M Flo 000000 Hsog Pro 000043 - 03

Form No.
: 646404-37F-0001 Rev: 02 Date: - Last Date Reviewed: / /

Document Title: Commented by Doc. Number OMC Transmittal/ Letter No Date Rev. No.
Operations Maintenance NB,BG,MK,SD,ID,MS,HK,OH,KAI,KB, DD, MA, FK, TM 21-Jun-23
M-FLO-000000-HSOG-PRO-000043 M-FLO-SNC-TRL-1384 03
Hazard Log Line 4,5,6 Metro Service Delivery
PMS Transmittal No. SNC/ M-SNC-FLO-TRL-1269 Document Review Code: A - REVIEWED AND PROCEED
Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Rev. No: 03 C - OBJECTION
D - REJECTED
E - REVIEW NOT REQUIRED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
NO. CLAUSE # / SECTION # DESCRIPTION OF COMMENTS REPLY / SOLUTIONS / Status
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Rail
Safe
ty
Major: FLOW to include a word document explaining the Hazard log, its purpose and scope
1 General ID/MS Agree; done Closed
and the content of each column, and in addition a section should explain the risk categorisation.
Minor: Column Q should contain existing mitigations (D&B mitigations) while currently it contains
2 General ID/MS Agree; This is reflected in the HL Procedure. Closed
O&M plans and mitigations. O&M mitigations and plans should be in column V rather than Q.
The following order is now reflected in the O&M Hazard Log to demonstrate the risk reduction to ALARP
Major: The columns should follow a logical order (between colomn Q to Y) from intial risk
- Initial Risk Ranking
towards the ALARP argument. (hazard identified-> Causes of the hazard-> consequences ->
3 General ID/MS - D&B Mitigation Closed
the risk ranking if available -> what have done the D&B to lower the risk -> what will the O&M do
- O&M Mitigation
to make it ALARP)
- Residual Risk Ranking
Some of FLOW sourced hazards also contain a D&B reference. For example FLOW-HZL-- Correct: where there are clear links between the O&M identified hazards and the D&B Hazard log this will be cross referenced. The cross referencing of the
4 General ID/MS Closed
SEC.00001 states that the source is FLOW but also contains a D&B reference from TSY. D&B Hazard ID's is a clear link to the D&B Mitigations and associated studies.
Agreed, this review is completed. The Hazard Log will be under review as part of the Licence application, through the trial run phase, and into commercial
service.
As per the Contractual requirement when relevant, references to supporting data and risk assessments undertaken and cross references to the D&B Hazard
Log;
More Detailed added for Hazard causes, consequences and mitigations.
2nd Cycle response:

Minor: Hazard causes and relative consequnces seem to be undefined or without suffficient Consequences/causes are reviewed and demonstrated to PMS during workshop
detail (excluding the SRACS and standards exported requirements). Likewise mitigation
measures seem to be irrelevant at many times to the hazard being discussed. Please review The Hazard Log is a live document and will be reviewed cyclical. In addition to the cyclical review as per our HSE-PR-00032 Operation and Maintenance
5 General the entire HL and update where necessary. ID/MS Hazard Log and HSE-PR-013-01 System Risk Management Procedure we will also review the HSE-RG-00002 O&M Hazard Log in the following: Closed
•Verification by documentation
2nd Cycle comment: •Verification by Trial run
Please review as consequences/causes are wrong in many cases. See new comments. •Verification at commercial service-12 month review
•Or as a result of audit/incident/investigation etc
•Changes to relevant legislation within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
•Response to TGA Safety Alerts as required,
•Introduction of new technology, plant or equipment,
•New operational requirements as a result of introduction of new technology.
•Changes to asset owner Requirements
•Changes in TGA Guidance Notes
Form No.: 646404-37F-0001 Rev: 02 Date: - Last Date Reviewed: / /

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Added Overspeed due to incorrect input of TSR by OCC
Added HSE-PR-026-01 On Call Procedure

The O&M Additional measures such as permit to work procedure (which also occurs in many
other hazards which it is unrelated to) and OPE-IN-00444 Possession Management Lines 4 & the existing mitigations should include a SIG SIL4 system included
6, OPE-IN-00445 Possession Management Line 5 are not relevant for this hazard.
6 FLOW-HZL-IM.00007 Furthermore, the existing mitigations should include a SIG SIL4 system for example. ID/MS 2nd Cycle response: Closed
the permit to work, possessions management are required to access the asset in response to the hazard or consequences. Electrical WI's cover the fittings as
2nd Cycle comment: described. Please note that these are prone to collapse without maintenance.
Please clarify why the permit to work, possessions management, electrical WIs are relevant
O&M mitigations for this hazard.
Agreed
Move Poor Lighting/Visibility to Hazard Cause
Also add ignition source (maintenance activity error or incorrect tools-not intrinsically safe)
Fire and explosion are to remain a consequence.
Agreed, added emergency lighting and HVAC and TVS.
Poor visibility and fire or explosion are the cause of the hazard not its consequence. Hazard: Confined spaces working
Exisitng mitigations should include: emergency lighting, HVAC etc. Intoxication, asphyxiation,high enviro temp, fall from height, falling objects, collapse, collision will be added.
7 FLOW-HZL-IM.00026 2nd Cycle Response: ID/MS Note: All confined spaces hazards merged into one (FLOW-HZL-IM.00025 to FLOW-HZL-IM.00027 into FLOW-HZL-IM.00024) Closed
The hazard cell contains too many hazards which are not inter-related. Each one
2nd cycle response:
should have its own hazard, cause and consequence e.g. how can you relate Please note that FLOW-HZL-IM.00026 deleted and merged into FLOW-HZL-IM.00024 as an overarching confined space hazard. It is the OMC view that
between confined space working, fall from height and collision. Please align relevant specific confined spaces working are to have task risk assessments applied in conjuction with PTW procedure and not a system risk assessment for each
hazards and mitigations when separating these hazards. scenario. As such TRA and PTW procedures are reference as O&M controls along with the confined spaces risk assessment form.
Clarity must be provided on the hazard itself. Just stating viaduct painting is not sufficient. What
Agreed; Intoxication, asphyxiation,high enviro temp, fall from height, falling objects, collapse, collision will be added.
is the exact hazard here? Is it the collapse of the scaffold? Or unsecured tools? Or exposure to
chemicals? Please define properly.
Weather events/heat etc will also be added to the hazard cause
Likewise some causes are missing. For example misuse/absence of correct PPE is a cause for
8 FLOW-HZL-IM.00031 ID/MS Agreed: misuse/absence of correct PPE Closed
this hazard.
2nd Cycle Response:
2nd Cycle Response:
The hazard was agreed with PMS during the workshop. The hazard is not random or unrelated. Hazard will be deleted and refer to the work at height and
The original hazard has been removed and replaced with a list of random unrelated top level
hazardous subtances (Hazardous substances FLOW-HZL-HSE.00004 & FLOW-HZL-HSE-00009)
hazards. Please clarify.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
The hazard requires clarity. Sharp edges does not provide any information about what the
actual hazard is. What is this hazard specifically related to in terms of sharp edges? Do you
mean sharp edges on seats in the station? Sharp edges on tools?? Etc etc.
Hazard: Sharp edges maintenance or replacement of assets, glass, tiles, doors, metal cabinets, access covers, ducting, tools
Likewise the hazard cause states extreme weather/temperature. How is this a cause for sharp
edges? Sharp edges can cause fatality, not only blood loss but loss of consciousness leading to fall from height
Also is it likely that sharp edges will cause a fatality? if not please amend. Agreed, remove extreme weather
9 FLOW-HZL-IM.00039 ID/MS Closed
2nd Cycle Response: 2nd Cycle Response:
The hazard must be better defined such as contact with sharp edges. The cause then becomes Removed replacement of assets in the hazard title and put it as hazard cause.
the replacement of assets etc.and we agree with current hazard causes listed.
Add Extreme weather damaging asset in hazard cause ( eg. broken window/glass)
3rd cycle comment:
Minor: Mention of type of glass provided by D&B (tempered glass) would be good design 26.02.2022 D&B Mitigation added
mitigation to include.
Power rail in itself is not a hazard. Electrocution by power rail is a hazard. Please define your
Agreed, Hazard: Exposure to Traction Power
hazards properly with sufficient detail.
LPIC training (testing and short circuit device & PPE)
The hazard cause should include lack of proper PPE.
Design elements of the mitigations to be included.
Existing mitigations should include the cover on the third rail, Circuit breakers, ACID system,
10 FLOW-HZL-IM.00045 equipment testing and bonding etc. ID/MS Closed
Damaged or missing power rail cover also to be added as hazard cause
2nd Cycle comment:
2nd Cycle Response:
Exposure to traction power is not in itself a hazard. A hazard would for example be
The OMC disagree, electrocution by power rail is a consequence
electrocution by power rail.
PMS second point is incomplete sentence.
The consequence is
Hazard cause makes no sense.

11 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00005 ID/MS Agreed, Hazard Cause is modified to be clearer, also column (L: Consequence) is modified for this hazard line. Closed
The severity score does not correlate with consequences mentioned in column L.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
The hazard should be electrocution by contact with the PSD. Agreed, the hazard and cause is modified to include (Poor maintenance, Incorrect installation, Component failure and Maintenance error).
Cause should also include poor maintenance and aging of the asset. Optimal emergency response added to the mitgation measures
HSE-PR-003-01 First Aid Procedure
12 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00007 Optimal emergency response should be included in the mitgation measures. ID/MS HSE-MA-00014-01 Emergency Response Plan Manual Closed
EHS Training OM-IND-06 EHS Induction exempted for High Risks Activities
2nd cycle comment:
The hazard should be electrocution due to contact with faulty PSD. Liekwise the hazard cause 2nd Cycle Response:
should state electrical fault of PSD due to (and then the listed causes). Disagree with Electrocution as hazard, this is a consequence.
Agreed, the hazard cause column for this hazard line has been modified in line with the comment.
The hazard consequences column for this hazard line has been modified in line with the comment.
2nd Cycle Response:

Disagree with collision between maitenance vehicle and passenger vehicle as hazard.
The hazard cause can be lack of training, fatigue, etc.
Added in Hazard Cause - Operator error - incorrect route set
Furthermore train collision and collision between maintenance vehicles is the hazard itself not Driver error - Failure to observe point of conflict signage
the consequence. Also fatility and injury should be included as consequences. Lineside signage obscured or missing / not maintained
2nd Cycle comment: Added in column Q - Point of conflict signage

13 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00026 The hazard should state collision between maitenance vehicle and passenger vehicle. Should ID/MS CBTC SIL 4 Signaling System Closed
there be any involvement of the OCC in the O&M controls? please clarify. If yes please update
O&M controls. Added O&M Control: Rulebook
OPE-IN-109-01 Manual Train Operation Lines 4&6
3rd cycle comment: OPE-IN-209-01 Manual Train Operation Line 5
The hazard is not clear. What do you mean? is it a collision between maintenance vehicle and
passenger vehicle or is it maintenance vehicle colliding with passengers?
3rd cycle comment: 29.06.2022 - FLOW Comment
It is maintenance vehicle colliding with passengers. Hazard line FLOW-HZL-TSM.00026 has been reworded to be more clear
“Conflicting movement between:
- Maintenance Vehicle and Staff (i.e staff working on track),
- Maintenance Vehicle and Passenger (i.e passenger evacuation on Level Crossing)”
The Hazard “collision between maintenance vehicle and passenger vehicle” is covered in hazard line FLOW-HZL-TSM.00024
14
Major: There are a number of documents (for example SEC-PR-016-01 Major Incident
Document) which have been provided as existing mitigation however these do not appear to
have been drafted or submitted to PMS for review. Not all documents are to be submitted to PMS (eg. WI's)
note: to checked the list of Security documents to be submitted to PMS
Please review all mitigation documents and clarify status.
15 Existing Mitigation NB/BG Closed
Process on the way sent by Hamad to BG and SB last 4th of August informally
13.11.2022 - the PMS is aware that the document referred to is not a contractual obligation for
submission to the PMS. The PMS is further aware that the issue regarding Major Incidents has 29.06.2022 This was discussed between FLOW Security and PMS
been addressed in the OMC's Emergency Response Plan. The PMS has no further
comments.(JV)

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
The risk matrix should be identified within this

Refer to O&M Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-00032 and System Risk Management Procedure
document to prevent human error or to allow
How is the risk rating identified – please clarify ?
correct evaluation.
16 BG The hazard log form (HSE-RG-0002) will be incorporated into HSE-PR-00032 Closed
Closed ID
No reference to O&M Hazard Log Procedure
Risk Matrix added to HSE-RG-00002 (Lookup sheet)
HSE-PR-00032 in the document.
Risk Rating
Agreed, Refer to O&M Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-00032

Likelihood should be changed to Probability as per the log itself.
17 Look up BG Closed
Frequency is the word we used to align in the System Risk Management Procedure
There should also be a definition of what each of the likelihood sub-headings are?
Servi
ce
Deliv
HK/OH/KAl
610 hazards do not have a post ‘existing mitigation’ residual risk rating. Please can this be s
18 General See comment 2 from ID/MS. Existing mitigations will now include ref to D&B controls Closed
extracted from FAST.
HK/OH/KAl
19 General Explanation of Risk Factor needs to be clearer. s Refer to O&M Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-00032 and System Risk Management Procedure Closed
HK/OH/KAl
s Awaiting D&B source for the exported requirement. This could be source document or safety study for example.
20 General Why are some columns in brown? – D&B Source. Closed
HK/OH/KAl
s
The ‘lookup’ tab needs more information and explanation.
21 General Risk calculation is confusing. It should be in matrix form. Please put definitions of risk probability Refer to O&M Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-00032 and System Risk Management Procedure Closed
and impact and specify probability and impact matrix that allow individual project risks to be
divided into priority groups.
General Clarify if, Training, certification of competence, Work Brieifngs, Tool Box Talks, Emergency KB These items are contained within the documents mentioned. eg.
drills, pre equipment checks and tests etc, should be added as forms of "Existing Mitigations" as training and certification is Competence Management Procedure, Briefings and Toolbox talks are PTW procedure and rulebook. Pre quipment checks are in
most mitigations within are related to Documentation that is put into place? the WI's such as MoR's for OPE and MS's for IM and TSM.
22 Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00001 Clarify if "Bomb Treat at station" should be seperated into three hazards considering the KB AGREED
different type of stations and different outcomes of at grade, elevated and underground? 29/06/21 DRCS M-FLO-000000-HS0G-RGR-000006
Reviewed with Security Team.
Hazard separated in different Stations, ( FLOW-HZL-SEC-00001 Bomb threat/activation Elevated Station, FLOW-HZL-SEC.00029 Bomb threat/activation
Shallow Underground Station, FLOW-HZL-SEC.00030 Bomb threat/activation Deep Underground Station)
Removed SEC-PR-016-01 Major Incident Document and Added Mitigation SEC-IN-00024 Security Threat Instruction and SEC-PR-00034 Security Threat
23 Procedure Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00001 Consider including, Luggage/Bags left by passengers in the station or platform, in "Hazard KB AGREED
Cause"?
24 Closed
Added Luggage/Bags left by passengers in the station or platform, in "Hazard Cause

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00001 Consider including, Bags/Equipment left by Staff/Contractors working within the station/back KB AGREED
25 office etc?, in "Hazard Cause". Closed
Added Bags/Equipment left by Staff/Contractors working within the station/back office etc
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00001 Considering including, Inhaling Smoke and Dust in "Consequenes". KB AGREED
26 Closed
Added Inhaling Smoke and Dust in "Consequenes
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00002 Clarify if the "Subsystem" should be Train? KB CLARIFICATION

and FLOW-HZL-SEC-
27 00003 Added: Subsystem clarified to Emergency Walkway/Access/Egress Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00003 Consider including Staff in "Who Exposed" as they may be on board the train? KB AGREED
28 and Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00004 Added Staff on Who are Exposed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00004 Clarify if , Train and Station should be seperated as mitigations and consequences to this KB AGREED
hazard will be different?
29 Yes, separated (Added FLOW-HZL-SEC.00031PBIED Attack (Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device) in the Train) Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00004 Consider including most of the "Hazard Cause" items from "Bomb Threat" in the PBIED hazard KB AGREED
30 casue as they are also relevant? Closed
Added the Hazard Cause of "Bomb Threat"
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00005 Consider including Staff in the "Who Exposed" as they may be present at stations. KB AGREED
31 Closed
Added Staff in 'Who Exposed'
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00006 Consider including Staff and Contractors in the "Who Exposed" as they may be present at KB AGREED
stations.
Added Staff (Contractors included on the definition of Staff as per FLOW Operations and Maintenance Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-032-01) on 'Who
32 Closed
Exposed'
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00010 Consider including, lazy security checks/access-egress gate locks being left open in the KB AGREED
"Hazard Cause".
Added and Reworded: Staff negligence during security checks/access-egress gate locks being left open
33 Added TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management System Procedure as Mitigation Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00010 Consider including Theft of property/equipment in the "consequences" section. KB AGREED

