Low Visibility Operations are considered to be among the most demanding operations.

The
introduction of Low Visibility Operations has been made possible due to the evolution of aircraft
automatic landing systems coupled with stringent requirements for airfield equipment and Flight
Crew qualifications.

The concepts and criteria established in the early 1960’s are the foundations for all CAT II/III
operations. The initial steps toward achieving the current CAT I operating minimums were taken
on September 28, 1961. The first air carrier operations with a minimums ceiling of 200ft and
800m visibility were authorised on May 11, 1962.

In 1963, operating minimums were reduced further to DH 200ft and RVR 550m for two and three
engined aeroplanes and DH 200ft RVR 600m for four engined aeroplanes.

On 9 January 1969, a Caravelle of AIR INTER became the first aircraft in the history of civil
aviation to land in actual CAT IIIa conditions during a commercial flight (Lyon-Paris). The
operational approval was obtained from the SGAC (France) only two months before in November
1968. This approval was the direct result of successful flight tests made since 1963 during which
automatic landing systems were tested (5 March 1963 at Toulouse: first automatic landing without
visibility). Fail-operational automatic landing was first used for these types of operations, but it
was found useful to develop fail-passive capability in order to satisfy airline requirements for
dispatch and operational flexibility.

Low Visibility Operations and in particular CAT II/III equipment represent a significant cost for an
airline.

The higher the category, the lower the visability and cloud base for an ILS approach.

The desired level of safety is achieved through:

− Airborne equipment,
− Non-visual aids (ILS facility),
− Visual aids (runway marks, lighting systems),
− Flight crew training,
− Flight crew procedures,
− ATC procedures,
− Aircraft maintenance,
− Airfield maintenance,
− Criteria for obstacle clearance.

CAT II weather minima has been established to provide sufficient visual references at DH to
permit a manual landing (or a missed approach) to be executed (it does not mean that the landing
must be made manually).

CAT III OBJECTIVE

The main objective of CAT Ill operations is to provide a level of safety equivalent to other
operations but in the most adverse weather conditions and associated visibility. In contrast to
other operations, CAT III weather minima do not provide sufficient visual references to allow a
manual landing to be made. The minima only permit the pilot to decide if the aircraft will land in
the touchdown zone (basically CAT III A) and to ensure safety during rollout (basically CAT III B).

Therefore an automatic landing system is mandatory to perform Category III operations. Its
reliability must be sufficient to control the aircraft to touchdown in CAT III A operations and
through rollout to a safe taxi speed in CAT III B (and CAT III C when authorized).

Automatic landing is not CAT III. An automatic landing system is only equipment providing
automatic control of the aircraft during the approach and landing and is not related to particular
weather conditions. This system is mandatory for all CAT III operations. However, it is a common
practice to perform automatic landing in good visibility but in that case, the ILS performance must
be sufficient and ILS signals protected.

As for CAT II operations, for those who fly internationally ...

JAA = Europe
FAA = USA
ICAO = Everywhere else

CAT II DEFINITIONS

ICAO definition
A category II approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with decision height lower
than 60m (200ft) but not less than 30m (100ft), and a runway visual range not less than 350m
(1200ft).

FAA definition
A category II approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with decision height lower
than 200ft (60m) but not lower than 100ft (30m), and a runway visual range less than 2400ft
(800m) but not less than 1200ft (350m).

JAA definition
A category II approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with decision height lower
than 200ft (60m) but not lower than 100ft (30m), and a runway visual range not less than 300m
(1000ft).

CAT III A DEFINITIONS

ICAO and FAA definition

A category III A approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height
or a decision height lower than 100ft (30m) and a runway visual range not less than 700ft (200m).

JAA definition
A category III A approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with a decision height
lower than 100ft (30m) and a runway visual range not less than 700ft (200m).

It is worth noting that the JAA considers that CAT III A is always associated with a decision height
(difference with ICAO/FAA).

