity or in election campaign whether directly or indirectly.

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, to avoid suspicion of political

partisanship, a judge shall not contribute to party funds.

Q: Judge C was appointed MTC Judge in 1993. Subsequently, the

Judicial and Bar Council received information that previously he had been
dismissed as Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila. It appeared that when he
applied for appointment to the Judiciary, his answer to the question in the
personal Data Sheet - “Have you ever been retired, dismissed or forced to
resign from any employment?" was - “Optional under Republic Act No.
1145.” The truth is, he was dismissed for gross misconduct as Assistant
City prosecutor.

May he be dismissed as Judge? [1998 Bar]

A: Yes. By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public

service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into
consideration in acting on his application for appointment as a judge, he
(the judge) committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be
appointed, and to remain, in the Judiciary he has tarnished with his
falsehood (Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube, 227
SCRA 193; Jose Estacion, 181 SCRA 33, Estanislao Belan, August 6,
1998).
Notes:
In one case, the Supreme Court held that when a judge concealed in
his application for appointment as a judge of his previous dismissal from
public service, he may be dismissed for dishonesty.

COMPULSORY INHIBITION OF A JUDGE

Q: State at least five (5) instances where judges should disqualify

themselves from participating in any proceedings where their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned (2016 Bar)

A: Any five (5) of the following instances provided in Sec. 5, Canon 3

of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:
a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness
in the matter in controversy;
c. The judge or a member of his or her family has an economic interest
in the outcome of the matter in controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the
judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was
a material witness therein;
e. The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant
within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
 g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

Section 1, Rue 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides for similar
grounds.

Q: In a case for homicide filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Presiding Judge Quintero issued an order for the arrest of the accused,
granted a motion for the reduction of bail, and set the date for the
arraignment of the accused. Subsequently, Judge Quintero inhibited himself
from the case, alleging that even before the case was raffled to his court, he
already had personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the case.
Is Judge Quintero’s inhibition justified? Explain. (2009, 2004 Bar)

A: Judge Quintero’s inhibition is justified. One of the grounds for

inhibition under Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary is “where the judge has actual bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings.”

Q: In a case before him, it was the son of Municipal Trial Court Judge
X who appeared as counsel for the plaintiff. After the proceeding, judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, B. The
defendant in the case, complained against Judge X for not disqualifying
himself in hearing and deciding the case. In his defense, Judge X alleged
that he did not disqualify himself in the case because the defendant never
sought his disqualification. Is Judge X liable for misconduct in office?
(1999 Bar)

A: Judge X is liable for misconduct in office. Rule 3.12 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should take no part in a proceeding
where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In fact, it is
mandatory for him to inhibit or disqualify himself if he is related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree (Hurtado v. Jurdalena, 84 SCRA 41). He
need not wait for a motion of the parties in order to disqualify himself.

VOLUNTARY INHIBITION OF A JUDGE

Q: Judge Clint Braso is hearing a case between Mr. Timothy and

Khristopher Company, a company where his wife used to work as one of
its Junior Executives for several years. Doubting the impartiality of the
Judge, Mr. Timothy filed a motion to inhibit Judge Clint Braso refused on
the ground that his wife has long resigned from the company. Decide.
(2014 Bar)

A: The fact that Judge Braso’s wife used to work for Khristopher
Company is not a mandatory ground for his inhibition. However, Section 2,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides that judges should disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceeding in which “it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are
unable to decide the matter impartially.” The Supreme Court has advised
that a judge “should exercise his decision in a way that the people’s faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired” (Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-
27934, September 18, 1967). While it may not be reasonable to believe that
Judge Braso cannot be impartial because his wife used to work as a Junior
Executive for Khristopher Company, the better part of prudence would
dictate that he inhibits himself from the case involving the said company.

Notes;
In the case of Pimentel v. Salanga, it was held that it is not mandatory
for a judge to inhibit if he is handling a case and one of the parties to it is an
employer of his wife. But if it appears to a reasonable observer that he
cannot decide impartially, the judge should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people’s faith in the court of justice will not be impaired.

