Thermonuclear

weapon

A thermonuclear weapon, fusion weapon

or hydrogen bomb (H bomb) is a second-
generation nuclear weapon design. Its
greater sophistication affords it vastly
greater destructive power than first-
generation nuclear bombs, a more
compact size, a lower mass, or a
combination of these benefits.
Characteristics of nuclear fusion reactions
make possible the use of non-fissile
depleted uranium as the weapon's main
fuel, thus allowing more efficient use of
scarce fissile material such as uranium-
235 239
235 ( U) or plutonium-239 ( Pu). The
first full-scale thermonuclear test was
carried out by the United States in 1952;
the concept has since been employed by
most of the world's nuclear powers in the
design of their weapons.[1]
A basic diagram of a thermonuclear weapon.
Note: some designs use spherical secondaries.
A. fission primary stage

B. fusion secondary stage

1. High-explosive lenses

2. Uranium-238 ("tamper") lined with beryllium reflector

3. Vacuum ("levitated core")

4. Tritium "boost" gas (blue) within plutonium or uranium hollow core

5. Radiation channel filled with polystyrene foam

6. Uranium ("pusher/tamper")

7. Lithium-6 deuteride (fusion fuel)

8. Plutonium ("spark plug")

9. Radiation case (confines thermal X-rays by reflection)

Modern fusion weapons consist

essentially of two main components: a
nuclear fission primary stage (fueled by
235 239
U or Pu) and a separate nuclear
fusion secondary stage containing
thermonuclear fuel: the heavy hydrogen
isotopes deuterium and tritium, or in
modern weapons lithium deuteride. For
this reason, thermonuclear weapons are
often colloquially called hydrogen bombs
or H-bombs.[note 1]

A fusion explosion begins with the

detonation of the fission primary stage. Its
temperature soars past approximately 100
million kelvin, causing it to glow intensely
with thermal X-rays. These X-rays flood the
void (the "radiation channel" often filled
with polystyrene foam) between the
primary and secondary assemblies placed
within an enclosure called a radiation case,
which confines the X-ray energy and
resists its outward pressure. The distance
separating the two assemblies ensures
that debris fragments from the fission
primary (which move much more slowly
than X-ray photons) cannot disassemble
the secondary before the fusion explosion
runs to completion.

The secondary fusion stage—consisting of

outer pusher/tamper, fusion fuel filler and
central plutonium spark plug—is imploded
by the X-ray energy impinging on its
pusher/tamper. This compresses the
entire secondary stage and drives up the
density of the plutonium spark plug. The
density of the plutonium fuel rises to such
an extent that the spark plug is driven into
a supercritical state, and it begins a
nuclear fission chain reaction. The fission
products of this chain reaction heat the
highly compressed, and thus super dense,
thermonuclear fuel surrounding the spark
plug to around 300 million kelvin, igniting
fusion reactions between fusion fuel
nuclei. In modern weapons fueled by
lithium deuteride, the fissioning plutonium
spark plug also emits free neutrons that
collide with lithium nuclei and supply the
tritium component of the thermonuclear
fuel.

The secondary's relatively massive tamper

(which resists outward expansion as the
explosion proceeds) also serves as a
thermal barrier to keep the fusion fuel filler
from becoming too hot, which would spoil
the compression. If made of uranium,
enriched uranium or plutonium, the tamper
captures fast fusion neutrons and
undergoes fission itself, increasing the
overall explosive yield. Additionally, in
most designs the radiation case is also
constructed of a fissile material that
undergoes fission driven by fast
thermonuclear neutrons. Such bombs are
classified as two stage weapons, and
most current Teller–Ulam designs are
such fission-fusion-fission weapons. Fast
fission of the tamper and radiation case is
the main contribution to the total yield and
is the dominant process that produces
radioactive fission product fallout.[2][3]

Before Ivy Mike, Operation Greenhouse of

1951 was the first American nuclear test
series to test principles that led to the
development of thermonuclear weapons.
Sufficient fission was achieved to boost
the associated fusion device, and enough
was learned to achieve a full-scale device
within a year. The design of all modern
thermonuclear weapons in the United
States is known as the Teller–Ulam
configuration for its two chief contributors,
Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, who
developed it in 1951[4] for the United
States, with certain concepts developed
with the contribution of physicist John von
Neumann. Similar devices were developed
by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
France, and China. The thermonuclear Tsar
Bomba was the most powerful bomb ever
tested.[5]

As thermonuclear weapons represent the

most efficient design for weapon energy
yield in weapons with yields above 50
kilotons of TNT (210 TJ), virtually all the
nuclear weapons of this size deployed by
the five nuclear-weapon states under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty today are
thermonuclear weapons using the Teller–
Ulam design.[6]

Public knowledge concerning

nuclear weapon design

Edward Teller in 1958

Detailed knowledge of fission and fusion

weapons is classified to some degree in
virtually every industrialized nation. In the
United States, such knowledge can by
default be classified as "Restricted Data",
even if it is created by persons who are not
government employees or associated with
weapons programs, in a legal doctrine
known as "born secret" (though the
constitutional standing of the doctrine has
been at times called into question; see
United States v. Progressive, Inc.). Born
secret is rarely invoked for cases of private
speculation. The official policy of the
United States Department of Energy has
been not to acknowledge the leaking of
design information, as such
acknowledgment would potentially
validate the information as accurate. In a
small number of prior cases, the U.S.
government has attempted to censor
weapons information in the public press,
with limited success.[7] According to the
New York Times, physicist Kenneth W. Ford
defied government orders to remove
classified information from his book,
Building the H Bomb: A Personal History.
Ford claims he used only pre-existing
information and even submitted a
manuscript to the government, which
wanted to remove entire sections of the
book for concern that foreign nations
could use the information.[8]

Though large quantities of vague data

have been officially released, and larger
quantities of vague data have been
unofficially leaked by former bomb
designers, most public descriptions of
nuclear weapon design details rely to
some degree on speculation, reverse
engineering from known information, or
comparison with similar fields of physics
(inertial confinement fusion is the primary
example). Such processes have resulted in
a body of unclassified knowledge about
nuclear bombs that is generally consistent
with official unclassified information
releases, related physics, and is thought to
be internally consistent, though there are
some points of interpretation that are still
considered open. The state of public
knowledge about the Teller–Ulam design
has been mostly shaped from a few
specific incidents outlined in a section
below.

Basic principle
The basic principle of the Teller–Ulam
configuration is the idea that different
parts of a thermonuclear weapon can be
chained together in "stages", with the
detonation of each stage providing the
energy to ignite the next stage. At a bare
minimum, this implies a primary section
that consists of an implosion-type fission
bomb (a "trigger"), and a secondary section
that consists of fusion fuel. The energy
released by the primary compresses the
secondary through a process called
"radiation implosion", at which point it is
heated and undergoes nuclear fusion. This
process could be continued, with energy
from the secondary igniting a third fusion
stage; Russia's AN602 "Tsar Bomba" is
thought to have been a three-stage fission-
fusion-fusion device. Theoretically by
continuing this process thermonuclear
weapons with arbitrarily high yield could be
constructed. This contrasts with fission
weapons, which are limited in yield
because only so much fission fuel can be
amassed in one place before the danger of
its accidentally becoming supercritical
becomes too great.

One possible version of the Teller–Ulam configuration

Surrounding the other components is a

hohlraum or radiation case, a container
that traps the first stage or primary's
energy inside temporarily. The outside of
this radiation case, which is also normally
the outside casing of the bomb, is the only
direct visual evidence publicly available of
any thermonuclear bomb component's
configuration. Numerous photographs of
various thermonuclear bomb exteriors
have been declassified.[9]

The primary is thought to be a standard

implosion method fission bomb, though
likely with a core boosted by small
amounts of fusion fuel (usually 50/50%
deuterium/tritium gas) for extra efficiency;
the fusion fuel releases excess neutrons
when heated and compressed, inducing
239
additional fission. When fired, the Pu or
235
U core would be compressed to a
smaller sphere by special layers of
conventional high explosives arranged
around it in an explosive lens pattern,
initiating the nuclear chain reaction that
powers the conventional "atomic bomb".

