Muria 2019PoliticalLaw2

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
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Political Law Review

Part Two
Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M.
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www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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C e s
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The Bill of Rights
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Due process of law
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Due process of law
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C a standard to which the governmental s action should conform in order that
It furnishes
deprivation of life, liberty or property, l
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b in each appropriate case, be valid.
o of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.

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n is ruled out and unfairness avoidedr
It is responsiveness to the supremacy
a v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849).

Negatively put, arbitrariness
B a (Ermita-Malate Hotel
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and Hotel Operators Association
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Due process of law
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Requisites for valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power as the rationale for the enactment of law or Ordinance, and to free it from the
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imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
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public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
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interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary
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for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
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(see City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308).
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Due process of law
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Shutdown of commercial blood banks) is justified by police power. The health of the people
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is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
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enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety.
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Police power of the h B of the public generally,
as distinguishedC s the interference of the
state is validly exercised if (a) the interest
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from those of a particular class, requires
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State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
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(Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168).
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Due process of law
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Notice and hearing are generally required only in the administrative quasi-judicial
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proceedings. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
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procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial function.
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h its executive or legislative functions,B
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In the performance of
body need not comply e s such as issuing rules and
l of the Philippines, G.R. No.

regulations, an administrative with the requirements of notice
111953, December 12, 1997).

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and hearing (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association
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Due process of law
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C to notice and hearing requirements s
Exceptions
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1. In proceeding where there is anlurgent need for immediate action, like the
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summary abatement of a nuisance b per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
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suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. n r
a or like establishments whichBareaimmediate threats to
Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theatres
public health andh

showing obscene movies
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decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought
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for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative b l that is, where the respondent
action,
is not precluded from enjoying the right o
without prejudice to the person affected,R
to notice and hearing at a later time
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such as the summary distraint and levy of
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the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
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appointee; and
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Due process of law
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3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed (see Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160).
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Due process of law
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VoidC
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for vagueness. As a rule, a statute or s
e act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men “oflcommon intelligence must necessarily guess at
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ofor failure to accord persons, especially the parties
its meaning and differ as to its application.” It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
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respects: (1) it violates due process
n out its provisions and becomesaanrarbitrary flexing of
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
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unbridled discretion in carrying
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the Government muscle
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(People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA, 186, 195-196).
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Due process of law
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C doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine s prohibits government from achieving
Overbreadth
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its purpose by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching constitutionally
ofar; its legitimate interest can be satisfied without

protected as well as unprotected activity. Stated otherwise, the essence of overbreadth
is that government has gone too
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reaching so broadly into the area of protected freedom (SWS, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, 357 SCRA 496, a a
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515).
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Due process of law
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C challenge is allowed to be made toeasvague statute and to one which is overbroad
A facial
regulate or proscribe speech and nob

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because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
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vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
n rperson making the

all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broadastatutes with no requirement that the a
h B by a statute drawn
C The possible harm to society ein spermitting some unprotected
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
l that the protected speech of

with narrow specificity."
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
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others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
R v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394).
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes (Estrada
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Due process of law
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Facial challenge is not proper in criminal statutes (see Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA
639). o b
394; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA
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Equal Protection Clause
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Purpose h of the equal protection clause. The equalB
Cfavor or privilege. It is intendedetoseliminate discrimination and oppression
protection guarantee exists to prevent
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undue
not demand absolute equality. It b

based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does
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circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced (Arroyo v.nDepartment of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, r
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September 18, 2012).
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B a
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C classifications. It is an establishedesprinciple of constitutional law that the
Valid
reasonable classification. And the b

guaranty of the equal protection of the l laws is not violated by a legislation based on
substantial distinctions; (2) musto

classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
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be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class (People v.a a
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Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18).
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Tests for determining the reasonableness of the classification
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Strict scrutiny test. It requires the government to show that the challenged classification
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serves a compelling state interest and the classification is necessary to serve that interest.
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This test is used in cases involving classifications based on race, national origin, religion,
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alienage, denial of the right to vote, interstate migration, access to courts and other
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rights recognized as fundamental.
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B a
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Intermediate
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or middle-tier scrutiny test. It
is at least substantially related tob

challenged classifications serves an important state interest and that the classification
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serving that interest. This is applied to suspect
classifications like gender and illegitimacy.
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Minimum or rational basis scrutiny. The government needs only show that the
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challenged classification
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is rationally related to serving a legitimate interest.
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B a
h s valid at one time, may become void at
C of relative unconstitutionality. A estatute,
Principle
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another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operations
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inquiry and investigation in lightoof changed conditions (see Central Bank Employees v.
becomes arbitrary, its validity, although affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
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Bangko Sentral, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004).
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Right against unreasonable searches and seizures
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Principle of relative unconstitutionality. A statute, valid at one time, may become void at
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another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
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operations becomes arbitrary, its validity, although affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in light of changed conditions (see Central Bank
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Employees v. Bangko Sentral, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004).
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Not all warrantless searches and seizures are prohibited. Not all searches and seizures are
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prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
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determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case
(Ricardo Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples’ Rights (ULAP) v. Gen.
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Renato de Villa and NCR-District Command, May 24, 1990, 188 SCRA 381).
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Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest would mean such
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facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
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believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
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Probable cause for a search would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead
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a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
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and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
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searched.
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Warrantless searches and seizures. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without
a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for
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any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure
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may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible
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in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
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motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
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view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
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seizures (see People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999).
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Plainview search. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
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(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
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intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
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the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
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seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
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be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
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lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
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accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent (Miclat
v. People of the Philippines, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011).
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Declaration of state of rebellion does not give authorities to conduct arrests without warrant
outside those provided under the Rules. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
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authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
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provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
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warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
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declaration of a ‘state of rebellion. In other words, a person may be subjected to a
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warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a
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state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present
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(Sanlakas and Partido Manggagawa vs. Executive Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., February 3,
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2004, 421 SCRA 656).
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Freedom of Speech and Expression
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B a
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Prior restraint. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other
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forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination (Bernas, Primer, 63).
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Regulation of symbolic speech. When speech and non-speech elements are combined in
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the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
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regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on free speech. A
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitutional
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power of the government and (2) furthers an important or substantial governmental
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interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (3) if the incidental
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restriction on alleged freedom is no greater than essential to that interest (SWS, Inc., 357
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SCRA 496, 504).
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Dangerous tendency rule. Speech may be curtailed or punished when it creates a
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dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent. All it requires, for speech
apprehended. o b
to be punishable, is that there be a rational connection between the speech and the evil
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Clear and present danger test. The question in every case is whether the words used are
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used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present
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danger that they will bring about the substantive evil that Congress has the right to
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prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
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Balancing of interests test. When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
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order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,
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the duty of courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
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Content-based regulation of speech. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to
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restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
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neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech (The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728,
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January 21, 2015).
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Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity. Content-based regulation
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bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present
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danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’”
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“Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
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pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
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presumed unconstitutionality.” (see The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728,
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January 21, 2015).
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Obscenity test. Three elements must concur before a material may be considered obscene:
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(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in
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sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
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material is utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 US
413).
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withC actual malice, that is, with knowledgesthat it was false or with reckless disregard of
Libel test. The test should be to determine whether
l edown is the reckless disregard of truth test (see

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whether it was false or not. The test laid
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Tulfo v. People, 565 SCRA 283).
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Content-neutral regulation of speech. A content-neutral regulation is merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner,
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and under well defined standards (see Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008, 545 SCRA 411).
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Sending of spam messages/mails cannot be prohibited by law. What matters is that the
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recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with
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spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them. To prohibit
the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
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even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
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category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to
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other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
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protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
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guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014).
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Right to Privacy
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Right to Privacy
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The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy
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means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from
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intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities (see SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
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November 3, 2008).
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a n r
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Right to Privacy
B a
C h s
Constitutional protections to zones of privacy. Two constitutional guarantees create zones
l e
of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis
o b
of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded
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into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
B
C h
by unreasonable government intrusion (Disini Jr., et al. v. Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R.
s
e
No. 203335, February 18, 2014 and April 22, 2014).
b l
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Right to Privacy
B a
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Reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a
l e
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the violation has been violated. The
o b
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
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this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community
a
norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable
B
C h
expectation of privacy.” (see Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
s
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C es
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a
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Right to Privacy
B a
C h s
Employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency
l e
information systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation
o b
of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer (see Pollo v. Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011).
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an B a r
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C es
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a
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b l
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Right to Privacy
B a
C h s
Installation of video camera or cctv should not cover areas where expectations of privacy maybe
l e
validly claimed. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
o b
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
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privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected,
a
was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s
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residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a
s
e
crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law (Sps. Bill and Victoria
l
Ching v. Alexander Choachuy, Jr. and Allan Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013).
b
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C h s
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C es
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a
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C e s
b l
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Right to Privacy
B a
C h s
e
Sub judice rule. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
l
b
pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
R o
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation
of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule
an a r
71 of the Rules of Court (Marantan v. Diokno, et al., G.R. No. 205956, February
B
12, 2014).
C h s
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
n
Right to Privacy
a a r
to privacy to informational privacy. TheB
Right h
e s
C evolved, with technological advancements
concept of privacy has, through time,
l
greatly having an influential part therein.
o
The Common Right to Privacy, where b
This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech,
he explained the three strands of the right to
R what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3)
an defined as the right ofBaindividuals r

decisional privacy. Of the three,
information about h
informational privacy––usually to control
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themselves (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666,
e
l
September 29, 2014).
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C es
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a n r
a
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b l
R o
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Freedom of religion
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C es
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a
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Freedom of religion
B a
C h s
l e
Freedom of religion. The right to religions profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long
o b
as belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
R
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (Iglesia ni
an r
Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529, 543).
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Freedom n religion r
a B a
C h s
l e
The state is absolutely prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause from regulating individual
beliefs, but placed on restriction on the ability of the state to regulate religiously
o b
motivated conduct (Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1, 91).
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an a r
Protected aspects: religious convictions and beliefs, religious speech and expressive
conduct.
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Freedom of religion
B a
C h s
Standard for Free Exercise Clause. If the purpose of a statute or other governmental
l e
action is to single out religion for adverse treatment, or to hinder (or discriminate
o b
against) a particular religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest. Such laws will survive strict scrutiny
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only in rarer cases (Choper, 279).
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Freedom of religion
B a
C h s
Standard of review for restraint. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
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enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
o b
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints
on freedom of expression on the ground that there is clear and present danger of any
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substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent (Choper, 549).
a B a
C h
Clear and present danger
sprovokes a hostile audience
test applies to speech directed at inciting lawlessness such as
(1) speech that advocate
e
dangerous ideas, (2) speech that
l
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reaction, (3) out of court contempt, and (4) release of information that endangers fair
trial (Id.).
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Freedom of religion o
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Standard of review for religiously motivated conduct.
interest test significantly increased thes
stateC
The strict scrutiny and compelling
l eabsolute immunity to religious activity, a

degree of protection afforded to religiously
compelling secular justification wasb

motivated conduct. While not affording
with religious practices. Althougho

necessary to uphold public policies that collided
R the members of the Court often disagreed over which
n conduct cases, this generalatestr established strong

governmental interests should be considered compelling, thereby producing dissenting
and separate opinions inareligious
presumption in favor h of the free exercise of religion (Estrada v.B
s
Escritor, 99).
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Freedom of religion
B a
C h s
l e
Standard for Establishment Clause. The general principle deducible from the Non-
establishment clause is that we will not tolerate either governmentally established
o b
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
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governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
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neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference (Id., 118).
B a
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Freedom of religion
B a
C h s
Lemon test for the Establishment Clause. If a law or government action raises issues under
l e
the Establishment Clause, the court usually applies a test requiring that, to be valid, the
o b
law or action must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive governmental
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entanglement with religion (Choper, 263; see The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR No.
205728, January 21, 2015).
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Right to travel
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Right to travel
B a
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l e
Permissible restrictions to the right to travel. There are only three considerations that may
permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
o b
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law
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or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.
an B a r
h
The requirement for a legislative enactment was purposely added to prevent
C s
inordinate restraints on the person's right to travel by administrative officials who may
e
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be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national security, public safety or
o b
public health. This is in keeping with the principle that ours is a government of laws
and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of law limiting the enjoyment
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of liberty should be construed against the government and in favor of the individual
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(Arroyo v. Delima, G.R. Nos. 1990304, 199046, 197930, April 17, 2018).
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Right to travel
B a
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Watch List Orders and Hold Departure Orders issued by the DOJ cannot restrict the right to
travel. Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No. 41 also suffers from other
o b
serious infirmities that render it invalid. The apparent vagueness of the circular as to
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the distinction between a HDO and WLO is violative of the due process clause. An act
an r
that is vague "violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
a
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers unbridled
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discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
s
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Government muscle." Here, the distinction is significant as it will inform the
l
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respondents of the grounds, effects and the measures they may take to contest the
o
issuance against them. Verily, there must be a standard by which a HDO or WLO may
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be issued, particularly against those whose cases are still under preliminary
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investigation, since at that stage there is yet no criminal information against them
a
which could have warranted the restraint (Arroyo v. Delima, G.R. Nos. 1990304, 199046,
B
197930, April 17, 2018).
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Right to travel
B a
C h s
l e
Right to return to one’s country. Right to return to one’s country is distinct and separate
from the right to travel and enjoys different protection under the International
o b
Covenant on Civil and Political rights (see Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668).
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Right to information
B a
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B a
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Scope. The right to information covers three categories of information which are
l e
matters of public concern, namely (1) official records; (2) documents and papers
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pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research
data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is
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part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The
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second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
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confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions
s
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of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data,
b l
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152,
187-188
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Exceptions.
l e
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
o b
privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply
to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national
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security, and information on investigation of crimes by law enforcement agencies
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before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as
B a
h
confidential. The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may
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impose (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152, 188).
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B a
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C process privilege is an exceptionesto the right to information. Court deliberations
Deliberative
are traditionally recognized as privilegedlcommunication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC
provides: Section 2. Confidentiality b
character, with only the Members
R o of the Court present. Court deliberations are
of court sessions. - Court sessions are executive in
n rrationale for the rule

confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided
herein or as authorized a a
h BDe Lima (TRO on Watch
by the Court. Justice Abad discussed the
List Order case): C the rules on confidentiality will enables

in his concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v.
e
lholding unpopular positions" or
the Members of the Court to
fear of humiliation for one's comments.

o b
"freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
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B a
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The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is
l e
known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process
o b
of reaching a decision. "Written advice from a variety of individuals is an important
element of the government's decision-making process and that the interchange of
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advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
a
recommendations;" the privilege is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative
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communications." (see In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and
s
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Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of February
b l
10, 2012 and the Various Letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19
and 25, 2012, February 14, 2012; Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International
R
Corporation, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016). o
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B a
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Deliberative process privilege maybe invoked in arbitration proceeding under Republic
Act No. 9285 (see Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corporation, G.R. No.
210858, June 29, 2016).
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B a
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Policy bases of deliberative process privilege. Deliberative process privilege contains three
l e
policy bases: first, the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it
o b
prevents public confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the
agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision;
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the public should not judge officials based on information they considered prior to
a
issuing their final decisions." (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International
B
C h
Corporation, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016).
s
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a
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B a
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C for protection of deliberative processs privilege. To qualify for protection under
Requirements
l e
predecisional and (2) deliberative. b
the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the document is both (1)
R o
n
A document is “predecisional” r
adecision to which it relates. In otherBawords, communications
under the deliberative process privilege if it precedes,
C h
in temporal sequence, the
s
e
are considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion.
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A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the give and-take of the
consultative process. The key question in determining whether the material is
o b
deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage
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candid discussion within the agency (In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
an r
and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of
a
February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January
B
C h
19 and 25, 2012, Resolution February 14, 2012).
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Right to travel
B a
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The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the
o b
Philippines is a signatory. That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality.
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And everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent tribunals for acts
an r
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Kant
a
Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 79484, December 7, 1987,
B
156 SCRA 222).
C h s
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Right to association
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Scope. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged (sec. 9, Art. III).
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Union security clauses not violative of the freedom of association. Closed show, union shop,
maintenance of membership shop, preferential show, maintenance of treasury shop,
o b
and check off provisions do not constitute unfair labor practice nor violate the freedom
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of association clause of the Constitution (Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149
an r
SCRA 470).
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Bar integration does not violate the freedom of association. Bar integration does not compel a
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
o b
integrated Bar chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body
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compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. Membership in the
an r
unified Bar imposes ony the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount (In The Matter of
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22).
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Right against undue deprivation of property
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Requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. The following are the
requisites: (a) the property taken must be private property; (b) there must be genuine
o b
necessity to take the private property; (c) the taking must be for public use; (d) there
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must be payment of just compensation; and (e) the taking must comply with due
an r
process of law (Manapat v. Court of Appeals, 536 SCRA 32).
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When is there taking? A number of circumstances msut be present in the taking of
property for pusposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
o b
property; (2) the entrance into the private property must be for more than a
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momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or collor of
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legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose, or otherwise
a
informally, appropriately, or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
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for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
s
e
beneficial enjoyment of the property (Forform Development Corporation v. Philippine
l
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National Railways, 573 SCRA 350).
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Public use. For condemnation purposes, public use is one which confers some benefit or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by the public. It is measured in
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terms of the right of the public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is
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sought, and, as long as the public has right to use, whether exercised by one or many
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members of the public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use (Santiago, 2015: 456).
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o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
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an r
B a
C h s
l e
Just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
o b
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to
R
intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that
an r
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full,
a
and ample. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be as
B
C h
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed
s
e
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
l
b
competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and the one
o
who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government (Republic
v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., 664 SCRA 233).
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Miranda rights
B a
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
h
C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Miranda rights
B a
C h s
Scope. The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial
l e
investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used
o b
against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he
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cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires
(People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004).
B a
C h s
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an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
Miranda n
rights r
a B a
1.
C h s
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
l e
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
2.
b
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
o
statement he might make could be used against him.
3.
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The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
an a r
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or
B
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished.
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Miranda rights
B a
h
C No custodial investigation shall ebesconducted unless it be in the presence of
4.
appointed by the court upon b

counsel engaged by the person l arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
on his behalf.
R o petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone
5. The right to counsel n may be waived but the waiver shallrnot be valid unless
a of counsel. a
6. Any statementh
made with the assistance
B
C s
e be inadmissible in evidence
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
(People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465) b l

exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
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a n r
a
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C e s
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Miranda rights
B a
C h s
Limited implication of their violations. The infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
l e
render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
o b
custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are
relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not
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affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation (see Ho Wai
a
Pang v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011).
B
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
Miranda n
rights r
a B a
C h s
l e
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of
the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
o b
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, any inquiry
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they make has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
an r
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
a
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned
B
C h
(see People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010).
s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Miranda rights
B a
C h s
l e
Right to counsel. The constitution requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of a crime should be provided with a counsel. This is a constitutional
o b
guarantee to protect the accused against the hostility and duress from the
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authorities during custodial investigation. Any confession or statement made
an r
without the presence of a counsel during the investigation is deemed to be
a
inadmissible as evidence in court. It appears that when the accused was taken with
B
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his statements his counsel was not around (People v. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425).
s
l e
o b
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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Miranda rights
B a
C h s
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of
l e
a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
o b
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
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impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer
a
who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. A lawyer
B
C h
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not
s
e
raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the
b l
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement
before the swearing officer (People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004).
R o
an B a r
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to bail
B a
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
h
C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to bail
B a
C h s
l e
When bail is a matter of right. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
o b
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
R
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
an r
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall,
a
before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death,
B
C h
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right (People
s
v. Plaza, G.R. No. 176993, October 2, 2009).
l e
o b
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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Right to bail
B a
C h s
l e
When bail is discretionary. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused
person in custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
o b
imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one
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facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
an r
imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already
a
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be
B
C h
denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
s
e
circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit: Sec. 5. Bail, when
l
b
discretionary Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
o
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary.
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
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Right to bail
B a
C h s
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing
l e
of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
o b
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail
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can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the
a
application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the
B
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pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
s
l e
o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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Right to bail
B a
C h s
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
l e
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
o b
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
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has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has
a
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
B
C h
conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense
s
e
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of
b l
his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue
risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (People v.
R o
Fitzergerald, G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006).
an B a r
C h s
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to bail
B a
C h s
Proof needed to discharge by the prosecution in the accused’s application for bail. By judicial
l e
discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
o b
presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof” in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment
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to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty
a
agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. "Presumption
B
C h
great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt
s
e
naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and
b l
excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record
R o
the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
an r
refused (see Janet Lim Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Rights of the accused
B a
C h s
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an B a r
C h s
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an B a r
C h s
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
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B a
h
C No person shall be held to answer sfor a criminal offense without due process
Scope.
l e
the contrary is proved, and shall b
of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
to be informed of the natureo

enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
R and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
n r
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process a to secure the attendance of witnessesa
evidence in hishbehalf. However, after arraignment, B trial may proceed
and the production of
Cthe absence of the accused providedesthat he has been duly notified

l 3).
notwithstanding
b
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable (sec. 14, art.
o
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C es
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a
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B a
C h s
l e
Right to counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
o b
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
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counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
an r
how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
a
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
B
C h
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
s
e
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
l
b
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
o
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
R
assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to
an r
procure an attorney of his own (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 753).
B a
C h s
l e
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C es
R
a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
Right to cross-examine and confront the witnesses considered waived in trial-in absentia. The
l e
contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed
o b
innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
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presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
a
Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
B
C h
opportunity to be heard. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in
s
e
absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By
rights (Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1). b l

his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these
R o
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C es
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R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Live video coverage of trials not allowed. Considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of
o b
justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
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people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and
an r
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be
a
allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and
B
C h
limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel
s
e
taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
l
b
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper
R o
an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to the protection of the writ of habeas corpus
B a
C h s
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R
an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
C h s
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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B a
h
C The writ of habeas corpus extends s to all cases of illegal confinement or
Scope.
detention by which any person is l
e
b deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful
when one is either deprivedo

custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued
R of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from
r
n liberty either through illegal confinement
exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances:
a a
detention and (2) h B from someone entitled
(1) deprivation of a person’s or through
to such custodyC s 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 63).

withholding of the custody of any person
e
l
(Veluz v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169482, January
o b
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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B a
h
C In general, the purpose ofethes writ of habeas corpus is to determine
Purpose.
application for a writ of habeas b

whether or not a particular person l is legally held. A prime specification of an
R o restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was

merely nominal or moral, illegal
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not
n rof personal freedom.

devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
a a
h B corpus is restraint of
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense
C object and purpose of the writeofs habeas corpus is to inquire

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
l
liberty. The essential
b
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
preclude freedom of action is sufficient (see o

relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
R Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778).
an B a r
C h s
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s of police officers facing administrative
Restrictive
e
custody and monitored movements
investigation are not grounds for the l
b issuance of writ of habeas corpus. This Court has
o by their superiors is not a form of illegal

held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
R
police officers under investigation
n ractual nor effective
detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint
which is beyond theaambit of habeas corpus. It is neither a
h B for. It is a permissible
precautionary C
restraint that would
s that the police officers
call for the grant of the remedy prayed
e
concerned are always accounted for (Ampatuan v. l
measure to assure the PNP authorities
2010; Manalo v. Calderon, 536 SCRA 290).

o b Macaraig, G.R. No. 182497, June 29,
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an B a r
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o b
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
h s in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means
C of amparo. The writ of Amparo originated
Writ
l e
b
"protection" in Spanish. It was intended to address the intractable problem of
o or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are

"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form,
R
and confined to these two instances
n r are "attended
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
a
judicial proceedings."aOn the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
h B
C or organized groups or private
by the following characteristics:
s
an arrest, detention or abduction
e
of a person by a
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;lthe refusal of the State to disclose

government official individuals acting with the
o
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned b or a refusal to acknowledge the
R
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law (see
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,n
a a r
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1).
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h
C permutations of the right to security s of person. The right to security of person
Various
l e
b
has the following permutations: First, the right to security of person is freedom from
o and third, the right of security of person is a

fear; second, the right of security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
R
psychological integrity or security;
n180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRAa1).r
guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government (see Secretary of National
aNo.
h B
Defense v. Manalo, G.R.
C e s
b l
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an B a r
C h s
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o b
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an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
h
C forms of writ of amparo. What began s as a protection against acts or omissions
Various
l e
purposes: (1) Amparo libertad forb
of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several
the habeas corpus writ; (2) o

the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to
R Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
n radministrativo for the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and a a
judicial review of h B for the protection of
legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
Cderived from the agrarian reform process s (see Secretary of National

administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario
e
Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008,l
peasants' rights
o b 568 SCRA 1).
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an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to speedy disposition of cases
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h s
C Section 16, Article III of the eConstitution
Scope. extends the right to a speedy
bodies." This protection extends b

disposition of cases to cases "beforel all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
R o and after the trial, affording broader protection

covers the periods before, during
to all citizens, including those in the military and
n r
than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial (Abadia v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. a a
h B
No. 105597, September 23, 1994, 236 SCRA 676).
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h s of cases is not limited to the accused
C constitutional right to a speedy disposition
The
l e
administrative cases, and in all b
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
hearings. While the concept ofo

proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
R speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a
n r
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the
speedy disposition ofaa case, like the right to speedy trial, isa
h attended by vexatious, capricious, B
deemed violated when
C postponements of the trial are asked

the proceedings are
e s and oppressive delays; or
l of time is allowed to elapse

when unjustified for and secured; or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period
o b
without the party having his case tried (People v. Sandiganbayan and Hernando Perez,
G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right against self-incrimination
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R self-incrimination
n
Right against
a a r
h B
C e s
Scope. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a
l
witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce
b
o
evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He
R
cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the
an r
Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-
a
accused, or even for himself. In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party
B
C h
in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right
s
e
to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
l
b
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take
o
the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically
R
states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
an r
used against him." (see People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
A person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
l e
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
o b
R
an r
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
a
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
B
h s
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
C e
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof,
l
b
not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
o
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h
AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
s
1. to refuse to be a witness;
l e
o b
2. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
R
3. to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
a n a r
incriminate him for h
B
WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
C e s
some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Nuances on the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused
l e
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
o b
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
R
an r
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
a
guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The
B
C h
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
s
e
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213
123 [1999]) b l
SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h
Hence, it has been held valid
s
l e
1. For a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
b
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
o
R
[1920])
an r
2. For an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination to have a
a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
B
h s
suffering from gonorrhoea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan
C
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912])
l e
o b
3. to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917])
4. to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
R
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921])
and
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
5. to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced,
l e
or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done (People vs. Otadora,
b
86 Phil. 244 [1950]) (see Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014).
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right to political beliefs and the right against involuntary servitude
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Scope. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
l e
aspirations. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment
b
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted (sec. 18, art. 3).
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Requiring private healthcare providers to render 48 hours of pro bono reproductive health
l e
services not involuntary servitude (see Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014,
721 SCRA 146).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right against cruel punishment
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Scope. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
l e
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for
o b
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
R
an r
employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
a
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
B
C h
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law (sec. 19, art.3).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or
l e
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
o b
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory,
R
an r
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
a
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition (Corpus v. People, G.R. No.
B
C h
180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1, 61).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right against double jeopardy
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h
C Double jeopardy exists when ethes following requisites are present: (1) a first
Concept.
jeopardy attached prior to the second;l(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for theb
only (a) after a valid indictment;o
same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches
R (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
n r his express consent
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case a a
h B
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
C
(Cerezo v. People of the
s
Philippines, G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011).
e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Appeal on ruling granting demurrer to evidence. The prosecution cannot appeal from a
ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal,
o b
unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended with
R
grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against
an r
double jeopardy will be violated. The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
a
is, however, not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when
B
C h
the prosecution is denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave
s
e
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal
l
b
case by granting the accused’ demurrer to evidence (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
o
164577, July 5, 2010).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Right against ex post facto law
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Concept. An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action
done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
o b
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
R
when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
an r
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
a
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
B
C h
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
s
e
defendant. The Supreme Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
l
b
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
o
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a
R
person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
an r
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty (see Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B post facto law generally prohibits the
C
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex
e s acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
l
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those
o b
acts and establish penalties for their violations;
and provide for their punishment. Administrative
or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
orders which do not mete out penalty for
R November 28, 2007).
violations thereof, not being penal laws, cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws (see
an a r
Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080,
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an a r
B Law
C h Public International
s
l e
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Public International Law
B a
C h s
l e
Sources. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the
b
sources of international law as follows:
o
R
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
an r
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
B
h
recognized by the contesting states;
C s
e
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
l
o b
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of most
R
an r
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
o b
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
General principles law. General principles of law are those commonly recognized by
o b
the major legal systems of the world. Legal principles common to major legal
R
systems are secondary sources, but they may be invoked as a rule of international
an r
law because it is a general principle common to the major legal systems of the world
a
and not inappropriate for international claims. General principles include those
B
C h
derived from domestic legal systems, such as res judicata, and those notion of
s
2006: 10).
l e
procedural due process, as well as judicial decisions of international courts (Agpalo
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Ex aequo et bono. The phrase means “in justice and fairness; according to what is just
o b
and good; according to equity and conscience,” (Agpalo 2006:10).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Classification of International law
l e
o b
R
As to their contents, international law may be classified into:
an a r
1. International law of peace, which consists of the rules of international law on the
h
rights and obligations of states in time of peace;
B
C e s
2. International law of war, which consists of the rules of international law on the
rights and obligations in time of war; and
b l
o
3. International law of neutrality, which consists of the rules of international law
R
on the rights and obligations of states connected with neutrality.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Classifications of International law
l e
o b
R
As to their binding force, international law may be classified into:
an a r
1. General law of nations, which is binding on all nations;
h B
2. Customary law of nations, which is binding on those that accept them; and
C e s
3. Conventional law of nations, which binding on the signatories to the
convention.
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Subjects of International law
l e
A subject of the law is an entityo
b
R capable of possessing international rights and duties
an r
and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims
(Brownlie, 2008:57).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Subjects of International law
l e
b
o of international law
R
Established legal persons as subjects
an r
1. States
a
Bstate power within a
h
2. Political entities legal proximate to states
3. Condominia (A
s
C by means of an autonomous administration).
condominium is a joint exercise of
e
particular territory
4. Internationalized territories b l
R
5. UN administration of territories immediately o prior to independence
6. International organizations
a n a r
7. Agencies of states
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Special types of personality
l e
1. Non-self-governing peoples
o b
R
2. National liberation movements
an r
3. Belligerent and insurgent communities
B a
h
4. Entities sui generis (i.e. Holy See)
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Belligerent communities. The term refers to the sections of the state which attempt by
l e
war to separate from the state of which they form a part and establish a national
o b
existence of their own. In order to be treated as subjects of international law, they
must attain the following conditions:
R
an r
1. They must be in possession of a certain part of the territory of the legitimate
government;
B a
h
2. They must have set up a government of their own; and
C s
l e
3. They must conduct their armed struggle according to the laws and usages of
war.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Effect of recognition of belligerency. The effect of recognition of belligerency by third
o b
states is to endow the community with all the rights and all the obligations of an
independent state so far as the war is concerned, but no further. Its armies are
R
lawful belligerents, not bandits; its ships of war are lawful cruisers, not pirates; the
an a r
supplies it takes from invaded territory are requisitions, not robbery; and at sea its
B
C h
captures made in accordance with maritime law are good prize, and its blockades
must be respected by neutrals.
s
l e
o b
But on the other hand, its government cannot negotiate treaties, nor may it accredit
R
diplomatic ministers. The intercourse it carries must be informal and unofficial. It
an r
has no rights, no immunities, no claims beyond those immediately connected with
B a
its war. It is thus a subject of international law only in a limited and imperfect
h
matter, (Arguego, 1952: 26-27, citing Lawrence, 64-68).
C s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Recognition of States
l e
Concept. Recognition is the acto
b
R by which a state—the recognizing power—makes
international person. It isn r is given, a state

manifest that it is ready to deal with a new state, the recognized state, as an
a a
important because until such recognition
B
h
will not be considered
s
a member of the family of nations
C to such membership (Aruego, 32-33).
with all the rights and
obligations incident
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
De facto recognition and de jure recognition. Normally, the recognition given to a new
o b
state is deemed de jure, which means that it is permanent. Where a state emerges as
a result of force, other states may not be exactly decided whether to grant or not
R
recognition with all its legal consequences; but in order to be able to have
an a r
commercial intercourse, they may accord said state de facto recognition which is
B
C h
temporary and provisional in nature, without full diplomatic intercourse.
s
l e
to be little difference in legal effect. It apparentlybconcedes international personality
De facto recognition is apparently revocable, but during its continuance there seems
temporarily, but the only test of membershipo

R in the community of nations upon a
an r
permanent basis is de jure recognition (Aruego, 33-34).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Recognition of a state vis-à-vis recognition of a government
b
1. The recognition of a state is the recognition of the existence of all its essential
o
R
elements—territory, people, government, and independence from external
an r
control—and the ability to perform the normal obligations of membership in the
a
international circle. It carries with it, therefore, the recognition of government of
B
C h
the state recognized and implies the willingness of the recognition state to deal
s
e
with that government in all matters that affect the state.
b l
2. The recognition of government, on the other hand—and it may and usually be
o
given in the course of the life of the state as an already recognized state—is a
R
manifestation of the readiness of the recognizing government to deal with the
an r
state through the instrumentality of the recognized government.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
3. The recognition of a state once given is generally irrevocable, while the
o b
recognition of a government may be revoked at any time. And when it is
revoked or when it is refused in the case of a new government, the state
R
withdrawing or withholding such recognition, suspends or does not have
an
official intercourse with the other state.
B a r
C h
4. In case the recognition of a government is withdrawn or in case that of a new
s
e
government is refused, the state as an international personality remains because
b l
a change in the government does not affect such international personality, only
that in the meantime its existence is ignored by the state withdrawing or
refusing recognition.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
General recognition only, not all of states required. It is not necessary that recognition be
o b
given by all the members of the family of nations in order that a state may become a
state de jure. It is sufficient that recognition be general. A recognition by the leading
R
powers will perhaps be sufficient for the purpose of the new state. With this
an a r
recognition given, other states generally consider the recognized state as a member
B
C h
of the family and in their relations with it consider it as such.
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Methods of recognition. The recognition may be formal or informal. It is formal when
o b
it is made by a treaty, proclamation, or declaration; and informal when it is implied
from the reception or sending of a diplomatic agent, the grant of an exequatur, the
R
official salute of the flag; or any other act of similar significance. Again the
an a r
recognition may be individual or collective. It is individual when a state is
B
C h
independently of others acknowledges the international personality of the new
s
state; and collective, when recognition is given by the concerted action of states.
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Effects of recognition. By its recognition, the recognizing state acknowledges the right
o b
of the recognized state to existence, independence, equality, jurisdiction, property
and domain, and diplomatic intercourse. Conversely, by virtue of the fact that it has
R
been recognized, the new state is as related to the recognizing state, entitled to the
an a r
rights and subject to the obligations prescribed by international law. If the new state
B
C h
has been carved out of another state by force, both the new state and the parent
s
state are placed on the same footing by the recognizing state. States not recognizing
l e
the new state must at least respect the de facto relation already set forth between
which are parties to it. o b

those states; that is, they must accept the fact that the recognition exists for the states
R
an B a r
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o b
R
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Theories of effect of recognition. The constitutive theory is that the act of recognition is
o b
said to confer international personality; so if a court needs to determine whether a
state or government has international personality it would engage in head-counting
R
exercise to see if sufficient recognition has been accorded. The declaratory theory is
an a r
that if a government satisfies the requirements of international law for existence
B
(Mcginley, 202).
C h
then it has personality whether or not any other entity has accorded it recognition
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
Duty
h s
Cof recognition. Hersch Lauterpacteadvocated the hybrid view that, while
b
recognition conferred personality, there l was a duty on the states to recognize a state
R o
that satisfied the international criteria of statehood (Mcginley, 202).
n r
in this regard (Brownlie, a a
Recognition as an act of state is an optional and political act and there is no legal duty
h 90).
B
C e s
b
Recognition is not determinant of diplomatic relations, l and absence of diplomatic
R o
relations is not itself non-recognition of the state (Brownlie, 90).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of states. States created in violation of the Covenant
o b
of the League of Nations and the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 1928
(known as the Paris Pact or the Kellog-Briand Pact) should not be recognized
(Mcginley, 204). R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
Public International
a
Law
a r
h B
C s
Estrada doctrine of non-recognition of governments. The Estrada doctrine is premised on
e
b l
the notion that it is impolitic for one government to comment on the legitimacy of
another through an act of recognition. Under the Estrada doctrine governments will
o
now not make any formal comments as to whether they do or do not recognize
R
an r
another government. Refusal to recognize a new state would carry with it the non-
recognition of the government of that state.
B a
C h s
e
This does not mean, however, that governments will not use other means available
l
b
in international law to show their support or disapproval of a new regime, such as
legitimate sanctions (Mcginley, 206).

R o
severing or curtailing diplomatic relations with that regime and applying other
an B a r
C h s
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o b
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
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B a
C h s
l e
Castaneda doctrine. The Castañeda Doctrine is a term used as reference to Mexico's
foreign policy during the presidency of Vicente Fox. Its name derives from Jorge G.
o b
Castañeda, proponent of the policy. President Fox appointed Castañeda to be his
R
Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of his term. Castañeda immediately
an r
broke with the old-style foreign policy, known as the Estrada Doctrine. The new
a
foreign policy called for an openness and an acceptance of criticism from the
B
C h
international community, and the increase of Mexican involvement in foreign affairs
s
e
(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casta%C3%B1eda_Doctrine).
l
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Act of state doctrine. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
o b
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
R
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
an a r
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves (U.S. v. Underhill, 168 U.S.
B
400).
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
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an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
The current view of the doctrine is that an action will be barred only if: (a) there is
o b
an official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory, which is
deemed valid; and (b) the relief sought or the defense interposed in the action
R
would require a court in the other foreign state where the action is filed, based on
an a r
such act of state, to declare invalid the foreign sovereign’s official act.
B
C h s
e
The doctrine covers only state action, not the action between individuals. The
l
b
doctrine may also be invoked by agents of foreign state from legal proceedings in
o
respect to acts done by them on behalf of the foreign state, within its territorial
jurisdiction (Agpalo, 2006: 168).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h
C of Government s
Recognition
l e
o b
Concept. By recognition of governments is meant the manifestation of the
R
an r
recognizing state that it is ready and willing to deal with the recognized
a
government as the highest organ acting for and in behalf of a particular state.
B
C h
Recognition of government is important because as a rule the state cannot have
s
e
official intercourse with another which has not recognized its government.
b l
Moreover, unless recognized said government will not have any standing in the
courts of another state, either as party plaintiff or as party defendant.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Withdrawal of recognition. Recognition may be withdrawn by a manifestation that the
o b
state would thereafter refuse to deal with the other state through the
instrumentality of the government, the recognition of which is being withdrawn.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Legal consequences of the recognition of government
l e
1. The recognized government may then enter into official intercourse with the
recognizing state;
o b
R
2. The recognized government may, in behalf of its own state, sue in the courts of
an r
the recognizing state;
B a
h
3. The recognized government may then be entitled to the immunities and
C s
exemptions from the jurisdiction of the courts of the recognizing state, in the
e
l
event that it is sued therein;
o b
4. Insofar as the courts of the recognizing state are concerned, the recognition of
the government operates to validate all its acts from the time of its
R
commencement, where it originated in revolution (Arguego, 42-43).
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
Rights of State
l e
o b
Fundamental rights of independent state
1. Right of existence R
an
2. Right of independence
B a r
3. Right of equality
C h s
4. Right of property and domain
l e
5. Right of jurisdiction
6. Right of diplomatic intercourse o b
R
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
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B a
C h
Sovereignty
s
l e
o b
Essential attributes of sovereignty. The essential attributes of sovereignty are: (a)
R
perpetuity, (b) comprehensiveness, (c) exclusiveness, (d) absoluteness, (e)
an r
inalienability, and (f) unity.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Right of existence. Right of existence is the right of a state to live, and to adopt such
l e
measures not inconsistent with the rights of other states, as may be necessary to
insure its existence and safety.
o b
R
an r
Implications of the right of existence or the right of independence and sovereignty. By virtue
a
of these rights, a state has the power (a) to determine its own constitution or form of
B
h s
government, or its rules; (b) to make its own laws and administer the same; (c) to
C e
negotiate and conclude treaties with other states; (d) to determine its own policies
l
b
with respect to commerce and natural resource, defense and immigration.
R o
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Intervention. Intervention takes place when a state interferes in the relations of two
o b
other states, without the consent of either of them, or when it interferes with the
domestic affairs of another state irrespective of the will of the latter, for the purpose
R
of either maintaining or altering the actual condition of things within (Arguego, 55,
an
citing Hall, International Law, 297).
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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l e
o b
R
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a
Law
a r
h B
NoCright of intervention in international law. s
that is incompatible with the right of l
e There is no right of intervention per se for
are some authorities who hold as b

jurisdiction and independence, although there
R o as a contingent measure and its necessity as a

preservation, its inclusion in a treaty
legal grounds for intervention the need for self-
ar
an is correlative with the right ofBindependence.
measure to protect the lives and property of the nationals of the intervening states.
h
The duty of non-intervention
C e s
b l
R o
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C h s
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o b
R
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
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B a
C h s
Grounds for justifiable intervention. Interventions have been regarded justifiable or
l e
made on various grounds, namely: (a) intervention for self-preservation; (b)
o b
intervention to maintain conditions necessary for the existence of international
relations; (c) intervention to carry out treaty stipulations; (d) intervention to preserve
R
an r
the balance of power; (e) intervention by general sanction; and (f) intervention on the
ground of humanity and religion (humanitarian intervention).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Drago doctrine. The Drago doctrine originating from Luis M. Drago, one time
Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Argentina, which asserts the rule
o b
that intervention is not allowed for the purpose of compelling a state to pay its
public debts.
R
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
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C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
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B a
C h s
l e
Monroe doctrine. As it was enunciated by President Monroe, the doctrine provided
that the United States will intervene in cases affecting the countries of American
o b
hemisphere in their relations to European powers, when they are likely to involve
R
occupation of territory, either permanent or of such character as to threaten
an r
permanency.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
h
C of equality. It means simply thatealls the members of the family of nations,
Right
regardless of their size, population, l
b form of government, wealth, and origin are
Ro
legally equal; that is, they are regarded as having similar privileges, immunities, and
duties.
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
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C h s
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o b
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
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B a
C h s
Manifestation of right of equality in international conferences. In international
l e
conferences, each state has only one vote. If there are several delegates of a state
o b
thereto, they vote as a delegation, as a unit. In the signing of international document,
in order to avoid the question of rank and precedence, the principle of alternat is
R
an r
followed; that is, each power occupies the first place in the list of signatures in the
copy which it receives.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h
Yalta Voting Formula
s
l e
o b
In Chapter V, Art. 23 the UN Charter names five states as permanent members of
R
the Security Council and under Art. 27, par. 3 accords them the veto power over
an r
substantive matters. However, Art. 27, para. 3 states this privilege only indirectly,
a
not explicitly. Decisions are to be made by an affirmative vote of nine (of the fifteen)
B
h s
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. This regulation is
C e
moderated in that parties to a dispute must abstain from voting on decisions falling
l
b
under the specifications of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Art. 52,
Voting_Procedure-UN_Security_Council.pdf)
R o
para. 3 (pacific settlement of local disputes) (see http://www.i-p-o.org/Koechler-
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
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C e s
b l
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B a
h
C of property and domain. By the rightesof property and domain is meant the right
Right
b l
of a state to hold and acquire in absolute ownership, territorial and non-territorial
possessions.
R o
n of a state. The property of a state r
possessions consists a a palaces, museums,
Nature and extent of the property or its non-territorial
h of its public buildings, fortifications,

B
and reservations, as well assthe official residences of its
C
diplomats, to which it has title, and its public vesselsewherever they may be. These
arsenals, arms, ammunition
are identified with the person of the state and are b lat all times independent of their
control.
R o
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C h s
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o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
Nature and extent of domain. The domain of a state consists of the sphere over or within
l e
which the state authority extends. It includes the land comprising the state including
o b
colonies and dependencies to which the state has a valid title; the maritime or fluvial
domain, which extends to the water area over which the state exercises rights of
R
an r
sovereignty; and the aerial domain which covers the space above the domain of the
state.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
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R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Methods by which a state may acquire valid title over a territory. They are (a) by
(e) by cession. o b
discovery and occupation; (b) by prescription; (c) by accretion; (d) by conquest; and
R
an B a r
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R
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o b
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C es
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a
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C e s
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C h s
l e
Discovery and occupation. Under modern international law, it would be necessary for
o b
discovery to be accompanied by effective occupation. There is effective occupation
when the following conditions have been met: (a) The parties occupying must have
R
been authorized by the state for which they are acting; (b) The state must by formal
an a r
act evidence its intention to acquire sovereignty over the new territory; and (c)
B
C h
There must be established within a reasonable time after discovery some
s
governmental authority. (Note: The territory to be acquired must be res nullius; that
l
is, it should not be under the control of any state).e
o b
R
an B a r
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R
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
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B a
C h s
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By prescription. Title by prescription arises out of a long continued possession where
no original source of proprietary right can be shown to exist, or where possession in
o b
the first instance being wrongful, the legitimate proprietor has neglected to exist his
R
rights, or has been unable to do so. The length of time required for the acquisition of
an r
territory by prescription is not definite, although fifty years is considered sufficient
by many writers.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
By accretion. By accretion is meant the increase or extension of the boundaries, or the
acquisition of land of the state or of a person by the operation of natural or artificial
o b
physical means. It may be gradual in which case it is called accretion by alluvium;
R
or sudden, in which case it is called accretion by erosion. The rule is that any
an r
accretion by alluvium within the boundaries of a state belongs to the state; while
a
sudden accretion, as the shifting of portions of territory by means of volcanic
B
C h
eruptions, provided they are identifiable, belong to the original owner.
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a
Law
a r
h B
C e s
b l
By conquest. Territory is acquired by conquest where there is a long occupation of
the territory with the intent to continue the possession for an indefinite period, and
R o
where there has not been a material, continued effort on the part of the opposing
state to regain possession. Mere military occupation is not enough. Conquered
an a r
territory, however, is usually held as a mere military occupation until the fate of the
B
C h
nation from which it is conquered is determined; but if the nation is entirely
s
subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist, the right of occupation
l e
becomes permanent, and the title vests absolutely in the conqueror (Arguego, 64-65,
citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543).
o b
R
an B a r
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o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
By cession. A state may acquire title over a territory by cession. The territory maybe
o b
ceded as a gift, in consideration of a purchase price, or in exchange for another
territory. It may be ceded as a result of war, or upon petition of the inhabitants of
R
the territory if it is a state by itself. (Arguego, 65-66).
an B a r
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an B a r
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Right of jurisdiction. It is the right of a state to exercise authority over all persons and
things within its boundaries and, conditioned by the rights of other states, over its
o b
subjects and property beyond its boundaries.
R
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
an B a r
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o b
R
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a n r
a
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Classification of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be classified as (a) jurisdiction over land
(d) jurisdiction over persons. o b

area and property; (b) maritime and fluvial jurisdiction; (c) aerial jurisdiction; and
R
an B a r
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o b
R
an B a r
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l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
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B a
C h s
l e
Jurisdiction over land and property. A state has exclusive jurisdiction over its land area
o b
and over the property within its boundaries, and over its own and the property of
its nationals which are not within the boundaries of another state. The right is
R
absolute, and no other state has the right to exercise control over any portion of its
an a r
land area or of its property, except through its consent, expressed in a treaty or
B
C h
otherwise, or unless such an exercise is sanctioned by international comity.
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Maritime and fluvial jurisdiction. The maritime and fluvial jurisdiction of a state
o b
includes its power to exercise authority over all persons and things within the
waters encompassed by its land boundaries; in its ships, both public and private,
R
within its limits and on the high seas and qualifiedly within the limits of other
an
states; and in some portions of the seas.
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
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o b
R
an B a r
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C es
R
a n r
a
h B
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b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Freedom of the seas. Freedom of the seas means that no state has sovereignty over any
o b
portion of the seas beyond its territorial waters, and therefore, though with
increasing exceptions, no state can take jurisdiction over any other than its own
ships upon the high seas. R
an B a r
C h s
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o b
R
an B a r
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o b
R
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C es
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a n r
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Extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction of state. State’s jurisdiction may be extended (a) to
places where a state is given extraterritorial rights; (b) to its vessel on the high seas
o b
and in foreign waters, subject to certain limitations; (c) to its nationals abroad in
R
certain cases; and (d) to those cases where it is allowed to exercise jurisdiction
an r
beyond the 12 nautical mile limit.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
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b l
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C h s
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Nature and extent of aerial jurisdiction. With respect to the jurisdiction of a state over
o b
the aerial space, there have been advanced three views. According to the first, air
space above a state territory is as completely subject to state sovereignty as is the
R
territory itself. According to the second view, the air, like the high seas, is open to
an a r
free navigation by all aircraft, subject to the right of states to provide for the security
B
C h
of their territory. The third view is that while the territory over the air space remains
s
with the subjacent state, it is subject to a servitude in favour of foreign states.
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
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C es
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a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
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B a
C h s
l e
Servitude. Restrictions on the free exercise of the jurisdiction of a state in the way of
o b
obligation to allow a foreign state to do a thing, or in the way of obligation to a
foreign state not to do a thing, are considered servitudes.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Nature and extent of jurisdiction of a state over persons within its territory. A state has
o b
jurisdiction over all persons within its territory with a few exceptions. In other
words, it has the right to exercise authority over all its citizens and its subjects and
R
over all aliens within its geographical limits. The only aliens who are exempted
an a r
from this jurisdiction are who are so by reason of the right of extraterritoriality or of
B
exterritoriality.
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Right of exterritoriality. The right or privilege which persons or things belonging to
o b
one state and found within the territory of another enjoy of not being subject to local
laws and local jurisdiction. This refers to exemptions enjoyed by travelling
R
sovereigns and diplomatic representatives and their official and non-official
an a r
household, foreign troops, naval forces, and qualifiedly consuls.
B
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Right of extraterritoriality. The right to be exempted from local jurisdiction granted to
provisions of treaties. o b
the citizens or subjects of another state. This refers to exemptions by virtue of the
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Five principles upon which jurisdiction may be claimed by states over crimes
b
1. Territorial principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the place the
o
R
offence is committed;
an r
2. Nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or
national character of the person committing the offense;
B a
C h s
3. Protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national
interest injured by the offense;
l e
the person committing the offence.; and
o b
4. Universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of
R
an r
5. Passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
a
nationality or national character of the person injured by the offence (Arguego,
B
C h
80, citing Report of the Research in International Law).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Universality principle permits a court in a state to try a person for a crime
o b
committed in another state not linked to the forum state by nationality of the
suspect or victim or harm done to its own national interest (Agpalo, 213).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a
Law
a r
h B
C e s
b l
Universality principle permits a court in a state to try a person for a crime
committed in another state not linked to the forum state by nationality of the
o
suspect or victim or harm done to its own national interest (Agpalo, 213).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Extradition. By extradition is meant the delivery by a state of a person accused or
o b
convicted of a crime to another state within whose territory or jurisdiction, actual or
constructive, it was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to
R
execute justice (Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Relations, Vol. I, p. 1).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
General principles governing extradition
b
1. No state is obliged to surrender a fugitive from justice in the absence of an
o
R
extradition treaty containing the crime alleged to have been committed as one of
an r
the extraditable offenses. If a state surrenders him otherwise, it does so only as a
matter or courtesy or comity.
B a
h s
2. The crime alleged to have been committed must have been committed within
C
the jurisdiction of the demanding state.
l e
o b
3. There must be sufficient evidence of the guilt of the person sought to be
extradited properly established before he is extradited.
R
4. The application for extradition must be from the proper authority and in the
an a r
proper forum.
h B
5. The person extradited can be tried in the courts of the demanding state only for
C e s
the offense with which he was been charged in the proceedings for extradition.
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a
Law
a r
h B
C e s
b l
6. If he has been exonerated form the charge, he cannot be tried for another offense
committed previous to his extradition until a reasonable time and opportunity
R o
have been given him after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the
country from which he had been taken.
an a r
7. Where the fugitive is not a citizen of the demanding state or of the state of
B
C h
asylum, it is customary for the surrendering state first to ask for the assent of the
s
e
home state.
b l
8. Generally, in extradition treaties, offenses against religious laws and political
o
offenses are not included among the extraditable offense. An offense is
R
considered political if it is incidental to and forms part of the political
an r
disturbances.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Diplomatic and Consular Relations
l e
Concept. Diplomacy compriseso
b
R any means by which states establish or maintain
transactions, in each casen r in this sense

mutual relations, communicate with each other, or carry out political or legal
may exist between h

a a
through their authorized agent. Diplomacy
states in a state of war or armed conflictBwith each other, but the
C
concept relates to communication, whether with friendly
e s or hostile purpose, rather
b l
than the material forms of economic and military conflict.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Diplomatic and Consular Relations
l e
o b
Mutual consent as basis. There is no right of legation in general international law. The
R
establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic
an a r
missions, takes place by mutual consent (art. 2, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations).
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Relation to recognition. While recognition is a condition for the establishment and
maintenance of diplomatic relations, the latter are not necessary consequences of
o b
recognition. The non-establishment or withdrawal of diplomatic representation may
R
be the result of purely practical considerations or a form of non-military sanction.
an B a r
h
Essence of diplomatic relations. The essence of diplomatic relations is the exercise by
C s
the sending government of state functions on the territory of the receiving state of
e
l
the latter.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
e
Theories of according privileges and immunities to diplomatic agents
l
o b
Representative theory which posits that the diplomatic agent is an agent of a
R
sovereign state and thus should be according with diplomatic privileges and
an a r
immunities.
h B
C
Functional theory which rests on practical necessity.
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Double aspect of diplomatic representation: the sovereign immunity (immunity
ratione materiae) attaching to official acts of foreign states, and the wider and
o b
overlying, yet more conditional, elements of functional privileges and immunities of
R
the diplomatic staff and the premises.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
alia in
l e
Functions of diplomatic missions. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter
o b
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
R
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its
an a r
nationals, within the limits permitted by the international law;
h
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
B
C e s
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving
l
State, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending State; and
b
o
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State,
R
developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
the following categories
l e
Classification of personnel. The Vienna Convention divides the staff of the mission in
o b
(1) The diplomatic staff, namely, members of the mission having diplomatic rank as
R
counsellors, diplomatic secretaries, or attaches;
an a r
(2) The administrative and technical staff, such as clerical assistants and archivists;
h B
(3) The service staff, who are the other employees of the mission itself, such as
C s
drivers and kitchen staff, referred to in the Convention as in the domestic
e
service of the mission.
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Head of mission. A diplomatic agent is the head of the mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission; and the ‘head of the mission is the person charged by
o b
the sending State with the duty of acting in that capacity ‘
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Classes and precedence of heads of mission. Head of missions are divided into three
classes, namely (a) that of ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State, and
o b
other heads of mission of equivalent rank; (b) that of envoys, ministers and
R
internuncios, accredited to Heads of State; (c) that of charge d’affairs accredited to
an r
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Except as concerns precedence and etiquette, there
a
shall be no differentiation between heads of mission by reason of their classes.
B
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Appointment of members other than head of mission. The sending State may freely
appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the case of military, naval or air
o b
attaches, the receiving State may require their names to be submitted beforehand,
for its approval.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Inviolability of mission premises. Article 22 confirms the inviolability of mission
premises – barring any right of entry by law enforcement officers of the receiving
o b
State and imposing on the receiving State a special duty to protect the premises
R
against intrusion, damage, disturbance of the peace or infringement of dignity. Even
an r
in response to abuse of this inviolability or emergency, the premises may not be
a
entered without the consent of the head of mission. Article 24 ensures the
B
C h
inviolability of mission archives and documents – even outside mission premises –
s
e
so that the receiving State may not seize or inspect them or permit their use in legal
l
b
proceedings.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Guarantee of free communication. Article 27 guarantees free communication between a
mission and its sending State by all appropriate means, and ensures that the
o b
diplomatic bag carrying such communications may not be opened or detained even
R
on suspicion of abuse. Given the purposes of diplomatic missions, secure
an r
communication for information and instructions is probably the most essential of all
immunities.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Inviolability of persons and immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction. Article 29
provides inviolability for the person of diplomats and article 31 establishes their
o b
immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction – with precise exceptions to immunity
R
from civil jurisdiction where previous State practice had varied. Immunity from
an r
jurisdiction – like other immunities and privileges – may be waived by the sending
a
State, and article 32 specifies the rules on waiver. Article 34 sets out the tax
B
C h
exemption accorded to diplomats along with detailed exceptions in respect of
s
e
matters unrelated to their official duties or to ordinary life in the receiving State.
l
b
Article 36 provides for exemption from customs duties on diplomatic imports
o
throughout a diplomat’s posting.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Treatment of families and junior staff. Articles 37 sets out a complex code for the
treatment of families and junior staff – where as pointed out above previous practice
o b
was varied and negotiation of a compromise difficult. Article 38 bars from all
R
privileges and immunities, except for immunity for their official acts, nationals and
an r
permanent residents of the receiving State. These two provisions in many States
a
drastically reduced the numbers of those persons more likely to bring into disrepute
B
C h
the system of privileges and immunities and were fully in accordance with the basic
s
e
justification applied throughout the Convention of limiting immunities to what is
l
b
essential to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions
o
as representing States.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Termination of functions of individual diplomatic staff. The sending State may for its
own reason, practical or political, terminate the functions of individual staff
o b
members on notification of this to the receiving State.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Declaration of persona non grata by the receiving State. The receiving State may at any
l e
time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the
o b
head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona
non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. The
R
an r
term persona non grata is simply the formal equivalent of ‘not acceptable’ in the
case of staff not having diplomatic rank.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h
Nationality and Citizenship
s
l e
o b
Nationality. The term nationality refers to the tie of allegiance of all members of a
R
political community, regardless of the amount of civil and political rights enjoyed by
an r
them.
B a
C h s
Citizenship. Where it is not used interchangeably with the term nationality,
l e
citizenship means membership in a political community with full civil and political
rights.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Determination of nationality. Nationality may be determined by (1) place of birth, jus
soli; (2) election; (3) nationality of the parents, jus sanguinis; and (4) some form of
naturalization.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Jus soli. The principle of jus soli is the principle according to which citizenship or
l e
nationality is determined by the place of birth, irrespective of the citizenship or
nationality of the parents.
o b
R
an r
Jus sanguinis. The principle of jus sanguinis is the principle according to which the
a
citizenship or nationality of the child follows that of the parents or one of them.
B
C h s
l e
Naturalization. Naturalization is the act of conferring on a foreigner the status of a
national or citizen.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
allegiance.
l e
Expatriation. Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
o b
R
Grounds for expatriation. Some of the grounds of expatriation are (1) entering the
an a r
military service of a foreign state, (2) desertion from the army or navy, (3) long,
h B
continue residence abroad by a national or a shorter residence by a naturalized
C
citizen, and (4) marriage to a foreigner.
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Continuity and Succession of States
l e
o b
Extinction of legal existence of a state. The legal existence of a state may be
R
extinguished by the disappearance of one or more of the essentials of state
an a r
existence—people, territory, government; by annexation, voluntary or forcible, into
h B
another state; by its division into two or more states; or by its incorporation, along
C
with others, into a federal union.
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
State succession. State succession means the substitution of one state for another, the
former assuming the rights and obligations of the latter.
o b
R
Universal succession. There is universal succession when the international
an a r
personality of the state succeeded to is completely absorbed by the successor,
h B
as in the case of the forcible or voluntary annexation of a state to another, the
C s
division of a state into two or more states, or the entrance of a state into a
e
l
federal union.
o b
R of another state as in the case of
Partial succession. There is partial succession when the succeeding state
conquest followed by cession; n r the

acquires only a portion of the territory
a a
in the emergence of a new state on
B
C h
foundation of a revolting territory.
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Legal effects of universal succession. In general, the annexing or absorbing state
succeeds to all the rights and obligations of the extinguished state.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a a r
Legalh B or by its separation, regarding:
C s
effects of annexation of a country to another
e
b l
Treaties. Political treaties are abrogated while those that are territorial or transitory
in nature remain binding upono
amity and others which are R
the absorbing state. Treaties of extradition and of
an they may have enjoyed underBsuch artreaties.

executory in nature are in general wiped out and third
states lose whatever benefits
h
C the public debts are assumed.eThe
Public debts. In general, s only possible exception is
been incurred for the prosecution of the war, or b
in the case where, the annexation being the result of l conquest, the public debts had
R o where the war arose because of the

transactions resulting in the incurring of the public debt.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Public property. The succeeding state succeeds to all the public property, and to all
rights in respect of the public property, subject of course to the charges or burdens
o b
of resting upon them. Res transit cum suo onere.
R
an a r
Private rights. The protection of private rights is obligatory upon the new sovereign.
h B
The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is
C s
dissolved; but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain,
e
l
undisturbed.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Obligations with private persons. In general, the obligation of the annexed state
towards private persons should be respected. Manifestly this must be subject to these
o b
qualifications; that an insolvent state could not by aggression, which practically left
R
to solvent state no other course but to annex it, convert its worthless into valuable
an r
obligations; that the state would be justified in refusing to recognize obligations
a
incurred by the annexed state for the immediate purposes of the war against the
B
C h
annexing state; and that probably no state would acknowledge private rights, the
s
e
existence of which caused or contributed to cause, the war which resulted in
l
b
annexation.
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
n
a
Law
a r
h B
C e s
Where a territory is separated from another and a new state is erected thereon, the
effects are:
b l
R o
Treaties. The treaties of the mother state continue to be binding upon itself, unless of
an a r
their nature and connection with the separated territory they must naturally fall.
h B
C e s
Public debts. The mother state continues to be bound therefor, although the same
b l
had been incurred on account of the separate state, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary between the mother state and the new state.
R o
Public property. The new state succeeds to all the public property of the territory.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Obligations with private persons. The obligations of the territory with private persons
are in general respected, except those that are personal to the displaced sovereign.
o b
R
Private rights. The protection of private rights is obligatory upon the new state.
an a r
While the people change their allegiance because their relation to the old sovereign
h B
is dissolved, their relations to each other and their rights of property remain
undisturbed
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
The Law on Treaties
l e
o b
Treaty means an international agreement concluded between States in written form
R
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
an a r
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
h B
C e s
Ratification, acceptance, approval and accession mean in each case the international
bound by a treaty. b l
act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Full powers means a document emanating from the competent authority of a State
designating a person or persons to represent the State for negotiating, adopting or
o b
authenticating the text of a treaty, for expressing the consent of the State to be
R
bound by a treaty, or for accomplishing any other act with respect to a treaty.
an B a r
h
Reservation means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
C s
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby
e
l
it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Right to make reservation. A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
l e
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is
o b
prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations,
which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not
R
an r
failing under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the
a
object and purpose of the treaty (Art. 19, Vienna Convention on the Law of
B
Treaties).
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Legal effects of reservation. A reservation established with regard to another party: (a)
modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions
o b
of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; and (b)
R
modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with
an r
the reserving State.
B a
C h s
The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to
l e
the treaty inter se. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry
o b
into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to
which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of
the reservation (Art. 21). R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Entry into force. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it
may provide or as the negotiating States may agree. Failing any such provision or
o b
agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the treaty
R
has been established for all the negotiating States. When the consent of a State to be
an r
bound by a treaty is established on a date after the treaty has come into force, the
a
treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the treaty otherwise
B
C h
provides. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the
s
e
establishment of the consent of States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date
l
b
of its entry into force, reservations, the functions of the depositary and other matters
o
arising necessarily before the entry into force of the treaty apply from the time of the
adoption of its text (Art. 24).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval. The
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the
o b
treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification; (b) it is
R
otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification
an r
should be required; (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
a
ratification; or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification
B
C h
appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during the
s
negotiation.
l e
o b
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or
R
approval under conditions similar to those which apply to ratification (Art. 14).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession. The consent of a State to be
bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when: (a) the treaty provides that such
o b
consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; (b) it is otherwise
R
established that the negotiating States were agreed that such consent may be
an r
expressed by that State by means of accession; or (c) all the parties have
a
subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of
B
C h
accession (Art. 15).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Unless
the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
o b
accession establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon: (a) their
R
exchange between the contracting States; (b) their deposit with the depositary; or (c)
an r
their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed (Art. 16).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Consent to be bound by part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions. The consent of a
State to be bound by part of a treaty is effective only if the treaty so permits or the
o b
other contracting States so agree. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
R
which permits a choice between differing provisions is effective only if it is made
an r
clear to which of the provisions the consent relates (Art. 17).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. A
State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
o b
treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting
R
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its
an r
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent
a
to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided
B
C h
that such entry into force is not unduly delayed (Art. 18).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Rules of interpretation of a treaty
l e
b
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
its object and purpose.

R o
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
an a r
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
h B
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement
C s
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
e
l
the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more
o b
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
o b
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of
R
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
an r
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties
B a
C h s
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended (Art. 31).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Grounds for invalidity of a treaty
l e
b
1. Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties.
3. Error. R o
2. Specific restrictions on authority to express the consent of a State.
4. Fraud.
an B a r
C h
5. Corruption of a representative of a State.
s
6. Coercion of a representative of a State.
l e
o b
7. Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force.
8. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus
R
an r
cogens”).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”). A
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
o b
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
R
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
an r
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
a
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
B
C h
general international law having the same character (Art. 53).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Termination of treaty. The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may
take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or (b) at any time by
o b
consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States (Art.
54).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty containing no provision regarding
l e
termination, denunciation or withdrawal. A treaty which contains no provision
o b
regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or
withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established
R
an r
that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
a
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the
B
treaty.
C h s
l e
withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1 (Art. 56).b
A party shall give not less than twelve months’ notice of its intention to denounce or
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
e
Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach. A
l
b
material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke
Ro
the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in
whole or in part.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
e
A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
l
b
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the
R o
treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either: (i) in the relations between
themselves and the defaulting State; or (ii) as between all the parties;
an a r
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending
h B
the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and
C
the defaulting State;
e s
b l
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if
o
the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one
R
an r
party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further
performance of its obligations under the treaty.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: (a) a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the
o b
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of
the treaty.
R
an B a r
h
Note: Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human
C s
person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions
e
l
prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties (Art. 60).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Supervening impossibility of performance. A party may invoke the impossibility of
performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the
o b
impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object
R
indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it
an r
may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
B a
C h s
Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for
l e
terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the
o b
impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the
treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty
(Art. 61). R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Fundamental change of circumstances. A fundamental change of circumstances which
has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
o b
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for
R
terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
an r
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
B a
C h s
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty.
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
l e
Severance of diplomatic or consular relations. The severance of diplomatic or consular
relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established
o b
between them by the treaty except insofar as the existence of diplomatic or consular
R
relations is indispensable for the application of the treaty (Art. 63).
an B a r
h
Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”). If a new
C s
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is
e
l
in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates (Art. 64).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an and International Humanitarian
Human Rights
a r Law
h rights are the rights possessed byBall persons, by virtue of their
C humanity, to live a life of freedom
Human
e sand dignity.
common
b l
R o on the behaviour of individuals and on the
They give all people moral claims
an r
design of social arrangements—and are universal, inalienable and indivisible.
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
h
C rights are universal. s
Human
l e
o b
Human rights belong to all people, and all people have equal status with respect to
R
n r
these rights.
Failure to respect h
a
an individual’s human right has the B
a
s depending on the person’s
same weight as failure to
respect the rightC
e
of any other—it is not better or worse
l
b
gender, race, ethnicity, nationality or any other distinction (UNDP HDR2000).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
B a r Law
C h s
Human rights are inherent.
l e
They are natural to human beings asb
human being.
R o they exist for the mere fact that a person is a
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B
C
Human rights are inalienable.
e s
b l
Human rights are inalienable: they cannot be taken away by others, nor can one give
R o
them up voluntarily (UNDP HDR2000).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
a r Law
Bindivisible in two senses:
C h s
Human rights are indivisible. Human
e
rights
l
are
o b
First, there is no hierarchy among different kinds of rights. Civil, political, economic,
R
social and cultural rights are all equally necessary for a life of dignity.
Second, some rights cannot n a rights. Nor can
a to promote economic, social and cultural r
be suppressed in order to promote others. Civil and political
economic, social and h

rights may not be violated
B
C s
cultural rights be suppressed to promote civil and political rights
e
(UNDP HDR2000).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
C h s
e
Human rights may be categorized as immediately demandable or progressively
demandable rights
b l
o
1. Immediately demandable rights are those which are self-executory and may be
R
availed of at anytime. Examples are the rights enumerated under the
an r
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
B a
2. Progressively demandable rights are those which are non-self-executory and
h s
whose availability is dependent upon the economic and social conditions of the
C e
society. Rights recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
l
b
and Cultural Rights are progressively demandable rights.
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
B a r Law
h
C rights may be categorized as negative s or positive rights
Human
l e
o b
1. Negative rights are self-executory rights and demands that the State refrain from
interfering in their free exercise. Examples of negative rights are the liberties
guaranteed under the BillR of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
n r
a of positive rights are
the State to secureatheir availability to the citizens. Examples
2. Positive rights are non-self-executory rights and requires the affirmative action of
h B
C
the economic and
e s
social rights mentioned in the Social Justice and Human Rights
Article of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
B a r Law
C h s
Human rights may be classified as
e maybe subject to the derogation by States
derogable
l
or non-derogable rights
b
1. Derogable rights refer to those which
2. Non-derogable rights refer

R oto those which could not be subject to any
during emergencies which threatens the existence of the nation.
a n
derogation even in times
a r
of emergency that threatens the existence of the State
or the nation.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h Bof their historical recognition.
Human
s Rights
1. C First Generation Rights – Civil andePolitical
rights may be categorized on the basis
b l
2. Second Generation Rights – Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
3. Third Generation Rights –o
R Right to Development and Environmental Rights
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
bl
R
Human Rights and o International Humanitarian Law
a n a r
h are the sources of internationalB
1. CTreaties
The following
e s human rights law
2. Customary international law bl

3. Jus cogens
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
a r Law
B and Political Rights
C h s
International Covenant
l e
on Civil
b
(ICCPR)
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
l
b
Human Rights
R o and International Humanitarian Law
a n a r
h B
The first right recognized under the ICCPR is the right to self-determination of
C
peoples.
e s
b l
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
and cultural development.o

freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
R own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth

n prejudice to any obligations
2. All peoples may, for their
and resources a a r arising out of
B principle of mutual
without
international h
s be deprived of its own
economic cooperation, based upon the
benefit, andC e
international law. In no case may a people
means of subsistence (art. 1).
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Recent trends in international law show the new thinking that the right to self-
C
determination
e s
of peoples has two aspects: the internal and external aspect.
b l
R
political status and pursue theiro economic, social and cultural development
The internal aspect refers to the right of the people to freely determine their
r
n in charting the destiny of their nation.
within the context of a unitary state. It pertains to the right of the people to
aand a
B
participate in governance
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
The external aspect refers to the right to B
C h to all people of the State. Otherss
independence of States, which right
belongs
l egroups to participate in the determination of
laid down different categories in order to
the political status and the pursuitb

accommodate the claim of people and
Ro
of economic, social and cultural development of
the nation.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
States parties are primarily responsible for human rights under the principles of
l e
international human rights law. Under the ICCPR, they have the primary
responsibility to
o b
R
1. respect and ensure to all individuals in their territory all the rights recognized
an r
in the covenant(s) without any distinction or discrimination
2. a
undertake all necessary step to give effect to these rights by the adoption of
B
h s
legislative and other measures in accordance with their constitutional
C
processes and the provisions of the covenant(s)
l e
3.
b
Undertake to ensure that any person whose rights and freedoms are violated
shall
o
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
1. effective remedy, notwithstanding thatB
h s
C by persons acting in an official capacity
the violation has been committed
e
2. his rights thereto determined bylcompetent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by b
3. such remedies enforcedR
o an other competent authority
by competent authorities when granted.
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B the life of the nation and the
C of which is officially proclaimed,
In time of public emergency which threatens
e s the States Parties to the present
covenant may derogate from certainl
existence
o
by the exigencies of the situation, b specific rights to the extent strictly required
provided that such measures are not
R
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination n
a(para. 1, art. 4, ICCPR).
solely on the ground of race, colour,
a r sex, language,
h
religion or social origin
B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
No derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8(paragraphsB1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be
h s
C this provision (para. 2, art 4, ICCPR).
made under
l e
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
The following rights are non-derogable rights
1. Right to life (art. 6, ICCPR)
l e
2.
o b
Right against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
R
punishment (art. 7, ICCPR)
an r
3. Right against slavery and involuntary servitude (art. 8, ICCPR)
B a
h
4. Right against imprisonment for non-fulfilment of contractual obligation
C
(art. 11, ICCPR)
e s
5.
l
Right against ex-post facto law (art. 15, ICCPR)
b
o
6. Right to recognition as a person everywhere under the law (art. 16,
ICCPR)
R
an r
7. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18, ICCPR)
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
h Bhuman rights are non-derogable. The
C
Fundamental
s that it must be understood that the
judicial guarantees of non-derogable
e
declaration of a state of emergency,lwhatever its breadth or denomination in
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held
internal law, cannot entail the bsuppression or ineffectiveness of judicial

guarantees that the States haveo
R to establish for the protection of the rights not
in States of Emergency, a
n
Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6,a
subject to derogation or suspension r
by the state of emergency (Judicial Guarantees
h B 1987, Inter-Am. Ct.
C
H.R. Ser. A, No. 9, 1987).
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B The enumeration of non-
C provisions in article 4 is related
Nature
sto, but no identical with, the question
of non-derogable rights under the Convention.
e
l
derogable
norms of international law. Thebproclamation of certain provisions of the

of whether certain human rights obligations bear the nature of peremptory
R o nature, in article 4, paragraph 2, is to be

Covenant as being of a non-derogable
seen partly as recognitionn r
ain the Covenant (e.g., articles 6 and a
of the peremptory nature of some fundamental rights
apparent that someh other provisions of the Covenant wereB

ensured in treaty form 7). However, it is
C e s included in the list of
l articles 11 and 18). (ICCR

non-derogable provisions because it can never become necessary to derogate
o b
from these rights during a state of emergency (e.g.,
General Comment on Article 4, Adopted at the 1950th Meeting of the Human Rights
Committee, on July 24, 2001, para. 11). R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B
Obligation to prevent, investigate and punish. The Inter-American Court of Human
construed that the obligation sof States Parties in the European
C
Rights
e the free and full exercise of the rights
b
Convention on Human Rights to “ensure” l
ogeneral, all the structures through which public
recognized by the Convention implies the duty of States Parties to organize
governmental apparatus and, in
R
full enjoyment of human a a r the States
nrights. As a consequence of this obligation,
power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and
h and punish any violation of theB

and, moreover, if possible attempt to s
must prevent, investigate rights recognized by
the Convention C
l e restore the right violated
b
and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the
1988, Sec. C No. 4, para. 66).

R o
violation (Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Judgment of July 29,
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
States’h B An illegal act which violates
C rights and which is initially enots directly imputable to a state (for
responsibility for acts of private individuals.
example, because it is the act of alprivate person or because the person

human
responsible has not been identified)b

o can lead to an international responsibility of
R to it as required by the Convention (Id.,
the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
anv. Honduras, 326). a r

prevent the violation or to respond
h
quoting Velasquez Rodriguez
B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
C
CULTURAL RIGHTS
e s
(ICESCR)
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B
C
As progressively demandable rights
e s
b l
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance o
Rits available resources, with a view to achieving
and co-operation, especially economic and
n of the rights recognized in thearpresent Covenant

technical, to the maximum of
a
progressively the full realization
B
measures. C h
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
h B
C
The principle of non-discrimination
e s
b l
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant o
R religion, political or other opinion, national
will be exercised without discrimination of any
or social origin, property,n r with due

kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
a a
birth or other status. Developing countries,
Bpresent Covenant to
C h
regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent
s
non-nationals (art. 2, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, ICESCR). e
they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B
C
Principle of equality
e s
b l
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of
R o
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set
an r
forth in the present Covenant (art. 3, ICESCR).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
h
Rights recognized under the ICESCR
B
C
Right to work (art. 6)
e s
l
Right to the enjoyment of just and favourable
Right to form trade unions and tob
conditions of work (art. 7)
Right to social security (art.R

9)
o strike (art.78)
anfamily (art. 10)

Right to protection for the
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
h s adequate food, clothing and
CRight to adequate living standards including
housing and the improvement of l
e
o
Right to the enjoyment of highestb living conditions (art. 11)
attainable standard of physical and mental
health (art. 12) R
a
Right to education (art.n 13)
a r
h B
Right to take part in cultural life, enjoy the benefits of scientific progress,
protection forC s
e (art. 15)
the moral and material interest resulting from any scientific,
l
literary or artistic production of which he is the author
b
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
B a r Law
C h s
l e
b
Ro Humanitarian Law
International
an (IHL)
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h Bpurposes:
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the international law of armed conflict.
IHLC has two basic principles which
e
serve s
as its
1. Persons who do not participate l
persons who, although werebpreviously direct participants in an armed
actively and directly in hostilities and
R
conflict, but for one reason o or another have stopped taking part in the
nof the Law of the Geneva. r
hostilities shall be respected, protected and treated humanely. This is also
a a
parties to a hostility to inflict injuryBon the enemy is not
known as the Principle
h
C is known as the Principle of the Law
2. The right of the
sof the Hague or the Law
unlimited. This
l e
of War.
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an a r
B IHL
C h IHR
s
Purpose:
l e
Enhance, promote Uphold, promote
o b
and protect rights
necessary for
and protect
fundamental
R
an r
human existence principles in time
Uphold the basic of war
B a
C h rights and protect
s
Objectives: human beings e
Protect non-
l
from abuses of
state authority o b combatants and
civilians
R
an r
Alleviate human
suffering
B a
C h Regulate war
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
h
C es
IHR IHL
Coverage:
b l
At all times;
All over the world;
During war;
Only within
Ro
All persons. territorial
an r
boundary where
B a
war is taking
C h s
place;
l e
All persons
o b affected by the
R
armed conflict
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
C h s
Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force or armed
l e
violence between States or protracted armed violence between
such groups. o b
governmental authorities and armed groups within the State or between
R
an
Armed conflict maybe international or non-international.
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
an B a r
C h s
e
There are two main kinds of IHL namely:
l
b
1. Treaty law which includes treaties, protocols and similar binding instruments.
R o
2. Customary law which refers to generally accepted principles and rules
established by state practice and opinio juris.
a n a r
h Bthe status of themselves
Some treaties (Geneva Conventions I-IV, Hague Conventions IV, 1948 Geneva
C
Convention, and 1945
e s
Nuremberg Charter) have achieved
becoming customary IHL.
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h
Fundamental Principles of IHL B
1. CPrinciple of Distinction. This is the
e s most basic principle of IHL
b l
which is for parties to the conflict to distinguish between combatants
corollary to this principle, o

and civilians, and between military objectives and civil objects. As a
R indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and
an r of the
so are the use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate.
a
h between military necessity andBhumanitarian
2. Principle of Proportionality. This poses proper balancing
C which is the heart of the IHL. Thus,

conflicting interests
e s among several
l advantage, the
considerations,
o b
military objectives for obtaining a similar military
objective selected should be the one where the attack may be
R and civilian objects.
expected to cause the least danger to civilians
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
3. Principle of Limitation. This is the basicB
C h s
principle or rule that the
right
egoes, “even war has its limits.”
of the parties to the conflict to choose
l
methods or means of
b
warfare is not unlimited. As the saying
taken from the preamble of theo

4. De Martens Clause. This is what may be called a fall back principle
R 1907 Hague Convention IV: “in cases
n and the rule of the principles of the
not covered by the Regulations…the inhabitants and belligerents
a a rlaw of
B civilized
remain under the protection
h
C laws of humanity, and the dictates
nations, as they result from the usages established among
s of public
peoples, from the
l e
conscience.”
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
Human Rights
B a r Law
h
C INTERNATIONAL LEGAL s
l e REGIMES GOVERNING
o
INTERNALb ARMED CONFLICTS
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
o
R
a n a r
h B are spelled out in Common
C 3 of the Geneva Conventions, eands in appropriate instances Optional
For an internal armed conflict, the applicable principles
l
Article
Protocol II.
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h
Common Article 3 provides: B
CPersons taking no active part in the
e s hostilities, including members of the
armed forces who have laid down
b l their arms and those placed hors de combat,
distinctions of any kind; o

shall in all cases be treated humanely, without any discrimination or adverse
R acts at all times and in all places: (a) violence
anin particular murder of all kinds, rmutilation, cruel
The prohibition on the
a
following
treatment, andh torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) B

to life and person,
dignity, in C e s outrages upon personal
sentences and the carrying out of execution

b l without previous judgment
particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d)the passing of
R o
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
an and cared for.

The wounded and sick shall be collected
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h
Common Article 3 also provides that parties B to the conflict should further
to bring into force, by meanssof special agreements, all or part of the
C
endeavour
e agreements shall not affect the legal
other provisions of the conventions,lwhich
status of the parties to the conflict. b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
Optional Protocol II develops and supplements Common Article 3 and applies
l e
to all armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
o b
Party to the Geneva Conventions between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
R
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
an a r
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the
protocol.
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
a n a r
h B must have control over a part
Protocol
s the alleged territorial control of
C territory of the State. In the Philippines,
II requires that a non-state armed group
e
the CPP-NPA-NDFP, and its claim of alrevolutionary government parallel to the
of the
o
Philippine government, is a factual b issue which is strongly contested by the
R the regime applicable is Common Article
government of the Philippines. Thus, in the armed conflict between the
3 and not Protocol II. a

n
government and the CPP-NPA-NDFP,
a r
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
Local Government Code
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Nature of the autonomy given to local governments. The Court has clarified that the
o b
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2]
refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
R
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not
an
make local governments sovereign within the State.
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to
o b
limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by
the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the
R
allocation of powers, responsibilities and resources among the different local
an a r
government units and officials have been placed by the Constitution in the
B
C h
hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution (League of
s
Provinces of the Philippines v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
l e
G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 190, 211-212).
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Power to regulate small-scale mining activities not fully devolved to local government
o b
units. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is
R
subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge,
an a r
subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional
B
C h
mandate, utilization of the country’s natural resources (League of Provinces of the
s
Philippines v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 175368,
April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 190, 213).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an Code
Local Government
B a r
C h s
l e
Nature of supervisory power over local governments of the President. General
o b
supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are
faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law. The court has
R
clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
an a r
(Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units
B
C h
or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority
s
(League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013, 696
SCRA 190, 211-12).
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Power to issue logging permits. The monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest
o b
products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility
which may be done either by the DENR or by the LGUs or by both (Ruzol v.
R
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186739-960, April 17, 2013, 696 SCRA 742, 777-778).
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Power to levy fees. The power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised
o b
the Sangguninang Bayan through the enactment of appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. Needless to
R
say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that “local
an a r
revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or
B
742, 781).
C h
ordinance (Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186739-960, April 17, 2013, 696 SCRA
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Appointments
l e
Power of appointments of LCE. Ao
b
R local chief executive has the power to appoint all
a
wages are wholly or mainlyn paid out of the funds of his localar
officials and employees of the local government unit: 1) whose salaries and
government unit
h provided in the LGC; and 2) those B
s
and are not otherwise he may be authorized
C(sec. 444-445, RA 7160).
by law to appoint
e
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Appointments
l e
Appointment of local treasurers.o
b
R Municipal, city and provincial treasurers are
eligible recommendees ofn r (sec. 470, RA

appointed by the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three ranking and
a a
the governor or mayor as the case maybe
B
7160).
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Appointments
l e
b
oexecutive may impose the penalty of removal
R
Power of removal. The local chief
pay, fine in an amountn not exceeding 6 months salary, orr

from service, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than 1 year without
a B a reprimand and
otherwise discipline
C h s
subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction.
If the penalty imposed
e
is suspension without pay for
l
not more 30 days, his
b
decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of 30
o
days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission, which
R thereof (sec.67, RA 7160).

shall decide the appeal within 30 days from receipt
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Appointments
l e
b
o administrator. Republic Act 7160 made the
R
Nature of the position of the provincial
a n service position that is primarily

reclassifying it as a non-career
a r confidential
provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority,
h
(Provincial Government B
of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales, 701 SCRA 635, 652 G.R. No.
C
185740, July 23, 2013). `
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Powers and liability for damages
l e
b
o units have the following general powers:
R
General powers of LGUs. Local government
n appropriate, or incidental forarits efficient and

1. exercise powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
a and those which are essential toB
well as powers necessary,
h
C (sec. 16);
effective governance,
s
the promotion of the
general welfare
l e
2. generate and apply resources (sec. 18);
3. exercise the power of eminent domain for o b
public use, or purpose or welfare
R
n of the Constitution and pertinent r
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
a
compensation, pursuant to the provisions
B a
laws (sec. 19);
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
b
4. authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands (sec. 21);
o
R
5. exercise corporate powers including to enter into contracts (sec. 22);
an r
6. negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, (sec. 23).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Limited power of vice-mayor to enter into contracts. There is no inherent authority on
o b
the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, unlike that provided for the mayor. Thus, the authority of the
R
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed
an a r
by the ordinance granting it (Vicencio v. Villar, G.R.No. 182069, July 3, 2012, 675
B
C h
SCRA 468, 478-479).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Indispensability of the authorization to enter into contracts. The sanggunian’s
o b
authorization in the execution of contracts which bind the local government unit
to new obligations is indispensable. Note should be taken of the fact that R.A.
R
No. 7160 does not expressly state the form that the authorization may be done by
an a r
resolution enacted in the same manner prescribed by ordinances, except that
B
C h
the resolution need not go through a third reading for final consideration unless
s
the majority of all the members of the sanggunian decides otherwise
l e
(Quisumbing v. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 266, 284-285).
o b
R
Liability for damages. Local government units and their officials are not exempt
an r
from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property (sec. 24, RA
7160).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Qualifications of local elective officials
l e
b
o An elective local official must be a citizen of
R
Qualifications of elective local official.
province or, in the case

a nof a member of the sangguniang a r panlalawigan,
the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
h B
s
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends
to be elected; a C
l e
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
b
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
o
language or dialect (sec. 39, RA 7160).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Qualifications of local elective officials
l e
b
o to other countries, such as the United States as
R
Immigrants not qualified. Immigration
an v. Commission on Elections,B385arSCRA 607).

proven by the candidate being greencard holder therein, constitutes abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines (Coquilla
h
C To be an actual and physicaleresident s of a locality, one
must have a dwelling place where one resides l
Residence requirement.
o b no matter how modest and

regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it
R
one’s residence (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013,
an a r
699 SCRA 507, 512).
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
o b
R
1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
an r
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after service of sentence;
B a
h s
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
C e
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
l
Republic of the Philippines;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
o b
R
an r
5. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
6. Permanent residents in foreign country or those who have acquired the right
o b
to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity
of the Local Government Code; and
R
an r
7. Insane or feeble-minded (sec. 40, RA 7160).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Term of office. No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
o b
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
R
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The
an a r
term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
B
C h
shall be for five (5) years (sec. 42, RA 7160).
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
What ‘consecutive terms’ means. For section 43(b) to apply, the local official
o b
concerned must be elected to the same position for the same number of times. It
is not enough for him to have served three consecutive terms. As such,
R
an r
1. succession of an individual to the mayor’s position due to the latter’s death is
not counted as a ‘consecutive term;’ and
B a
h s
2. involuntary severance from public office for any length of time short of the
C
full term provided by law
l e
o b
is not contemplated in the prohibition of serving not more than three
consecutive terms as it amounts to an interruption in the continuity of service
R
(Borja v. Commission on Elections, 295 SCRA 157; Lonzanida v. Commission on
an r
Elections, 391 SCRA 602).
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Right to contest in the recall election during the term of the official. An elective official
o b
is not disqualified by the consecutive term limit where he was elected and
served two full terms, becomes a private citizen for two years, subsequently
R
wins a recall election during the same term, and serves the unexpired portion
an
thereof (Adormeo v. Commission on Elections, 376 SCRA 90).
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Rule on succession
l e
b
o to the office. A permanent vacancy arises
R
Permanent vacancy warranting succession
a n is removed from office, voluntarily

office, fails to qualify, dies,
a r resigns, or is
when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
h
otherwise permanently B
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office (sec.
44, RA 7160). C
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an Code
Local Government
B a r
C h s
Rule on succession
l e
b
o to certain situations. The rule on succession
R
Inapplicability of the rule on succession
facto officer is ousted fromn rThe ouster of a

in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de
a a
office and the de jure officer takes over.
B
C h
de facto officer cannot
s
create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local
Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as
l e the de jure officer, the
(Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 507,b

rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position
o
519-520).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Rule on succession
l e
When second-placer cannot take o
b
R over the vacated position. The holding that the
a n to situations where the certificate

declared ineligible is limited
a rof candidacy of
second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-place is disqualified or
h
the first placer was B
valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be
C
cancelled because
e
of a violation of law that took place, s or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificatelof candidacy (Jalosjos, Jr. v.
o b
COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1, 31-32).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an r
B a
C h s
Local legislative power
l e
b
o For an ordinance to be valid, it must a)
R
Requisites for the validity of an ordinance.
a n d) not prohibit but may regulate

not be partial or discriminatory;
a r trade; e) be
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; b) not be unfair or oppressive; c)
h
general and consistent with public policy; and f) not be B
unreasonable (Tatel v.
Virac, 207 SCRAC 157).
e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Discipline
l e
o b
R
Grounds for disciplinary actions. An elective local official may be disciplined,
an r
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
B a
h
1. disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
C
2. culpable violation of the Constitution;
e s
of duty; b l
3. dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction
R o
4. commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
an r
punishable by at least prision mayor;
5. abuse of authority;
B a
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
o b
6. unauthorized absences for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in
R
the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
an r
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; g) application
a
for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
B
C h
immigrant of another country; and
s
e
7. such other grounds as may be provided in the Local Government Code and
l
b
other laws (sec. 60, RA 7160).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Preventive suspension. Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after
o b
the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
R
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
an a r
integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That any single preventive
B
C h
suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days;
s
Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed
l e
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than
o b
ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing
and known at the time of the first suspension (sec. 63[c], RA 7160).
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Ombudsman authority to remove local officials. Under Section 60 of the Local
o b
Government Code, the Sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective
barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so.
R
Unlike the Sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
an a r
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove
B
C h
an erring public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary, who
s
may be removed only by impeachment (Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,
l
G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625 SCRA 299, 308). e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
Boundary disputes
l e
Settlement of boundary disputes.o
b
R Boundary disputes between and among local
n r
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
1. Boundary disputesa involving two (2) or more barangays a
B
in the same city or
h
C bayan concerned;
municipality shall
s
be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang
l e
o b
2. Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned; R
a n or component cities of different
3. Boundary disputes involving municipalities
a r
h B
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the
province concerned;
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
4. Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one
o b
hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly
urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
R
sanggunians of the parties;
an a r
5. In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty
B
C h
(60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
s
e
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by
b l
the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above (sec. 118, RA 7160).
R o
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an
B a r
C h s
l e
Appeal of decision on boundary disputes. Within the time and manner prescribed by
o b
the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian
concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in
R
dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year
an a r
from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the
B
7160).
C h
dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes (SEC. 119, RA
s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es
R
a n r
a
h B
C e s
b l
R o
an B a r
C h Live Long and Prosper!!!
s
l e
b
Ro
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
C h s
l e
o b
R
an B a r
h
C es

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R

Political Law Review

Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M.

o of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.

a v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849).

l of the Philippines, G.R. No.

111953, December 12, 1997).

public health andh

n and the replacement of a temporary r

ofar; its legitimate interest can be satisfied without

regulate or proscribe speech and nob

R o in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to

n rperson making the

l that the protected speech of

not demand absolute equality. It b

R o merely requires that all persons under like

reasonable classification. And the b

substantial distinctions; (2) musto

is at least substantially related tob

l edown is the reckless disregard of truth test (see

an defined as the right ofBaindividuals r

l eabsolute immunity to religious activity, a

compelling secular justification wasb

with religious practices. Althougho

R the members of the Court often disagreed over which

n conduct cases, this generalatestr established strong

n rrationale for the rule

List Order case): C the rules on confidentiality will enables

fear of humiliation for one's comments.

appointed by the court upon b

(People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465) b l

to be informed of the natureo

Cthe absence of the accused providedesthat he has been duly notified

rights (Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1). b l

when one is either deprivedo

to such custodyC s 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 63).

application for a writ of habeas b

R o restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was

n rof personal freedom.

C object and purpose of the writeofs habeas corpus is to inquire

preclude freedom of action is sufficient (see o

o by their superiors is not a form of illegal

2010; Manalo v. Calderon, 536 SCRA 290).

o or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are

direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;lthe refusal of the State to disclose

o and third, the right of security of person is a

the habeas corpus writ; (2) o

Cderived from the agrarian reform process s (see Secretary of National

o b 568 SCRA 1).

bodies." This protection extends b

R o and after the trial, affording broader protection

hearings. While the concept ofo

C postponements of the trial are asked

l of time is allowed to elapse

international person. It isn r is given, a state

temporarily, but the only test of membershipo

which are parties to it. o b

Right to social security (art.R