STSDSD Course PDF Handout

CHITKARA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF MARITIME STUDIES
SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH

DESIGNATED SECURITY DUTIES
(STSDSD)
Course Handout
___________________________________________________________________________________
Chandigarh-Patiala National Highway, Punjab 140401.

Ph: +91 8288088578
Web: www.chitkara.edu.in
STSDSD Course Handout
COURSE OUTLINE
Approximate Time
(Hours)
Subject Area
Lecture Practical
1 Introduction 1.0
2 Maritime Security Policy 0.75
3 Security Responsibilities 1.25
4 Ship Security Assessment 1.0
5 Security Equipment 1.0 0.25
6 Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response 1.0 0.5
7 Ship Security Actions 0.5 0.25
8 Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises 1.0
9 Security Administration 0.5
10 ANTI PIRACY - Piracy Awareness

1.3
11 Pirate attack 2.0
12 The Release Process 0.5
13 Seafarer’s Family 0.7
Assessment and Feed Back 0.5
TOTAL 13.0 1.0

GRAND TOTAL 14.0
Chapter 1
Introduction - Course Overview
1. The SOLAS Ch.X-2 makes it mandatory for Contracting Governments port facilities and Companies
ships to comply with the ISPS Code as applicable and to implement various security measures on board
ships and port facilities. Part A of the ISPS Code lays down the mandatory requirements and the
corresponding non-mandatory guidelines are laid down in Part B. The Company Security Officer (CSO)
of the company is responsible for implementing these measures at the company level, Ship Security
Officer (SSO) is responsible for implementing these measures on board the ship and Port Facility
Security Officer (PFSO) in the port. The specific duties of the CSO, SSO & PFSO are laid down in Part
A and the guidelines laid down in Part B.
2. To implement these guidelines effectively on board the ship, a good understanding of the ISPS Code and
the relevant maritime security issues is necessary not only for the CSO & SSO but also for those working on
board the ship? The ISPS code has therefore prescribed the training guidelines under Part B of the code.
Hence this course is designed to cover following topics in a duration of 1 ½ days (9.5 Hours).
a) Introduction to the Course
b) Maritime Security Policies
c) Security Responsibilities
d) Ship Security Assessment & Ship Security Plan
e) Security Equipment
f) Threats identifications, Recognition and Response
g) Ship Security actions
h) Emergency Preparedness, Drills & Exercises.
i) Security Administration
j) Security Training
COMPETENCIES TO BE ACHIEVED
3. On successful completion of the course, the trainee will be able to effectively carry out the duties and
responsibilities to assist the Ship Security Officer in implementing the ISPS code on board. The
achievement of the competence will be assessed through a written/oral exam at the end of the Course.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
4. The Ships at Sea and in harbours have always been an easy target of Criminal activities like piracy,
stowaways, smuggling etc. Over a period of time a number of international and national legislations have
come into force to fight and eliminate these criminal activities. However, the advent of terrorism has added
another critical dimension to this threat. Although the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States by Al-
Qaeda stunned the World with their ruthlessness and boldness, the fangs of terrorism have been gradually
becoming more lethal and sophisticated. In the latter half of 20th century a number of terrorist organizations
have mushroomed in different parts of the world. The geneses of these organizations has been
attributable to various factors like political deprivations, religious intolerance/persecutions, mis-
governance and poverty. Most of these terrorist organizations were localized as they were fighting for
local issues, in the recent years some of the terrorist groups have become multi-national in nature. The
most infamous among these is the group called Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. The evolution of Al-
Qaeda is important in understanding the concept of terrorism. Given below is a brief history of this
organizations.
a) In the 1970s, a very bitter and bloody revolt was under way in Egypt by a movement of Islamic
fundamentalists. President Mubarak and his large security services brutally crushed this revolt, which
ultimately adopted the name, Egyptian Jihad. At that time there were a few revolutionary groups in
Egypt, but Egyptian Jihad was number one on Mubarak's terrorist, target list. During the Soviet-Afghan
War (1 g7g- 1989), an international force of Moslems, called the Afghan Arabs was formed. They
numbered 3,000 to 4,000. During the War a Saudi, Osama bin Laden, worked with an Egyptian
physician, Adman al Zawahiri, who more or less led the Egyptian Jihad contingent in Afghanistan.
b) The Afghan Arabs, under Osama bin Laden: were basically hit-and-sun guerrilla units, operating
from caves or the desert. The Egyptian Jihad, under Adman al Zawahiri, fought differently. Zawahiri
knew the clandestine ways in which to set up cells, secret Communications, and the basics of planning
urban warfare, in 1998 the two groups merged and formed Qaeda at Egyptian Jihad. After the war, the
Afghan Arabs moved from Country to Country-Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen-as a dispersed unit. In
Yemen they reassembled under the leadership and direction of bin Laden. Later they settled back in
Afghanistan under the protection of Mullah Oleander of the Tibia.
c) Zawahiri had a huge impact on bin Laden who started thinking-politically, militarily and religiously.
At about this time, the terror war essentially had turned into a religious War, the fundamental Islamic
militants versus the world, with the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt being the prime targets. In
essence, Zawahiri became bin Laden's political thinker religious leader, organizer and planner. Because
Zawahiri could not reverse the trend toward his main target, Egypt, he managed to convince bin Laden
that the principal target for disruption was the United States because of its interference in the Middle
East-particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both Zawahiri and bin Laden sought to bring about a
World dominated by their brand of Islam. The seeds were planted in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia,
Yemen, Afghanistan, and, because of its geographic location and religious bent, Pakistan. Bin Laden
had access to the necessary funding for the group’s activities, while Zawahiri had the knowledge,
experience, and organizational abilities to carry out those activities.
d) Over the years, the Egyptian Jihad group had experience in secret Work, Cell building and organization.
Their ranks were populated with well-trained Scientists, engineers, medical personnel, and seasoned fighters.
Because of their talent and experience, these Egyptian Jihad groups took control of Qaeda al Egyptian Jihad.
It is important to note that Zawahiri places a high premium on recruiting well educated individuals. Those
interested in joining Qaeda al Egyptian Jihad were put through a, battery of tests, which were basically
intelligence tests, Those who scored well were chosen and trained in special camps, while the lesser
performers were sent on to Tore basic boot camps. The organization is loosely knit, but directions Crone
from the top. While ideas and information flow in from personnel stationed abroad, Zawahiri and his group
of terror scholars select targets. Local support is supplied by lower-level Cell members. At the critical time,
the technical squads travel to target Countries to Construct and design weapons. The technical squads
usually leave the target Country at least two days before the attack.
e) For the 11 September 2001 attack, a different operational strategy came into play, particularly in member
selection and required training. The 19 attackers were clearly not all at the same level of training,
experience, or even intellect. The final plan came from Zawahiri's inner circle, with bin Laden's
blessings. Probably because of the size of the project, plus initial lack of familiarity with the United
States, key people were selected for special training and intelligence gathering in the United States.
Intelligence surveillance teams were sent in very early (circa 1992). At the appropriate time (4 to 6
months before the attack), the muscle Crowd arrived. - The elements of 11 September were put together
with apparently one person, Mohamed Atta, knowing where most of the pieces fit. His direction and
final plans were approved via the brain group in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that Qaeda al Egyptian
Jihad will stage further attacks against any country which in their opinion is against their ideology.
CURRENT SECURITY THREATS & PATTERNS
5. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the world has achieved a
heightened sense of security awareness. Over 90% of the international trade which is carried by
merchant ships and pass through ports. Therefore the damage to the ships or the port facilities can ruin
the global economy. The maritime industry is no longer considered a safe, non-political, global
transportation system that moves goods by sea harmlessly from one place to another but rather, an entity
that exposes all nations, maritime and non-maritime alike, to the threat of terrorist attack. The bombing
of the "VLCC Limburg" off the Yemeni coast is a stark reminder that maritime security cannot be taken
for granted, given the world's very high dependence on sea borne trade and the Vulnerability of the
global supply chain, the threat of disruptions to sea lines of Communication became very clear with the
Limburg explosion. It showed that we must act post-haste to prevent terrorists from inflicting disaster on
the world by bringing global commerce to a standstill through a catastrophic maritime attacks.
Countering the threat of maritime terrorism is clearly and rightly a major global priority. It is therefore,
vital that we expeditiously and effectively implement the new IMO security measures.
6. In the aftermath of the 9/11, the United Nations, through the Security Council resolution 1373(2001)
on 28 Sep 2001 called on the international community to redouble its efforts to prevent and Suppress
terrorist acts, including full implementation of all anti-terrorist Conventions. Simultaneously, the
Secretary-General of IMO proposed to the Member States that the Organization should review all its
Conventions and other instruments that have a bearing on the prevention and suppression of unlawful
acts, including terrorism that may affect the safety and Security of shipping and port facilities. The
proposal was made because terrorist acts against shipping and ports for example, the use of a gas tanker
as an explosive device in a major port city, an attack on a large cruiser of the explosion or deliberate
sinking of vessels in Canals or heavily trafficked shipping lanes would be devastating with enormous
commercial, environmental and public health consequences. Moreover such incidents could have a
significant adverse impact, for a considerable period of time, on the transportation of the World's trade,
7. The 22nd session of the IMO Assembly, held in November 2001, approved the Secretary-general’s
proposal and adopted resolution A. 924(22) calling for a review of measures and procedures to prevent acts
of terrorism that threaten safety of passengers, crew ships. By the same resolution, the Secretary-General of
IMO was requested to take appropriate measures, within the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme
of the Organization, to assist governments in strengthening maritime and port security. In 2002, IMO
therefore launched a global programme on maritime/port security in order to provide this assistance through
the use of regional, sub-regional and national seminars/workshops, The seminars/workshops were intended
for those in charge, or expected to be in charge, of maritime and port security, and for government officials
with responsibility for maritime/port Security-associated legislation or enforcement. The programme proved
to be of great value to the participating Organizations and is therefore to be continued in 2003. Given the
conclusions of the Diplomatic Conference in December 2002, the programme for this current series of
Seminars Workshops is primarily based on SOLAS 74 Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code part A and Part
B. While the principal motivation for the development of this seminar/workshop was the terrorist attack
in the USA, the event will also cover other illegal acts that may affect the safety and security of shipping
and port facility operations.
SHIP & PORT OPERATIONS AND CONDITIONS