The secondary is usually shown as a

column of fusion fuel and other
components wrapped in many layers.
Around the column is first a "pusher-
tamper", a heavy layer of uranium-238 (
238
U) or lead that helps compress the
fusion fuel (and, in the case of uranium,
may eventually undergo fission itself).
Inside this is the fusion fuel itself, usually a
form of lithium deuteride, which is used
because it is easier to weaponize than
liquefied tritium/deuterium gas. This dry
fuel, when bombarded by neutrons,
produces tritium, a heavy isotope of
hydrogen that can undergo nuclear fusion,
along with the deuterium present in the
mixture. (See the article on nuclear fusion
for a more detailed technical discussion of
fusion reactions.) Inside the layer of fuel is
the "spark plug", a hollow column of fissile
239 235
material ( Pu or U) often boosted by
deuterium gas. The spark plug, when
compressed, can itself undergo nuclear
fission (because of the shape, it is not a
critical mass without compression). The
tertiary, if one is present, would be set
below the secondary and probably be
made of the same materials.[10][11]

Separating the secondary from the primary

is the interstage. The fissioning primary
produces four types of energy: 1)
expanding hot gases from high explosive
charges that implode the primary; 2)
superheated plasma that was originally
the bomb's fissile material and its tamper;
3) the electromagnetic radiation; and 4)
the neutrons from the primary's nuclear
detonation. The interstage is responsible
for accurately modulating the transfer of
energy from the primary to the secondary.
It must direct the hot gases, plasma,
electromagnetic radiation and neutrons
toward the right place at the right time.
Less than optimal interstage designs have
resulted in the secondary failing to work
entirely on multiple shots, known as a
"fissile fizzle". The Castle Koon shot of
Operation Castle is a good example; a
small flaw allowed the neutron flux from
the primary to prematurely begin heating
the secondary, weakening the
compression enough to prevent any
fusion.
 Classified paper by Teller and Ulam on 9 March 1951: On Heterocatalytic Detonations I: Hydrodynamic Lenses and
Radiation Mirrors, in which they proposed their revolutionary staged implosion idea. This declassified version is
extensively redacted.

There is very little detailed information in

the open literature about the mechanism
of the interstage. One of the best sources
is a simplified diagram of a British
thermonuclear weapon similar to the
American W80 warhead. It was released
by Greenpeace in a report titled "Dual Use
Nuclear Technology".[12] The major
components and their arrangement are in
the diagram, though details are almost
absent; what scattered details it does
include likely have intentional omissions or
inaccuracies. They are labeled "End-cap
and Neutron Focus Lens" and "Reflector
Wrap"; the former channels neutrons to the
235 239
U/ Pu Spark Plug while the latter
refers to an X-ray reflector; typically a
cylinder made of an X-ray opaque material
such as uranium with the primary and
secondary at either end. It does not reflect
like a mirror; instead, it gets heated to a
high temperature by the X-ray flux from the
primary, then it emits more evenly spread
X-rays that travel to the secondary,
causing what is known as radiation
implosion. In Ivy Mike, gold was used as a
coating over the uranium to enhance the
blackbody effect.[13] Next comes the
"Reflector/Neutron Gun Carriage". The
reflector seals the gap between the
Neutron Focus Lens (in the center) and the
outer casing near the primary. It separates
the primary from the secondary and
performs the same function as the
previous reflector. There are about six
neutron guns (seen here from Sandia
National Laboratories[14]) each protruding
through the outer edge of the reflector with
one end in each section; all are clamped to
the carriage and arranged more or less
evenly around the casing's circumference.
The neutron guns are tilted so the neutron
emitting end of each gun end is pointed
towards the central axis of the bomb.
Neutrons from each neutron gun pass
through and are focused by the neutron
focus lens towards the centre of primary in
order to boost the initial fissioning of the
plutonium. A "polystyrene
Polarizer/Plasma Source" is also shown
(see below).

The first U.S. government document to

mention the interstage was only recently
released to the public promoting the 2004
initiation of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead Program. A graphic includes
blurbs describing the potential advantage
of a RRW on a part by part level, with the
interstage blurb saying a new design
would replace "toxic, brittle material" and
"expensive 'special' material... [that require]
unique facilities".[15] The "toxic, brittle
material" is widely assumed to be
beryllium, which fits that description and
would also moderate the neutron flux from
the primary. Some material to absorb and
re-radiate the X-rays in a particular manner
may also be used.[16]

Candidates for the "special material" are

polystyrene and a substance called
"Fogbank", an unclassified codename.
Fogbank's composition is classified,
though aerogel has been suggested as a
possibility. It was first used in
thermonuclear weapons with the W76
thermonuclear warhead, and produced at
a plant in the Y-12 Complex at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, for use in the W76. Production
of Fogbank lapsed after the W76
production run ended. The W76 Life
Extension Program required more Fogbank
to be made. This was complicated by the
fact that the original Fogbank's properties
were not fully documented, so a massive
effort was mounted to re-invent the
process. An impurity crucial to the
properties of the old Fogbank was omitted
during the new process. Only close
analysis of new and old batches revealed
the nature of that impurity. The
manufacturing process used acetonitrile
as a solvent, which led to at least three
evacuations of the Fogbank plant in 2006.
Widely used in the petroleum and
pharmaceutical industries, acetonitrile is
flammable and toxic. Y-12 is the sole
producer of Fogbank.[17]

Summary

A simplified summary of the above

explanation is:
1. A (relatively) small fission bomb
known as the "primary" explodes.
2. Energy released in the primary is
transferred to the secondary (or
fusion) stage. This energy
compresses the fusion fuel and
sparkplug; the compressed sparkplug
becomes supercritical and undergoes
a fission chain reaction, further
heating the compressed fusion fuel
to a high enough temperature to
induce fusion.
3. Energy released by the fusion events
continues heating the fuel, keeping
the reaction going.
 4. The fusion fuel of the secondary
stage may be surrounded by a layer
of additional fuel that undergoes
fission when hit by the neutrons from
the reactions within. These fission
events account for about half of the
total energy released in typical
designs.

Compression of the
secondary
The basic idea of the Teller–Ulam
configuration is that each "stage" would
undergo fission or fusion (or both) and
release energy, much of which would be
transferred to another stage to trigger it.
How exactly the energy is "transported"
from the primary to the secondary has
been the subject of some disagreement in
the open press, but is thought to be
transmitted through the X-rays and
Gamma rays that are emitted from the
fissioning primary. This energy is then used
to compress the secondary. The crucial
detail of how the X-rays create the
pressure is the main remaining disputed
point in the unclassified press. There are
three proposed theories:

Radiation pressure exerted by the X-

rays. This was the first idea put forth by
 Howard Morland in the article in The
Progressive.
X-rays creating a plasma in the radiation
channel's filler (a polystyrene or
"Fogbank" plastic foam). This was a
second idea put forward by Chuck
Hansen and later by Howard Morland.
Tamper/Pusher ablation. This is the
concept best supported by physical
analysis.

Radiation pressure

The radiation pressure exerted by the large

quantity of X-ray photons inside the closed
casing might be enough to compress the
secondary. Electromagnetic radiation such
as X-rays or light carries momentum and
exerts a force on any surface it strikes.
The pressure of radiation at the intensities
seen in everyday life, such as sunlight
striking a surface, is usually imperceptible,
but at the extreme intensities found in a
thermonuclear bomb the pressure is
enormous.

For two thermonuclear bombs for which

the general size and primary
characteristics are well understood, the Ivy
Mike test bomb and the modern W-80
cruise missile warhead variant of the W-61
design, the radiation pressure was
calculated to be 73 ×106 bar (7.3 TPa) for
the Ivy Mike design and 1,400 ×106 bar
(140 TPa) for the W-80.[18]

Foam plasma pressure

Foam plasma pressure is the concept that

Chuck Hansen introduced during the
Progressive case, based on research that
located declassified documents listing
special foams as liner components within
the radiation case of thermonuclear
weapons.

The sequence of firing the weapon (with

the foam) would be as follows:
1. The high explosives surrounding the
core of the primary fire, compressing
the fissile material into a supercritical
state and beginning the fission chain
reaction.
2. The fissioning primary emits thermal
X-rays, which "reflect" along the inside
of the casing, irradiating the
polystyrene foam.
3. The irradiated foam becomes a hot
plasma, pushing against the tamper
of the secondary, compressing it
tightly, and beginning the fission chain
reaction in the spark plug.
4. Pushed from both sides (from the
primary and the spark plug), the
lithium deuteride fuel is highly
compressed and heated to
thermonuclear temperatures. Also, by
being bombarded with neutrons, each
lithium-6 (6Li) atom splits into one
tritium atom and one alpha particle.
Then begins a fusion reaction
between the tritium and the
deuterium, releasing even more
neutrons, and a huge amount of
energy.
5. The fuel undergoing the fusion
reaction emits a large flux of high
 energy neutrons (17.6 MeV [2.82 pJ]),
238
which irradiates the U tamper (or
238
the U bomb casing), causing it to
undergo a fast fission reaction,
providing about half of the total
energy.

