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Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 279–288
Complex Adaptive Systems Conference with Theme:
Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Societal Challenges, CAS 2019,
Complex Adaptive Systems Conference with Theme:
Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Societal Challenges, CAS 2019,
A Neural Network-based Approach for Detection of Time Delay
A NeuralSwitch Attack onApproach
Network-based Networked
forControl Systems
Detection of Time Delay
Switch Attack
Alireza Abbasspoura
, Armanon Networked
Sargolzaeib
, MauroControl
VictoriobSystems
, Navid Khoshavib,c
a
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
AlirezaDepartment
Abbasspour
b
a
, Arman
of Electrical Sargolzaei
and Computer
b
, Mauro
Engineering, Florida Victorio
Polytechnic
b
, Navid
University, Lakeland, Khoshavi
FL, USA
b,c
c
Department of Computer Science, Florida Polytechnic University, Lakeland, FL, USA
a
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA
b
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Florida Polytechnic University, Lakeland, FL, USA
c
Department of Computer Science, Florida Polytechnic University, Lakeland, FL, USA
Abstract

Recent improvements in communications have led to the proliferation of networked control systems (NCSs). NCSs are used to
Abstract
increase the efficiency and reliability of these systems. However, these connectivities between agents, sensors, and centralized
controllers expose NCSs to a range of faults, failures, delays, and cyber-attacks. Detection of intelligent and new types of attacks
Recent improvements in communications have led to the proliferation of networked control systems (NCSs). NCSs are used to
such as time delay switched (TDS) attacks is a crucial task in the design of NCSs. The injection of the TDS attack to NCSs has the
increase the efficiency and reliability of these systems. However, these connectivities between agents, sensors, and centralized
potential to provoke inefficiency or even cause instability in these systems. The TDS or delay signal attack influences the system
controllers expose NCSs to a range of faults, failures, delays, and cyber-attacks. Detection of intelligent and new types of attacks
by introducing a random delay in the process of transmitting and receiving packets. Due to the connectivity between agents,
such as time delay switched (TDS) attacks is a crucial task in the design of NCSs. The injection of the TDS attack to NCSs has the
especially in distributed power grids, the injection of a TDS attack on one agent can propagate to others, which can lead to
potential to provoke inefficiency or even cause instability in these systems. The TDS or delay signal attack influences the system
catastrophic consequences. This paper uses a neural networked-based detection algorithm to estimate the TDS attack in real-time.
by introducing a random delay in the process of transmitting and receiving packets. Due to the connectivity between agents,
The performance of the proposed TDS attack detection and estimation are evaluated through simulation for two area power systems.
especially in distributed power grids, the injection of a TDS attack on one agent can propagate to others, which can lead to
catastrophic consequences. This paper uses a neural networked-based detection algorithm to estimate the TDS attack in real-time.
The performance
© 2019 of the proposed
The Authors. TDS
Published byattack detection
Elsevier B. V.and estimation are evaluated through simulation for two area power systems.
This is an
© 2020 Theopen access
Authors. article by
Published under the CC
Elsevier B.V.BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc=nd/4.0/)
Peer-review
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V.committee
This is an under
open responsibility
access article under of
the the
CC scientific
BY-NC-ND of the Complex Adaptative Systems Conference with
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Peer-review
Theme: under responsibility
Leveraging AI and of the scientific
Machine Learning committee
for of the Challenges.
Societal Complex Adaptive Systems Conference with Theme: Leveraging
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc=nd/4.0/)
AI and Machine Learning for Societal Challenges
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the Complex Adaptative Systems Conference with
Time delay switch
Keywords:Leveraging
Theme: attack;
AI and network Learning
Machine control system;
for neural networks;
Societal load frequency control; attack detection.
Challenges.

Keywords: Time delay switch attack; network control system; neural networks; load frequency control; attack detection.