CAT III B DEFINITIONS

ICAO and FAA definition

A category III B approach is a precision approach and landing with no decision height or a
decision height lower than 50ft (15m) and a runway visual range less than 700ft (200m), but not
less than 150ft (50m).

JAA definition
A category III B approach is a precision approach and landing with no decision height or a
decision height lower than 50ft (15m) and a runway visual range less than 700ft (200m), but not
less than 250ft (75m).

ICAO/FAA and JAA differ by the minimum RVR associated with CAT III B approaches (50m /
75m).
JAA: Where the DH and the RVR do not fall in the same Category, the RVR will determine in
which Category (CAT III A or B) the operation is to be considered.
here's a couple of extra points from our ops man.
CAT3A (A= w/o rollout) we have 600'RVR mins. but visual ref. to land (no R/O).
TDZ, MID RVR are controling and R/O RVR is req'd but advisory only.

CAT3B (B= w/ rollout) we have 300' RVR min and no visual ref required to land.
Below 600'RVR all the RVRs are required and controlling.

We no longer differentiate between A or B it's just CAT3 w/ or w/o rollout and you really don't see
"no rollout".

We do frequent equip chks to keep CAT3 currency for the a/c to CAT1 unprotected runways.

CAT-II Instrument Landing System

The CAT-II system is an instrument approach system. This type of
precision approach provides the pilot with vertical and horizontal
guidance to the runway. The guidance system gives accuracy, integrity,
and availability information during adverse weather conditions.

Background: March Airfield currently carries a Category I Instrument Landing System

(ILS). Upgrading the lighting and navigational aids of the airfield would provide the
rating of a Category II-ILS (CAT-II) system at March. The CAT-II system is an
instrument-approach system which provides for approaches to decision height (DH) of
not less than 100 feet and visibility of not less than 1/8 mile of runway visual range
(RVR), or 1200 feet. The CAT-II system is classed as a precision approach. A precision
approach provides the pilot vertical guidance as well as horizontal guidance to the
runway. This guidance system provides the pilot accuracy, integrity, and availability
information during adverse weather conditions.

Project Description: The key to establishing the CAT-II system at March is an improved
lighting system. The lighting system will consist of runway centerline lighting and
touchdown zone lights. The centerline lighting system will be constructed in a straight
line which runs parallel with and within 2 feet of the runway centerline. The lights will be
spaced 50 feet apart. The lighting system will extend from 75 feet on the runway side of
the threshold of the usable landing area, to within 75 feet of the upwind end of the
runway. The lights will be bi-directional and emit white light. The last 3000 feet of
lighting will be color coded to denote remaining runway usage.

The touchdown zone lights are used to provide continuity across the threshold into the
touchdown area, and provide visual cues during the flare out and touchdown phases of
the landing. This lighting system will be constructed so as to present, in plain view, two
rows of high intensity light bars arranged symmetrically about the centerline of the
runway. The rows of lights will be located within the paved area of the runway to define
that portion of the landing area used for landing flare and touchdown. The system will
extend from the threshold of usable landing area toward the upwind end of the runway, a
distance of 3000 feet. The light bars will be located in each row at 100-feet intervals.
Each light bar will contain three lights spaced at 5 feet on center, with the inboard light
located 36 feet from the runway centerline.

Once the aircraft is safely on the ground, it will be necessary to provide guidance signs to
aid the aircraft pilot in finding his parking destination, provide ground control of the
aircraft, and maintain safety of ground operations. Several mandatory and destination
signs will need to be established. Some examples are stop signs, taxiway or runway
intersection signs, outbound destination, inbound destination, and holding position.

This got me thinking...Is there a technology available that would control all aspects of
landing an Aircraft, ie- An advanced ILS where it would control the direction of the
aircraft, decending and speed of the aircraft all in conjunction to the Localizer and
GlideScope. Is this technology in the works or has it not been created yet?