Q: Justice B of the Court of Appeals (CA) was a former Regional

Trial Court (RTC) Judge. A case which he heard as a trial judge was raffled
off to him. The appellant sought his disqualification from the case but he
refused on the ground that he was not the judge who decided the case as he
was already promoted to the appellate court before he could decide the
case.

Was the refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case proper?

Explain your answer. (2014 Bar)
A: The refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case is improper. In the
case of Sandoval v. CA (G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283),
involving the same facts, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
Justice concerned was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.
However, he “should have been more prudent and circumspect and
declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case,”
because “a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived,
rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality.” This axiom is
“intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and
respect for the judiciary.”
Notes:
But under the Code of Judicial Conduct, it is mandatory for the judge
not to sit in a case if he was a judge of the inferior court who decided the
case. In spirit, this provision is applicable in the present case because what
is to be preserved is the public confidence in the integrity and respect for
the judiciary. Thus, the refusal of Justice B to recuse from the case was not
proper.

Q: The criminal case arising from the P10 Billion Peso pork barrel
scandal was raffled to Sandiganbayan Justice Marciano Cobarde. Afraid
that he would antagonize the parties, his political patrons and ultimately,
his judicial career, he decided to inhibit from participating in the case,
giving “personal reasons” as his justification.

If you were to question the inhibition of SB Justice Cobarde, on what

legal basis, and where and how will you do this? (2013 Bar)

A: The grounds relied upon by Justice Cobarde for his inhibition

conveys the impression that “the parties” and “his political patrons” are in a
special position improperly to influence him in the performance of judicial
duties (New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 4, Sec.
8). Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan sits in Divisions, so the fears of Justice
Cobarde are unfounded. Justice Cobarde should not shirk from the
performance of his judicial duties.

I would file a motion with the Division of the Sandiganbayan in which

Justice Cobarde is sitting for the remittal of his voluntary inhibition. I
would advance in motion the reasons why the “personal reasons” set forth
by the Justice are insubstantial and does not merit his inhibition. I would
likewise set the motion for hearing as appropriate.

Notes:
A judge cannot inhibit himself from the proceeding on the ground that
he might be influenced in the performance of his judicial function because
the parties involved in the case are his political patrons.
He shall not be allowed to inhibit because he should not shirk from the
performance of his judicial duties.

Q4: Assume that your friend and colleague, Judge Peter X. Mahinay, a
Regional Trial Court judge stationed at KL City, would seek your advice
regarding his intention to ask the permission of the Supreme Court to act as
counsel for and thus represent his wife in the trial of a civil case for
damages pending before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
 What would be your advice to him? Discuss briefly. (2004 Bar)

A: I would advise him against it. Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct expressly and absolutely prohibits judges from engaging in the
private practice of law, because of the incompatible nature between the
duties of a judge and a lawyer. Moreover, as a Judge he can influence to a
certain extent the outcome of the case even if it is with another court. A
Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency
(Rule 2.04, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Notes:
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges shall not engage in the
private practice of law. Thus, Judge Peter X cannot appear in court to
defend his wife.

Q: On what grounds may a judge be disqualified, or asked to

voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case? Briefly explain each
ground. (1988 Bar)

A: Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a judge is

disqualified from sitting on any case in which he or his wife or child is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise or in which he
is related to either party within sixth degree of consanguinity of affinity or
to counsel within the fourth civil degree.

Under the last sentence of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a
judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from participating in a case for just
and valid reasons.

The rule on voluntarily inhibition of judges was set by the Supreme

Court in Pimentel v. Salonga, 21 SCRA160 as follows:

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as

any to draw the attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes
to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when the
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor 'of one
party or with bias or prejudice ‘against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired.
INITIATION OF COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Q: An anonymous letter addressed to the Supreme Court was sent by

one Malcolm X, a concerned citizen, complaining against Judge Hambog,
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Mahangin City, Branch 7. Malcolm X
reported that Judge Hambog is acting arrogantly in court; using abusive and
inappropriate language; and embarrassing and insulting parties, witnesses,
and even lawyers appearing before him. Attached to the letter were pages
from transcripts of records in several cases heard before Judge Hambog,
with Judge Hambog’s arrogant, abusive, inappropriate, embarrassing and/or
insulting remarks or comments highlighted.

