International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

ISSN: 0885-0607 (Print) 1521-0561 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International

Intelligence Cooperation

STÉPHANE LEFEBVRE

To cite this article: STÉPHANE LEFEBVRE (2003) The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International
Intelligence Cooperation, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16:4,
527-542, DOI: 10.1080/716100467

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/716100467

Published online: 02 Feb 2011.

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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 527–542, 2003
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Inc.
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080=08850600390229323

STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE

The Di⁄culties and Dilemmas of

International Intelligence Cooperation
The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 once again
forcefully brought to the fore the necessity for cooperation among security
and intelligence agencies, both nationally and internationally. 1 The
transnational nature of several terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda (the Base)
being the most notorious, implies that their detection, disruption, and
elimination can succeed fully only if done globally.2 That said, no one
should surmise that international intelligence cooperation did not exist
prior to 11 September (hereafter 9=11). In fact, Western security and
intelligence agencies have long cooperated (and sometimes simultaneously
competed), either bilaterally — the preferred way — or multilaterally. Their
cooperation is sometimes difficult, uneven, and haphazard, but when lives
are believed to be at stake due to terrorists’ active targeting, efforts to
make it work are certainly redoubled.
With 9=11 and the initiation of military operations against al-Qaeda in
A f g ha n i s t a n , t h e s e e s t a b l i s h e d l i a i s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s h a d t o b e
complemented with vigorous new ones involving Middle Eastern and
Central Asian countries, often making for strange alliances. 3 While a
variety of intelligence liaison relationships with countries in these regions
may have existed previously they took an enhanced —more operational —
turn. Tactical intelligence must be shared to ensure military success, and

Ste´phane Lefebvre is a former Strategic Analyst at the Canadian Department

of National Defence and a former Marcel Cadieux Policy Planning Fellow at
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The
views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views
of any governmental or nongovernmental organizations with which he is or
has been affiliated. An earlier version of this article was presented at the
Colloque Renseignement et Se´curite´ internationale, Laval University, Quebec
City, Canada, on 20 March 2003.

527
528 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE

human intelligence gathered to better understand and counterterrorist

organizations, as Arabs can more easily infiltrate Islamist terrorist groups
than can non-Arabs. For these enhanced relationships to work well,
confidence and trust are essential ingredients, as are the perceived benefits
to both sides in the liaison. Although intelligence liaison activities are
rarely discussed, their importance needs to be recognized.

THE IMPACT OF 9=11

After the 11 September attacks, the United States made full use of its foreign
intelligence liaison relationships, for both defensive and offensive purposes,
in its ‘‘extensive, shadowy struggle against al-Qa’ida.’’ 4 Included were
efforts to benefit from the knowledge and experience of the Russian,
Chinese, Pakistani, and even Libyan intelligence services. The director of
Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI), Jorge Dezcallar, publicly
confirmed the enhanced levels of cooperation among intelligence agencies
since 9=11.5 Even this cooperation between the United States and its allies
against al-Qaeda was not entirely new. When al-Qaeda emerged, several
years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) quickly recognized the
value of cooperation with foreign intelligence services in facing the
challenges of knowing more about the organization and penetrating it. The
cooperation, recognized as fruitful by all parties, led to the dismantling of
several al-Qaeda cells worldwide.6
Just as the CIA expanded its foreign liaison activities to address the
increasing threat posed by al-Qaeda, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), under the leadership of Louis J. Freeh, director from 1993 to 2001,
increased the number of its overseas legal attaché offices from 16 in 1992
to 44 by September 2001. The new offices were concentrated in countries
facing a terrorist problem, and where cooperation and coordination with
the FBI would be most mutually beneficial.7 After 9=11, thirty of these
legal attaché offices were reinforced by 300 Special Agents and 85 support
staff ‘‘to assist in pursuing leads and coordinating the investigation with
our international colleagues.’’8
But the Final Report of the United States Senate’s and House of
Representatives’ Joint Inquiry Staff, which investigated the events leading
to the attacks of 11 September, concluded that the U.S. intelligence
community had relied too much on the cooperation of foreign intelligence
agencies instead of recruiting and developing its own human sources
abroad. In the opinion of the Joint Inquiry Staff, the results of this
cooperation in terms of productive intelligence were mixed because various
foreign services were not able or willing to really go after the al-Qaeda
network and its leadership. Compounding this problem was the failure of
U.S. intelligence agencies ‘‘to coordinate their relationships with foreign