* Corresponding author
E-mail address: a.sargolzaei@gmail.com

1877-0509
* © 2019
Corresponding The Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V.
author
E-mail
This address:
is an a.sargolzaei@gmail.com
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc=nd/4.0/)
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the Complex Adaptative Systems Conference with Theme: Leveraging AI and
1877-0509 © 2019for
Machine Learning TheSocietal
Authors. Published by Elsevier B. V.
Challenges.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc=nd/4.0/)
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the Complex Adaptative Systems Conference with Theme: Leveraging AI and
Machine
1877-0509 Learning
© 2020for Societal
The Challenges.
Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the Complex Adaptive Systems Conference with Theme: Leveraging AI
and Machine Learning for Societal Challenges
10.1016/j.procs.2020.02.250
280 Alireza Abbasspour et al. / Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 279–288

Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000

1. Introduction

Networked control systems (NCSs) are recently used to transmit the sensor measurements from a remote location
to a centralized control unit through communication channels. The simplicity and efficiency of NCSs for constructing
the network among multi-agent systems have received significant attention over past years. This has led to leveraging
NCSs in many critical infrastructures such as transportation systems [7], power systems [2, 16], and biomedical
systems [20, 14]. On the other hand, NCS offers low response time for adjusting the network configuration [10, 24].
The enormous utilization of NCSs in control safety-critical systems has increased the demand for protecting these
units against faults [4, 6]. A failure in these kinds of systems can result in life-threatening consequences.
The time delays can make a system unstable it is injected into the feedback loop of an NCS [18, 5, 23, 9, 8]. This
circumstance stems from the fact that the controller needs to receive the measurement values in real-time to be able
to generate the control signals. The design of NCS under natural time delays is a big challenge that has been explored
by many research studies [4, 23, 5]. Most of these methods have designed controllers for the systems under constant
time delay or assumed only natural time-varying time delay. However, an adversary can inject random time delay to
multiple feedback lines of NCSs. This type of attack is called Time Delay Switch (TDS) or signal delay attack, which
has been introduced by [13] for the first time in NCSs. It is demonstrated in [14] analytically and through simulation
that TDS attacks can cause inefficiency and instability in NCSs. Even though the 2003 blackout in northeastern USA
and Canada, or 2012 one in India were not resulted because of cyber-attack, but the consequences of a cyber-attack
on NCS can be similar [20].
However, a neural network (NN) based approach is presented in [22] to estimate natural time delays in industrial
communication systems. The proposed design requires knowledge for the nonlinear model of the system. Authors in
[11] used NN based approach to evaluate the delays in an NCS system to observe its effects on stability. The methods
mentioned above are not able to detect and estimate abrupt TDS attacks. To address the effect of the TDS attack, [15,
18] proposed an adaptive control algorithm that detects and estimates TDS attacks in real-time and compensates for
its negative effects. An effective method to create a robust controller against TDS attacks is also presented at [19].
The authors designed an emergency controller that could control the system as soon as an attack was detected. The
technique was evaluated only for power distribution systems, and the detection technique is based on the approach
suggested in [18]. However, the designed resilient controller and detection approach in the above studies require a
good knowledge about the system which might not be a practical assumption for complex systems. A study of TDS
attack compensation over a nonlinear system was presented in [17]. The proposed emotional learning control
technique is able to track the reference signals despite the presence of TDS attack. However, it can only compensate
the effects of the TDS attack, but it cannot detect and estimate it in real time.
This paper presents a NN based approach to detect and estimate TDS attacks injected into the feedback line of an
NCS in real-time. The proposed method consists of an estimator unit that estimates the transmitted state through a
Luenberger observer. The estimated state then is sent to a detector unit which uses the received delayed signal and
expected state to detect and estimate the TDS attack. A load frequency control for a distributed power system is used
as a case study to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of the proposed approach.
This paper organizes as follows: Section 2 formulates NCSs under TDS attacks and discusses the problem
statement. Section 3 describes the NN based detection and estimation approach. Section 4 illustrates the state-space
model of load frequency control (LFC). Section 5 demonstrates the accuracy and effectiveness of our proposed
detection algorithms through an attack scenario which follows by discussions and conclusion.
 Alireza Abbasspour et al. / Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 279–288 281
Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000

Fig 1: Basic Diagram of an NCS System with multiple plants under control.

