Universitatea din Bucureşti

Facultatea de Ştiinţe Politice

Alina-Carmen Ciolcă

Populism and political modernity – towards a conceptual history and the possible
explanation of a transdoctrinary rhetoric in modern Romanian political thought (19th-
early 20th century)

Dizertaţie
Programul de master

Politică Comparată
realizată sub îndrumarea
Lect. Dr. Raluca Alexandrescu

2013
 Table of contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………..3

First chapter.......………………………………………………………………………………...9

• Populism – a consensus-lacking conceptual trajectory……....…….……………………..9

• Which democracy challenged in the name of which people?...........................................17

• Populism and political (anti)modernity.............................................................................26

Second chapter......……………………………………………………………………………...32

• The peasant issue..............……………………………………………………………….33

• Towards an anti-political democracy?........................................................................…...42

• The Jewish issue..........................................................................................……………..47

• The national issue.................................................………………………………….........52

Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………...……61

Bibliography.……………………………………………………………………………...…….48

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 Introduction

First of all, this text aims to constitute itself in a work of conceptual analysis. The concept
we would focus on, on the basis of the conceptual history method, is that of populism, along with
its relation to the notion of political modernity, as well as its potential representation in a study
case pertaining to the sphere of Romanian political thought in the age of what is historically
considered to be that of the creation and consolidation of the modern Romanian state (second
half of the 19th century up to the early 20th century).

More specifically, we would firstly analyse the variations undergone by the content given
to this term that certainly maintains a problematic relation with the concept itself. Obviously,
numerous authors have already put forward their attempts to explain this concept whose
ambiguity is frequently deplored. The actual inflation in the usage of the term certainly
complicates any attempt at its conceptualization. Moreover, the term in question is a connoted
and controversial one – sure to be designating modern and contemporary (quite recurrent
apparently) political phenomena – whose usages and mis-usages of a more or less scientific
nature express quite often an axiological evaluation. The turnaround between the term and the
concept proves to be in this case more problematic that in others, since at least in the public
sphere, we may note a utilisation of the term absent proper understanding of the concept. We
therefore consider it relevant to approach this subject, firstly given the fact that we are dealing
with a topical political phenomenon in question, designated by a term often abused in its usages
and also given the necessity to clarify in a coherent and intelligible way some of the most
strikingly controversial aspects related to its conceptualization(s). Apart from undertaking a
review on the specific literature on populism and to systematize the main (convergent or
divergent) theoretical approaches, we aim to analyze, through the lens of the different
dimensions underlined by these approaches, the source of an intrinsic paradox as far as its
relation to political modernity is concerned: while it describes political phenomena of modern
emergence since they could not have made appearance absent the entire succession of factors
which historically fashioned political modernity, it boasts at the same time an anti-modernity
stance, advocating for an underlying simplification of politics, contesting elements and principles
which are basic to the functioning of the modern political system of liberal democracies:

3
representative politics and resulting elites, bureaucracy, political parties, and more generally
politics etc, besides proposing an abandonment of rational-“disenchanted” logic in favour of an
affective-irrational-“(re)enchanted” one in a field where now traditionally the former one should
prevail – the political one. All this while bearing in mind that the political phenomenon in
question actually preceded the coining of the term and its subsequent conceptualization. Of
course, necessary theoretical and pragmatic considerations on what is to be more clearly
understood under the umbrella of “political modernity” and its contrary “anti-modernity” along
with its reflection in populism will be exposed. What is more, in close connection to the relation
populism-modernity, we would make use of our theoretical systematization in order to
interrogate its relation with other fundamental concepts constantly under scrutiny in its diverse
conceptualizations, namely: democracy, the people, nation, representation, nationalism,
liberalism and even politics. We will note that the relations with these concepts are not evaluated
identically throughout the consulted literature. It would be appropriate to observe that among
these, the ones with which it constantly maintains a problematic relation are “the people” and
most of all, “democracy”. The mere fact that it can be envisaged in such antagonistic manners as
“a perversion of democracy” 1 or on the contrary “the avatar of true democracy” 2 leads us to
considering its definition as a contextualisable one. And even if we are to utilize a rather
axiologising language such as “the perversion of democracy”, which is the democracy that
undergoes this perversion and what is the source of this lack of consensus? Having in view an
evaluation of the seemingly tensed or at least ambiguous relation populism - democracy, not
before we scrutinize “which” democracy or which of its acceptations is in question here, we
would contend that perhaps the most fundamental tension lies within democracy itself, i.d.
between its founding principle(s) and the requirements of its actual institutional functioning, as
we shall note., which is also strongly connected to the notion of political modernity. The same is
to be maintained about “the people” and/or “the nation”, given that this one can be considered in
a more or less inclusive or, on the contrary, exclusive, logic. Thus while discussing one
acceptation or another, we consider it should be correlated to determined acceptations of the
above-mentioned concepts. What is more, even the perspectives on the most elementary nature

1
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Counter-democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust, Trad. Arthur Goldhammer,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 265
2
Margaret CANOVAN, “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”, in Yves MENY,
Yves SUREL (ed.), Democracies and the populist challenge, Palgrave, Basingstoke , 2002, p. 30

4
of populism are far from reaching consensus, perhaps due to the relative eclecticism of its
manifestations in the empirical-historical sphere. It is viewed as either an ideology, or a political
style, or an a-ideological or even anti-political rhetoric, very likely imbued with demagogy, as a
movement or a political practice with certain institutional consequences, either under the
monopole of (charismatic, authoritarian, paternalistic, and the list of potentially frequent
attributes may continue) leaders, or also identifiable with political parties or other formations.

This first theoretical dimension of our endeavour will be treated in a first chapter divided
in three subchapters, as follows: Populism – a consensus-lacking conceptual trajectory, Which
democracy challenged in the name of which people?, Populism and political (anti)modernity.
As far as the first subchapter is concerned, we would support our analysis based on the
approaches of numerous exegetes of populism, namely Peter Wiles, Pierre Rosanvallon,
Margaret Canovan, Guy Hermet, Pierre-André Taguieff, Ernesto Laclau, Francisco Panizza,
Roger Dupuy, Yves Mény, Yves Surel, Danielle Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnel. In the case
of the second the second chapter, we would argue on the already mentioned tension between
populism and democracy, one of the central issues and at the same time primary source of the
lack of consensus in conceptualizations of populism, as well as the issue of the people object of
the populist appeal. We have deemed it appropriate to include at this point intellectual
approaches belonging to the sphere of theories of democracy, with a view to gaining well
articulated perspectives on the concerned concepts (democracy, representation, the people and
the nation), themselves bearers of internal tensions. In this sense, we had in mind the insights of
Pierre Rosanvallon, Bernard Manin, Hanna Pitkin, Gianfranco Pasquino, Norberto Bobbio,
William Kornhauser, Joseph Schumpeter, Peter Worsley, Benjamin Arditti, Robert Hollinger and
Michael Mann, but we would also approach a classical reference in political theory, Max Weber,
in order to draw upon the relevant relatedness between populism and Weber’s significantly older
concept of “plebiscitary democracy”. Finally, regarding the third subchapter, drawing closely on
the conceptual analysis of the previous one, apart from theoretical insights into our main concept,
we would enrich our analysis with approaches on the concepts of modernity and anti-modernity
of Antoine Compagnon and Jean-Marie Domenach, in order to discuss the way in which
populism presents itself as an anti-modernity stance.

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 Secondly, we would attempt at an empirical application of the concept of populism on a
case study represented by instances of modern Romanian political thought. The period which
interests us is, of course, that of the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, that
is precisely the time of creation and respectively consolidation of the modern Romanian state and
precisely what Romania experienced as the (first) modernization phase. We would focus our
research on the display of populist, potentially nationalistically-articulated, rhetoric as it is
visible from political writings, discourses and other forms of reproduction of political expression
assumed by several political figures belonging to different ideological orientations both on the
right and on the left wing: liberal, radical, socialist, Marxist, poporanist, sămănătorist. More
precisely, we would mention the names of the political thinkers and politicians envisaged:
Dimitrie Alexandru Sturdza, Mihail Kogălniceanu, Nicolae Iorga, Radu Rosetti, George Panu,
Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Constantin Stere. The choice of political actors representing
several different doctrinary stances is by all means intentional, as we deem it relevant to evaluate
the potential presence of populism as a rhetoric, and moreover as an anti-modern one, in various
ideological contexts. Moreover, arguing that there might actually exist a common core associated
to our main concept, we believe this analysis would provide a good context/pretext to discuss
and perhaps offer another potential explanation (among others) to the problematic character of
the Romanian modernization, one already analysed as such by specialised exegetes 3. In fact, we
are of the opinion that we are dealing with another paradox this time related to our study case: in
the context of a modernization not yet achieved and still under construction, already anti-
modernity stances each in their own way make their appearance, sometimes with explicit
rejections of modernity, as in the case of Nicolae Iorga. Whether on the liberal camp, on the
radical, the traditionalist-sămănătorist or poporanist one, we may encounter the drift towards
irrationality and/or temptation towards simplification of politics (among other criteria) in each
case. What is more, the respective discursive-normative perspectives on the idea of “democracy”
and respectively “the people” are also to be taken into consideration as relevant in the analysis of
one rhetoric or another. In addition to this, we would place all these political stances in the
context of their real polemic with one another. In so doing, as pretext for their expressing,
respectively our identifying, of populist rhetoric, we have identified several issues of predilection

3
Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, ”Les malaises de la modernisation roumaine. Le moment 1848 et la démocratie”,
Studia Politica, vol. VI, no. 4, 2006, pp. 867-883

6
that make the object of the polemic and according to which we would also organize our analysis,
namely: the agrarian-peasant issue, the Jewish issue, the anti-political democracy (in partial
connection with the first), and last but not least the national issue. Among these topics, the one
which seems to be unanimously subjected to the most heated debate and in connection to which
all these political thinkers express more or less radically their views is the first one, also in close
connection to the rather dramatic context of the Peasant Rebellion of 1907.

This second dimension of our work will be treated in a second chapter, which will
comprise the analysis of the corpus of sources related to the above mentioned instances of
Romanian political thought through the reading of the concept of populism and its relation to
political modernity. This chapter will be divided into four sub-chapters, corresponding to our
synthesis of the sources which we have reviewed, as follows: The peasant issue, Towards an
anti-political democracy?, The Jewish issue, The national issue. The corpus of sources as well as
our research hypothesis will be further presented. We would also make usage of theoretical
insights strictly relating to our study-case proving truly valuable for a general understanding of
the topic, such as the works of Zigu Ornea on the two Romanian doctrines sămănătorism,
poporanism, as well as its interesting preface to Radu Rosetti’s book Pentru ce s-au răsculat
țăranii, Sorin Alexandrescu on the more general topic of Romanian modernity and anti-
modernity, as well as the precious insights of Raluca Alexandrescu on the problematic character
of Romanian modernization and democratization, the interesting and erudite article of Alexandra
Ionescu analyzing Constantin Stere’s political views on what was coined as peasant democracy,
another article by Cristian Preda on interpretations of Constantin Gherea’s political thought, as
well the analysis of Victor Rizescu on Romanian Marxist populism in his preface to a collection
of Constantin Stere’s political writings.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis that we would put forward concerns the reflection of populism as a
political view and rhetoric expressed first and foremost at a discursive level and also with a
strong nationalistic articulation in the instances of Romanian political thought envisaged by our
research. It contends that populist-nationalist rhetoric comes to constitute itself in a
transdoctrinary phenomenon, reflected by political thinkers of various, sometimes radically
different, political orientations: liberal, radical, Marxist, samanatorist, poporanist, this

7
transdoctrinary character being itself in coherence with the core attributes of the populist
phenomenon according to its main conceptualizations.

Methodological remarks

As far as the methodological approach is concerned, we shall first of all make use of the
method of conceptual history, with aid from the approaches of Quentin Skinner and Reinhardt
Koselleck.

Strictly with regards to the second part of our analysis, we shall of course utilize methods
of qualitative research, suitable for our approach, namely the documentary analysis and discourse
analysis, while the sources envisaged cover several categories: political and ideological writings,
party programs, political discourses and parliamentary debates, political journals and/or organs
where the actors in question were active or leading figures. Among the first category of sources,
we would mention the works of political reflection of C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Mihail
Kogălniceanu, George Panu in his heated polemic with Radu Rosetti on a topic within the
peasant issue, Constantin Stere and D.A. Sturdza. With regard to the second category, we would
mention the program of the National Liberal Party of 1892 as published and commented by the
political journal Lupta coordinated by George Panu, as well as that of the Nationalist- Democrat
Party (with a speech by Nicolae Iorga), and that of the Peasant-Democrat Party published by the
organ Zările, led by Constantin Stere. In addition, in the third category of sources, we also seek
to analyze speeches (generally parliamentary interventions) carried out by Mihail Kogălniceanu,
Nicolae Iorga and D.A. Sturdza. Last but not least, in the fourth category of sources we have
considered the oppositionist radical journal led by George Panu Lupta, the political-educational
journal only too suggestively entitled Neamul românesc pentru popor whose director was
Nicolae Iorga, Viața Românească (the poporanist journal partly led by Constantin Stere), as well
as the organs Zările (of the Peasant-Democrat Party), and Voința națională : diar național-
liberal (of course, belonging to the National Liberal Party). As already mentioned, we would
carry out an analysis of these sources which should give visibility to the interactive polemic
between these authors expressing their political views.

8
 First Chapter

The first chapter of our text aims at giving an absolutely non-exhaustive account of the numerous
conceptualizations of populism as they appear in the literature consulted. We are to organize this
first section in three thematic subsections which will illustrate our analysis of the theoretical
framework envisaged and of the central issues we wish to underline: Populism – a consensus-
lacking conceptual trajectory, Which democracy challenged in the name of which people?,
Populism and political (anti)modernity. In addition, the theoretical approaches taken into
consideration show us up to which point the perspectives on the concept in question differ from
one another, as well as its relation to other relevant concepts. We would also mention that this
theoretical framework does not consist solely of works treating the concept of populism, but also
texts elaborating on the concept of political modernity whose relation with the former we seek to
underscore and on the theory of democracy. These have provided us with clearly articulated
acceptations of the concepts of democracy, representation, the people and nation, concepts
which are relevant for many theorisations of populism, as well as for the establishment of its
relation to modernity, and which we deemed it necessary to discuss, in order to reveal the source
of the tensions often identified between, or even within, the concepts in question.

9
Populism – a consensus-lacking conceptual trajectory

We will start by reviewing the acceptations that populism received across the envisaged
literature, while showing the lack of consensus that marks the intellectual debate on the very
nature of this phenomenon, having as a possible source the eclecticism of political manifestations
labeled as “populist” 4. Ideology, movement, rhetoric, political style are all possibilities among
the different conceptualization schemes.

Firstly, an issue deplored by numerous analysts is represented by the vagueness and

“discriminatory incapacity” (to paraphrase Giovanni Sartori5) of this concept which seems to
suffer, in the terms of the same author, from a syndrome of “conceptual stretching”. According
to Pierre-André Taguieff, this is due to its abusive usages and with axiologizing temptation of the
term, which further on makes it difficult to recover its differentiating content and its conceptual
utility6. As well, Guy Hermet also states that the term of populism or more accurately, the label
of “populist” has come to amount to an insult, and moreover, it is a label never accepted7.

