PS 151a Question Bank.

1. 2. 3. 4. Access the relative merits of a counter-value nuclear posture versus a counter-force nuclear posture. In light of the horrors of World War II strategic bombing and the Holocaust, which makes more sense? s After WWII, the United States rapidly demilitarized. The Soviet Union did not. In your opinion, do you believe this to be a significant factor in the outbreak of the cold war? Analyze the nature of the Bismarck-Moltke feud. What implications does this conflict have for contemporary civil-military relations? What does Clausewitz say? Are the outcomes of wars deterministic (i.e. we lost Vietnam and would lose it again if we could fight it over any way we wanted)? Some authors maintain that the outcomes of wars are a given, but that leaders simply misjudge the likely outcome until the war is underway. From this perspective, wars then only begin when there is uncertainty about the outcome, which can only be solved through the actually waging of the war. Others argue that, in fact, that wars outcomes might have ended up quite differently than they did in actuality and as a result that we should view the outcomes as probabilistic. In your opinion, which is a more compelling argument and how should policy be crafted to reflect that belief? Assess Hitler as a strategist. To what extent were his military polices consistent with his political objectives. Assess the British policy of appeasement. Can you see this type of policy in action today? Bismarck claimed that policy makers were like ships at sea, in that they could not determine the weather but that they could openly steer their ship. Bad steersman crashed upon the shores, good pilots brought their ships safely to port. Do you agree with this somewhat fatalistic view of world politics? Might it vary depending on the size of the state in question or the power relations among the states in the international system at a particular time? Bismarck was able to pursue a successful limited war strategy to increase his position as a great power in Europe. The United States fought in three major limited wars during the post WWII era (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War). Evaluate the relative success of the United State's use of limited war compared to Bismarck What do s. you believe explains the differences and similarities? Bismarck opponents seem to have accepted their losses in the limited wars during the mid-19th century. s Clausewitz also points out that wars are never over. What types of social conditions lead to wars that end and to wars in which the fighting stops but the underlying tensions continue to simmer?

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. Clausewitz covered a great deal of theoretical territory, but he left a great many things out? What are some of the problems or actors that he ignored? 11. Clemenceau declared that was far too important to be left to the generals. Does the history of the British, French or German leadership in WWI support this contention? 12. Compare the Weinburger and Powell Doctrines to the basic tenets of Clausewitz. If a state were to follow the ideas of either Clausewitz or Weinburger, which would likely be more successful at deterring potential wars from occurring? 13. Discuss the interaction of political and military considerations in the development of Anglo-American strategy in Europe during the World Wars. 14. Do you believe that social class, racial and ethnic cleavages affect how states prosecute wars and whom states mobilize? How might these problems affect the costs, duration and outcomes of wars? Do these types of problems exist today? 15. During the cold war, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) apparently made for a stable and peaceful conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. More recently, START talks and other arms control conventions aim to reduce our strategic arsenals. Do you believe this to be a wisest policy? What might be a safer alternative? 16. During World War I, the closing act of the war became one of limited aims fought with total means. In WWII, the allies switched to a doctrine of unconditional surrender. Did the allies doctrine of unconditional surrender conform to Clausewitz dictum that war is a continuation of policy by other means? Was it a wise policy to s pursue, in your opinion? 17. Explain the origins of the Cult of the Offensive. Do you think this was a decisive factor that led to the initiation and the extended duration of World War I? 18. Following the Vietnam War, large numbers of American soldiers fell victim to PTSD. What conditions during the war and afterwards helped to create this problem? How were previous wars different? 19. George Bush frequently compared Hussein to Hitler and the situation in the Middle East to the situation Britain and France faced in Munich before the outset of World War II. Do you believe this comparison to be either valid