34 Closed
Added Theft of property/equipment in the consequences
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00013 Consider including, lazy security checks/access-egress gate locks being left open in the KB AGREED
"Hazard Cause".
Added and Reworded: Staff negligence during security checks/access-egress gate locks being left open
35 Added TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management System Procedure as Mitigation Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00019 Clarify how CBR hazard is R4 after the mitigations, considering the many types of attacks that KB
are well beyond and above an operators scope of mitigation? FLOW is not aware of any CBR attacks within KSA or GCC
Furthermore, FLOW has Emergency Plans and Procedures, Trained, Competent Staff to prevent or minimize the likelihood of such an Attack and an Incident
Command Structure that are crucial in responding to such Attack. With the involvement of KSA Emergency Services.
36 Closed

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
FLOW-HZL-SEC-00019 Clarify how your mitigations for CBR has resulted in (R4) but for Hostile Vehicle Attack is (R3) KB CLARIFICATION
37 FLOW are aware that VBIED have occurred within the past 20 years, therefore consider more likely than CBR. Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00020 Clarify why the initial rating of (R4) for this Hazard is so low, considering your customers or staff KB CLARIFICATION
may be exposed to ignited fires or slips and trips causing injury?
38 Initial Risk Rating adjusted from R4 to R3 on reviewed with Security functional specialist Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00020 Clarify why your exisitng mitigations have not improved this Hazard? KB CLARIFICATION
39 After reviewed with Security functional specialist, the mitigations provided the Risk Rating improved R3 to R4 Closed
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00023 Clarify why the initial rating of (R4) for this Hazard is so low, considering your customers or staff KB CLARIFICATION
may be exposed to VBIED or electrocution prior to apllying any mitigations?
40 After reviewed with Security functional specialist: Closed
Initial Risk Rating adjusted from R4 to R2
Residual Risk Rating adjusted from R4 to R3
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00023 Clarify why your exisitng mitigations have not improved this Hazard? KB CLARIFICATION
After reviewed with Security functional specialist, the mitigations provided the Risk Rating improved R2 To R3
41 Closed
FLOW-HZL-IM.00013 Clarify if R2 residual risk is acceptable and ALARP following your application of existing KB
mitigations, taking into account your customers may be exposed to "fatality/major injury/being
struck by a vehicle? Agreed, Residual Ranking is now R3.
42 Closed
Reviewed and Updated Initial and Residual Rating. In reference to the DRCS M-FLO-000000-HS0G-RGR-000006 comment.
ALARP Statement Updated
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00247 Clarify why incomplete? KB Below Hazards were deleted after advised from Operations Managers
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00248 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00247
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00458 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00248
43 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00476 Closed
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00458 - Completed
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00476 - Awaiting D&B Information

FLOW-HZL-TSM.00013 Clarify why the existing mitigation have not reduced the residual risk from R3 to R4 as this KB
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00014 implies your list of mitigations are ineffected? The risk at residual risk has been assessed after considering the existing mitigation, the risk's frequency has been modified to (F:Incredible), risk ranking is now
44 Closed
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00015 R4.
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00028 Clarify why the initial rating of (R4) for this Hazard is so low, considering your customers are KB
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00029 exposed to major injuries prior to apllying any mitigations?
The risk at resdiual risk has been assessed after considering the existing mitigation, the risk's frequency has been modified to (F:Incredible), risk ranking is now
45 Closed
R4.
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00028 Clarify why your exisitng mitigations have not improved this Hazard? KB Agreed, risk assessment modified.
46 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00029 Closed
Asse

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Comment agreed, linear heat detection is added. The hazard line for additional mitigation have been reviewed and updated. i.e. Linear heat detection cable
removal and installation-Corrective , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-02603 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-02096
On-board fire detection system shall be maintained in accordance to maintenance procedure
31.10.2021 MK
and maintenance plan
2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive , Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
Internal Smoke Detector Maintenance And Calibration- Preventive, ref. TSM-MS-05637
Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813 maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
47 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00003 Smoke Detector Cleaning, ref. TSM-MS-05660 MK Closed
The above mitigation is added in the hazard log. The mitigation should include preventitive
Smoke detector test , ref. TSM-MS-05737
maintenance tasks that check the condition of
the linear heat detection.
Please confirm if smoke detection is the only method of Fire detection?
Agreed, column updated.

31.10.2021 MK
Maintenance of train system shall be maintained in accordance to maintenance procedures 2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive , Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
and maintenance plan. Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813 maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
48 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00003 MK Closed
No Procedures have been listed? maintenance tasks that check the condition of
This safety requirement is transferred from DBC. OMC has received it from DBC, OMC is not authorised to reword it, hence rejected. 31.10.2021 MK
Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
Please refer to - IGBT Radiator Checking and Light , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12357 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01241 maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
[D&B Transferred -commented-] [TSY.RQ_SHA_086.MAIN: In accordance with maintenance The mitigation should include preventitive
plan. 8 years inspection on traction must include: 2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive , maintenance tasks that check the condition of
- IGBT and capacitor exchangers shall be cleaned and inspected ] Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813 the linear heat detection.
Please confirm the relavance of 8 Years inspection and include the specific documents as 29.06.2022 Please refer on FLOW reply above mentoning the preventive Maintainance
mitigation. Also, please reword 'Capacitor Exchangers' as this needs clarity?
31.10.2021 MK
Agreed, The hazard line has been reviewed and updated. The hazard is related to train and depot equipment. Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
Fire in Depot - Depot Equipment/ Maintenance
Column 'I:Hazard Owner' is now modified to include Rolling Stock, also Column 'KHazard Cause' is modified to include depot equipment staff error. maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
50 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00005 Please make the hazard title clear as to what the actual hazard is associated to as the MK Closed
The mitigation should include preventitive
mitigation relate to the train. maintenance tasks that check the condition of
2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive ,
Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813 the linear heat detection.
The above mitigation is added in the hazard log.

i.e. Main contactor visual inspection and cleaning- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12245 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00941
[D&B Transferred -commented-] [TSY.RQ_SHA_091.MAIN: In accordance with maintenance
plan. 1 year inspection on CVS must include:
2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive ,
- General inspection: Connection status - Flash sign - Cubicle tightness - Cleanliness - Earthing
Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813
braid connection - Check if drainage parts are not clogged - Mechanical fixations of main
The above mitigation is added in the hazard log.
components - Check of the seals of sealed compartments 31.10.2021 MK
- Visual inspection and cleaning of main contactor Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
- Visual inspection and cleaning of the precharge contactor maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
- Check the discharge time of the capacitors (by the software). The mitigation should include preventitive
- Visual inspection of the Voltage presence indicator maintenance tasks that check the condition of
- Checking of the output diode and replacement if it is in short-circuit] the linear heat detection.
Please include the specific documents as mitigation.


D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Agreed, the mitigation column has been reviewed and updated.

31.10.2021 MK
Internal Smoke Detector Maintenance And Calibration- Preventive, ref. TSM-MS-05637, Smoke
2nd Cycle: Visually inspect the Linear Heat Detection cable task is already covered in the maintenance plan, referring to - Visual inspection-Preventive , Additional mitigation given relates to corrective
detector test , ref. TSM-MS-05737
Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12136 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00813 maintenance i.e cable removal and installation.
The above has been repeated. This also is evident in other hazard mitigations through out the
maintenance tasks that check the condition of
document.
Rolling Stock & Depot Equipment - General

53 General The document numbers within the Harzard log given are different to Aconex numbers for MK Document now is reviewed and updated. Internally all referenced documents are recognized by the operators and maintainers. T Closed
the same document. Hazard log has alternative reference numbers,see Aconex.
Fleet & Asset Maintenance Management FAMM Procedure ref. TSM-PR-00010 The mitigations within the referenced document are consolidated in the FLOW level documents, and replaced by:
54 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00008 MK -Rule Book ref. OPE-PR-007-01 31.10.2021 MK Closed
The above referenced document does not exist within Aconex. -Fault Management Procedure ref. AMS-PR-005-01
In line with procedure in Train Wake up-Asleep System Tests Procedure ref. M3-TSY-PRO-SYS00-T20-000096, Wake up/ Auto – As per design if the wake
After intervention on the train, the functional test are carried out before train insertion, combined up/auto test is unsuccessful the train cannot be inserted to the mainline.
55 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00009 tests are performed before train insertion. In case of failure, trains cannot be inserted. MK Please also note that we refer to: 31.10.2021 MK Closed
Please specify the test and reference the documents. OPE-IN-115-01 Minimum Operating Requirements Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-215-01 Minimum Operating Requirements Line 5
Yes as discussed it is a separate HR procedure. FLOW Disciplinary Policy and Procedure applies when appropriate ref. HUR-PR-012-01 A02
Competency management are referenced:
DM Depot Manual Mode speed restriction 10 km/h shall be respected and followed.
TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management System Procedure
56 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00015 MK TRA-PL-001-01 Training Plan 31.10.2021 MK Closed
Please confirn if a Disciplinary procedure will be implemented if violations of speed limits are
HSE-FO-015-01 Safety Critical Roles and Responsibilities Matrix
ignored.
HSE-PR-014-01 Task Risk Assessment Procedure
57 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00016 Please specify the test and reference the documents. MK Agreed, column updated. 31.10.2021 MK Closed
Yes as discussed it is a separate HR procedure. FLOW Disciplinary Policy and Procedure applies when appropriate ref. HUR-PR-012-01 A02
Competency management are referenced:
TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management System Procedure
Please confirn if a Disciplinary procedure will be implemented if violations of rules are
58 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00022 MK TRA-PL-001-01 Training Plan 31.10.2021 MK Closed
ignored. HSE-FO-015-01 Safety Critical Roles and Responsibilities Matrix
HSE-PR-014-01 Task Risk Assessment Procedure

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Mitigations added for Lighting system is maintained, e.g.:

- Headlights Cleaning , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-00285 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01088
59 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00024 Please confirm how the 'Maintenance Vehicle driver low vision' is mitigated? MK 31.10.2021 MK Closed
- HSE-PR-004-01 B Fitness for Duty Procedure
Also visual tests are considered in Competence Management System Procedure ref. TRA-PR-001-01
Train preps are carried out prior to entering train service and will also cover interior
60 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00028 MK Agreed, mitigation is updated, referred to OPE-FO-118-01 Train Preparation Check list – Line 4&6 31.10.2021 MK Closed
inspection etc. PMS suggest including these processes as mitigations.

[D&B Transferred] [TSY.RQ_PHA_207.MAIN: Maintenance Plan of the axle and gear box has
2nd cycle: Maintenance Plan of the axle and gear box is covered by the below:
to be respected.] 31.10.2021 MK
61 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00029 MK -TSM-PL-04002 RST Maintenance Services Plan_Line 4&6 Closed
Unable to locate update?
-TSM-PL-04003 RST Maintenance Services Plan_ Line 5
Please provide document reference number for Axle maintenance.
i.e. - Gearbox Main Overhaul- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12199 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00890
(Highlighted in blue)
[D&B Transferred] [TSY.SSS_PE_TSY_034.MAIN: In case of PSD failure, O&M shall follow

appropriate procedures described in the manuals.]
62 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00030 MK Agreed, column updated. 31.10.2021 MK Closed
Please specify the appropriate procedures as described in manuals.
[D&B Transferred] [TSY.SSS_PE_TSY_034.MAIN: In case of PSD failure, O&M shall follow

appropriate procedures described in the manuals.]
63 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00034 MK Agreed, column updated. 31.10.2021 MK Closed
Please specify the appropriate procedures as described in manuals.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
[D&B Transferred -commented-] [TSY.RQ_SHA_097.MAIN: In accordance with maintenance

plan. 3 months inspection on semi-permanent bars must include:
[D&B Transferred -commented-] [TSY.RQ_SHA_099.MAIN: In accordance with maintenance Column is updated with example i.e. - Replacement of Coupler Wearing Bar-Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-05624 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-
64 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00036 plan. 3 months inspection on automatic couplers must include: MK IN-01069 CLOSED - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
- Inspection every 3 months- Preventive-Automatic Coupler , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12126 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00794
Please provide document reference numbers for the two above statements.
Note that this also applies for all hazards, with 'D&B tranferred -commented' statements and
will need to be updated throughout the complete document.
Fleet & Asset Maintenance Management FAMM Procedure ref. TSM-PR-00010, Section IV, B3
to 6. The mitigations within the referenced document are consolidated in the FLOW level documents, and replaced by:
65 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00040 MK -Rule Book ref. OPE-PR-007-01 CLOSED - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
The referenced document is not available on Aconex? Please update with correct -Fault Management Procedure ref. AMS-PR-005-01
document number and update all relavant sections within Hazard log.
Chocks / blocks not removed on the track or behind the wheels
Maintenance Error
The chocks/blocks as a cause is removed, it is not applicable for Normal Mode.
Please give details of how the above Hazard Causes will be mitigated.
66 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00040 MK CLOSED - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
HVAC related document is referring to securing the train component against falling on the track, which could cause deformation and derailment, in the context
Condensate and drainage water circuits cleaning (Drainage Water Discharge Circuit of wheel-track interface hazard.
Assembly), ref. TSM-MS-12463
Also,Please confirm why this HVAC related document has been referenced for this Hazard?
All method statements and checklists are including closing boxes and well fix e.g. Condensate This control measure is to ensure securing the train components against falling on the track, which could cause deformation and derailment, in the context of
and drainage water circuits cleaning (Drainage Water Discharge Circuit Assembly), ref. TSM- wheel-track interface hazard. 31.10.2021 MK
67 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00040 MS-12463 MK Closed
Ambigious original wording now removed.
Please re-word the above to make it clear to read and understand.
-Agreed, column updated.
-This control measure is to ensure securing the train components against falling on the track, which could cause deformation/derailment.
All method statements and checklists are including closing boxes and well fix e.g. Condensate
and drainage water circuits cleaning (Drainage Water Discharge Circuit Assembly), ref. TSM-
68 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00042 MS-12463 MK CLOSED - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
Please re-word the above to make it clear to read and understand.
Also,Please confirm why this HVAC related document has been referenced for this Hazard?

