Case Analysis

1. Dipo v. Wassan Singh (1983) 3 SCC 383

Smt Dipo vs. Wassan Singh Case held that the property acquired the character of joint
family property following the 1974 conveyance of the deed. As a result, the plaintiff
had ancestral property.
FACTS OF DIPO v. WASSAN CASE:

The appellant, who claimed to be the closest heir to the dead Bua Singh, her brother,
sued to reclaim custody of his property.
The sons of Ganda Singh appeared in court on behalf of the defendants. The
defendants claimed that Smt. Dipo was not Bua Singh’s closest heir, and even if she
was, the defendants had a preferable title to the property owing to tradition, because
the entire estate was an ancestral property in Bua Singh’s hands.
The Subordinate Judge 1st Class in Amritsar determined that some of Bua Singh’s
possessions were ancestral, while others were not. As a result, he ruled the sister was
not eligible to inherit ancestral property but might inherit non-ancestral property, as
was customary.
The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment and filed a form of paupers (a person
from poor financial background) appeal to the District Judge, but the appeal was
denied because the appellant did not submit the appeal in person as required by Order
33 Rule 3.
As a result, the plaintiff-appellant filed a second appeal with the Punjab and Haryana
High Court. However, the second appeal was denied because it was time-barred
because the copy of the decree was filed after the time limit had expired.
As a result, an appeal to the Supreme Court was filed.

LEGAL ISSUES:

Whether the plaintiff had any special rights to Bua Singh’s ancestral property?

CONTENTIONS:

Plaintiff’s contention
 Appellant claimed herself as the nearest heir of the deceased Bua Singh, her brother,
and sued to recover the possession of properties that belong to her brother.

Defendant’s contention

The contention laid down by the defendants was that Smt. Dipo wasn’t the closest
heir of Bua Singh and even if she was; the defendants had a preferential title in the
property due to custom, as the whole of the land was ancestral property in the hands
of Bua Singh.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Bench: Reddy, O. Chinnappa (J)

● The Court stated that the High Court’s dismissal of the second appeal was
unjustified. Because the flaw was technical and the second appeal was filed on
time, the Court felt it was unjustified to dismiss it on such minor technical
grounds.
● The High Court should have permitted the second appeal and disposed of it on
the merits despite the trial court’s delay in submitting the decree copy.
● Regarding the District Judge’s denial of the appeal, because it was not
submitted in person, the Court concluded that the District Judge had already
accepted the appeal and that dismissing it now would be futile.
● According to Hindu law, a person receiving property from his three direct
paternal ancestors must hold it in coparcenary with three immediate male
descendants, but if the person has a son, son’s son, son’s son’s son, or son’s
son’s son, he must hold the property completely as his own.
● A male descendant obtains a portion of ancestral property. They are born with
an interest in it. However, the property is treated as independent property in
other relationships, and if the coparcenary dies without a son, the property
falls to his heirs via succession.
DECISION:

The bench of the Apex Court, which included Reddy, O. Chinnappa, Desai, and D.A. JJ.,
held:
 ● The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s determination that Smt. Dipo was Bua Singh’s
sister.
● The Lower Courts’ decision was found to be incorrect. The Lower Court’s reluctance
to decide in favor of the plaintiff-appellant regarding the ancestral property made up
for a significant delay.
● In terms of ancestral property, the defendants were collateral, and the plaintiff had
priority over the defendants’ holdings.
● The learned Subordinate Judge’s, District Judge’s, and High Court’s judgments and
decrees were all overturned.
The appeal was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay the costs.
CONCLUSION:

According to Hindu law, a property inherited by a son from his direct three paternal ancestors
becomes a joint family property held in coparcenary with his son, son’s sons, and son’s son’s
sons.

2. V. Tusamma v. Sesha Redyy (1977) 3 SCC 9

Tulasamma’s (Appellant) husband was the brother of Shesha Reddy (Respondent). The
Appellant’s Husband died and she filed a case for maintenance. Respondent entered into a
compromise with her that she shall be given certain properties which she can enjoy in her
lifetime, but not own and dispose. On her death, the same shall go back to the Respondent.
Respondent argued that the said interest cannot be converted to an absolute one and the
district Munsiff upheld his view.