8. Before we delve any further into the maritime security ship and port operations and the conditions under
which they perform. The Port: The criticality of the ports in the nation’s economy cannot be over
emphasized. Disruption of a port activity would thus not only hurt the nation's economy but will also invite
Worldwide media attention is the prime aim of any terrorist Organization. Thus, ports are an attractive
targets for terrorists. The Ports are also extremely Vulnerable as they are spread over large areas with large
in lout-flow of men, cargo and vehicles. Under such circumstances, ensuring the security of the port against
sabotage and terrorism becomes herculean task. The problem gets further compounded by the fact that the
ports in addition to landward threats are also vulnerable to threats from the sea, there is also a possibility of
the Criminals/terrorists using the ships/cargo as a conduit for their activities. In short the scale and the varied
nature of the port operations make the ports highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
9. The Port: The criticality of the ports in the nation’s economy cannot be over emphasized, Disruption
of a port activity would thus not only hurt the nation's economy but will also invite Worldwide media
attention is the prime aim of any terrorist organization. Thus, ports are an attractive targets for terrorists.
The Ports are also extremely vulnerable as they are spread over large areas with large in out-flow of
men cargo and vehicles. Under such circumstances, ensuring the security of the port against sabotage
and terrorism becomes herculean task. The problem gets further compounded by the fact that the ports
in addition to landward threats are also Vulnerable to threats from the sea, there is also a possibility of
the criminals/terrorists using the ships/cargo as a conduit for their activities. In short the scale and the
varied nature of the port operations make the ports highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
10. The ship. In order to understand the ship operations from the point of view of security, two main
aspects need to be considered. These are, the non-permanent multinational and the floating nature of its
crew and secondly the operational area now a days a number of ships operate with multinational crews
and it is difficult to verify their antecedents. Further With the reduction in the periods of Contract, the
time available for a thorough in Estimation into an individual’s past records is very limited. The
situations becomes further complicated when the owner the charterer and the manning agency are all
from different nationalities, Regulation 5 of X-2 of SOLAS 74 stipulate stipulates that company should
provide information to the Master as to who is responsible (Ship Management Companies, Manning
Agents, Contractors), for appointing shipboard personnel, parties responsible for deciding the
employment of the ship and the terms of the charter party if applicable. The Ships operate in different
parts of the World where the degree of threat as well as protection may considerably vary. Further the
ships at sea, with very limited self defence capability, may find it extremely difficult to protect
themselves against highly motivated, trained and armed terrorists.
11. The ships to day operate under tremendous commercial pressures with very fast turnaround time. Under
such circumstances the requirements of security may conflict with the commercial interests, an example in
this regard would be checking containers for suspected arms and explosives thus delaying the departure of
the ship. Hence a delicate balance between the security and the commercial Concerns has to be
maintained. However, it is extremely important to understand that no Commercial interest, however
important can take precedence over security requirements.
Chapter 2
MARITIME SECURITY POLICES
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, CODES &
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Birth of the ISPS Code: The 9/11 terrorist attack 2001 have brought about a sea change in the
maritime legislation regarding security. On December 13 2002, the IMO agreed to nine amendments to
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS 74). Because SOLAS 74 was
already applicable to all passenger vessels and cargo vessels over 500 tons engaged in international
voyage and to mobile offshore oil and gas rigs, it was seen by the United States and other nations as the
appropriate vehicle for enforcing new security regulations. The conference agreed that all cargo ships
over 500 tons engaged in international voyage, all passenger Vessels and mobile offshore oil and gas
rigs, and all port facilities must meet the new Requirements by 01 July 2004. The Code consists of two
parts - Part A which is mandatory and Part B which gives guidelines. The chronology of events leading
to the birth of ISPS Code are illustrated below:
• November 2001 Maritime Security Committee establishes intercessional working group on
Maritime Security.
• November 2001 - IMO adopts resolution (A924 (22)) for review of measures and procedures
against terrorism. ,
• Feb. 2002 - MSC intercessional working group had this first meeting,.
• Feb. 2002 - The outcome of the meeting discussed by MSC Sept.
• 2002-MSC intercessional working group meets again,
• Dec. 2002-MSC considered the outcome of the group meet and agrees that the proposed text be
considered by the Diplomatic Conference
• 12 December 2002 - Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held in London adopts new a
amendments to SOLAS - 74 and ISPS Code
MANDATORY MEASURES
2. Among the measures called for under the compulsory Part A, titled "special Measures to Enhance
Maritime Security," is a requirement for ships to develop security plans and to have a ship security officer.
Shipping companies must also appoint company security officers. In addition, the compulsory section calls
for the development of comprehensive security plans for international port facilities, focusing on areas that
have direct contact with ships. The reference to port facilities, rather than ports, is significant, because IMO
does not have the authority to tell contracting governments how to secure their ports, it created the term "port
facility" to refer to areas where a vessel covered by SOLAS 74 receives services: Any such port facility must
comply with SOLAS 74 regulations, but it Will be up to each IMO member flag state to declare which
locations within each of its country's ports are port facilities that must implement the security requirements.
The Port of London, for example, has 70 terminals along 94 miles of the Thames River Kenneth Hawkes, a
maritime trial lawyer and executive vice president for corporate development of Mar sec international Inc., a
Miami-based maritime security Company, says that any of these are potential port facilities. Not
designating the entire port as a port facility could save money, but it could also result in unaddressed
security Vulnerabilities.
3. For designated port facilities, the code mandates that a system of three security levels be set up to
reflect normal, medium, and high threat situations. Declaration of a security level would trigger the
implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port. For both ships and ports,
for instance, a security level-one would involve the monitoring of restricted areas; controlling access to
the ship; supervising the handling of cargo and ship stores; and opening communications among ports
and ships, so that messages could be sent immediately, Ship security plans must include procedures for
each of these security levels so that the officers and crew know the steps required to respond to them.
The idea is that when approaching a port facility ship will be told what Security level is in effect at that
port facility at that time and the ship would then be required to implement the appropriate procedures to
match the security level in that port facility.
4. To establish what Security level is required in each of its port facility contracting signatory
government will have to Conduct security assessments that identify critical assets as well as areas,
equipment, and buildings where an attack could cause significant loss of life or damage to the port
facility economy of the environment. An assessment must then identify the likely threats to these
Critical assets, helping to prioritize security measures. Finally, the assessment must identify a port
facility Weaknesses in terms of its physical security, structural integrity, protection systems, procedural
policies, Communication systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other likely targets. Some
other key mandatory changes are not part of the ISPS Code Part A or B, One is an amendment speeding
up the schedule for the mandatory fitting of smaller freight ships on international voyages with
Automatic identification Systems (AIS) using global positioning systems and VHF radio frequencies,
which would allow the ships to share data with shore-based control Centres.
5. Another amendment to SOLAS 74 requires that ship identification number be made visible on a
vessel to help port and shipping authorities to identify them. And new language also calls on flag state
authorities to issue each of their registered vessels detailed "synopsis records," including updated
records of ownership, classification society notes, and safety assessments. (Classification societies are
independent bodies charged with setting standards for seaworthiness and then certifying that ships
belonging to that society have met those standards. There are currently about a dozen such classification
societies, and they are among the organizations vying to be designated by IMO member states as the
authority that will certify a ship security plan under, the new IMO requirements.).Another amendment:
Requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert system, by 2004 and the remainder by 2006.
These alarms would transmit ship-to-shore security alerts to a local designated maritime Security
authority, such as U.S., Coast Guard/Customs or a police force. The signal would identify the ship, its
location, and whether the ship is under threat or its security has already been breached. These
Compulsory systems would not raise alarms on board the ship. They would be activated from the
navigation bridge and from at least one other location known only to a limited personnel on board.
6. Voluntary recommendations: Part B of ISPS Code is the voluntary section of the code, is more detailed
and has been Written for guidance to governments, national agencies, local administrations, and shipping
and port authorities to help them implement the requirements called for in Part A of ISPS Code. For
example, Part A of ISPS Code as noted earlier calls for the development of three security levels to signify
whether a normal, medium, or high threat situation exist. A ship will be told what the security level is
prevailing on the port facility and she will have to match its procedures to that levels. Part B of ISPS Code
offers suggestions for what might constitute appropriate procedures for the three Security levels. One
example is cargo handling. The general objectives in Part A call on ships to prevent Cargo tampering and
stop unauthorized cargo from being brought on board through inventory control procedures at a ship's access
point and in the cargo hold itself, as Well as the checking of loaded cargo to make sure that it matches its
documentation and the checking of seals. More detailed guidance on cargo-handling procedures is
offered in Part B of the ISPS code, which says that these procedures can be carried out by visual
physical examination, scanning and detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs,
7. Implementation: The onus of implementing these new regulations falls squarely on IMO member
governments. Flag states must approve ship security plans for their registered vessels. They also have to
verify the compliance of ships with the mandatory section Part A of the ISPS code and the amendments
to SOLAS 74 (also mandatory). Governments of the flag states are further charged with issuing to their
registered vessels "International Ship Security Certificates" signifying that those vessels Comply with
the new Regulations. It is also up to each government, as noted earlier, to designate port facilities, which
will amendments to comply with to SOLAS 74, including the need to appoint a port facility security
officer, carry out a port facility security assessment, and develop a port facility security plan.
8. Enforcement. While the IMO itself has no enforcement authority, IMO expects that member governments
will implement the changes, given that the whole package has been pushed "fairly urgently" by many of
these governments. IMO expects it to be ratified by January 2004 by a sufficient number of countries for it to
come into force. But it may not be smooth sailing toward complete compliance,
9. Problem Areas: Two major problem areas seen in the implementation of ISPS Code are:
v Main cost of implementation:
One major stumbling block is cost. Carrying out this package of new security measures will cost the
shipping industry, along with flag and port states, "billions of dollars". Besides some companies could
be forced to shut down if too much of the cost is passed on to them. IMO has taken note of the
difficulties that may be faced by some flag states in implementing the new security package. It has
created a $1.5 million fund to enable maritime security experts to visit flag states that need assistance in
drawing up effective and internationally her Toni zed security procedures. One problem is that this
program only addresses the costs of providing advice to governments on administrative changes,
Countries and their shipping industry have to finance the operation of new, procedures, inspectorates,
training, monitoring and checking, notes Hawkes. Despite the cost, implementation of the new security
standards is inevitable, experts agree, Flags of "convenience" countries will have to raise their
certification fees to fund compliance, says Hawkes, because the price of not complying is likely to be a
loss of trade. Hawkes explains that U.S. authorities may bar from American ports any ships deemed not
to have an effective IMO compliant ship security plan and operations. This could include ships with
adequate security that have called at ports that do not have the proper safeguards in place, he says. As a
result, ports with poor security standards could be reduced to receiving local traffic.
v Lack of expertise in implementation:

These experts are in-house IMO maritime security specialists or approved consultants. They hold
seminars and workshops for government officials training them in what kind of administrative structures
and national legislation are required to comply with IMO treaties and conventions. IMO sets up regional
workshops and invites flag state representatives to attend. According to IMO public information,
Countries, can also request for the assistance. The level of interest among flag states is extremely high,
as is the level of concern: "That's not the problem, the problem is that while governments recognize the
importance of complying, they don't know how they are going to fund it,"
v Likely implementation Scenario:

The World's two largest markets, the United States and the European Union, are certain to implement the
reforms, dragging the rest of the maritime transport industry into compliance. The U.S. government and the
EU will eventually make the voluntary Part B of ISPS Code a legal requirement in their respective
jurisdictions. What may happen from a legal perspective is that Part B of SPS Code will in essence become
mandatory, not through legislation but because it will set the standard within the industry of what security
should be. Shipping Companies that do not implement the new IMO standards could face legal and
insurance liability. For example, since the IMO code can be interpreted as imposing a legal duty to inspect,
"someone can allege breach of duty" if a ship fails to detect a dangerous item, that then can cause harm.
Unprepared vessels working in areas of the World where such maritime crime is rife could face a move by
insurance Companies to refuse paying on a claim. Insurers might claim such a ship was not Seaworthy, as it
was not fit for its intended use; in such a case, a claim would not be honoured.
10. Definitions: The definition of various terms used in the ISPS Code are as follows:
v Convention means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended
(SOLAS 74). "Regulation means a regulation of the "Convention, a Chapter means a chapter of the
Convention.
v Ship Security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures on board the ship
designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship's stores or the ship from the
risks of a security incident. Port facility security plan means a plan developed to ensure the
application of measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, Cargo
transport and ship's stores within the port facility from the risks of a security incident Ship Security
Officer means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by the Company
as responsible for the security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of the ship
security plan, and for liaison with the company security officer and port facility security officer.
v Company Security Officer means the person designated by the Company for ensuring that a ship
security assessment is carried out that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for approval, and
thereafter implemented and maintained, and for liaison with port facility Security officer and the
ship security officer.
v Port Facility Security Officer means the person designated as responsible for the development,
"implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for the liaison with
the ship security officers and company security officers,
v Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall
be maintained at all times,
v Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures
shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident. .
v Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be
maintained for limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although
it may not be possible to identify the specific target,
v The term "ship", when used in ISPS Code, includes mobile offshore drilling units and high
speed crafts as defined in regulation X-21.
v The term "Contracting Government' in connection with any reference to a port facility, when
used in sections 14 to 18, includes a reference to the Designated Authority,
- Terms not otherwise defined in this part shall have the same meaning as the meaning attributed to
them in chapters 1 and Chapter X-2 of ISPS Code.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION OR NON-ACTION BY THF SHIP SECURITY OFFICER:
-The duties of Ship Security Officers are laid down in para 12 of part A of the ISPS Code. The guideline
of the same are given in para 8, 9 and 13 of part B. The SSO is the main executive authority of the SSP
on board the ship. While making a declaration of security, the 5SO is required to affix his signature
against the security activities which will be his responsibility as distinct from the responsibilities of
PFSO. The SSO may also sign the declaration of security on behalf of the Master, It is therefore evident
that, the SSO must diligently act upon all the duties entrusted to him by the Code. Any laxity or non-
action by the SSO could seriously jeopardize the Ship's Security.
The International Ship Security certificate issued to the ship can be withdrawn if the ship is found to
be in non-compliant of the requirements of Chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 or ISPS Code. Reg. 9 of Chapter
X-2 of SOLAS 74 lays down the control and compliance requirements. This regulation is divided into
three distinct part i.e. control of the ship before entering the port, Control of the ship in the port and
certain additional provisions, Regulation 9 of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS-74 specifies the control and
comply measures for control of the ships in port, ships intending to enter a port of another contracting
government and the additional measures. This regulations permits the authorized officers to verify the
ships certificates. If there are clear grounds to believe that a ship is not complying with the requirements
of the ISPS code, additional inspection/detection may be ordered the rules also permit denial of entry to
the ship into the port as well as expulsion. Clear grounds means evidence of reliable information that the
ship is not complying with chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 and Part A of the ISPS Code. Examples of clear
grounds may be;
• Invalid Certificate,
• Serious deficiency in security equipment or documentation.
• Receipt of a complaint that the ship does not comply with chapter X-2 "Part A of ISPS Code.
• Ships personnel not familiar with essential ship board security procedures or cannot carry out
security drills.
• Key security members of the ship are unable to establish proper communication among
themselves.
• Ship has embarked persons or loaded stores from a port or a ship which are in violation of
Chapter X-Z/Part A of ISPS Code. Further the ship has not completed declaration of security
measures with the concerned port facility of is not complying with the measures required
relevant to the declaration of security measure,
HANDLING SENSITIVE SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
11. Information Security: In order to plan an attack on a ship or a port facility the most crucial element
that a saboteur or a terrorist needs is critical information about the ship of port. Denial of this Critical
information is what information security is all about. Information security therefore, includes all forms
of Communications written, verbal, graphic, or electronic, such as radio transmissions and Computer
data. Information security protects the marine assets and associated personnel by restricting the access
and release of operational information pertinent to the vessel. This information includes-security plan,
load plan, personnel information, passenger manifold, cargo manifests, Cruising routes, asset values,
