VOL.

213, SEPTEMBER 2, 1992

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Caiña vs. People

G.R. No. 78777. September 2, 1992.*

MERLIN P. CAIÑA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH IV, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeals.—This Court en banc, through a resolution entitled Murillo vs. Consul, UDK-
9748, March 1, 1990 laid down the following guidelines for appeals in civil cases and criminal cases
except where the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed: (1) If an appeal
is attempted from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and should
never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the notice that

______________

30 PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 201 SCRA 487.

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Caiña vs. People

the court of choice is the Supreme Court; (2) If an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of law
the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (3) If an appeal is essayed from the judgment
rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead
of by petition for review, the appeal is inefficacious and should be dismissed; and (4) it is only through
petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court may properly be invoked.

Same; Same; Questions of fact and questions of law; Petition for review on certiorari.—Questions on
whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or whether or
not there was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by the
private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise exists are questions of
fact. In this regard, the petitioner’s case should not have been elevated to this Court since a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 allows only questions of law to be raised (Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of
Court). The proper procedure that he should have adopted was to file a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of judgment pointing out errors of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed (See Resolution of
Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1971, par. 22 [b] of Interim Rules of Court and Sec. 22, BP 129).

Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability, when extinguished.—It is clear from the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court that there was no finding of recklessness, negligence and imprudence on the part of the accused.
We quote: “With respect to the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is the thinking of the court
that the most important or paramount factor in cases of this nature, is to evidently prove the
recklessness, negligence and imprudence of the accused. The prosecution failed to show a clear and
convincing evidence of such recklessness, negligence and imprudence. Prosecution witness Rene Abas
stated that the speed of the jeep of the accused was on a regular speed or not so fast or just the very
speed the jeep can run (Decision, p. 5, Records, p. 477, Italics supplied) It can be gleaned therefore from
the decision that the act from which civil liability might arise does not exist.

PETITION to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Br. 24.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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     Jatico & Arnado Law Office for petitioner.

     Jaime Y. Sindiong for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Merlin P. Caiña, whom we denominate petitioner, questions the award of damages made by the
Municipal Trial Court while acquitting him of the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries. The award of damages was initially deleted on appeal but was later on reinstated by
the Regional Trial Court upon a motion for reconsideration.

The records of this case were sent to the Court of Appeals inspite of the appellant’s error in filing a
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law. The appellate court forwarded the
case to us. Instead of rejecting the case at that time, this Court considered the issue sufficiently
important to warrant this review. The completed records were re-assigned to the undersigned ponente
for study and report preparatory to full court deliberations only on August 5, 1992.
The facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner, Merlin P. Caiña, accused of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, was
acquitted of the criminal charge against him in a decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. However, the petitioner was ordered to pay the private complainant,
Dolores Perez, the sum of P2,893.40 representing actual damages. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is hereby acquitted.

“However, the accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P2,893.40 representing
the actual damages incurred by the private complainant in connection with this case.” (Records, pp. 479-
480)

The petitioner, questioning the award of damages, appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

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Caiña vs. People

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, the decision pertaining to the civil aspect only,
appealed from, is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered, absolving accused of civil liability. It is
understood that this decision does not touch the trial court’s decision on the acquittal of the accused.”
(Rollo, p. 33)

The private complainant subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration upon which the Regional Trial
Court reversed its former decision, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, this court hereby RESOLVES to reconsider its
decision dated February 17, 1986 and consequently to AFFIRM as it hereby affirms in toto the decision
appealed from as far as the civil aspect of the same is concerned.” (Rollo, p. 43)

As a result of such reversal, the petitioner filed this appeal raising one legal issue to be resolved:

“THAT THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL
LIABILITY AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE SAID AWARD IS VOID AND ILLEGAL. (Rollo, p. 26)

The petitioner alleges that the award for damages is void and illegal as there was no finding of any
preponderance of evidence as to the causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage
suffered by the private complainant. In fact, there is a clear showing from the face of the decision of the
trial court that the fact from which the civil liability might arise does not exist.