Describe briefly the procedure followed when giving due course to a

complaint against an RTC judge. (2015 Bar)

A: If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof

shall be sent to the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within
10 days from date of service. Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment,
the Supreme Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, or assign the
case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation. The investigating Justice shall set a date for the hearing
and notify the parties thereof, and they may present evidence, oral or
documentary, at such hearing. The investigating Justice shall terminate the
investigation within 90 days from its commencement, and submit his report
and recommendation to the Supreme Court within 30 days from the
termination of the investigation. The Supreme Court shall take action on
the report as the facts and the law may warrant (Rule 140).
Notes:
An anonymous letter together with a complaint may be sent to the
Supreme Court for the administrative charge of a judge. When the
complaint is sufficient in substance and in form, the supreme Court shall
send a copy of the complaint to the respondent giving him 10 days within
which to comment. The Supreme Court shall refer the matter to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report or recommendation.
However, the Supreme Court may assign the case to a Justice of the Court
of Appeals for evaluation, report and recommendation. The investigating
Justice shall set the date for hearing. The respondent shall be allowed to
present evidence, oral or documentary. The investigating Justice shall
terminate the case within 90 days from its commencement and shall submit

Q: Judge A has an illicit relationship with B, his Branch Clerk of

Court. C, the wife of Judge A, discovered the illicit affair and consulted a
lawyer to vindicate her violated marital rights. If you were that lawyer,
what would you advise C, and if she agrees and asks you to proceed to take
action, what is the legal procedure that you should follow? Discuss fully.
(2014 Bar)

A: I will advise her to file an administrative case against Judge A with

the Supreme Court. I can tell her that she can also file civil or criminal
actions against him. But an administrative case is confidential in nature and
will not unnecessarily drag the name and reputation of the court into the
picture.

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals,

Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals (Rule 140)

Q: A complaint for rape against ZZ was filed by the father of Dulce,

an 11-year old girl, with the Municipal Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu.
After preliminary examination of the offended party and the witnesses,
Judge YY of said court issued an order finding probable cause and ordering
the arrest of ZZ without bail. ZZ was arrested and detained. He filed: (1) a
Waiver of Preliminary Investigation, and (2) an Ex- Parte Motion to Fix
Bail Bond. Judge YY granted the waiver and forthwith elevated the records
of the case to the RTC, which forwarded the same to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
Ten (10) days after the elevation of the records. YY, acting on the Motion
To Fix Bail, issued an order fixing the bail bond at P20, 000.00. The father
of Dulce filed against YY an administrative complaint for ignorance of law,
oppression, grave abuse of discretion and partiality. If you were the
executive judge of the RTC designated to investigate the case and to make
a report and recommendation thereon, what would be your
recommendation? (1991 Bar)

A: The facts narrated in this case is similar to the decision of the

Supreme Court in 1989. The judge was found guilty of ignorance of the law
for granting bail despite the fact that he had already lost jurisdiction after
elevating the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

If I am the RTC Judge assigned to investigate the case, I would

recommend the dismissal of the Judge for gross ignorance of the law.

Notes:
 In one case, the Supreme Court held that when the records of the case
were already elevated to the RTC, the inferior court lost its jurisdiction over
the case. Consequently, it is bereft of jurisdiction to grant bail. For granting
the bail, the judge may be administratively disciplined for ignorance of the
law.

Q: Under the grievance procedures in Rule 139-B of the Rules of

Court, may judges be investigated by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines? Explain. (1989 Bar)

A: Judges may not be investigated under the grievance procedure in

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complaints against judges are filed with
the Supreme Court which has administrative supervision over all courts.
This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in a minute resolution in reply to
the letter of acting Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Rodolfo
Nocon 03 January 1989.
Notes:
Under the law, the Supreme Court has the administrative supervision
over all courts. Therefore, judges cannot be investigated by the IBP.