It's called LAAS (Ground base referenced GPS) coupled approaches. The system uses a land
based interrogator to control aircraft separation based on known separation standards. Much of
the systems are aircraft based, but the local guidence is from the ground. That said, this is at
least 7 years out. There are problems being addressed right now with LAAS accuracy, the
communication system to tell an aircraft to speed up or slow down (mostly due to available
frequencies in the VHF band which will be made available in 2009 following the Digital Television
transition), and the overall accuracy of space based systems which will be upgraded in 2012. The
system will allow simultaneous LAAS straight in and curved approaches with 1/4 mile of runway
separation. The biggest change is the runway separation standards due to ground interrogation
systems and aircraft based separation systems (the Boeing product which was just released is
the Aircraft System).

The entire system is autoland capable. As for the technical on it, the system uses a ground based
reference pseudolite (Placed within 250' of the runway threshold) that is tightly calibrated to within
1 meter. It sends out a reference signal to approaching aircraft. The signal includes barometric
data for specific runway for aircraft altitude correction (RNAV/VNAV Corrections), the actual
touchdown point of the runway within 1 meter of accuracy corrected for placement of the
pseudolite for linear guidance, and GPS data which has been corrected by the landing system.
WAAS will provide 200 and 1/2 once the Satellites are upgraded in 2012 and most airports won't
have this system. The LAAS augments WAAS and actually over-rides the WAAS signal once an
aircraft is on final or within reach of final to guide the aircraft down. It is more or less and digital
space based enroute navigation system with an accuracy corrector for commerical airports. It
came about when the FAA studied the potential to use MLS in conjunction with GPS. It
progressed from MLS to the differential GPS system, to the Psuedolite System.
An "interesting" situation today at my CAT1 equipped airfield.
Visibility is 7KMS but cloud now drops to OVC at 200 feet therefore Safeguarding and Low Visibility
Procedures are technically required, As I understand it, one of the main reasons for introduction of
CAT 1 safeguarding would seem to be runway protection from unauthorised vehicles, the good
visibility would have precluded this allowing everything to be seen with no problem?
:ugh:
Discuss!!
Ed
Low Visibility Procedures were initiated by ECAC in 1988 in their DOC 17.The aim was to protect
the ILS signal for CATII and CAT III operations. If your ILS is only CAT I , you don't need LVP.
Some airports have implemented "safeguarding measures" before to implement LVP in order to
avoid a sudden and hard transition in the available runway capacity. But again the regulation does
not request that kind of local procedure if only CAT 1 approaches are available.
The ICAO DOC 4444 do not recognize LVP: The mention in chapter7 is about "Low visibility
operations" which are just "procedural control" when the controller does not have visual contact
with the traffic outside. Then there is a list of "additional requirements" when there is a need to
perform CAT I and II approaches.
There is an ICAO draft manual on LVP (It is just a manual, not a PANS) which still need to be
upgraded to reflect the reality.
And finally there is a pending proposition to implement an LVP definition in ICAO DOC 7030 EUR by
the ICAO Air Navigation Planning Group end of november 2007 :
Low visibility procedures (LVP). Specific procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of
ensuring safe operations during category II and III precision approaches and/or departure
operations in RVR conditions less than a value of 550 m.
Still far away from Airport that are only CAT I equipped.

Ed Set

1st October 2006, 16:31

An "interesting" situation today at my CAT1 equipped airfield.