Before discussing the merits of this case, we first discuss the procedural aspect.

The procedure adopted by the petitioner in this case is improper. This is evident from the fact that the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court claiming that the
issue raised is a pure question of law (Records, p. 805). The proper procedure that should have been
followed was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Regional Trial Court in its order issued March 31, 1987

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(Records, p. 807) correctly reminded the petitioner that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be
through a petition for certiorari governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the Regional Trial
Court forwarded the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in turn, noting in
the Notice of Appeal that only questions of law were involved, thereupon transmitted the records of
said case to this Court (Rollo, p. 1).

This Court en banc, through a resolution entitled Murillo vs. Consul, UDK-9748, March 1, 1990 laid down
the following guidelines for appeals in civil cases and criminal cases except where the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed: (1) If an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a
Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and should never go to this Court, regardless of
any statement in the notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; (2) If an appeal by notice of
appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the
appellant raises naught but issues of law the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (3) If an
appeal is essayed from the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of by petition for review, the appeal is inefficacious and should
be dismissed; and (4) it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court may properly be invoked.

Applying the rules abovementioned, the Court of Appeals should not have transmitted the records to
this Court.

But even assuming arguendo that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was correctly filed,
from a reading of the petitioner’s brief, it can be seen that what the petitioner is raising is a question of
fact.
The case of Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93, 100-101 [1991], distinguishes
between questions of fact and questions of law. We quote:

x x x      x x x      x x x

“x x x a question of law—which exists ‘when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts’—there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth

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Caiña vs. People

or the falsehood of alleged facts,’ (Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289,
292, citing II Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2784, and II Martin, Rules of Court, 255; SEE also, Francisco, The
Rules of Court, Annotated and Commented, 1968, ed., Vol. III, pp. 485-488) or when the ‘query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation.’ (See Lim vs. Calaguas, 83 Phil. 796, 799, and Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co. vs. Rich, 28 SCRA 699, 705, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., p. 474)

x x x      x x x      x x x

Questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or
whether or not there was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered
by the private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise exists are
questions of fact.
In this regard, the petitioner’s case should not have been elevated to this Court since a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 allows only questions of law to be raised (Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of
Court).

The proper procedure that he should have adopted was to file a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals within 15 days from notice of judgment pointing out errors of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed (See Resolution of Court of
Appeals dated August 12, 1971, par. 22 [b] of Interim Rules of Court and Sec. 22, BP 129).

However, this Court noting that this case was last acted upon by the Regional Trial Court six (6) years
ago and the records of the case have already been brought to this Court, has decided to delve on the
merits of the case.

The petitioner’s contention is meritorious. We grant the petition.

It is clear from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court that there was no finding of recklessness,
negligence and imprudence on the part of the accused. We quote:

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“With respect to the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is the thinking of the court that the most
important or paramount factor in cases of this nature, is to evidently prove the recklessness, negligence
and imprudence of the accused. The prosecution failed to show a clear and convincing evidence of such
recklessness, negligence and imprudence. Prosecution witness Rene Abas stated that the speed of the
jeep of the accused was on a regular speed or not so fast or just the very speed the jeep can run.
(Decision, p. 5, Records, p. 477, Italics Supplied)

It can be gleaned therefore from the decision that the act from which civil liability might arise does not
exist.

It is noted by the Court that in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, the
accused’ (petitioner in this case) acquittal was based on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt making it possible for Dolores Perez to prove and recover damages. (See Article 29,
Civil Code) However, from a reading of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, there is a clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise does not exist. Civil liability is then extinguished. (See
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 570 [1984])

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the Regional Trial Court issued on July
14, 1986 is SET ASIDE while the Regional Trial Court’s decision issued on February 17, 1986 reversing the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court pertaining to the civil aspect, absolving accused of civil liability, is
hereby REINSTATED.

     Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

     Feliciano, J., On official leave.

Petition granted; order set aside.

Note.—In an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised (De Guzman vs. Intestate Estate of
Francisco Benitez, 169 SCRA 284) Caiña vs. People, 213 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 78777 September 2, 1992