or fair? How might events have turned out differently if the allies in 1937 had possessed 12,000 nuclear weapons along with the ability to crush Germany domestic economy? s 20. George Bush, at the moment the Gulf War ended, was arguably the most popular president ever. His decline in popularity was both staggering in its pace and awe inspiring in its depth. In your opinion, why didn the Gulf t War provide sustained popularity for the man who drove his country to war and won a what was characterized by many as a great victory? 21. Germany bore a heavy burden after the war as a result of atrocities attributed to it. Japan committed similar acts but has not suffered the same stigma internationally that Germany did/has. Why do you think this is? 22. Given the horrors of Hitler final solution, and that the United States was apparently aware of the Auschwitz s and other camps some time before the end of the war, do you believe the US pursued the destruction of the Nazi military as quickly as it might have or should have? If the US should have pursued alternative policies, what might they have looked like? 23. How does 7 Weeks War transform the international system? Compare the systemic transformation that followed this rather short and relatively inexpensive war to the system transformation that followed in the wake of W.W.II. 24. How well did The Schlieffen Plan serve German political interests? What alternative objectives and strategies might Germany have pursued during the early 20th century? 25. How were German war aims altered during W.W.I? To what extent were strategic plans subordinate to these political objectives? 26. In each of the wars studied, states apparently learned lessons from the previous wars they had been involved in. In your opinion, typically, do states seem to make good use of past experience or do technology and societies change to such a degree between wars that lessons from the past simply muddy the current waters? 27. In July 1914, almost every political and military leader believed that the war would be a short one. Obviously, it was not. How could so many be so wrong at the same time? 28. In On War, Clausewitz discusses the use and theory of limited war. Compare his ideas with the several cases that we have looked at this semester. How does limited war differ in practice from what Clausewitz anticipated in theory? 29. In the popular mythology of the Vietnam War, the war is typically cast as being the least popular war ever, and unpopular from the outset. Would you agree with the characterization, if so why, and if not, how do explain the creation of the myth? 30. In what ways did public opinion influence the strategies of the opposing coalitions in W.W.I? Are there any lessons here applicable to the contemporary world? 31. In what ways did Bismarck opponents thwart him in achieving his objectives? What lessons might the modern s analyst draw from Bismarck experience? s 32. In what ways were Prussia wars against Denmark, Austria and France Limited? Why did Bismarck impose s these limitations? 33. In World War I, the generals dictated the strategies that led, in part, to the outbreak of war. How did the civilians react to this during the interwar period? 34. In your view, who is/was most responsible for the cold war. Was it inevitable? 35. Is Clausewitz view germane to the contemporary political/military environment? s 36. Many argue that the U.S. embargo of Japan pushed the Japanese towards an aggressive solution to their problems in Asia. In your opinion, was the US culpable, and if so how does this reflect on the widespread use of economic sanctions today? 37. Many authors argue that Clausewitz work has little relevance in the nuclear age. Do you agree? However, if s this were the case, what would be a better alternative framework to view strategy? 38. Many contemporaneous accounts called World War I The war to end all wars. How does this notion square with a Clausewitzian view of foreign policy? 39. NSC-68 takes a worst case scenario as its starting point. Is this type of analysis justified today? What would the worst case look like today for the US, and what type of policies would that imply? 40. Nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the way the major powers planned for war (or to prevent it). While nuclear destruction would be a horrible thing, in your opinion do you believe that nuclear weapons and strategy played a significant role in determining the lack of major power war after W.W.II? hot

41. Pogroms in the Soviet Union and the collectivization of the agricultural industry cost millions of people their lives. Stalin purges of the officer corps stripped the military of nearly all officers above the rank of captain. s Yet, after all this, nearly 20 million Soviets gave their lives to sustain Stalin regime. Why? s 42. Thomas Schelling believed that the costs of the Korean War (~40,000 US dead) was a cheap price to pay for maintaining the US reputation. Do you agree? Would this attitude be sustainable with today more modern, s, political and social mores? 43. Should the US have pursued the development of the hydrogen bomb? 44. The third world bore a heavy price for the US-Soviet competition (When elephants fight the mice and grasses suffer). In your opinion, should the US have allowed the Soviets to expand their influence in the 3rd world unchallenged? 45. The Cold War competition was relative stable in the European and Strategic nuclear realms. In the 3rd world, it was quite violent. How could the US have achieved its foreign policy goals at lower costs to the people on the ground in the nations being fought over? 46. The Gulf war was a resounding success that is slowly fading into oblivion. The Vietnam War continues to capture the imagination of scholars and popular artists alike. In your opinion, why is this and do you believe it to be a good thing? What broader lessons about society might we draw from the Gulf War which have not been to date? 47. The Korean War is most frequently viewed as ending in a draw or a stalemate which is then perceived as a loss for the United States. But the outcome of the war had far reaching effects and implications for many actors beyond simply the United States, South Korea and North Korea. Evaluate the greater population of winners and losers and then sum up to describe who you feel should be viewed as the ultimate winner (if any). 48. The most frequently cited quotation form Clausewitz is his assertion that war is the execution of politics by other means. What does Clausewitz mean by this? 49. The outbreak of WWII was characterized by several major surprises: The sudden collapse of France, Operation Barbarosa, the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Given the high level of intelligence information available, how could leaders have failed to foresee these events taking place? 50. Compared to other European states, the Prussia that Bismarck guided was quite homogeneous (ethnically and racially). How might this have been an advantage or disadvantage in his policy goal of unifying the German states into a single great power? 51. The Truman administration apparently jumped into the Korea war without hesitation, in your opinion, was this wise policy? What were the alternatives and how might they have played out given your ex post knowledge compared to Truman ex ante beliefs. s 52. The United State active participation in Vietnam lasted from 1946 until 1975. We fought as active combatants s from 1965 until 1973. Clearly, this is the longest war we have fought. Why did war last so long? 53. The United States pursued a policy of disarmament and isolationism during the inter-war period. Would similar policies be wise today? What role did this play in facilitating WWII? 54. The United States was responsible for almost every step of the technological arms race with the Soviet Union. Physicists such as Hans Bethe (project manager for the H-bomb) argue that the US should not have pursued the development of the hydrogen bomb, MIRVs and other innovations since they would inevitable be matched. Do you agree with the Nobel Prize winner? 55. The Vietnam War is popularly viewed as an unmitigated failure. Both the United States military and the United States government (and other states as well) learned many lessons which were latter applied in the Gulf war (and Falklands). What were these lessons and why are they so important? 56. The Vietnam War was at the local level a failure but in the longer term part of a successful strategy to divide the communists. Locally, The Gulf War can at least be labeled a qualified success, in that some, if not al, of our goals were achieved at minimal costs in human terms. However, what, in your opinion, will be the long-term consequences of the war? Has the United States increased its ability to manage potential threats around the world? 57. The Vietnam War was fought as a limited war using limited means to pursue limited aims. As such, it did not go well, almost from the very outset. Why did the local limited war go so poorly and were there steps that might have been taken that would have led to different and better outcomes? 58. To what degree were the German and Japanese societies for facilitating the outbreak of the war and then the horrible means by which these two states prosecuted the war?