This would complete the fission-fusion-

fission sequence. Fusion, unlike fission, is
relatively "clean"—it releases energy but no
harmful radioactive products or large
amounts of nuclear fallout. The fission
reactions though, especially the last
fission reactions, release a tremendous
amount of fission products and fallout. If
the last fission stage is omitted, by
replacing the uranium tamper with one
made of lead, for example, the overall
explosive force is reduced by
approximately half but the amount of
fallout is relatively low. The neutron bomb
is a hydrogen bomb with an intentionally
thin tamper, allowing as many of the fast
fusion neutrons as possible to escape.

Foam plasma mechanism firing sequence.

A. Warhead before firing; primary (fission bomb) at top, secondary (fusion fuel) at bottom, all suspended in
polystyrene foam.

B. High-explosive fires in primary, compressing plutonium core into supercriticality and beginning a fission reaction.
 C. Fission primary emits X-rays that are scattered along the inside of the casing, irradiating the polystyrene foam.

D. Polystyrene foam becomes plasma, compressing secondary, and plutonium sparkplug begins to fission.
3
E. Compressed and heated, lithium-6 deuteride fuel produces tritium ( H) and begins the fusion reaction. The neutron
238
flux produced causes the U tamper to fission. A fireball starts to form.

Current technical criticisms of the idea of

"foam plasma pressure" focus on
unclassified analysis from similar high
energy physics fields that indicate that the
pressure produced by such a plasma
would only be a small multiplier of the
basic photon pressure within the radiation
case, and also that the known foam
materials intrinsically have a very low
absorption efficiency of the gamma ray
and X-ray radiation from the primary. Most
of the energy produced would be absorbed
by either the walls of the radiation case or
the tamper around the secondary.
Analyzing the effects of that absorbed
energy led to the third mechanism:
ablation.

Tamper-pusher ablation

The outer casing of the secondary

assembly is called the "tamper-pusher".
The purpose of a tamper in an implosion
bomb is to delay the expansion of the
reacting fuel supply (which is very hot
dense plasma) until the fuel is fully
consumed and the explosion runs to
completion. The same tamper material
serves also as a pusher in that it is the
medium by which the outside pressure
(force acting on the surface area of the
secondary) is transferred to the mass of
fusion fuel.

The proposed tamper-pusher ablation

mechanism posits that the outer layers of
the thermonuclear secondary's tamper-
pusher are heated so extremely by the
primary's X-ray flux that they expand
violently and ablate away (fly off).
Because total momentum is conserved,
this mass of high velocity ejecta impels
the rest of the tamper-pusher to recoil
inwards with tremendous force, crushing
the fusion fuel and the spark plug. The
tamper-pusher is built robustly enough to
insulate the fusion fuel from the extreme
heat outside; otherwise the compression
would be spoiled.

Ablation mechanism firing sequence.

1. Warhead before firing. The nested spheres at the top are the fission primary; the cylinders below are the fusion
secondary device.

2. Fission primary's explosives have detonated and collapsed the primary's fissile pit.

3. The primary's fission reaction has run to completion, and the primary is now at several million degrees and
radiating gamma and hard X-rays, heating up the inside of the hohlraum and the shield and secondary's tamper.

4. The primary's reaction is over and it has expanded. The surface of the pusher for the secondary is now so hot that
it is also ablating or expanding away, pushing the rest of the secondary (tamper, fusion fuel, and fissile spark plug)
inwards. The spark plug starts to fission. Not depicted: the radiation case is also ablating and expanding outwards
(omitted for clarity of diagram).
 5. The secondary's fuel has started the fusion reaction and shortly will burn up. A fireball starts to form.

Rough calculations for the basic ablation

effect are relatively simple: the energy
from the primary is distributed evenly onto
all of the surfaces within the outer
radiation case, with the components
coming to a thermal equilibrium, and the
effects of that thermal energy are then
analyzed. The energy is mostly deposited
within about one X-ray optical thickness of
the tamper/pusher outer surface, and the
temperature of that layer can then be
calculated. The velocity at which the
surface then expands outwards is
calculated and, from a basic Newtonian
momentum balance, the velocity at which
the rest of the tamper implodes inwards.

Applying the more detailed form of those

calculations to the Ivy Mike device yields
vaporized pusher gas expansion velocity
of 290 kilometres per second (180 mi/s)
and an implosion velocity of perhaps
400 km/s (250 mi/s) if 3⁄4 of the total
tamper/pusher mass is ablated off, the
most energy efficient proportion. For the
W-80 the gas expansion velocity is roughly
410 km/s (250 mi/s) and the implosion
velocity 570 km/s (350 mi/s). The
pressure due to the ablating material is
calculated to be 5.3 billion bars
(530 trillion pascals) in the Ivy Mike device
and 64 billion bars (6.4 quadrillion
pascals) in the W-80 device.[18]

Comparing implosion mechanisms

Comparing the three mechanisms

proposed, it can be seen that:

Pressure (TPa)
Mechanism
Ivy Mike W80

Radiat ion pressure 7.3 140

Plasma pressure 35 750

Ablat ion pressure 530 6400

The calculated ablation pressure is one

order of magnitude greater than the higher
proposed plasma pressures and nearly
two orders of magnitude greater than
calculated radiation pressure. No
mechanism to avoid the absorption of
energy into the radiation case wall and the
secondary tamper has been suggested,
making ablation apparently unavoidable.
The other mechanisms appear to be
unneeded.

United States Department of Defense

official declassification reports indicate
that foamed plastic materials are or may
be used in radiation case liners, and
despite the low direct plasma pressure
they may be of use in delaying the ablation
until energy has distributed evenly and a
sufficient fraction has reached the
secondary's tamper/pusher.[19]

Richard Rhodes' book Dark Sun stated that

a 1-inch-thick (25 mm) layer of plastic
foam was fixed to the lead liner of the
inside of the Ivy Mike steel casing using
copper nails. Rhodes quotes several
designers of that bomb explaining that the
plastic foam layer inside the outer case is
to delay ablation and thus recoil of the
outer case: if the foam were not there,
metal would ablate from the inside of the
outer case with a large impulse, causing
the casing to recoil outwards rapidly. The
purpose of the casing is to contain the
explosion for as long as possible, allowing
as much X-ray ablation of the metallic
surface of the secondary stage as
possible, so it compresses the secondary
efficiently, maximizing the fusion yield.
Plastic foam has a low density, so causes
a smaller impulse when it ablates than
metal does.[19]

Design variations
A number of possible variations to the
weapon design have been proposed:

Either the tamper or the casing have

235
been proposed to be made of U
(highly enriched uranium) in the final
fission jacket. The far more expensive
235
U is also fissionable with fast
238
neutrons like the U in depleted or
natural uranium, but its fission-efficiency
235
is higher. This is because U nuclei
also undergo fission by slow neutrons (
238
U nuclei require a minimum energy of
about 1 megaelectronvolt (0.16 pJ)),
and because these slower neutrons are
235
produced by other fissioning U nuclei
235
in the jacket (in other words, U
supports the nuclear chain reaction
238
whereas U does not). Furthermore, a
235
U jacket fosters neutron
238
multiplication, whereas U nuclei
consume fusion neutrons in the fast-
fission process. Using a final
235
fissionable/fissile jacket of U would
thus increase the yield of a Teller–Ulam
bomb above a depleted uranium or
natural uranium jacket. This has been
proposed specifically for the W87
warheads retrofitted to currently
deployed LGM-30 Minuteman III ICBMs.
In some descriptions, additional internal
structures exist to protect the secondary
from receiving excessive neutrons from
the primary.
The inside of the casing may or may not
be specially machined to "reflect" the X-
 rays. X-ray "reflection" is not like light
reflecting off of a mirror, but rather the
reflector material is heated by the X-
rays, causing the material itself to emit
X-rays, which then travel to the
secondary.

Two special variations exist that will be

discussed in a subsequent section: the
cryogenically cooled liquid deuterium
device used for the Ivy Mike test, and the
putative design of the W88 nuclear
warhead—a small, MIRVed version of the
Teller–Ulam configuration with a prolate
(egg or watermelon shaped) primary and
an elliptical secondary.
Most bombs do not apparently have
tertiary "stages"—that is, third compression
stage(s), which are additional fusion
stages compressed by a previous fusion
stage. (The fissioning of the last blanket of
uranium, which provides about half the
yield in large bombs, does not count as a
"stage" in this terminology.)