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INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 529

services adequately, either within the Intelligence Community or with

broader U.S. Government liaison and foreign policy efforts.’’9
While the Joint Inquiry Staff assessment might be correct, it seems to
underestimate the time necessary to infiltrate terrorist organizations or
recruit agents knowledgeable enough about them to be useful. Given its
human intelligence weaknesses in regions such as the Middle East and
Central Asia,10 the United States has no choice but to work with friendly
indigenous intelligence agencies. While intelligence liaison arrangements of
a bilateral nature are usually the most productive, multilateral
arrangements, especially in the context of a coalition fighting terrorism,
have been considered. While no new multilateral arrangements have
surfaced publicly, the assumption must be that multilateral liaison is being
done on at least an ad hoc basis, given the needs of the moment. Although
Australian intelligence specialist Desmond Ball has argued that ‘‘the few
multilateral arrangements of the Cold War offer no models’’ for the
current situation,11 many of those arrangements survived the fall of the
Berlin Wall and have been applied to 9=11.

MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Close allies routinely exchange intelligence through various bilateral and
multilateral means. But the depth and breadth of these exchanges very
much depend on their sharing a common perception of a threat or sets of
interests. 1 2 The common threat posed to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members by the Soviet Union during the Cold War
was thus conducive to allied services sharing large amounts of intelligence
on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The advent and spread of terrorism
in the 1970s forced exchanges and cooperation on this issue among close
allies, although this collaboration materialized rather slowly.13
Yet, common threat perceptions and shared interests necessary to fruitful
relationships among intelligence agencies are not sufficient, as other factors
may indeed complicate these relationships. For instance, a nation or a
specific agency’s intelligence culture may play a role. To wit, as the Cold
War progressed, the United States came to rely increasingly on national
technical means of gathering intelligence, to the detriment of human source
intelligence, including that provided through liaison relationships. 14
Furthermore, the notion of trust in, and respect for, other agencies is
foremost when the time comes to decide on the extent of intelligence
sharing arrangements. That is why, for instance, the United States has built
its most productive relationships around key allies, such as the member
nations of NATO, Japan, and South Korea.15 During the Cold War, these
allies established several multilateral forums for intelligence liaison
purposes, to which a few mechanisms were added in the 1990s.

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530 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE

The UKUSA Agreement

The UKUSA Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the First Party (the
United States) and Second Parties (the United Kingdom (UK), Australia,
Canada, and New Zealand), divided signals collection efforts among its
signatories.16 Historian Stephen Dorril correctly qualifies it as ‘‘the most
important and resilient part of British intelligence’s ‘special relationship’
with the United States,’’ 17 which, incidentally, has gone far beyond the
world of signals intelligence. For instance, the British Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), which produces intelligence assessments for senior
policymakers, has long involved the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in
its work, and vice-versa. 18 Cooperation among the five parties to the
agreement is believed to be close, but not necessarily mutually beneficial,
given the disproportionate resources at the disposal of the United States
and the United Kingdom, and those of the relatively small intelligence
communities of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.19 The relationships
fostered by the UKUSA Agreement are a key to the United States’s effort
to secure its homeland, and necessary to its fight against terrorism.

The Club of Berne

The Club of Berne, a forum for the heads of the separate national European
Union security services, has met annually since 1971, and has its own
dedicated communications system. According to the 1999 annual report of
the Dutch National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst—BVD,
now the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst — AIVD, or General
Intelligence and Security Service), that year’s meeting agenda for the Berne
Club included such items as terrorism, communications interception,
encryption, and cyberterrorism. In 2000, the Club focused on the position
or role of intelligence services with respect to European integration.
Informal contacts also take place among smaller groups. The Club works
in relative secrecy, amidst doubts about its efficiency and very shaky legal
footing. The situation reports drawn up by the heads of the participating
services merely provide information to member states, since they are
addressed to no particular European political authority, such as the
European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.20

The European Union

On 20 September, 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council realized that
enhanced cooperation among the member countries’ intelligence services
was required. It decided to establish, within Europol,21 for an initial six-
month period, a Counter-Terrorism Task Force for which the member
states were invited ‘‘to appoint liaison officers from police and intelligence