Tulasamma appealed to the District Court which held that she has got absolute interest in the
said property due to Section 14 (1) and Clause (2) of the Hindu Succession Act did not apply
as she had got this right by succession and not by any instrument.
The same was challenged in High Court which gave an opposite view that she got this
property by a compromise and the same was instrument and that it was before the HAS Act
was passed, so she had no absolute right.

However, the Supreme Court final held that she was the absolute owner of the said property
taking into consideration Section 14(1) of the Act and not 14(2) even when the compromise
has been entered into.

14(1) of the Act removes the incapability of a woman to acquire property as a full owner. The
property could have been acquired by her before commencement of the Act, as a limited
owner, or after the commencement of the Act. Except for s. section 14, there is no other
provision in the entire Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which specifies the ‘nature’ of the
interest that a Hindu woman takes in the property that she may inherit under this Act. Had it
not been for this phrase used in the section, ‘whether acquired before or after the
commencement of the Act’, controversies as well as conflicts, genuine or due to vested
interests of the parties, were bound to surface. It is these words that enables a woman to
inherit the property as an absolute owner under the Act.

Limited Estate Expressly Conferred under a Will or an Award [Section 14(2).Section 14(1)
removes statutory incapability of a woman to hold property as the absolute owner. It
recognizes that the acquisition of property by a woman needn’t be only for her maintenance,
by obliterating the differences between the acquisition of property and the differential
consequences based on the sex of the acquirer. But at the same time, it hasn’t interfered with
the powers of an owner of property, to make a disposition of his property in accordance to his
wishes. Thus, if a person wants to settle his property in favour of a woman by creating any
life interest in it, he is competent to do so. Section 14(1) does not mean that after the
commencement of the Act, a woman can never acquire any life interest; she can.
The position before the enactment of the Act was, that barring some exceptions, a woman
couldn’t take an absolute ownership in property, and a compulsory limited ownership was
being imposed on her. The situation presently, is that this statutory disability to acquire a full
ownership is now removed, and depending upon the terms & conditions of the grant, she can
acquire either a limited or the absolute estate. Her position has been brought at par with men.
An absolute owner can make any kind of disposition of his property, in favour of anyone,
under the Hindu law. Such life interest or a limited ownership will not mature into the
absolute ownership. What is removed by the Act is the inability of the recipient to take a full
ownership, but the Act does not impose a disability on the powers of an owner to make a
disposition in accordance with his wishes.

Section 14(2) thus provides:

Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or
under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an
award, where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award
prescribe a restricted estate in such property.

Now, Section 14(2), which is an exception to the general rule incorporated under s. 14(1)
protects the power of the owner to settle the property in accordance with his wishes. Hence,
where a female receives a limited interest in any property under a decree of a court or an
award or under a gift or a Will executed by an individual, such limited ownership wouldn’t be
affected by section 14(1) and would not mature into an absolute interest. Section 14(1) is very
wide in application, but section 14(2), being an exception, has a restricted application. Both
these sections cover cases where a female acquires property by way of gift or Will, but the
consequences mentioned are different. Where a female acquires property under a Will or a
gift and the case is covered under section 14(1), the limited interest would mature into an
absolute interest, but where it is governed by section 14(2), the limited interest would remain
a limited interest. This overlapping has created a confusion and has made this a focal point of
litigation.

3. Smt. Hussenabi v. Husenab Hasan AIR 1989 Kar 218

 Smt Hussenabi v Husensab Hasan1 a grandfather made an offer of a gift to his

grandchildren. He also accepted the offer on behalf of minor grandchildren.
However, no express of implied acceptance was made by a major grandson.
Karnataka HC held that since the three elements of the gift were not present in
the case of the major grandchild, the gift was not valid. It was valid in regards to
the minor grandchildren.
1
AIR 1989 Kant 218.
When a donor makes declaration of gift orally or in writing that must signifies
the clear and unambiguous intention of the donor to transfer the ownership of
property on the other person (donee). The gift made under Muslim in writing is
known as hibanama. It need not to be in stamp paper, attested or registered.