The U.S. tested three-stage bombs in

several explosions (see Operation
Redwing) but is thought to have fielded
only one such tertiary model, i.e., a bomb
in which a fission stage, followed by a
fusion stage, finally compresses yet
another fusion stage. This U.S. design was
the heavy but highly efficient (i.e., nuclear
weapon yield per unit bomb weight) 25 Mt
(100 PJ) B41 nuclear bomb.[20] The Soviet
Union is thought to have used multiple
stages (including more than one tertiary
fusion stage) in their 50 Mt (210 PJ)
(100 Mt (420 PJ) in intended use) Tsar
Bomba (as with other bombs, however, the
fissionable jacket could be replaced with
lead in such a bomb, and in this one, for
demonstration, it was). If any hydrogen
bombs have been made from
configurations other than those based on
the Teller–Ulam design, the fact of it is not
publicly known. (A possible exception to
this is the Soviet early Sloika design.)
In essence, the Teller–Ulam configuration
relies on at least two instances of
implosion occurring: first, the conventional
(chemical) explosives in the primary would
compress the fissile core, resulting in a
fission explosion many times more
powerful than that which chemical
explosives could achieve alone (first
stage). Second, the radiation from the
fissioning of the primary would be used to
compress and ignite the secondary fusion
stage, resulting in a fusion explosion many
times more powerful than the fission
explosion alone. This chain of
compression could conceivably be
continued with an arbitrary number of
tertiary fusion stages, each igniting more
fusion fuel in the next stage[21]: 192–193 [22]
although this is debated (see more:
Arbitrarily large yield debate). Finally,
efficient bombs (but not so-called neutron
bombs) end with the fissioning of the final
natural uranium tamper, something that
could not normally be achieved without the
neutron flux provided by the fusion
reactions in secondary or tertiary stages.
Such designs are suggested to be capable
of being scaled up to an arbitrary large
yield (with apparently as many fusion
stages as desired),[21]: 192–193 [22]
potentially to the level of a "doomsday
device." However, usually such weapons
were not more than a dozen megatons,
which was generally considered enough to
destroy even the most hardened practical
targets (for example, a control facility such
as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex). Even
such large bombs have been replaced by
smaller-yield bunker buster type nuclear
bombs (see more: nuclear bunker buster).

As discussed above, for destruction of

cities and non-hardened targets, breaking
the mass of a single missile payload down
into smaller MIRV bombs, in order to
spread the energy of the explosions into a
"pancake" area, is far more efficient in
terms of area-destruction per unit of bomb
energy. This also applies to single bombs
deliverable by cruise missile or other
system, such as a bomber, resulting in
most operational warheads in the U.S.
program having yields of less than 500 kt
(2,100 TJ).

History

United States

The idea of a thermonuclear fusion bomb

ignited by a smaller fission bomb was first
proposed by Enrico Fermi to his colleague
Edward Teller when they were talking at
Columbia University in September
1941,[13]: 207  at the start of what would
become the Manhattan Project.[4] Teller
spent much of the Manhattan Project
attempting to figure out how to make the
design work, preferring it to work on the
atomic bomb, and over the last year of the
project was assigned exclusively to the
task.[13]: 117, 248  However once World War II
ended, there was little impetus to devote
many resources to the Super, as it was
then known.[23]: 202 

The first atomic bomb test by the Soviet

Union in August 1949 came earlier than
expected by Americans, and over the next
several months there was an intense
debate within the U.S. government, military,
and scientific communities regarding
whether to proceed with development of
the far more powerful Super.[24]: 1–2  The
debate covered matters that were
alternatively strategic, pragmatic, and
moral.[24]: 16  In their Report of the General
Advisory Committee, Robert Oppenheimer
and colleagues concluded that "[t]he
extreme danger to mankind inherent in the
proposal [to develop thermonuclear
weapons] wholly outweighs any military
advantage." Despite the objections raised,
on 31 January 1950, President Harry S.
Truman made the decision to go forward
with the development of the new
weapon.[23]: 212–214 
Operation Castle thermonuclear test, Castle Romeo shot

But deciding to do it did not make it a

reality, and Teller and other U.S. physicists
struggled to find a workable
design.[24]: 91–92  Stanislaw Ulam, a co-
worker of Teller, made the first key
conceptual leaps towards a workable
fusion design. Ulam's two innovations that
rendered the fusion bomb practical were
that compression of the thermonuclear
fuel before extreme heating was a
practical path towards the conditions
needed for fusion, and the idea of staging
or placing a separate thermonuclear
component outside a fission primary
component, and somehow using the
primary to compress the secondary. Teller
then realized that the gamma and X-ray
radiation produced in the primary could
transfer enough energy into the secondary
to create a successful implosion and
fusion burn, if the whole assembly was
wrapped in a hohlraum or radiation case.[4]
Teller and his various proponents and
detractors later disputed the degree to
which Ulam had contributed to the theories
underlying this mechanism. Indeed, shortly
before his death, and in a last-ditch effort
to discredit Ulam's contributions, Teller
claimed that one of his own "graduate
students" had proposed the mechanism.

The "George" shot of Operation

Greenhouse of 9 May 1951 tested the
basic concept for the first time on a very
small scale. As the first successful
(uncontrolled) release of nuclear fusion
energy, which made up a small fraction of
the 225 kt (940 TJ) total yield,[25] it raised
expectations to a near certainty that the
concept would work.
On 1 November 1952, the Teller–Ulam
configuration was tested at full scale in
the "Ivy Mike" shot at an island in the
Enewetak Atoll, with a yield of 10.4 Mt
(44 PJ) (over 450 times more powerful
than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki
during World War II). The device, dubbed
the Sausage, used an extra-large fission
bomb as a "trigger" and liquid deuterium—
kept in its liquid state by 20 short tons
(18 t) of cryogenic equipment—as its
fusion fuel, and weighed around 80 short
tons (73 t) altogether.

The liquid deuterium fuel of Ivy Mike was

impractical for a deployable weapon, and
the next advance was to use a solid
lithium deuteride fusion fuel instead. In
1954 this was tested in the "Castle Bravo"
shot (the device was code-named Shrimp),
which had a yield of 15 Mt (63 PJ) (2.5
times expected) and is the largest U.S.
bomb ever tested.

Efforts in the United States soon shifted

towards developing miniaturized Teller–
Ulam weapons that could fit into
intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By
1960, with the W47 warhead[26] deployed
on Polaris ballistic missile submarines,
megaton-class warheads were as small as
18 inches (0.46 m) in diameter and 720
pounds (330 kg) in weight. Further
innovation in miniaturizing warheads was
accomplished by the mid-1970s, when
versions of the Teller–Ulam design were
created that could fit ten or more
warheads on the end of a small MIRVed
missile (see the section on the W88
below).[9]

Soviet Union

The first Soviet fusion design, developed

by Andrei Sakharov and Vitaly Ginzburg in
1949 (before the Soviets had a working
fission bomb), was dubbed the Sloika,
after a Russian layer cake, and was not of
the Teller–Ulam configuration. It used
alternating layers of fissile material and
lithium deuteride fusion fuel spiked with
tritium (this was later dubbed Sakharov's
"First Idea"). Though nuclear fusion might
have been technically achievable, it did not
have the scaling property of a "staged"
weapon. Thus, such a design could not
produce thermonuclear weapons whose
explosive yields could be made arbitrarily
large (unlike U.S. designs at that time). The
fusion layer wrapped around the fission
core could only moderately multiply the
fission energy (modern Teller–Ulam
designs can multiply it 30-fold).
Additionally, the whole fusion stage had to
be imploded by conventional explosives,
along with the fission core, substantially
multiplying the amount of chemical
explosives needed.

The first Sloika design test, RDS-6s, was

detonated in 1953 with a yield equivalent
to 400 kt (1,700 TJ) (15%-20% from
fusion). Attempts to use a Sloika design to
achieve megaton-range results proved
unfeasible. After the United States tested
the "Ivy Mike" thermonuclear device in
November 1952, proving that a
multimegaton bomb could be created, the
Soviets searched for an alternative design.
The "Second Idea", as Sakharov referred to
it in his memoirs, was a previous proposal
by Ginzburg in November 1948 to use
lithium deuteride in the bomb, which would,
in the course of being bombarded by
neutrons, produce tritium and free
deuterium.[27]: 299  In late 1953 physicist
Viktor Davidenko achieved the first
breakthrough, that of keeping the primary
and secondary parts of the bombs in
separate pieces ("staging"). The next
breakthrough was discovered and
developed by Sakharov and Yakov
Zel'dovich, that of using the X-rays from
the fission bomb to compress the
secondary before fusion ("radiation
implosion"), in early 1954. Sakharov's
"Third Idea", as the Teller–Ulam design
was known in the USSR, was tested in the
shot "RDS-37" in November 1955 with a
yield of 1.6 Mt (6.7 PJ).