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INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 531

services specialising in the fight against terrorism.’’22 The Club of

Berne, mandated to provide guidance to Europol’s counterterrorism
experts, formed a consultation group of directors of counterterrorism
departments, which meets four times a year, to that effect.23 On 14 March,
2003, the European Union and NATO signed an agreement on the security
of information, a prerequisite for the exchange of intelligence between the
two organizations.24

The Kilowatt Group

Created in 1977, upon an Israeli suggestion following the attack by Black
September at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, was the Kilowatt Group.
Believed to have changed its name since then, it is comprised of twenty-
four member services: EU member states, Canada, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States (CIA and FBI), Israel (MOSSAD and Shin
Beth), and South Africa. They exchange, on a non-reciprocal basis,
information on terrorists and terrorist organizations. According to an
Assembly of the Western European Union report, however, ‘‘the ‘group’ is
little more than a telex network.’’25

The NATO Special Committee

The NATO Special Committee, known in NATO parlance as AC=46, is one
of the oldest intelligence exchange mechanisms among allies. Established by
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 3 December 1952, it is comprised of
the heads of security intelligence services of NATO member countries, each
of whom speaks for his country’s intelligence community. AC=46 advises
the NAC on espionage, terrorist, and other nonmilitary related threats that
might affect the alliance and its member states. The work of the
Committee, whose chairmanship rotates annually among heads of service,
is supported by the NATO Office of Security. In the wake of 9=11, the
Belgian chair of the Special Committee established, within NATO
Headquarters, an analytical unit to compile and analyze intelligence on
terrorism obtained from security services, disseminate this intelligence to
the Council and the Secretary General, and closely cooperate with NATO
military intelligence bodies. The Committee also explored the possibility of
increasing its cooperation in the field of counterterrorism with Russian
intelligence agencies.’’26
As part of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s (EAPC) Action
Plan 2000–2002, meetings of the EAPC forty-six countries’ intelligence
agencies were held within the framework of the NATO Special Committee.
These meetings focused on the identification of threats from, and responses
to, international terrorism.27 An EAPC meeting touching upon intelligence,
but outside the framework of the NATO Special Committee, was also held
post-9=11. Hosted by Poland, it was attended by a representative of the

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532 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE

Canadian chair of the NATO Special Committee, who chaired Working

Table 1 on the exchange of information, education, and training.28
In April 2002, Romanian authorities organized a symposium for NATO
members and candidate countries to discuss ‘‘The Intelligence and Security
Services and the Security Agenda of the XXIst Century.’’ According to a
NATO official who attended the meeting, ‘‘the event was also meant to
dispel lingering suspicions among intelligence services, which in the past
worked against each other.’’29

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units

The Egmont Group was established in 1995 to provide an international
forum for cooperation and the exchange of intelligence among national
financial intelligence units. Initially focused on the fight against money-
laundering, its work now includes efforts to thwart the financing of
terrorism. Many of its members are actively supporting their U.S.
colleagues in the war on terrorism.30 In June 2002, 11 financial intelligence
units, including the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of
Canada (FINTRAC), were added to the organization’s 58 members,
raising its membership to 69.31

‘‘Uni¢cation’’ of Services
In March 2001, Russian intelligence agencies hosted a meeting in St.
Petersburg, bringing together the heads of intelligence agencies, or their
representatives, from no fewer than 39 states. This ‘‘International Forum
of Secret Services’’ had, as its ultimate objective the bringing about of a
new level of intelligence cooperation through the ‘‘unification’’ of
espionage agencies.32 The Forum was certainly among the largest gathering
of intelligence agencies ever, outside of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council in AC=46 format.
While useful for bringing together the intelligence services of several
countries for some lofty purposes, and building confidence and trust over a
long period of time, these multilateral arrangements are, overall, far from
being privileged platforms for intelligence cooperation. The key reason has
to do with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, according to
the principle that ‘‘the wider the dissemination of information, the greater
the chance of its unauthorized disclosure.’’33 Bilateral liaison arrangements
are thus the preferred means of international intelligence cooperation.
Most, if not all, bilateral exchanges are subject to the third-party rule,
which means that intelligence supplied by a party to another cannot be
shared with a third one without the originator’s consent. Without such a
rule, intelligence shared with an ally could end up in the hands of a third
party friendly to the original recipient but an adversary of the originator.34

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INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 533

BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Bilateral liaison arrangements are a defining characteristic of the intelligence
world. Set up formally (i.e., with the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding) or informally (on the basis of an unwritten, gentlemanly
agreement), they pay particular attention to the participants’ protection of
their intelligence. They usually cover a wide range of issues, including the
sharing of assessments, raw data, or training facilities and the conduct of
joint operations, some of which could lay dormant at any given time.
While traces and discussions of particular bilateral relationships can be
found in the historical literature, key questions such as ‘‘How does such
cooperation arise? How frequently and what form does it take? Who
authorizes it and arranges it?’’ are not always easily answered.35
Most intelligence agencies recognize that the gaps in their coverage, access,
or expertise to do certain things, periodically compel them to rely on allied
intelligence services to fill the void. As an example of lack of expertise, in
the mid-1980s the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (France’s
internal security service — DST) asked the CIA and Germany’s Federal
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst — BND) for assistance in
exploiting documents provided by Colonel Vetrov (codenamed Farewell) of
the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), who in 1980 had offered his
services to the DST. Yves Bonnet, the head of the DST at the time, had
simply concluded that his service did not have the necessary expertise to
do the job.36
The liaison relationships of the United States have perhaps been discussed
more than those of any other country, largely because of the greater openness
of U.S. society with regard to intelligence matters. For example, the United
States and Germany have built a solid cooperative partnership dating back to
the end of World War II.37 They shared responsibilities against common
targets, specifically the Soviet Union and the German Democratic
Republic, throughout the Cold War and at least until the end of the Soviet
Union in 1991. With the advent of terrorism in Germany in the 1960s and
1970s, intelligence cooperation between the two countries extended to this
area as well.38
Israel, which faces constant threats from terrorism, has also developed a
series of intelligence relationships with its closest allies. Additionally, the
foreign intelligence service, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks
(ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim — MOSSAD), has built
unlikely ties with certain Muslim and Arab intelligence agencies, including
that of Jordan.39
Others, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)
and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), have hundreds of
liaison arrangements in place with foreign security and intelligence

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agencies. As of 2003, ASIO had 233 liaison partners, distributed across 104
countries, 40 and, as of 2002, CSIS had 230 liaison arrangements with
agencies from 130 countries. Like other Canadian organizations with an
intelligence mandate — the Department of National Defence, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, the Communications Security Establishment,
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Privy
Council Office — CSIS also has full-time Security Liaison Officers (SLOs)
posted abroad. 41 Given their large number, the liaison arrangements
managed by intelligence agencies are quite likely to differ tremendously in
scope, breadth, and depth.

REASONS FOR COOPERATION

Intelligence agencies cooperate for many reasons. No one agency can do and
know everything. But, they act primarily in support of their nation’s foreign
policy objectives and in their self-interest. They may even get better in the
process,42 that being one of the objectives behind many of the overtures
offered by multilateral arrangements for the sharing of intelligence, such as
NATO’s EAPC meetings in the framework of the Special Committee.
The United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
particularly attractive partners for less fortunate services that can trade
human intelligence for the more sophisticated and expensive technical
products to which they would not otherwise have access. As Paul Taillon
notes, ‘‘[O]n occasion, some smaller nations can have access to important
human intelligence sources, and therefore these states can be attractive
partners in intelligence-gathering activities abroad.’’ 43 Ultimately,
intelligence cooperation occurs when the potential benefits are evident, and
the costs or risks of that cooperation well understood.44 Filling identified
gaps, reducing operational costs, and replacing nonexistent diplomatic
relations are among the major benefits of intelligence cooperation. Others
may include some ability to influence, where applicable, the policies of
other countries, or ‘‘affect the course of a military conflict,’’ as happened
in 1984 after Iraq received U.S. intelligence useful in its war against Iran.45

RESTRAINTS ON COOPERATION
The nature and extent of intelligence liaison relationships can be affected by
several factors:
(1) Differences in perceptions of a threat and the foreign policy objectives of the
services’ respective nations, which may prevent a coordinated, effective, and
forceful approach in, perhaps, the fight against terrorism;46
(2) Differences in the distribution of power, which may be conducive to unequal
relationships with the consequent impact, for example, on domestic affairs for
the dominant partner, such as complaints about unfair burden-sharing;47

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INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 535