In case the gift ids made through the deed , registration of that is essential under
certain circumstances. It must be noted that registration by itself will not remove
any defects in the gift i.e. if the formalities of hiba are not followed. The
declaration made by the donor should be clear. A declaration of Gift in
ambiguous words is void.
Declaration simply signifies the intentions of the donor to make a gift. It is a
substantiation of the intention of the donor to transfer the ownership of the
property to the donee.

Free Consent: The declaration must be made by donor voluntarily and with
free consent. Any gift made by a donor under threat, force, coercion, influence
or fraud is not a valid gift.

Bona fide Intention: while declaration should made by the donor with bonafide
intention (good intention). If the intention of donor is not honest then the gift
made will be held ineffective. A gift made with an intention to defraud the
donee is void.

I. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFT

Under Muslim law gift is a contract therefore there must be proposal

(declaration) and acceptance (Qabul). It’s a bialateral transaction which will not
be effective until and unless other party accepts it. Even if gift is made through
registered instrument it requires acceptance of donee.

The acceptance of gift must be made before the death of the donor. It is also
very important to establish the factum of acceptance which can be done by the
overt act of the donee and which would in law amounts to taking possession of
property by the donee. The acceptance may be inferred, and it may be proved by
the donee’s possession of the property or the deed of the gift. So the acceptance
will be presumed if the possession of some interest, right, profit or benefit
accrues to one part, or some forbearance, detriment loss or responsibility is
given suffered or undertaken by the other.
 4. Mohd. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 605 ( Ayodhya Case)
This case is popularly known by the name of “Ayodhya Dispute Case”. This case witnessed
all the Prime Minister of Independent India. This dispute is a social, religious, historical and
political debate in India which centred on a plot of land in the city of Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh.
This was a very prolonged case and finally, the Supreme Court passed a verdict for case on
dated 9th November 2019.

Facts of the Case

It was the story of an Ayodhya city which cohabits both, Hindu (who claim birthplace of Lord
Rama) and Muslim (who see it as a city which locates Babri Mosque which was built by first
Mughal emperor, Babur in 1528). First religious violence in Ayodhya occurred in the year of
1850 over a nearby mosque at Hanuman Garhi. In this process, the Babri Mosque was
attacked by Hindus. Local Hindus always demand occasionally for the possession of the land
where Babri mosque was established and they should be allowed to build a temple on that
land. They believed that the Babri mosque was built by breaking a Hindu Temple. But, their
demand was always refused by the Colonial Government. On 22nd December 1949, an
offshoot of Hindu Mahasabha called Akhil Bharatiya Ramayana Mahasabha (ABRM)
organised 9 days continuous recitation of Ramcharitmanas. At the end of which, Hindu
activists broke into the mosque and established idols of Rama and Sita inside. Jawaharlal
Nehru ordered to remove idols but the same was refused by a local official, K.K.K. Nair
(known for his Hindu nationalist connections), claiming it would lead to communal riots. The
Police locked the gates and entry was banned for both, Hindu as well as Muslim. Priests were
allowed to enter for daily worship as idols were present inside and Mosque had been
converted into a de facto temple. Both Sunni Waqf Board and AMRM filed a civil suit in
local court claiming their religious rights on site.
The legal battle over Ayodhya began in 1950 when a petition was first filed by Gopal Singh
Visharad, who was refused entry. He was Ayodhya secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, an
organization formed to oppose the secular principle of the Congress party. The court dragged
on the issue for almost a decade and in 1959 the Nirmohi Akhara filed another complaint
claiming that the area should be in their possession. In response to the above-mentioned
lawsuits, the Sunni Central Waqf Council filed a counter-request in 1961. The Council was
established by Indian law to protect and preserve Muslim religious and cultural sites.
Issues raised
The issue of this case revolved around the possession of land traditionally regarded as the
birthplace of Lord Rama and the history of Babri Mosque.

One of the major issues of this case was:-

● Whether a previous Hindu temple was demolished or modified to construct a mosque

by Babur?