As a matter of fact, several (at least intended) scientific approaches resort to a vocabulary
of the “pathological” which would be inherent to the nature of populism, whether viewed as a
movement or an ideology. We would firstly recall here one of the earliest but often cited
conceptualizations of populism in the article of Peter Wiles, whose title, stating from the
beginning that it is a syndrome we are dealing with, and not a doctrine, is quite suggestive in this
sense. Prior to exposing a rather eclectic and not so problematizing enumeration of no less than
24 traits of the phenomenon, the author defines it as any movement or creed based on a premise
that transforms it into a constant political syndrome of socialist tonalities : “the virtue lies in the
simple people, that represent the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions” 8. The
same axiologizing vocabulary of the pathology is to be encountered in Pierre Rosanvallon’s
4
Guy HERMET, Op.cit., p. 54
5
Giovanni SARTORI, “Concept misformation in comparative politics”, The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970, p. 1039
6
Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, “Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes“,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No. 56, 1997, p. 4
7
Guy HERMET, Op.cit., p. 21
8
Peter WILES, “A syndrome, not a doctrine : some elementary theses on populism”, in Ghiţǎ IONESCU , Ernest
GELLNER (ed.), Populism : its meanings and national characteristics, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969,
p. 166

10
work La contre-démocratie : La politique à l'âge de la défiance, who devotes a subchapter to
explaining “the perverse inversion of the ideals and functioning of democracy” 9 that is populism.
Since the will of the citizen is consumed at the moment of the elections (given the invalidity of
the imperative mandate), the author believes the mechanisms of a “counter-democracy” that
should exceed the limits of traditional electoral-representative democracy should be developed.
But this democracy can degenerate in the form of populism, viewed as the radicalizing
pathology, up to the extreme anti-politicisation of the three forms of manifestation of counter-
democracy: the surveillance of power, the negative sovereignty and the idea of the people as a
judge10.

In exchange, the thesis of the invariably pathological character of populism is rejected by

Margaret Canovan. Her argumentation focuses on rather structural aspects that on those related
to ideological or political practice per se. As it manifests itself in modern democracies, populism
should be described as an appeal to the people directed against both the established structures of
power, and the society’s dominant values and ideas11. The relevance of the concept lies therefore
in the problematisation of the notion of democracy that populism brings forth, as populists
proclaim themselves to be the “true defenders” (with the complete exclusion of the other
politicians) of democracy and make of it the ultimate source of their legitimacy12. The populist
perspective over democracy is nonetheless competing to the traditional one, in the sense that,
understood as government exclusively “by the people” and not by politicians, bureaucrats or
judges, this democracy presupposes, at least at an ideal level, a separation from the
representative dimension13. Canovan considers the source of the populist challenge to the usual
democratic functioning to be the tension inherent to democracy and to the democratic project
itself, that we may encounter in two distinct but complementary formulations, which translate the
distance between democratic principle and democratic practice. Two dimensions of democracy
are distinguished – the redemptive one – expression of the saviour democratic ideal having
popular sovereignty at its core and manifesting anti-institutional tendencies – and the pragmatic

9
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Op.cit., p. 265
10
Ibidem, pp. 265-268
11
Margaret CANOVAN, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two faces of democracy”, Political Studies, XLVII,
1999, p. 3
12
Margaret CANOVAN, “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”, in Yves MENY,
Yves SUREL (ed.), Op.cit., p. 30
13
Ibidem, p. 42

11
one – democracy as a way of governing, founded on a system of institutions and norms that
render effective political power, as well as the peaceful resolution of conflicts14.

Furthermore, as an alternative way of conceptualizing populism, we may identify the

concern for the quest of a ”specific minimum” capable of characterizing and individualizing this
phenomenon among others. An approach that appears to us as a fundamental one in the sense of
establishing what could be called “generic populism” is that of Guy Hermet. According to him,
the defining element of this phenomenon, common to all its manifestations and the only one to
play the role of a diferentia specifica is represented by a temporality that places in a register of
pretended immediateness the concrete realization of all collective demands or wishes, ignoring
and “short-circuiting” the temporary regime of usual politics, rejecting the complexity of the
very art of politics and the exercise of government15. It is argued that here lies the veritably
antipolitical character of populism, in this temporality to which a second one is added, related to
the circumstances in which populism makes its appearance – legitimacy crises of representative
systems. It is therefore neither the direct appeal to the people (in this sense, Hermet contests
Canovan’s approach), nor the supposed incarnation in a charismatic leader with authoritarian
accents, not even the rejection of the principle of political representation that makes the
difference between what Guy Hermet defines as a “method of exploitation of the temptation of
abandonment of political rationality in its chronological dimension” and other political styles. In
fact, populism would simply suppose a simplification of representation in an elimination of the
mediations that complicate it, without it being necessarily assumed by a providential leader.
Also, there is no unique register of appealing to the people, but a plurality of registers that
renders this no valid differentiating criterion 16 . Apart from this, given its discontinuous
appearance as a historical phenomenon, populism does not acquire any ideological tradition.
However, several levels of articulation of populism are identified: populism as a movement;
populism as a rather problematic, if existing, ideology through its poverty, reduced to the
idealization of a people seen as an organic and structurally united entity, to the rejection of the
right-left cleavage, with a negative, anti-elitist and moralizing dominant; the populist rhetoric,
which plays a primary role, impregnated with aggressiveness and polemic; populism as a source

14
Ibidem, p. 10
15
Guy HERMET, Op. cit., pp. 49-50
16
Ibidem, p. 52

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of legitimacy, different from that of democrats through its logic of incarnation and affectivity
rather than that of representation and rationality, and finally, populism as an attitude of
receptivity of masses to the populist message and of latent antagonism to the “enemies”
designated by this message17.

Pierre-André Taguieff speaks as well of a plurality of registers of articulation of

populism, which does not however confound itself with a certain established type of political
regime, nor with an ideology, but is viewed as a political style which in order to be put at work
supposes “the symbolic exploitation of certain social representations”, expressing, in its the
appeal to the people, the consensus on its identity and demands 18. Ideologically undetermined,
populism would have a great capacity of absorbing elements of other political or economical
doctrines, especially under the influence of the political environment of its emergence. In a
similar conceptual design to the one operated by Guy Hermet, the author identifies six registers
of articulation of populism: populism-movement (firstly as popular mobilization), populism-
regime (realized in authoritarian semi-plebiscitary regimes under a leader incarnating “the will
and the spirit of the people”), populism-ideology (rather political-cultural tradition than coherent
doctrinal content), populism-attitude, populism-rhetoric (demagogic discourse, appealing to the
people always against a certain otherness, with a polemical dominant) and finally populism as
type of legitimization (especially in the context of crisis or political transitions) 19.

In the same attempt at a generic definition of populism, but leading to thoroughly

different results, Ernesto Laclau explains populism in the terms of a mode of articulation or a
political logic identifiable not with a movement with social basis and sociological orientation20,
but with political-discursive practices that construct a popular subject, on the premises of the
construction an internal frontier dividing the social space in two camps 21. Thus populism is
defined by a process of discursive construction – construction of relations of equivalence, of
signifiers emptied and then refilled with meaning, and of social-political frontiers – addressing

17
Ibidem, pp. 52- 63
18
Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, “Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes“,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No. 56, 1997, p. 8
19
Ibidem, pp. 14-16
20
Ernesto LACLAU, On populist reason, Verso, London, 2005, p. 117
21
Ernesto LACLAU, “Populism : What’s in a name ? “ in Francisco PANIZZA (ed.), Populism and the mirror of
democracy, Verso, New York, 2005, pp. 43-44

13
the “oppressed”22. If such a discourse based on logic of equivalence may be used by any political
or social actor in order to articulate certain themes, and if any movement will necessarily address
a people against an enemy by the construction of social frontier, the issue that Laclau deems
relevant is not who is populist and who is not, but the extent to which they are so, because this
category would apply more or less to all socio-political actors. The people itself, object of this
discourse, is not a given reality, its identity is more than to be represented, it is to be
constructed23. In the same logic, Laclau comes to identify populism to politics itself, in the sense
that both of them suppose the statement of an alternative vision to the existing socio-political
realities. The issue of the relation between populism and politics is also approached by Francisco
Panizza. This relation lies according to him at the very heart of populist discourse. There is an
ambivalent link, as populism presupposes not only a de-politicisation, through the pretension of
populist leaders of exteriority to the political sphere (which is always a discursive construction),
but also a hyper-politicisation of social relations, through the elimination of the line of separation
between private and public and the expression of issues relating to the private domain into the
public sphere24. As well, displaying a conceptualisation of populism similar to that of Laclau,
Panizza refers to the primacy of modes of signification, which result in constructing antagonisms
between “us” and certain “others” invariably demonised, two instances to be permanently
constructed and submitted to logics of inclusion or exclusion, while populism can be defined as
“a process of addressing the people that retroactively determines what is the name of the
people”25.

A historical approach this time which, attempting at explaining the sources and
evolutions of the populist phenomenon throughout the history of France, results in a completely
different conceptualization, is that of Roger Dupuy. In his work La politique du peuple : XVIIIe-
XXe siècle : Racines, permanences et ambiguïtés du populisme, he departs from a fundamental
observation: the practical existence precedes, by far, the usage of the concept 26. This primary
form of existence, that of a popular imaginary and a political mobilization emerging since the

22
Ibidem
23
Ibidem, p. 48
24
Francisco PANIZZA (ed.), Op.cit., Verso, New York, 2005, pp. 23-24
25
Ibidem, pp. 6-19
26
Roger DUPUY, La politique du peuple : XVIIIe-XXe siècle : Racines, permanences et ambiguïtés du populisme,
Albin Michel, Paris, 2002, p. 8

14
18th century, which was difficult to identify and to name27, would be at best designated by the
concept of “democratic populism”, which associated to that of “politics of the people”, would
explain the pure, spontaneous manifestation, having its source veritably in the popular strata
against the power of the strong 28 . However, given their vulnerability to manipulations and
instrumentalizations by some of the elites against others and drifting thus towards forms of
extremism, anti-parliamentarism and xenophobia, this derives in a secondary form of existence,
designated by the “instrumentalised populism” 29. Therefore, in this original approach we have to
deal with an assumed changing of the conceptual content according to its varying referent. These
two conceptual categories would be useful not only to fill in the conceptual vacuum pre-existent
as to the “politics of the people”, but also to understand, in a perspective that refuses to become
axiological or to give automatically a negative connotation of the term “populism” 30, current
manifestations, deemed to be problematic, of popular discontent such as the protest vote, in
contexts of crisis of political systems31. Yves Meny and Yves Surel explain populism in a not
very distant key, as a specific form of mobilisation which expresses in an exacerbated manner
the place of the people in democratic institutions, in the context of dis-functioning of political
systems or of perceived fault-lines between the political elites and those whom they are supposed
to represent32.

Last but not least, Danielle Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnel conceptualize populism as
well in the terms of a constructed antagonism - an ideology opposing “a homogeneous and
virtuous people against a number of elites and some dangerous “others” presented as depriving
the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity and voice” 33. Four principles are related
to this definition of populism. The first concerns the idea of unity and inherent goodness of the
people, a homogeneous community opposed by demonised elites or other instances of otherness.
The second resides in the absolute sovereignty of the people, as sole demand of the democratic
functioning which must be nothing more than a simple reflection of popular will. Thirdly, the
traditional culture and way of life of the people are values that need to be preserved and valued,
27
Ibidem, p. 209
28
Ibidem, p. 183
29
Ibidem, p. 229
30
Ibidem, p. 210
31
Ibidem, p. 230
32
Yves MENY, Yves SUREL (ed.), Op.cit., pp. 13, 21
33
Daniele ALBERTAZZI, Duncan McDONNEL (ed.), Twenty First Century Populism: The Specter of Western
European Democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008, p. 3

15
as they inherently lead to common good. The last principle would be that of the identification of
the leader and/or the populist formation with the will, aspirations, culture of the people, in a
positioning that preserves both their extraordinary character and their belonging to the common
people34.

If we are to dress a synthesis on the approaches considered up to this point, we would

note that an element common (implicitly or explicitly) to all these conceptualizations, not
necessarily the particularizing one, would be the dimension of antagonism (at least discursive)
that populism supposes and constructs, as a political movement, rhetoric, ideology or even
discursive mode of articulation/construction of identity and otherness or generally of social
representations, as per the more abstract formulations of Laclau and Panizza.

34
Ibidem, p. 7

16
Which democracy challenged in the name of which people?

After briefly reviewing the main relevant approaches on the concept of populism, we would
proceed at discussing the sources of its at least ambiguous, if not tensed relation with democracy.

First of all, a question needs to be addressed: if populism is perceived as essentially a

menace to democracy, if populists proclaim themselves to be the defenders of true democracy or
is even regarded by some analysts like Margaret Canovan as being compatible with democracy –
what is the reading that we should apply on the notion of democracy? It is a question legitimately
expressed by Yves Meny and Yves Surel. The two authors make a crucial statement: in order to
determine where the real divergences or convergences between populism and democracy lie, we
should observe the relationship that populism has with the two dimensions of the concept of
democracy – “democracy-principle” and “democracy-regime” 35 . So, according to these two
authors, populism would not constitute a challenge to the principle of democracy (the power
belongs to the people), but to the democratic functioning based on political representation, that
populism tends to contest or minimize.

Actually, following Canovan’s argumentation, to this duality of the relationship between

populism and democracy corresponds a more fundamental duality which is that of democracy
itself. Furthermore, while trying to explain the difficulty of actually putting into practice the
founding democratic ideal, Pierre Rosanvallon states that there is a contradiction between the
political, respectively the sociological principle of democracy 36 . The former “sanctions the
power of a collective subject”, while the latter “tends to dissolve its consistency and reduce its
visibility”. For in the real democratic functioning, the sovereign people is abstracted and reduced
to a number, this people needs to be constructed and expresses therefore a problem of
objectivation, of prefiguration37. As well, as far as the distance between the democratic ideal and
its practical realization, the same author reminds us that the formulation “representative
democracy”, designating the sole possible achievement of that ideal, presents by itself an internal
contradiction and according to other authors, it would actually represent some sort of

35
Yves MENY, Yves SUREL (ed.), Democracies and the populist challenge, Palgrave, Basingstoke , 2002, pp. 3-5
36
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le peuple introuvable. Histoire de la représentation démocratique en France,
Gallimard, Paris, 1998, p. 12
37
Ibidem, pp. 14-15

17
“intermediate regime”, integrating popular power and aristocratic values38. As a matter of fact,
Bernard Manin illustrates how this formula that has the additional role of distinguishing among
two forms of democracy – direct and representative – is derived from another that precedes it,
namely “representative government” – designating a regime originally considered to be opposed
and preferable to the democracy that had been imagined only in its direct form39. The progressive
enlargement of the right to vote and the universal vote eventually represented conditions that
influenced the evolution of this form of government up to present days, without actually
changing much of its institutional-normative functioning (designation of the governing instances,
public affairs conducting etc) and without assigning any institutional role to the “assembled
people” 40.

But if there is a relation of incompatibility between populism and the principle of

democratic representation as basis for democracy as a functioning regime is something that
various authors underline (Canovan, Meny, Surel, Taguieff), Guy Hermet states in exchance that
populism does not essentially contradict the principle of representation but only makes use of it
differently in the political game41. In this way, a simplified form of representation is at work,
which would transcribe the ambition of incarnation and identification with the people and not, as
Rosanvallon explained with regard to the sociological principle of democracy, of its abstraction
in an instance deprived of visibility and objectivated form, which classical democratic
representation. We could thus contend that populism, at least at a discursive level, assumes the
vocation of making the political principle of democracy prevail while erasing the sociological
one, constraint in the way of the “true” representation of the people. Nevertheless, Hanna Pitkin
shows that there is a series of equivoques and tensions that the issue of political representation
raises, firstly with regard to the whom and what should be represented – the desires or the
interests of the electors 42 , the sense of “acting for” and thus the issue of the limits of
independence of the representative43, the competition of primacy between the national level and
the local one, the extent to which representation should however be “receptive” to the

38
Ibidem, p. 11
39
Bernard MANIN, Principes du gouvernement représentatif, Flammarion, Paris, 1996, pp. 11-12
40
Ibidem, p. 14
41
Guy HERMET, Op. cit., p. 47
42
Hanna Fenichel PITKIN, The concept of representation, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 1967, pp. 209-210
43
Ibidem, pp. 214-215

18
represented entities and finally a certain distance between the ideal and the empirical reality of
representation through its institutionalization in representative governments 44 . To several of
these issues the liberal thought, starting with Edmund Burke, had given clear-cutting answers,
whose essence was institutionalized in the present-day representative governments, first of all by
the nullity of the imperative mandate and the primacy of national interest in parliaments 45 (of
course with the exception of chambers representing regions or federated states in decentralized
or federal states). Finally, it is worth mentioning that political representation, as Hanna Pitkin
conceptualized it, has a clearly deliberative dimension, through which we would understand the
demand not just for specialized expertise, but also for debate and rationality, thus the elimination
of arbitrariness in public choice46. Taking into consideration most of the conceptualizations of
populism up to now, it would represent a visible contestation of these principles.