(3) The poor human rights records of a liaison partner, which may lead to a setback
in the relationship.48 This is a tricky issue for Western governments, which have
to carefully balance the requirement to protect their citizens with that of not
assisting human rights violations through cooperation with a liaison partner.49
(4) Legal issues. For example, the CSIS can enter into a liaison arrangement with a
foreign agency only with the approval of the Solicitor General of Canada, after
consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The
Solicitor General may impose conditions on any arrangements, and must ensure
that the human rights record of a prospective partner be assessed and weighed in
any decision, that all applicable laws of Canada be respected, and that the
arrangement be compatible with Canada’s foreign policy.50
The impact that judicial practice may have on a liaison arrangement must
be taken into account by both parties. A recent Canadian case is instructive.
In 2002, Nicholas Ribic, charged under Canada’s international hostage-
taking law, was granted access to CSIS and Department of National
Defence documents, some of which contained intelligence received in
confidence from foreign intelligence agencies. While recognizing this fact,
the trial judge took the position that a fair trial took precedence over the
protection of third parties’ intelligence data. The federal government
lawyers lost the argument that a release of the documents would damage

Canada’s ability to obtain intelligence from foreign governments and

other third parties. ‘We promised, before we received the information,
that we would keep the information confidential,’ Alain Préfontaine, a
Justice Department lawyer, said in an interview. ‘The source would be
more reluctant to divulge information in future . . . knowing that the
third-party might disclose it to the Canadian government, who might
then make it public.’51

(5) Related to the above is the fear that the intelligence exchanged, or knowledge
acquired, through the relationship will be compromised or passed on to a
third party without the originator’s consent is a major constraining factor on
any liaison arrangement.52 Numerous historical cases are available to illustrate
this point.
Certainly, one of the most damaging cases was Harold Adrian Russell
(Kim) Philby’s. A British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer working
for the KGB, he served as a liaison officer to the CIA from 1949 until
recalled to London in 1951. His time in Washington, D.C., was marked by
unprecedented access from the highest to the CIA’s lowest-ranked officials,
its planning, and what the Agency knew about Soviet operations. Without
compunction, he used this knowledge to derail a joint SIS-CIA infiltration
operation in Albania, thereby leading to the death of at least 300
individuals.53 Also, during his time in Washington, he hosted at his home
a fellow KGB spy, Guy Burgess, working for the British Foreign Ministry,

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a security risk if any. This infuriated the CIA, which, along with the SIS, was
still unaware that Philby was working for the Soviets. According to Miles
Copeland, who was with the Agency at the time, CIA Director Walter
Bedell Smith ‘‘sent an ultimatum of the greatest bluntness to the British.
‘Fire Philby,’ he said, ‘or we break off the intelligence relationship’’’ 54
(Philby defected to the Soviet Union a few years later). During this
delicate period, the United States severed its cooperation with Britain on
atomic weapons amidst fears that its nuclear secrets would be
compromised.55
A more recent case is the leak of a National Security Agency (NSA)
memorandum on signals intelligence collection against members of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A female employee of the
NSA’s cousin in the United Kingdom, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), was arrested in March 2003 and charged under the
Official Secrets Act. According to a news report, the memo was leaked
because of the arrested employee’s disagreement with the policy on Iraq
being pursued by her government and that of the United States.56 The leak
was excessively embarrassing to the United States, which became subject to
a UN investigation into the matter at the time when it was fighting hard at
the UNSC to see its views on Iraq prevail. Ian Davis and David Isenberg
of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) argued that
the leak was ‘‘driving a further wedge between Western nations at a crucial
time,’’ and speculated that the damage caused to transatlantic relations
would take a while to repair.57
(6) The intelligence exchanged through a liaison relationship could potentially
be used for unintended purposes, as it was by Israel in June 1981 when it
struck Iraq’s Osirak reactor, thanks to satellite imagery obtained from the
CIA. In response, the United States amended its intelligence-sharing
agreement with Israel to ensure that it would use U.S. intelligence for only
defensive purposes.58
This list, while not exhaustive,59 illustrates the variables to be weighed by
intelligence agencies when considering entry into a particular liaison
arrangement with a foreign intelligence agency. These variables lead to the
assumption that intelligence agencies likely prefer formal rather than
informal agreements, since they offer more protection and lay the base for
a more equitable quid pro quo.