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Agreed, control measures updated.
2nd Cycle:
Train preps are carried out prior to entering train service and will also cover interior inspection etc.
OPE-FO-118-01 Train Preparation Check list – Line 4&6
Closing of workorders is to be performed prior to train preparation to revenue service

Please include further mitigations such as train prep, ensuring that the maintenance
-CMMS FUNCTIONAL DESIGN MAINTENANCE AMS-SP-001-01 OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD: Train preparation
69 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00042 personell are fully trained and competant. Also personell are assessed/audited at MK Closed
- OPE-FO-118-01 Train Preparation Check list – Line 4&6 form document number to be referenced
appropriate intervals and other examples of mitigations ect.
Added: OPE-IN-109-01 Manual Train Operation Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-209-01 Manual Train Operation Line 5
OPE-FO-118-01 Train Preparation Checklist Form - Lines 4&6
OPE-FO-218-01 Train Preparation Checklist Form - Line 5
Competence Management Procedure highlighted
Agreed, work instruction related to Stinger is updated. i.e. Use of Stinger System WI ref. TSM-RE0T-INS-S300-00186
(Note: Wording not updated in FAST HL AD1 version) 2nd Cycle:

OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD: Mitigation measures
TSM WI requested by RAMS Manager A.Ismail. Agreed, we confirm it is covered in section (5.Competencies or qualifications) of the document: - Stinger Inspection & Maintenance , Method Statement ref.
70 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00063 MK should also include competence management Closed
TSM-MS-07124- , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00493
in the instruction & use of stinger system
Please update as above Also competence management reference is added in the column.
Note: This is now removed in the hazard log. Communication with D&B in Aug 2021 advising of the error as this is not a passenger hazard.
OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD: What are the

differences between FLOW-HZL-TSM.00065 &
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00066? If 00066 contains the
This hazard is transferred from DBC to OMC following the transfer process agreed
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00060 same hazard as 00065, mitigations should be
Passengers transportation Hazards
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00062 the same with additional mitigations for hazard
Updated D&B PROVIDED & EXPORTED EXISTING CONTROL(S) and O&M CONTROL(S) for FLOW-HZL-TSM.00065 and FLOW-HZL-TSM.00066,
71 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00064 MK 00066. Closed
Please elaborate title with details
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00065
29.06.2022 Please note that FLOW-HZL-TSM.00065 & FLOW-HZL-TSM.00066 are different safety requirements that is why they have different Mitigations
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00066
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00064
Control measures column is updated in line with the comment. OPEN - 01/11/2021-SD: FLOW-HZL-
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00065
72 Please provide complete list of mitigatons MK TSM.000069 should describe Fire on-board Closed
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00067
Updated D&B PROVIDED & EXPORTED EXISTING CONTROL(S) and O&M CONTROL(S) for FLOW-HZL-TSM.000069. relevant to mitigation measures.
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00069
OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD
(Note: Wording not updated in FAST HL AD1 version) The exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a FAST source in column B. These exported requirements have gone through
Please update as above a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed
between the 3 parties. The request is therefore rejected.
Also, more detail of that Hazard is needed? We will update when we recieve the information from D&B. Please note that a letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
22.06.22 MK OPEN as per OMC comments 29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
We will update when we recieve the information from D&B. Please note that a letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682 OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD
29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
(Note: Wording not updated in FAST HL AD1 version) FAST Response on SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context(shared through email): The Safety Requirements tagged SRAC (most of the
Please update as above Safety Requirements provided as example) are the Safety requirements coming from the Products’ Manuals or from the Standards which have to be re-
exported to the O&M and the end-user.
22.06.22 MK OPEN as per OMC comments It is a normal practice that the products’ suppliers are not exporting the risks but only the Safety Related Applicable Conditions.
74 General MK Closed
3rd cycle comment: The SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context will be put in a seperate tab inside the HSE-RG-00002 and HSE-PR-00032 will be updated on the
change.
Comment not addressed. Comment closure pending till provision of D&B information.
The Residual Ranking, FAST did not provide the Severity and Frequency. As per the FAST Safety Policy the Quantitative values (Frequency and Severity) are
required only for the quantitative risk analyses (CSM method C)with fast.
For FLOW identified hazards and hazard cuases have been reviewed and modified when needed.
Column 'B', the exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a FAST source. These exported hazards and requirements have
75 General Titles and Hazard causes need to have more specific wording. MK 31.10.2021 MK Closed
gone through a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which
previously agreed between the 3 parties. Therefore can't be altered.
TSY.RQ_PHA_176.MAIN The replacement of watertightness gaskets of train's subsystems

Agreed, the control measure column has been updated adding control measures.e.g. - Top Gasket Replacement , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-00260 ,
shall be done following suppliers recommendations
76 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00074 MK Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01060 Closed - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
- Radiator gasket replacement- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-02358 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01212
Please provide specific document references as mitigation
OPEN - 01/11-2021 - SD Please refer to

The exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a FAST source in column B. These exported requirements have gone through
procedure for controlling pest infestation also.
77 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00075 Please be specific as to what this Hazard is relating to? MK a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed Closed
between the 3 parties. The request is therefore rejected.
Please be specific as to what this Hazard is relating to? Also reword for better clarity and
78 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00076 MK a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed Closed - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
understanding. between the 3 parties. The request is therefore rejected.
TSY.RQ_PHA_195.MAIN In accordance to the maintenance plan. Appropriate maintenance of

the train filters shall be done regularly to limit the accumulation of waste liable to ignite (fire risk). Agreed, the control measure column has been updated adding control measure example e.g. - Fresh Air Filter Replacement-Preventive , Method Statement
79 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00077 MK Closed - 01/11/2021 - SD Closed
ref. TSM-MS-02453 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01116
Please provide specific documet references as mitigation
The exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a Fast source in column B. These exported requirements have gone through a
80 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00078 Please reword for more detail, better clarity and understanding MK D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed 31.10.2021 MK Closed
between the 3 parties. The request to reword is therefore rejected.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Please reword for more detail, better clarity and understanding.

81 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00079 TSY.RQ_SHA_082.MAIN The traction motor bearings shall be periodically inspected and MK a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed 31.10.2021 MK Closed
greased (every 150.000 km) and replaced (every 1.500.000 km). between the 3 parties. The request to reword is therefore rejected.
Control measure reference is added:
e.g. Traction Motor Checking- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12185 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00909
TSY.RQ_SHA_092.MAIN In accordance with the maintenance manuals. Regular and skilled

Agreed, the control measure column has been updated adding control measure example e.g. - Visual Inspection Global- Preventive , Method Statement ref.
82 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00080 performance of preventive maintenance has to be done on the WSP function. MK Closed - 31/10/2021 - SD Closed
TSM-MS-12150 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00849
Please include all related and specific documents i,e Work Instructions, references as
83 General MK Agreed, work Instruction references are added. Moreover, please note that all related work instructions also are cross referenced in the Method Statements. Closed - 31/10/2021 - SD Closed
part of the mitigations as the Maintenance Plans do not detail this.
OPEN - 31/10/2021 - Ongoing entries to check

We commit to fix what we can, for FLOW identified hazards it have been reviewed and modified. (Live document)
Column 'B', the exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a FAST source. These exported hazards and requirements have
Please ensure document is reviewed internaly and quality checked prior to submitting to gone through a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which
PMS - Multiple spelling and gramatical errors exist through out document, this confuses previously agreed between the 3 parties.
84 General the reviewer and sentences are not clear. SD Closed
2nd Cycle Response:
22.06.22 MK OPEN as per OMC comments Hazard Log is a live document and will continue to be reviewed within the life of the contract.
29.06.2022 The same reply above as of 2nd Cycle
Agreed, control measure is updated to include:

OPE-IN-017-01 A Manual Train Rescue
OPE-IN-217-01 A02 Manual Train Rescue - Lines 5
OPE-FO-218-01 Train Preparation Check list Line 5
Please include reference to performing door system tests, and reference the Working OPE-FO-118-01 Train Preparation Check list Line 4&6
85 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00141 SD Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
Instruction required for these tests to mitigate safety loop failure. OPE-IN-114-01 Handling Train Failures - Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-117-01 Manual Train Rescue - Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-217-01 Manual Train Rescue - Line 5
OPE-PR-007-01 Rule Book
OPE-IN-015-01 Minimum Operating Requirements

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
"Warning shall be added in the maintenance manual to respect the discharge delay
Work instructions TSM-IN-01156 & TSM-IN-01158 are for closing and opening the panel.
before any maintenance intervention" - Which
The correct relevant work instrcution to (Safety measures-Preventive, ref. TSM-MS-10220) is the below:
86 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00140 Maintenance manual is OMC refering too? TSM-IN-01156 & TSM-IN-01158 which are SD Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
"HV capacitors discharge checking" Safety Measures work istruction Ref. TSM-IN-01222
referenced in the Method statement relating to this hazard ( TSM-MS-10220) are not So now the WI above is added in the HZL Rev. A03 now.
available to PMS. Please provide these 2 x documents for census checking of warnings.
As a mitigation, OMC should consider referencing the following procedure/form into this
87 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00138 Hazard Log: TSM-PR- SD Agreed, Control measures column is updated. Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
00009 RST (LOTO) Procedure & HSE-FO-025-01 Safety Permit Electrical Isolation
Passenger exchange hazards: Why would the maintenance test of an uncoupling button be
The hazard line does not indicate any maintenance test of uncoupling button with passengers onboard.
done with passangers on board? PMS do not see the relevance to this Hazard. If a scenario
88 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00137 presented itself whereby units required uncoupling with passangers onboard, all passengers SD Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
a D&B assurance process, workshops between the PMS, D&B and O&M and a verification and mapping process by the O&M. All of which previously agreed
should be informed and seated/secured. Please elaborate on the scenario or situation OMC are
between the 3 parties. The comment therefore is rejected.
refering too, and include the communication to passangers as a mitigation measure.
OPEN - 31/10/2021 - Ongoing entries to check

The exported safety requirements and associated hazards are demonstrated as a FAST source (in column 'B'). where information from D&B is incomplete, (Live document)
O&M entity await complete information to include in the O&M Hazard Log.
Numerous Hazards have not been mitigated and this log remains incomplete preventing Please note that a letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
a comprehensive review from PMS i.e, stated as "Not available". Please complete for Clarified meeting with ID last 15th of August
89 General next submission. SD/MK Closed
2nd Cycle Response::
22.06.22 MK/SD OPEN as per OMC comments OMC still await information from the DBC as minuted in P3 Assurance Working Group
29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
Agreed, this hazard is in the depot and Staff only exposed. Comment to be rejected and sent back to D&B. D&B advised ongoing amendment from D&B Open - 27/10/2021 - SD. Hazard still present in
(email sent to PMS/DBC on 22nd Aug 2021). A03.
2nd Cycle Response::

Passenger exchange hazards: How does the use of 2 stingers effect passenger
FLOW-HZL-TSM.00118/ TSY.RQ_SHA_264.MAIN Strikethrough from A04 and added to Rejected Exported Requirements, for discussion with DBC
exchange and create untimely train movement? PMS do not see the relevance to this
90 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00118 Hazard. SD Closed
29.06.2022 Accepted by TSM. FAST Comment on D&B Hazard Log M3-FST-RGR-SYS00-D80-000003-AK8-Annex-A 21062022 for
TSY.RQ_SHA_264.MAIN "(AK8) FAST Commits that FLOW can records that only the Minatenance Staff in the workshop might be affected (not the
22.06.22 MK/SD OPEN as per OMC comments passengers) if the Safety Requirement is not prperly implemented. The FAST Hazard Log is too conservative for this specific Safety Requirement exported to
the MAIN"
Some maintenance tasks on bogie require inspections to be carried out whilst

components are warm from service: such as pad & disc tempertature checks, gearcase
91 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00096 oil change etc. This will require further mitigations to be put in place for bogie inspection SD Agreed, the control measure column has been updated adding control measures related to task risk assessment. Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
hazards whilst parts/components are hot. Please add additional mitigations for these
inspections.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Method statements contain all relevant detailed maintenance work instructions. For example the below method statement/work instruction are linked to the
exported safety requirement which is associated with hazard of Derailment which mitigate the risk to passengers, staff and public
Mitigation measures which list maintenance documentation should be more specific to
i.e. - The Profile Wheel Control- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12168 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00905
92 General the hazard: Which maintenance task within the referenced document specifically SD Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
mitigates or reduces the hazards identified by D&B/OMC? Referenced safety requirement in the Method Statement which can be found in O&M Hazard Log (ref. FLOW-HZL-TSM.00084) is : RQ_SHA_113: 150 000
KM inspection on bogies must include:
Mitigation measure listed by OMC for this specific hazard is a Method statement for the
use & safety of the maintainer performing audible test. How is this a mitigation for the
passenger/public? The mitigation measure is the actual test of the PA to ensure
Control measures column is updated in line with the comment. As with many other hazards with maintenance as specificed as mitigation, maintenance prevent
correct/safe decibel levels - This is detailed in the Working Instruction, not the Method
93 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00058 SD injury to the passengers, resulting excessive peak noise levels, the passengers hearing could be damaged on the permenant or temporary basis. Closed - 26/10/2021 - SD Closed
statement. OMC should reference the W/I detailing the mitigation measures as a e.g. Internal Loudspeaker Test- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-00238 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01184
minimum. This example is evident across many other hazards listed within this Hazard
Log. Please update entire document to reference the specific W/Instruction or actual
document detailing the mitigations.
use & safety of the maintainer performing maintenance tasks. How is this a mitigation
94 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00042 SD Agreed, column updated. Closed - 31/10/2021 - SD Closed
for the passenger/public? Please reference the actual maintenance task/document (Work
Instruction) detailing the mitigation measures for the public/passengers safety.
use & safety of the maintainer performing maintenance tasks. How is this a mitigation
for the passenger/public? Please reference the actual maintenance task/document (Work
Instruction) detailing the mitigation measures for the public/passengers safety.
Method statements contain all relevant detailed maintenance work instructions. For example the below method statement/work instruction are linked to the
exported safety requirement which is associated with hazard of Derailment which mitigate the risk to passengers, staff and public
Mitigation measures listed by OMC for numerous hazards are Method statements. i.e. - The Profile Wheel Control- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-12168 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00905
M/Statements are for the use & safety of the maintainer performing maintenance tasks.
96 General How is this a mitigation for the passenger/public? Please reference the actual SD Referenced safety requirement in the Method Statement which can be found in O&M Hazard Log (ref. FLOW-HZL-TSM.00084) is : RQ_SHA_113: 150 000 Closed - 31/10/2021 - SD Closed
maintenance task/document (Work Instruction) detailing the task/Activity (actual KM inspection on bogies must include:
mitigation) for the public/passengers safety.
Agreed, this comment has been covered for hazards.

PMS suggest the OMC reference the closing of work orders as a mitigation for trains to e.g. FLOW-HZL-TSM.00028
97 General SD Closed - 31/10/2021 - SD Closed
be released into service. e.g. FLOW-HZL-TSM.00042
Method statements listed only detail mitigation tasks/activities for maintainer safety (as
comment 12).

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
This hazard is not applicable to Line5 if specific to viaduct (see column F and R).
Removed Line 5 and Line 5 mitigations
Inadequate design and build would not be a hazard cause as such items will be recitified before
99 FLOW-HZL-IM.00008 ID/MS Closed
handover following testing and commissioning - please clarify if you mean something else. Inadequate design can manifest itself at any point in O&M activity despite effective handover (eg. Can PMS predict the level and severity of RCF on the
curvature design and built on Riyadh Metro?)
The hazard is unclear - is it in the depot? Mainline? If in the depot how will it affect public? This refer to mainline.
Does the hazard relate to lifitng operations by FLOW or a third party? This is relate to FLOW lifting operations
The consequence states 'delays in completion' - what is this referring to? completion of what? Removed delays in completion as a consequence
Uncontrolled action due to miscommunication - this is a cause not consequence. Please review Uncontrolled action due to miscommunication is consequence of Lack of communication indicated in the hazard cause
100 FLOW-HZL-IM.00022 all consequences. ID/MS Closed
The method statements refer to lifting operations and their controls (eg. use of PTW, toolbox talk, check on the load capacity and capability of equipment)
Please review O&M controls. The work instructions how will they mitigate failure of lifting
operations. FLOW-HZL-IM.00022 deleted and incorporated to generic lifiting operation hazard FLOW-HZL-HSE.00011
2nd cycle comment:

How is the consequence electrocution? 29.06.2022 Electrocution can be a consequence of the maintenance activities on lifting machines i.e. Overhead Crane.
Work at height is a hazardous activity. FLOW mitigate this hazard using Task Risk Approach, as such a generic work at height hazard has been recognized in
Work at height is not in iteself the hazard. Please state the hazard clearly. the hazard log. It is not the intention of the OMC to input every work at height risk in what is essentially a system risk log.
Define hazard causes more clearly. Moving vehicle alone is not sufficient. Do you mean a Agreed, moving vehicle collided with the MEWP added to Hazard Cause
moving vehicle collided with the MEWP/scaffold?
The consequence does reduce by the use of PPE (eg. Fall prevention, fall arrest, harness.) This will be identified under Task Risk Assessment Procedure put
101 FLOW-HZL-IM.00017 The frequency will drop however the consequence shall remain the same. ID/MS into practice under PTW procedure. Please note HSE-FO-029-01 is referenced also. Closed
The residual risk severity for this risk should remain the same as the initial risk as the mitigation MEWP & Scaffold overturn/collapse could result multiple fatalities.
does not tend to reduce to number of staff exposed, the mitigation reduce the frequency of
occurrence of this hazard. Please reassess the hazard categories. Moreover, the consequence Please note that FLOW-HZL-IM.00017 deleted and merged FLOW-HZL-HSE.00009 as an overarching Work at Height hazard. It is the OMC view that specific
would result in single fatality, not multiple. Work at Height are to have task risk assessments applied in conjuction with PTW procedure and not a system risk assessment for each scenario. As such
TRA and PTW procedures are reference as O&M controls along with the Work at Height risk assessment form.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Line 5 does not have viaducts. Review.
102 FLOW-HZL-IM.00034 Please explain how the railway protection procedure will provide mitigation of this hazard? ID/MS Removed Line 5 and railway protection procedure Closed
SCADA is used to monitors and control equipment (eg. lighting, escalator). This helps the O&M staff to respond immediately hence avoid slip, trip & fall (eg.
lighting failure, fault in escalator)
Add the below mitigations:
HSE-PR-016-01 Worksafe Procedure
Slip, trip and fall are not related to D&B SCADA systems.
OPE-IN-152-01 Handling Spillages, Graffiti, Vandalism on a train
OPE-IN-115-01 Minimum Operating Requirements - Lines 4&6
The O&M controls require more. For example, station cleaning and maintenace related items.
OPE-IN-215-01 Minimum Operating Requirements – Line 5
103 FLOW-HZL-HSE.00003 For example one of the hazard cause is listed as poor lighting so the O&M mitigation should ID/MS Closed
OPE-IN-155-01 Handling Passenger Evacuation from a train - Lines 4&6
include the maintenance procedure for lighting. Likewise for all the other hazard causes listed.
OPE-IN-255-01 Handling Passenger Evacuation from a train – Line 5
INM-IN-081 Escalators Work Instruction Lines 4 & 6
INM-IN-082 Escalators Work Instruction Line 5
Lighting inspection- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-02374 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01150
INM-IN-00104 Station, Depot Normal and Emergency Lighting System Work Instruction
HSE-PR-020-01 Permit To Work Procedure
The entire hazard log needs to be reviewed and updated.
Hazards descriptions are not relevant or clear in many instances. For example, cleaning viaduct
104 General is not a hazard description and provides no information on what the hazard is. Similarly hazard ID/MS Workshop with PMS is required as OMC disagree with this comment. Closed
causes and consequences are not clear or in many instances incorrect. The same is true for
the mitigations as in many cases the stipulated mitigation does not cover the hazard presented.
Please review the entire hazard log and update as required.
VFDS removed. SCADA monitors asset failures. Asset could failed as a result of breach eg. Water incursion causing flood damaging electrical components.
105 FLOW-HZL-IM.00239 The first three listed D&B measures do not relate to the hazard. ID/MS Closed
ACID prevents trespass and subsequent deliberate act.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
OTP is dealt with in FLOW-HZL-OPS.00522.
Added
TSM-MS-06114TSM-MS-06114 Track Structure Inspection & Maintenance
O&M controls should include regullar inspection and maintenance of the signaling, interlocking
TSM-MS-03109 ATS - VCP Cabinet : Visual inspection & cleaning of the Cubicle
systems, service brakes, traction system etc.
TSM-IN-00510 ATS - VCP Cabinet : Visual inspection & cleaning of the Cubicle
TSM-MS-03114 SMARTIO 24Vdc Cubicle : Cleaning
106 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00516 OTP procedure should be included. Procedure for train movement should be included. Track ID/MS Closed
TSM-IN-00516 SMARTIO 24Vdc Cubicle : Cleaning
cleaning procedure should be added.
TSM-MS-02216 Service Brake Unit with PB Replacement- Preventive
TSM-IN-00840 Service Brake Unit with PB Replacement- Preventive
TSM-MS-07105 Traction Transformer Inspection & Maintenance
TSM-IN-00476 Traction Transformer Inspection & Maintenance
TSM-MS-06114 Track Structure Inspection & Maintenance
TSM-IN-00455 Track Structure Inspection & Maintenance
INM-IN-054-01 Inspection and Maintenance of Concrete Track Plinth and Track Bed-Line 4, 5 & 6
The D&B mitigations stated do not relate to the hazard.

OMC strongly disagrees with the PMS statement that D&B mitigations do not relate to the hazard.
The O&M controls should include the method statements as well if they include the information
on clearing site prior to handback of possession. Possession management work instruction clearly states clear the lineside and pass a 'site clear' message.
in reference to PTW procedure, section Closure of PTW -

The general process for the closure of an activated PTW is shown below when the workgroup leaves
Riyadh Metro premises, the LPIC must:
• Give declaration that the worksite is ready to hand back to the Landlord
• Close the PTW in CMMS with the required information
All method statements states that after maintenance activity PIC must ensure that no tools and equipment left in the worksite. Method statement: eg. INM-MS-
107 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00521 ID/MS 025 Method Statement Electrical System Line 4&6 Closed
Please note that Sweep train is also included.
09.06.2022 The O&M mitigations as mentioned above already included the in Permit To Work Procedure as well as some Maintenence Method Statements
29.06.2022 FLOW Comment - The O&M mitigations as mentioned above already included in the Permit To Work Procedure as well as some Maintenance
Method Statements
21/11/2022 Added
"TRA-TM-00023_H2_Permit_to_Work_Planning-SISO
TRA-TM-009-01 Lineside Person in Charge"
Extract;
"The purpose of the Operations and Maintenance Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002 is to record the
HSE-PR-00032 OM identification and assessment of system safety risks associated with the Operations and
108 HAZARD Log Pocedure Maintenance of Riyad Metro Lines 5 and 4/6 + interfaces." DD Please refer to Section 3.2 Terms of HSE-PR-00032 OM HAZARD Log Pocedure Closed
1.1 Purpose Please explain what is meant by "system", and clarify this scope more in details (Safety
Management System? Transit System?)
Extract;
HSE-PR-00032 OM "The purpose of the Operations and Maintenance Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002 is to record the
109 HAZARD Log Pocedure identification and assessment of system safety risks associated with the Operations and DD Please refer to Section 3.2 Terms of HSE-PR-00032 OM HAZARD Log Pocedure. Definition as per Riyadh Public Transport Network Lexicon. Closed
1.1 Purpose Maintenance of Riyad Metro Lines 5 and 4/6 + interfaces."
Please explain more what these interfaces are?

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Extract;
HSE-PR-00032 OM "...as such it is a key component of the RAMS life cycle of the Riyadh Metro asset.".
110 HAZARD Log Pocedure Please expand the Abbreviation in full for the first occurrence in the document. It should DD Done. Document updated Closed
1.1 Purpose read Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). (The same applies to
the "TGA" Guidance in the following statement).
HSE-PR-00032 OM "TGA Guidance, Safety Management Systems", can you please add an additional
This is a Public Transport Authority document now renamed as Transport General Authority. The information you request is not available other than date. The
111 HAZARD Log Pocedure information on this Guidance for further Reference (Year/Place of issue, Issuing DD Closed
date October 2017 has been added.
5.1 References Authority, any web source)?
Extract;
HSE-PR-00032 OM " ..transferred DBC Hazards".
112 HAZARD Log Pocedure Please add DBC to the list of abbreviations and expand in full for the first occurrence in DD note:DBC was replaced and removed by D&B contractor used in Abbreviation section as per Riyadh Public Transport Network Lexicon. Closed
1.2 Scope the document.
Extract;
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Rail Safety Manager : Rejected: The Rail Safety Manager Responsibilities Section 2 aligns with the PMS Code A approved System Risk Management Procedure. The combination of
HAZARD Log Pocedure
113 "Maintaining the Operations & Maintenance Hazard Log" DD Closed
2 Responsibilities and all bullet points provides a comprehensive list of resposibilities.Refer to Hazard Log User Responsibilities in Section 2.
Please add "Maintaining and Continuously Reviewing the Operations & Maintenance Hazard
authorities
Log"
Extract;
HSE-PR-00032 OM Owners of Control Measures
HAZARD Log Pocedure "Ensure control measures are implemented effectively and as intended and Please refer to section 6 Monitoring and Audit and refer to Rail Safety Manager Responsibilities and authorities.
114 DD Closed
2 Responsibilities and monitoring performance of control measures".
authorities Please explain how effectivenis is assessed, and how the Owner will assess the
effectiveness of his own actions? What is the process of monitoring?
Extract:
"Verification at commercial service-12 month review
HSE-PR-00032 OM Or as a result of audit/incident/investigation etc"
Please refer to section 6.1.
115 HAZARD Log Pocedure Please clearly list all the initiating events/conditions that would require a review of the DD Closed
Section 6.1 referred to in Section 4.7 Tab 3. The phrase "but not limited to;" has been included.
General Hazard Log (outside the regular 12 months review), instead of "etc".(some additional
could include : Change, design review, Emergency). This will help clarify the Review
Process.
The description is taken directly from BS EN 50126 (2017).

Extract;
"Catastrophic :
Affecting a large number of people resulting in multiple fatalities, and/or
HSE-PR-00032 OM
• Extreme damage to the environment
HAZARD Log Pocedure
Critical :
Table 2 - Comparison of
116 • Affecting a very small number of people and resulting in at least one fatality, and/or " DD Closed
System Risk Frequency
• Large damage to the environment
categories of FLOW
In order to clearly define the limits between "Catastrophic" and "Critical", it would be
O&M and D&B
useful to define what a "large" and "small" number of people means? (give a group size),
and what a "Large" and "extreme" damage means? (Give a loss/impact value estimation).
The same applies to "Severe" and "Minor" in the last column.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
The form document control :

The code at the bottom (footer) of the page is the same as in the Cover page. There Done.Updated
should be a separate code for the form (footer) and the record itself (the log). Please
ensure that the codes are properly assigned.
Also, the revision date for the form (template) should be available at the footer as part of
HSE-RG-00002 A03
the document control and changes tracking. Please update. Please also make sure the
Operations and
footer is reproduced at all the sections.
117 Maintenance Hazard DD Closed
Log Line 4, 5,6
2nd Cycle comment:
Form
The revision date of template of this log is not addet at all. see below snap shot.
FO Rev.: A02
Rev. Date: ????? 29.06.2022 Please see snip of A04 Footer
Page 1 of 18
HSE-RG-00002 A03
Operations and Contained in the SEC-PL-001-01 Security Control Plan in Section 4 and Section 5.
For all the Security threats scenarios, shouldn't there be a "Planning of Drills" in the supporting
118 Maintenance Hazard DD Closed
documentations? Is this part of the Emergency Response Plan? HSE-PL-007-01 Emergency Management Plan in Section 7.
Log Line 4, 5,6
General
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Initially column V is the Additional Control columns after the Residual Risk Ranking. In A03, the columns in the O&M Hazard Log was rearranged:
Extract;
Operations and
In some of the comments in the column AC (Remarks) " 02/08/2021 Updated Column Q
119 Maintenance Hazard DD column Q now is D&B PROVIDED & EXPORTED EXISTING CONTROL(S), Closed
Existing Mitigations and Column V Additional Controls"
Log Line 4, 5,6 column R for the O&M CONTROL(S) and
Actually Column V is "Residual Risk Factor", any reason for this confusion? column V for the Residual Risk Factor
Column AC
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Extract;

Operations and Column Y : ALARP statement.
120 Maintenance Hazard Log "Doha Metro ICC Sweep Train Procedure DD Please refer to section 4.5 Risk Acceptance for explanation Closed
Line 4, 5,6 Dubai Metro Normal Operation of Trains"
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00010 Is that a "Benchmarking" against these?
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Extract;

Operations and Column Y :
Edition already mentioned, IEC already included, International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
121 Maintenance Hazard Automated Urban Guided Transport Safety requirements. DD Closed
Date added: 2009
Log Line 4, 5,6 Please give more details on the mentioned standard (for instance, Date of issue, code,
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00014 Revision, issuing body )
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Extract; It is not possible to specifiy all substances that would be needed to identify all types of risk.
Operations and Hazard " Hazardous Substances" Added to consequence:
122 Maintenance Hazard Can you specify the specific Risk with relation to "Hazardous Substances?" DD Loss of consciousness Closed
Log Line 4, 5,6 (Fire/Release/Spillage/Theft/unproper use) so that mitigations are properly identified to Asphyxiation
FLOW-HZL-SEC.00020 cover all types of Risks. Multiple fatalities
Extract :
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Hazard "Manual Handling"
Added Lack of training/competence, Operator unfit for the task in the hazard cause and add the following mitigations:
Operations and Please insert in the "causes" column " (K)
TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management Procedure
123 Maintenance Hazard " Lack of training/competence" DD Closed
TRA-TM-007-01 Health and Safety At Work
Log Line 4, 5,6 "Operator unfit for the task" HSE-PR-004-01 Fitness for Duty Procedure
FLOW-HZL-IM.00023 And update the mitigations to take into consideration these points (Manual Handling
Training, Safety Critical Roles, Fitness for Duty Procedure"

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Extract;
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Confined Spaces Working
Operations and Hazard Causes (Column K)
124 Maintenance Hazard Please add to the causes DD Done, updated. Closed
Log Line 4, 5,6 " Not following/using the Safe Systems of Work/PTW system".
FLOW-HZL-IM.00024 And add to the mitigations
"Proper implementation of the Permit to Work System/Safe Systems of Work"
Extract;
"The purpose of the was to exercise provide assurance to FLOW that D&B Exported Safety
HSE-PR-00032 OM Requirements accepted are accurate and within the responsibility of FLOW to apply
125 HAZARD Log Pocedure controls." MA The PMS have misquoted. The extract in the comment section cannot be found in our procedure. Closed
4.2 Hazard Transfer Please rewrite and amend the gramatical structure.
Please review the grammar and spelling throughout this document and amend
accordingly.
HSE-PR-00032 OM Please ensure all abbreviations are added to 3.1 Abbreviations section. (for instance
126 HAZARD Log Pocedure MA HSQE is already in the Abbreviation. KSA removed. N/A removed. SC&OL removed. Closed
General : N/A, HSQE, KSA, SC&OL, etc.)
HSE-RG-00002 A03
Please add the risk rating matrix(table) with the different risk levels, Severity VS Frequency
Operations
columns and their corresponding colors for example: Table 4 System Risk Calculating, page-
Maintenance Hazard System Risk Calculation Table added in Lookup sheet of the O&M HL. Risk rating is defined in the Hazard log procedure.
127 17 of Hazard Log Procedure, or refer to the document containing this Matrix. On the "lookup" FK Closed
Log Line 4,5,6
section, we would like to understand the Risk Rating colors (R1, R2, R3, R4), please explain in
a note as much as you can.
General - Lookup
In column (K) the "Hazard Cause" for Staff electrocution should be elaborated, for example:
how staff could be electrocuted.
This is a safety requirement thus the information is limited on the information provided by the D&B.
Please specify in column "G" "WHO EXPOSED"
Please refer to the comments column.
No Initial Risk Evaluation (i.e. Frequency, Severity, Risk Rating, Initial Risk Factor)
HSE-RG-00002 A03
Operations No Residual Risk (i.e. Frequency, Severity, Risk Rating, Residual Risk Factor) 29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
Maintenance Hazard
Log Line 4,5,6 3rd Cycle comment: FAST Response on SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context(shared through email): The Safety Requirements tagged SRAC (most of the
128 FK Safety Requirements provided as example) are the Safety requirements coming from the Products’ Manuals or from the Standards which have to be re- Open
Hazard No.: FLOW-HZL- D&B to provide complete information as per the comment. exported to the O&M and the end-user.
TSM.00072, Electrocution It is a normal practice that the products’ suppliers are not exporting the risks but only the Safety Related Applicable Conditions.
System:TSY 3rd cycle comment:
Subsystem: RST The SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context will be put in a separted sheet inside the HSE-RG-00002 and HSE-PR-00032 will be updated on
Comment not addressed. Above mentioned sections are not updated. the change.
4th cycle response; The Residual Ranking, FAST did not provide the Severity and Frequency. As per the FAST Safety Policy the Quantitative values (Frequency and Severity) are
26-06-2023 required only for the quantitative risk analyses (CSM method C)with fast.
Comment not addressed. Residual Risk is updated without rating of Freuency and Severity.