The Soviets demonstrated the power of

the "staging" concept in October 1961,
when they detonated the massive and
unwieldy Tsar Bomba, a 50 Mt (210 PJ)
hydrogen bomb that derived almost 97%
of its energy from fusion. It was the largest
nuclear weapon developed and tested by
any country.
United Kingdom

Operation Grapple on Christmas Island was the first British hydrogen bomb test.

In 1954 work began at Aldermaston to

develop the British fusion bomb, with Sir
William Penney in charge of the project.
British knowledge on how to make a
thermonuclear fusion bomb was
rudimentary, and at the time the United
States was not exchanging any nuclear
knowledge because of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946. However, the British were
allowed to observe the U.S. Castle tests
and used sampling aircraft in the
mushroom clouds, providing them with
clear, direct evidence of the compression
produced in the secondary stages by
radiation implosion.[28]

Because of these difficulties, in 1955

British prime minister Anthony Eden agreed
to a secret plan, whereby if the
Aldermaston scientists failed or were
greatly delayed in developing the fusion
bomb, it would be replaced by an
extremely large fission bomb.[28]
In 1957 the Operation Grapple tests were
carried out. The first test, Green Granite,
was a prototype fusion bomb, but failed to
produce equivalent yields compared to the
U.S. and Soviets, achieving only
approximately 300 kt (1,300 TJ). The
second test Orange Herald was the
modified fission bomb and produced
720 kt (3,000 TJ)—making it the largest
fission explosion ever. At the time almost
everyone (including the pilots of the plane
that dropped it) thought that this was a
fusion bomb. This bomb was put into
service in 1958. A second prototype fusion
bomb, Purple Granite, was used in the third
test, but only produced approximately
150 kt (630 TJ).[28]

A second set of tests was scheduled, with

testing recommencing in September 1957.
The first test was based on a "… new
simpler design. A two stage thermonuclear
bomb that had a much more powerful
trigger". This test Grapple X Round C was
exploded on 8 November and yielded
approximately 1.8 Mt (7.5 PJ). On 28 April
1958 a bomb was dropped that yielded
3 Mt (13 PJ)—Britain's most powerful test.
Two final air burst tests on 2 and 11
September 1958, dropped smaller bombs
that yielded around 1 Mt (4.2 PJ) each.[28]
American observers had been invited to
these kinds of tests. After Britain's
successful detonation of a megaton-range
device (and thus demonstrating a practical
understanding of the Teller–Ulam design
"secret"), the United States agreed to
exchange some of its nuclear designs with
the United Kingdom, leading to the 1958
US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement.
Instead of continuing with its own design,
the British were given access to the design
of the smaller American Mk 28 warhead
and were able to manufacture copies.[28]

The United Kingdom had worked closely

with the Americans on the Manhattan
Project. British access to nuclear weapons
information was cut off by the United
States at one point due to concerns about
Soviet espionage. Full cooperation was not
reestablished until an agreement governing
the handling of secret information and
other issues was signed.[28]

China

Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese

nuclear-weapons program during the First
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955. The
People's Republic of China detonated its
first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb on 17
June 1967, 32 months after detonating its
first fission weapon, with a yield of 3.31
Mt. It took place in the Lop Nor Test Site, in
northwest China.[29] China had received
extensive technical help from the Soviet
Union to jump-start their nuclear program,
but by 1960, the rift between the Soviet
Union and China had become so great that
the Soviet Union ceased all assistance to
China.[30]

A story in The New York Times by William

Broad[31] reported that in 1995, a
supposed Chinese double agent delivered
information indicating that China knew
secret details of the U.S. W88 warhead,
supposedly through espionage.[32] (This
line of investigation eventually resulted in
the abortive trial of Wen Ho Lee.)

France

The French nuclear testing site was moved

to the unpopulated French atolls in the
Pacific Ocean. The first test conducted at
these new sites was the "Canopus" test in
the Fangataufa atoll in French Polynesia
on 24 August 1968, the country's first
multistage thermonuclear weapon test.
The bomb was detonated from a balloon
at a height of 520 metres (1,710 ft). The
result of this test was significant
atmospheric contamination.[33] Very little
is known about France's development of
the Teller–Ulam design, beyond the fact
that France detonated a 2.6 Mt (11 PJ)
device in the "Canopus" test. France
reportedly had great difficulty with its
initial development of the Teller-Ulam
design, but it later overcame these, and is
believed to have nuclear weapons equal in
sophistication to the other major nuclear
powers.[28]

France and China did not sign or ratify the

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963,
which banned nuclear test explosions in
the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer
space. Between 1966 and 1996 France
carried out more than 190 nuclear tests.[33]
France's final nuclear test took place on 27
January 1996, and then the country
dismantled its Polynesian test sites.
France signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty that same year, and then
ratified the Treaty within two years.

One of France's Triomphant-class nuclear-armed submarines, the Téméraire (S617)

France confirmed that its nuclear arsenal

contains about 300 warheads, carried by
submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and fighter-bombers in 2015.
France has four Triomphant-class ballistic
missile submarines. One ballistic missile
submarine is deployed in the deep ocean,
but a total of three must be in operational
use at all times. The three older
submarines are armed with 16 M45
missiles. The newest submarine, "Le
Terrible", was commissioned in 2010, and
it has M51 missiles capable of carrying TN
75 thermonuclear warheads. The air fleet
is four squadrons at four different bases.
In total, there are 23 Mirage 2000N aircraft
and 20 Rafales capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.[34] The M51.1 missiles are
intended to be replaced with the new
M51.2 warhead beginning in 2016, which
has a 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) greater
range than the M51.1.[34]

France also has about 60 air-launched

missiles tipped with TN 80/TN 81
warheads with a yield of about 300 kt
(1,300 TJ) each. France's nuclear program
has been carefully designed to ensure that
these weapons remain usable decades
into the future.[28] Currently, France is no
longer deliberately producing critical mass
materials such as plutonium and enriched
uranium, but it still relies on nuclear energy
 239
for electricity, with Pu as a
byproduct.[35]

India

Shakti-1

On 11 May 1998, India announced that it

had detonated a thermonuclear bomb in
its Operation Shakti tests ("Shakti-I",
specifically, in Hindi the word 'Shakti'
means power).[36][37] Samar
Mubarakmand, a Pakistani nuclear
physicist, asserted that if Shakti-I had been
a thermonuclear test, the device had failed
to fire.[38] However, Harold M. Agnew,
former director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, said that India's
assertion of having detonated a staged
thermonuclear bomb was believable.[39]
India says that their thermonuclear device
was tested at a controlled yield of 45 kt
(190 TJ) because of the close proximity of
the Khetolai village at about 5 kilometres
(3.1 mi), to ensure that the houses in that
village do not suffer significant
damage.[40] Another cited reason was that
radioactivity released from yields
significantly more than 45 Kilotons might
not have been contained fully.[40] After the
Pokhran-II tests, Rajagopala
Chidambaram, former chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission of India said
that India has the capability to build
thermonuclear bombs of any yield at
will.[39]

The yield of India's hydrogen bomb test

remains highly debatable among the Indian
science community and the international
scholars.[41] The question of politicisation
and disputes between Indian scientists
further complicated the matter.[42]
In an interview in August 2009, the director
for the 1998 test site preparations, K.
Santhanam claimed that the yield of the
thermonuclear explosion was lower than
expected and that India should therefore
not rush into signing the CTBT. Other Indian
scientists involved in the test have
disputed K. Santhanam's claim,[43] arguing
that Santhanam's claims are
unscientific.[37] British seismologist Roger
Clarke argued that the magnitudes
suggested a combined yield of up to 60
kilotonnes of TNT (250 TJ), consistent with
the Indian announced total yield of 56
kilotonnes of TNT (230 TJ).[44] U.S.
seismologist Jack Evernden has argued
that for correct estimation of yields, one
should 'account properly for geological
and seismological differences between
test sites'.[40]

India officially maintains that it can build

thermonuclear weapons of various yields
up to around 200 kt (840 TJ) on the basis
of the Shakti-1 thermonuclear test.[40][45]

Israel

Israel is alleged to possess thermonuclear

weapons of the Teller–Ulam design,[46] but
it is not known to have tested any nuclear
devices, although it is widely speculated
that the Vela incident of 1979 may have
been a joint Israeli–South African nuclear
test.[47][48]: 271 [49]: 297–300 