Visibility is 7KMS but cloud now drops to OVC at 200 feet therefore Safeguarding and Low Visibility
Procedures are technically required, HOWEVER one of our standby generators is U/s so
safeguarding cannot be completed.
ILS/Approach Lights?Runway Lights all working normally, but obviously with the possibility of losing
one electrical circuit should a failure occur.
Aerodrome Authority ask that all aircraft are advised that they must now use an alternative non
precision decision height (490 feet in this case).
Bearing in mind that a CAT 1 airfield doesn't actually need safeguarding what would your action be
from the Flight Deck? Do you use the non precision decision height or can Company SOPs override
this in certain circumstances?
Probable that the cloud MAy be wrong of course!!
Situation resolved when it suddenly became BKN at 300 and Safeguarding was no longer required.
As I understand it, one of the main reasons for introduction of CAT 1 safeguarding would seem to
be runway protection from unauthorised vehicles, the good visibility would have precluded this
allowing everything to be seen with no problem?
:ugh:
Discuss!!
Ed

NW1

1st October 2006, 16:39

My Co procedures state "no effect" for lack of standby power for lack of stby pwr to rwy lights.
Another thought is that un-categorised ILS minima are the same as Cat I, but with an accepted
reduction in % approach success....

HTH

Data Dad

1st October 2006, 16:46

ahhh! Mon -ami!

You mean they STILL haven't fixed that genny?? :=

Been there done that about 2 weeks ago - (and still recovering)

It's not XXX airport authority - it's CAP 168 which says that without the backup then no precision
approaches permitted (the ILS effectively becomes non-categorised). I agree with you - stupid
when it's only Cat 1 to start with and it's actually the lights other services that will suffer (the ILS
has it's own battery back-up) and even more stupid when it's for cloud not vis.

See ya in the mad house soon!!!

DD

Earthmover

1st October 2006, 17:20

My Company's procedures are the same as NW1 - and comparing location, it can't be the same
Company.

However: I'm inbound to your airfield and you tell me I MUST use a higher minima - well, I ain't
going to get the book out and argue the toss with you in the air- I'm going to do as I'm told.

By the way - bet this gets moved to 'Tech Log' .....!

Sir George Cayley

1st October 2006, 18:15

All the ground ops vehicles may be able to see 10 kms, but with the ever increasing height of
contol towers in this country ( is it a willie wafting thing?) ATC may actually be IMC when it comes
to 200' cloud ceiling:eek:
Sir George Cayley

Ed Set

1st October 2006, 21:42

The muddy situation clears somewhat-and I may now be answering my own question!!
Further investigation reveals that there is a "conflict" between those airlines operating per CAP168
and those who are more realistically now on JAR-OPS.

As Data Dad says, these lucky people must adopt a non precision minima whilst this does not apply
to those operating JAR-OPs. These lucky folk can simply adopt the normal ILS minima.
You'll be delighted to know DD that as I write, the Airport Authority are replacing the miscreant
generator, though it will mean a total airfield closure whilst they do it.
Hopefully this will solve the problem- at least for those involved at our far end of the universe.

:D

Ed

411A

1st October 2006, 22:38

Flight deck crew really do need to remember that it is THEY who decide what minima are required,
to complete the approach, and descend to....not the ATC facility.
So-called 'approach bans' excepted, of course...which, IMHO, are a complete waste of time.

Consult your respective ops procedures/ops specs for the appropriate answer, and you might well
find that ATC is there to help...not impede, which may well be counter to what a very few in the
ATC business might suppose.
ATC advises what equipment might be unserviceable, not what minima the respective operator is
authorized to use.

Data Dad

1st October 2006, 23:07

From my own experience of this problem...

ATC at this (UK) airport are not telling aircrew what minima to use - The Airport Authority (who are
in the UK get their licence by following what it says in CAP 168) are following THEIR rules by
declaring and NOTAMing that precision approaches (ILS) are not permitted because the required
ground equipment is not all serviceable for that approach (ILS when Low Visibility Procedures in
force). It's a weird one I agree! And as usual (snow clearing/slot times/eobt's etc) it's us in ATC
that get caught in the middle. :ugh:

Not being a professional pilot I have to ask - under JAR-Ops do you have a published minima for a
(normally) CAT 1 ILS that then becomes (effectively) an uncategorised one - are the approach
plates still valid?

