Article

the International

Mass media: Playground Communication Gazette

2016, Vol. 78(1–2) 121–136
! The Author(s) 2015
of stereotyping Reprints and permissions:
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DOI: 10.1177/1748048515618116
Jeanne Boden gaz.sagepub.com
KU Leuven, ChinaConduct bvba, Gent, Belgium

Abstract
China’s position in the world has grown, but reliable information about China and
reporting on China is often problematic due to reasons both from European and
Chinese side. This leads to speculation, creation of wrong perceptions, the situation
where journalists and writers copy each other. Before turning to issues at stake in the
practice of mass media reporting about China in the West, this article considers the
historical background, namely the postcolonial context, the schools of thought of
Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, Orientalism and Occidentalism. It also contemplates the
information flow in China and in Europe respectively, as it takes place in different cultural,
social and political contexts. Against this background, this article looks into issues in the
practice of media reporting and the production of journalistic texts about China in
Europe, such as news selection and news value, journalists and writers, language issues
and presentation and representation of China in mass media in the West.

Keywords
Chineseness, eurocentrism, mass media, postcolonial, sinocentrism

Introduction
Stereotyping and clichés commonly arise from lack of knowledge. The knowledge
that Europeans have about China is often based on what they read and see in mass
media. Therefore, mass media play a major role in the perception of Europeans
about China (and likewise in the perception of the Chinese about Europe).
Nevertheless, the fact that mass media often present superficial and biased infor-
mation is highly problematic and often worsens the stereotyping. If informing is the
primary role of mass media, severe problems arise at various levels of news pro-
duction and selection and at the level of discourse. Eurocentrism is at work in
Europe, influencing the image of China in Europe, and Sinocentrism is at work
in China, influencing the image of Europe in China.

Corresponding author:
Jeanne Boden, KU Leuven, ChinaConduct bvba, Karel de Stoutestraat 49, B-9000 Gent, Belgium.
Email: jeanne@chinaconduct.com
122 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

Before turning to issues at stake in the practice of mass media reporting about
China in the West, this article considers the historical background, the postcolonial
context, Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, Orientalism, Occidentalism, terms that are
explained below, and then contemplates the information flow in China and in
Europe respectively, as it takes place in different cultural, social and political con-
texts. A brief look into history exploring the Euro-China interaction helps to
understand the complexity. The postcolonial context is crucial to our interpretation
of mutual stereotyping.
News value, and the flow of information in general, is connected to cultural values,
to social and political contexts, and to power relations. To be able to discuss the image
of China in mass media in Europe today, this article should examine the specific
features of information flow in China and in Europe, respectively, as these take
place in very different social and political contexts with other rules and other dynamics.
After considering this overall context, this research will focus on the practice of
media reporting on China in Europe as well as on the production of text about
China in Europe leading towards misunderstandings and clichés. This article will
look into a number of issues at stake in the practice of mass media news produc-
tion, including news selection and news value, journalists and writers, issues related
to the language gap between Mandarin and European languages, the presentation
of China itself with the dominant discourse the Chinese government wants to
impose, dissidents and self-censorship in mass media in the West.

Mutual stereotyping
Fascination and contempt
The image of China in the West today is rooted in the postcolonial context and
Eurocentrism remains at work in mass media reporting on China in Europe today.
Many postcolonial theorists such as Said (1995), Spivak (1988), Bhabha (2004) and
Shohat and Stam (1994) have reacted against Eurocentrism with its binary oppos-
itions like centre/margin, north/south, east/west, enlightened/ignorant, civilized/
primitive, nations/tribes, religions/superstitions, culture/folklore, art/artefacts and
its overall simplification in depicting postcolonial areas. Not surprisingly scholars
researching Asia such as Mahbubani (2005), Sakai (1997) and De Bary (2007) have
taken part in that postcolonial debate and have pinpointed Eurocentrism in the
study of Asia in various domains.
In China, the tension between being Chinese and the interaction with the global
has been a widely discussed topic by many authors such as Pan (2006), Sheng
(2001), and Wu (2008).
Despite the fact that China, apart from some areas, has never been colonized,
postcolonial discourse prevails in mass media reporting on China. To understand
where this postcolonial discourse comes from, it is important to look into China’s
recent history where Western powers sought to colonize the country. Western
nations had been trying to open up the Chinese market to be able to trade with
Boden 123