Q: In Administrative Circular No. 1 addressed to all lower courts

dated January 28, 1988, the Supreme Court stressed:

All judges are reminded that the Supreme Court has applied the “Res
Ipsa Loquitur” rule in the removal of judges even without any formal
investigation whenever a decision, on its face, indicates gross incompetence
or gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct (See: People vs.
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712; Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Romillo, Jr., 142
SCRA 262).

The application of the “res ipsa loquitur” rule in the removal of judges
is assailed in various quarters as inconsistent with due process and fair play.

Is there basis for such a reaction? Explain. (1988 Bar)

A: In one view, there is a basis for the reaction against the res ipsa
loquitur rule on removing judges. According to the position taken by the
Philippine Bar Association. The res ipsa loquitur rule might violate the
principle of due process, that is the right to be heard before one is
condemned.

Moreover, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure
for the removal of judges. Upon service of the complaint against him, he is
entitled to file his answer. If the answer merits a hearing, it is referred to a
justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, the report of the
investigation is submitted to the Supreme Court for proper disposition.

The danger in applying the res ipsa loquitur rule is that the judge may
have committed only an error of judgment. His outright dismissal does
violence to the jurisprudence set In Re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.
The other view taken by the Supreme Court is that the lawyer or a
judge can be suspended or dismissed based in his activities or decision, as
long as he has been given an opportunity to explain his side. No
investigation is necessary.
Notes:
Under the law, judges or lawyers cannot be removed or suspended
without due process of law. Hence, a judge cannot be remo ved under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor despite of the fact that the decision of the
judge, on its face, indicates gross ignorance of the law.

Grounds

Q: An Audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator found

that Judge Contaminada committed serious infractions through the
indiscriminate grant of petitions for annulment of marriage and legal
separation. In one year, the judge granted 300 of such petitions when the
average number of petitions of similar nature granted by an individual
judge in his region was only 24 petitions per annum.

The audit revealed many different defects in the granted petitions;

many petitions had not been verified; the required copies of some petitions
were not furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal.

If you were the counsel for Andy Malasuerte and other litigants
whose marriages had been improperly and finally annulled, discuss your
options in administrative proceeding against Judge Contaminada, and state
where and how you would exercise these options. (2013 Bar)

A: As a counsel for Andy Malasuerte, I have the option of

participating in the administrative proceedings by filing a verified
complaint in writing against Judge Contaminado, with the Office of the
Court Administrator, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court, the Code of Judicial
Conduct (Rules of Court, Rule 140, Sec. 1) and the new Code of Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary.

Q: Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits on Saturdays for

relaxation, as the owner of the cockpit is a friend of his. He also goes to the
casino once a week to accompany his wife who loves to play the slot
machines. Because of this, Judge Horacio was administratively charged.
When asked to explain, he said that although he goes to these places, he
only watches and does not place any bets.

Is his explanation tenable? Explain. (2005 Bar)

A: The explanation of Judge Horacio is not tenable. In the case of City

of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr., 375 SCRA 1 [2002], the Supreme Court
penalized a city court judge for going to gambling casinos and cockpits on
weekends. According to the Court, going to a casino violates Circular No.
4, dated August 27, 1980, which enjoins judges of inferior courts from
playing or being present in gambling casinos.

The prohibition refers to both actual gambling and mere presence in

gambling casinos. A judge’s personal behavior, not only in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

With regard to going to cockpits, the Supreme Court held that “verily,
it is plainly despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see
him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and
bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due
him. Ultimately, the Judiciary suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible
representation of the Judiciary" (City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr., ibid
at p. 8).