ownership data, any other information regarding the vessel, its owners, and its operations.
12. Safeguarding your information: Information concerning the operations or financial status of a marine
asset (and the associated personnel) should be closely controlled as an effort to reduce Vulnerability. The
release of what may seem like harmless information can give a criminal the motive and opportunity to
commit a Crime. If the vessel is involved in commercial operations, the release of Certain Data could
provide the competition with a valuable edge. You may think that you really don't have any information
worth stealing or using. Think again, would you leave a credit card receipt on the floor of a restaurant would
you put up a sign in front of your home saying, nobody home, back in two weeks"? Doubtful, but people
routinely, throw away and broadcast important and personal information without ever realizing it.
13. The problem of documents: Credit card receipts, trip itineraries, notes on future plans of operations,
old log books, cheques, ATM receipts, bank deposit slips, court documents, social security numbers of
employees or family, old licenses, old bills, magazines with addresses affixed, business records,
purchase receipts, and the list goes on, All of these are examples of documents that are routinely thrown
into the trash by people every day. These people have no idea that they are practically handing over the
keys to their business and personal life over to the criminal element. It's incredible what people throw in
the garbage without thinking
14. It may seem like high-level espionage to consider that someone would use garbage to exploit a
Weakness, but it is most assuredly yet. Even street lever Crack addicts" know that they can exploit
someone's garbage for a quick buck. The professional Criminal will use the garbage to find
Vulnerabilities. He does this by searching for any piece of information that will provide an opening, or
opportunity. There is an actual case where a vessel was burglarized for an amount exceeding $50,000
because the criminal found the alarm code Written on a business card in the vessel's garbage,
15. The Criminals may recruit a corrupt crew member to determine anything from alarm codes to a
Cruising itinerary. A visitor or service person that boards the vessel may obtain the same information,
Regardless of how trivial it may seem, information needs to be protected.
16. A document shredder should be used to destroy documents. If the shredder is not a portable option,
all documents should be manually destroyed by hand and/or burned. All personnel associated with a
marine asset should be made aware of the importance of information security, particularly where
documents are concerned. This can be accomplished by awareness training using the information in this
publication.
17. Communications Security. The interception of radio signals as a means to gather information has been
going on since the radio was first put to use. Communications security extends to all Communications
methods such as telephones, cell phones, radio transmitters, and the spoken Word. Maritime radio
transmissions are particularly vulnerable to monitoring and exploitation. This is due to the fact that most
vessels use the same (or can access them) frequencies or channels. Another person or vessel can overhear
almost any marine VHF transmission, SSB and HF transmissions are equally vulnerable, but the WHF
presents a special problem.
18. The problem is that most cruising vessels use handheld VHF aboard. Radio conversations between
the primary vessel and the tender usually indicate who is where, and what they are doing, it’s not hard to
ascertain in many cases that only one or a few people man the primary vessel. This provides the
eavesdropping criminal with an opportunity. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that most
Caribbean islands use the VHF as a primary form of communication, and the whole island usual.
19. Commercial vessel operators, especially commercial fishermen, are usually the savviest when it
comes to radio transmissions. This is because they know that the competitor is listening to their every
move. If they say the wrong thing, the competitor will beat them to the best catch
20. Communication security applies to all devices, radios, cellular phones and even hard-wired
telephones, especially in foreign countries. Don't rely on a built-in scrambling device that may be an
option on your Trans receiver. They provide a false sense of security and can be easily monitored. Only
an expensive, dedicated data encryption device can guarantee Communication security. If you need this
security level, then you will have to invest in these devices.
21. The best policy regarding radio or telephone transmissions is to consider it a likelihood that someone
is always listening. This will create a security conscious mind set and enhance the overall security
program. Remember, if it can be broadcast. It can be intercepted, and deciphered, Treat every phone of
radio call as if these were a note written on a postcard.
Chapter 3
SECURITY RESPONSBILITIES CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
1. Subject to the provisions of regulations 3 & 7 of chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74, Contracting
Governments shall set security levels and provide guidance for protection from security incidents.
Higher security levels indicate greater likelihood of occurrence of a security incident. Factors to be
considered in setting the appropriate security level include:
• The degree that the threat information is credible.
• The degree that the threat information is corroborated.
• The degree that the threat information is specific or imminent; and
• The potential consequences of such a security incident.
2. Contracting Governments, when they have set security level 3, shall issue, as necessary, appropriate
instructions and shall provide security-related information to the ships and port facilities that may be
affected, Contracting Governments, may delegate to a recognized security organization some of their
security-related duties under chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 and this Part A of ISPS Code with the exception
of:
• Setting of the applicable security level.
• Approving a port facility security assessment and subsequent amendments to an approved
assessment.
• Determining the port facilities which will be required de-designate a port facility security officer
• Approving a port facility security plan and subsequent amendments to an approved palm,
• Exercising control and compliance measures pursuant to Regulation 9 of chapter X2 of SOLAS 74
and
• Establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security,
• Contracting Governments shall, to the extent they consider appropriate, test the Effectiveness of
the ship security plan or the port facility security plan, or of amendments to such plans, they
have approved, or in the Case of ships, of plans which have been approved on their behalf.
Contracting Governments should ensure that appropriate measures are in place to avoid
unauthorized disclosure of, or access to security sensitive material relating to a ship Security
assessment, ship security, plan, port facility security assessment and port facility security plan,
and to individual assessment or plans. Contracting governments may identify a Designated
Authority within Government to undertake their security duties relating to a port facility as set
out in chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 or part A of ISPS Code.
RECOGNIZED SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS
3. Contracting Governments may authorize a recognized security organization (RSO) to undertake