What is more, populism is deemed to have a problematic relation with what is considered
to be the liberal dimension of democracy. It is for sure one of the reasons why it is often
characterized as being of an essentially undemocratic nature. However, if we are to take into
consideration the fact that, as Gianfranco Pasquino puts it, the syntagm “liberal democracy”
itself is not just simply a linguistic collocation, although widely used, and the liberal character of
a democracy is not something to be taken for granted47, then we would perhaps have a more
realistic perception as to how far democracy per se goes. Actually, the distinction between
democracy and liberalism was very well explained by Norberto Bobbio, who demonstrated the
relationship between the two may very well be on mutual non-exclusion and benign
complementarity, but under no circumstances of identity or automatic mutual presupposition48. It
is actually this liberal dimension that became integrant part of the regular democratic functioning
that fulfilled the need to counterbalance the potential tyrannies of majorities of democracies and
to protect the minorities’ rights, by placing above the norm of popular sovereignty that of the
inalienable rights of the individual, constitutionally recognized and which are the basis of the
liberal doctrine, thus solving somehow the tension between equality and liberty, by stipulating

44
Ibidem, p. 221
45
Ibidem, pp. 209-210
46
Ibidem, p. 212
47
Gianfranco PASQUINO, « Populism and democracy », in Daniele ALBERTAZZI, Duncan McDONNEL (ed.),
Twenty First Century Populism: The Specter of Western European Democracy, Palgrave Macmillan, London,
2008., pp. 17-18
48
Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalism and democracy, Verso, London, 2005, p. 48

19
the “equality in liberty” 49. In this sense, William Kornhauser distinguishes between “populist
democracy” and “liberal democracy” 50, while only the latter involves institutional mediation of
political action and through it the limitation of both the power of the majorities and of the
minorities, while the former is based on the elimination or a bypass of the control of institutional
procedures and intermediate associations 51. On the other hand, as far as the tension between
equality and liberty is concerned, as previously mentioned, imperfectly done, as Ernesto Laclau
argues about the incapacity of liberalism to consistently integrate the democratic ideology of the
masses into its functioning and its discourse52. The same author expresses the view that populism
would bring about a (necessary) radicalization of democratic politics with a view to a more
participatory-inclusionary version of it. But where does the rather systematic disdain of populism
(bearing in mind that not all authors conceptualize it in the same manner) actually originate in?

It is a fact that the standard, working version of implementation of democratic politics

has been so far a rather hybrid alternative, namely liberal (representative) democracy. But as
Robert Hollinger argues, this is an “imperfect” mixture of an “imperfect liberalism” and “an
imperfect democracy”, designed out of an elitist logic to steer away any potentially radicalism or
tyranny of the “mob” 53 . If we also take into account significant approaches such as that of
Ernesto Laclau, it seems appropriate for us to contend that the origin of the rejection of populism
viewed either as an exacerbated form of democratic politics/rhetoric or a downright menace to
democracy is of a liberal-elitist nature. Which finally leads us to discussing the actual sources or
arguments of the liberal profound distrust in populism which, as we would see, are to a great
extent coincident with what could be observed as the original liberal-elitist distrust in democracy
itself54.

Perhaps the most evident and fundamental one would be that outlined by Ernesto Laclau
as the scepticism expressed by liberalism since the XIX century regarding the political
competence of mass of the people itself, eventually political subject of universal vote of

49
Ibidem, pp. 32-33
50
William KORNHAUSER, The politics of mass society, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, Illinois, 1959, p. 131
51
Ibidem
52
Ernesto LACLAU, Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism, fascism, populism, NLB, London, 1977,
p. 179
53
Robert HOLLINGER, The dark side of liberalism: Elitism vs Democracy, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1996, p. XII
54
Ibidem

20
democracies55 , or as the author suggestively puts it “the denigration of the mob” – i.e. irrational,
unpredictable, therefore dangerous, once entered into politics, masses. This is a fact also stressed
by Roger Dupuy who relevantly notes that the source of the popular mobilization back at its
origins, as well as in contemporary contexts of protest forms of popular discontent, is primarily a
disregard for what is called “bassa pulitica” and the incapacity of traditional political elites to fill
in the gap separating themselves from the base level of society 56. What alimented this disregard
was according to Dupuy to be found in the liberal “grande peur” discussed by Laclau as well as
to the potential violence of the “populace” and its capacity to act as competent citizens57. What is
more, deriving from the first fundamental source of liberal distrust is another one concerning the
potential of the necessarily ignorant masses to be attracted to demagogic charismatic leaders
manipulating the acquired popular legitimacy towards the realization of potentially dangerous
plans58. Moreover, the people addressed by the populist appeal may as well constitute itself into
a tyrannical majority, oppressing the minorities of any kind (religious, ethnic, professional, etc.),
showing what Michael Mann considers to be the “dark side of democracy” 59.

Another source would be found, as Yves Meny and Yes Surel show as well 60, in what
Pierre Rosanvallon calls the “procedural illusion” 61 , i.e. in the excessively institutionalized
approach to democracy that tend to focus on the dimension” system”, almost wiping away that of
the founding principle of democracy, that remains still the sovereignty of the people. One of the
conceptualizations having contributed to the “disenchantment” of the vision on democracy
would be that of Schumpeter. He sought to demonstrate the unrealistic character of what he
identified as being the classical definition of the democratic method, while analyzing several
variables that cannot really be objectivated: the common good, thee people and the will of the
people 62 . The author also gives his own definition, that might be considered at least at first
glance as a minimalist one: “Democracy only means that the people is able to accept or reject the
persons called to govern them.” At this definition, a supplementary and very relevant criterion is
however introduced, namely the free competition between the candidates running for the votes of
55
Ernesto LACLAU, On populist reason, Verso, London, 2005, p. 19
56
Ibidem, p. 16
57
Ibidem, pp.21-23
58
Robert HOLLINGER, The dark side of liberalism: Elitism vs Democracy, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1996, p. XVIII
59
Michael MANN, The dark side of democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 55
60
Yves MENY, Yves SUREL (ed.), Op.cit., p. 4
61
Pierre ROSANVALLON, Op.cit., 1998, p. 339
62
Joseph A. SCHUMPETER, Capitalisme, socialisme, démocratie, Trad. Gaël Fain, éd. Payot, 1954, p. 341

21
the electors63. Obviously, the additional criterion is indicative of a strongly liberal dimension
considered as being consistent with the democratic functioning.

Nonetheless, given the above observations, it appears difficult to ignore the democratic
dimension of populism, at least taking into consideration its reference to the people and its
sovereignty, key concepts which are, according to Margaret Canovan, along with the majority
rule, at the core of its however poor ideology64. It is what Peter Worsley also states, while noting
that there is an underlying tension subsisting in our conceptions of the “just society” regarding
the rights of minorities (which the populism has a tendency to ignoring) and of majorities, which
are to be found at the heart of populist claims making it thus “profoundly compatible with
democracy” 65 . It is something that Guy Hermet does not reject either, at least partly, since
otherwise the author expresses dichotomizations between “populists” and “democrats”, partly
due to his own conception of democracy, which in its real functioning, demands a total
delegation of the power of the electors towards their political representatives and where the
sovereignty of the people remains rather an optimistic proclamation endowed with symbolical
value and legitimizing purpose66. Francisco Panizza states in exchange that populism should be
regarded neither as a the highest form of democracy nor as its enemy, but as a “mirror” of it,
which may reflect even the less agreeable face of the people67. As a matter of fact, we would
introduce here the concept forged by Max Weber, to which populism proves a close relatedness
and a highly similar logic, describing precisely a particular form of democracy, namely a
plebiscitary one.

We shall commence by explaining the significance that Max Weber attributed to what he
coined as “plebiscitary democracy”. Weber deplores the political state of affairs dominated by
impersonal party politics, which did not give way to the expression of veritable charismatic
political personalities able to assume leadership positions, amounting to a “leaderless
democracy” and practically excluding the masses from political life68. Therefore, he opts for an

63
Ibidem, p. 387
64
Margaret CANOVAN, « Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy », in Yves
MENY, Yves SUREL (ed.), Op.cit., p. 33
65
Peter WORSLEY, « The concept of populism », in Ghiţǎ IONESCU , Ernest GELLNER (ed.), Op.cit., p. 247
66
Ibidem, pp. 28-29
67
Francisco PANIZZA, Op. cit., pp. 30-31
68
Max WEBER, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland, in Gesammelte Politische Scriften,
1920, pp. 208-210, available online at http://141.89.99.185:8080/uni/professuren/e06/a/a/ha/inhalt

22
alternative form of democracy, one which would allow both the expression of authentic and
charismatic political leadership surpassing the smallness of petty cliques (to which eventually
party politics is identified) and at the same time the inclusion of the masses to politics through
their direct participation to the election of a potential leader hence acquiring popular legitimacy,
which he brands as “leadership plebiscitary democracy” (Führerdemokratie/ plebiszitäre
Demokratie)69. Charisma (one of the most prominent weberian concepts) is seen of course as the
fundamental source of legitimacy and a prerequisite of the political actor in order for this
unfortunate depersonalization of politics to be avoided. As well, there is an almost complete
neutralization of the idea of demagogy, what is more, it is seen a necessary means to actually
acquire popular support and to the manifestation of democratic practice and mass participation :
“democracy and demagogy belong together” 70 . A statement that could stir very skeptical
reactions from the side of adepts of the unquestionable liberal character of modern democracies.
We might assume that the political subject of this democracy which Weber proposes is by no
means idealized as an undoubtedly sage people, but Weber boasts in this sense a coldly realistic
vision, since they are to be necessarily subjected to demagogy and manipulation through
propaganda. Moreover, the modern, novelty character of this charismatic-popular type of
legitimacy is that it stands apart both from the divine-right monarchic legitimacy and from the
implemented parliamentary representation. It is also worth noting that while acknowledging the
parliamentary, party-oriented skepticism towards the potential dangers of this Caesarism as well
as its intrinsic antiparliamentary character, Weber argues that the authority of the plebiscitary
leader is meant to be “above political parties/ parliament”71. However novel it may be, still the
“feasible” form of democracy 72 actually tends towards its not so modern variant – a form of
direct democracy with the at least symbolical inclusion of the masses. Liberal representative
democracy does not orient itself towards any “nostalgia for Athens”. Obviously, the plebiscite is
the fundamental political tool of accomplishment of Weber’s democracy, while regarded by
mainstream liberal democrats as a means of legitimizing power with authoritarian tendencies,

69
Ibidem, p. 212; Max WEBER, Politics as vocation, 1919, p. 19-20, available online at http://anthropos-
lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf
70
Max WEBER, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland, in Gesammelte Politische Scriften,
1920, p. 209, available online at http://141.89.99.185:8080/uni/professuren/e06/a/a/ha/inhalt
71
Max WEBER, Politics as vocation, 1919, p. 16, available online at http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf
72
the formulation of Peter BREINER, in Max Weber and Democratic Politics, Cornell University Press, New York,
1996, p. 158

23
and eventually a perversion of the democratic practice and principle to anti-democratic scope. In
any case, even if the leader really were to be the incarnation of the electors’ wishes, as far as
direct democratic ideals are concerned, the basic principle of representative democracy (deemed
as practically the only possible functioning of democracy) is clear on this: the consuming of the
political will of the citizen at the time of the elections and its giving away in the hands of the
representative-to-be is to regarded as simply the regular functioning of modern representative
democracies and the imperative mandate is (with very few exception cases) null! In this sense,
could the very formulation “plebiscitary democracy” actually be the expression of an oxymoron?
Or how self-obvious really is it that democracy exist only in its representative variant? As we
have seen, the plebiscitary model of democracy would suppose a direct form of handing the
mandate to a leader placing himself above parliamentary politics, resulting in a direct, non-
mediated relation between the electors and the elected. For this and for several other aspects (the
underlying idea of a better involvement of masses in politics, anti-parliamentarism, anti-elitism
and eventually rejection of the regular functioning of the “system” ), we would draw a strong
connection between Weber’s concept and populism. As a matter of fact, this should be obvious
also from the constant references that Weber makes to the idea of caesarism, which we may
define as a proto-populist form of politics and which used as a primary political tool of self-
legitimization precisely the plebiscite, ancestor of what we know today as referendum, also made
use of by populist political actors.

On the other hand, if this democracy is capable of showing the less pleasant face of the
people, this could be associated to what Michael Mann labeled as the “dark side of democracy”.
The author states that the fusion between the two significations that may be given to the notion
of “people” – demos and ethnos – may prove to be highly problematic through its exclusive logic
and may generate discrimination towards minority ethnic groups. Moreover, he distinguishes
between two visions on “the people”, which have consequences at the level of the management
of those who are supposed to be (or not) the political subjects of democracy: the liberal version
or that of the “stratified people”, which regards the people as a non-homogeneous community of
different social, ethno-cultural, professional groups, etc., having different interests which the
state aims to reconcile and not to erase, respectively the “organic” vision that envisages it in the
terms of an indivisible and ethnically homogeneous entity, which supposes that the state strives
for the maintenance of this homogeneity by means of discrimination and more or less violent

24
cleansing of other ethnic groups73. As well, the author relates this latter vision to that of nation-
people, where the nation is understood as an ethnic group, which (auto)defines itself as having
common origins and culture, but which also becomes politically conscious, demanding political
rights in a determined territory74.

If one wishes to determine which is the “people” addressed by populism’s appeal, one
may note that this separation between dêmos and ethnos, is restated by Pierre-André Taguieff75.
In fact, the determination of the object of the populist appeal represents one of the classification
criteria of populism, as in this sense the author distinguishes between protesting populism, of
socialist tendency , addressing the “popular classes” or “the small people” opposing thus the
lower-class people against the elites, an identitary populism, of nationalist tendency, addressing
the people as an ethnic category, opposing it to others considered as ennemy 76. Guy Hermet
speaks in exchange of three different peoples of which populism may claim to be the follower, in
a distinct manner or simultaneously, namely: a national trans-class people, including all the
national classes, a “plebeian” populism, corresponding to the protesting populism of Taguieff,
and an ethnic people 77 . This comes to show that, as Taguieff noted, another source of the
ambiguity of the concept of populism is the one deriving from the ambiguity of the populus in
question78, since the term “populism” does not suppose an automatic reference to a univocal
acceptation of this people, but more precisely the belonging to this people is submitted to more
or less inclusive or exclusive logics.

73
Michael MANN, Op. cit., p. 55
74
Ibidem, p. 11
75
Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, “Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes“,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No. 56, 1997, p. 8
76
Ibidem, p. 15
77
Guy HERMET, Op. cit., p. 52
78
Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, « Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais problèmes »,
Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, N°56, octobre-décembre 1997, p. 11

25
Populism and political (anti)modernity

In order to assess what we have assumed to be a rather paradoxical relationship between

populism and political modernity, we would of course firstly make reference to relevant
conceptualizations of the notion of (political) modernity, as well as its contrary – anti-modernity.