Notes:
In the case of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, Jr, it was held that under the
law, judges shall not play and be present in gambling casinos. Thus, judges
will be penalized for being present in a cockpit.
Q: Before he joined the bench, Judge J was a vice-mayor. Judge J
resumed writing a weekly column in a local newspaper. In his column,
Judge J wrote:

“It was wondering if the present vice-mayor can shed off his crocodile
hide so that he can feel the clamor of the public for the resignation of
hoodlum public officers of which he is one".
When charged administratively, Judge J invoked freedom of expression. Is
his defense tenable? Explain. (Bar)
 A: The Judge’s reliance on freedom of expression is untenable. The
judge's vicious writings compromise his duties as judge in the impartial
administration of justice. His writings lack judicial decorum which requires
the use of temperate language at all times. The judge should not instigate
litigation (Galang v. Santos, 307 SCRA 583 [1999], Royeca v. Animas. 71
SCRA 1 [1976]).

Notes:
In the case of Galang v. Santos, it was held that in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, judges shall observe judicial decorum. Thus, a
judge may be penalized for his vicious writings.

Q: A judge, in order to ease his clogged docket, would exert efforts to

compel the accused in criminal cases to plead guilty to a lesser offense and
advise party litigants in civil cases, whose positions appear weak, to accept
the compromise offered by the opposing party.

Is the practice legally acceptable? (1998 Bar)

A: The practice is legally acceptable as long as the judge does not

exert pressure on the parties and takes care that he does not appear to have
prejudged the case. Where a judge has told a party that his case is weak
before the latter was fully heard, such was considered as a ground for his
disqualification (Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124).

Notes:
In the case of Castillo v. Juan, it was held that judges shall encourage
a compromise but they shall not apply pressure on the parties to enter into a
compromise. They shall not prejudge the case before them. Thus, a judge
shall inhibit himself to sit in a case if he said that the case is weak.

Q: A Judge of the Regional Trial Court, notwithstanding the fact that

he was facing criminal charges at the time he obtained his appointment, did
not disclose the pendency of the cases either to the President or to the
Supreme Court. He claims that: (a) he enjoys presumption of innocence in
the pending criminal cases; (b) that the said cases even if sustained after
trial do not involve moral turpitude; and (3) before an administrative
complaint based on a criminal prosecution can be given due course there
must be a conviction by final Judgment.

May the Judge be considered as an undeserving appointee and

therefore be removed from his office? (1996 Bar)
 A: He may be considered as undeserving and removed from office.
This problem falls squarely under the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Court Administrator v. Estacion, 181 SCRA 33, wherein a
complaint was filed concerning the appointment of a Regional Trial Court
judge notwithstanding the fact that he was then facing criminal charges for
homicide and attempted homicide. The Judge also claimed that (a) he
enjoys the presumption of innocence, (b) the said cases, even if sustained,
do not involved moral turpitude, and (c) before an administrative complaint
based on a criminal prosecution is given due course, there must be a
conviction by final judgment. The Supreme Court held:
“The argument that he had not yet been convicted and should be presumed
innocent is beside the point, and so is the contention that the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide do not involve moral turpitude. The
important consideration is that he had a duty to inform appointing authority
and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them
to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position he was
seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the
important information in question because he deliberately withheld and
thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his reason for
suppression of such vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into
account against him if it had been disclosed.

As stressed in the report, it behooves every prospective appointee to

the judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on
his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect
on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required
of appointees to the judiciary under Article VIII, Sec. 7 (3) of the
Constitution. The fact alone of his concealment of the two criminal cases
against him is clear proof of his lack of the said qualifications and renders
him unworthy to sit as a Judge."
The respondent Judge was accordingly removed from office.
Notes:
In the case of Court Administrator v. Estacion, it was held that
applicants for judicial office shall apprise the appointing authority of every
matter bearing on his fitness to the judiciary. Thus, a judge may be
removed from office for concealing that he was charged with a crime when
he applied for judicial office.