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
HSE-RG-00002 A03
Operations
Please remove Earthquake from here and from the rest of the document.
Maintenance Hazard
because Riyadh is not an earthquake zone.
Log Line 4,5,6 Reject. Multiple D&B safety requirements referred to earthquake
129 FK Closed
3rd Cycle comment:
Hazard No.:FLOW-HZL- 29.06.2022 FLOW Comment - this is for D&B not for FLOW
TSM.00044, Earthquake D&B to clarify why refering to Earthcquake if Riyadh is not an earthquake zone.
System: Transit System
For most of other Hazards in this Hazard Log, Initial Risk (Columns M,N,O,P) and Residual
Risk (Columns S,T,U,V) are incomplete, even for R1 which is Red category. Unavailable information are awaiting from D&B. this are indicated in the Remarks column (AC)
3rd Cycle comment: 29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
HSE-RG-00002 A03 D&B to provide complete information as per the comment. FAST Response on SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context(shared through email): The Safety Requirements tagged SRAC (most of the
Operations Safety Requirements provided as example) are the Safety requirements coming from the Products’ Manuals or from the Standards which have to be re-
Maintenance Hazard 3rd cycle comment: exported to the O&M and the end-user.
130 FK Open
Log Line 4,5,6 It is a normal practice that the products’ suppliers are not exporting the risks but only the Safety Related Applicable Conditions.
General Comment The SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context will be put in a separted sheet inside the HSE-RG-00002 and HSE-PR-00032 will be updated on
4th cycle response; the change.
26-06-2023
There is no mention of COVID19 hazard in the Hazard Log which is an important requirement
and it is stated in BS EN 50126, Section 6.3- Risk Analysis. Please see sec-6.3.3.1
HSE-RG-00002 A03 Requirement of this phase shall be to:
Operations a) Systematically identify and prioritize all reasonably foreseeable hazards associated
Maintenance Hazard with the Agreed, COVID include as a hazard (FLOW-HZL-HSE.00005).
131 FK Closed
Log Line 4,5,6 system in its application environment, including hazards arising from:
General Comment ...

...
- occupational health issues;
Column "L" of Consequences is not filled properly for some of the hazards. In some cases the
column says "Not Available" while the Hazard is available with risk level as Yellow. Unavailable information are awaiting from D&B. this are indicated in the Remarks column (AC)
3rd Cycle comment: 29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
HSE-RG-00002 A03 D&B to provide complete information as per the comment. FAST Response on SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context(shared through email): The Safety Requirements tagged SRAC (most of the
Maintenance Hazard 3rd cycle comment: exported to the O&M and the end-user.
132 FK Open
4th cycle response; the change.
26-06-2023

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Column "G" of "Who exposed" is not updated for several hazards and it only says "Not
Unavailable information are awaiting from D&B. this are indicated in the Remarks column (AC)
Available"
29.06.2022 This comment is covered in letter is sent to PMS raising this concern ref. M-FLO-SNC-LET-000682
3rd Cycle comment:
HSE-RG-00002 A03 FAST Response on SRACS/IEC safety requirements without the full context(shared through email): The Safety Requirements tagged SRAC (most of the
D&B to provide complete information as per the comment.
Maintenance Hazard exported to the O&M and the end-user.
133 3rd cycle comment: FK Open
the change.
4th cycle response;
26-06-2023
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Hazard Log Procedure On page-09, the term "Hazard Probability" is defined in this table but not found anywhere in the Hazard Probability changed to Hazard Frequency
134 FK Closed
document. It is recommended to remove it.
3.2 Terms
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Hazard Log Procedure On page-05, Section 1.3 "User Responsibility" is found under "PURPOSE AND SCOPE" while it Updated. User responsibility included in section 2
135 FK Closed
1.3 User Responsibility is more suitable to include it in Section-02 "RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES"
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Hazard Log Procedure Within " FLOW identified Operations (OPE)," please confirm how OPE means Operations?
Because in Fig-2 OPS is also referred to as Operations. Similarly within "FLOW identified Agree, change OPE to OPS for uniformity.
136 FK Closed
4.1 SYNTHESIS OF Security (SEC)" please confirm how SEC means Security, because SEC means Saudi Electric For SEC, please refer to section 3 of the Hazard log procedure.
REQUIREMENTS Company here in Saudi Arabia but not Security.
Please rephrase the whole paragraph specifically the text in red in the 3rd paragraph of section
HSE-PR-00032 OM 4.2 for example: "As a due diligence exercise FLOW undertook a Verification and Mapping of Updated.
Hazard Log Procedure D&B Exported Safety As a due diligence exercise FLOW undertakes a Verification and Mapping ofthe D&B Contractor Exported Safety Requirements. The purpose of this exercise
137 FK/MA Closed
4.2 HAZARD TRANSFER Requirements. The purpose of the was to exercise provide assurance to FLOW that…......." is to provide assurance to FLOW that D&B Contractor Exported Safety Requirements accepted are accurate and within the responsibility of FLOW to apply
controls.
It is apparent that this para is written in the past tense which looks like a part of a report.
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Hazard Log Procedure
138 5 REFERENCES & Please position and locate Section-05 after Section 3 FK The sequence of the section is align with the PMS approved template used within FLOW organization Closed
ASSOCIATED
DOCUMENTS
HSE-PR-00032 OM
Extract: FAST
139 HAZARD Log Pocedure TM Please refer to section 3.1 for the definition of FAST Closed
Surely FAST is an acronym for a joint venture. Please write what FAST stands for in full.
3.1 Abbreviations

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Extract;
The above table needs to be aligned properly
HSE-PR-00032 OM
HAZARD Log Pocedure Already Aligned and updated
140 TM Closed
4.1Synthesis of
Requirements
HSE-PR-00032 OM
141 HAZARD Log Pocedure Please ensure that all abbreviations are captured in the document. TM Please refer in 126 comment Closed
3.1 Abbreviations
HSE-PR-00032 OM
142 HAZARD Log Pocedure Please annex the documents refered to in this procedure. TM Rejected: Please refer to Section 5. Closed
General Comment
Line 5 removed.
Add the following mitigations:

Internal Smoke Detector Maintenance and Calibration- Preventive , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-05637 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01122
First cycle comment: Smoke Detector Cleaning , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-05660 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01128
hazard not applicable to line 5, please update column F Smoke detector test , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-05737 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-01135
Moreover, no control measures on the proper maintenance of the train or infra equipment or INM-IN-090-01 HVAC System Work Instruction for (Line 4 & 6)
143 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00570 the fire detection/suppression systems to keep them in an available status? ID/MS INM-IN-087-01 Fire ALarm Detection System Work Instruction (Line 4 6) Closed
Would there be any communication protocol with the civil defense for a quick localization and INM-IN-084-01 Fire Fighting System Work Instruction (Line 4 6)
intervention o that elevated section? INM-IN-096-01 Smoke Exhaust System Work Instruction (Line 4 6)
Finally having a fire at occasional frequency isn’t it too much recurrent?
Occassional frequency is equivalent to once a year to once per 10 years which is given in initial risk ranking. Please note that we have considered Passenger
behaviour as cause which cannot be entirely controlled by OMC.
Update the frequency to Remote (D)

First cycle comment:
Added Maintenance instructions as samples:
Could you please clarify why FLOW are expecting to have multiple simultaneous evacuation
OPE-IN-176-01 Emergency Response for Infrastructure Damage
144 occasionally (frequency C)? An O&M control could be a proper maintenance and inspection ID/MS Closed
INM-IN-00108 Intake Switching Station (Passage Post) Work Instruction (Line 4 ,6)
activity on any critical system that its failure might lead to a total shut down or total evacuation:
ATS - VCP Cabinet : Visual inspection & cleaning of the Cubicle , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-03109 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00510
like power supply, signalling, etc.
Track Structure Inspection & Maintenance , Method Statement ref. TSM-MS-06114 , Work Instruction ref. TSM-IN-00455
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00588
Disagree, please see below information in reference to System Risk Consequence Assessment:
145 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00047 The hazard consequences (Fatality) doesn’t match with the severity level in column N, please ID/MS Critical - 3 - Affecting a very small number of people and resulting in at least one fatality Closed
amend.
Please refer to the Table 2 - Comparison of System Risk Frequency categories of FLOW O&M and D&B Contractor in OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN

Major: many hazards in FLOW HL have reached a residual risk of R3, starting with slip trip fall
hazards and reaching fire and explosion scenarios. PMS raise their concerns about the ability of
the operator to mitigate such risk leading them to R4 category. Those residual risks must be
reassessed in the next revision of this HL
for example: Collision with an obstacle: the D&B has provided wall segregation with the outside Reviewed and demonstrated to PMS during workshop. (Fatal Four OSHA)
environment with fences where needed and vehicle fall detection and fences where overhead
146 General roads are available along with obstacle detection and ACID system to prevent uncontrolled ID/MS 11.08.2022 FLOW Comment - Response after the HSE Hazards Joint Risk Review Workshop. Hazard has been seperated to FLOW-HZL-HSE.00009 and Closed
people or staff to enter the train way from station or emergency egress doors. the remaining of FLOW-HZL-HSE.00017 considering the different Risk of who expose. In which FLOW-HZL-HSE.00009 Residual Ranking is R3 (Exposed Member of the
the responsibility relies with FLOW to ensure that if obstacles are available on the trainway Public, Passengers) and FLOW-HZL-HSE.00017 Residual Ranking is R4 (Exposed: Staff).
FLOW will deal with the situation to prevent any harm to the passengers staff and system either
by sweep trains, possenssion handover management and procedures etc.
Similar observation regarding Working at height, this is a regular maintainer task that should be
fully covered by FLOW procedures and instructions and brought to R4 with the appropriate
mitigations.
The functional safety of Sil Rated systems in normal mode ensures limited human interface and as a result limited human error probability. The person
booking on for duty is therefore limited as to the errors that can be made using the system. Even if errors are made the failure modes have been analysed to
First cycle comment: can you please clarify how the D&B mitigation can cover Unfit for duty
ensure levels of protection are in place. Tetra radio is for reporting to OCC any concerns regarding fitness for duty.
hazard, as a reminder it states : Signaling System, Communication systems (tetra radio) high
level,
It is the experience of the OMC that despite O&M mitigations, the human elements involved in this hazard result in an R3 rating. Using experience from UK rail
147 FLOW-HZL-HSE.00001 SCADA, and PSDs. ID/MS Closed
networks and GCC.
Could you clarify as well why the O&M mitigations are not sufficient to bring this hazard to R4?
07.07.2022 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00664 Initial Risk Frequency was discussed and agreed during the Joint Risk Review Workshop between FLOW and PMS.
Major: This hazard should be covered, firstly, by FLOW possession management and work
instructions to clear site after maintenance works and secondly residual risk factor R2 means Line 5 sweep Train and TRA were included in the O&M Mitigations.
that FLOW has failed to mitigate the risk. The sweep train is the last layer of protection to HSE-FO-009-01 D Task Risk Assessment Form_Line Sweep in UTO
ensure clear passage of guideway. OPE-IN-250-01 Sweep Train – Line 5
During the workgroup 2 meetings FLOW has been informed that this issue is not applicable in
tunnels. Please ammend the OM controls to include line 5 sweep trains. FLOW-HZL-OPS.00664 - Reviewed and updated, the Hazard now is having R3 Residual Ranking as per the propose change by FAST with regards to the
148 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00664 ID/MS additional Switch inside the Train for the purpose of Full Headlight during Sweep Train in UTO. FLOW is still waiting for the completion of the D&B Open
The initial frequency should be aligned with FLOW-HZL-OPS.00521 Configuration Management Process.
2nd cycle response: Added O&M Mitigations:

The hazard has changed from coliision to poor visibility. As such the hazard causes do not align TRA-TM-00023_H2_Permit_to_Work_Planning-SISO
with the hazard, e.g. why would trespass or tools left after maintenance cause poor visibility? TRA-TM-009-01 Lineside Person in Charge
Additionally with all the O&M controls and a switch being installed by FAST to allow the
headlight to be switched on, why is the residual severity "3"?

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
How can electrocution be the consequence if the hazard is third rail switch off? This hazard is 29.06.2022 Their will be possibility of Uncontrolled evacuation due to Passenger activating the PEED(Inside the Train) and opening the Train Doors and since
related to the performance of the system and not the safety. The SIL2 switches on egress only cetrain electrical section will de-energized. Passengers who reaches the energize section still have the risk of electrocution.
points are performing as intended. Hazard should be withdrawn.
21/11/2022 Added
OPE-IN-131-01 Handling Trespasser on Lineside - Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-231-01 Handling Trespasser on Lineside - Line 5
During the activation of Evacuation Secured Zone, the Traction Power will be Switched OFF in the adjacent sections as well in addition to the affected section
149 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00612 ID/MS Closed
04.01.2023
Electrocution and multiple fatalities were removed from the list of consequences, and Initial Risk Ranking is updated.
Hazard remains as there will still be a possibility of passengers activating the PEED which will lead to uncontrolled evacuation.
29.06.02022 - FLOW Comment - electrocution/evacuation were removed and Initial Severity was modified from Catastrophic to Marginal.
Why is electrocution/evacuation a consequence of overshoot? An overshoot will result in the
train moving to the next station. Furthermore, this is a performance issue not a safety issue. 04.01.2023
Panic, uncontrolled evacuation, electrocution, multiple fatalities, and major injury have been removed as consequences, and the Initial Ranking has been
150 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00609 ID/MS updated. Open
2nd cycle comment:
electrocution remains in consequence. Likewise why is the consequence of an overshoot Hazard remains. When the train performs a forward jog, there is a risk of slips, trips, and falls for both staff and passengers.
multiple fatalities?
Why are member of public and passengers input as persons exposed? This hazard exposes
staff (which is omitted).
"Acceptable with agreement of the Employer" - The residual risk is R4. Why does it require 09/08/2022 Updates from the Joint Risk Review Workshop (FLOW and PMS) Hazard is separated depending on who expose as per PMS suggested. The
agreement of employer? Hazard for Confined Spaces working- Limited means of access and egress were split by person expose. FLOW-HZL-HSE.00008 person expose is Staff and
FLOW-HZL-HSE.00016 with Member of the Public, Passengers.
151 FLOW-HZL-HSE.00016 Open
Agreed, The ALARP Statement is now modified to "Acceptable"
HSE-PR-00027 confined space procedure was not shared with PMS for review. Please submit
for review. HSE-PR-00027 is not included in the deliverables as per our Doc Control. However, it is reviewed and approved internally within FLOW. We shared to ID and
MS for information last June 13,2023 in the email.
2nd cycle comment:
The hazard causes and hazard do not correlate, for example some of the causes are poor
training, lack of competence and incorrect planning. As the hazard relates to public and
passenegrs these hazard causes no longer make sense in that context.
ID/MS
Should include members of public as persons exposed.

152 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00027 ID/MS 04.01.2023 Agreed, members of public as persons exposed included Closed
04.01.2023
Train driving practical is an O&M control since it includes checking of communication equipment such as a portable handheld TETRA radio (battery, volume),
as well as safety-critical tasks such as receiving the appropriate authority to move the train in the depot or mainline. The information being sent and received
from the Train Driver to the OCC controllers and vice versa, will be included in the handover to the next shift OCC controllers.
Please clarify O&M controls e.g. why is train driving practical an O&M control for OCC shift
153 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00517 ID/MS Added in O&M Mitigations: Closed
handover?
OPE-IN-115-01 Minimum Operating Requirements - Lines 46
OPE-IN-215-01 Minimum Operating Requirements - Line 5
OPE-PR-010-01 OCC Operations Procedure - Lines 4&6
HSE-PR-020-01 Permit to Work Procedure - All lines
OPE-FO-011-01 Manual Train Operation - Authority to Proceed Form

D - REJECTED
COMPANY COMMENTS
CONTRACTOR
Comment
Initiator
ACTIONS TAKEN
Please include Members of public as exposed persons.