First of all, Jean-Marie Domenach, while establishing that its primary essence would be
the opposition to what is traditional or old-aged, focuses on the socio-political dimension of
modernity and mentions three phases of crisis that have been crucial to its evolution, namely: the
late 18th century along with the French Revolution and the affirmation of the ideals of the
Enlightenment, the late 19th century where these ideals were challenged by the emergence of the
masses as political actor and of collective passions (up to resulting in political extremisms such
as anti-Semitism, fascism, socialism, etc.), finally the unfinished phase, beginning in the 1960’s,
bringing the triumph of the individual-private dimension over the collective-public one and the
demise of mass ideologies79. Furthermore, one important element of the core of this modernity
which commenced well before the French Revolution with the critique of the established social
order, reviewed by Domenach is the secularized and secularizing irruption of individualism as a
new logic of structuring society and social relations, in a an open rupture with the holism that
constituted the logic of the traditional society and with consequences in all fundamental areas:
culture, economy, law, politics 80 . Bearing a decidedly secular character, (however without
leading to an irreducible atheism) this emergence of the individual as the centre of the societal
universe supposes a new form of legitimacy, morals, law and politics based on the universality of
the natural, thus inalienable, rights of man. Moreover, the emancipation of the individual, giving
way to the birth of modern economy and the autonomization of society, further leads to the
emergence of the modern bureaucratic State, based on an extension of Cartesian rationalism into
the political sphere, without it being an extension to the political power encountered until then in
most societies81. It is the issue of the legitimacy of the new secularized political power that is
actually deemed to be at the very heart of modernity: it does no longer base itself on an
“external”, transcendental source (as even Athenian democracy did) i.e. in superior religious
instances represented on earth by the Church or the institution of the monarchy, but on the

79
Jean-Marie DOMENACH, Approches de la modernité, École Polytechnique, Ellipses, Paris, 1986, pp. 13-14
80
Ibidem, pp.16-17
81
Ibidem, p.19

26
principle of popular sovereignty82. However this also is cause to troubling questions, given the
unchallengeable, ideally unlimited character of this new circular form of legitimacy which
identifies political power to the people - thus the source and the object of power are coincident -,
while this latter is imagined as a homogenous source of “general will”. The liberal response to
the resulting issue of potentially tyrannically exercised popular legitimacy, starting with
Benjamin Constant, was of course to oppose to it, in the spirit of the same modernity, the reality
of individual rights and liberties and the preservation of the autonomy of the social space 83.
Therefore the replacement of the divine legitimacy with the absolute popular sovereignty in its
Rousseauist reading results in political modernity’s founding paradox: unconfined individual
freedom (sole premise of a truly free and democratic society) resulting in unconfined collective
dictatorship. Thus modernity bears in itself the germs of both free rule and totalitarianism.
Nevertheless, what the liberal thought noted as well, was the simultaneously increasing
privatization of individual existence. However, this process continued up to the dangerous point
of the complete withdrawal and depoliticization of the individual, while proportionately the State
increased its ascendancy and its bureaucratic apparatus 84 . Which furthermore brings along
another crucial element of political modernity, i.e. the development of bureaucracy and
increasing bureaucratization, corresponding to the incremental challenge faced by the State.
Nonetheless, in this respect, it is clearly assumed that despite it being a translation of democratic
equality in its strict application of rational, impersonal, specialized procedures, its opacity,
capacity of substitution of elected political elites and resistance to any attempt at reform render it
rather a menace to democracy and even more particularly to democratic representation85. The
issue of representation and power is also at the core of modernity. Specifically, representation is
either contested by Rousseauist thought, thus in a preference for direct democracy and
disconsidering the practical possibility of it drifting into demagogy and dictatorship, or
representative democracy is accepted, however at the costs of stripping the elector of its
prerogatives and responsibilities86. Jean-Marie Domenach also approaches the sensitive topic of
the relation between political totalitarianisms and modernity, in a troubling interrogation over the
profound nature of the former: is it to be regarded as a revival of pre-modern political themes

82
Ibidem, p. 20
83
Ibidem, p.21
84
Ibidem, p. 23
85
Ibidem, pp. 168-169
86
Ibidem,p.161

27
and practices or as a form of paroxysm of the path opened by modernity itself (through the
Jacobin Terror), a holistic reaction to an excess of individualism?87 In fact, since the author tends
to embrace the latter response, the crucial element which would justify considering
totalitarianism as an eminently modern phenomenon is that which is central to modernity itself :
the source and type of legitimacy in the name of which power is exercised which is undoubtedly
the popular (perhaps a more accurate term than “democratic”) one, in a “perverse” relationship
representative-represented, i.e. a total, mystical, organic fusion between the two actors of the
representation scheme88.

Furthermore, one fundamental but at the same time original approach which we would
take into consideration would be the one developed by Antoine Compagnon, this time centered
not directly on the notion of modernity, but on its contrary – anti-modernity. In his work – a
refined analysis of French intellectual history - Les Antimodernes, de Joseph de Maistre à
Roland Barthes, he assumes as main departure point the idea that anti-modernity, more than its
usually prescribed assimilations to neoclassicism, conservatism or traditionalism, represents
actually a stance of resistance but also of ambivalence towards modernity assumed by true
moderns89. Six registers of articulation of anti-modernity are identified: a historical-political one
(which would constitute our main interest) – the counterrevolution; a philosophical one – the
anti-Enlightenment thought; a moral-existential one – pessimism; a religious-theological one –
the original sin; an esthetic one – the sublime; a style of expression – the vituperation. Anti-
moderns are in fact viewed as authentic founders and representatives of modernity, thus
modernity actually contains in itself the anti-modernity potentiality. Just as counterrevolution is
inseparably connected to the Revolution, it represents its contentious double and opposes it in its
very same terms, on the same grounds. What is more, counterrevolution should be distinguished
from anti-revolution, since the former supposes a theory, a reflection on the revolution, while the
latter amounts to merely a resistance to it. Analogically, anti-moderns (the term counter-modern
would not be appropriate simply from a linguistic point of view) are more than modernity’s
opponents; they are also its attentive exegetes 90 . Moreover, as De Maistre pointed out, the

87
Ibidem, p. 163
88
Ibidem, p. 165
89
Antoine COMPAGNON, Antimodernii: de la Joseph de Maistre la Roland Barthes, trad. Irina Mavrodin, Adina
Dinitoiu, Pref. Mircea Martin, Editura Art, București, 2008, p. 23
90
Ibidem, pp. 27-30

28
counterrevolution, thus the restoration of the Monarchy, would not attempt at denying that which
cannot be denied anymore – the Revolution as a historical event –, and instead of being a
contrary Revolution, it will become the opposite of the Revolution91. Whether of conservative-
traditionalist, reactionary – nostalgic (for the feudal pre-centralization age of aristocratic
autonomy) or reformist (constitutional monarchist) nuance, the counterrevolutionary thought
displays an antidemocratic stance, a profound despise for universal suffrage and for the principle
of equality, as well as an appraisal of aristocratic and intellectual elitism92.

Further on, after having given conceptual accounts in the above sections on the two main
notions whose relation interests us in this subchapter, we would finally attempt at assessing the
interaction between populism and modernity. We have departed from the idea that populism,
whether viewed as a type of rhetoric, a doctrine, a movement or a political style, constitutes a
political phenomenon of certain modern emergence, as we can see, in the strict context of
political modernity, most likely as the manifestation of a crisis of the democratic - representative
system. Nevertheless, we assume that its constitutive elements, which even particularize it
among other phenomena, are those of an anti-modern positioning. We would explain our
considerations, making reference most of all to the explanatory model developed by Guy Hermet
with regards to populism, since it boasts the highest complexity and relatedness to the object of
this analysis. Firstly, its core anti-political stance is a multi-fold one. One first element consists
in the discursive distortion of the temporary and practical register of modern politics, claiming an
immediate, undisputable and problem-free resolution to the desires (and not necessarily the
interest) of the instance designated as the people93. Furthermore, the rejection of the basic art of
politics itself actually translates a programmatic abandonment of political reason which had
triumphed in modernity, in a willingly irrational pursuit of the attainment of whatever political
agenda94. What is more, even the populist political agenda is, at least ideally, destined to be a
mere expression and re-enactment of an imperative mandate, placed through sorts of plebiscitary
mechanisms. Therefore, the functioning logic is not that of regular democratic representation, but

91
Ibidem, pp.35-36
92
Ibidem, pp. 32-53
93
Guy HERMET, Op. cit., p. 50-51
94
Ibidem

29
rather, if still a type of representation, an organic, emotional, mediation-free incarnation of a
popular will imagined as homogeneous 95 . Besides, the space for pluralism is limited, since
pluralism is prone to translating a condemnable, subversive challenge to popular will and
opposition to the fulfilment of the ideals of the national community96.Which leads us to another
aspect of its anti-political dimension, namely its anti-parliamentary and anti-party rhetoric.
Parliamentary assemblies and political parties, along with the other potential elites and the
odious notion of politicization, are pointed out as principal scapegoats for the mal-functioning
and failure of the political system, even as part of a sort of anti-national conspiracy (in which
ethnic minorities are also not excluded to play a part) 97. The bureaucratic apparatus with its
technicality and opacity is also to be despised, for the same unnecessary obstruction of the will
of the people. Briefly, the modern political system needs serious simplifications in order to be
congruent with the project of delivering the well-being of the national community. Also, the sort
of backward-looking nostalgia for a “good, old” society and its traditional values, un-perverted
by the current corrupt system98, is in an apparent convergence with the anti-modernity identified
by Antoine Compagnon with regard to the opponents of the French Revolution and their
followers. In addition to this, its constitutive holistic vision on the society and on the nation is in
clear opposition to the modern affirmation of individualism, extended from the public to the
private sphere, also a thing of note, since populism envisages an erasure of the line of separation
between the two99. Moreover, it is already obvious that populist rhetoric and politics are confined
to but a national system of reference and bear no claim to universality, as would be valid in the
case of an established modern political doctrine. However, we would last but not least refer to
the type of legitimacy that populism assumes, which is by no means coincident to any pre-
modern realities, namely the divine right legitimacy, but a radical, organic interpretation of the
principle of popular sovereignty. Since the source of political legitimacy is a fundamental aspect
of the core of modernity itself, as underlined by Domenach, we would actually trace here (apart
from what has been mentioned in the beginning of our evaluation) an extremely relevant element
testifying to the modern dimension of populism.

95
Ibidem, p. 59
96
Ibidem, pp.74-75
97
Ibidem, p. 56
98
Ibidem, p. 79
99
Francisco PANIZZA (ed.), Op.cit., Verso, New York, 2005, pp. 23-24

30
 To sum up, we would contend that populism is not just a product of modernity, but also,
interestingly enough, a peculiar reflection of it. Insomuch as modernity itself – and its
democratic ideal in the original absolute acceptation – contains an internal paradoxical
counterpoise between the affirmation of individual rights and the absoluteness of popular
sovereignty, populism is mainly convergent with the basic element of modernity as identified by
Jean-Marie Domenach – the source of the legitimacy in the inexorable sovereignty of the people,
with all the utopian content that it bears. Therefore, perhaps our primary assumption could be
reformulated: although presenting a rhetoric and a logic boasting a series of anti-modernity
elements, populism represents a phenomenon of clearly modern essence as it is a consequence of
political modernity’s founding principle and, what is more, may even be regarded as one of the
instances of modernity’s self-contestation (authentically “modern” in the understanding of
Antoine Compagnon), as well as of its intrinsic paradoxes.

31
 Second chapter

The following chapter of our text aims at providing a non-exhaustive empirical analysis with
regards to the applicability of the concept of populism on a Romanian case study, namely
political thought belonging to the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century
stemming from several authors (politicians, political thinkers, political historians, journalists)
associable, through their manifested allegiances, with different political doctrines, as follows:
Mihail Kogălniceanu and D.A. Sturdza as relevant representatives of liberalism, Nicolae Iorga
(sămănătorist), Radu Rosetti (radical, rather poporanist at a later stage), George Panu (radical),
Constantin Stere (poporanist) and Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (Marxist-socialist). We would
make use of the already displayed conceptualization of populism in its nonetheless ambiguous
dynamic with political modernity in order to identify its presence in the Romanian political
debate over the described time framework, as something more (or something less) than a
particular doctrine, more precisely a rhetoric potentially used by political actors of different
political orientations. Therefore, ours will be a discursive and conceptual analysis based on a
framework of sources proven relevant for the identification of populist, even nationalistically-
articulated, rhetoric and thus for the testing of our hypothesis, concerning the emergence of this
populism as a trans-doctrinary discourse. Our corpus of sources consists in various instances of
political expression: parliamentary debates/speeches, political writings, party programs, journals
and organs. Furthermore, in order to render the relevantly polemic character of the debate, we
have systematized the content of this corpus into several themes approached with predilection by
the protagonists of this debate, source and pretext for populist discourse: the peasant issue, the
anti-political democracy, the Jewish issue and the national issue. Their content will be exposed in
the following pages.

32
The peasant issue

Given that Romania remained at the end of the 19th century and throughout the first part
of the 20th century an agrarian country, with an overwhelmingly rural population and a high rate
of illiteracy, marked by a profound imbalance in the distribution of property, the peasant issue is
to be remarked as one of the central most fundamental themes of the Romanian political
debate100. Containing in itself the conflict articulated primarily around the agrarian property and
its socio-economic distribution101, it is at the center of preoccupation of political actors stemming
from different political-cultural milieus and orientations, as we shall easily note. Moreover, far
from being confined to the limits of socio-economic sphere, the peasant issue in its complexity
exceeds it and becomes an eminently political one. It may in this sense constitute a “pretext” for
the production of discursive approaches in which it becomes relevant for the more general
valences of the Romanian democracy, the conceptualization of the people/the nation (and its
supposed enemies, accordingly designated), as well for expressing the tension between
modernity-progress and tradition102. More specifically, we believe it to be a vehicle for clear
populist rhetoric and we shall argue in this sense. What is more, we shall take note of the
evolution of this theme throughout the period envisaged, with special emphasis on the context of
the 1907 Peasant Rebellion.

