BENGSON III V.

HRET

DOCTRINE: Repatriation results in the recovery of his original nationality. Such act allows a person to recover or
return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Cruz was born with Filipino parents. In 1985, he joined the US Marine Corps,
and took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, the rendering of service to,
or the acceptance of a commission in the armed forces of a foreign country is an expatriating act. Subsequently,
Cruz is naturalized as a citizen of the US.

In March 1994, Cruz subsequently reacquired his Filipino citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
2630. He ran for Congressman in the 1995 elections and won for the Second District of Pangasinan. Petitioner
Antonio Bengson filed a Petition for Quo Warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
alleging that Cruz did not possess the requisite natural-born citizenship required by the Constitution. The HRET
dismissed the petition

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

RULING: YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. CA 63 enumerates three (3) modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:

1. By naturalization,
2. By repatriation, and
3. By direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. Desertion of the armed forces;

2. Services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. Political economic necessity.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

Further, RA 2630 provide that any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with law, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
MO YA LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER ON IMMIGRATION

DOCTRINE: An alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino, provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under the law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
husband who was subsequently naturalized in the Philippines follows the citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as a Filipino, provided he does not suffer any disqualifications.

FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961.
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines,
she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. Lau was later permitted to come into the Philippines
on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,
she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could
not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a
result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD: YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has
to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is
no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC

DOCTRINE: Foundlings are natural-born citizens so long as there is a high probability that their parents are
Filipinos. The presumption is their parents are nationals of the Philippines, and the burden of proving otherwise
shifts to the authorities.

FACTS: Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares claimed that she was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and
was legally adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and Jesus Sonora Poe in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991
after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, Poe returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demise on February 3, 2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on May 25, 2005. On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration
granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport. In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Mary Grace Poe-
Llamanzares declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before
May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Thus, petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she was a foundling and that her
biological parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc  cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

ISSUES: Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

RULING: YES. Foundlings are natural-born citizens so long as there is a high probability that their parents are
Filipinos. The presumption is their parents are nationals of the Philippines, and the burden of proving otherwise
shifts to the authorities.

There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical
of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99%
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on
Evidence.

Further, foundlings are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens. In fact, that foundlings are automatically conferred
with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the
UN Convention Law.
SALUDO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS

DOCTRINE: There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. for
alleged wrongful dishonor of his AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The
dishonor of these AMEX credit cards was allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of
suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding
the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his
community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether venue was improperly laid because not one of the parties, including Saludo, was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint?

RULING: NO. The Court explained that the term “resides” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions
filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff
or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning.

There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is
equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS VS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE: Under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume and
exercise jurisdiction over the status of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence non-
resident aliens. Not being permanent residents, they cannot adopt in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 335 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-residents cannot adopt.

FACTS: Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 3, 1949, he
married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born
on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her
with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother)
could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family).

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,
1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned
thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time.
They had been in the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.

ISSUE: Whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.

RULING: NO. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that non-resident aliens cannot adopt. This
legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we sympathize with the plight of Baby
Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms,
which unqualified deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status not only of the
person to be adopted, but also of the adopting parents. The Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 15) adheres to the
theory that jurisdiction over the states of a natural person is determined by his nationality. Pursuant thereto, the
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the status of an alien petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political
law of the Philippines is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, which adopts the view that personal
status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domicillary law (Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). Hence, under either
the nationality theory or the domicillary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over
the status of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence non-resident aliens.
REPUBLIC v. MANALO

DOCTRINE: Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals
whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by
the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino
Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by the petitioner Manalo in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court.

Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the civil registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue
of a judgment of divorce rendered by a japanese court and that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, Manalo.

The RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code which does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, whether married to a filipino or to foreigners or if they celebrated
they marriage in the Philippines or in another country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall have conrol over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with
the determination of the condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations including marriages.

The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision and held that Article 26 of the Family code of the Philippines is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for Divorce against her Japanese husband because the Decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer maried to the former, capacitating him to remarry; that the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequetial. CA ruled that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese National, who in turn is no longer married to her.

ISSUE: Whether or not conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous.

RULING: YES. The Nationality Principle is not an absolute rule. The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code of
the Philippines is a testament that the state may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to
the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of
divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her count. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties
to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.