Agreed, Members of public as exposed persons
D&B controls should include FACP (Fire alarm control panel).
Agreed, added FACP (Fire alarm control panel) and Manual Call Point in the D&B controls
154 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00554 O&M controls should include waste management procedure. ID/MS Closed
Agreed, added HSE-PR-018- 01 Waste Management Procedure in the O&M controls
Why are passengers included as persons exposed? 04.01.2023

155 FLOW-HZL-OPS.00618 ID/MS Closed
Passengers will continue to be affected because this is a degraded operating mode with passengers on board.
Added O&M Mitigations

HSE-PR-019-01 Incident Management Procedure,
FLOW-HZL-IM.00173 In respect of explosions within station perimeters on the Metro, please refer to expected actions
156 JV OPE-IN-00366 TMCS Operation - Lines 46, Closed
FLOW-HZL-OPS.00484 to be taken with reference to your Station ERPs and the generic Emergency Response Plan.
OPE-IN-367 TMCS Operation - Line 5"
HSE-PL-007-01 Emergency Management Plan
157 FLOW-HZL-TSM.00044 Should the exposed persons include passenegers and public as well? MS Open
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00241 How will a strike on viaduct affect Line 5? MS Open

158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00046 A human error would affect passenegrs and public too. MS Open
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00057 Why only passengers exposed this should also include staff and operators BR Open
Goes from R1 to R4 Hazard is about chemicals Liquids yet no mention in the O&M controls
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00148 BR Open
about First Aid ,COSSH, storage
Persons exposed should be staff only, Passengers or members of public would not be in
Technical Rooms or back of house
A review of all the hazards related to mainitiance should be undertaken as to who is exposed to
158 General BR Open
the ahazard as the above proves there is inconsitsincy across all
not sure why this Hazzard is included if there is ,potential accident ,no safety Impact ,with intial
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00221 risk as R4 but then includes workinstruction for Chemical Treatment System, how can this then BR Open
remain a R4 with nobody being exposed ? What about maintiance team
Intoxication, asphyxiation, burn, noise, high environmental temperature is the hazard yet these
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00222 are classed as Minor Injury ?, also the O&M Controls not clear enough as to what they control BR Open
,Standby generator work instruction ? UPS System work Instruction ?
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00230 Why is this hazzard ubnder INM MEP / this is TSM ,O&M control Plumbing work Instruction ? BR Open
Hazzard cause -nasty smells & diseses yet does not mention Cleaning work instructions as
control method / this is also an Operational issue
FLOW-HZL-IM.00242
158 Not Civils or structure related these fall under MEP BR Open
/243/244/245
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00248 Passengers exposed not staff ?/ then hazard cause mentions staff BR Open
158 FLOW-HZL-IM.00262 Incorrect documentation for HVAC in O&M controls including procedure and work instructions BR Open
RIYADH METRO
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES CONTRACT Package 5B
HSQE PROCEDURE
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG - LINES 5,
4&6
ER Code: M-FLO-000000-HSOG-PRO-000043 ER Revision: 03

FLO Document No.: HSE-PR-00032 FLO Revision: D
Date of Issue: June 20 2023
This procedure applies to:

All Personnel Working on Package 5B
FLOW Internal Copyright © FLOW 2019

The information in this document is proprietary to FLOW and has been provided on the basis that, unless otherwise agreed in writing with
FLOW, it shall not be copied or transmitted in any form to a third party.
As the information in this document is under continual development, users must ensure they have the most up to date version, available from
the FLOW Electronic Document Management System. Unless otherwise indicated this document is deemed to be uncontrolled and is only valid
on the date printed.
Revisions History:
Author Reviewers Sponsor
Rev. Issue Date
Name/signature Name/signature Name/signature
G. Antonucci
A. Arfeen M. Leone
03 20/06/2023 G. Fraser
S. Morrison
C. Tucker M. Leone
02 11/10/2022 G. Fraser A. Ismail
S. Morrison
D. Fatti
G. Fraser A. Ismail M. Leone
01 12/05/2022
S. Morrison
D. Fatti M. Leone
N. Carr A. Ismail
00 27/09/21
G. Fraser S. Morrison
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG Revision No.: D
HSE‐PR‐00032
‐ LINES 5, 4&6 Page 2 of 35
Project Code: M‐FLO‐000000‐HS0G‐FOR‐000020 FO No.: QUA‐FO‐015 (E01)
Rev. No.: 03 Rev. Date: 16 Nov 2021
Development And Modifications Traceability Table
Rev. Description Developed Sections Doc. Status
Updates from the official
provision of D&B Hazard
Logs "M3-FST-RGR-
4.7 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG
SYS00-D80-000003-AK9-
TEMPLATE - TAB 3
Annex-A:02 and "M3-
FST-RGR-SYS00-D80-
6.1 MONITORING – O&M HAZARD LOG
000001-Annex-A-OnM-
4.7.1 Master Tab Template, number 16
AE3"
TEMPLATE - TAB 6
Updates in response to
M-FLO-000000-HSOG-
PRO-000043_02 – DRCS
TEMPLATE - TAB 7
03 Updates in response to B
LRS-ISA-P3-R05-SN095
TEMPLATE - TAB 8
ITCF-C19120-00-ATF-NT-
TEMPLATE - TAB 9
00100 - Operations and
Maintenance Hazard Log
Section 4.1 Table 1 – Synthesis of Requirements
Procedure
3.2 TERMS
Updated accepted
Transferred Safety
Requirement Permanent
and Temporary from
D&B (FAST/ANM/BACS)
M-FLO-000000-HSOG- Section 4.1 Table 2 – Synthesis of Requirements
02 PRO-000043_01 and B
updates from the Joint
Risk Review
01 M-FLO-000000-HSOG- B
PRO-000043_DRCS

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 3 of 36
Project Code: M-FLO-000000-HS0G-FOR-000020 FO No.: QUA-FO-015 (E01)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE ........................................................................................................ 6

1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................6
1.2 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................6
2 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES................................................................................. 7
3 ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS ............................................................................................. 9
3.1 ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................................9
3.2 TERMS ..............................................................................................................................10
4 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................... 13
4.1 SYNTHESIS OF REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................13
4.2 HAZARD TRANSFER..........................................................................................................14
4.3 OPERATOR SYSTEM RISK ASSESSMENT ...........................................................................18
4.4 ALARP MODEL .................................................................................................................21
4.5 RISK ACCEPTANCE ...........................................................................................................23
4.6 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG STRUCTURE ............................................24
4.7 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG TEMPLATE ..............................................24
Master Tab Template .............................................................................................................. 25
System & Subsytem Guideline ................................................................................................ 27
5 REFERENCES & ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS ........................................................................ 29
5.1 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................29
5.2 ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS ..............................................................................................29
5.3 ASSOCIATED WORK INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................30
6 MONITORING AND AUDIT................................................................................................. 31
6.1 MONITORING – O&M HAZARD LOG................................................................................31
6.2 AUDIT ...............................................................................................................................32
7 RECORDS .......................................................................................................................... 33
APPENDIX A OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG (SAMPLE) ............................... 34

HSE-PR-00032
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Client Hazard Transfer Form .............................................................................................16
Figure 2 - Hazard/Control Transfer from the D&B Contractor to FLOW ...........................................17
Figure 3 - ALARP Decision Making Model..........................................................................................22
TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 – Synthesis of Requirements.................................................................................................14
Table 2 - Comparison of System Risk Frequency categories of FLOW O&M and D&B Contractor ...19
Table 3 - System Risk Consequence Assessment ..............................................................................20
Table 4- System Risk Calculation ......................................................................................................20
Table 5 - System Risk Ranking Matrix ................................................................................................21
Table 6 - Systems and Subsytems ......................................................................................................28

HSE-PR-00032
1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this procedure is to identify and assess the system safety risks associated with the
Operations and Maintenance of Riyadh Metro Lines 5 and 4/6 + interfaces. The system safety risks
are recorded in the Operations and Maintenance Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002 (Appendix A). The O&M
Hazard Log provides a risk assessment in support of the safety certification process by
demonstrating the level of risk is managed as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
This procedure presents the Operations and Maintenance Hazard Log for the Riyadh Metro (lines 5
and 4/6) of package 5 O&M Contract. The Hazard Log is the document collecting all safety
management activities, hazards identified, as well as solutions and decisions taken associated with
the Operation and Maintenance of the Railway System. It is compiled in accordance with British
Standard European Norm (BS EN 50126) 1999, as such it is a key component of the Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) life cycle of the Riyadh Metro asset. Additionally, it
is also a requirement of the TGA Guidance, Safety Management Systems Element 6, Risk
Assessment. Finally, the development and maintenance of the O&M Hazard Log is a contractual
requirement in accordance with O&M Contract Package 5 Exhibit D Section 3, Safety Requirements.
The Hazard log is a key component of the Railway Safety Certification process.
1.2 SCOPE
All system safety risk arising from activities associated with the operation and maintenance of
Riyadh Metro Lines 5 and 4/6 + interfaces, including relevant assets, buildings, transferred the D&B
Contractor hazards and associated safety requirements agreed during the hazard transfer process.
It is applicable to all passengers, staff, members of the public and third-party interfaces that could
be impacted by the Riyadh Metro system.
The O&M Hazard Log is reviewed by O&M Functional Specialists and approved by O&M Functional
Directors in accordance with the Document Control Procedure QUA-PR-007-01.
Excluded from O&M Hazard log are support activities which take place in facilities which are not
Contract assets or buildings, such as staff accommodation.

HSE-PR-00032
2 RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES
Title Responsibilities and Authorities
Contribute as required to the risk assessment process; and

All Employees implement risk control measures in accordance with FLOW
Procedures and Work Instructions
HSQE Director Overall responsibility for ensuring that suitable processes are in
place for the identification, assessment and control of safety risks
arising from the operation and maintenance of the system.
Ensure that the exercises to demonstrate operational readiness

Operational Readiness
incorporates suitable and sufficient practical tests in order to
Director
validate the effectiveness of any proposed risk control measures
Ensure control measures are implemented effectively and as

intended and monitoring performance of control measures and,
where necessary, the development and implementation of
additional measures to further control risk. The control owner is
not below director level. This is to ensure the participation of
Owners of Control directors in leadership and ownership of control measures. The
Measures SMEs (including the Rail Safety Manager) are fully involved in
ensuring control measures are implemented effectively and as
intended. The ownership by directors adds an additional aspect to
the regime of monitoring the performance of control measures
and, where necessary, the development and implementation of
additional measures.
Review of system supplier Hazard Transfer Forms and determining

whether relevant hazards (and their proposed control measures)
Functional Specialist
are acceptable, and should be transferred, to FLOW for
management during operational and maintenance activities

HSE-PR-00032
Title Responsibilities and Authorities
Rail Safety Manager Responsible for the development, implementation and

maintenance of this Procedure, including in particular:
• Coordination of System Risk Assessment activities and

ensuring consultation across the organization;
• Maintaining the Operations & Maintenance Hazard Log
• Incorporating the results of System Risk Assessment
activities within the Safety Certification application;
• Ensuring outputs from the System Risk Assessment are
used to influence the design and development of the
Health, Safety, Quality and Environment (HSQE)
Management System, to ensure that it is effective in
controlling the assessed levels of risk;
• Managing the process for transferring responsibility for
control measures to/from other parties; and
Monitoring the effective implementation of adequate risk control
measures
PMS-Program Facilitates the hazard transfer process and the joint risk review
Management Services board workshops
Hazard Log User • Read in conjunction with the Rail Safety Management Plan
HSE-PL-006-01, System Risk Management Procedure HSE-
PR-013-01 and supporting FLOW and D&B Contractors
documents referenced within the O&M hazard log as
hazard control(s) or exported safety requirements.
• Report errors or omissions to Rail Safety Manager who is
responsible for drafting, reviewing and updating of the
hazard log as per the System Risk Management Procedure
HSE-PR-013-01.
• Check the latest revision/status of this document on
Aconex.

HSE-PR-00032
3 ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS
3.1 ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations Definitions
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BS EN British Standard European Norm
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
CJV Construction Joint Venture
CSM Common Safety Methods
D&B Contractor Design and Build Contractor
FMECA Failure Modes Effects & Critical Analysis
HEP Human Error Probabilities
HILC High Integrity Level Command
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HSQE Health, Safety, Quality and Environment
HTF Hazard Transfer Form
ICP Independent Competent Person
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IM Infrastructure Maintenance
MEP Mechanical, Electrical & Plumbing
OCC Operations Control Center
O&M HL Operations & Maintenance Hazard Log
OPS Operations

HSE-PR-00032
Abbreviations Definitions
PMS Program Management Services
POS Power Supply
PSD Platform Screen Doors
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety
RCRC Royal Commission for Riyadh City
RST Rolling Stock
SEC Security
SIG and LV Signaling & Low Voltage
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SCIL Safety Critical Item List
SPHA System Preliminary Hazard Analysis
SRAC Safety Related Application Condition
SRIL Safety Related Item List
SSS Specific Safety Studies
TJV Track Joint Venture
TGA Transport General Authority
TSM Transit System Maintenance
TSY Transit System
3.2 TERMS
Terms Definitions
As Low As Reasonably A principle for safety decision making that involves weighing a risk
Practicable against the effort, time and money needed to control it.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 10 of 36
Terms Definitions
ANM ArRiyadh New Mobility
BACS Consortium of Bechtel, Almabani, CCC, Siemens
Control Any measure or action that modifies risk. Risk treatments become
controls, or modify existing controls, once they have been
implemented.
Contract Asset All the assets relating to the Railway. This includes those assets
given to the O&M Contractor as part of the handover process (i.e.
the Works Assets) and also assets provided during the term by the
O&M Contractor
FAST D&B Contractor, Riyadh Metro Project, Package 3
FLOW Riyadh Metro Operator for Package 5 (Line 3, Lines 4 & 6 and Line 5)
An interface is typically defined as a point of interaction or a

Interface common boundary between several systems, people, organizations,
entities, etc. as per Riyadh Public Transport Network Lexicon.
Harm Injury, ill health, damage to the environment or other loss
Hazard Any source of potential damage, harm or adverse effects on

something or someone under certain conditions
The hazard frequency is a qualitative level of occurrence of a hazard

Hazard Frequency
based on a quantitative scale.
Hazard Transfer Form Record of proposal by D&B Contractor that a control measure for a
hazard should be implemented by another party
Operations & The document records and references all hazards identified, safety
Maintenance Hazard Log management activities, decisions made, and solutions adopted.
Operator System Risk Risk assessment coordinated by the Rail Safety Manager to include
Assessment the outputs of the system supplier’s risk assessments, intelligence
gained by reviewing the design of the system, expert knowledge of
other Metro operations from within the FLOW assessment team and
data from other comparable railway systems.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 11 of 36
Terms Definitions
Risk According to International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

31000, risk is the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” and an effect
is a positive or negative deviation from what is expected.
The severity is a qualitative level of the consequences of a potential

Severity accident. This level is expressed by a category from I to IV as
explained in Table 3: Hazard Severity Levels.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 12 of 36
4 METHODOLOGY
The O&M Hazard Log records and references all hazards identified, safety management activities,
decisions made, and solutions adopted during trial run and commercial operations.
The process for the identification & demonstration of safety hazards consisted of:
• identification and categorization of potential hazard associated with the operation and
maintenance of the system using the operator system risk assessment in line with ALARP
principles,
• hazard transfer and proposed control from the D&B Contractor to the O&M in the form of
exported safety requirements that are under operation or maintenance responsibility,
• verification and mapping assurance of hazard and proposed control by the functional
specialist,
• evaluation of the effectiveness of proposed controls.
4.1 SYNTHESIS OF REQUIREMENTS
The synthesis of requirements contained within the O&M hazard log is demonstrated in table 1. It
is composed of;
• FLOW identified Infrastructure Maintenance (IM),