China, but they had never succeeded. It took various wars before the West suc-
ceeded in opening the door to China.
Europe, and the West, in general, tend to appreciate non-Western areas, includ-
ing China, from a Eurocentric or Western-centric viewpoint. Eurocentrism is the
result of Europeans trying to conquer over a number of centuries, map and study
the world from a Eurocentric point of view. Sinocentrism in China arises from
China looking at the globe from its own perspective, with China (Zhongguo) trad-
itionally putting itself at the centre of the globe.
A brief look into China’s recent history shows how the Chinese Empire came to
an end due to pressure from outside in the 19th century and how China was forced
to change. Since the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese Empire was confronted with
the military power of ‘Western’ (including Japan) nations, trying to colonize China.
These colonizing attempts brought an end to the millennia old Chinese Empire.
Taken by surprise about the military strength of the West, the Chinese engaged in
politics of ‘strengthening themselves’ (ziqiang yundong) concerned with ‘saving the
nation’ (jiuguo). Already in the 19th century reform-minded intellectuals like Kang
Youwei and Liang Qichao were aware of the need for China to modernize. Sun
Yat-sen, the first president of the Chinese Republic established in 1911, argued that
although China was not really colonized, it was in a state that was worse than being
colonized; it was a kind of ‘sub-colony’ (ci zhimin) vulnerable to the whims of
several foreign nations.
Sun Yat-sen formulated a modernization program for China with three goals
(sanmin zhuyi): the Principle of Nationalism (minzu zhuyi) a reaction against foreign
control, Power of the People (minquan zhuyi) a gradual implementation of democ-
racy and Livelihood of the People (minsheng zhuyi) a social economic program.
The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in China were
marked by political, legal, social, educational and cultural changes. It was the
May Fourth Movement in 1919 that became a beacon of modernization and the
symbol of emancipation for China. Scholars like Chen Duxiu, Cai Yuanpei, Lu
Xun and Hu Shi reacted against Imperial Confucian traditions and pleaded for a
new Chinese culture (Xin wenhua yundong) inspired by Western standards, espe-
cially science and democracy. In the newly established magazine La Jeunesse
(Xin qingnian), Chen Duxiu called for the replacement of ‘Mr. Confucius’ by
‘Mr. Science’ and ‘Mr. Democracy’. China found inspiration in the West and
changed thoroughly in a variety of ways, but democracy was not implemented.
In 1949, on the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong
stressed that a new period for China had arrived and that the Chinese people could
stand up again, awakened, liberated from and organized against imperialism. Mao
Zedong secured his place in history by reunifying China under central control after
a century of war and civil war since 1840, the so-called century of humiliation
(bainian guochi).
The year 1978 again marked a new period for China. This again was the dawn of
a period for China to search for equilibrium between fascination for the West and
simultaneously the rediscovery of the strengths of China’s own culture and
124 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

traditions. Today, while the country is justly proud of its ‘five thousand years of
Chinese culture’ and its rapid economic growth, the frustration and burden of the
‘sub-colonial’ state have not fully disappeared. Recently, China set up various edu-
cative exhibitions on the country’s recent history. These exhibitions present
the Opium War as the starting point of China’s road to modernization. One of
these exhibitions in the Today Art museum in Beijing, curated by Pan (2012) started
with the article: ‘The crisis of being backward and beaten up is the starting point of
China’s mutation towards modernity’. The scars of ‘humiliation’ have not been
forgotten.
Since the Opium War, Westerners had been perceived and depicted as aggressors
for China. During Mao’s reign, the West was depicted as the enemy of China’s
regime. In today’s China, foreigners are still addressed as ‘alien’ or derogatory
terms such as ‘guilao’ or ‘yangguizi’, meaning ‘foreign devil’ continue to be used,
or the common way to address foreigners in China as ‘laowai’, implies ‘outsider’.
Since the Opening up and even more since the 1990s internationalization and
interaction with areas outside China intensified. China rapidly modernized thanks
to the economic boom. In many ways, China learned and continues to learn from
the West again, but it also revived and continues to revive its own traditions. As a
result, a mixture of fascination for the West and contempt and frustration about
the aggressor in former times influence stereotypes.
In the West, fascination for China and simultaneously fear for the rise of China
have coexisted since early times. But especially since China opened up and boomed
economically. On the one hand, Westerners are aware of the fact that China has
learned from Western systems and knowledge, including scientific knowledge, but
on the other hand, the West seems to refuse to recognize that China’s tradition
revives, with China developing politically, economically and legally all ‘with
Chinese characteristics’.

Ambiguity, Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism

Eurocentrism is at play in the West dealing with China and in perceptions in the
West of China’s recent development. Westerners commonly tend to see the mod-
ernization of China as its ‘Westernization’. Westerners recognize that China is
changing and modernizing, but many seem to think (or maybe hope) that China
will eventually become like the West, taking Western standards and systems as the
norm. The fact that many young Chinese study in the West, speak English well and
adapt easily to international working environments is an often-heard simplistic
argument in Europe to prove that China is becoming like the West. In Europe,
the West is often considered the model that China should and eventually will
follow. China, however, becomes more and more aware of its own strength and
traditions and even speaks of a Renaissance of the Chinese culture.
Eurocentrism does not necessarily refer to ‘Europe’, but may also include the
United States of America and other areas. The concept of the ‘West’ is ambiguous,
not necessarily referring to the geographical location of countries in the West, but
Boden 125

also including Australia, or Japan in some cases, areas that are in fact part of the
‘East’ from a European viewpoint. For Williams (1984), the ‘West’ is overlaid with
a long, sedimented history of ambiguous usage, going back to the West/East div-
ision of the Roman Empire, the West (Judeo-Christian)/East (Muslim, Hindu,
Buddhist) division of the Christian Church and the post-war division of Europe
into the capitalist West and the communist East. Pieterse (1994: 14) refers to ‘sta-
tions’ of European progress in which Greece, Rome, Christianity, the Renaissance
and the Enlightenment are nothing but ‘moments of cultural mixing’. We can
conclude that the ‘West’ is a myth, a construction for both Europeans,
Westerners in general and also for the Chinese.
Perceptions about China in Europe are also influenced by China itself.
Postcolonial theorists like Hall and Ames (1995), Chow (2000), Shohat and
Stam (1994) and Sakai (1997) have reacted against the use of ethnic prefixes.
Nevertheless, while various researchers have argued that reference to ethnic iden-
tity evokes associations with racism or dominance, the Chinese themselves seem to
have persistently used prefixes in reference to China and Chinese culture. China
often addresses issues as ‘internal’ and widely uses vague concepts like ‘Chinese
characteristics’. Among many Chinese, there seems to be a deep-rooted conviction
that only the Chinese can understand Chinese culture and China. This results in a
situation where on the one hand the Chinese have reacted against Western dom-
inance but on the other, have ostentatiously stressed their ‘Chineseness’ and have
explicitly profiled themselves as being ‘Chinese’ as a distinction for other ‘civiliza-
tions’, and by doing so have erected a barrier between China and the rest of the
world.
Nevertheless, ‘China’ turns out to be a vague concept as well. Geographically,
China can refer to Mainland China or to Greater China including Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore and overseas territories. Different ‘Chinas’ have been constructed
through history. Like the ‘West’, ‘China’ is a construction for the Chinese and for
Westerners.
China is concerned with the stereotyping about China in the West. Mo’s
History of Sinology (2006), which deals with the way the West looks at China
throughout history, from the first dynasty of the Chinese Empire in 221 BC
until the 20th century is exemplary. Sun and Chen (1993) state that study of
the perception of China outside the country really took off after China opened
up and its international influence started to grow due to rapid economic
development.
China looks at Europe and the West in general from a Sinocentric viewpoint,
measuring the West by Chinese standards. Indeed, in spite of rapid economic
reform over the past decades, China kept its ancient centralist political system
with one centre of authority in place. Therefore, the relationship between China
and the Eurocentric West remains complex, a lack of mutual understanding and
trust prevails and a dialogue on equal footing remains difficult to achieve.
Ambiguity of terms and concepts, and a lack of information consequently result
in mutual stereotyping, including in mass media in Europe.
126 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

Orientalism and occidentalism

Said’s Orientalism (1978, 1995) analyzes how Western discourse is used in writings
related to Asia in order to serve the political and economic interests of Western
colonial powers in the East. Said focuses mainly on colonized areas in Asia and,
therefore, his conclusions are not fully applicable to China. Nevertheless,
Orientalism can also be detected in writings about China. Chinese scholar Chen
(1995) analyzes how Occidentalism and the image of the Modern West are at play
in China. In her analysis of Chinese literature, poetry and theatre and the docu-
mentary River Elegy (Heshang), she concludes that Occidentalism is at work in at
different levels and discourses: ‘official Occidentalism’ and ‘anti-official
Occidentalism’. The image of the Modern West serves different agendas in
China. In ‘official Occidentalism’, the Chinese government uses the image of the
Western other to support Chinese nationalism. During Mao Zedong’s reign, the
capitalist West was the enemy from which China needed to be protected. In ‘anti-
official Occidentalism’, used by opponents of the Chinese government, the Western
other is a metaphor for political liberation from the ideological suppression within
a totalitarian society (Chen, 1995).
Authors such as Edward Said and Chen Xiaomei point out how constructions of
the ‘other’ are created by individuals or groups to serve a variety of purposes and
agendas. Like ‘Europe’ and ‘China’, the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, the ‘Orient’ and
‘Occident’ are constructed in specific ways to serve specific goals.

The image of China in the West

The image of China in the West has varied over the centuries. Marco Polo is
considered one of the first Western people to document China in the 13th century
and his chronicles have fascinated generations of Europeans. In the 18th century,
Montesquieu wrote about China in Persian Letters (Montesquieu, 1973, 1993,
2004) referring to China’s particular way of thinking, family constructions, to
Confucian values and ancestor worship. His description of China influenced
European understanding of the country (Montesquieu, 1973, 1993, 2004). The
image of China in the West has fluctuated between general contempt to respect
and admiration (Hagerdal, 1996: 31–32). Terms such as ‘the yellow peril’, ‘the
yellow danger’ and ‘the dragon awakes’, ‘the dragon roars’ express the fear the
West has for China.
Contrary to this there is the fascination for China. Different Westerners tend to
construct different ‘Chinas’. Sinologists tend to see the Chinese Empire as the
golden age and Communism as an un-Chinese experiment epitomized by the
Cultural Revolution. Journalists and political scientists tend to look at China
from a mainly political viewpoint or from the point of view of human rights.
The analysis of China by post-structuralists like Michel Foucault (1994) or
Roland Barthes (2009) has been criticized by Chinese researchers for its imagined,
oversimplified and generalized depiction of China, due to a lack of deeper under-
standing. Ning (2001) criticizes Michel Foucault (1994) for opening his book
Boden 127

The Order of Things with a categorization taken from a ‘certain Chinese encyclo-
paedia’. According to Ning (2001), the book Foucault refers to is nothing more
than a fictional novel wrongly assumed to be an historical record.
Western authors such as Jullien (2004), Hall and Ames (1995) have attempted to
overcome the West–East dichotomy by linking European knowledge to the Chinese
or have undertaken comparative studies. Others, such as Saussy (1993), have tried to
formulate an understanding of Chinese holistic thinking. They use the Yi Jing, or
concepts like yin and yang at the core of their motivation to argue that a Western
concept like ‘allegory’ cannot be used to study Chinese literature because it refers to a
different cosmic concept in which everything is interrelated.
In conclusion, in spite of many attempts, the various preconceptions and stereo-
types about China in the West that have existed throughout history continue to
resonate today. Europe often interprets China from a Eurocentric viewpoint
reflecting European needs and fears. Both fascination and contempt can be
found in the image of the West in China and in the image of China in the West.
These perceptions inspire the main patterns we can detect in discourses on China in
contemporary mass media in Europe.

European versus Chinese general context of information

flow and mass media
To be able to talk about mass communication and information flow, we must look
at the cultural, social and political context in which information is produced and
communicated. Indeed, postcolonial mutual stereotyping is not the only one at
work in the creation of the image of China in mass media in Europe – the lack
of understanding of the general context and maybe even the lack of interest play a
role. The ways in which information is shared and exchanged follow different
patterns and dynamics in Europe and in China and this fact too influences the
perception and stereotyping of China in the West.
The information flow in Europe today is inspired by the context of democracy
and human rights, with values such as equality and individual freedom as basic
building blocks of politics and society. The historical background of Europe with
the inheritance of the Greek–Roman tradition and the Enlightenment has resulted
in the context we deal with today. Speaking in public, debating, arguing, reaching
consensus, defending the freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom of
obtaining information and the freedom of speech underlie dealing with information
in Europe and in the West.
In the European context, various centres of authority coexist, different view-
points are openly discussed and consensus needs be reached between the various
parties. It is in this context that the image of China is communicated by mass
media. The difference in the social and political context between China and
Europe influences the creation of that image of China in Europe.
China, with its Confucian background traditionally has one centre of authority,
and a centralized dominant discourse that needs to be followed. The Confucian
128 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

meritocratic context is structured in a hierarchical way affecting the information

flow, and an official dominant discourse is imposed top-down. The consequence of
this is censorship, which is not a Communist invention, but has existed throughout
the ages in China. Qu Sanqiang looks back into China’s past and concludes: ‘For
thousands of years, no matter which dynasty was in power, official authority
always rigorously controlled the flow of information and ideas for the maintenance
of feudal rule’ (Qu, 2002: 49).
Adhering to and imposing a dominant discourse go hand in hand with censor-
ship and implicitly with self-censorship in dealing with information. Today the
central government in China continues to formulate and implement its policy
through a dominant discourse. In contrast to Europe with its multiple centres of
authority and consensus where a variety of voices are heard and coexist, the mass
media and information flow context in China, with one centre of authority, presses
to speak with one voice. The centrality of power is reflected in the centrality of
information flow with only one press agency, Xinhua – a central point to control
the official media.
Consequently, a lot of information is considered ‘inside information’ (neibu) and is
available to party members only. Communication in the public space where the
maintaining of harmony is at stake, needs to follow the official dominant discourse,
and is therefore often vague, indirect and not explicit. Changes in policy will lead to
changes of focus in mass media. Access to what China considers sensitive information
is limited and dissident voices are silenced. Europeans not familiar with a central
discourse and censorship often do not succeed in grasping the relative dynamics of
such a system and usually interpret the Chinese context in an extreme black and white
way, thinking that the Chinese, cut off from all kinds of information, are not
informed at all. The grey zone that exists between what is allowed and not allowed,
and the sometimes vibrant dynamics between the top-down central dominant dis-
course and what happens bottom-up with plenty of initiatives taken, with newspapers,
magazines and online formats exchanging information in a more liberal way, is
ignored due to lack of insight on how things really work in China. The lack of insight
in this tension between top-down officially imposed information and bottom-up ini-
tiatives in China’s reality add up to the stereotyping about China in Europe.
The dominant central discourse can be detected in the way the Chinese media
report inside China, as well as in the information flow from Chinese media in
general, but also in the way that China presents itself in Europe and in the
West. Chinese organizations and people communicating in Europe continue to
use the same method as in China, with the dominant discourse and its propaganda
and censorship. An example is the endless repeating of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese
Dream’. Almost every article one reads about China contains this concept of the
‘Chinese Dream’ of which the real meaning remains very vague. The use of Chinese
propaganda in the West draws attention towards the officially imposed rhetoric
and implicitly the lack of freedom of speech and freedom of press. This may
strengthen the perception in Europe of the authoritarian system in China to
which many Europeans already react.
Boden 129

Europe and the West, in general, criticize China for the lack of freedom. In turn,
China criticizes Europe for its slow of decision-making process and its incapacity of
speaking with one voice. These particular climates and contexts in which informa-
tion exchange and mass communication take place should be taken into account in
the understanding of how mutual stereotyping comes into being.
Exemplary of the very different general sociopolitical contexts of information
exchange and mass media was the stark contrast in mass media reporting between
the election of a new president in the United States of America in 2012 and the
almost simultaneously power switch in China. Mass media like newspapers and
television staged the rat race between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. What was
happening during the elections and the step-by-step released results could be fol-
lowed openly by anyone who was interested. Two weeks after the elections in the
United States of America, a power switch took place in China, silently, without
open communication upfront, without elections and open reporting, without
staged debates and competition between various candidates. The only news in
the media in Europe was the introduction of Xi Jinping and his new team, as if
it was no more than a triviality, while the impact of Xi Jinping on a global scale can
be considered as important as the re-election of Barack Obama. This example not
only displays the differences between the political systems but also shows the dif-
ferent ways of dealing with information and mass communication.
In 2014, media offered a second prime example of Eurocentrism in mass media
in Europe. Indeed, the visit of President Barack Obama to Belgium and Europe in
2014 was broadcasted live and every step Barack Obama made was commented
upon. It was almost impossible not to be informed. However, when president Xi
Jinping visited Belgium and Europe just a few weeks after President Obama, mass
media paid far less attention to the visit. Moreover, Xi Jinping, and China in
general, were criticized for not respecting, human rights and so on. Such contrasts
reveal the huge gap that exists in mass media reporting on China in the West and
on events taking place in the realm of the West.
As an effect of globalization, these two contexts interact, resulting in complexity,
misunderstanding and biased perceptions. European perceptions about China and
Chinese perceptions about Europe often address each other’s political and social
context. The dominant discourse that China wants to impose to the world, con-
firms the stereotyping of China as an authoritarian system that is observed in
Europe. Actually, we can speak of a clash between two sociopolitical contexts
resulting in stereotyping in mass media. Superficially, the Western ‘free world’
seems to be juxtaposed to the Chinese ‘authoritarian, censored world’. But reality
is far more complex.

Some issues at stake in the practice of media reporting

on China in the West
The stereotyping described above is recognizable in reporting on China in the West
today, both in the positive way (the apparently endless opportunities in China and
130 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

the fascination for the country), and in the negative way (the fear for China).
We will now explore a number of issues related to the practice of reporting on
China in Europe influencing and often worsening the stereotyping and therefore
leading to disinformation rather than information. The issues listed above reflect
the complexity of the general context we discuss. The issues below will exemplify
the complexity of the field and show that problems occur on many different levels
of reporting on China in Europe. Apart from problems at the levels of news selec-
tion, news value and news presentation, distortion of information also occurs on
the level of the people reporting, the producer of the text, the journalist, the writer
or the TV maker. Problems also occur on the level of language. Finally, censorship
and a restricted climate of information lead to the creation of dissidents and self-
censorship, which add to the building of biased perceptions.

News selection, news value, news presentation

Eurocentrism becomes obvious in the popularity of a negative focus of news selec-
tion and of news value in mass media in Europe, and in the popularity of journal-
ists and even academics highlighting the negative focus on China, but also in news
presentation.
Distortion and bias already comes into being at the level of news selection from
what press agencies present. Due to China’s centralized system with a dominant
discourse and implicit existence of censorship, information provided by the Chinese
press agency Xinhua in the West is often considered as biased and filtered through
the official and political lens and therefore not fully reliable. Europeans often
criticize China and consider information in mass media in the West to be more
objective and ‘true’. But also in the West information is not value free and only a
few powerful news agencies such as Reuters, AP, CNN and NCBC control the
information flow. What these news agencies provide is offered in bite-sized pack-
ages, ready for immediate use. The information they provide is considered to be
‘objective’ and ‘reliable’, while this kind of information is just as much a choice
inspired by certain interests and serving certain agendas. Journalists, politicians
and even academics rely on these information flows. The social, political and cul-
tural implication of the specific selection of these large news agencies providing
news, which is also based on biased perceptions, is most of the time ignored. There
is a discrepancy here that deserves attention both from European media and from
the Chinese media active in Europe. The stereotyping in the choice of news leads to
more stereotyping.
News selection does not only happen at the level of press agencies but also at the
level of media channels that have their own interests to defend. It also takes place
at the level of the journalist or writer who produces text and in the realm of the
interaction between those two levels. In 2008, a journalist from a European
national television station was sent out to report on the Olympic Games in
Beijing in 2008. Upon arrival, he had already listed a number of topics he
wanted to report on: aids, pollution, social unrest and another long list of problems
Boden 131

in China. When someone asked: ‘Can we also say something positive about China?’,
he replied that positive news is ‘no news’ in the West and he had his responsibility to
take and his task to perform to justify the costs of him being in Beijing.
This example mirrors the fact that news selection takes place in the interaction
between the producer of text and the publishing media channel. The mass media
channel may not accept certain news items produced by the journalist, or may
choose to leave out images or words, or in case of a newspaper add pictures to
the delivered text that distorts the original message or adds a specific flavour or
tendency to what was initially meant by the journalist, writer or text producer.
News selection at various levels influences stereotyping. A comparison between the
dynamics of news selection in Europe and in China is beyond the scope of this
article, but would be interesting to research.
A related problem in reporting on China in Europe is ‘news value’, or the
inherent features of an event that make it worthwhile to report on. Various factors
influence the value of news, such as simplification, identification (geographic prox-
imity, cultural proximity, social proximity, time proximity and personalization)
and sensationalism (Östgaard, 1965: 39–63).
Like in news selection, news value about China in Europe clearly displays a
preference for negative news. The research of Professor Lutgard Lams ‘China:
economic magnet or rival? Framing of China in the Dutch and French language
quality press in Belgium and the Netherlands’1 confirms this. Her research proves
not only the preference for politics and economics as topics to write on about
China in Europe, but more importantly that almost 60% of the analyzed articles
show a negative tone, with around 25% neutral tone and only a bit more than 15%
a positive tone.
Finally, not only in the choice of news and in news value problems influence
stereotyping, likewise Eurocentric distortions exist in the way news is presented and
in the wording of an event. Exemplifying a biased view was the 2014 discussion on
the ‘terrorist attack’ in Kunming, Yunnan and the minimizing thereof in media in
the West. Interestingly, the Renminwang made a comparison of words used to
describe the London ‘terrorist attack’ in 2013 and the Kunming ‘terrorist attack’
in 2014. What happened in London was addressed as ‘terror attack’ (BBC),
‘Terrorism’ (The Telegraph), ‘Terrorism’ (CNN), ‘Terrorist attack’ (Fox News),
while Kunming was described as a ‘Knife attack’ (BBC), ‘Violence’ (The
Telegraph), ‘Knife-wielding’ (CNN), ‘Uighur-Han conflicts’ (Fox News).
Although censorship does not openly exist in the West where freedom of speech
is claimed to be a human right, the power and choices of news agencies, of media
channels, and of individual producers of text and the interaction between all these
layers clearly reflect political and other agendas.

The language gap

In the distorted communication between China and Europe the language gap,
while it is often totally neglected, has major influence. The situation has improved
132 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

tremendously over the past decades, with more and more Westerners studying
Chinese and more and more Chinese studying English, but far more efforts
have been taken in China than in the West. The discrepancy between China and
the West in learning each other’s languages is obvious. This aspect in itself may
conceal a Eurocentrism viewpoint. The limited effort taken by Westerners in learn-
ing Chinese is exemplary, but even more the fact that language issues are often
totally overlooked in the information flow between China and the West. Mass
media, but even the academic world in the West, come to conclusions about
China based on Western, European or United States of American sources
only, purely relying on translated documents. The fact that what has been trans-
lated is a selection in itself, just as much motivated by specific agendas and inter-
ests, is ignored and the implicit reduction of information neglected. This is a widely
accepted way of dealing with information about China in the West and one sel-
dom sees question marks added to this. Huge amounts of relevant information are
never translated from Chinese into any other languages, and are consequently
overlooked.
We turn to art for a concrete example. In 1992, Italian curator Achille Bonito
Oliva went to China to select Chinese artists to participate in the Venice biennale in
1993. This was the first time in history that Chinese contemporary artists from
Mainland China were invited to participate on a structured level in a large event in
the West. Oliva’s choice was severely criticized in the Chinese media, in magazines
and newspapers. The Chinese criticized Oliva for his Eurocentric (Ouzhou zhong-
xin) attitude and biased choice, not showing any engagement or involvement with
what was really going on in China, but purely establishing his own Eurocentric
agenda. None of these criticisms written in Chinese have ever been translated in a
non-Chinese language or have in any way reached the West. Still, Oliva’s choice in
1992 has had major impact on how the West perceives contemporary Chinese art
on a global scale. The stereotyping that was established with the choice of Oliva for
the Venice Biennale in 1993 continues to be at work through today. His choice was
not only blindly accepted in the West, but was also taken to be representative of
contemporary Chinese art. These kinds of events deepen already existing precon-
ceived wrong images of China and stereotypes. By not translating this kind of
criticism arising in a Chinese context, the Chinese voice is silenced and biased
perceptions continue to exist.
Somewhat related to this issue is the phenomenon of copying of the limited
information that has been translated. When a certain article that is deemed influ-
ential has been translated once from Chinese into English, even if that article is
taken out of context or becomes totally outdated after a while, it is used over and
over again by Westerners, resulting in the copying of the already copied translated
text. The translated article becomes a kind of basis for almost everyone writing
about that specific topic. Not only the copying of copied texts becomes absurd but
also the endless repetition of the same things. This reflects the lack of available
information on topics or fields about China in the West. It also reveals the gap
between the information flow inside and outside China.
Boden 133

The people reporting: Feeding fascination and feeding fear

As mentioned above, both positive and negative stereotyping exists and the reasons
for that are a myriad. In some cases, mass media reporting on China in Europe
tends to play onto the positive stereotypes, the fascination of China, highlighting
the endless opportunities and economic growth in China and so on. Indeed, for
business and economic exchanges, the opportunities are enormous, but mass media
tend to present opportunities as easy to realize, which is a stereotype and in many
cases does not correspond to reality. The use of terms such as ‘economic growth’,
‘monster profit’, ‘the world’s largest consumer market’, ‘Chinese fortune’, ‘billion
contract’ and many more create the impression that everything in China is simple
and easy, present for anyone to take. This kind of rhetoric is appealing to those
who do not know the complexity of China’s reality, but it also influences general
perception about China resulting in a positive stereotype, a mythologizing of
fascination.
Opposed to this, mass media in the West tend to favour people engaging in anti-
China rhetoric. Those using an anti-China discourse can easily secure success in
mass media reporting on China. A Western journalist who can claim being har-
assed by the authorities in China instantly becomes a hero for the media in the
West. Westerners in China questioned by the authorities become ‘witness of the
harsh regime’ and are broadcasted live sharing their ‘horrible’ story. Anti-China
discourse is used by journalists, but mass media in Europe tend to even stage
academic experts famous for their anti-China rhetoric. The favouring of mass
media for anti-China rhetoric repeatedly brings the same few reporters on stage
with their individual specific view helping to build clichés, and rather than present-
ing a variety of voices in mass media with the goal of providing information, this
limited selection of reporters, again worsens the stereotyping.
Quite remarkable is the fact that Chinese reporters are almost absent in mass
media in the West. It is difficult to pinpoint what the reason for this is. This aspect,
however, merits further research.

Dissident voices and self-censorship

Anti-China discourse comes from both Westerners and from Chinese. Chinese
dissidents naturally fit the Eurocentric discourse. Obviously, there is a political
dimension at work. Westerners and Chinese who take the position of challenging
the Chinese authorities can potentially become darlings of mass media in Europe,
‘China bashing celebrities’. Their stories and statements are blindly accepted, taken
at word value, not questioned in any way in Western mass media.
China tends to minimize or block dissident voices in the media. Critical voices
from the West who report too often on sensitive issues could have their visa to
China refused. The blocking of access to China is one way to silence a critical voice
from outside.
Inside China political dissidents are silenced (and consequently they often
become celebrities in the West, cf. supra). Probably one of the most popular
134 the International Communication Gazette 78(1–2)

examples is Ai Weiwei who has become an international hero, not so much for his
art, but for his anti-establishment actions and rhetoric.
Actions to silence voices inside and outside China, lead to self-censorship. When
reporting on a sensitive topic, one becomes very much aware of the consequences of
one’s writings. In 2009, when the author of this article participated in a project on
Xinjiang she was confronted with the dominant discourse, the limitation of the free-
dom of speech in China and the awareness of dealing with sensitive issues. Several of
the author’s Chinese colleagues and friends in China advised her not to do the project
if she wanted to continue my research in China. During the project, which consisted in
an online blog that ran over 60 days and a book, the author was extremely aware of
the sensitivity of the topic and, thus, was carefully weighing every word. Stories like
this are common among people writing about China, both Chinese and non-Chinese.
Self-censorship of reporting on China reaches far beyond the borders of China.

Conclusion
A complex tangling of Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism and the interaction between
Europe and China influence stereotyping of China in mass media in Europe and
in the West in general. A look into history gives a view on the background of mutual
stereotyping throughout the ages. But more importantly, the difference in social,
political and cultural contexts between Europe and China highlights the fact that
information flow and mass media have different dynamics and follow different pro-
cesses. Stereotyping not only results from nation-centred viewpoints but also from
the different context. Both the European/Western and the Chinese-specific context
that reaches into the West exert influence on the coming into being of stereotyping.
Positive and negative stereotyping in mass media is also the result of practices in
the mass media process showing biased selection and distortions at many levels of the
information flow. Distortions exist at the level of: news selection, news value and
presentation, language, the people reporting, dissident voices and self-censorship.
Each of these issues deserves much more attention, research and analysis.
Biased perceptions both negative and positive have prevailed throughout the
centuries and continue to exist today. The impotence of communicating beyond
one’s own social, political and cultural context is problematic. The all-encompass-
ing availability of mass media today has not altered the situation and has not
resolved the lack of knowledge about Europe in China and vice versa. Whereas,
mass media could be an active player by providing information to enable mutual
understanding, it is more often a playground of clichés and stereotyping.
Globalization demands better information channels and mass media could be
one of the means for improvement.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Boden 135

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article: The author(s) received financial support from the
European Commission under the LLP Jean Monnet Programme (Education, Audiovisual &
Culture Agency) for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Note
1. Lams Lutgard, Unpublished paper presented at the conference ‘Mass Communication
and EU-China Relations’ on 3–4 April 2014 organized by the College of Europe at the
EU Committee of the Regions in Brussels.

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