FINDING THE RIGHT QUID PRO QUO

Although the literature on international intelligence cooperation is sparse
and largely historical 60 there is hardly any doubt that all intelligence
services perform some kind of liaison function. None has all the
resources—financial, human, and technical—to be entirely self-sufficient in

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INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 537

all areas. Furthermore, the transnational nature of security threats makes

isolation an impossible option. While international cooperation has to be
entertained, its benefits must be weighed against the costs and risks. Post
9=11, once implausible relationships are now apparently working out, at
least for the narrow purpose of combating al-Qaeda.
Multilateral arrangements, though they exist, are mostly neglected by
intelligence agencies, which place more importance on bilateral
relationships, primarily for security reasons. Fulfilling other objectives,
such as influencing policies and outcomes, is usually easier bilaterally,
rather than through a forum comprised of dozen of intelligence agencies,
each having a different mandate and objective. What is shared and done
multilaterally is usually not of a sensitive nature. Multilateral
arrangements, such as NATO and the Club of Berne, could be useful,
however, to establish relations based upon trust and confidence with new
organizational members or outside partners. Their purpose is, therefore,
more political, and their activities conducted in support of national or
agreed-upon policy objectives. While some multilateral arrangements have
contributed to the ongoing global war on terrorism, their impact, as far as
can be openly discerned, has been minimal.
In all likelihood, bilateral liaison arrangements and certain special-
function multilateral intelligence arrangements will characterize
international intelligence cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups. The Joint Inquiry Staff’s conclusion that United
States intelligence must develop its own human intelligence sources is well-
intended. But foreign intelligence agencies, because of their geographical
location and the composition and ability of their personnel, will continue,
in many cases, to have a clear comparative advantage which will not be
overcome by the U.S. putting more money into intelligence while isolating
itself in so doing. The key for U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as for
other agencies involved in the worldwide fight against terrorism, will be to
find the right quid pro quo with their liaison partners, while protecting
their own sources, methods, and information in reaching both their
common and separate objectives.

REFERENCES
1
This article focuses upon the international intelligence cooperation between
civilian security and intelligence agencies responsible for fighting terrorism and
therefore makes no attempt to characterize the nature and extent of military
intelligence relationships.
2
See, inter alia, Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to
Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 163.

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538 STE¤PHANE LEFEBVRE

3
For instance, Libyan intelligence agencies assisted the West in the fight against
terrorism post-9=11. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘‘Dangerous Liaison: Post-September
11 Intelligence Alliances,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3,
Fall 2002, p. 51.
4
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives
Investigating the Events Leading to the Attacks of September 11, 2001
(Washington, DC: 18 September 2002), p. 14; see also pp. 7–8.
5
El Pais, Spain, 28 April 2002.
6
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Statement before the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives
Investigating the Events Leading to the Attacks of September 11, 2001
(Washington, DC: 8 October 2002). This was confirmed by the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) on 17 October 2002. George J. Tenet, Written
Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence before the
Joint Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of
Representatives Investigating the Events Leading to the Attacks of September
11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), pp. 11–12.
7
Eleanor Hill, Statement of 8 October 2002.
8
Robert S. Mueller III, Testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee of the
U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives Investigating the Events Leading
to the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: 17 October 2002), p. 3.
9
Joint Inquiry Staff, Report: The Context. Part I: Findings and Conclusions
(Washington, DC: 10 December 2002), p. 9.
10
See, inter alia, Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the
CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002).
11
Desmond Ball, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The Intelligence Dimension of
the War Against Terrorism,’’ in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of
Global Order, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds. (Houndmills, United Kingdom:
Palgrave, 2002), p. 71.
12
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, pp. 174–175.
13
Jean-Franc° ois Gayraud and David Sénat, Le terrorisme (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, Que sais-je? No. 1768, 2002), pp. 61–62.
14
Richard Re and Kristen Eichensehr, ‘‘A Conversation with Bob Graham.
Searching for Answers: U.S. Intelligence After September 11,’’ Harvard
International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002, p. 40.
15
Ibid., p. 41.
16
Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: The
Penguin Press, 2002), p. 26. The key work on this subject is Jeffrey T.
Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation
Between the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
17
Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence
Service (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. 56.