PRACTICAL EXERCISES
SIMPLE CONTRACTS – LEASE, SALE OF REALTY

Q: Prepare a Contract of Lease of an apartment unit, (1998, 1996,

1988, 1987)
A:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This contract of lease, entered into by and between:

A.B., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at

_______________ and hereafter called the LESSOR
- and-

B.D., Filipino, of legal age, single, with residence at

_________________and hereafter called the LESSEE.

WITNESSETH:

THAT, for and in consideration of the rentals to be paid, the LESSOR has
hereby leased to the LESSEE and the LESSEE hereby accepts the same In
lease, the * following described property:
(description of apartment) subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Period of the Lease-

2. Rentals to be Paid –

3. (Other terms and conditions)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these

presents, at __________________, this _________________day of
_____________, 1998.
A.B. C.D.
Lessor Lessee WITNESSES
(acknowledgment)

Q: Gerry Cruz is the owner of a 1,000-square meter lot covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345 located in Sampaloc. Metro Manila.
Gerry decided to sell the property but did not have the time to look for a
buyer. He then designated his brother, Jon, to look for a buyer and
negotiate the sale. Jon met Angelo Santos who expressed his interest to buy
the lot. Angelo agreed to pay PI Million for the property on September 26.
2005.

Draft the Deed of Sale of Real Property. (2005, 1991, 1989)

A: DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This instrument, executed by and between: GERRY CRUZ, of legal

age, single, and a resident of _______________, herein represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, JON CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of
_____________ and _____________ hereafter referred to as the VENDOR,
- and -

ANGELO SANTOS, Filipino, of legal age, single, a resident of

_____________ and hereafter referred to as the VENDEE,
WITNESSETH:

THAT, for and in consideration of the sum of One Million Pesos

(P1,000,000.00), in hand paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR and
receipt of which is herein acknowledged by the latter, the VENDOR has
sold, transferred and conveyed, and by these presents does hereby sell,
transfer and convey, unto the VENDEE, that certain parcel of land with an
area of 1,000 square meters, more or less, located in Sampaloc, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12345 of the Register of Deeds
of Manila, and which is more particularly described as follows:
(technical description)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed these

presents at Manila, this 26th day of September, 2005.

GERRY CRUZ ANGELO SANTOS

Vendor Vendee
T.I.N. _________ T.I.N. _________

By:
JON CRUZ
Attorney-in-Fact
WITNESSES:
___________________ _________________
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
IN THE CITY OF MANILA, Philippines, personally appeared before me,
Mr. JON CRUZ, with Community Tax Certificate No.
____________issued at ____________ on ______________, 2005, in his
capacity as Attorney-in-Fact of Mr. GERRY CRUZ, with Community Tax
Certificate No. ____________issued at ____________ on
______________, 2005, both of whom are personally known to me to be
the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument, and they
acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed,
and the free and voluntary act and deed of the principal whom Mr. JON
CRUZ represents. I further certify that the foregoing instrument is a deed of
sale of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila, and consists of ____
pages, including this page, and is signed on each and every page by the said
parties and their instrumental witnesses.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission expires on December 31, 2005
(Address)
Commission No._______, Manila
Attorney’s Roll No.
IBP Membership No.
PTR O.R. No. ________, Manila, 2005
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2005.

PROMISSORY NOTE

Q: Prepare a negotiable promissory note. (1994, 1991 Bar)

A: City of Manila, September 28, 1994
6,000.00
Thirty (30) days after date, I, Arturo M. Padilla, hereby promise to pay
to the order of Milagros Concepcion, the sum of six thousand (6,000.00)
Pesos (Philippine Currency).
(Sgd.) Arturo M. Padilla

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM

SHOPPING

Q: Prepare a Verification and Certification against Forum

Shopping. (2010, 2003)

A: VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM

SHOPPING
X, after being duly sworn, hereby deposes and states: That he is the
plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that he has caused the foregoing
Complaint to be prepared; that he has read the same and that the allegations
of fact therein contained are true of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic documents; That (a) he has not heretofore commenced any action
of filed an claim involving the same issued in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency, and to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; and (b) if he should thereafter learn that the same
of similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.