Keep on discussing ;)

DD

blackmail

2nd October 2006, 11:29

hello every one,

airport authorities announces in due time(via atc &/or notam):" ils backup power source unavail, ils
uncategorised "& weather does not cooperate, e.g. 7km, 200ft ovc.
what, as pilot, do you do?
1) look up your sops:jar-ops1 manual part A chapter 8: minimas & tables with inop ground
equipement. it says: no ils(cat 1/2/3) allowed with back up power source inop.
2)considering fuel options & before deciding a diversion, what can you do to stay legal, make your
life more easy & try an appraoch?
question: do i have the wx minimas to start/continue the non precision approach(npa)?
answer: yes, with 7km vis you can suppose you are above min required rvr.
ceiling? ceiling is only a legal consideration at the flight planning stage for a npa(so, if your are in
the briefing room, you are below minima & you need a second alternate enroute or at destination
with upgraded minimas in order to depart to your destination).
but to continue our case, suppose the notam is promulgated when you are already airborne & you
are informed in due time by atc or atis of the situation.
3) so you start your set up & brief + double brief(ryr pilots will understand)+monitored
approach(f/o flies the approach with the autopilot/capt lands the aircraft)
technical set up e.g. for b737ng:
autopilot mode lnav & vertical speed( vnav not allowed, only 1 fms)
minimas: mda for npa.
radio aids: the ils of course, but only as an information source. we also suppose the ils front course
& npa inbound course are aligned with the landing rwy.

4)conclusions: the wisdom to do all above, is at pilots discretion, because with a solid ovc at 200ft
agl & npa mdh's of circa 500ft agl, there is a great possibility of a missed approach. i only tried to
explain the legal/technical/practical implications for this example.
a last thing: operators define minimas according to jar ops rules & must at all times be equal or
higher than state minima's.

discountinvestigator

2nd October 2006, 12:48

Firstly, should ATC have even been considering low visibility procedures? I have been banging my
head against the wall for years on this matter.

There is difference here between low cloud procedures and low visibility procedures. However, lots
of MATS 2, and by default the Aerodrome Manuals do not make a difference.

The pilot operates by visibility only. By all means tell them that the cloud is low and there might be
a go-around resulting. However, it means nothing to the flight deck the low cloud thing. The low
cloud is meant for the foggy low visibility days as it starts with the cloud ceiling lowering. To get the
safeguarding done in time, you can use lowering cloud ceiling as an indicator. There is no indication
here of relatively low visibility.

When do you need runway and approach lights? The crew have their various approach light out
minima etc. If it was day, then you really need a working PAPI and that is all. It is nice to have the
rest working, and they were. It is just that you do not meet the nighttime reversion to standby
power.

If you study the nighttime reversion for CAT I, it is a 15 second change over time. This appears to
be written on the basis of what diesel generators can do, not what is required for safety. You can
survive a loss of lights for about two seconds around flare time, if you have to. Therefore, 15
seconds equals potential prang. Remember Britannia and their 757 excursion?

Was the standby generator the back up power for the ILS? Is there no battery back up for the ILS?
Only if there was no battery back up (UPS or whatever), then you would consider making the ILS
"uncategorised". However, absolutely nothing has altered the ILS signal characteristics at this point.
Nothing has changed the obstacle environment etc.

If you do the risk study, what you have done is to make the system more dangerous. This is not
operating in accordance with "as low as reasonably practicable". Therefore, if you are an airport in
England and Wales, beware! If you are an airport in Scotland, it is slightly different, but modern
interpretation would probably apply from down South. For Norn Iron, no case law...

Overall, I would guess that the airport operator has not done their risk assessments to show that
daylight operations with the generator out are acceptable. For night operations, a 15 second
change over time does not actually stop the accident anyway :rolleyes:

So, at the end of the day, this could all have been solved if you had split low cloud and low visibility
procedures. As everywhere else...