59. Traditional historians hold the Soviet Union largely responsible for the Cold war, revisionist scholars point out that the US may have been largely to blame as well. What could the US have done differently that would have led to a more pacific world after World War II? 60. US strategy in Korea was similar to that which we employed in WWII. How might we have fought the war differently? How would Clausewitz design our strategy? 61. Using a Clausewitzian framework, evaluate the political and military strategies pursued by the Americans during the Gulf War. Was George Bush a brilliant foreign policy strategist who simply mismanaged the domestic political situation or is the conventional wisdom regarding the Bush presidency largely flawed? 62. Was the decision to drop the nuclear bombs in Japan a wise one? Evaluate this based on what is known to day and what was likely known at the time. 63. Was the gulf war a successful war, or in other words, a victory? Answer this question by comparing the popular myth of the war to a careful matching of the ends or goals set out at the beginning of the war, the means used to achieve them, and the post-war realities. 64. What combination of domestic and foreign conditions facilitated the success of Bismarck strategy of limited s war? Could these conditions be replicated today? 65. What differences does Clausewitz see between limited and general war? What are the major problems political leaders confront in a limited war? 66. What does Clausewitz believe to be the proper roles of civilian and military leaders in formulating and executing national strategy? 67. What fundamental principles of war can be deduced from the writings of Clausewitz? Are these principles still valid today? 68. What is the nature of war according to Clausewitz? How do the political objectives of war affect its nature? 69. What lessons can we take away from the origins of World War I that might apply to today world? s 70. What policies did the opposing coalitions pursue towards revolutionary Russia? Did these policies advance or hinder their strategic objectives? 71. What real or presumed lessons of WWI appear to have affected Anglo-American strategy in WWII? Were these lessons appropriate to the new technological and strategic situations? 72. What role did the treaty of Versailles play in the origins of World War II? 73. What were the political objectives of France, Britain and the United States? Was allied military strategy consistent with these objectives? 74. What, in you opinion, were the most serious mistakes made by political leaders, diplomats, and generals in the July crisis that led to World War I? What accounts for their poor performance in managing that crisis? 75. What, in your opinion, were the most important underlying causes of The First World War? From these causes, whom do you believe, if anyone should have been held accountable for the war? 76. Why is the Vietnam War perceived as such a tremendous failure? Explain how might it better be thought of: as a smaller loss in part of large, and victorious, war. In your answer, be sure to review the other parts of this larger war. 77. Some historians have described World War I as the result of an unsuccessful effort by Germany and AustriaHungary to wage a limited war in Eastern Europe. Do you agree with this interpretation? If so, why were the Central Powers unable to keep the war a limited one? 78. Describe the basic structure of the POW game. How do the different state and social structures influence soldiers decision to remain loyal or to exercise their exit option? 79. Honoring the various war conventions (Geneva, Hague, etc.) and observing the basic tenets of just war theory has long been presented as altruistic behavior by realist scholars and practitioners. Is this always the case, and if not, under what conditions (and why) would behaving in an apparently altruistic fashion actually increase the apparent power of a state?

80. Compare and contrast, using the cases we investigated this semester, the role that each of the three images
(individual, state, system) play in determining war outcomes, costs and durations.