It is well established that Edward Teller

advised and guided the Israeli
establishment on general nuclear matters
for some twenty years.[50]: 289–293  Between
1964 and 1967, Teller made six visits to
Israel where he lectured at the Tel Aviv
University on general topics in theoretical
physics.[51] It took him a year to convince
the CIA about Israel's capability and finally
in 1976, Carl Duckett of the CIA testified to
the U.S. Congress, after receiving credible
information from an "American scientist"
(Teller), on Israel's nuclear
capability.[49]: 297–300  During the 1990s,
Teller eventually confirmed speculations in
the media that it was during his visits in the
1960s that he concluded that Israel was in
possession of nuclear weapons.[49]: 297–300 
After he conveyed the matter to the higher
level of the U.S. government, Teller
reportedly said: "They [Israel] have it, and
they were clever enough to trust their
research and not to test, they know that to
test would get them into
trouble."[49]: 297–300 
North Korea

North Korea claimed to have tested its

miniaturised thermonuclear bomb on 6
January 2016. North Korea's first three
nuclear tests (2006, 2009 and 2013) were
relatively low yield and do not appear to
have been of a thermonuclear weapon
design. In 2013, the South Korean Defense
Ministry speculated that North Korea may
be trying to develop a "hydrogen bomb"
and such a device may be North Korea's
next weapons test.[52][53] In January 2016,
North Korea claimed to have successfully
tested a hydrogen bomb,[54] although only
a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was
detected at the time of the test,[55] a
similar magnitude to the 2013 test of a 6–
9 kt (25–38 TJ) atomic bomb. These
seismic recordings cast doubt upon North
Korea's claim that a hydrogen bomb was
tested and suggest it was a non-fusion
nuclear test.[56]

On 3 September 2017, the country's state

media reported that a hydrogen bomb test
was conducted that resulted in "perfect
success". According to the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), the blast resulted in an
earthquake with a magnitude of 6.3, 10
times more powerful than previous nuclear
tests conducted by North Korea.[57] U.S.
Intelligence released an early assessment
that the yield estimate was 140 kt
(590 TJ),[58] with an uncertainty range of 70
to 280 kt (290 to 1,170 TJ).[59]

On 12 September, NORSAR revised its

estimate of the earthquake magnitude
upward to 6.1, matching that of the CTBTO,
but less powerful than the USGS estimate
of 6.3. Its yield estimate was revised to
250 kt (1,000 TJ), while noting the estimate
had some uncertainty and an undisclosed
margin of error.[60][61]

On 13 September, an analysis of before

and after synthetic-aperture radar satellite
imagery of the test site was published
suggesting the test occurred under 900
metres (3,000 ft) of rock and the yield
"could have been in excess of 300
kilotons".[62]

Public knowledge
The Teller–Ulam design was for many
years considered one of the top nuclear
secrets, and even today it is not discussed
in any detail by official publications with
origins "behind the fence" of classification.
United States Department of Energy (DOE)
policy has been, and continues to be, that
they do not acknowledge when "leaks"
occur, because doing so would
acknowledge the accuracy of the
supposed leaked information. Aside from
images of the warhead casing, most
information in the public domain about this
design is relegated to a few terse
statements by the DOE and the work of a
few individual investigators.

Photographs of warhead casings, such as this one of the W80 nuclear warhead, allow for some speculation as to the
relative size and shapes of the primaries and secondaries in U.S. thermonuclear weapons.
DOE statements

In 1972 the United States government

declassified a document stating "[I]n
thermonuclear (TN) weapons, a fission
'primary' is used to trigger a TN reaction in
thermonuclear fuel referred to as a
'secondary'", and in 1979 added, "[I]n
thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a
fission explosive can be contained and
used to transfer energy to compress and
ignite a physically separate component
containing thermonuclear fuel." To this
latter sentence the US government
specified that "Any elaboration of this
statement will be classified."[note 2] The only
information that may pertain to the spark
plug was declassified in 1991: "Fact that
fissile or fissionable materials are present
in some secondaries, material unidentified,
location unspecified, use unspecified, and
weapons undesignated." In 1998 the DOE
declassified the statement that "The fact
that materials may be present in channels
and the term 'channel filler,' with no
elaboration", which may refer to the
polystyrene foam (or an analogous
substance).[63]

Whether these statements vindicate some

or all of the models presented above is up
for interpretation, and official U.S.
government releases about the technical
details of nuclear weapons have been
purposely equivocating in the past (see,
e.g., Smyth Report). Other information,
such as the types of fuel used in some of
the early weapons, has been declassified,
though precise technical information has
not been.

The Progressive case

Most of the current ideas on the workings

of the Teller–Ulam design came into public
awareness after the Department of Energy
(DOE) attempted to censor a magazine
article by U.S. antiweapons activist
Howard Morland in 1979 on the "secret of
the hydrogen bomb". In 1978, Morland had
decided that discovering and exposing this
"last remaining secret" would focus
attention onto the arms race and allow
citizens to feel empowered to question
official statements on the importance of
nuclear weapons and nuclear secrecy.
Most of Morland's ideas about how the
weapon worked were compiled from highly
accessible sources—the drawings that
most inspired his approach came from
none other than the Encyclopedia
Americana. Morland also interviewed
(often informally) many former Los
Alamos scientists (including Teller and
Ulam, though neither gave him any useful
information), and used a variety of
interpersonal strategies to encourage
informative responses from them (i.e.,
asking questions such as "Do they still use
spark plugs?" even if he was not aware
what the latter term specifically referred
to).[64]

Morland eventually concluded that the

"secret" was that the primary and
secondary were kept separate and that
radiation pressure from the primary
compressed the secondary before igniting
it. When an early draft of the article, to be
published in The Progressive magazine,
was sent to the DOE after falling into the
hands of a professor who was opposed to
Morland's goal, the DOE requested that the
article not be published, and pressed for a
temporary injunction. The DOE argued that
Morland's information was (1) likely
derived from classified sources, (2) if not
derived from classified sources, itself
counted as "secret" information under the
"born secret" clause of the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act, and (3) was dangerous and
would encourage nuclear proliferation.

Morland and his lawyers disagreed on all

points, but the injunction was granted, as
the judge in the case felt that it was safer
to grant the injunction and allow Morland,
et al., to appeal, which they did in United
States v. The Progressive (1979).

Through a variety of more complicated

circumstances, the DOE case began to
wane as it became clear that some of the
data they were attempting to claim as
"secret" had been published in a students'
encyclopedia a few years earlier. After
another H-bomb speculator, Chuck
Hansen, had his own ideas about the
"secret" (quite different from Morland's)
published in a Wisconsin newspaper, the
DOE claimed that The Progressive case
was moot, dropped its suit, and allowed
the magazine to publish its article, which it
did in November 1979. Morland had by
then, however, changed his opinion of how
the bomb worked, suggesting that a foam
medium (the polystyrene) rather than
radiation pressure was used to compress
the secondary, and that in the secondary
there was a spark plug of fissile material
as well. He published these changes,
based in part on the proceedings of the
appeals trial, as a short erratum in The
Progressive a month later.[65] In 1981,
Morland published a book about his
experience, describing in detail the train of
thought that led him to his conclusions
about the "secret".[64][66]
Morland's work is interpreted as being at
least partially correct because the DOE
had sought to censor it, one of the few
times they violated their usual approach of
not acknowledging "secret" material that
had been released; however, to what
degree it lacks information, or has
incorrect information, is not known with
any confidence. The difficulty that a
number of nations had in developing the
Teller–Ulam design (even when they
apparently understood the design, such as
with the United Kingdom), makes it
somewhat unlikely that this simple
information alone is what provides the
ability to manufacture thermonuclear
weapons. Nevertheless, the ideas put
forward by Morland in 1979 have been the
basis for all the current speculation on the
Teller–Ulam design.