certain security-related activities, including:
• Approval of a ship security plan, or amendment thereto, on behalf of the Administration;
• Verification and certification of compliance of a ships with the requirements of chapter X-2 of
SOLAS 74 and Part A of ISPS Code on behalf of the Administration,
4. Conducting port facility security assessment required by the Contracting Government.
5. An RSO may also advise or provide assistance to a Company or port facility on security matters,
including Ship security assessment, ship security plan, port facility security assessment and port facility
security plan. This can include completion of an SSA or SSP or PFSA or PFSP, if an RSO has done so
in respect of an SSA or SSP, that RSO is not authorized to approve that SSP, when authorizing a RSO.
Contracting Governments should give consideration to the competency of such an Organization. A RSO
should be able to demonstrate:
• Expertise in relevant aspects of security, appropriate knowledge of ship and port Operations,
including knowledge of ship design and construction if providing services in respect of ships and
of port design and construction and if providing services in respect of port facilities,
• Their capability to assess the likely security risks that could occur during ship and port facility
operations, including the ship/port interface, and how to minimize such risks
• Their ability to maintain and improve the expertise of their personnel,
• Their ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness of their personnel & their ability to
maintain appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, security-
sensitive material. Their knowledge of the requirements of chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 and part A
of ISPS Code and
• Relevant national and international legislation and security requirements,
• Their knowledge of Current security threats and patterns & their knowledge of recognition and
detection of Weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
• Their knowledge of recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and
behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security &their knowledge of Security
and surveillance equipment and systems and their operational limitations.
6. When delegating specific duties to a RSO, Contracting Governments, including Administrations,

should ensure that the RSO has the competency needed to undertake the task. A recognized security
organization, as referred to in regulation 1/5 and fulfilling the requirements of Regulation of Chapter X-
1 of SOLAS 74, may be appointed as an RSO provided it has the appropriate security-related expertise
listed in paragraph 4.5. A port or harbour authority or port facility operator may be appointed as an RSO
provided it has the appropriate security related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.
THE COMPANY
7. The ISPS Code lays down specific requirements for the Company. It is the aim of this chapter to
guide the Ship Owners in interpreting these guidelines so as to arrive at specific implementation actions.
The ISPS code specifies the following requirements for the Company,
8, Master's Authority. The ship security plan must clearly emphasize the Master's, overriding authority
and responsibility to make decisions to ensure Security of the ship. The Master may request the
assistance of the Company or any Flag or port State as may be necessary,
9. Company's Responsibility. Each shipping company or the operator must designate at least one
Company Security Officer to be responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining. Ship
security Plan for every ship in the company fleet. Likewise, the company or the operator must designate
a Company Security Officer for each ship in the Company fleet of ships,
10. Company Support. The Company must ensure that the Company Security Officer, each Master, and
each Ship Security Officer have the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities outlined
in SOLAS 74 and the ISPS Code and the Ship Security Plan. The necessary information that must be
provided by the Company to the Master includes the following:
- Parties, such as the ship management company, manning agents, contractors, and/or concessionaires,
who are responsible for appointing shipboard personnel.
- Parties who are responsible for deciding the employment of the ship, for example, bare boat chatterer(s).
- Contact information for time or voyage charterers, when a ship is employed under a charter party
agreement.
11. The company must keep all information current and updated for changes that may occur. Only
Current up-to-date information on any given date must be kept on board. The Company is not
responsible for keeping or providing information that relates to a previous owner or operator of the ship.
As required by the IMO, the name of the person or organization who appoints the members of the Crew
or other persons employed or engaged on board the ship in any capacity on the business of the ship is:
Ship's Owner (Name and Address):
Company Security Officer.
Ship's Manager / Operator. (Name and Address):

Company Responsible for Employment of Ship
(Including Sub-charterer if any) (Name and Address):
Company Responsible for Manning:
(Name and Address)
THE PORT FACILITY

