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Efklides, A. (2008) - Metacognition. European Psychologist, 13 (4), 277-287. Doi 10.1027 1016-9040.13.4.277
Efklides, A. (2008) - Metacognition. European Psychologist, 13 (4), 277-287. Doi 10.1027 1016-9040.13.4.277
Metacognition
Defining Its Facets and Levels of Functioning
in Relation to Self-Regulation and Co-regulation
Anastasia Efklides
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Abstract. Research in the field of metacognition, a multifaceted phenomenon, is in the main fragmented without much theoretical
integration of the findings related to its various facets. Moreover, metacognition is usually conceived of as an individual and conscious
process that serves the regulation of cognition. However, there is growing evidence that metacognition also functions at a nonconscious
level, is involved in the co-regulation of cognition in collaborative settings, and interacts with affect in the self-regulation of behavior.
Based on these considerations, a multifaceted and multilevel model of metacognition is proposed that broadens Nelson and Naren’s
conceptualization of metacognition. The implications for theory and measurement of metacognition as well as for interventions involving
metacognition are explored.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
DOI 10.1027/1016-9040.13.4.277
278 A. Efklides: Metacognition
Metacognitive Knowledge
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
* Such models or representations of cognitive functions are often given with the prefix meta added to the name of the function: Metalanguage,
metamemory, metathinking.
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
A. Efklides: Metacognition 279
tions) and, from this point of view, is also connected to the 2001, 2006). They are the interface between the person and
more experiential facet of metacognition, namely, ME. In the task, the awareness the person has of task features, of
fact, one of the controversies in TOM research is whether the fluency of cognitive processing, of the progress toward
TOM is a theory (or set of beliefs) or a simulation of others’ the goal set, of the effort exerted on cognitive processing,
mental states upon one’s own (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; and of the outcome of processing (Efklides, 2002a; Efkli-
Harris, 1989). des, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & Ziliaskopoulou, 2006). They
Independently of the theoretical controversy over the take the form of metacognitive feelings, metacognitive
processes underlying acquisition of TOM, it can be as- judgments/estimates, and online task-specific knowledge
sumed that as children acquire TOM and become aware (Efklides, 2001, 2006).
that reality is distinct from the representations of it, and that Feeling of knowing, feeling of familiarity, and feeling
representations of reality can differ between people and can of confidence are some indicative metacognitive feelings
be wrong or inaccurate, the foundations of epistemic think- extensively studied in metamemory research. Also, there
ing and epistemological beliefs are also laid (Kitchener, are feelings studied in the context of problem solving, such
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
1983; Kuhn, 2000). Epistemological beliefs regard the na- as feeling of difficulty (Efklides, 2001), that are crucial for
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ture and the constraints of knowledge, the truth and validity the self-regulation of effort (Efklides, 2002a; Efklides et
of knowledge, and the means or methods of knowledge al., 2006). Metacognitive judgments/estimates include
acquisition. Epistemological beliefs, having as their object judgment of learning, estimate of effort expenditure, esti-
knowledge and cognition, can be also considered part of mate of time needed or spent, but also estimate of solution
MK (Kuhn, 2000). Moreover, they are crucial for the crit- correctness, and so forth, that make clusters with feelings
ical appraisal of one’s and others’ thinking, knowledge, be- of difficulty and confidence (Efklides, 2002a). The online
liefs, and theories about the world, and for the regulation task-specific knowledge comprises task information that
of the person’s and others’ cognition. we are attending to, and ideas or thoughts that we are aware
Metacognitive knowledge gets continuously enriched, of as we deal with a task (e.g., cognitive procedures we are
updated, and differentiated by integrating information applying). It also comprises MK that we retrieve from
coming from the monitoring of cognition at a conscious memory in order to process the task; for example, MK
level through observation of one’s and others’ behavior/ac- about tasks and procedures that we used in the past, com-
tions and their outcomes when dealing with specific tasks parison of the current with other tasks about their similar-
in various contexts (Fabricius & Schwanenflugel, 1994), ities or differences, and so forth.
through awareness of our ME (Flavell, 1979), as well as What distinguishes online task-specific knowledge from
through communication and interaction with others (Ruff- the other ME is that it is analytic in nature, unlike the other
man, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Language-use also allows ME. Specifically, metacognitive judgments can be prod-
individuals to communicate the content of their awareness ucts of either analytic or nonanalytic processes, that is, heu-
to the others, to reflect, to draw inferences, and to make ristic, inferential, and attributional processes (Kahneman,
attributions about the relations between inner states and ob- 2003; Koriat, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). Social
servable behaviors and action outcomes. In fact, there are cognition processes, such as judgment formation and judg-
strong relations between children’s language abilities and ment correction processes, may also play a role (Yzerbyt,
TOM, as well as with MK (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dardenne, & Leyens, 1998). For example, we may use sta-
Dunn, 1996; Lockl & Schneider, 2007). Finally, language tistical inferences based on normative information and in-
and reflection allow people to analyze and compare their dividualized information regarding one’s self or other per-
subjective mental states and knowledge with those of other sons (Nelson, 1996), or on cues from one’s ME – For ex-
people and to form explicit theories about knowledge and ample, use of feeling of confidence as a cue to infer ability
cognition. This leads to the building of a socially shared (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002; Metallidou & Efklides, 2001).
and socially negotiated model of cognition, as well as of Social comparison processes or stereotypic knowledge can
one’s self and others as cognitive beings (King, 1998; Lo- also be used to make judgments about one’s own or others’
ries et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 1998). Because the processes cognition (Lories et al., 1998; Salonen et al., 2005).
involved in the formation of MK are not connected to the Metacognitive feelings, on the contrary, are nonanalytic
monitoring of cognitive processing, one would say that MK in nature (Koriat, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). The
represents the offline monitoring of cognition, unlike ME, mechanism underlying the formation of metacognitive
which are manifestations of the online monitoring of cog- feelings, particularly of feeling of knowing, has been de-
nition. bated for very long and, although their experiential and
cognitive (informational) nature is fully accepted and rec-
ognized (Koriat, 2007), their affective character has re-
Metacognitive Experiences ceived very little attention. Yet, following Frijda (1986),
feelings have an affective character with positive or nega-
Metacognitive experiences (ME) are what the person is tive valence. This is clear in feeling of difficulty which is
aware of and what she or he feels when coming across a associated with negative affect (Efklides & Petkaki, 2005).
task and processing the information related to it (Efklides, Such an association of metacognitive feelings with affect
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
280 A. Efklides: Metacognition
is corroborated by neuropsychological evidence that lo- ments, are differentiated from self-reports of MK, and that
cates metacognitive monitoring in the anterior cingulate both of them are explained by a higher-order factor, pre-
cortex, which is an area connected to both the affective and sumably metacognition (Metallidou & Efklides, 2000).
the cognitive regulatory loops (Fernandez-Duque et al., This study also showed that self-reports of metacognitive
2000). If we accept that metacognitive feelings are both feelings and MK were differentiated from cognition (in
affective and cognitive in nature, then we can place them terms of task performance), as well as that self-reports of
within the context of the broader mechanism of self-regu- metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments/esti-
lation of behavior. mates were differentiated from self-reports of emotions and
In this respect, the affective character of ME can be ex- motivation. Therefore, the distinction of ME and MK, at
plained by two feedback loops (Carver, 2003; Carver & least as regards self-reports, from cognition and emotion
Scheier, 1998; Efklides, 2006). The first one is related to can be maintained, although in the self-regulation process
the outcome of cognitive processing and detects the dis- they are closely interacting.
crepancy from the goal set. The higher the discrepancy
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
from the goal, the more the negative affect experienced; for
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
A. Efklides: Metacognition 281
metacognitive judgments about other persons’ current spective of the correctness of the response, as well as
cognitive processing, are instrumental for the co regula- monitoring of error after the response has been produced
tion and other-regulation of cognition and behavior. Fi- (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Van Veen & Carter, 2002).
nally, MS can also contribute to the co-regulation and Moreover, there is evidence that error detection is taking
other-regulation of cognition, possibly through the con- place in the same brain area when there is external feed-
trol of one’s own cognition following feedback from the back regarding one’s response and, consequently, there is
other person(s), or through the guidance given to the oth- explicit awareness of error, as well as when there is no
er person (other-regulation). such feedback (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000).
Indeed, if metacognition is instrumental to the regula-
tion of attention or effort – for example, to new stimuli
The Conscious and Nonconscious Character or to difficult tasks (Metcalfe, 1994) – then there needs
to be continuous monitoring of the incoming informa-
of Metacognition tion, as well as of the current processing and its outcome
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
282 A. Efklides: Metacognition
Metacognition and Self-Regulation task-specific knowledge is used to figure out the exact
reason that caused the feeling of difficulty. However,
Self-regulation is a volitional process aiming at securing feeling of difficulty is affected not only by task features
action for the attainment of self goals (Carver & Scheier, but also by self-concept of ability (Efklides & Tsiora,
1998). To successfully self-regulate, people need to be 2002). Therefore, if feeling of difficulty is strong and the
aware of their goals and monitor and control their cogni- attribution is lack of ability, then the reappraisal of the
situation suggests that cognitive processing is not possi-
tion, emotions, behavior, and environment (Kuhl & Fuhr-
ble and, therefore, the task should be abandoned. More-
mann, 1998). Metacognition is instrumental in this process
over, feeling of difficulty, estimate of effort (expended),
as self-regulated learning theories have shown (Boekaerts,
and feeling of confidence feed back on the person’s self-
1999).
concept and update it (Efklides & Tsiora, 2002). In this
Specifically, the importance of ME is that they make
way, ME contribute to self-awareness not only at the task
the person aware of the state of his or her cognition and
or situational level, but at a more general level through
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
A. Efklides: Metacognition 283
fect, and metacognition, the self-regulation process is fa- Implications of the Model for Theory
cilitated because the person is informed of what is sub-
jectively significant and of the progress toward one’s The multifaceted and multilevel model of metacognition
goal. In the case of control being needed, then ME and proposed here provides a framework that can accommo-
MK can activate MS, and through them the cognitive reg- date the variability of metacognitive phenomena as identi-
ulatory loop. However, metacognitive feelings can also fied in previous research. The most important contribution
activate the affective regulatory loop, directly through is that it extends the relevant theorizing in the direction of
their affective quality, or indirectly through MK and MS; self-regulation, co-regulation, and other-regulation. It can
in the latter case, there is cognitive control of emotion. also lead to hypotheses regarding the relations of the three
At the same time, the personal-awareness level in- levels of metacognition between them as well as between
forms the meta-meta level that represents the social level the various facets of metacognition within each level and
of metacognition. This level comprises only metacogni- across levels. Such hypotheses can throw light on the con-
tive judgments about the one’s and others’ ME, MK, and ditions that make metacognition successful in the self-reg-
MS; it is informed by self-awareness at the personal lev- ulation process, as well as why metacognition often fails to
el, as well as by information received from the ongoing control cognition, or why metacognition can be flawed, to-
interaction with others. Monitoring at this level is explicit tally dissociated from action, or even detrimental to it.
and can take the form of reflection. It leads to a socially- Specifically, metacognition is a critical component of
shared and negotiated representation of the person-in- the self-regulation process because at the personal-aware-
context. Control at this level is exercised in a conscious ness level it is part of self-awareness. Self-awareness is the
analytic mode and its access to one’s own and others’ experience of I as agent – Acting, thinking, and feeling at
cognition and affect at the object level is through the per- a specific place and time, in unity with one’s past (experi-
sonal-awareness level of the interacting persons. ences, beliefs, and goals) and future goals (Vogeley, Kur-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
284 A. Efklides: Metacognition
then, Falkai, & Maier, 1999). Metacognitive experiences a framework for understanding the complexity of the inter-
have the characteristics of I as agent at a particular place actions between the facets and the levels of metacognition.
and time, but also have unity with one’s past and future
through their relation with self-concept (Efklides & Tsiora,
2002). Also, awareness of MK regarding one’s self and its Implications of the Model for Measurement
interactions with cognitive tasks links the self of the present
with the self of the past, again providing coherence and of Metacognition
continuity to the I. Finally, awareness of the self versus the
others as cognitive beings allows not only shaping of one’s Besides the theoretical implications of the multifaceted and
self-awareness, but also allows the prediction of others’ multilevel model of metacognition, it is evident that the
mental states, thus facilitating (or interfering with) social methodology, particularly the measures of metacognition,
interaction and co-regulation/other-regulation. needs to be enriched. Up to now, the usual measures are
Social cognition processes have been advocated in the past self-report questionnaires for MK (Schraw, 2000), self-re-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
as contributing to the formation of metacognitive judgments port ratings of ME (Efklides, 2002a), and thinking aloud
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
regarding the person and the others (Martin & Stapel, 1998; protocols for MS (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). For theory
Yzerbyt et al., 1998). However, this line of research has not of mind, spontaneous speech and children’s responses to
been fully incorporated within the metacognition tradition. tasks tapping theory of mind are used (Bartsch & Wellman,
By advocating the three levels of metacognition, hypotheses 1993), whereas in metamemory research, experimental
can be formulated regarding the differentiation of social cog- procedures are favored along with rating scales (Koriat,
nition effects to each level of awareness as well as their inter- 2007).
action with other factors that affect metacognition at each However, most of the self-report measures are static,
level and each component of it. prospective, or retrospective, dependent on language or in-
With respect to the efficiency of metacognition to suc- ferential processes. To fully understand how metacognition
cessfully control cognition, this is an issue we already re- functions, behavioral and physiological measures are also
ferred to. The multifaceted and multilevel model proposes needed, as well as methodologies that can capture the vari-
that the lack of efficient metacognitive control can be due ability and dynamic nature of ME during task processing
to various reasons. For example, ME can be noncalibrated (within task) and between tasks and contexts. Such behav-
in relation to actual performance (e.g., underconfidence or ioral data can include verbal and nonverbal behaviors, in-
overconfidence) and, thus, misinform the person; or they dicators of facial expressions, body movements, gazes, and
can be flawed, for example, illusions of familiarity, of so forth (see Iiskala, Vauras, & Lehtinen, 2004) that can
knowing, or of difficulty (Efklides, 2002a; Koriat, 2007; reveal affective and informational aspects of ME, as well
Whittlesea, 1993). Also, MK can be flawed because it is as the change of ME along with the course of cognitive
inferential in nature or mindlessly adopted from other peo- processing. For MS, observation of patterns of behaviors
ple in social interaction (i.e., at the social level of metacog- indicative of strategy use is important information that can
nition) without any connection to the person’s actual think- reveal their presence, even in cases in which the person is
ing and feeling. Furthermore, MK of strategies being de- not aware of their use (Dermitzaki & Kiosseoglou, 2004).
clarative in nature cannot control cognition unless it Measures that can reveal implicit and explicit metacog-
becomes procedural. Finally, MS, being procedural knowl- nition are also needed in longitudinal studies of the devel-
edge, can be automatized and performed even in opposition opment of MK (Annevirta & Vauras, 2001; Lockl &
to one’s MK or ME, or against the requirements of the self- Schneider, 2007). Such a developmental design can throw
regulation and co-regulation processes. Needless to say that light on the interaction of the facets of metacognition be-
practicing of MS in an analytic way based on MK or in- tween them, as well as with cognition and affect, along with
struction is effortful and, thus, interacting with task-pro- growing age, knowledge and/or expertise. Neuropsycho-
cessing demands, often at the expense of performance. logical measures and neuroimaging techniques, on the oth-
Metacognition can also be dissociated from action/be- er hand, are instrumental for understanding the association
havior (Paris, 2002) if the person is ruminating, that is, uses of brain functioning with conscious and nonconscious
his/her MK to figure out possible lines of action/behavior monitoring and control of cognition (Van Veen & Carter,
and their implications without the support of affect to make 2002). Finally, measures of affect are needed in conjunc-
a decision. It can be also dissociated from action/behavior, tion with measures of ME in order to capture the interac-
if the person is asked to report on thinking processes or tions of metacognition with affect (Efklides & Petkaki,
feelings of which she or he was not aware of, as in auto- 2005) and with attributions about subjective inner states as
matic use of strategies. Moreover, it can be detrimental for in social psychology research (Schwarz & Clore, 2003).
action/behavior if the person uses MK in self-serving, re- Yet, in order to understand the role of metacognition in
petitive, associational ways without the constraints im- the self-regulation process, we also need studies combining
posed by the task, by reality, and/or by the social context. experimental methodology that implicate the self (e.g.,
All the above issues are challenges to metacognition the- feedback, social comparison) along with measures of ME
ory and research and the model proposed here can provide and affect (Efklides & Dina, 2007). To also understand co-
European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287 © 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
A. Efklides: Metacognition 285
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287
286 A. Efklides: Metacognition
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85–96. About the author
Posner, M.I. (2005). Genes and experience shape brain networks of
conscious control. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 173–183. Anastasia Efklides is Professor of Experimental and Cognitive
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have Psychology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece.
a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515–526. Her research interests regard life-span development of cognitive
Reder, L.M., & Schunn, C.D. (1996). Metacognition does not ap- functions, motivation, metacognition, and self-regulation, with an
ply: Strategy choice is governed by implicit learning and mem- emphasis on metacognitive experiences and the factors involved
ory. In L.M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory and metacognition in their formation.
(pp. 45–78). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Robinson, E. (1983). Metacognitive development. In S. Meadows
(Ed.), Developing thinking: Approaches to children’s cognitive
development (pp. 106–141). London: Methuen. Anastasia Efklides
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002). The relation between
children’s and mothers’ mental state language and theory-of- School of Psychology
mind understanding. Child Development, 73, 734–751. Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
Salonen, P., Vauras, M., & Efklides, A. (2005). Social interaction: 54 124 Thessaloniki
What can it tell us about metacognition and co-regulation in Greece
learning? European Psychologist, 10, 199–208. E-mail efklides@psy.auth.gr
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers European Psychologist 2008; Vol. 13(4):277–287