• FLOW identified Operations (OPE),
• FLOW identified Transit System Maintenance (TSM),
• FLOW identified Security (SEC)
• FLOW identified Health, Safety & Environment (HSE).
• D&B Contractors transferred safety requirement.
The figures stated in table 1 are based on HSE-RG-00002 revision C03 and will be subject to changes
in the future revisions. The
The residual risk rankings are demonstrated where available from R1 to R4, showing the
requirements to have been met, and mitigated to the Acceptable region in terms of ALARP. Where
requirements remain as open or Not Available in the residual risk ratings, the data is awaited from
the D&B Contractor. The FLOW identified Hazards with R3 Residual Ranking were agreed upon with
OMC and OMER; please refer to HSE-RP-00001: Safety Assessment of OM Identified Hazards with
Residual Risk Score R3 Report. As for those ANM SRAC temporary mitigations for 3J1 and 6H2 with
R3 Residual Ranking, they are discussed with OMER; please refer to Appendix B. This data will be
included when received within future revisions of the D&B Contractor Hazard Log.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 13 of 36
Residual Ranking
Source
Total Open/NA R1 R2 R3 R4
INM FLOW 41 0 0 0 0 41
INM D&B (FAST) 264 0 0 0 0 264
OPE FLOW 112 0 0 0 14 98
OPE D&B (ANM) 129 3 0 0 126 0
OPE D&B (BACS) 34 12 0 0 0 22
OPE D&B (FAST) 614 0 0 0 0 614
TSM FLOW 59 0 0 0 16 43
TSM D&B (FAST) 124 0 0 0 0 124
SEC FLOW 30 0 0 0 19 11
HSE FLOW 20 0 0 0 14 6
ICT FAST (FAST) 2 0 0 0 0 2
TOTAL 1429 15 0 0 189 1225
Table 3 – Synthesis of Requirements
4.2 HAZARD TRANSFER
The supplier for the Metro system for Lines 4,5 & 6 (FAST Consortium) have demonstrated that all
reasonably practicable control measures have been identified and documented within the
Contractors Safety Management Plans for D&B Contractor. The control measures are.
• Incorporated into the design, or

• Specified to the Operator in Operations & Maintenance Manuals, or
• Passed to the Royal Commission for Riyadh City (RCRC) as system owner, with a request that
responsibility be transferred to another party.
Where safety requirements are specified in the D&B Contractor plans, the requirements are
exported from the D&B Contractor to O&M as part of the hazard transfer process. These are
identified in table 1 as D&B Contractor source.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 14 of 36
As a due diligence exercise FLOW undertakes a Verification and Mapping of the D&B Contractor
Exported Safety Requirements. The purpose of this exercise is to provide assurance to FLOW that
the D&B Contractor Exported Safety Requirements accepted are accurate and within the
responsibility of FLOW to apply controls.
Verification Process
• The D&B Contractor Exported Safety Requirements are allocated to the correct O&M owner.
• The data is accurate, reflecting the information at the PMS facilitated Hazard Transfer
Workshops.
• Amendments made by the D&B Contractor are an accurate reflection of what was agreed at
the Hazard Transfer Workshops.
Mapping
• FLOW has in place O&M control measures that capture the specified D&B Contractor
Exported Safety Requirements.
• Identification of additional measures requiring revision of existing FLOW controls.
• Identification of measures requiring new FLOW controls to be developed.
• FLOW rejects the exported D&B Contractor requirement.
The evidenced verification and mapping of agreed the exported D&B Contractor safety
requirements are then provided to the PMS who in turn refer the material to the D&B Contractor
whereby the D&B Contractor assurance processes confirm that the O&M Contractor have suitably
mitigated the exported safety requirement. Once the D&B Contractor assurance is received, the
PMS on behalf of the Client forwards the Hazard Transfer Form to the O&M Contractor for final
approval and signature(s), having already acquired the D&B Contractor approval signature(s).
The Client Hazard Transfer Form is signed by the Functional Specialist of FLOW. Identified as the
Operations Manager and Director, Infrastructure Manager and Director, TSM RAMS Manager and
TSM Deputy Director that took part in the hazard transfer process for effective implementation of
the exported safety requirement. The Client Hazard Transfer Form is included in figure1.
The O&M Signatures to be gained fall into three categories of the business delivery units aligned to
the category of exported safety requirement. These are.
• Operations
• Transit System Maintenance
• Infrastructure Maintenance

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 15 of 36
The agreed exported safety requirements are then migrated to the O&M Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002
and identified as FAST source.
The Exported D&B Contractor Requirements that are rejected are included in an outstanding item
list and shared with PMS for discussion with the D&B Contractor. Once the agreement has been
reached, the updated Exported D&B Contractor Requirements will re-enter the verification and
mapping process outlined in Figure 2.
For the Exported D&B Contractor Requirements that remain in the rejected status after further
discussion with PMS and D&B Contractor, the requirements are escalated to the joint risk review
board.
Safety Requirement exported to O&M

Reference No. FROM TO Date
FAST Reference # FAST D&B (Package 3) FLOW O&M (Package 5)

Details Submission Revision PMS Correspondence Reference FLOW Correspondence Reference
Hazard Log The associated Hazard Log provides the full context of the Safety Requirements exported.
Statement The exported D&B Safety Requirements attached have been reviewed by Flow Functional Specialist(s)/ Subject Matter Expert(s)
during PMS facilitated hazard transfer workshops and the FLOW Internal O&M Verification and Mapping process.
O&M Acceptance and Observations

Acceptance Status
Accepted
Status Summary
Statement Details of the acceptance status are defined within the attached document.
Signatures
Name Date Signature
D&B Author
Name Date Signature

O&M Receiver (TSM)
Name Date Signature

O&M Receiver (OPE)
Name Date Signature

O&M Receiver (IM)
Figure 1 – Client Hazard Transfer Form

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 16 of 36
Figure 2 - Hazard/Control Transfer from the D&B Contractor to FLOW

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 17 of 36
4.3 OPERATOR SYSTEM RISK ASSESSMENT
FLOW’s System Risk Assessment in accordance with HSE-PR-013-01 System Risk Management Procedure is
supplementary to the assessment carried out by the system supplier. This will ensure that all operational
and maintenance hazards have been identified and the risk associated with them adequately controlled.
The System Risk Assessment is carried out with the aid of workshops attended by a cross-section of personnel
with knowledge and experience of Riyadh Metro system operations and maintenance activities. The
objectives of the assessment are to:
• Identify the hazardous events relevant to the operation and maintenance of the Metro system.
These include the foreseeable external events that may impact on safe operations and maintenance
activities, in addition to accidents that could occur on the operational system or Metro premises.
• Identify the possible causes (precursors) for each such event and the underlying hazards which may
create them.
• Estimate the frequency with which the relevant hazardous events are likely to occur due to each
precursor, with the proposed risk control measures in place.
• Estimate the consequences of each hazardous event.
• Review and ‘sense check’ the results from the risk assessment; and
• Assess the reasonableness of additional control measures.
Persons accounted for in the risk assessment including:
• Staff: Employees, contractors and third parties working on Metro premises

• Passengers: Persons within trains, the ‘paid area’ of stations, or elsewhere in stations or car parks
but known to be travelling; other than staff
• Public: Other persons on Metro premises or affected by activities taking place on Metro premises.
The FLOW System Risk Frequency is designed to accommodate the range of frequencies encountered in
the O&M phase with reference to EN 50126-1: 2017. The D&B Contractor Risk Frequency categories
contrasts in that a frequent is factored at 1E-5 as opposed to the FLOW System Risk Frequency factored at
1E-3 for the frequent events.
Therefore, where the D&B Contractor frequency is calculated at 1E-5 within the FLOW O&M hazard log,
this equates to Occasional category. The actual calculated frequency is not changed between D&B
Contractor and O&M.
Table 2 below illustrates the comparison of System Risk Frequency categories of FLOW O&M and D&B
Contractor (Reference: FAST Hazard Log M3-FST-RGR-SYS00-D80-000001).

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 18 of 36
D&B D&B Events per hour in
FLOW Events Events per Metric Prefix
Frequency occurrence based
Category per hour in hour in
on 24h/day
Metric Prefix Metric
Prefix
Frequent Once every 6 weeks F ≥1E-3
Once every 6 weeks to once a 1E-4 ≤ F < 1E-3

Probable
year
Once a year to once per 10 1E-5 ≤ F < 1E-4 Frequent F ≥1E-5

Occasional
years
Once per 10 years to once per 1E-6 ≤ F < 1E-5 Probable 1E-6 ≤ F < 1E-5
Remote
1,000 years
once per 1,000 years to once 1E-7≤ F <1E-6 Occasional 1E-7 ≤ F < 1E-6
Improbable
per 100,000 years
once per 100,000 years or F< 1E-7 Remote 1E-8 ≤ F < 1E-7
Incredible
more
Improbable 1E-9 ≤ F < 1E-8
Incredible F< 1E-9
Table 2 - Comparison of System Risk Frequency categories of FLOW O&M and D&B Contractor
Consequence to persons or Consequence or

Severity Category Score
environment service/property
• Affecting a large number of people
Any of the below consequences
resulting in multiple fatalities, and/or
Catastrophic 4 in presence of consequences to
• Extreme damage to the environment
persons or environment
• Affecting a very small number of

people and resulting in at least one
Critical 3 fatality, and/or Loss of a major system
• Large damage to the environment

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 19 of 36
• No possibility of fatality, severe or
minor injuries only, and/or
Marginal 2 Severe system(s) damage
• Minor damage to the environment
• Possible minor injury

Insignificant 1 Minor system damage
Table 3 - System Risk Consequence Assessment
Severity 1 2 3 4
Frequency(events/hr) Insignificant Marginal Critical Catastrophic
A Frequent F ≥1E-3 R2 R1 R1 R1
B Probable 1E-4 ≤ F < 1E-3 R3 R2 R1 R1
C Occasional 1E-5 ≤ F < 1E-4 R3 R2 R2 R1
D Remote 1E-6 ≤ F < 1E-5 R4 R3 R2 R2
E Improbable 1E-7≤ F <1E-6 R4 R4 R3 R3
F Highly F< 1E-7

R4 R4 R4 R4
Improbable
Table 4- System Risk Calculation
Individual hazards will be risk ranked in accordance CENELEC the risk ranking matrix described in
Table 5:
Risk Rating Definition
R1: Shall be eliminated. Risk control measure shall be implemented to mitigate the risk to
Intolerable a level of ALARP.
Shall only be accepted when risk deduction is impracticable and with the agreement
R2:
of the Employer. Risk control measure shall be implemented if cost is justifiable to
Undesirable
mitigate the risk to a level of ALARP.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 20 of 36
Acceptable with adequate control and the agreement of Employer. Further risk
R3: Tolerable control measure is recommended but not mandatory to mitigate the risk to a level of
ALARP.
R4: Negligible Risk level is considered acceptable. No additional risk control measure is required.
Table 5 - System Risk Ranking Matrix
Operator System Risk Assessments are identified in the FLOW O&M HL as FLOW source. Where D&B
Contractor exported Hazards and associated safety requirements demonstrably apply to the Operator
System Risk Assessment the D&B Contractor Hazard ID is cross referenced. This provides the link to the
associated D&B Contractor information that shall include but not be limited to.
• SRAC’s-Safety Related Application Conditions,

• HILC’s -High Integrity Level Commands,
• SRIL’s -Safety Related Items List (Item defined as a system, subsystem, product or
component,
• SCIL’s-Safety Critical Items List (FLOW AMS-PL-001-01 Asset Management Plan-Strategic
Asset Management),
• CSM’s – Common Safety Method,
• FMECA’s for specific items and associated safety cases,
• HEP’s – Human Error Probabilities,
• SSS’s –Specific Safety Studies, and
• SPHA – System Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
4.4 ALARP MODEL
FLOW subscribes to the ALARP model which is defined in CENELEC Standard EN 50126: Railway
applications — the specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and
Safety (RAMS) as shown in Figure 2. Within the ALARP method employed by FLOW collective risks
are considered. This means the risks arising from the system to all persons using the system, the
environment, and the material values are considered.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 21 of 36
Figure 3 - ALARP Decision Making Model
The System Risk Assessment methodology includes the identification of practicable measures to
reduce risk and a process to determine which measures are reasonable to introduce for those risks
that fall within the ALARP range.
To do this an initial assessment is first carried out using the experience and expert judgement
available within the FLOW organization. If this initial assessment can establish that either:
• There are clear safety benefits, and the costs and effort associated with introduction are
relatively small; or
• The costs are clearly extremely high, or introduction would significantly hinder the provision
of the service, and the safety benefits are small;
Then no further analysis will generally be required before making a decision on whether or not to
introduce the control.
Where this expert judgement cannot clearly establish whether it is reasonably practicable to
introduce a control measure, then a more detailed assessment will be carried out under the
coordination of the Rail Safety Manager.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 22 of 36
4.5 RISK ACCEPTANCE
The Hazard log provides traceability to the analyses and rationales that have been developed for
risk acceptance. The following was used to assess the acceptability of a risk.
• the application of codes of practice;
• Standards and rules that have met all the following criteria to be used as a code of practice
for the risk management process:
o widely accepted in the railway sector;
o relevant for the control of the specific hazard; and
o available to an assessment body so that it can:
- assess the suitability of how the risk assessment is applied and the results of applying
it; or
- mutually recognize any safety assessment report on the same system.
• comparison with similar systems (reference systems); or
• Reference systems can be used to determine the acceptability of risk. Where an existing
system is be used as a reference system the O&M Hazard log will demonstrate that:
o it has been proven in use and has an acceptable safety level;

o the system being assessed is used under similar functional, operational, and
environmental conditions and has similar interfaces as the reference system.
• explicit risk estimation.
o Explicit risk estimation is an assessment of the risks associated with hazard(s), where risk
is defined as a combination of the rate of the occurrence of the hazard or hazardous
event causing harm (the frequency) and the degree of severity of the harm (the
consequence). The estimation can be qualitative, semi‐quantitative or quantitative. The
choice will be determined by factors such as the availability of quantitative data and
confidence in such data. Any analysis should be proportionate to the potential risks. Any
risk assessment should follow a systematic and structured process.
o Risk acceptance criteria are used to judge whether the risk is sufficiently reduced to
allow the Sponsor to accept and implement the change. For FLOW this means that the
risks should be reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Hazards were analyzed and evaluated using one or more of the aforementioned risk acceptance
principles.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 23 of 36
4.6 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG STRUCTURE
The excel Hazard log document is composed of a main hazard log worksheet (Hazard Log)
containing all details as required by Transport General Authority (TGA) Guidance Safety
Management Systems and the Contract.
In addition to the main hazard log there are a series of worksheets for the cover page, revision
control, review, control guidance, ALARP and Lookup.
4.7 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG TEMPLATE
The hazard log Excel sheet is composed of 7 tabs:
Tab 1 Cover Page -

Tab 2 Revision Control -
Tab 3 Review Verification by documentation
Verification by Trial run
Verification at commercial service-12 month review
Or as a result of audit/incident/investigation etc.
Changes to relevant legislation within the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia,
Response to TGA Safety Alerts as required,
Introduction of new technology, plant or equipment,
New operational requirements as a result of introduction of
new technology.
Changes to asset owner Requirements
Changes in TGA Guidance Notes
Tab 4 Control Guidance Describes the TGA requirements for Hazard Log content
Tab 5 Summary Chart Contains the summary chart of the following Tab:
• Tab: Hazard Log
• Tab: SRAC & IEC
• Tab: BACS-FLOW 4A1 Temporary Mitigation
• Tab: ANM SRAC 3J1 6H2
Tab 6 Hazard Log Containing all details as required by TGA Guidance Safety
Management Systems and the Contract
Tab 7 SRAC & IEC DBWC(FAST) Exported SRAC and IEC 62267 safety requirements
without the full context: As per the D&B "The implicit residual
risks are the risks mitigated by the Safety Requirements
identified and exported by the suppliers or the manufacturers
of a product to the end user".