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18
See Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw
the World (London: John Murray, 2002), pp. 271–280.
19
Christopher O. Spencer, ‘‘Intelligence Analysis Under Pressure of Rapid Change:
The Canadian Challenge,’’ The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 1,
Spring 1996, p. 63.
20
See, inter alia, Sylvain Besson, ‘‘Un vétéran des renseignements franc° ais oppose le
secret-défense à l’enquête sur ses comptes suisses’’ (6 December 2002), at
h t t p : ==w w w . m a r c o s b i l l i o n s . c o m =m a r c o s =Y 2 0 0 2 =D e c e m b e r =0 6 % 2 0
French%20intelligence%20veteran%20opposes% 20secrecy%20defence.htm;
M r. L e m o in e, R a p p o rt e u r , ‘ ‘T h e N e w C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g E u r o p e a n
Intelligence — Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,’’ Report submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee, Document A=1775 (Brussels: Assembly of
the Western European Union, 4 June 2002), at http:==www.assembly-
weu.org=en=documents=sessions_ordinaires=rpt=2002=1775.html#P179_22707;
and Intelligence Forum e-mail at http:==lists.his.com=intelforum=msg04402.html
21
Europol was set up to deal with criminal intelligence. See its booklet entitled
Europol Intelligence Management (The Hague, n.d.).
22
European Union, ‘‘Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home
Affairs), Brussels, 20 September 2001,’’ document SN 3926=6=01 REV6
(Brussels, 20 September 2001).
23
Frank Gregory, ‘‘The EU’s Role in the War on Terror,’’ Jane’s Terrorism &
Insurgency (January 2003); Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service
(AIVD) (The Hague: AIVD, 2002), p. 55. Accessed at http:==www.aivd.nl= on
12 March 2003.
24
The text of the draft agreement is available as an attachment to the Forwarding
Note from the Council of the European Union, ‘‘Agreement between the
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Security
of Information,’’ PESC 599, COSDP 463 (Brussels: 18 December 2002).
Accessed at http:==faculty.maxwell.syr.edu=asroberts=foi=library=gsoia=
nato_eu_2002_drft.pdf on 12 March 2003. See also NATO Press Release
PR=CP(2003)022 (14 March 2003). Accessed at http:==www.nato.int on 14
March 2003.
25
‘‘Swiss Citizen Abducted by Western Secret Service?’’, ‘‘Fortress Europe?’’ -
Circular Letter (FECL) No. 46, August 1996; Lemoine, The New Challenges
Facing European Intelligence.
26
Annual Report 2001 of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) (Prague: BIS,
2002). Accessed at http:==www.bis.cz=eng=vz2001=vz2001.html on 10 March
2003; Annual Report 2001 of the National Security Service (AIVD) (The Hague:
AIVD, 2002), p. 55. Accessed at http:==www.aivd.nl= on 12 March 2003;
NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001),
p. 298; Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.
27
EAPC Action Plans can be found on the NATO Web site at
http:==www.nato.int=pfp=eapc-blue.htm#work.
28
The agenda and speeches delivered at this meeting are posted at
http:==www.nato.int=docu=conf=2002=c020222b.htm.

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29
Agence France Presse, as quoted in Southeast European Times, 11 April 2002.
‘‘President Ion Iliescu Meets Participants in Symposium on Role of Intelligence
Services in XXIst Century,’’ Romanian News Agency, 12 April 2002. Accessed
at http:==www.romania.fi=news_archive= on 12 March 2003.
30
Alan Larson, ‘‘The International Dimension of Combating the Financing of
Terrorism,’’ Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance
(Washington, DC: 9 October 2002). In his Executive Order of 24 September
2001, U.S. President George W. Bush requested that the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and other appropriate agencies make all efforts to
cooperate and coordinate with other countries, including with respect to the
sharing of intelligence about funding activities in support of terrorism. ‘‘Bush
Executive Order on Freezing Terrorist Assets’’ (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, International Information Programs, 24 September 2001).
Accessed at http:==usinfo.state.gov= on 25 September 2001.
31
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Performance
Report for the Period Ending March 31, 2002 (Ottawa: Minister of Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 2002), pp. 1–2, 58; and Jimmy
Gurulé, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (Washington,
DC: 9 October 2002), p. 14. See also Statement of Purpose of the Egmont
Group of Financial Intelligence Units (The Hague, 13 June 2001).
32
Oleg A. Kalugin, ‘‘Window of Opportunity: Russia’s Role in the Coalition
Against Terror,’’ Harvard International Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2002,
p. 60.
33
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ International
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 1990, p. 315.
34
Ibid., pp. 315–316.
35
Lemoine, The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence.
36
See Yves Bonnet, Contre-espionnage: Me´moires d’un patron de la DST (Paris:
Calmann-Lévy, 2000).
37
CIA historian Kevin Conley Ruffner compiled a rich collection of documents on
this relationship, Forging an Intelligence Partnership: CIA and the Origins of the
BND, 1945–49, that was recently declassified. This was noted in Ruffner’s
biographic details in the Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter
2002=2003 (accessed at http:==www.intelligence-history. org=jih=contributors-2-
2.html on 6 March 2003); and discussed in Vincent Jauvert, ‘‘Gehlen, l’homme
du Reichet de la Maison-Blanche,’’ Le Nouvel Observateur, 11 July 2002.
38
Loch K. Johnson and Annette Freyberg, ‘‘Ambivalent Bedfellows: German-
American Intelligence Relations, 1969–1991,’’ International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 165–179.
39
Yigal Sheffy, ‘‘Israeli Intelligence and Counterterrorism,’’ paper presented at the
annual conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence
Studies (CASIS) (Ottawa: 26–28 September 2002), p. 9.