12. A port facility is required to act upon the security levels set by the Contracting Government within
whose territory it is located. Security measures and procedures shall be applied at the pat facility in such
a manner as to cause a minimum of interference without, or delay to, passengers, ship, ship's personnel
and visitors, goods and services. At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out through
appropriate measures in all port facilities, taking into account the guidance given in part B of ISPS
Code, in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:
• Ensuring the performance of all port facility security duties;
• Controlling access to the port facility;
• Monitoring of the port facility, including anchoring and berthing area(s):
• Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
• Supervising the handling of cargo;
• Supervising the handling of ship's stores; and
• Ensuring that security communication is readily available.
13. At Security level 2, additional protective measures, specified in the port facility security plan, shall
be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking into account the guidance given in part
B of this Code. At security level 3, further specific measures, specified in the port facility security plan,
shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking into account the guidance given in
part B of ISPS Code. In addition, at security level 3, port facility is required to respond to and
implement any security instructions given by the Contracting Government within whose territory the
port facility is located.
14. When a port facility security officer is advised that a. ship encounters difficulties in complying with
the requirements of chapter XI-z of SOLAS 74 of ISPS code or this part or in implementing the
appropriate measures and procedures as detailed in the ship security plan, and in the case of security
level 3 following any security instructions given by the Contracting Government within whose territory
the port facility is located, the port facility security officer and the ship security officer shall liaise and
co-ordinate appropriate actions. When a port facility Security officer is advised that a ship is at a
security level which is higher than that of the port facility, the port facility security officer shall report
the matter to the competent authority and shall liaise with the ship security officer and co-ordinate
appropriate actions, if necessary.
SHIPSECURITY OFFICER (SSO)

15. Ship security officer, means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by
the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of
the ship security plan and for liaison with the Company Security officer and port facility security
officers. The SSO is designated by the company. The SSO is the executive instrument of the Ship
Security Plan. Needless to say that excellent Security plan will yield no results unless it is implemented
by an intelligent and security conscious individual. The duties and responsibilities of the SSO include,
but are not limited to:
• Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate Security measures
are maintained,
• Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan (SSP), including any
amendments to the SSP.
• Co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores with other shipboard
personnel and with the relevant port facility security officer,
• Proposing modifications to the SSP.
• Reporting to the Company Security Officer any deficiencies and non-conformities Identified
during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and Verifications of Compliance
and implementing any corrective actions;
• Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;
• Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as appropriate;
Reporting all security incidents; Co-ordinating implementation of the SSP with the company
security officer and the relevant port facility security officer, and Ensuring that Security
equipment is properly operated, tested, and maintained, if any.
16. The Ship Security Officer is responsible for liaising and communication with the Port Facility
Security Officer and Ship Security Officers of other ships in case of ship-to-ship operations,
• Periodic Review Procedures: The Company Security Officer is responsible for ensuring a ship
security is carried out
• The Ship Security Officer must review the Ship Security Plan.
At least twice within five years. In addition, internal audits shall be arranged by the Company Security
Officer to review the effectiveness of the Ship Security Plan. The Ship Security Plan is reviewed to
ensure its efficiency, continuing suitability and effectiveness, with a view to consider the need for
improvement. The aim is to re-examine all the procedures in use to see whether any improvements can
be done and whether the procedures are still relevant. Procedures may need to be amended due to
instructions from owners or fitting of new equipment. When the SSP has been put to use as a response
to a Security Level 2 or 3, or in a drill, all parties directly involved shall comment on the effectiveness
of the SSP and its content to the SSO.
COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER (CSO)

17. A Company Security Officer (CSO) is a person designated by the shipping company to be
responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining individual Ship Security Plan for all of part
of the company fleet of ships. Depending on how the fleet of ships are organized. A Company may
designate more than one CSO as long as it is clear who the CSO for a particular ship is.
18. Designation: The Company designates a company security officer for a particular ship. Company
Security Officer means the person designated by the Company for ensuring that a ship Security assessment is
carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter implemented and
maintained and for liaison with the port facility security officers and the ship security officer.
19. Duties and Responsibilities: The duties and responsibilities of the Company Security Officer
include, but are not limited to the following:
• Advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using appropriate security
assessments and other relevant information.
• Supervising security assessments for each Ship,
• Ensuring the development, the submission for approval, and thereafter the Implementation and
maintenance of the ship security plan;
• Ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to eliminate the deficiencies and
satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship
• Arranging for internal audits and reviews of security measures and activities,
• Arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the Administration or the
recognized security organization (RSO);
• Ensuring that deficiencies & non-conformities are identified during internal audits, periodic
reviews, security inspections & verifications of compliance are promptly addressed & dealt with.
• Enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
• Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship;
• Ensuring effective communication and cooperation between the ship Security officer and the
relevant port facility, security officer,
• Ensuring Consistency between security requirements and safety requirement;

• Ensuring that, if a sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each ship reflects the
ship-specific information accurately; and
• Ensuring that any alternative of equivalent arrangements approved for a particular ship or group
of ships are implemented and maintained.
PORT FACILITY SECURTY OFFICER (PFSO)

20. A port facility security officer (PFSO) shall be designated for each port facility. A person may be
designated as the port security officer for one or more port facilities. In addition to those specified in
SPS Code, the duties and responsibilities of the port facility security officer shall include, but are not
limited to:
• Conducting an initial comprehensive security survey of the port facility, taking into account the
relevant port facility security assessment,
• Ensuring the development and maintenance of the port facility security plan;
• Implementing and exercising the port facility security plan (PFSP);
• Undertaking regular security inspections of the port facility to ensure continuation of appropriate
Security measures;
• Recommending and incorporating, as appropriate, modifications to the port facility Security plan
(PFSP) in order to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to take into account relevant
changes to the port facility,
• Enhancing security awareness and vigilance of the port facility personnel;
• Ensuring adequate training has been provided to personnel responsible for the Security of the
port facility, - Reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining records of occurrences which
threaten the security of the port facility;
• Co-ordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the appropriate Company
and ship security officer(s);
• Co-ordinating with security services, as appropriate;
• Ensuring that standards for personnel responsible for security of the port facility are met
• Ensuring that security equipment is ргорегӀу орегated, tested, calibrated and maintained, if any,
• Assisting ship security officers in confirming the identity of those seeking to board the ship
when requested.
The port facility Security officer shall be given the necessary support to fulfil the duties and
responsibilities imposed by chapter X-2 of SOLAS 74 and Part A of ISPS Code.
VESSEL PERSONNEL WITH SPECIFIC SECURITY OUTIES