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 24 of 36
Tab 8 BACS to FLOW These are temporary Safety requirements/Mitigation from
4A1 Temporary DBWC(BACS) exported to OMC.
Mitigation
Tab 9 ANM to FLOW Temporary SRAC Mitigations Transferred by ANM to FLOW for
Temporary SRAC 3J1-6H2 TURN BACK CONFIGURATION Phase 1A.
3J1 6H2
Tab 10 Deleted Items Contain deleted FLOW Identified Hazards that were merged to
other Hazards. Remarks columns have the information of why
they are deleted.
Tab 11 ALARP Assesment using the experience and expert judgement available
within the FLOW organization and option for detailed
assessment under the coordination with the Rail Safety
Manager.
Tab 12 Lookup Contain the source for the main hazard log worksheet
Master Tab Template
HAZARD SUB
SOURCE OPERATING MODE SYSTEM Line
NUMBER SYSTEM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Hazard Number: This unique identification number is used for traceability and linking
purpose. It is composed of the combination between the hazard cause number and the
requirement number. A unique reference number for identification based on the following
format: FLOW-HZL-SSS.XXXXX where SSS is the business unit (eg. TSM, OPS, IM) and XXXXX
is a 5-digit chronological number.
2. Source: where the hazard is identified (eg. FLOW, FAST, ICP, BACS)
3. Operating mode: Normal, Degraded, Emergency, or combination of modes.
4. System: a group of sub-systems to fulfil a required function under given conditions
5. Subsystem: inter-related components influences and interactions with the system of which
failure may be a contributary factor
6. Line: Lines 4, 5 & 6
WHO EXPOSED HAZARD HAZARD OWNER/S D&B HAZARD REFERENCE HAZARD CAUSE

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 25 of 36
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
7. Who exposed: who are affected by the hazard (Staff, Passenger, Member of the public,
Emergency services)
8. Hazard: Hazard description
9. Hazard Owner: Business unit responsible for the hazard (eg. OPE, IM)
10. The D&B Contractor Hazard Reference: the unique reference number of the hazard assigned
by the D&B Contractor to provide a link to all additional controls provided by the D&B
Contractor.
11. Hazard Cause: Events causing the Hazardous Situations: Events which could lead to the
potential accident in a specific context.
INITIAL RISK
D&B PROVIDED & EXPORTED
CONSEQUENCES Frequency Severity Risk Initial Risk EXISTING CONTROL(S)
Score Score Rating Factor
(12) (13) (14)
12. Consequence: the result or effect of an action or condition

13. Initial Risk Rating: a combination of frequency and severity rating prior the application of
controls for the O&M phase (refer to section 4.3 Operator System Risk Assessment)
14. D&B Contractor Provided & Exported Existing Control(s): D&B Contractor controls reference
ID identified, applied at D&B Contractor phase to mitigate the hazard.
RESIDUAL RISK CONTROL

Residual CONSIDERED CONTROL ALARP
O&M CONTROL(S) Frequency Severity Risk
Risk BUT OWNER/S STATEMENT
Score Score Rating
Factor REJECTED
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
15. O&M Control(s): verified and mapped O&M controls in response to the exported D&B
Contractor safety requirements and/or O&M controls identified as part of the Operator
system risk assessment.
16. Residual Risk Rating: As per the D&B As per the D&B "The explicit residual risks are identified
in the FAST and entities Hazard Logs as per the contractual residual risk assessments
processes".
17. Control Considered but Rejected: risk controls that have been considered but rejected.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 26 of 36
18. Control Owner/s: nomination of the person responsible for each risk control
19. ALARP Statement:
• Acceptable – implementation by the Operator is acceptable
• Acceptable – with control and the agreement of the Employer
• Undesirable – controls to be implemented if cost is acceptable to the Employer
• Intolerable – controls shall be implemented to reduce the risk to the level of ALARP
DATE OF THE NEXT

DATE ADDED DATE REVIEWED REMARKS
REVIEW
(20) (21) (22) (23)
20. Date Added: date the hazard is added

21. Date Reviewed: date the hazard is reviewed (planned or unplanned)
22. Date of the next review: the hazard’s next review date in accordance with the System Risk
Management Procedure HSE-PR-013-01
23. Remarks: Updates on the hazards or any other additional information
System & Subsystem Guideline

Table 6 provides guidance on system and subsystem categories for FAST identified hazards from the
hazard transfer process (refer to section 4.2) and FLOW identified hazard from the Operator system
risk assessment (refer to section 4.3). FAST identified hazards and associated systems and
subsystems referenced in FAST Intermediate Hazard Log M3-FST-RGR-SYS00-D80-000001 from the
design and build phase are incorporated into the O&M Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002.
System Subsystem
CJV Structures and MEP
TJV Track Systems
Depot Equipment
FAST Transferred Hazard POS
TSY System Integration
RST
SIG and LV
Civil & Structures
IM (CJV)
MEP
FLOW Identified Hazard Rolling Stock
TSM (TJV/TSY) Depot Equipment
Power Supply

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 27 of 36
Track
PSD
Signaling & Low Voltage
Stations
Trains
OPS(CJV, TJV,TSY)
OCC
Guideway
All
Trains
Stations
HSE
Depot
Guideway
OCC
Third Parties
All
Trains
Stations
SEC Depot
Guideway
OCC
Third Parties
Table 6 - Systems and Subsystems

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 28 of 36
5 REFERENCES & ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
5.1 REFERENCES
Document Number Document Name
M3-FST-RGR-SYS00-D80- FAST Intermediate Hazard Log

000001 AD1
Railway Applications - The Specification and

BS EN 50126 (1999) Demonstration of Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)
Railway Applications - The Specification and

BS EN 50126 (2017) Demonstration of Reliability, Availability,
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)
ISO 31000 (2018) Risk Management
Not Available TGA Guidance, Safety Management Systems - October 2017
5.2 ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
QUA-PR-005-01 Control of Records Procedure
QUA-PR-010-01 HSQE Audit Procedure
QUA-PR-013-01 Management of Change Procedure
HSE-PR-013-01 System Risk Management Procedure
QUA-PR-014-01 Management Review Procedure
HSE-PR-017-01 Environmental Aspects, Impacts, Risks and Opportunities

Procedure
HSE-PL-006-01 Rail Safety Plan
QUA-PR-007-01 Document Control Procedure
HSE-RG-00002 O&M Hazard Log Lines 4,5 & 6

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 29 of 36
HSE-RP-00001 Safety Assessment of OM Identified Hazards with Residual Risk
Score R3 Report
AMS-PL-001-01 FLOW Asset Management Plan-Strategic Asset Management
5.3 ASSOCIATED WORK INSTRUCTIONS
Not Available

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 30 of 36
6 MONITORING AND AUDIT
6.1 MONITORING – O&M HAZARD LOG
Development Phase
The O&M Hazard Log HSE-RG-00002 applicable to lines 5, 4/6 + interfaces shall be monitored and
reviewed during the development phase including trial run, to take account of FLOW Identified
Hazards and D&B Contractor Exported Hazards. This in accordance with package 5 O&M Contract
Exhibit D 3.3. Additionally, the O&M Hazard Log is a key component of the Safety Certificate and
Operating License application to the Transport General Authority. The Safety Certification &
Operating License application is led by the Railway Safety Manager and employs the use of an
Independent Competent Person (ICP) as the level of Assurance required by the TGA. The ICP assures
the Hazard Log is developed in accordance with HSE-PR-013 System Risk Management Procedure
and recognised industry standards.
Commercial Phase
The Operations & Maintenance Hazard Log will be fully reviewed after twelve months of full
operational service and subsequently on an annual basis as a minimum.
The Rail Safety Manager will coordinate this process and ensure that the reviews are carried out
either to the planned program or when changes are proposed which may affect the content and
relevance of the Operator system risk assessment.
The Operations & Maintenance Hazard Log will also be reviewed where required under the FLOW
Management of Change Procedure, specifically in relation to organizational, operational, or
technical changes. Examples of these include but not limited to.
• Verification by documentation
• Verification by Trial run
• Verification at commercial service-12-month review
• Or as a result of audit/incident/investigation etc
• Changes to relevant legislation within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
• Response to TGA Safety Alerts as required,
• Introduction of new technology, plant or equipment,
• New operational requirements as a result of introduction of new technology.
• Changes to asset owner Requirements
• Changes in TGA Guidance Notes

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 31 of 36
6.2 AUDIT
Procedural compliance auditing will be undertaken in accordance with the FLOW HSQE Audit
Procedure.

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 32 of 36
7 RECORDS
The records that will be generated by the application of the procedure are described in Table 6.
These records shall be maintained in accordance with the Control of Records Procedure.
Table 6 – System Risk Assessment Records
Document Description Minimum Retention
Document that records and

references all hazards
Operations & Maintenance identified, safety
Life of the Contract
Hazard Log management activities,
decisions made, and solutions
adopted
Record of proposal by the

D&B Contractor that a control
Client Hazard Transfer Forms measure for a hazard should Life of the Contract
be implemented by another
party

HSE-PR-00032
- LINES 5, 4&6 Page 33 of 36
APPENDIX A OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG (SAMPLE)
INITIAL
D&B
HAZARD OPERATING WHO HAZARD RISK
SOURCE SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM Line HAZARD HAZARD HAZARD CAUSE CONSEQUENCES
NUMBER MODE EXPOSED OWNER/S Frequency Severity Risk Initial Risk
REFERENCE
Score Score Rating Factor
FLOW-HZL- FLOW Degraded, Station Access/Egress 4, 5, 6 Passengers, Bomb Security/ TSY.10.2.1.3 Individual or Group place explosives and Derailment C 4 C4 R1
SEC.00001 Emergency Staff threat/activation Operations make threat. Fire
Elevated Station Individual or group make spurious allegations Collision
of explosives and makes threat. Multiple Fatalities
Passengers or member of station Staff Slip, trip & fall
identify suspicious package Minor/Major injury
Explosion Uncontrolled station evacuation
Bags/Equipment left by Staff/Contractors Service delay/disruption leading to overcrowding
working within the station/back office etc. Panic
Luggage/Bags left by passengers in the Infrastructure collapse
station or platform Asset damage
Inhaling Smoke and Dust
RESIDUAL Residual
D&B PROVIDED & EXPORTED RISK Risk
O&M CONTROL(S) Factor CONTROL(S) CONSIDERED BUT REJECTED
EXISTING CONTROL(S) Frequency Severity Risk Rating
Score Score
Communication systems OPE-PR-007-01 Rule Book E 3 E3 R3
(tetra radio) high level voice TRA-PR-001-01 Competence Management System Procedure
encryption that meets the TRA-TM-003-01 Safety Critical Communication Training
safety critical environment HSE-IN-001-01 Safety Critical Communications
Fire Management System SEC-PL-001-01 Security Control Plan
Manual Fire Fighting HSE-PL-008 Incident Management Plan
Equipment HSE-PL-007-01 Emergency Management Plan
HVAC System HSE-PR-001-01 Accident/Incident Reporting and Investigation
Emergency Exits HSE-PR-019-01 Incident Management Procedure
CCTV System HSE-PR-020-01 Permit to Work Procedure
BMS (Building Management TRA-TM-001-01 Crowd Control Training
System) SEC-PR-00034 Security Threat Procedure
SCADA(Supervisory Control SEC-IN-00024 Security Threat Instruction
and Data Acquisition) SEC-IN-00004 Security Operation Station
ACID (Access Control and OPE-FO-017-01 HOT Assessment Checklist Form
Intrusion Detection) SIL2 OPE-IN-093-01 Dealing with Unattended Property
Public Address System OPE-IN-187-01 Emergency Response for Bomb Threat Terrorism
Passenger Information OPE-IN-155-01 Handling Passengers Evacuation from a Train Line 4&6
Display OPE-IN-255-01 Handling Passengers Evacuation from a Train Line 5
Directional Signage OPE-IN-169-01 Station Keys and Card Management Line 4&6
Train Emergency Stop Button OPE-IN-269-01 Station Keys and Card Management Line 5
Emergency Call Points OPE-IN-299-01 Public Announcement Scripts For OCC - Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-363-01 Public Announcement Scripts For OCC - Lines 5
OPE-IN-161-01 Closing of Stations during Station Operating Hours Line 4&6
OPE-IN-261-01 Closing of Stations during Station Operating Hours Line 5
OPE-IN-112-01 Alternative Services Mainline - Lines 4&6
OPE-IN-212-01 Alternative Services Mainline - Line 5
Revision No.: D
HSE-PR-00032 OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE HAZARD LOG - LINES 5, 4&6
Page 34 of 36
FO No.: M-FLO-000000-HS0G-FOR-000020 FO No.: QUA-FO-015 (E01)

CONTROL OWNER(S) ALARP STATEMENT DATE ADDED DATE REVIEWED DATE OF THE NEXT REVIEW Remarks
Security Director 'Acceptable with agreement of the Employer 21/05/2020 12/05/2022 (A04) 12/5/2023 01/03/2021 Updated in Column J
Operations Director Operator System Risk Workshop
'IEC 62267 Railway applications - Automated urban guided transport 23/03/2021 Updated in Column Q
(AUGT) - Safety requirements 2009
RIS-8046-TOM Iss 2 Spoken Safety Critical Communications 29/06/21 DRCS M-FLO-000000-HS0G-RGR-000006
ISO 45001:2018 Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems -Reviewed with Security Team.
– Requirements with guidance for use Hazard separated in different Stations, ( FLOW-HZL-SEC.00029 Bomb
threat/activation Shallow Underground Station, FLOW-HZL-SEC.00030 Bomb
threat/activation Deep Underground Station)
-Removed SEC-PR-016-01 Major Incident Document Added Mitigation SEC-IN-
00024 Security Threat Instruction and SEC-PR-00034 Security Threat Procedure
-Added the Causes listed in No 24 "Luggage/Bags left by passengers in the
station or platform" and No 25 "Bags/Equipment left by Staff/Contractors
working within the station/back office etc."
-Added the Consequence listed in Comment No. 26 Inhaling Smoke and Dust in
"Consequences"
-Removed OPE-PR-008-01 Operations Reporting Procedure. Relevant only to
fare evasion
02/08/2021 Updated Column Q Existing Controls and Column R O&M Controls
04/07/2021, 06/07/2021 & 03/08/2021 Operator Risk Assessment Workshop
27/04/2022 Updated Columns Q, R, and Y
Revision No.: D
Page 35 of 36

APPENDIX B ANM SRAC TEMPORARY MITIGATIONS FOR 3J1 AND 6H2
Revision No.: D
Page 36 of 36


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Form No.

: 646404-37F-0001 Rev: 02 Date: - Last Date Reviewed: / /

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

2nd Cycle response:

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Added Overspeed due to incorrect input of TSR by OCC

Added HSE-PR-026-01 On Call Procedure

Fire and explosion are to remain a consequence.

Agreed, added emergency lighting and HVAC and TVS.

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Hazard cause makes no sense.

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

2nd Cycle Response:

2nd Cycle comment: Added in column Q - Point of conflict signage

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

The risk matrix should be identified within this

Agreed, Refer to O&M Hazard Log Procedure HSE-PR-00032

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

FLOW-HZL-SEC-00002 Clarify if the "Subsystem" should be Train? KB CLARIFICATION

FLOW-HZL-SEC-00010 Consider including Theft of property/equipment in the "consequences" section. KB AGREED

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

FLOW-HZL-OPS.00476 - Awaiting D&B Information

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Agreed, column updated.

Agreed, column updated.

Please include the specific documents as mitigation.

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Agreed, the mitigation column has been reviewed and updated.

Rolling Stock & Depot Equipment - General

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Mitigations added for Lighting system is maintained, e.g.:

Agreed, column updated.

[D&B Transferred] [TSY.SSS_PE_TSY_034.MAIN: In case of PSD failure, O&M shall follow

[D&B Transferred] [TSY.SSS_PE_TSY_034.MAIN: In case of PSD failure, O&M shall follow

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

[D&B Transferred -commented-] [TSY.RQ_SHA_097.MAIN: In accordance with maintenance

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Agreed, control measures updated.

Closing of workorders is to be performed prior to train preparation to revenue service

(Note: Wording not updated in FAST HL AD1 version) 2nd Cycle:

OPEN - 01/11/2021 - SD: What are the

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

TSY.RQ_PHA_176.MAIN The replacement of watertightness gaskets of train's subsystems

OPEN - 01/11-2021 - SD Please refer to

TSY.RQ_PHA_195.MAIN In accordance to the maintenance plan. Appropriate maintenance of

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Please reword for more detail, better clarity and understanding.

TSY.RQ_SHA_092.MAIN In accordance with the maintenance manuals. Regular and skilled

OPEN - 31/10/2021 - Ongoing entries to check

29.06.2022 The same reply above as of 2nd Cycle

Agreed, control measure is updated to include:

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

OPEN - 31/10/2021 - Ongoing entries to check

2nd Cycle Response::

Some maintenance tasks on bogie require inspections to be carried out whilst

Date: 19-Jul-23 B - REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS X

Agreed, this comment has been covered for hazards.