Spitoon

2nd October 2006, 16:44

discount, I don't know whether you've been banging your head against the wall but you sure are
giving me a headache.
lots of MATS 2, and by default the Aerodrome Manuals do not make a differenceIt is the airport
authority that is responsible for developing and maintaining LVPs although ATC play a major role
and will normally trigger their implementation.
The low cloud is meant for the foggy low visibility daysThis is incorrect. The low cloud thing is
meant to control quality of the ILS signal by ensuring that no large chunks of metal etc. sit close to
the antenna when an aircraft is going to want to make a cat II/III approach. Cat II/III stopbars etc
are located to achieve this. If the cloud is below 200ft and all aircraft angd ground equipment is as
it should be, the pilot is going to choose to make a cat II/III approach. The think that tells him/her
that all the necessary protection is in place is the phrase "LVPs in force". It is nothing directly
related to fog.

The rest of your diatribe mixes safety management processes and international standard
compliance and probably doesn't help this debate greatly.

Why the airport authority chose to say that a higher minima should be used is puzzling. Can
anyone give the CAP 168 reference? It's an interesting question that obviously needs more
investigation than I've given it now but my immediate reaction is that it would have been
appropriate simply to tell the pilot that standby power (presumably for AGL) is unserviceable and
ask his/her intentions.

Max Angle

2nd October 2006, 17:30

I think his point, and one that has been made few times on this board is that MEASURED cloudbase
(which is all that will ever be reported) is largely irrelevant in the process of flying an ILS whereas
RVR is crucial which is why the approach ban is based on it. We have all flown ILS approaches
where the cloudbase is reported as 200ft or below and LVPs are in force but you see the lights at
400-500ft. The base of the cloud is not solid and is quite variable in density, as long as the RVR is
OK you can easily land from a CAT1 approach on almost all occasions when LVPs are in force which
does make you wonder if the criteria for adopting them are wrong. Particularly relevant at places
like LHR where the 50% reduction in flow rate causes chaos, costs airlines a small fortune every
time it happens and more importantly makes me late home from work.

Interesting thread though, to be honest I had not idea that the ILS would safe guarded unless CAT2
or 3 approaches were in force and it wouldn't occur to me to ask. Despite what "blackmail" says
above I can find no reference in our documentation that would prohibit a CAT1 approach without
back-up power in fact our table (JAR-OPS) specifically allows it without a standby ILS or backup
power for runway or approach lighting.

So, in answer to the original question, I would carry out a CAT1 approach to 200ft and argue about
it later.

Ethics Gradient
 2nd October 2006, 20:21

Having been in a similar situation recently with a bust iRVR machine in cat 2 we ended up
diverting. Our ops manual said we could make an approach bloke on the ground said his ops
manual said we couldn't.
Burning round the hold at 3000' is not the place to get into an argument so we hung on as long as
we could to see if they could fix it and then nobbed off to our alternate.
Company were fully supportive which was nice.

Despite some discrete enquires I never did get to the bottom of who's books have primacy and
would probably do the same again rather that face a lengthy chat with the CAA.

TheOddOne

2nd October 2006, 20:48

discount,

I'm puzzled by your assertion that diesel generators are used for backup. We certainly don't use
them like that.

Our SOP is to use a ring main as its own backup. Thus, a break in the ring DURING any period of
LVPs is covered by the supply coming around the other way, so to speak.

If the ring is interrupted before the onset of LVP, then it can't be used as its own backup. What we
do then is to use the Diesel generators as the PRIMARY source and the mains as BACKUP. That way,
we get the 1 sec changeover required for CATIII. This doesn't cost any more, just a bit of lateral
thinking to give the result.

I'll also repectfully disagree with you about there being a difference between LVPs due low cloud
and low horizontal surface visibility. Yes, we often get situations where we are 200' cloud ceiling but
several km under it. We still need LVPs in this circumstance, so that when crews cloudbreak at
200', there is a reasonable chance that the a/c is aligned with the runway. I reckon you've got less
than 15 secs between a 200' cloudbreak and the flare in a big a/c. That's supposed to be possible
to hand-fly for a CATI approach. Thus we protect for this condition.