21. The Master is responsible for the safety and security of the crew passengers, and cargo. The
development of general security policies and procedures is the responsibility of the Company Security
Officer. The Ship Security Officer is responsible for implementing, maintaining, and supervising the
Ship Security Plan.
The specific Security duties for each personnel will be laid down in the Ship Security Plan.
• Duties and responsibilities of security watch of the security Watch must be aware of the security
level the ship is operating in. A sharp lookout shall be maintained. Suspicious persons, object
and activities and malfunctioning of Security equipment shall be reported to the duty officer,
• Communication - To summon assistance, the security Watch shall be provided with means of
communication to keep in touch with the duty officer.
• -Briefings - All officers and crew members are to be briefed about their duties and the security
level the ship is in at every change of security level, on possible threats, the procedures for
reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for vigilance.
22. Officer of the Watch (OOW). It is the responsibility of the Deck Watch Officer to: -Familiarize
him/herself with all Current security standing orders before Corning on duty.
• Be responsible for all specific security duties being carried out on board and/or and additional
duties passed on by the Master.
• Know the current Security Level and the security measures that have been implemented.
• Be aware of the immediate recall procedures in case of an emergency.
• -Brief the oncoming Watches as to the current security level, their standing orders and any
additional specific security measures in place.
• Ensure all Watches are in acceptable dress and are neat and tidy in appearance,
• Ensure all Watches are equipped with the proper security equipment to enable thorn to carry out
their duties, ensure gangway and rowing patrol watches are relieved promptly for meals and at
the end of the hour of duty & ensure that a copy of the standing orders for each post be available
at the post.
• Ensure all watches know how to report any incidents or problems, check the gangway log and
visitor badge issue arrangements when coming on duty and at least once between beginning and
end of Watch.
• Visit all duty personnel at least once before midnight and once between midnight and OSOO.
• Record all visits in the security log, ensure the Master and Ship's Security Officer's Contact
details in Case Of emergency, - Tour the ship randomly and visit all restricted areas, check all
mooring lines, rat guards, lounge areas and all around berthing area. -Brief relieving OOW as to
the current security level, the standing orders and any additional specific security measures in
place,
• Record the handover takeover of duties in the security log.
23. All other Ship's Officers: Assist the SSO for reporting a security incidents or potential security
breaches.
• Assist the SSO in implementing security measures at each security level and report any
nonconformities or failures.
• Be, responsible, while on duty, for implementing the requirements of the SSP relevant to their
position.
24. Crew members it is the duty of all crew members and employees to make themselves familiar with
the contents of the SSP and relevant supporting orders. They are to be familiar with their duties as laid
down in ship security plan.
FACILITY PERSONNEL
25. The security requirements of a port facility will be determined through port facility security
assessment. The security duties of various port facility personnel will depend upon the type and degree
of security required at the various port facilities. These duties will be contained in the port facility.
Chapter 4
SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

1. Security risk analysis, otherwise known as risk assessment, is fundamental to the security of any
organization. It is essential to ensuring that controls and expenditure are fully commensurate with the
risks to which the organization is exposed. However many conventional methods for performing
security risk analysis are becoming more and more untenable in terms of usability, flexibility, and
Criticality in terms of what they produce for the user.
2. Security in any system should be commensurate with the risks involved, However the process to
determine which security controls are appropriate and cost effective, is quite often a complex and
sometimes a subjective matter. One of the prime functions of security risk analysis is to make this
process to be more objective basis. There are a number of distinct approaches to risk analysis, However,
these essentially break down into two types: quantitative and qualitative,
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

3. This approach employs two fundamental elements the probability of an event occurring and the likely
loss should it occur. Quantitative risk analysis makes use of a single figure produced from these Eller
Tents, This is called the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) or the "Estimated Annual Cost (EAC)". This is
calculated for an event by simply multiplying the potential loss by the probability. It is thus theoretically
possible to risk events in order of risk (ALE) and to make decisions based upon this.
4. The problems with this type of risk analysis are usual associated with the unreliable and inaccurate
data Probability can rarely be precise and can, in some cases, promote complacency. In addition,
controls and Countermeasures often tackle a number of potential events. However the events themselves
are frequently interrelated. Notwithstanding the drawbacks, a number of organizations have successfully
adopted quantitative risk analysis.
QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

5. This is by most widely used approach to risk analysis. Probability data is not required and only
estimated potential loss is used. Most qualitative risk analysis methodologies make use of a number of
inter related elements:
(a) THREATS: These are the events that can go wrong or can 'attack' the system. Examples may
include fire or fraud. Threats are always present for every system.
- VULNERABILITIES: These make a system more prone to attack by a threat or make an attack."
more likely to have some successor impact, for example, for fire to occur - the vulnerability would be
the presence of inflammable materials (e.9, paper oil, gas).
- CONTROLS: These are the Counter measures against vulnerabilities. These are four types:-
• Deterrent controls reduce the likelihood of a deliberate attack

• Preventative controls protect vulnerabilities and make an attack unsuccessful or reduce its impact
• Corrective Controls reduce the effect of an attack Detective Controls discover attacks and trigger
preventative or corrective Controls.
6. Security Assessment: Security Assessment is a risk-based decision making tool. It is a systematic and
analytical process to consider the likelihood that a security breach will endanger an asset, individual or
function and based on that, to identify actions to reduce the vulnerability and mitigate the consequences
of a security breach. The Ship Security Plan (SSP) is based on the results of the Security Assessment
(SSA). The most essential part of developing or updating an effective Ship Security plan (SSP) is
undertaking a comprehensive, documented Ship Security Assessment. The Ship Security Assessment is
the responsibility of the Company Security Officer, even though he may delegate the task to other
competent people with appropriate skills and experience, such as a "Recognized Security Organization"
(RSO) authorized by the Flag State, Security Survey means an inspection, check and/or audit to control
and improve the mitigation strategy, protective measures and actions in the Ship Security Plan. The Ship
Security Assessment (SSA) shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained by the Company.
ASSESSMENT TOOLS
7. The Ship Security Assessment shall include at least the following

• An on-scene security survey.
• Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations; ...
• Identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations that it is important to protect ...
• Identification of possible threats to the key shipboard operations and the likelihood of their
occurrence, in order to establish and priorities security measures; and
• Identification of Weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and
procedures.
Each Ship Security Assessment (SSA) must consider:
• Threats that may be unique for the port facility at which the ship will call,
• Types of port facilities
• Port facility security measures
8. The Ship Security Assessment (SSA) must address the following areas of the ship that, if damaged or
Used for illicit purpose, could endanger people, property, or operations on the ship of within the port
facility.
• Physical Security
• Structural integrity of the ship and/or port facilities
• Personnel protective systems
• Policies and procedures
• Communication systems, including radios and telecommunications
9. The Ship Security Assessment must be reviewed, accepted or approved and retained by the Company.
The Completed ship Security Assessment must include a summary report that describes how the
assessment was conducted and identified the vulnerabilities that were found along with the
Countermeasures to be used for each vulnerability, The Ship Security Assessment will contain
information that should be kept confidential. The Ship Security Assessment itself should be protected
against unauthorized access and/or disclosure.
ON-SCENE SECURITY SURVEY

