G.R. No.

193960               January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO;
THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND
ABC,1 Respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching private respondent’s back, shoulder and left
eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the private respondent’s intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262. In her
affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended
prior to the subject incident.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused.

RULING:
No, RA 9262 should not be construed in a manner that will favor the accused.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the
act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts
refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity
because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.
G.R. No. 161090               July 4, 2012

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO represented by

GAVINO PLOPENIO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses and Edwardo owns 11.8643 and 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in
Caramoan, Camarines Sur respectively. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino
Plopenio was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) at ₱51,125.60 per hectare in DARAB Case No. V-LV-040-CS-00. On this basis,
petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657.
On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation.
Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and
Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary administrative proceedings.
Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16
days after their receipt of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were allowed to
file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the petition was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is an error in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on Appeal by
Certiorari to the Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law.

RULING:
No, there is no error in applying Rule 45 of Rules of Court on Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court and not Rule 60 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section
60 thereof. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court
of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and
those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v SANDIGANBAYAN and VICTORIA AMANTE
G.R. NO. 167304 AUGUST 25, 2009
FACTS:
Victoria Amante, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of P.D. 1455, otherwise known as “The
Auditing Code of the Philippines”. Accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation due to lack of
Jurisdiction stating that Section 4 of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have
original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Salary Grade 27 or higher, based on the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(R.A. 7658). The Sandiganbayan considered the said motion by Amante and dimissed the case.
Petitioner disputed the contention of Amante and the appreciation of the Sandiganbayan of its
decision in Inding v Sandiganbayan, which in this particular case, Inding did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for in Section 4(a)
(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the RPC. Petitioner adds that the
enumeration in the said statutes were equally applicable to offenses committed in relation to
public office.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the offense therein charged is intimately connected with the
accused’s office and was and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, the accused had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their offices.
It is beyond the clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification
as to the public officals involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of the same code. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade
27 and above, except those specifically enumerated.
It is a well settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of statute will be interpreted in their
natural , plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET
G.R. No. 183137
FACTS: On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet
approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet
Revenue Code of 2005 (“Tax Ordinance”). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance
levied a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to “resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.” It was Pelizloy Realty
Corporation's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusement tax on
gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of Benguet.
Pelizloy filed the present petition on June 10, 2008 on pure questions of law assailing
the legality of Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance as being a (supposedly)
prohibited percentage tax per Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees
to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being
“amusement places” under Section 140 of LGC.
RULING:
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on
“the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.”
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not
among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to
amusement taxes.
Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots hinges on whether
the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow
the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted
to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.”
G.R. No. 155344               January 20, 2004

ROLANDO N. CANET, Petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Julieta
Decena was the mayor there. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council
resolution, was allowed to operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities
in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any
Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof. This ordinance was submitted to
Decena for her approval but she denied it because the said ordinance
does not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting as well as a
separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance
indefinitely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a

municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor’s permit would not only
be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on
Decena’s administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution
allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution).
The tax ordinances Canet mentioned contain general provisions for the
issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions
prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of cockpits and
other game fowl activities.
G.R. No. 169435             February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,

CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
The municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era was in a boundary dispute when the former
claimed the middle and isolated northern portions of the latter’s territory, pursuant to
RA 3753 which created the Marcos town in the Province of Ilocos Norte,
contending that the law requires that the land area of a municipality must be
compact and contiguous. Nueva Era, on the other hand, argued that its entire
land area has always been an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous
cultural community, and thus the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected
and preserved as part of Nueva Era. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte
declared the disputed portions as part of Nueva Era’s territory since none of Nueva
Era’s barangays were mentioned to comprise the municipality of Marcos in RA 3753.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753.
RULING:
No, there is no part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under
R.A. No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory
are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated
from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory,
Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon
which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded
from its operation and effect. Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not
mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be
set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally.
G.R. No. 161081             May 10, 2005

RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental

Mindoro, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental
Mindoro, respondent.

FACTS:
Ramon Atienza and Jose Villarosa were serving as the Vice-Governor and Governor of
Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, Governor Villarosa issued a memorandum that
concerning the “AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES,
MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN”. Vice-Governor Atienza argued that the
authority to approve the purchase orders of all the needs of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan are under the authority of the Vice-Governor as Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Vice-Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in
connection with the procurements of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel,
repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
RULING:
Yes, the Vice-Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection
with the procurements of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and
maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority granted to the Vice-
Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve
disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve
purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. Since
it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment
for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the
purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment.
G.R. No. 116695 June 20, 1997

VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON.
JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City; and
SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE GUEVARA, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent was filed a complaint against petitioners for forcible entry in
the MTCC of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on
August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period
of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did
not acquire jurisdiction over him. 

On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer. On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the
motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their
receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the
admission of their answer, which was attached thereto. Two days later,
petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended
answer. 

ISSUES:
Whether or not the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of
pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.

RULING:
Yes, the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be
applied STRICTLY.
The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction.
The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision,
its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or
the other.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, EMDEN
ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents.

FACTS:
It was also registered as the sole homeowners' association in the said village with the
Home Financing Corporation. However, the association was not able file its corporate
by-laws. The LGVHAI officers then tried to registered its By-Laws in 1988, but they
failed to do so. They then discovered that there were two other homeowners'
organizations within the subdivision - the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North)
Association, Inc. [North Association] and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas
Homeowners (South) Association, Inc.["South Association].
Upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that LGVHAI was dissolved for
its failure to submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and
for its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the
association's activities. These paved the way for the formation of the North and South
Associations.
ISSUES:
Whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by
Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said
corporation.

RULING:
No, LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the
Corporation Code had no effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.
Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws states that every corporation formed under this Code, must
within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for
its government not inconsistent with this Code.
As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins
with the determination of the meaning and import of the word "must" in this section
Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty
which may be enforced. It is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion or
mandatoriness. However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always
imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the
tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of the
statute in which it is used demands or requires. This is equally true as regards the word
"must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to
its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and
"must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.
G.R. No. 165132               March 7, 2012

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
NELLIE R. APOLONIO, Respondent

FACTS:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB). In December 2000, NBDB's Governing Board approved the conduct of a Team
Building Seminar Workshop for its officers and employees. Prior to the conduct of the
workshop, some of the employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask whether
a part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could
be given to them as cash. After consulting Rogelio Montealto, then Finance and
Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions
of the proposal and concluding the proposal to be legally sound and in the spirit of the
yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after the end of the workshop,
SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their
approved allowance. Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint against
Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the Ombudsman alleging that Dr. Apolonio and
Mr. Montealto committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift
cheques.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Ombudsman have the power to directly impose the penalty of
removal from office against public officials.
RULING:
Yes, the Ombudsman have the power to directly impose the penalty of removal from
office against public officials.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of
its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to
impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it
recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is
the authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and employees