One first approach which we would take into consideration is that of liberal figure Mihail
Kogălniceanu. In a discourse from 1861 for the Defense of the Government, he declares himself
to be an un-withering adept of the granting of property to peasants, claiming an authentic interest
in the improvement of the peasantry’s state, which is amounted to “the foundation of the
Romanian nation” 103. The presence or absence of property structurally conditions the political
“capacitating” of the peasantry, its full awareness of and eventually participation to the status of
political subject of the democracy under construction. The “emancipation of the lower classes”
thus constitutes a necessity not only in socio-economic terms, but has a crucial relevance for the
national interest which should necessarily prevail against petty private interests. The oppressed

100
Alexandra IONESCU, “Constantin Stere et la démocratie paysanne: pour une éthique de la nation”, Studia
Politica, vol. I, no. 1, 2001, p. 140
101
Ibidem
102
Ibide, pp. 143-144
103
Mihail KOGĂLNICEANU, Discursuri parlamentare, antologie, pref., tab. cron. și note de Georgeta Penelea-
Filitti, Minerva, București, 1994, p. 236

33
peasantry represents the largest part of the people, while the boyars could not fulfill the same
representative dimension. The political dimension of this “emancipation” is expressed in the
clearest of terms: “the rise of the peasants in the rights and dignity as citizens (…)”, noting that
this process, as well as its discourse itself, were not to be damaging to the boyars themselves, but
only to “boyarism”, which represents in fact a terminological denomination for the notion of
privilege104. We would assume that in the constant discursive mobilization of recent past events
with great significance for the creation of the political unit in question itself (1848, 1957, 1859),
of the greatest relevance are the provisions of the Paris Convention, constantly brought into the
argumentation and turned into an essential factor of legitimization, such as the imperative of
political equality as well as the improvement of the status of the peasants as soon as possible105

The source of the great property is in exchange a factor of heated polemic between two
radical thinkers, the former closer in fact to poporanism106: historian Radu Rosetti and political
journalist and politician George Panu. The starting point of a contentious exchange of intellectual
productions was Radu Rosetti’s book issued in 1906 Pământul, Sătenii și Stăpânii în Moldova
(The land, the peasants and the landowners in Moldavia), in which the authors analyzes with
arguments and sources of remarkable subtlety the evolution of relations of sovereignty and more
specifically, of landownership in Moldavia, since the birth of the principality. Assuming as
ultimate conclusion the most controversial idea that, through the specific historical development
(namely the initial inexistence and late development of a centralized political power), the great
property is an illegitimate consequence of systematic “usurpation” by the “dominating classes”
on a land which at first only made the object of collective (obștesc) ownership and that the
currently existing peasant class had only been deprived of a land which they did own and
work107, as no great boyar property had existed until the 18th century, the study attracts virulent
reactions, among which the most notable would be that of G. Panu, who at first writes a critical
study in response to it – Cercetări asupra stării țăranilor (Research on the status of the
peasantry) - , in which Rosetti’s main argument - the illegitimate origin of the great property – is
contradicted, thus the great property considered a natural of the equally natural political

104
Ibidem, pp. 236-237
105
Ibidem, p. 237
106
Radu ROSETTI, Pentru ce s-au răsculat țăranii, ed. îngrijită, st. introd. și note de Z. Ornea, Editura Eminescu,
București, 1987, p. XI
107
Radu ROSETTI, Pentru adevăr și dreptate: răspuns unei critice, Tipografia "Dacia", Iasi, 1911, p. 4

34
development, while the peasants had come to derive their right of property(if any) merely by
collective labour (claca), a complete nonsense according to Rosetti. The terms of this conflict of
views are in fact radically political, exceeding the limits of a mere historical debate as the
polemic continues with a series of other replies. Panu’s study is followed by Rosetti’s
suggestively entitled response Răspuns la o agresiune, in its turn followed by Panu’s even more
critical essay O încercare de mistificare istorica sau Cartea d-lui R. Rosetti " Pământul, sătenii
și stăpânii". As evident from its very title, the radical-accusative tone does not lack in this piece
of writing either, although the objective of the “historical mystification” is not outwardly pointed
out. Finally, Rosetti’s reply Pentru adevăr și dreptate: răspuns unei critice does definitively
place Panu’s reaction under the sign of a guilty political affiliation, namely to a “hysterical
political coterie”108 (the conservative one, known for its natural opposition to the dismantling of
the great property), against the interests of “an entire kin”. As well, the accusation of subversive
influence of the peasant revolt of 1907 is refuted, while the identification of another source of the
historical injustice done to the “community of the Romanian people” deprived arbitrarily by a
class of “privileged” of its “ancestral rights on the land” is clearly made: the Organic Regulations
of 1832, symbol of the Russian “invasion”, which did nothing less than to aid the usurpation109.
The association with a foreign inimical power is by no means accidental in the economy of this
clearly populist discourse, since we have to deal with a clear designation of who constitutes the
“true people”, respectively “its enemy” (external and internal), plotting against its interests. This
tensed intellectual exchange, if corroborated with the strictly political debate surrounding the
resolution(s) of the peasant issue and the prospective agrarian reform, more so in the context of
the 1907 Peasant Uprising, demonstrates up to which extent the existence of the great property
itself becomes politicized as a matter of great stakes, legitimizing or de-legitimizing potential
political action towards the peasant-agrarian issue. Moreover, the same radical terms are utilized
by Rosetti in his post-1907 writing aiming to tackle the causes of the Peasant Rebellion, Pentru
ce s-au răsculat țăranii 110 . In a rather similar logic to that displayed by Kogălniceanu, the
realization of the interests of the peasantry is a vital constituent of the fulfillment of the “national

108
Ibidem
109
Ibidem, pp. 122-123
110
Radu ROSETTI, Pentru ce s-au răsculat țăranii, ed. îngrijită, st. introd. și note de Z. Ornea, Editura Eminescu,
București, 1987

35
ideal”111. What is more, the peasantry is identifiable (and identified actually) with the people
itself, most often designated through Rosetti’s terminological variant (a specifically Romanian
one) – “obștia” – the community – a conceptual category which boasts, interestingly enough –
both an ethnic (exclusively Romanian) as well as a socio-economic or class dimension, since
clearly enough, its adversaries constitute, symmetrically, a two-fold category – the “old and new
boyars” and the “foreigners”. Moreover, partly superposed with each of these two categories is
that of lease-holders, “vicious exploiters of the peasantry’s needs, national and foreign
leeches”112. Following this logic, the resolution of the peasant issue appears as one of greatest
urgency, given the dangerously outgrown saturation of the popular community towards the
abuses of the “system” led by a clutch of malevolent people 113 , potentially leading to such
disastrous consequences as the dismantling of the Romanian state itself.

However, G. Panu’s openly expressed position towards the peasant issue is not at all a
contrary one, if we are to take into consideration its diatribes against the political leaders of the
day for not duly supporting the emancipation (especially by means of public instruction) of the
peasantry, seen as a necessity in terms of political solidarity, one of the fundamental criteria of a
modern conception of the people of a State114.

We would now refer to a political stance assumed by perhaps the most politically visible
representative of what constituted a political-cultural doctrine, a specifically Romanian one
(which we would not even attempt a translation to), namely samanatorism. Nicolae Iorga, the
political figure in cause, did indeed give a certain voice in the political arena to some of the
doctrine’s prominent ideas: a programmatic purging and emancipation of our national culture, a
somewhat xenophobic approach as to potentially applicable socio-political ideologies and
cultural production, most importantly the idealization of peasant life as representing the essence
of Romanianis, while the only social categories that were envisaged as part of the national
community were the peasants and the old boyar class115. Nonetheless, the necessity of a multi-
fold emancipation of the peasantry is perhaps the most firmly stated among the issues

111
Ibidem, p. 403
112
Ibidem, p. 412
113
Ibidem, pp. 404-405
114
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1885, No. 71
115
Zigu ORNEA, Sămănătorismul, București, Minerva, 1971, p. 189

36
approached by Iorga, especially in the context following the 1907 Peasant Rebellion. In this
respect, he pleaded for the “amnesty of the peasant rebels”, besides from taking such a radical
position on the matter as to address a prayer for a number of peasants killed in the revolt and a
curse at the same time for those guilty of the disastrous state of the peasantry (foreigners,
upstarts, politicians) in the pages of the journal “Neamul românesc”, a type of discourse sure to
be imbued with great stylistic effect and emotional impact.116A less emotional tone is adopted in
his parliamentary discourse for the amnesty of the peasants, however not hesitating to instantly
name one of the most important (perhaps not the only one) scapegoats for the current deplorable
state of the peasantry: the Jewry117. It was in general the “foreign element” that triggered the
violent reaction of a population otherwise peaceful and kind118, another argument in favour of
granting amnesty to an already wronged, and equally idealized (!), peasant population119. The
justified distrust in the political elites is on the other hand another element to have determined a
violent reaction from the peasantry generally identified with the popular classes 120. Further on, a
personal identification with the representative of “the interests of the entire people” and of its
liberation as independent and, very relevantly, nationalist deputy, is assumed121. Moreover, the
under-representation of the peasantry or lack of representation whatsoever is signalled, given the
electoral restrictions still in place at the time of issuing of these discursive approaches.
Something which does not do justice to the clear thinking, rationality, appropriateness and sharp
political flair of the peasantry, as displayed for instance in the debates with the revolutionary
committee in Moldavia in 1848122. The author of the discourse goes as far as to declare the
Romanian peasant to be the most intelligent among all European peasantries, apart from boasting
a strong sense of solidarity and national consciousness not to be encountered in the case of the
superficial “ruling classes”123. Nonetheless, it is not just the peasantry which is idealized, but
also the peaceful, pre-modern cohabitation with the boyars, before it had been vitiated by
“foreign regulations” 124 . In fact, the conformity with the “ancestral customs” is the most

116
Ibidem, p. 218
117
Nicolae IORGA, Discursuri parlamentare, Bucovina, București. 1939-1940, p. 11
118
Ibidem, p. 13
119
Ibidem, p. 20
120
Ibidem, p. 22
121
Ibidem, p. 25
122
Ibidem, p. 42
124
Ibidem, p. 44

37
important criterion for the elaboration of contemporary legislation and regulations, since the
attempt at implementing foreign elements of legislation and/or of civilization inconsistent with
our “life conception” cannot be a successful one125. At this point, Iorga’s perspective is a rather
dualist one, if we also take into consideration the cries for “full reform” and radical measures as
far as the state of the peasantry is concerned. However, since we could not consider his approach
to be a progressive one, we would contend that while the claim for reform is punctual, the sense
of the reform is yet to be discovered, not necessarily “ahead”, but perhaps a specific “adaptation”
of “backward”. The Organic Regulations are also in this case to be blamed for most of the
country’s evils, while the “secular” arrangements were supposedly more representative and did
not lack the dimension of political trust from the represented (the peasants) towards the
representative (the administrative officials)126.

Representative of a doctrine which shared with the semanatorist view the determining
preoccupation for the fate of the peasantry, that is poporanism, Constantin Stere developed his
views on the peasant issue in a different key, i.e. one expressed in close connection with (and
terminology of) Marxist sociology. While rejecting the applicability and/or necessity of social-
democratism and of a Marxist revolution in the Romanian socio-political context, Stere explains
the position of the peasantry in the Marxist-revolutionary conception as reactionary and rather
counter-revolutionary 127 . Something which nonetheless does not alter its fundamental role in
Romanian society and as the most relevant social category. Nevertheless, other classes such as
the small bourgeoisie and the intellectuals would be joining the peasantry (in their most
“conscious and vigorous” elements) which would enable it to take part “consciously” in political
life, all the more that the well-being of the peasantry is sure to have an impact on the economic
interests of the entire society128. Moreover, the discourse is seemingly radicalized at a later time
when, at least formally, after the agrarian reform of 1919, the peasant-agrarian issue had begun
to find a resolution. The journal “Zarile”, issued as organ of the Peasant-Democrat Party stated
as one of its mottos that “the ownership of the land could not base itself on an absolute right of

125
Ibidem, p. 52
126
Ibidem, p. 62
127
Constantin STERE, Scrieri politice si filozofice, ed. si pref. de Victor Rizescu, Do-MinoR, București, 2005,
pp.177-179
128
Ibidem, p. 320

38
property in the agrarian regime of a state of peasant workers”129. The peasantry is deemed to be
just as vulnerable to the abuses of power, in a practically unconstitutional regime. In addition to
this, the only practical possibility for the Romanian state is to be an agrarian one, by virtue of its
agrarian people (“we are all a people formed of peasants”)130, and for the fact that the state of the
most numerous class – the peasantry – conditions that of the entire society. In specific Marxist-
materialist terms, a need for the “direct socialization of production means” currently unavailable
to the peasantry, is expressed. Moreover, while addressing a critique to Iorga for his demagogical
pretension of being an honest representative of the peasantry, an antagonization of the categories
of the peasantry and respectively the urban population, as well as the “ruling classes” in general,
is expressed131.

Last but not least, the Marxist-socialist point of view belongs to author Constantin
Dobrogeanu-Gherea. In his work entitled Neoiobăgia (Neoserfdom), Gherea firstly addresses a
critique to the poporanist view, for its lack of consistence regarding research methods as well as
the excessive idealism preventing them to “see the social issue” of the country, especially the
agrarian one, in its dimensions132. Therefore, Gherea forges a new concept in order to define the
socio-economic status of the current peasantry: neoserfdom – defining a return to essentially the
old state of serfdom (feudal production relations), formally abolished by the emancipation
implicitly brought along through the implementation of “liberal-bourgeois forms”, but under a
hybrid form, adapted to the new liberal-bourgeois settlement and consisting in a form of
production and socio-economic exploitation of the peasantry this time by at least two categories:
the great owners (boyars) and the newer category of the lease-holders 133 . In this new
arrangement which in the terms of the author, amounts to a monstrosity, the peasantry finds itself
subjected to even more exploitation, while all the other social categories are co-interested in
maintaining this state of affairs in the detriment of the former134. What is more, the undertaking

129
Zările: organ săptămânal al Partidului Țărănist-Democrat, director C. Stere, Atel."Adevărul" S.A., București,
1932 Vol. 4
130
Zările: organ săptămânal al Partidului Țărănist-Democrat, director C. Stere, Atel."Adevărul" S.A., București,
1932 Vol. 3
131
Zările: organ săptămânal al Partidului Țărănist-Democrat, director C. Stere, Atel."Adevărul" S.A., București,
1932 Vol. 2
132
Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, Neoiobăgia : studiu economico-sociologic al problemei noastre agrare,
Socec, București, 1910 , p. 3
133
Ibidem, p. 19
134
Ibidem, p. 20

39
of the bourgeois forms brought about a reactionary, noxious institutional arrangement, an ever
more complicated and corrupted bureaucratic apparatus135. What is more, the ruthlessness of the
new ruling class of bourgeois lease-holders towards the ruining of the peasantry is bound to have
the most tragic consequences on state of the wealth of the nation itself 136. Thus we encounter
time and again the expression of the mere identification (interdependence would be already
exceeded) of the state of the peasantry with that of the national society, just as the peasantry is
most often conceived as the very equivalent of the nation. A troubling and radical criticism is
formulated, which we would amount to an effort of demythologization, against the liberal-
bourgeois generation of 1848, guilty for not having carried out the agrarian reform in 1864 in the
interests of the latter. The rationale behind this process was according to Gherea a furthering of
the exploitation already in place, now only exacerbated, in a sort of conspiracy against the
interests of the only “producing class”137. Gherea contends that only if the entire land had been
passed on to the peasants as communal inalienable property the effects of this reform would have
been positive. From a socialist point of view, it seems indeed an acceptable possibility, but the
author obviously chooses to omit the difficulty that Kogalniceanu and collaborators had
encountered even for this partial reform, no doubt incomplete and not without perverse effects.
The political diatribe goes so far as to designate Kogalniceanu as “reporter of the
conspirators” 138 . The scapegoating logic could not have been absent from such a discursive
construction, as the 1848 generation and their inimical political work are to be blamed for all the
evils currently experienced by the entire social corps.

After taking into consideration these diverse instances of political thought of such
different doctrinal orientation, we can only assume that the magnitude of what was coined as
“the peasant(agrarian) issue” was certainly one factor explaining why the arduous debate
surrounding it drifted into such radicalism and virulent polemic. The assumed need of the
political characters not only to identify the sources of the problems related to the peasant issue
but also to clearly and perhaps too univocally name the culpable is but another source of the
tension created around what was indeed a matter of national interest. What is more, the

135
Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, Scrieri social-politice, st. introd., antologie și note de Damian
Hurezeanu, Editura Politica, București, 1968 , pp.81-82
136
Ibidem, pp.84-85
137
Ibidem, pp. 94-97
138
Ibidem, p. 98

40
conceptualization of the nation and/or people all gravitate around a single denominator – the
peasantry – and it is perhaps only its enemies, necessary objects of scapegoating for the , whose
naming may vary this time closely related to the doctrinal orientation – the Jews, the internal-
external conspiracy, the boyars, the lease-holders, the reactionary liberal bourgeoisie.

41
Towards an anti-political democracy?

A second theme of debate as pretext for expressing populist rhetoric, partly related to the
previous one, as we shall see, is the one generally related to the discursive-normative conception
on Romanian democracy and its related subtopics, such as the debate on universal suffrage and
the enlargement of popular participation to political life, political parties, and even the monarchy.
The more important stakes related to this debate are in fact to be conceived in the larger
perspective of what Romanian political modernization is or should be, for a normative sense is
permanently present in the debate. The Romanian political modernity, in its reality and not
necessarily in a sort of (post)-Weberian ideal-type, is marked by equivoques reflected, very
significantly, in the intellectual conceptions on democracy, along with a struggle towards
institutional accommodation139, but also pertaining to the notion of democracy itself, containing
in itself a constant tension between experience and expectation140.

