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Exhausted and without hope, East Asian youth are 'lying flat'

Li spent every day in high school studying. On his college entrance exam, his score
placed him in the top 0.37% among all high school seniors in Shandong province.
He's studying for his master's degree at one of the top three law schools in China,
and was hoping to get a job at a prestigious international law firm based in
Beijing.
But when he applied for graduate jobs and internships in March, he got rejected
from more than 20 international law firms in China. Instead, he settled for a
trainee position at a domestic law firm.
"The competition between me and other interns was so intense," said Li. "When I see
those students who are still trying to go to prestigious international law firms, I
feel exhausted and unwilling to contend with them anymore."
The "tang ping" lifestyle has started to resonate with him, he said. Tired of
trying to get to the top, Li has decided to "lie flat" by doing the bare minimum at
his internship.
"Many people who were better than me were working harder than me, so I felt
anxious," he said. "'Tang ping' is ... contending with the status quo, not being
ambitious, not working so hard."
Supporters of the phrase have also developed a philosophy that extends beyond the
initial Baidu post. In one group on the social platform Douban, someone posted a
manifesto describing the characteristics of the "tang ping" lifestyle.
"I will not marry, buy a house or have children, I will not buy a bag or wear a
watch," the "lying flat manifesto" read. "I will slack off at work ... I am a blunt
sword to boycott consumerism."
That group was eventually banned this spring, after attracting thousands of
participants. A hashtag for the term was also censored on Weibo, China's version of
Twitter.
The pressures facing young people in China are high. A record 9.09 million students
graduated from university or college this year, according to data from China's
Ministry of Education.
Even after finding jobs, many workers have bemoaned intense work schedules,
especially at major tech firms. The culture, known as "996," refers to working 9
a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week. The excessive work culture was blasted by China's
top court on Thursday. It called out companies across a range of industries it said
violated labor rules, including an unnamed courier firm that told employees to work
996 hours.
A lot of young people are working for such companies, according to Terence Chong,
an associate professor of economics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK).
"They compete with each other," he said. So even if not everyone wants to work such
hours, they may feel compelled to do so to keep up.
Those stresses aren't limited to the tech sector. Tony Tang — a 36-year-old
university professor in Guangdong — said he was tired from working 12 hours a day,
seven days a week.
"I think I'm too overworked," said Tang, who requested to be referred to by the
pseudonym Tony Tang because he was afraid of facing repercussions for his views.
"They just regard working hard as one kind of things for Chinese people to do."
The rising cost of housing is adding to the pressure. As measured by square meter,
the average cost of a unit in a residential building in Beijing more than doubled
in the six years to 2019, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics. Over
the same period, the average annual disposable income in the city increased 66%.
"No matter how hard they work, it is very difficult to buy [a] house," said Chong
of CUHK. "In a society [where] you see some hope there, if you work hard, then you
can ... buy [a] house and so on, then you can work hard. But the thing is if you
cannot see any hope, then you want to 'tang ping.'"
While "tang ping" is a relatively new trend in China, young people in other parts
of East Asia say they've been struggling with similar frustrations for years.
At just 22, Shin Ye-rim has given up on ever getting married, giving birth or
owning a home.
"I think the biggest problem is that house prices are going up too severely," said
Shin, who studies at the prestigious Yonsei University in Seoul. She added that she
didn't know if she could financially support a child.
In 2011, a South Korean newspaper coined the word "sampo" — literally "give up
three" — to describe a generation who has given up on dating, marriage and having
kids.
In 2014, interpersonal relationships and home ownership were added to that list,
giving rise to the "opo" generation, or "give up five." More sacrifices have been
added since then, eventually giving rise to the term "n-po," referring to the nth
degree.
In 2017, 74% of South Korean adults said they gave up at least one thing — meaning
marriage, dating, leisure activities, home ownership or another aspect of life —
because of economic difficulties, according to a survey of 3,880 people conducted
by job portal Incruit.