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40
ASIO Director General Dennis Richardson, Address to Australian Industry
Group (Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, 17, 19, and 21 February 2003).
Accessed at http:==www.asio.gov.au=Media= comp.htm on 10 March 2003.
41
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Public Report 2001 (Ottawa: CSIS,
2002). Accessed at http:==www.csis-scrs-gc.ca on 10 March 2003); Government of
Canada, The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community (Ottawa: Privy
Council Office, 2001), pp. 17–18. Accessed at http:==www.pco-bcp.gc.ca on 10
March 2003.
42
As Paul Taillon argues, ‘‘more experience in working with foreign security,
intelligence agencies and military forces may assist in an overall improvement
of national intelligence services.’’ Hijacking and Hostages, p. 166.
43
Ibid., p. 166; See also Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence
Cooperation,’’ p. 312.
44
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 307–323.
45
Ibid., p. 314.
46
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 172.
47
Ibid., p. 172; Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’
p. 309.
48
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 174.
49
This is a particularly sensitive issue in Canada. The Security Intelligence Review
Committee (SIRC) regularly audits CSIS on this matter, while being fully
conscious of the balance to be maintained between protecting Canadians and
preventing further abuses as a result of intelligence exchanges. See Security
Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2000–2001: An Operational Audit
of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2001), p. 7.
50
Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2001–2002: An Operational
Audit of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2002), p. 19.
51
Tom Blackwell, ‘‘Kidnapping Ruling May Pose Security Threat,’’ The National
Post, Canada, 14 September 2002.
52
Paul Taillon, Hijacking and Hostages, p. 175.
53
Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightley, with an introduction by John le
Carré, The Philby Conspiracy (Toronto: Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 2, 187–188;
John Prados, President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations
from World War II through the Persian Gulf, revised and updated edition
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996 [1986]), pp. 48, 50.
54
Bruce Page, et al., The Philby Conspiracy, pp. 234–235.
55
This led Britain to build the Blue Danube atomic bomb. Michael Smith, ‘‘MoD
Shows Terrorists How to Make an A-Bomb,’’ The Daily Telegraph, 15 April
2002, p. 1. Cooperation was restored in 1958. Peter Hennessy, The Secret
State: Whitehall and the Cold War, p. 59.

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56
Martin Bright, ‘‘GCHQ Arrest over Observer Spying Report,’’ The Observer, 9
March 2003. This was compounded by stories that the United States was
clearly reluctant to share intelligence with UN inspectors in Iraq for fears ‘‘that
sensitive information might be leaked to the Iraqis and that intelligence-
gathering sources could be compromised.’’ Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Colum
Lynch. ‘‘U.N. Officials Say Intelligence to Prove US Claims Is Lacking,’’ The
Washington Post, 27 January 2003, p. 12.
57
Ian Davis and David Isenberg, ‘‘The Long History of UN Espionage,’’ The
Observer, 9 March 2003.
58
Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,’’ p. 316; Bob
Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987), pp. 160–161.
59
Other factors include: a) ‘‘nations that provide key intelligence may seek to extort
political or other benefits from a partner, or to avoid sanctions;’’ b) ‘‘participation
in international intelligence arrangements may also cause a nation to conduct
intelligence operations of little or no direct use to its own security;’’ and c)
‘‘Finally, nations may risk, or so believe, serious embarrassment when details
of intelligence sharing become public.’’ Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘‘The Calculus of
Intelligence Cooperation,’’ pp. 317–318. For a general discussion, see also
Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 200–220.
60
For a short overview, see Arthur S. Hulnick, ‘‘Intelligence Cooperation in the
Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?’’ International Journal of Intelligence
and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 455–465.

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