Firstly, the deficit of representation in the Parliamentary Assembly is a fact deplored by

Nicolae Iorga in his discourse on the Message addressed to the King in 1909141. Evidently, the
category the most under-represented is the peasantry, as previously shown. The political parties
are deemed as quite undesirable political formations, while party discipline is dismissed as the
mere annihilation of any inch of freedom of (political) conscience 142 . The idea of direct
representation is also displayed, since Iorga seems to assume a sort of imperative mandate when
stating that his presence in the Chamber of Deputies was to “express the feelings of the country
(which had delegated him there)143. In addition to this, the xenophobic and anti-Semitic views do
not fail in being expressed, a fact due to the same malevolent collaboration of some of the
Romanian politicians with the foreign nations to such an extent that Romania had come to
display civil war and class struggle manifestations144 . The change of the electoral system in the
sense of enlargement of the popular basis and the implementation of the direct vote for the entire
population (i.e. including the peasantry) would be a welcome step towards the resolution of this
structural problem and for the forging of a “Romanian Country”. If to all this we add the claim to

139
Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, ”La démocratie roumaine: vocation ou exercice de volonté?”, Studia Politica, vol.
V, no. 3, 2005, pp. 583-603
140
Ibidem, pp. 584, 588
141
Nicolae IORGA, Discursuri parlamentare, Bucovina, București. 1939-1940, p.30
142
Ibidem, p. 32
143
Ibidem, p.33
144
Ibidem, p. 67

42
be engaged into “practical politics” (“the best politics”) when prescribing at least theoretically
and a not so objectivated sense an ethnic-cleansing program, for the sake of saving the
“Romanian element” in the face of the foreign bourgeoisie – a duty of the State towards the
interests of the country – an ethno-cultural and ethnic-based exclusionary perspective on the
nation becomes evident. Corroborated however with the apparently divergent claims for the
“democratization” of political and public life, we could only analyze this ambivalent rhetoric in
the terms of populism.

A similar anti-party positioning is assumed by George Panu, who most often prefers to
designate them in the pages of his journal “Lupta” through a repetitive personal terminology:
“(collectivist) coterie” “collectivist government”, “collectivist politics”. However, since Panu
decides to take position against both of the two dominant political-ideological camps (the liberals
and the conservatives), alternative terminology in terms of political insults can be forged – e.g.
“reactionary” “clutch of ill-interested politicians”. In any case, the connotative meaning of this
terminology relates itself to the idea of demonized, conspirator minority, lacking any
representative valence of the honest and systematically oppressed majority. In addition, a
radically secular view is expressed as to the presence of religious instances in public affairs, as
well as to the inclusion of religion in public education curricula, more likely a source of
confusion, ignorance and persistence of old superstitions 145 . Moreover, an impediment to
authentic progress, religion should not play any role in an identitarian “definition” of the
Romanian nation, while its illegitimate involvement in public affairs is but the consequence of
petty political interests of submission and domination of the same “collectivist coterie”. But
perhaps the most virulent opposition is manifested towards the institution of the monarchy and
most of all towards the very person of the King. In this sense, Panu is an exception among the
political figures analyzed in this study. Apart from the series ironically dealing with the
“Memoirs of the King”, one most radical, up to insulting rhetoric is displayed in an article
entitled “The dangerous man”, while the lead title more than offensively reads “The lechery of
the regime” 146 . The betrayal of “the interests of the country” by the Chamber of Deputies,
through the vote for Government’s provisory convention with Austro-Hungary is to be
considered the consequence of the “foreign instigation” maneuvered by the “German rookie”,

145
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1885, No. 76
146
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1887, No. 164

43
anti-national instrument of the foreign conspiracy, the source of “all evils, abuses, betrayals, the
damned soul of the regime” which is the King. We believe our extensive quotation is well
justified in this case, as the language used is of utmost relevance for the display of an
exacerbated populist rhetoric as to the theme of the antinational conspiracy, as well as the
univocal designation of the enemies of the people and the country through the already discussed
scapegoating, irrational type of argumentation. Against these structural issues of the Romanian
political specter, an organic vision on democracy itself is developed, with the affirmation of a
need for authentic achieving of political, social and even economic equality. But it also regards
the legitimate means of political protest against an essentially illegitimate and non-representative
political power and in this sense, with the need for an objectivation of the “nation”. The article
“The organized nation”147, opposing two analytical categories – the “organized, fictitious nation”
whose manifestation of political will is consummated by the act of elections and the “real
nation”, which is the authentic conceptualization of what constitutes indeed the political
community and whose civic manifestation of political will must exceed the insufficient moment
of the elections in a logic interestingly similar to what Rosanvallon coined as “counter-
democracy” – actually opposes two visions on democracy, a “procedural” one (in the terms of
the same Pierre Rosanvallon) and what we would name an organic-radical one, suggestively
reminding of a rudiment of direct democracy. However limited though the elections may be from
the perspective of political representativeness, as sole solution to the endemic problems of the
Romanian “partial” democracy Panu considers the implementation of the universal suffrage.
Apart from giving birth to parties with truly large popular basis, the reform would crush
“political coteries” and be the true limit to the monarchic power 148
. The lack of
representativeness of the 3-college system is clearly pointed out in numerical terms as well, and
the actual regime is but an enactment of a zero-sum game between exploiters and exploited149.
The issue of the electoral (in)competence is somehow dismissed, even as far as the imperative of
literacy is concerned150, by the ultimate argument of the ideal inalienability of this “fragment of
sovereignty” for each individual, all the more that the passion and interests of these individuals

147
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1887, No. 218
148
George PANU, Sufragiul universal, Tipografia "Lupta", Al. Lefteriu, 1893 , p. V
149
Ibidem, pp. 10-11
150
Ibidem, pp. 54-57

44
are to prevail before sophisticated, almost fictitious, “scientific truths” 151 . In fact, it is precisely
the popular masses, mostly the peasantry, that determine the existence of the Romanians as a
“people” and not the reactionary ruling minority that continuously disregard the interests of the
former152. Last but not least, since a potential tyranny of the majority would be undesirable, the
electoral system must be founded on the principle of proportional representation153.

The need for a structural improvement of the Romanian democracy is also expressed by
Constantin Stere. Along with equal, direct and popular vote, the respect for legality and
constitutional freedoms, the creation of a rural democracy, with a more effective and vigorous
participation of the people to the Government of the country and to civic life, are all claims made
by Stere154. It is not just the peasantry that suffers from this deficit of democratic participation,
but also the small bourgeoisie, vexed by the privileged oligarchy as well as the abuses of the
administration155. Strangely enough, a stronger antiparty stance is developed at the same time a
party discourse is developed, i.e. that of the Democrat-Peasant Party led by Stere. In addition to
this, the regime in placed is accused of an effective lack of constitutionalism, given the violation
of the provisions of an only formally existing one (the Constitution of 1923)156. A new one is
demanded, consecrating the equal, direct and mandatory vote, as well as proportional
representation that would be a “true image of the nation itself”.

As far as Constantin Dobrogeanu Gherea’s discourse on the state of the Romanian

democracy is concerned, a thoroughly antiparty and generally anti-politics rhetoric in Marxist
terminology is developed, for the simple reason that they are all representatives of the same
socio-economic class (the “wrong” one): the bourgeoisie157. What is more, the corruption of the
entire political class is doubled by an unhealthy proclaimed nationalism. To this plague, adds
another: the equally corrupt and overdeveloped bureaucratic apparatus, all converging to the ruin
of the people. An emotional language is utilized in order to reveal the necessity of a class-

151
Ibidem, p. 34-35
152
Ibidem, pp. 41-45
153
Ibidem, p. 89
154
Constantin STERE, Op.cit, p. 312
155
Constantin STERE, Op.cit, p. 320
156
Zările: organ săptămânal al Partidului Țărănist-Democrat, director C. Stere, Atel."Adevărul" S.A., București,
1932, Vol. 4
157
Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, Scrieri social-politice, st. introd., antologie și note de Damian
Hurezeanu, Editura Politica, București, 1968 , p. 102

45
conscious working people – consisting in the peasantry and the urban workers – acting for the
fulfillment of its political will, case in which the numbers prevailing, the minoritarian
bourgeoisie is bound to abide by the new working organization 158. Of the political measures
demanded in view of this coming emancipation, we would mention the direct universal vote, the
equal rights for women, as well as, in a natural socialist logic we might say, the dismantling of
the budget for religious denominations, free instruction, free justice and absolute communal
autonomy159. A quite generous program but with no precisions regarding the possibility of its
implementation.

With respect to the political figures envisaged by us, the rhetoric reviewed is indicative of
the source of at least a part of the malaise defining Romanian political modernity: there is an
effort towards the assimilation of a democratic discourse on the one hand and an effort towards
the (re)thinking of its best possible implementation in the strictly political field because in this
sense, accommodations are needed and they may sometimes lead to revealing the distance
between the democratic ideal and the practical existence of the democratic regime. It is perhaps
because of the objectivation of this distance that the different views on democracy and
democratization are articulated in an anti-political stance and by consequence in a rejection of
political products of modernity: political parties (since the anti-party rhetoric is something
common to all the stances analyzed here), the State establishment, the bureaucratic apparatus.
These may occasionally, and following the discursive needs of the moment, be turned into
impediments of an authentic democratization, and thus inimical instances to the political subject
of this democracy, irrespective of its different constituencies, the people. We would refer
uniquely to the “discursive” needs of such positioning bearing in mind the political realities
related to the protagonists of these anti-political discourse, who did actually assume a political
career as well as party membership.

158
Ibidem, pp. 120-122
159
Ibidem, p. 123

46
The Jewish issue

Perhaps a sub-theme of the previous one related to the debate on what Romanian
democracy is or should (not) be from the perspectives of the political figures envisaged by this
study, and in the context opened in 1878 by the discussion on the 7th article of the Romanian
Constitution of 1866, the Jewish issue is still another focal, rather independent, point of polemic,
as well as a pretext for the expression of a particular type of populist discourse, but not one
shared by the all the positions expressed in this regard, as we shall see.

To begin with, the only virulently anti-Semite positioning in the matter is the one
assumed by Nicolae Iorga, made clear on numerous occasions in his interventions in the
Romanian Parliament as well as in his writings, even when tackling issues of more general
substance. Among the ones which deal specifically with the matter, one notable interpellation
regarding the “Jewish unrest” is contained in the volume entitled Problema evreiască la Cameră.
Note despre vechimea evreilor în țară: o interpelare, with a preface written by more notorious
anti-Semite A.C. Cuza160. Briefly, the latter’s preface, more than drawing attention to the danger
of the “Jewish menace” and the necessity of a firm nationalistic movement able to oppose
“modern ideas” if these are convergent with the victory of the Jews against the Romanian nation,
constitutes a diatribe against several “jewishized” political figures such as C. Stere and G. Panu,
accused for not adhering to the same programmatic anti-Semitism. As far as Nicolae Iorga’s
interpellation is concerned, it is claimed to be addressing merely the problem of recent Jewish
manifestations and not the whole of the Jewish issue, since the dimensions and character of the
latter, as well as its potential resolution, exceed by (too) far a strictly political, governmental
handling of the matter. Since the Jewish issue has come to be organically bound to the greater
national issue, i.e. regarding the very existence of the Romanian nation, only master of its ethno-
historical rights on the Romanian territory161. Nation, kin and people are mere equivalents, thus
the ethno-cultural acceptation and an exclusionary logic in the conceptualization of the political
community is more than evident on this discursive level, while proposing the instrumentalization
of the same exclusionary mechanism on the effective socio-political sphere, as the Government
and the State are however not exempt from the action of supporting the only legitimate As a

160
Nicolae IORGA, Problema evreiască la Cameră. Note despre vechimea evreilor în țară: o interpelare, cu o
introd. de A. C. Cuza, Tipografia "Neamul Românesc", Vălenii-de-Munte, 1910
161
Ibidem, pp. 13-14

47
matter of fact, at this point Iorga’s rhetoric superposes State and nation, while re-conceptualizing
the notion of national State, defined culturally and spiritually by the exclusive Romanian
element. The myth of Judeo-socialism and of the international, but also internal Jewish
conspiracy, the same ones accused for the turbulence provoked in the country, are displayed and
instrumentalized as well162. The accusation of the internal conspiracy would even legitimize as
much as restricting the freedom of the press and of opinion to Romanians (!), given the socialist
anti-national propaganda carried out by the existing Jewish press. As to another restriction, with
regards to political rights, a double standard is to be applied to the Jewish population, whose
right to elect or be elected depends on the fate of their application to the Legislative Bodies163.
Any further modification to the content of the 7th Article of the Constitution and to the regime of
rights and freedoms for the Jews is rejected firmly and in agreement with other members of the
Chamber, as they are decidedly a foreign element to the Romanian nation, and what is more, one
that had made themselves guilty of the material and moral decay of the great landownership and
ruining of the peasant population through land-lease and usury164. The concept of anti-Semite is
also deconstructed and finally the practical existence of such a category denied, by virtue of the
non-existence of any Jewish State - therefore we have to deal with the same equivalence
relationship established between State and nation, only that in the reversal sense, i.e. the nation
defined by the State and not vice-versa - , but in any case good patriotism cannot be (mis)taken
for anti-Semitism. Liberal-constitutional criteria pale in front of the imperative of defending the
Romanian nation and the national character of the State when advising to ignore such
“impediments” while censoring a part of the press – be it openly Jewish or just pro-Jewish. The
volume ends with a pseudo-chronology, extracted from a series of more or less obscure
documents, of the Jewish presence in the Romanian Principalities, aiming implicitly to testify to
the unfortunate consequences of the existence of this minority on Romanian territory165. Finally,
we could only contend that the whole of this volume and most importantly Iorga’s discourse
constitute itself in a populist-illiberal manifesto and an explicit rejection of modernity.

The accusation of corrupting the peasant world (common peasants and great landowners
alike) is placed on the same Jewish minority by Radu Rosetti in his analysis of the sources of the

162
Ibidem, pp. 15-19
163
Ibidem, p. 18
164
Ibidem, pp.20-21
165
Ibidem, pp. 34-48

48
Peasant Rebellion of 1907. Firstly, the primary cause of the rebellion is to be found in the
exploitation and humiliation inflicted on the peasants of Flamanzi by a Jewish trust of lease-
holders, while its more general authentic causes sources are the selfishness, greed and dishonesty
of the old and the new “ruling class” (of which the Jews are an integrant part) 166. Moreover, the
exclusive logic in the perspective on the national community is at work in this case as well: a
clear-cut conceptual differentiation between “population” and “nation” (or the “community” –
obștia – the preferred terminological variant) where the former includes “Jews and other
foreigners” and the latter…simply excludes them, while trying to demonstrate that the peasantry,
making up for 80 percent of the former and 90 percent of the latter, is by far the most numerous
social category of the nation167. And most importantly, it results that it could not be part of an
ethnic group other than Romanian. In addition to this, an erasure of the 7th Article, the granting
of citizenship to the Jewish population as well as the economic submission, if not outright
occupation, of the Romanian State by the Jews are all dangers to be feared in the event of a
violent continuation of the rebellion leading to a final of a collapse of the State 168. Thus the
Jewish minority is viewed as a permanently negative potentiality, which through the
maintenance of the current state of affairs to its regard (the 7th Article, the protectionist economic
policies, etc.) must be systematically neutralized.