As in other countries, pressures on South Korea's job market have increased,
especially during the coronavirus pandemic. Last year, South Korea's unemployment
rate rose to 4%, its highest level in 19 years, according to government website
Statistics Korea. The data also showed that 9% of people between the ages of 15 and
29 were unemployed.
"The job market is so poor that it becomes hard to get a job," said Lim, the
Keimyung University professor. "Because there are no jobs, you are less able to
plan a future-oriented life."
As in China, apartment prices are skyrocketing. Median prices for an apartment in
July were higher than at any point since KB Kookmin Bank began keeping records in
December 2008.
There are also social reasons for giving up on traditional roles. Feminist issues,
such as gender discrimination and digital sex crimes, have recently come to the
fore in patriarchal South Korea.
Shin, the Yonsei student, said her mother quit her job after giving birth to her
and her younger sister. Now, she doesn't want to let marriage get in the way of her
own personal or professional life.
"I thought that my marriage partner could get in the way of my professional work or
things that I want to do personally," Shin said. "I've been studying and working
hard to achieve self-fulfillment, but I don't want to give up on that by getting
married or having a child."
Resignation generation
Young Japanese people have been frustrated with work pressure and economic
stagnation for years, too.
Some identify as the "satori sedai," or "resignation generation," a term first used
in 2010 on 2channel, an anonymous message board in Japan that was popular at the
time. It's characterized by pessimistic attitudes towards the future and a lack of
material desire.
"I spend my money only on things [that] I like and find value [in]," said Kenta
Ito, 25, who describes himself a minimalist and identifies with the satori sedai.
He earns a decent wage at a consulting firm in Tokyo, but doesn't care about owning
things like a house or a car.
Almost 26% of the 2,824 people ages 16 to 35 living in Japan surveyed by the
consulting firm Dot in Tokyo in 2017 — its most recent survey on this topic — said
they associate themselves with the characteristics of the satori generation.
"They would do what they're expected to do, but maybe not so much beyond that,"
said Sachiko Horiguchi, an associate professor of anthropology at Temple
University's Japan Campus. "They're less materialistic, not so interested in
consumption."
She added that the "satori sedai" have not seen a lot of economic development,
resulting in their outlook.
"The resignation partly comes from the gap between the older generation who have
seen economic progress ... versus this generation," she added.
Japan's economy has remained largely stagnant since its asset bubble burst in the
early 1990s. The country's GDP growth slowed from 4.9% in 1990 to 0.3% in 2019,
according to the World Bank, while the average real annual salary declined from
4.73 million yen ($43,000) in 1992 to 4.33 million yen ($39,500) in 2018, according
to data from the country's Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.
"Their salary isn't basically going to go up either under the economic decline, so
you can't look for economic reward or material reward for what you do," Horiguchi
said of the satori generation.
For 21-year-old Nanako Masubuchi, a senior at Gakushuin University in Tokyo,
stagnant wages are one of the factors that impacted her decision to work overseas a
few years after she graduates.
"About [the] Japanese [economy], I still cannot feel positive," she said.
Shifting demographics are a concern across other parts of East Asia, too.
Last year, South Korea recorded more deaths than births for the first time ever,
according to Statistics Korea.
China's population, meanwhile, grew at its slowest rate in decades in the 10 years
prior to 2020, according to census data.
In a bid to arrest a demographic crisis, China announced in May it will allow
couples to have three children — but it's not clear how effective that will be. A
two-child policy introduced in 2015 failed to spur more births.
With 13.5% of its people now age 65 or above, China has as many elderly people as
Japan in the early 1990s, spurring concerns that there won't be enough young
workers to keep powering its economic growth.
How much of that shift toward an older population will ultimately be attributable
to "tang ping," though, may not become clear.
And some experts, like CUHK's Chong, suggested that while the trend might reflect
what's taking place in the minds of some young people right now, many aspects of
the manifesto — like slacking off at work and forgoing material things — may never
become widespread.
"'Tang ping' may be just the thought of some young people," Chong said.
"Ultimately, in the heart of people, people still want to work hard and get a good
life."