Written submission of parties to the case

After the long hearing of 14 days, the Supreme Court has given 3 days to all the parties of
this case to give written submission and clear what are they actually praying. Following are
the summary of written statements by different parties to this case:-

Nirmohi Akhara.
In the event that the verdict comes in favour of one of the Hindu parties, the Akhara should
retain the right to serve the deity.
The authorization to build a Ram temple on the disputed site and Nirmohi Akhara should be
authorized to manage the premises once the temple is built.
If the court decides to confirm the verdict of the High Court of Allahabad in 2010 and the
Muslim parties declare that they will not do any construction on the disputed site, the court
should ask the Muslim parties to give their share of the land to the Hindu parties. on a
long-term lease so that a large Ram temple can be built. (The verdict of the High Court of
Allahabad had divided the disputed land into three parts: the Sunni Waqf Council, the
Nirmohi Akhara and Ram Lalla)
The court should order the government to provide land to the Muslim side to build a mosque
outside the conflict area.
Ram Lalla Virajman

The written submission on behalf of Ram Lalla Virajman says that the court should give all of
the lands in dispute to Ram Lalla.
The statement stated that no part of the disputed land should be given to the Nirmohi Akhara
or the Muslim parties.
Ram Janambhoomi Punar Sudhar Samiti
Only a Ram temple should be allowed to be built on the disputed site in Ayodhya.
Once the temple is built, a trust must be formed to manage it.
Gopal Singh Visharad

Gopal Singh Visharad, whose ancestors would have performed rituals on the temple site for
centuries, argued that it is his constitutional right to offer prayers to Ram Janmabhoomi.
His statement said that there should be no compromise in the Ram Janmabhoomi case.
Sunni Waqf Board

The Commission has stated that it wishes to obtain the same remedy as that invoked at the
hearings. During the hearings, Commission counsel, Rajeev Dhawan, requested that the Babri
Masjid regain its form before being destroyed on December 6, 1992.
Hindu Mahasabha

The Supreme Court is expected to form a trust to oversee the management of the Ram temple
to be built on the disputed site in Ayodhya.
The Supreme Court should appoint an administrator to deal with this trust.
Shia Waqf Board

During their relief casting before the High Court of Allahabad, they said that the Muslim
parties should give up their claim on the disputed land and hand it over to the Hindu parties to
build a Ram temple.

In a written submission, the Shia Waqf board of directors said that a Ram temple should be
built on the disputed site in Ayodhya.
He stated that the Waqf Shiite council is the lawful owner of the disputed land, not the Waqf
Sunni council.
The land that was given to the Sunni Waqf Council in the High Court order should now be
given to the Hindu parties.

Judgement
The bench of five judges of the Supreme Court heard the litigation cases on the title from
August to October 2019. On 9th November 2019, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice
Ranjan Gogoi, announced its verdict; he quashed the previous ruling and ruled that the land
belonged to the government on the basis of the tax records. He further ordered that the land
be turned over to a trust for the construction of the Hindu temple. He also ordered the
government to donate another five-acre piece of land to the Waqf Sunni Council to build the
mosque.

Following are the top ten points that were highlighted in the Judgement of this case:-

● The Supreme Court granted the entire 2.77 acres of disputed land in Ayodhya to the
deity Ram Lalla.
● The Supreme Court ordered the government of Central and Uttar Pradesh to allocate
5-acre alternative land to Muslims in a prominent location to build a mosque.
● The court asked the Center to consider giving some sort of representation to Nirmohi
Akhara for setting up a trust. Nirmohi Akhara was the third party to the Ayodhya
conflict.
● The Supreme Court rejected the plea of Nirmohi Akhara, who sought to control all of
the disputed lands, claiming that it was its custodian.
● The Supreme Court ordered the Union government to create a trust in 3 months for
the construction of the Ram Mandir on the disputed site where Babri Masjid was
demolished in 1992.
● The Supreme Court said that the structure below the disputed site in Ayodhya was not
an Islamic structure, but the Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) did not establish whether a
temple was demolished to build a mosque.
● The court also declared that the Hindus regard the disputed site as the birthplace of
Lord Ram while the Muslims also say the same thing about the site of Babri Masjid.
● The court also declared that the Hindus’ belief that Lord Rama was born on the
disputed site where Babri Masjid was once, cannot be challenged.
● The Supreme Court also declared that the 1992 demolition of the 16th-century Babri
Masjid mosque was a violation of the law.
● While reading its judgment, the Supreme Court declared that the UP’s Waqf Central
Sunni Council had not established its cause in the Ayodhya dispute and that the
Hindus had established that they were in possession of the outer courtyard of the site
in dispute.