Nuclear reduction
In January 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev publicly proposed a three-stage
program for abolishing the world's nuclear
weapons by the end of the 20th century.[67]
Two years before his death in 1989, Andrei
Sakharov's comments at a scientists'
forum helped begin the process for the
elimination of thousands of nuclear
ballistic missiles from the US and Soviet
arsenals. Sakharov (1921–89) was
recruited into the Soviet Union's nuclear
weapons program in 1948, a year after he
completed his doctorate. In 1949 the US
detected the first Soviet test of a fission
bomb, and the two countries embarked on
a desperate race to design a
thermonuclear hydrogen bomb that was a
thousand times more powerful. Like his US
counterparts, Sakharov justified his H-
bomb work by pointing to the danger of the
other country's achieving a monopoly. But
also like some of the US scientists who
had worked on the Manhattan Project, he
felt a responsibility to inform his nation's
leadership and then the world about the
dangers from nuclear weapons.[68]
Sakharov's first attempt to influence policy
was brought about by his concern about
possible genetic damage from long-lived
radioactive carbon-14 created in the
atmosphere from nitrogen-14 by the
enormous fluxes of neutrons released in H-
bomb tests.[69] In 1968, a friend suggested
that Sakharov write an essay about the
role of the intelligentsia in world affairs.
Self-publishing was the method at the time
for spreading unapproved manuscripts in
the Soviet Union. Many readers would
create multiple copies by typing with
multiple sheets of paper interleaved with
carbon paper. One copy of Sakharov's
essay, "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful
Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom",
was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and
published by the New York Times. More
than 18 million reprints were produced
during 1968–69. After the essay was
published, Sakharov was barred from
returning to work in the nuclear weapons
program and took a research position in
Moscow.[68] In 1980, after an interview with
the New York Times in which he
denounced the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the government put him
beyond the reach of Western media by
exiling him and his wife to Gorky. In March
1985, Gorbachev became general
secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.
More than a year and a half later, he
persuaded the Politburo, the party's
executive committee, to allow Sakharov
and Bonner to return to Moscow. Sakharov
was elected as an opposition member to
the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies
in 1989. Later that year he had a cardiac
arrhythmia and died in his apartment. He
left behind a draft of a new Soviet
constitution that emphasized democracy
and human rights.[70]

Notable accidents
On 5 February 1958, during a training
mission flown by a B-47, a Mark 15 nuclear
bomb, also known as the Tybee Bomb,
was lost off the coast of Tybee Island near
Savannah, Georgia. The bomb was thought
by the Department of Energy to lie buried
under several feet of silt at the bottom of
Wassaw Sound.[71]

On 17 January 1966, a fatal collision

occurred between a B-52G and a KC-135
Stratotanker over Palomares, Spain. The
conventional explosives in two of the
Mk28-type hydrogen bombs detonated
upon impact with the ground, dispersing
plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb
landed intact near Palomares while the
fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast
into the Mediterranean sea.[72]
On 21 January 1968, a B-52G, with four
B28FI thermonuclear bombs aboard as
part of Operation Chrome Dome, crashed
on the ice of the North Star Bay while
attempting an emergency landing at Thule
Air Base in Greenland.[73] The resulting fire
caused extensive radioactive
contamination.[74] Personnel involved in
the cleanup failed to recover all the debris
from three of the bombs, and one bomb
was not recovered.[75]
Variations

Ivy Mike

In his 1995 book Dark Sun: The Making of

the Hydrogen Bomb, author Richard
Rhodes describes in detail the internal
components of the "Ivy Mike" Sausage
device, based on information obtained
from extensive interviews with the
scientists and engineers who assembled
it. According to Rhodes, the actual
mechanism for the compression of the
secondary was a combination of the
radiation pressure, foam plasma pressure,
and tamper-pusher ablation theories
described above; the radiation from the
primary heated the polyethylene foam
lining of the casing to a plasma, which then
re-radiated radiation into the secondary's
pusher, causing its surface to ablate and
driving it inwards, compressing the
secondary, igniting the sparkplug, and
causing the fusion reaction. The general
applicability of this principle is unclear.[13]

W88

In 1999 a reporter for the San Jose

Mercury News reported that the U.S. W88
nuclear warhead, a small MIRVed warhead
used on the Trident II SLBM, had a prolate
(egg or watermelon shaped) primary
(code-named Komodo) and a spherical
secondary (code-named Cursa) inside a
specially shaped radiation case (known as
the "peanut" for its shape). The value of an
egg-shaped primary lies apparently in the
fact that a MIRV warhead is limited by the
diameter of the primary—if an egg-shaped
primary can be made to work properly,
then the MIRV warhead can be made
considerably smaller yet still deliver a high-
yield explosion—a W88 warhead manages
to yield up to 475 kilotonnes of TNT
(1,990 TJ) with a physics package 68.9
inches (1,750 mm) long, with a maximum
diameter of 21.8 inches (550 mm), and by
different estimates weighing in a range
from 175 to 360 kilograms (386 to
794 lb).[76] The smaller warhead allows
more of them to fit onto a single missile
and improves basic flight properties such
as speed and range.[77]

See also
COLEX process (isotopic separation)
History of the Teller–Ulam design
NUKEMAP
Pure fusion weapon

Notes
1. The misleading term "hydrogen bomb" was
already in wide public use before fission
 product fallout from the Castle Bravo test in
1954 revealed the extent to which the
design relies on fission as well.
2. emphasis in original

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g/oclc/558172005) . OL 7311029M (http
s://openlibrary.org/books/OL7311029M)
– via Internet Archive.
67. Taubman, William (2017). Gorbachev: His
Life and Times. New York: Simon and
Schuster. p. 291. ISBN 978-1471147968.
68. A. Sakharov, Memoirs, R. Lourie, trans.,
Knopf (1990), and Moscow and Beyond,
1986–1989, A. Bouis, trans., Knopf (1991);
for Elena Bonner's account of their time in
Gorky, see E. Bonner, Alone Together, A.
Cook, trans., Knopf (1986).
69. A. Sakharov, At. Energy 4, 6 (1958),
reprinted in Sci. Global Secur. 1, 175 (1990)
70. A. Sakharov, At. Energy 4, 6 (1958),
reprinted in Sci. Global Secur.1
71. "For 50 Years, Nuclear Bomb Lost in Watery
Grave" (https://www.npr.org/templates/stor
y/story.php?storyId=18587608&t=1566568
815867) . NPR. 3 February 2008.
72. "US to clean up Spanish radioactive site 49
years after plane crash" (https://www.thegu
ardian.com/world/2015/oct/19/us-to-clean
-up-spanish-radioactive-site-49-years-after-
palomares-plane-crash) . The Guardian. 19
October 2015.
73. "The Cold War's Missing Atom Bombs" (htt
ps://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-
nuclear-needle-in-a-haystack-the-cold-war-s
-missing-atom-bombs-a-590513.html) .
Der Spiegel. 14 November 2008.
74. "US B-52 nuclear bomber crash in
Greenland 51 years ago has ill Danes
seeking compensation" (https://www.foxne
ws.com/us/us-b-52-nuclear-bomber-crash-i
n-greenland-51-years-ago-has-ill-danes-see
king-compensation) . Fox News. 3 June
2019.
75. Swaine, Jon (11 November 2008). "US left
nuclear weapon under ice in Greenland" (htt
ps://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnew
s/europe/greenland/3439318/US-left-nucle
ar-weapon-under-ice-in-Greenland.html) .
The Daily Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235 (http
s://www.worldcat.org/issn/0307-1235) .
OCLC 49632006 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/oclc/49632006) . Archived (https://web.
archive.org/web/20090601160800/https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/eur
ope/greenland/3439318/US-left-nuclear-w
eapon-under-ice-in-Greenland.html) from
the original on 1 June 2009. Retrieved
10 February 2021. "Following the crash, and
a painstaking clear-up mission to recover
thousands of pieces of material from 500
 million gallons of ice, the Pentagon stated
that all four weapons onboard had been
"destroyed". However, documents obtained
by the BBC under the US Freedom of
Information act have disclosed that while
this is technically true—none of the bombs
remained complete—one of the weapons
was not recovered."
76. Harvey, John R.; Michalowski, Stefan (21
December 2007). "Nuclear weapons safety:
The case of trident". Science & Global
Security. 4 (1): 288.
doi:10.1080/08929889408426405 (https://
doi.org/10.1080%2F0892988940842640
5) .
 77. Stober, Dan; Hoffman, Ian (2001). A
Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the
Politics of Nuclear Espionage (https://archi
ve.org/details/convenientspywen00stob) .
Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0743223782.
LCCN 2001054945 (https://lccn.loc.gov/20
01054945) . OL 7927314M (https://openlib
rary.org/books/OL7927314M) – via
Internet Archive.