Cheers,
TheOddOne

Riverboat

3rd October 2006, 03:27

There you are, carrying out your Cat 1 ILS approach, with the needles nearly crossed, or if you
have a FMS, totally crossed, and suddenly the ILS fails. What happens?
You go around. I must admit I can't quite see the argument for only allowing (or promulgating) a
non-precision approach if a stand-by generator isn't available. Different if it is Cat II or III, as you
could be in a rather awkward spot, but not Cat 1.
Furthermore, I agree with 411A - it's nothing to do with the airport ATC what my MDA is - at least
it isn't according to my company Ops Manual, which doesn't mention stand-by generators
anywhere. Does anyone elses Ops Manual do so?
RB

discountinvestigator

3rd October 2006, 13:20

discount,

I'm puzzled by your assertion that diesel generators are used for backup. We certainly don't use
them like that.

Our SOP is to use a ring main as its own backup. Thus, a break in the ring DURING any period of
LVPs is covered by the supply coming around the other way, so to speak.

If the ring is interrupted before the onset of LVP, then it can't be used as its own backup. What we
do then is to use the Diesel generators as the PRIMARY source and the mains as BACKUP. That way,
we get the 1 sec changeover required for CATIII. This doesn't cost any more, just a bit of lateral
thinking to give the result.

I'll also repectfully disagree with you about there being a difference between LVPs due low cloud
and low horizontal surface visibility. Yes, we often get situations where we are 200' cloud ceiling but
several km under it. We still need LVPs in this circumstance, so that when crews cloudbreak at
200', there is a reasonable chance that the a/c is aligned with the runway. I reckon you've got less
than 15 secs between a 200' cloudbreak and the flare in a big a/c. That's supposed to be possible
to hand-fly for a CATI approach. Thus we protect for this condition.

Cheers,
TheOddOne

I am aware that the main way to achieve the one second change over time is to use diesels as
primary, with mains as secondary, at many airports. Also there is the double ring. However, see the
paragraph below as to whether this was required or not.

I wish to continue the debate about the split in low visibility and low cloud procedures further. If
you had no CAT III system, and only a CAT I ILS, would you still put in low visibility procedures for
low cloud and high visibility operations? I would suggest not. The change in the ILS signal
deflection when using CAT I holds for departing aircraft and flying to a 200'DH is still manageable.
The main signal deflections are from large tails vacating at the end of the runway or from big wings
in overflight. Yes, there are other reflections etc. A 737 old generation I seem to remember gave a
return to CAT III signal when vacating most of the way down a runway and its tail was 60 metres
from centreline, for example. At the CAT I hold, it does not eat all the dynamic ILS tolerance up.

The main debate should be on the total disconnect between JAR OPS 1 requirements and CAP 168
requirements. If it was high visibility and daylight, why would the crew need all of the other lights
apart from PAPI, they can shoot the approach with the lights out anyway! Many operators do not
even require a PAPI, but I will not go against Annex 14 in this area. I feel that no PAPI = no
approaches. I still feel that the lower risk option was to continue operations with the ILS.

Data Dad

3rd October 2006, 14:57

Spitoon - the CAP 168 reference is Chapter 6 page 29 & 30 (section 10) and more specifically para
10.4.

The argument about LVP's for Cat 1 at this airport has raged a long time!

Meantime the Aerodrome Manual and our Mats Part 2 state that we have to do it.

:ugh: :ugh:

DD

discountinvestigator
 3rd October 2006, 15:47

Perhaps if we split up the ideas, then we can develop procedures and apply them at the right time.

There are procedures to protect the ILS signal. These are required for when the aircraft requires
them, and that is RVR less than 550m. Keep on packing them in until then. After the second go-
around, maybe it is time to slow it down a bit and go to CAT II or III approach separations and use
the CAT III holding positions. As for me, I think you should always use the CAT III holds anyway.