2. Problem statement formulation

A diagram of a multi-agent NCS system is presented in Figure 1. Agents communicate with the controller through
communication channels. Commands from the controller to the actuators and sensing signals from measurement
sensors will be transmitted through the network. Since the communication channels are not explicitly designed for
NCSs, this network environment is a fragile link of the system, the susceptible medium for faults, failures, and attacks.
The NCS can be mathematically represented by the state space model below, considering the number of agents is
na:

�̇(�) = ��(�) + ��(�)

� (1)
�(�) = ��(�)

�
where �(�) = ��� (�)� �� (�)� ⋯ �� (�)� � describes the states variables of the NCS, and �� is the state vector of the � �ℎ
�
agent. �(�) = ��� (�)� �� (�)� ⋯ �� (�)� � describes the control input vectors, and �(�) =
� �
��� (�) �� (�) ⋯ �� (�) � represents the outputs, the aggregate state measurements of the system. Each agent in the
� �

�
NCS can have different number of inputs �� (�) = ���,� (�)��,� (�) ⋯ ��,��� (�)� , outputs �� (�) =
� �
���,� (�)��,� (�) ⋯ ��,��� (�)� , and states �� (�) = ���,� (�)��,� (�) ⋯ ��,��� (�)� . It means that each vector in �(�), �(�),
and �(�) have its own dimension, where ��� , ��� , and ��� are the dimensions of each vector of the states, inputs, and
outputs for the � �ℎ agent, respectively. �, �, and � are deterministic matrices of appropriate dimension.
The matrices � and � can be found as follows:
��,� ��,� ⋯ ��,�
⎡ ⎤
��,� �� ⋯ ��,�
�=⎢ ⎥ (2)
⎢ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⎥
⎣ ��,� ��,� ⋯ ��,� ⎦

�
� = ���� ����� ��� ⋯ ��� � � (3)

The state space model 1 under TDS attack can be defined as:
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Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000

�̇(�) = ��(�) + ��(�)

� (4)
�(�) = �(� − �)

where �(�) is the received signal from the communication channel under attack. The adversary injects random delay
� = [��� , ��� , ⋯ , ��� ]� to the measured states by flooding the communication channels or acting as a man-in-the-middle
attack.
Remark 1: Stochastic natural delays on communication channels are small in magnitude and do not have a significant
impact on the system stability; therefore, they are disregarded in this paper [14].
Assumption 1: We assume that adversaries only have access to manipulate the sensory signals transmitted through
the communication channel.

3. Proposed detection approach

The ANN used in the proposed TDS attack detection is illustrated in the following subsection. The ANN-based
observer consists of a Luenberger observer and an ANN which estimates TDS in real-time [1].

3.1. ANN observer

TDS attacks have no fixed pattern and can be injected at any time to the communication channels; therefore, the
ANN-based estimator is a proper candidate for the estimation. The overall equation for the proposed TDS attack
estimation and state observer is described here

��̇(�) = ���(�) + ��(�) + �(�(�) − �� (� − �̂ ))

� (5)
��(�) = ���(�)

where the estimated state vector, ��̇, is calculated using the Luenberger observer. � is the observer gain, and �̂ =
[�̂�� , �̂�� , ⋯ , �̂�� ]� is the estimated TDS attack.
The �̂� = ℱ� (��� , �� ) can approximate the � �ℎ TDS attack:

� �(�� �̄�� (�))