Further reading

Basic principles

Sublette, Carey (19 March 2019). "Section 4.0

Engineering and Design of Nuclear Weapons"
(http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfa
q4.html) . Nuclear Weapon Archive. Archived
(https://web.archive.org/web/202102062336
52/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/
Nfaq4.html) from the original on 6 February
2021. Retrieved 9 February 2021.
Hansen, Chuck (1988). U.S. Nuclear Weapons:
The Secret History (https://archive.org/detail
s/usnuclearweapons0000hans) . Crown.
ISBN 978-0517567401. LCCN 87021995 (htt
ps://lccn.loc.gov/87021995) .
OCLC 865554459 (https://www.worldcat.org/
oclc/865554459) . OL 2392513M (https://op
enlibrary.org/books/OL2392513M) .
Retrieved 10 November 2021 – via Internet
Archive.
Hansen, Chuck (2007). Swords of
Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Development Since 1945 (http://www.uscold
war.com) (PDF) (CD-ROM & download
available) (2nd ed.). Sunnyvale, California:
Chukelea Publications. ISBN 978-
0979191503. 2,600 pages.
Barroso, Dalton E. G. (2009). A Fisica dos
Explosivos Nucleares (https://books.google.c
om/books?id=6bE6781f1Q8C) [The Physics
of Nuclear Explosives] (in Portuguese)
(2nd ed.). Livraria da Física. ISBN 978-
8578610166. OCLC 733273749 (https://www.
worldcat.org/oclc/733273749) .
OL 30689359M (https://openlibrary.org/book
s/OL30689359M) . Retrieved 9 February
2020 – via Google Books.
History

Bundy, McGeorge (1988). Danger and

Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First
Fifty Years. Random House. ISBN 978-
0394522784. LCCN 89040089 (https://lccn.lo
c.gov/89040089) . OCLC 610771749 (https://
www.worldcat.org/oclc/610771749) .
OL 24963545M (https://openlibrary.org/book
s/OL24963545M) .
DeGroot, Gerard J. (2005). The Bomb: A Life
(https://archive.org/details/bomblife00degr) .
Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-
0674017245. OCLC 57750742 (https://www.
worldcat.org/oclc/57750742) . OL 7671320M
(https://openlibrary.org/books/OL7671320
M) – via Internet Archive.
Galison, Peter; Bernstein, Barton J. (1
January 1989). "In Any Light: Scientists and
the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–
1954". Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences. 19 (2): 267–347.
doi:10.2307/27757627 (https://doi.org/10.23
07%2F27757627) . eISSN 1939-182X (http
s://www.worldcat.org/issn/1939-182X) .
ISSN 1939-1811 (https://www.worldcat.org/is
sn/1939-1811) . JSTOR 27757627 (https://w
ww.jstor.org/stable/27757627) .
Goncharov, German A. (31 October 1996).
"American and Soviet H-bomb development
programmes: historical background". Physics-
Uspekhi. 39 (10): 1033–1044.
Bibcode:1996PhyU...39.1033G (https://ui.ads
abs.harvard.edu/abs/1996PhyU...39.1033
G) .
doi:10.1070/PU1996v039n10ABEH000174 (h
ttps://doi.org/10.1070%2FPU1996v039n10A
BEH000174) . eISSN 1468-4780 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/issn/1468-4780) . ISSN 1063-
7869 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1063-7
869) . LCCN 93646146 (https://lccn.loc.gov/9
3646146) . OCLC 36334507 (https://www.wo
rldcat.org/oclc/36334507) .
S2CID 250861572 (https://api.semanticschol
ar.org/CorpusID:250861572) .
Holloway, David (1994). Stalin and the Bomb:
The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–
1956. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-
0300060560. OCLC 470165274 (https://www.
worldcat.org/oclc/470165274) .
OL 1084400M (https://openlibrary.org/books/
OL1084400M) .
Rhodes, Richard (1995). Dark Sun: The
Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (https://archiv
e.org/details/darksunmakingofh00rhod) .
New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-
0684804002. OCLC 717414304 (https://www.
worldcat.org/oclc/717414304) .
OL 7720934M (https://openlibrary.org/books/
OL7720934M) – via Internet Archive.
Schweber, Silvan S. (2007). In the Shadow of
the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the Moral
Responsibility of the Scientist (https://archive.
org/details/inshadowofbombbe00schw) .
Princeton Series in Physics. Princeton
University Press. ISBN 978-0691127859.
OCLC 868971191 (https://www.worldcat.org/
oclc/868971191) . OL 7757230M (https://op
enlibrary.org/books/OL7757230M) – via
Internet Archive.
Stix, Gary (20 October 1999). "Infamy and
Honor at the Atomic Café: Father of the
hydrogen bomb, "Star Wars" missile defense
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Edward Teller has no regrets about his
contentious career" (https://www.scientificam
erican.com/article/infamy-and-honor-at-the-
a/) . Scientific American. Vol. 281, no. 4.
pp. 42–43. ISSN 0036-8733 (https://www.wo
rldcat.org/issn/0036-8733) .
Young, Ken; Schilling, Warner R. (2020). Super
Bomb: Organizational Conflict and the
Development of the Hydrogen Bomb. Cornell
University Press. ISBN 978-1501745164.
OCLC 1164620354 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/oclc/1164620354) . OL 28729278M (http
s://openlibrary.org/books/OL28729278M) .
 Younger, Stephen M. (2009). The Bomb: A
New History (https://archive.org/details/bom
bnewhistory00youn) . HarperCollins.
ISBN 978-0061537196. OCLC 310470696 (ht
tps://www.worldcat.org/oclc/310470696) .
OL 24318509M (https://openlibrary.org/book
s/OL24318509M) – via Internet Archive.

Analyzing fallout

De Geer, Lars‐Erik (1991). "The radioactive

signature of the hydrogen bomb". Science &
Global Security. 2 (4): 351–363.
Bibcode:1991S&GS....2..351D (https://ui.adsa
bs.harvard.edu/abs/1991S&GS....2..351D) .
doi:10.1080/08929889108426372 (https://do
i.org/10.1080%2F08929889108426372) .
ISSN 0892-9882 (https://www.worldcat.org/is
sn/0892-9882) . OCLC 15307789 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/oclc/15307789) .
Khariton, Yuli; Smirnov, Yuri; Rothstein, Linda;
Leskov, Sergei (1993). "The Khariton Version".
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (4): 20–
31. Bibcode:1993BuAtS..49d..20K (https://ui.
adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1993BuAtS..49d..2
0K) . doi:10.1080/00963402.1993.11456341
(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F00963402.1993.
11456341) . eISSN 1938-3282 (https://www.
worldcat.org/issn/1938-3282) . ISSN 0096-
3402 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0096-3
402) . LCCN 48034039 (https://lccn.loc.gov/4
8034039) . OCLC 470268256 (https://www.w
orldcat.org/oclc/470268256) .
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related
to Teller-Ulam design.

Principles

"Basic Principles of Staged Radiation

Implosion (Teller–Ulam)" (http://nuclear
weaponarchive.org/Library/Teller.html)
from Carey Sublette's
NuclearWeaponArchive.org.
"Matter, Energy, and Radiation
Hydrodynamics" (http://nuclearweapona
rchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq3.html) from
Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
"Engineering and Design of Nuclear
Weapons" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.
org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html) from Carey
Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
"Elements of Thermonuclear Weapon
Design" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.or
g/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-4.html) from Carey
Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
Annotated bibliography for nuclear
weapons design from the Alsos Digital
Library for Nuclear Issues (http://alsos.
wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=science/
Nuclear+Weapons+Design)
History

PBS: Race for the Superbomb: Interviews

and Transcripts (https://www.pbs.org/w
gbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/int
erview/index.html) Archived (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20170311225702/htt
p://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/fil
mmore/reference/interview/index.html)
11 March 2017 at the Wayback Machine
(with U.S. and USSR bomb designers as
well as historians).
Howard Morland on how he discovered
the "H-bomb secret" (https://fas.org/sg
p/eprint/cardozo.html) (includes many
slides).
The Progressive November 1979 issue (h
ttp://progressive.org/?q=node/2252) –
"The H-Bomb Secret: How we got it, why
we're telling" (entire issue online).
Annotated bibliography on the hydrogen
bomb from the Alsos Digital Library (htt
p://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse
=warfare/Hydrogen+Bomb)
University of Southampton, Mountbatten
Centre for International Studies, Nuclear
History Working Paper No5. (https://we
b.archive.org/web/20080226213021/htt
ps://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/p
df/nuclear_history/Working_Paper_No_
5.pdf)
Peter Kuran's "Trinity and Beyond" (htt
p://www.atomcentral.com/trinity.html)
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0181209124851/http://www.atomcentra
l.com/trinity.html) 9 December 2018 at
the Wayback Machine – documentary
film on the history of nuclear weapon
testing.
YouTube Playlist of declassified nuclear
explosion tests obtained by converting
film scans to digital at Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory (https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v=pWpqGKUG5yY&list=
PLvGO_dWo8VfcmG166wKRy5z-GlJ_OQ
ND5&index=1)
Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Thermonuclear_weapon&oldid=1159284329"

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