A notably different position is assumed by G. Panu, who does indeed, in conformity with
A.C. Cuza’s accusations, take up the cause of the Jewish minority firstly in the journal which he
led, “Lupta”. In an article occasioned by the refusal of the Romanian Students Congress to
include in their ranks the Jewish Students, the author takes the opportunity to discuss the Jewish
issue and assumes a position against precisely the exclusive logic based on ethnic
differentiation169. Brotherhood among Romanians and Jews is stated to exist independent of any
such exclusive operations, while the fatherland is also something shared by both Romanians and
Jews having been born and bred in this same territory. The same criterion is taken into
consideration with regards to the granting of citizenship in another article issued on the subject

166
Radu ROSETTI, Pentru ce s-au răsculat țăranii, ed. îngrijită, st. introd. și note de Z. Ornea, Editura Eminescu,
București, 1987, p. 401
167
Ibidem, p. 403
168
Ibidem, p. 406
169
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1885, No. 109, pp.1-2

49
of the expelling of Jewish journalists from Romania 170 . The author criticizes implicitly the
constitutional provisions based on the same ethnic, “blood-related”, criteria that d - efine the
quality of “Romanian”, indifferent to the country of origin of the respective Romanians or their
acquiring of political rights. What follows is an interesting conceptualization of the actual status
of the Romanian Jews, as neither Romanians nor foreigners, but as an intermediate category,
namely one that only exists explicitly in the international law and not in the Romanian law –
landed (pamanteni). Nonetheless, since the landed Jews are an internal social class whose
problems are to be dealt with internally, their addressing to the foreign instances is condemnable
and represents the manifestation as foreigners. That is precisely why, for whatever reasons of
blame (even conspiracy against the State), the Romanian Government should have applied the
standard legal coercive measures. However, we would consider the positioning expressed in his
writing Campanie contra țarei : chestia evreiască 171 to be more ambiguous, as the cited volume
consists in fact in a protestation against the unjustified tackling of the issue by the foreign press.
The same anti-international stance to the matter is maintained, since the Jewish issue is deemed
to have been solved by the 1879 modification of the 7th Article, even with the wise restriction to
172
granting of citizenship on individual basis . Moreover, the relevance of discussions
surrounding the political rights of the Jewish minority is minimized, as representing too little
interest for the bulk of the Jewish population, also since the political realm is a generally
undesirable one173. What is more, the massive emigration of the Jewish population towards the
Eastern countries is explainable through aspects of strict socio-cultural meaning: the largest
numbers of the Jewish population are of “inferior” nature and resistant to socialization, they do
not however resist authentic competition from stronger nations, therefore they are forever in seek
of economically inferior host-countries where they can thrive174.

A moderate and scientific-based position is assumed by C.Stere as well. Firstly, the

Jewish issue is seen the context of a necessary and legitimate conflict, while savage anti-
Semitism is rejected as a shameful irrational fanaticism, as the essence of this issue is neither a

170
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1885, No. 115, pp.1-2
171
George PANU, Campanie contra țarei : chestia evreiască, Tipografia "Heliade", București, 1902
172
Ibidem, pp.52-54
173
Ibidem, p. 57
174
Ibidem, p. 65

50
religious, nor a racial one175. However, cultural-religious identity and the perpetuated form of
trans-communitarian solidarity hinder significantly their capacity to be integrated in modern-day
societies176.But what is deemed as objectively more problematic is the fact that, in the context of
Romania’s economical and political underdevelopment, the Jews had come to constitute the
largest part of its middle class, a middle class that would not let itself culturally (including
linguistically) integrate into the national culture of the majoritarian people, thus becoming an
obstacle in its socio-cultural advent177. In addition to this, the middle class is the most likely to
acquire eventually political dominance, all the more reason for a less tolerant attitude of the
people. What is more, this time in obvious Marxist language, Stere contends that the Jews fail to
be the “agents of a progressive, revolutionary capital”, producing exclusively destructive,
“reactionary” types of capital – usurious and land-lease capital, without any positive added-value
consequences on national economy178. The social consequences of this lack of balance within the
middle class are also unfortunate, for given the impenetrability of this one by either the upper
class or the lower one, a rupture is created within the “national organism”179. Nevertheless, the
issue is considered to have been almost equally problematic irrespective of the origin of the
foreign population. Stere in fact re-conceptualizes it in Marxist terms as a class imbalance
resulting in a national conflict articulated economically, socially and culturally180, but not ethno-
racially, reason for which the Romanian environment is the only one where the Jewish issue is
authentically posed, even if for the most part, in the wrong terms of anti-Semitism. But what is
lacking in this rhetoric, by clear contrast to the other views analyzed here, is the absence of a
discursive logic of exclusive victimization of the Romanian people and accusation of the Jewish
counterpart, since the both are in a tragic sense equally victims. Finally, the struggle is a
legitimate one, but the means of dealing with it need to be supplemented by state intervention, on
the field of population management, i.e. the facilitating the emigration of the Jewish element181.

In the framework of what came to constitute a theme of debate of its own, we would
assume that the discourse on the Jewish issue proves to be, more than anything, an indicative of
175
Constantin STERE, Scrieri politice si filozofice, ed. si pref. de Victor Rizescu, Do-MinoR, București, 2005, pp.
277-278
176
Ibidem, pp. 280-282
177
Ibidem, pp. 289-290
178
Ibidem, p.291
179
Ibidem, pp. 294-295
180
Ibidem, pp. 296-297
181
Ibidem, pp. 2980299

51
the most essential vision on the national community and of the nature of the potential
“exclusions” operated by the protagonists of populist rhetoric on the subject of their discourse –
the people. In the first two instances, scapegoating by simple denomination and manipulation of
related clichés is a basic characteristic of the discourse. In exchange, the following two positions
do not boast the same virulently organicist-exclusionary view, but nevertheless discuss in more
rational terms the quite problematic character of a fully-fledged Jewish potential integration in
the national community, partly due to their cultural particularization, but mostly stemming from
their “internationalized” way of cooperation and the constant resort to the international
community.

52
The national issue

Our final topic of debate, which, through the exploration of our corpus of sources, we
have identified as vehicle of expression for populist discourse, this time with a necessarily ethno-
nationalistic content, would be that which marks already the end of the 19th century and which
would be still of a more crucial importance – the national issue. More specifically, we would
identify two phases of the evolution of this topic. Firstly, the context in which we would analyze
this theme is mainly the one represented by the end of the 19th century by discursive approaches
regarding Romania’s positioning towards the Romanians of Transylvania, respectively towards
the Hungarian ethno-national policies and the allegations regarding the supporting from the
Kingdom of a national irredentist movement. Secondly, we would also take into account
instances of discursive content towards Romania’s involvement in the First World War, partly as
a more engaged prolongation of the former. In this case, as in others, the representatives of
different political doctrines engaged themselves in the polemic regarding the appropriate position
that Romania should assume as to the more and more problematic relation between the
Romanian population in Transylvania and the Austro-Hungarian state, as well as to the
accusations of supporting from within the Kingdom the Transylvanian irredentist-separatist
movement.

First of all, we would begin with liberal leader D.A. Sturdza’s discourse from 1894
entitled precisely “The National Issue”182. The speech is destined to alleviate, on an extremely
radical tone, one accusation, placed at the time on the National Liberal Party and in fact to cast
another on the Romanian conservatory Government. The allegation according to which the
“national issue” is synonymous to the Transylvanian nationalist-separatist movement of Daco-
Romanianism and Irredenta, whose main supporters and propagandists would be the national-
liberals from the Kingdom is firmly rejected, while claimed to have its source in the “despicable”
boyar conspiracy. The entire discourse is structured around the idea of a theory of conspiracy,
with the Romanian government as main actor, capable of denouncing its own people (both the
Romanians from Transylvania and from the Kingdom) in order to attain its monstrous goal of
abolishing civil liberties, while proving its utter lack of national feelings and its distancing from

Dimitrie A. STURDZA, Cestiunea națională : discurs rostit în întrunirea publică de la 25 septembre din Sala
182

Orfeu de 1833-1914, Tipografia "Voința Națională", București, 1894

53
the interests of the Romanian people. Proving more diligence towards the satisfaction of foreign
interests in order to gain primacy and further on, pursuing their own interests, at the very cost of
endangering their own Romanian kin, they are not worthy of being considered a political party,
but merely a coterie.183 The serious accusations culminate with the idea of national treason by the
boyar power, as it was their custom, while the liberals, imbued with political morality, had
always refused to seize power against “the country and the nation”. The diatribe of the treason of
the boyar government goes so far as to implying that the enemy outside actually works through
the enemy “within”, a grave example of which is represented by the censorship to which “our
handbooks” and “National History” were submitted by the Romanian Government to the
Hungarian one 184 .The perspective on nationhood and even more, on the constituency of the
Romanian people, is of a clearly organic, ethno-cultural type, , or in terms of Michael Mann, the
demos coincides with and is defined by ethnos. Nevertheless, the reference to the suffering and
tribulations of the Transylvanian Romanians might be considered as partly a pretext for attacking
political adversaries and employing insults in terms of political terminology, destined to
designate “the enemy” from whom the authentic representatives of “the people” need to detach
themselves. The same nationalistic-populist rhetoric is to be encountered in D.A. Sturdza’s
“ethnic and political study” Europe, Rusia and Romania. The necessity to carry out authentically
“Romanian” politics is from the beginning speaking in this sense, as the “study” is, judging by its
discursive content, far from simply fulfilling a scholarly purpose, but rather a political one185.
The openly anti-Russian positioning is expressed as a natural extension of a pro-European,
Westernized perspective. The rapture” of Bessarabia and the russification policies in the
Romanian province are only a small part of the justifications in the sense of considering Russia
as the main foreign inimical force menacing the very existence of the Romanian independent
state. But the Jewish population also has an important contribution to bring to the Russian de-
nationalization policies, given their preference of neighbouring the “Russian-Slavic” group,
wherefrom once emigrated, they become an antinational demobilizing force186. Moreover, in the
context of necessity of a permanent state of alert and fight against the menacing Slavic force, it is
obvious which side Romania should take, as it is culturally bound to Western Europe and more

183
Ibidem, p. 59
184
Ibidem, p. 63
185
Dimitrie A. STURDZA, Europa, Rusia și România. Studiu etnic și politic, Stabilimentul Grafic I.V. Socecu,
București, 1890, p. 4
186
Ibidem, p.6

54
importantly, should under no circumstance rely itself on a policy of neutrality,which would
amount to outward treason of its “most vital interests”187. A special stylistic effect in the general
construction of Sturdza’s text is bound to be produced by the reproduction of a patriotic poem of
nationalistic mobilization with a particularly bellicose content, along with the legitimization of
the potential war by the usage of an element of national mythology – the figure of the Roman
Emperor Traian, father of the future Romanian nation who had decided its positioning as
“guardian of the civilized world” against the backward Easterners188. The element which draws
our attention the most in this discursive production is the legitimization of the nationalistic-
populist argument through the claimed essentially European ethno-cultural heritage, by virtue of
which the Romanian stance must be one of unequivocal conflict with the Eastern counterparts.

A less radical but more comprehensive discourse on this same issue was addressed by
Mihail Kogălniceanu in the form of an interpellation, interestingly enough, not only to the
189
Romanian Government but symbolically also to the Hungarian Government . More
specifically, it concerns the expelling of the six Romanian authors of the proclamation of the
Romanian irredentist movement from Transylvania by the Hungarian state, but it is also claimed
to come in dutiful response to the discussions around the cause of “Romanianism” in the
Hungarian Parliament. While embracing a moderate position as to the maintenance of peaceful
relations between the states under the regime of international legality, while firmly rejecting any
allegations of belonging to the irredentist movement, as well as - very importantly - the
legitimacy of the any claims of the Romanian Kingdom over Transylvanian territory (!), the
author assumes however a distinctive position as a”Romanian” political actor, namely as a past
supporter of the Hungarian cause . The eminently emotional tone of the discourse is firstly given
by the resort to the personal memories of a time, in 1859-1860, when Kogalniceanu was in the
position, and took the opportunity, to offer support and asylum to Hungarian exiles, currently
prominent politicians, an act which entitles and also obliges him to address now the Hungarian
political authorities, along with the fact of having contributed alongside the Cuza Regime, to the
success of the Hungarian revolutionary movement190. The account of the sequence of events is

187
Ibidem, pp. 26-27
188
Ibidem, p. 27
189
Mihail KOGĂLNICEANU, Interpelațiunea privitόre la expulsarea românilor de peste Carpati adresata
Guvernului : (Şedinţa Camereĭ deputaţilor din 11 Februarie 1886), Imprimeria Statului, București, 1886, p.1
190
Ibidem, pp.6-7

55
imbued with the most personal details. However, despite the denial of Romania’s potential
territorial claims over Transylvania, which is to remain a realm of peaceful coexistence and
union (!) between the Romanian and Hungarian nations, the statement of the indestructible
ethno-national bond between the Romanians of both sides of the Carpathians is more than clear,
as Transylvania is, in the already traditionalized historical perspective, the very heart of the
Romanian nation and civilization and the birthplace of Romanian legendary political leaders 191.
At this point, we believe Kogalniceanu’s discourse to be somewhat paradoxical, since in this
instance as in the previous one, we have identified a clear expression of the same ethno-cultural
vision on the concept of nation, coexisting the reference to the regime of international legality
and to the criterion of order and authority but most importantly, to the lack of legitimacy of
Romanian claims over Transylvania. Nevertheless, the fate of the Romanian nation in
Transylvanian, the respect of its rights made the object of Cuza’s negotiations with the
Hungarians wanting to transit Moldavian territory, so when textually evoking the respective
conventions it is the principle of legality itself at work for the ideal of ethno-cultural nationhood.
The tone of the discourse turns gradually more radical, with the Hungarian government being
declared to have re-become the enemy to the Romanians, as well as to all the other nations living
in Hungarian territory. Moreover, as far as the violation of what in fact were collectively
differentiated rights following a strict ethno-cultural-linguistic logics, the usage of the Romanian
language seemed to be the most prominently problematic issue and of course, of the greatest
socio-political stake. Finally, while supporting the cause of the Romanian irredentists expelled
from Transylvania and pleading for at least a milder treatment from the side of the Romanian
state, the author resorts again to an overtly emotional reference to the memory of 1848, most
especially addressed to the liberal leader of the Government, in the person of I.Brătianu, a former
revolutionary himself. We would not advance the idea that this rhetoric proposed an explicit or
implicit renunciation to political rationality in favour of a simplified, emotionally-driven
approach to political issues but rather a mélange between principles of rational order and criteria
which ultimately transcend this rational order and relate to something of a re-sacralised,
irrational order, duly expressed through specific language – “the brotherhood of blood”, “the
creed of the Romanian nation”, “the criteria of humanity”, etc., with the legacy of 1848 exploited

191
Ibidem, p. 11

56
as final legitimizing factor for the current claims that the Romanian Government ought not to
remain idle to the suffering of their co-nationals.

The issue is also tackled by the Romanian liberal-radical journal Lupta led by George
Panu. Firstly, the serial entitled more than clearly “The issue of the Romanians in Transylvania”
constituted itself in a constant plea for the national cause, while attacking various more punctual
topics related to the greater issue. The serial was at times accompanied also by virulently anti-
Hungarian articles such as the one entitled “Hungarian pickpocketing” in which the qualification
of “Hungarian” is made synonymous with “stupid and brutal”, due to the futility of confiscating
a few brochures on the Romanian issue in Transylvania in obscuring “the truth of our national
cause and of the Hungarian persecutions” and to the lack of civility of the act itself 192. The
language continues in this virulent tone, as the incident is to be added to the long series of
“inhuman acts” committed by the Hungarians against the Romanians, but who under no
circumstances will wither in the defence of their national ideal. What is more, the anti-Russian
stance is assumed by this voice as well, as we can note in the case of an article entitled “Sacred
Russia”193. The menace is deemed to be even greater as to the desire of the Eastern Empire to
seize political control over Romania, an aim to be attained, among other means, by the
conspiratorial network of shameful collaborators. A topic deemed to be of utmost national
importance, compared to which petty political discussions should fade away. However, the
positioning towards Romania’s appropriate foreign policy is different from that assumed by
Sturdza, in the sense that the radicalism of the anti-Russian statements is far more articulated,
and more importantly, in that the nationalistic stance extends itself up to the refusal of any
collaboration with any other of the European powers (in this case only Germany is mentioned),
which would only be another source of national humiliation. Nevertheless, this populist approach
does not lack the idea of the inimical conspiracy, thus of the external and internal enemy plotting
against the national interests.