ℱ(��� , �� ) = � (6)

where � � and �� are the estimated NN output layer and hidden layer weight matrices, respectively. Also �̄�� = [��� , �� ]�
is the input vector to the NN, � is a sigmoid activation function which represents the transfer function of the hidden
layers [21, 3]:

2
�� (�� �̄��,� ) = � �̄� − 1, � = 1,2, . . . , � (7)
1 + ������ �,�

where � denotes the number of hidden layers, �� is the � �ℎ row of �, and the � �ℎ element of �(��̄�� ) is denoted by
�� (�� �̄��,� ).
Remark 2: It is already illustrated that for a restricted set of � ∈ �� and sufficient number of hidden layers of neurons,
weights and proper threshold value, a recurrent NN observer with the following structure is stable [21]. This paper
modified the proposed ANN algorithm to detect TDS attack.
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Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000

3.2. NN updating laws

This subsection presents the updating law of the NN observer to ensure the detection of the TDS attack. Considering
the estimator shown in (6), the NN updating laws can be presented as:
��
�̇ (�) = −�� �
� � − �� ‖��‖�
�
���
(8)
��
��̇ (�) = −�� � � − �� ‖��‖��
���
where �̃� (�) = �� (�) − ���� (� − �̂� ) ≤ ��� is the estimation error of the NN which is bounded by ��,� , and �� , �� >
0 are the NN learning coefficients; � = 0.5(�� � ��) is the objective function of the NN, and �� , �� are the small positive
coefficients which can be tuned by designer to get optimum performance in NN. In order to obtain the NN updating
laws (8), the derivative of the objective function can be calculated using static gradient approximation and chain rules
[21], thus, we have:
� �
�̇ (�) = −�� ��� � ���
� � �
� � �� − �� ‖�‖�
� � (9)
��̇ (�) = −�� ��� � ��� � � � �
� � �� � �̄ − �� ‖�‖�

where �� = �� × � and �� is a small positive constant, and � is an identity matrix; �� and �� are defined by:

�� = �(�� �̄� )
(10)
�� = � − �(�� �̄� )

and

���� �̄� � = ����(�� (�)� ), � = 1,2, … (11)

and �� (�) denotes the � �ℎ element of �� vector.

The following algorithm describes the steps for the TDS attack detection:
 Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000
284 Alireza Abbasspour et al. / Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 279–288

4. Case study: Distributed Power Grids, Load Frequency Control

An NCS structure is used in power systems to increase the efficiency and reliability. While control and monitoring
will be much easier in this structure, the performance of power grids can be disrupted in the presence of cyber-attacks.
There are several other types of attacks that can cause inefficiency and instability if power systems, such as false data
injection or denial of service [2]. TDS attack is a new type of cyber-attack that targets state measurements in smart
grids [18]. Lack of success in making a timely and accurate diagnosis of a small or larger magnitude TDS attack can
result in system failure [12] and has a high potential for endangering the providers and consumers [12, 13].
Here, we focused on detecting the TDS attack injected to state measurement of a load frequency control (LFC)
system with multiple agents. The mathematical model of a distributed power system is shown below.
Consider dynamic model of NCS described in 1. The states of the � �� power area can be defined as �� (�) =
� �
[�� � ���� ���� ���� � � (�)]� and state variables are the frequency deviation �� � , generator power deviation ���� , turbine
� � � �
valve position ���� , tie-line power flow ���� , and control error � � (�) = ∫� (� � �� � + ���� ) ��, respectively.
��� , ��� , �� , �� , and �� are known and deterministic matrices defined as:
0 0 0 0 0
⎡ 0 0 0 0 0⎤
⎢ ⎥
��,� = ⎢ 0 0 0 0 0⎥ (12)
⎢−2���,� 0 0 0 0⎥
⎣ 0 0 0 0 0⎦
−�� 1 −1
⎡ 0 0⎤
⎢ �� �� �� ⎥
⎢ −1 1
0 0 0⎥
⎢ ���,� ���,� ⎥
⎢ −1 −1 ⎥
��� = ⎢ 0 0 0⎥ (13)
�� ��,� ��,�
⎢ � ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ � 2 ���,� 0 0 0 0⎥
⎢���,��� ⎥
⎣ �� 0 0 1 0⎦

�
1
�� = �0 0 0 0�
��,�
(14)

�
−1
�� = � 0 0 0 0�
�� (15)

where �� , �� , �� , �� , ��,� , and ���,� are the frequency bias factor, generator moment of inertia, speed-drop coefficient,
damping coefficient, governor time constant, and turbine time constant for the � �� power area, respectively. ��,� denotes
the stiffness constant between the � �� and ��ℎ power area.
 ArmanAlireza
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et al. Science
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Science 168 (2020) 279–288 285

Fig. 2: Schematic diagram of LFC under noise and TDS attack.

5. Simulation results

The accuracy of the proposed estimation algorithm under TDS attacks is evaluated with a two-area interconnected
power system with parameters defined in Table 1 of [18]. The simulation time and sampling time are specified to be
10 seconds and one millisecond, respectively. The designed LQR controller is designed based on the literature [18]
and is able to damp the system to almost zero steady-state error within a short period of time. Therefore, 10 seconds
of simulation is a reasonable amount for simulation.
The TDS attack is modeled through a function � which illustrates how multiple attacks can be injected to the
feedback signals:

�(��,� (�)) = ��,� (� − ��,� ) (16)

where ��,� is the random delay injected to the � �� state of the � �ℎ agent.
Root mean square error (RMSE) is calculated to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed estimation algorithm under
two scenarios for TDS attacks injected into a two-area interconnected power system.

�
� �
���� ����
��
(��,� − �̂�,� )� (17)
�=�
���
where ��� is the total number of states for the NCS.

5.1. Scenario I: Single TDS attack

Consider an TDS attack targets the third state of the first power area:

0 0<�<1
��,� = � (18)
1� 1 ≤ � ≤ 10
286 Alireza
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00 Science 168 (2020) 279–288
(2019) 000–000

Fig. 3: Performance of the proposed detection and estimation in presence

of a single TDS attack (Scenario I).
Fig. 3 shows that the proposed attack detection algorithm can detect and track the injected TDS attack accurately.
It should be noted that the attacker injected a small TDS attack after two seconds of the system operation.

5.2. Scenario II: Simultaneous TDS attacks

Here, we consider that multiple TDS attacks are injected simultaneously to the third state of the first and second
power areas.

0 0<�<4
��,� = � (19)
2.8� 4 ≤ � ≤ 10

Fig. 4: Performance of the proposed detection and estimation in presence of

simultaneous TDS attacks (Scenario II).
 Alireza Abbasspour et al. / Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 279–288 287
Arman Sargolzaei / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000

0 0<�<4
��,� = � (20)
3� 4 ≤ � ≤ 10

Fig. 4 demonstrate the performance of our proposed TDS attack detection algorithm. The proposed algorithm
detected and estimated both TDS attacks accurately.

6. Conclusion and Discussion

This paper introduced a detection algorithm for interconnected multi-area power systems to estimate TDS attacks,
assuming hackers can inject malicious data into feedback communication channels. The proposed detection algorithm
consisting of a Luenberger observer and an ANN observer which is able to detect and estimate for the simultaneous
attack while our proposed method, which consists of both model-based and learning-based methods, can detect and
track the TDS attacks in real time for NCSs. Here, we validated the accuracy of the proposed TDS attack detection
through an interconnected multi-area power system. Significantly lower values of RMSE, which are 0.008 for the first
scenario and 0.0216 for the second scenario, indicate that the proposed algorithm can estimate TDS attacks accurately
and promptly.

Acknowledgements

This research is supported in part by the Florida Center for Cybersecurity under Grant #3910-1006-00-D. Any
opinions, findings and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsoring agency.

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