There are procedures to protect the lack of vision from the tower. I would suggest that these may
be more appropriate for operations in the dark and also in visibilities significantly higher than RVR
550. If you cannot see a grey truck on the concrete at the other end of the aerodrome, you might
want to go "procedural" with ground operations. This requires the locking of gates, lowering of
barriers and the rest of it.

When there was only one Trident or Caravelle on approach, it could be a combined procedure and
nobody minded. With well over 90% of aircraft at some airports equipped to CAT II or III
approaches and low visibility take-offs, is it not time to take another look at why the rules were
written that way in the first place?

A7700

3rd October 2006, 16:47

An "interesting" situation today at my CAT1 equipped airfield.

Visibility is 7KMS but cloud now drops to OVC at 200 feet therefore Safeguarding and Low Visibility
Procedures are technically required, As I understand it, one of the main reasons for introduction of
CAT 1 safeguarding would seem to be runway protection from unauthorised vehicles, the good
visibility would have precluded this allowing everything to be seen with no problem?
:ugh:
Discuss!!
Ed
Low Visibility Procedures were initiated by ECAC in 1988 in their DOC 17.The aim was to protect
the ILS signal for CATII and CAT III operations. If your ILS is only CAT I , you don't need LVP.
Some airports have implemented "safeguarding measures" before to implement LVP in order to
avoid a sudden and hard transition in the available runway capacity. But again the regulation does
not request that kind of local procedure if only CAT 1 approaches are available.
The ICAO DOC 4444 do not recognize LVP: The mention in chapter7 is about "Low visibility
operations" which are just "procedural control" when the controller does not have visual contact
with the traffic outside. Then there is a list of "additional requirements" when there is a need to
perform CAT I and II approaches.
There is an ICAO draft manual on LVP (It is just a manual, not a PANS) which still need to be
upgraded to reflect the reality.
And finally there is a pending proposition to implement an LVP definition in ICAO DOC 7030 EUR by
the ICAO Air Navigation Planning Group end of november 2007 :
Low visibility procedures (LVP). Specific procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of
ensuring safe operations during category II and III precision approaches and/or departure
operations in RVR conditions less than a value of 550 m.
Still far away from Airport that are only CAT I equipped.

Data Dad

3rd October 2006, 22:35

On further reflection I am coming to the opinion that LVP's for CAT 1 ILS approaches is a little bit of
a red herring!

I believe (now) that we have Safeguarding/LVP's (at our airport with CAT 1 ILS) not to protect CAT
1 approaches but in order to protect departures which of course can continue at IRVR values much
lower than arrivals.

From the UK AIP AD 1-1-7 para 2.12:

"Low Visibility Procedure (LVP).

Procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe operation during Category 2
and 3 approaches and Low Visibility Take-off. (LVPs are initiated when the cloudbase lowers to 300
ft and is expected to lower further or the RVR falls to 1200 m and is expected to deteriorate further.
They should be fully in place by the time the cloudbase reaches 200 ft or the RVR falls to 600 m.)"

Thoughts please! (V Interesting discussion BTW)

DD

throw a dyce

4th October 2006, 01:16

I thought that the minima for landing fixed wing is 550M and 500M for helis.Therefore you do need
LVP at Cat 1 ILS for inbounds below 600M(just) and for outbounds as Data Dad says.
What happens when the wx criteria require Safeguarding / LVP's but they aren't in place? It can
take some time to get Safeguarding on.We advise the pilots,and they usually land anyway.
Therefore if we can't go into Safeguarding/LVP because of a generator problem,shouldn't that be
the same criteria.Give them the info so that they decide their minima.Is there any difference
between minima for a Safeguarded versus Non Safeguarded Cat 1 ILS?
The other day I went in the board said LVP on,Safeguarding not in place :confused: := Also I
thought you needed Safeguarding with BKN at 300ft.:confused: :confused: