1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

3 INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
4
Menes Ankh El, Case:1:23-cv-01094-JMS-KMB
5 Plaintiff
v.
6
STATE OF INDIANA,
7 Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider
COUNTY OF MARION,
8 CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,

9 Defendant.

10 I, Menes Ankh El, received the Court’s entry and order on July 17, 2023. I now
11 request that this Court alter its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). In support, I
12 state the following:
13 BIAS
14  “Regardless of whether we’re talking about trial judges, appellate court judges or
15 Supreme Court Justices, their decisions are based upon their personal biases,
16 beliefs, assumptions and values, which are formed as a result of our personal
17 backgrounds and life experiences. We all have personal biases, beliefs,
18 assumptions, and values. The question is how much our lack of self-awareness
19 is skewing our perception of things.”
20  “Ultimately, our life experiences have very much to do with our personal choices
21 in terms of wheat we do, if anything, to try and broaden our worldview. If our
22 parents didn’t teach us to see things from other people’s perspectives, we either
23 need to take it upon ourselves to learn such things or we live in a false reality
24 that our perspective is the only perspective.”
25  “Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, “There comes a point where [judges]
26 should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men [and women].” So

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27 when judges do decide to be ‘ignorant’, using his words, aren’t they contributing
28 to the injustice?”
29 The forgoing quotes are from an April 15, 2017, Psychology Today article
30 titled “Injustice at the Hands of Judges and Justices discussing an April 13, 2017,
31 ABA Journal article titled “Do judges contribute to injustices? A conversation with
32 Judge Jed Rakoff”. I thoroughly comprehend and expect the inherent bias of the
33 Court, in the aspect that most of the judges in this Court were former prosecutors
34 and judges in the courts of the Defendants, and thusly may have a degree of
35 partiality for them.
36 Allegations that anyone is outside of any court’s jurisdiction may induce a
37 cognitive dissonance that sounds like nails on a chalk board to most, if not all
38 judges. From My own college psychology supported experience, I am also of the
39 overstanding that certain words can trigger the dissonance causing a misreading of
40 a claim or complaint. My name alone could be a trigger. With all due respect to
41 this Honorable Court, Me stating that I am a Moorish National may have triggered
42 that dissonance which caused the Court to perform a biased reading of My claim.
43 FRIVOLITY
44 According to Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed., the definition of a frivolous
45 complaint, is when the complaint “is clearly insufficient on its face… and is
46 presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the plaintiff.”
47 The gist of the Court’s order is that My claim is frivolous because the
48 gravamen of My claim for damages is that I am “a “National of the Moorish
49 Republic” he is not a United States citizen and therefore not subject to Indiana law”
50 and that My arguments are “similar to sovereign citizen theories that have been
51 rejected repeatedly by the courts as frivolous and a waste of court resources”. The
52 Court’s order demonstrates a gross misreading of My claim, if it was actually read.
53 The gravamen of My complaint is that the Defendants committed commercial
54 fraud by refusing to prove the subject-matter of the courts. As I stated on lines 274-
55 279, of My claim:

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56 “The verbal and documentary records of each of the commercial
57 actions at issue show that the fraud begins and continues with the
58 judges’, officers of STATE OF INDIANA, refusal to order the
59 prosecutors to prove that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court
60 was proper. It is the judges’ obligation to know the limitations of the
61 subject-matter jurisdiction of his court. It is also the judges’ duty to
62 direct the prosecutor to answer any jurisdictional challenges.”

63 I request that this Court take Judicial Notice of the facts that: I do not claim
64 to be, use or mention the words “sovereign” or “sovereign citizen”, “sovereign
65 Moorish National”, “flesh-and-blood human being”, “strawman”, “birth certificate”,
66 or “accept for value” anywhere in the complaint. I do not mention or use U.C.C.
67 filings, commercial affidavits, or any other sovereign citizen tactics to assert My
68 sovereignty, or as basis of My complaint. I am not connected, in any way, to any
69 sovereign citizen or Moorish Sovereign groups, and reject any assumptions or
70 presumptions that I am.
71 I request that the Court take Judicial Notice of the facts that: I do not
72 mention the Moorish Science Temple of America or the incorporated version. I do
73 not assert that God or Allah have commanded Me or this Court to do anything. I
74 am not connected, in any way, to the Moorish Science Temple of America or the
75 incorporated version, or any other religious group, religious corporation, or sect. I
76 reject any assumptions or presumptions that I am. Neither religion nor religious
77 groups control or influence what I do or what I am saying in this action.
78 Therefore, the frivolousness that the Court speaks of must be based on My
79 assertion that I am a Moorish National. Me being a Moorish National has nothing
80 to do with the commercial aspects of this case, which I state that this action is of a
81 “mixed nature”. The other side of this action is of an International nature based on
82 the fact that I contend that am not a U.S. citizen, and that the Defendants’ actions
83 violate various current Human Rights Treaties that the United States is signatory
84 to. This is a violation of Article VI. Note that I am not using the Treaty of Peace
85 and Friendship or any of the other ancient and broken and dead treaties that My
86 predecessors and contemporaries are trying to enforce.
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 87 FACE OF THE COMPLAINT
88 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, the Supreme Court replaced
89 its traditional pleading standard under Rule 8 with a new requirement that a
90 complaint state “enough factual matter” to make the claim “plausible”. In Ashcroft
91 v. Iqbal, the court stated that “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
92 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
93 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
94 As it pertains to the ‘plausibility’ of the commercial nature of the Defendants’
95 actions, I request that this Court take Judicial Notice of 27 CFR 72.11, which
96 dictates that all of the Defendants actions complained of are commercial in nature.
97 I request that this Court take Judicial Notice of Rule 2 of the Indiana Rules of Trial
98 Procedure which, like Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do for this
99 Court, determines that all of the Defendants’ actions were civil in nature. The code
100 and the trial rule both make it very plausible that the Defendants’ actions were
101 indeed commercial in nature. They also make it so that this Court has jurisdiction.
102 As it pertains to the ‘plausibility’ that the Defendants committed commercial
103 fraud, I stated on lines 274-279, of My claim that “The verbal and documentary
104 records of each of the commercial actions at issue show that the fraud begins and
105 continues with the judges’, officers of STATE OF INDIANA, refusal to order the
106 prosecutors to prove that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court was proper.”
107 Pursuant to the Indiana Trial Rules, the Defendants are in possession of the audio
108 and documentary record for each of the actions at issue.
109 As this Court is familiar with the 20 previous actions that I have filed, the
110 Court is surely familiar with the fact that most, if not all of the actions and
111 pleadings pertained to the Defendants’ courts refusing to prove that the subject-
112 matter jurisdiction was proper. This fact increases the plausibility that the
113 Defendants committed the commercial fraud alleged.
114 The following quotes are also from the above mentioned Psychology Today
115 article:

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116  “Judge Rakoff states the following as a second reason for the lack of judicial
117 objectivity: “I think judges see too many cases that are alike, and therefore they
118 assume that the next case is just like the other 55 they’ve seen. So they are not
119 as open to seeing that this case might be different.””
120  “His third explanation “is that a great many judges are former prosecutors and
121 very few are former defense counsel.”
122  “In this instance, Rakoff explains himself as follows: “Judges who are former
123 prosecutors are more inclined to accept what current prosecutors before them
124 are doing…”
125 The plausibility of the Defendants’ refusing to prove the subject-matter
126 jurisdiction and usurping jurisdiction is not hard to reach when viewed from an
127 egotistical standpoint. This is especially true in quasi-criminal actions in which
128 judges hold the power to destroy lives and virtually make people disappear from the
129 face of the earth.
130 As I am not a “sovereign citizen” or a “sovereign Moorish National”, and I am
131 not using any of the same frivolous, faulty, misguided arguments, tactics, and even
132 histories that My predecessors have used, this action is not and cannot be similar to
133 any frivolous action that the Court mentions. My nationality is not a factor in the
134 commercial aspect of My claim. The human rights aspect of My claim requires that
135 the Defendants prove that they were in the bounds of Article VI via the human
136 rights treaties that the United States is signatory to.
137 I request that the Court take Judicial Notice of the following quote is from
138 the “Nature of This Action” section of My complaint:
139 “JURISDICTION AND VENUE
140 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§
141 1330(a), 1331, 1350, 1367(a) supplemented by Title 28 U.S.C. §
142 1605(a)(1),(2). This Court has jurisdiction over all other claims
143 pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because all of the claims arise from
144 a common nucleus of operative facts that are so intertwined that they
145 cannot be separated. Venue in this judicial district is proper under
146 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).

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147 NATURE OF THIS ACTION
148 This action is one of a mixed nature. One side is the purely
149 Commercial nature pursuant to 27 CFR §72.11 and Rule 2 of the
150 Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. The Defendants committed
151 commercial fraud in an administrative/civil venue. The other side of
152 this action is of an International nature based on the fact that I am not
153 a U.S. citizen. The Defendants’ actions also violate the various Human
154 Rights Treaties that the United States is signatory to, pursuant to the
155 Article VI of the Constitution for the United States of America.
156 This action is has absolutely nothing to do with any
157 Constitutional or civil rights. However, I do claim My human right to
158 contract or not to contract, and to enforce the various human rights
159 treaties that the Defendants are bound to through the Constitution for
160 the United States of America. I seek injunctive and declaratory relief,
161 as well as compensatory and punitive damages.”

162 If the Defendants’ actions were not commercial in nature, then the
163 Defendants are required to prove so, as opposed to this federal Court making an
164 assumption or presumption contrary to the federal statute. “Unless a statute in so
165 many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s
166 jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and
167 applied.” (See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)).
168 As the laws of the United States are law of the land, the code subjects the
169 Defendants to this Court’s jurisdiction under Title 42 USC §1603 et seq. for their
170 commercial actions pursuant to 27 CFR 72.11.
171 “When a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into
172 activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as
173 fully as if it were a private person or corporation.” (See Pardon v. Terminal R.
174 Co., 377 U.S. at 196).
175 “When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions
176 contained in a regulatory enactment, it must by taken to have acted cognizant of
177 the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory
178 purposes.” (See Mitcheel v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291-292 (1960)).

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179 “A statutory waiver of state Eleventh Amendment immunity is effective “only
180 where stated in the most express language or by such overwhelming implication
181 from the text as will live no room for any other reasonable construction.” (See Port
182 Authority Trans-Hudson Corp v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)).
183
184 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, I respectfully request that this Honorable
185 Court perform an unbiased reading of My claim and rescind its order dismissing
186 this action.
187
188 Respectfully submitted,

189 /s/Menes Ankh El

190 Menes Ankh El
191
192 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
193 I certify that this document was electronically filed with the U.S. District Court for
194 the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division on July 21, 2023.

195 /s/Menes Ankh El

196 Menes Ankh El
197

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