In a qualitatively different approach, the nationalistic-populist discourse is exacerbated in

the approaching of Romania’s participation to the First World War, in the pages of the journal
led by Nicolae Iorga, Neamul românesc pentru popor. The overtly backward-looking vision, the

192
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1892, No. 1787
193
Lupta: ziar liberal-opoziționist, director politic G.Panu, Iași, 1886, No. 146

57
idealization of the Romanian fatherland, people, or more precisely, kin – a term much preferred
to people or even nation – , along with explicit religious references (in the lineage of Romanian
Orthodoxy of course) and a quasi-mystical, organic dialectic on the concept of nation, as general
traits of the rhetoric displayed in the articles of this journal, are also to be encountered in the
article “Why we must go to war (?)”194. As the title suggests, the article is bound to constitute
itself in a legitimization of the war to which Romania also takes part in 1916. It is actually more
than a legitimate act, it is a sacred one, given the cruel and savage treatment inflicted on the
Transylvanian and Bukovinian brothers by the German and the Hungarian enemies and also the
systematic theft of territories by these diverse enemies, including the Russians and the voracious
wolves “devouring” Macedonia. The resort to emotional-irrational arguments is more than
obvious in this article of, dare we say, war propaganda. As it is in the conceptualization of the
nation or the kin, provided in the continuation of the article 195: “all people bearing the same
origin, sharing a common tongue and faith, the same laws, customs and purposes, inhabiting a
finite land”, or in the case of the Romanians “all those who originate from the Romans and the
Dacians, who speak the same beautiful Romanian language, and who pray to the same Holy
Trinity : the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost (...)”. At this point we may note to which extent
the discourse proposes a re-enchanted and refuses a secular conception of the people, of
citizenship, and ultimately, of politics. More than elsewhere, the organic vision of the people and
the superposition of demos and ethnos discussed by Michael Mann are at work.

A notably different positioning is the one assumed by C. Stere in his articles firstly
published in the war-time journal Lumina and later on gathered in the volume Marele răsboiu și
politica României (The Great War and Romania’s politics). In the chapter dedicated to the topic
“Bessarabia and the national ideal”, the author presents his plea for the (according to him)
shamefully forgotten land of Bessarabia, protesting against Romania’s equally shameful
involvement in the war against the Central Powers in an anti-Entente and more specifically anti-
Russian position. In this respect, we might assume that the author’s perspective is accordingly
impacted by his personal life experience. The article entitled “The national ideal”, qualifies the
alliance with Russia as the expression of an attitude of slaves, lack of “national pride and

194
Neamul românesc pentru popor, director Nicolae Iorga, Tipografia "Neamul Românesc", Vălenii de Munte,
1916, No.5
195
Neamul românesc pentru popor, director Nicolae Iorga, Tipografia "Neamul Românesc", Vălenii de Munte,
1916, No. 12

58
dignity” in the sequence of such a recent act of felony (Russia’s annexation of Bessarabia
1879)196 . The lack of legitimacy of this undignified “trading of Romanian souls” is justified
firstly by the historical sacrifices in blood equally offered by this province to the glory of the past
times – in this sense, the mythological figure of Stephen the Great does not fail to be evoked.
Thus the lack of legitimacy to invocating the “national ideal” to justify what represents but an
assault to the “moral being of the kin” and the prohibition to “take the sacred name of the ideal in
vain”, while however “the great and sacred people” is to be exempt from the guilt of this
treason197. What is more, as underlined in “Bessarabia’s right over Romania”, the Romanian
Kingdom has the duty towards Bessarabia to claim the entire territory, since legally speaking
there was no sanctioning of its rapt by Russia198. The nation is viewed as organically indivisible
and none of its potential amputations must be consented by any of its members, while the
organic belonging to a nation of an individual (namely, a Romanian) is enough to entitle him to
the inalienability of its citizenship. The final argument is the same: the nation cannot be blamed
for the treason and violation of the sacrosanct rights of the Romanian territory199.

After reviewing these stances expressed on the topic which we have synthesized as “the
national issue”, we would contend that it was indeed a productive theme for the production,
stemming from political actors affiliated to different political camps (liberal, radical,
samanatorist, finally poporanist), of a populist rhetoric strongly imprinted with nationalistic
accents. As we could note, much of the themes and traits that make up populist discourse are to
be recognized, even if in qualitatively different expressions, in each of these cases, some of them
in a more than occasional clash with what we have conceptualized as being characteristic to
political modernity: anti-secular, re-enchanted vision on politics, backward-looking stance, the
permanence of the enemy outside or within and scapegoating as means of political
disqualification, as well as mystical idealization of the homogeneous people. But what we deem
to be more striking and common to all these discursive approaches is represented firstly by the
initial terminological ambiguity between the appellatives of the subjects of the Romanian
democracy : people, nation, nationality, more importantly yet, the specifically Romanian kin
(neam). The referent is surely the same – the Romanians (perhaps yet another linguistic

196
Constantin STERE, Marele răsboiu și politica României, Lumina, București, 1918, pp.80-81
197
Ibidem, p. 82
198
Ibidem, p. 97
199
Ibidem, p.100

59
alternative), but the fact that from a statistical point of view, the last one appears to be
dominating the political discourse is of relevance for the conceptualization of this common
referent and testifies to the difficulty if not impossibility of embracing the civic-liberal “melting-
pot” perspective in the conceptualization of the people and/or the nation. A matter which
constitutes for certain one of the sources of the malaise of Romanian modernization, as
incongruous with the principles of political modernity.

60
 Conclusions

First of all, as far as the first dimension of our study is concerned, with regard strictly to
the concept of populism, we have demonstrated to which extent differ the theoretical
perspectives on its content. Ranging from a direct appeal to the people against certain elites
(Margaret Canovan), a political syndrome (Peter Wiles) or an anti-political pathology of counter-
democracy (Pierre Rosanvallon), a primary manifestation of a “politics of the people” (Roger
Dupuy), a mode of articulation and discursive construction of antagonistic social categories
(Ernesto Laclau), up to a rupture with the usual temporal regime of politics (Guy Hermet), its
definitions, more or less extensive, as well as the criteria of conceptualization are of a
remarkable variety and as we have seen it, the axiological vocabulary does not fail to appear
either. However, if we were to isolate an element common to all these conceptualizations, not
necessarily the one with a particularizing valence in relation to other political phenomena, it
would be the relation of antagonism that populism constructs and by virtue of which it pretends
to mobilize, between socio-political entities, of which one is bound to represent “the people”
(regardless of its exact structure) and the other – its enemy (the elites, the politicians or the
political system as a whole, the ethnic minorities, etc.).

No less divergent are the manners in which its relation to democracy is envisaged, which
varies from ambiguous, to problematic, up to eminently compatible or contrary. But as we have
observed, the source of ambiguities and tensions resides in the primordial tensions within the
very concepts of democracy, political representation or people. However, after having noted that
neither the representative nor the liberal dimension of democracy-as-regime are to be taken for
granted, and do not count among the basic categories of democracy-as-principle in its primordial
acceptation of “power of the people” (Pierre Rosanvallon), we would contend that it is not just
populism that represents a challenge to democracy (understood as representative democracy) and
most importantly to its functioning, but it is democracy itself that retains two competing
principles, the political and the sociological one, according to Pierre Rosanvallon’s revealing
observations. The same argument is valid with regard to the two competing acceptations of the
people, respectively the nation: the liberal-civic one, expressing an inclusive logic, and the
organic one, identifiable with the nation itself and operating exclusions on ethno-cultural basis,

61
whose problematic character in terms of administration of “minorities” was relevantly observed
by Michael Mann. In its different versions, populism may claim to represent either one of the
two categories, but it is not a priori evident who is (or is not) part of which people.

Furthermore, as far as one of the main assumptions of our study is concerned - i.e.
regarding a paradoxical dynamic between populism and political modernity, the former being the
at least discursive expression of a rejection of the latter, which in exchange constitutes the
context of emergence of the former - after taking into consideration conceptualizations of
political modernity, respectively anti-modernity, in order to assess their relation to populism, we
would on the one hand reaffirm the assumption from which we have departed. A crucial aspect at
the heart of modernity itself separating it from the political precedence, the source of political
legitimacy is a point which testifies also to the clearly modern dimension of populism, which
assumes nothing close to pre-modern realities (divine right legitimacy) but only a radical,
organic image of the principle of popular sovereignty. Although describing thus eminently
modern phenomena, populism represents an anti-modernity stance through a series of
constitutive elements such as the more or less implicit claim for simplification of politics and
cleansing of all elements concretely hindering “the true will of the people”, the illiberal
dimension and the at least subtle challenge to representative politics and respective elites, the
position taken against modern bureaucracy, the holistic anti-individual perspective on society,
the anti-party and generally anti-politics rhetoric, as well as the irrational-affective logic in a “re-
enchanted” view of society. On the other hand, populism may also be regarded as a particular
reflection of modernity, given modernity’s internal paradox between the affirmation of
individual rights and the absolute, rather utopian character of popular sovereignty as legitimate
source of political power. Therefore, we could also rephrase our initial assumption, in the sense
that although boasting an anti-modernity positioning, the essence of populism is of clearly
modern nature, while it may also be considered as an instance of modern self-contestation of
modernity itself (Antoine Compagnon).

Moreover, with regard to the second dimension of our study, we would consider our
hypothesis, contending that populism is to be identified as a trans-doctrinary rhetoric throughout
the political expressions displayed by the political figures envisaged, to have been confirmed.
What is more, we believe that through its application on our case study, a clear objectivation of

62
one of populism’s core traits, i.e. the a-ideological character and its capacity to accommodate
itself discursively with the political environment of its emergence. In addition to this, the
problematic dynamic populism-political modernity, as well as the ambiguities of its relation with
modern democracy are also reflected in the context of a somewhat “hesitant” Romanian
modernization (Raluca Alexandrescu), given the underlying tensions between tradition and
modernity and or/progress, or democratic ideal and democratic functioning system. In this sense,
we would assume that the equivoques of the Romanian modernity are the equivoques and
tensions lying within democracy and modernity themselves. In this way, following a
systematization of the thematic content of the Romanian debate, we have distinguished four
themes which aroused polemic or radical reactions from the side of the different actors. By doing
this, we did point out populist rhetoric expressed, and for the most, shared as by all these actors,
regardless of the topic of debate. Apart from the generally virulent, polemic, emotional tone
adopted by the protagonists of these political stances, and from the general drift towards
irrationalized political stances with respect to the various issues, perhaps the most relevant
indicative in this sense is that we firstly have to deal with conceptualizations of the nation and/or
of the people in tackling with all the debates. These conceptualizations, whether more or less
inclusive/exclusive, whether class or ethnically articulated, contain as well an implicit
designation of who is not/ should not be considered part of the people, that is, the peoples’s
enemies who bear different names and are constantly made scapegoats for the various evils
experienced by the country, in discourses with often remarkable stylistic effects: the Jews, the
foreigners (more generally), the reactionary boyars, the lease-holders, the political parties (to be
read – political adversaries) etc. The terminology designating the people may also vary: (simply)
people, nation, kin – a most preferred and suggestive linguistic alternative - , popular community.
We would also make the observation that the ethno-cultural approach in the conceptualization of
the people prevails by far over the civic-liberal one, while “ethnos” coincides with “demos”, in
the terms of Michael Mann. In a close relatedness, the vision on democracy is of course quite
relevant given the stakes related to the implementation of the universal suffrage, as well as the
generally anti-party and jointly anti-system positioning, a field in which specific terminologies
are developed as well. Moreover, various populist themes, such as the idea of the internal and/or
external conspiracy, the idealization of the people (i.e. the peasantry), the vicious bureaucratic

63
apparatus which together with a series of institutional provisions only hinder the “will of the
people”. are also to be encountered.

Finally, we also consider that this analysis is able to contribute to the development of a
different potential research direction. As we have seen, there is a precedence of a populist
rhetoric making constant use of political diatribes and insults at a time when although the
referent existed. The conceptualization (of populism) lacked, but it is nevertheless existent now,
while the term is widely used in public discourse. Bearing in mind its actual often granted
axiological dimension especially in common political language thus its potentiality as a political
insult, we would analyze its capacity precisely in this role of political diatribe in public
discourse, in a qualitative comparison with the type of political discourse already analyzed in the
present study.

64
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Benjamin ARDITI, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism. Difference, Populism, Revolution,

Agitation, Edinburgh University Press Ltd, Edinburgh, 2007

Margaret CANOVAN, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two faces of democracy “, Political
Studies, XLVII, 1999
Roger DUPUY, La politique du peuple : XVIIIe-XXe siècle : Racines, permanences et
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Guy HERMET, Les populismes dans le monde : une histoire sociologique : XIXe-XXe siècle,
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Guy HERMET, “Populisme et nationalisme“, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No.56, 1997

Guy HERMET, “El populismo como concepto“, Revista de Ciencia Politica, Trad. Jearim
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Ghita IONESCU, Ernest GELLNER (ed.), Populism : its meanings and national characteristics,
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Ernesto LACLAU, On populist reason, Verso, London, 2005

Ernesto LACLAU, Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism, fascism, populism, NLB,
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Yves MENY, Yves SUREL (ed.), Democracies and the populist challenge, Palgrave,
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Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, “La rhétorique du national-populisme“, Mots, No. 9, 1984

Pierre-André TAGUIEFF, “Le populisme et la science politique du mirage conceptuel aux vrais
problèmes“, Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, No. 56, 1997

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Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalism and democracy, Verso, London, 2005

Peter BREINER, Max Weber and Democratic Politics, Cornell University Press, New York,
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Robert HOLLINGER, The dark side of liberalism: Elitism vs Democracy, Praeger, Westport,
CT, 1996

William KORNHAUSER, The politics of mass society, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, Illinois,
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Bernard MANIN, Principes du gouvernement représentatif, Flammarion, Paris, 1996

Michael MANN, The dark side of democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005

Hanna Fenichel PITKIN, The concept of representation, University of California Press, Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1967

Pierre ROSANVALLON, Counter-democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust, Trad. Arthur

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66
 3. Classical texts

Max WEBER, Politics as vocation, 1919, available online at http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-

content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf

Max WEBER, Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland, in Gesammelte

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Antoine COMPAGNON, Antimodernii: de la Joseph de Maistre la Roland Barthes, trad. Irina

Mavrodin, Adina Dinitoiu, Pref. Mircea Martin, Editura Art, București, 2008

Jean-Marie DOMENACH, Approches de la modernité, École Polytechnique, Ellipses, Paris,

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Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, ”La démocratie roumaine: vocation ou exercice de volonté?”, Studia

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Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, ”Les malaises de la modernisation roumaine. Le moment 1848 et la

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Raluca ALEXANDRESCU, ”Les héritages de la pensée politique de 1848 dans la seconde

moitié du XIXe siècle”, Studia Politica, vol. VIII, no. 3, 2008, pp. 563-588

Sorin ANTOHI(coord.), Modernism și antimodernism: noi perspective, Editura Muzeului

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67
Daniel BARBU, “The Nation Against Democracy. State Formation, Liberalism, and Political
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Alexandra IONESCU, “Constantin Stere et la démocratie paysanne: pour une éthique de la

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Silvia MARTON, “«Le sentiment national est une barrière plus forte que toutes les lois»: «la
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Cristian PREDA, “Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea în lectura postbelică din România”, Studia

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Zigu ORNEA, Poporanismul, 1930-2001, Minerva, București, 1972

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Florin ȚURCANU, “Néo-traditionalisme et politique dans la Roumanie des années ’20”, Studia
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6. Methodology

Reinhart KOSELLECK, Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der

politischenund sozialen Sprache/ Mit zwei Beiträgenvon Ulrike Spree und Willibald Steinmetz
sowie einem Nachwort zu Einleitungsfragmenten Reinhart Kosellecks von Carsten Dutt,
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Giovanni SARTORI, “Concept misformation in comparative politics”, The American Political

Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, 1970

Quentin SKINNER, Visions of politics. Regarding method, Cambridge University Press,

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