10. The "On-Scene" Security Survey should examine and evaluate the existing shipboard security
protective measures, procedures, and operations for: Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties
• Monitoring restricted areas to prevent unauthorized access
• Controlling access to the ship
• Monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the ship.
• Controlling the embarkation/disembarkation of person and their belongings,
• Supervising cargo handling and delivery of ship stores.
• Ensuring the ready availability of ship security equipment and communication systems. .
• Handling of unaccompanied baggage
11. Expert Assistance: The Company Security Officer (CSO) should consider soliciting the assistance of
outside experts in the following areas to prepare a complete and adequate Ship Security Assessment (SSA)
• Knowledge of security threats and patters,
• Recognizing and detecting Weapons, dangerous substances and devices.
• Recognizing characteristics and behaviour of persons who are likely to threaten security
• Techniques used to circumvent security measure.
• Methods used to Cause a security incident of explosives on ship structures and equipment,
• Ship Security Standard practices, actions for ship and port facility,
• Contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response.
• Physical Security, ,
• Radio and telecommunications, including computer equipment and networks.
• Marine engineering
• Ship and port facility operations.
12. Ship-Specific Information: Prior to conducting the Ships "On-Scene Security Survey", collect the
following information about the ship:
• General layout of the ship.
• Location of "restricted areas", including the navigation bridge, engine room, control room,
steering gear space, and other important equipment and machinery spaces.
• Access points.
• Tidal changes that could affect the vulnerability or security of the ship. . Cargo spaces and
stowage arrangements.
• Location of ship stores.
• Location of unaccompanied baggage. .
• Emergency and stand-by equipment designed to maintain essential Services. .
• Number of shipboard personnel along with existing security duties and training. ...
• Existing security and safety equipment for protecting ship's personnel and passengers. .
• Evacuation routes and assembly stations for orderly emergency abandonment of the ship, .
• Agreements for private security services for protecting the ship or port facilities., .
• Existing security equipment, measures, and procedures, including cargo inspection and control
procedures, surveillance and monitoring equipment, required personnel identification
documents, and ship security communications alarm, and lighting.
13. Points of Access the Ship Security Assessment should identify and examine all points of access,
including open Weather decks, and evaluate the potential for each such point which can be used by
individuals for unauthorized entry.
14. Security Measures and Guidance Considering existing security measures, guidance, procedures, and
operations, the Ship Security Assessment should determine specific security guidance for the following
• Restricted areas,
• Emergency response procedures, including fire emergencies. .
• Supervision of ship personnel, passengers, visitors, vendors, repairmen, and dock Workers. .
• Frequency and effectiveness of security patrols.
• Access control systems, including identification requirements. .
• Security communication equipment and procedures,
• Security doors, barriers, and lighting.
• Security equipment, including surveillance equipment.
15. Protected items: The Ship Security Assessment should consider all possible security threats that
may include the following:
• Ship Personnel, Passengers, visitors, vendors, repairmen, and port facility personnel.
• Navigation and emergency response equipment, Cargo, especially dangerous cargo or hazardous
materials, Ship Stores
• Security Communication equipment
• Security surveillance equipment.
16. Security Threats: The Ship Security Assessment should consider all possible security threats that
may include the following:
• Damage to the ship or port facility caused by an explosive device (bomb), arson, sabotage, or
Wandali ST.
• Hijacking or seizure of the ship's or of ship personnel or passengers. ,
• Tampering with cargo, stores, or critical ship equipment. .
• Unauthorized access, inducing stowaways.
• Smuggling of Weapons or the use of the ship to transport terrorists and/or their equipment. .
• Use of the ship itself as a weapon to cause damage or destruction,
• Attacks from the sea while at berth, at anchor or at sea.
17. Vulnerabilities: The Ship Security Assessment should consider vulnerabilities, including:
• Conflicts between safety measures and security measures.
• Conflicts between regular shipboard duties and security assignments. ,
• Watch-keeping duties, limited numbers of shipboard personnel, and the effects of fatigue on
alertness and performance.
• Inadequate security training. ,
• Inadequate or poorly maintained security equipment, including communication equipment.
18. The company security officer shall ensure that the ship security assessment is carried out by an
Organization with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship, the ship security assessment in
addition to above requirements shall also include the following elements:
• Threats to Ships: Threats to a ship can rapidly change. A ship's location, the time of day, and
International events can dramatically alter the threat to a ship. As a consequence, it is critical for
the SSO to regularly monitor events to determine potential threats during the passage of the ship
as she sails to her next destination, Information about potential threats is available from a variety
of sources. These include port authorities, Captains of the Port, port security officers, local law
enforcement agencies and local consular or diplomatic representatives. A variety of government,
industry and international business organizations also provide information on potential threats.
For example, governments issue warnings for areas with high security risks, Internet sites are
also available that Compile data on piracy and other threats. Issues to consider when making an
assessment are:
• Location: A ship's location can be important in determining a potential threat. For instance,
ships are most vulnerable to attack by pirates at sea when near land, and when sailing through
narrow channels where speed and manoeuvrability may be restricted. Government 1 general
Warnings are announced for specific countries of regions of high pirate activity.
• Time of day: Ships are most vulnerable under cover of darkness when there is inadequate light
to detect of protect against an unauthorized boarding at sea, at a mooring or at anchorage.
• Type of Ship: Cargo ships are generally more vulnerable to robberies thefts and drug smuggling
than other types of ships. If terrorists are seeking to smuggle weapons into a country, they may also
choose a cargo ship. But if terrorists want to block a channel, a bulk carrier may be targeted. If
terrorists are seeking to use a ship as a weapon, they may, seek to gain control of a ship transporting
hazardous Cargo.
• -'Noe of Cargo. The presence absence of a particular cargo, its nature and properties and
stowage may cause a threat.
SECURITY ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION

19. The Ship Security Plan is derived and based on the findings of the Ship Security Assessment. Hence, it
needs to be documented and forms the supporting document for the ship security plan. Para 8.5 of Part A of
ISPS code stipulates that the ship security assessment shall be -
• Documented
• Reviewed
• Accepted and retained by the company
Chapter 5
SECURITY EQUIPMENT & SYSTEMS AND SHIP SECURITY PLAN
In the earlier years the only method of ensuring security was physical examination. With the passing of time
the criminals have resorted to innovative techniques to hood Wink the inspectors. Also With large and quick
movement of personnel and cargoes taking place, it is no more possible to ensure security through physical
inspection alone. Physical inspection of one single container may take up to a day. Needless to say that
commercial considerations cannot allow such luxuries. In order to detect and nab today's clever and
technology savvy criminal, a number of highly sophisticated equipments are in use. The use of metal
detectors and the arch is well known to us. We have also come across luggage, X-Ray machines at the
airports. Description of some of the prominent and latest equipment are in use or likely to be in use in the
near future is given in the Succeeding paragraphs.
SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS AND THEIR OPERATIONAL

Explosives emit distinct odours that dogs can be trained to detect. However, search dogs need to rest about
every half-hour. At the Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, N.M., Kevin
Linker and his colleagues have developed an essential part of what may be aptly described as an electronic
dog. The key to the handheld "sniffer" is a component known as a chemical pre concentrator. It draws in a
large volume of air, collects heavy organic Compounds from the air stream onto a filter; and then vaporizes
these compounds in the presence of an explosives detector is so sensitive, a person who had handled a bomb
or a suitcase containing explosives would register as having 100,000 times more residue than a "clean
passenger says co-developer Dave Hannum.
At the Lawrence Liver more National Laboratory in Live' more, Calif., PM Was shown a similarly small
detection unit that can rapidly identify poison gases and bio Warfare agents.
X-RAYS
The next part of the security system that could use improvement is the passenger scanner. The Current
method for inspecting individual passengers is to use a metal detector, which is unable to detect non-metallic
objects such as explosives. The Solution lies in Weaker, not stronger, X-rays just powerful enough to look
through clothes. It takes a front and back scan of a passenger in a little more than 6 seconds. The operator
sees images like those shown here using a model. Plastic explosives taped to his chest and back stand out,
along with a pistol, bullets and pocket change. What is significant about the X-ray is that, while you can see
the man's shin bones, which are very close to the skin, no internal organs appear on the image. This is
because the subject is scanned with a narrow beam of X-rays that cannot penetrate more than a fraction of an
inch into the body. Most of the rays are scattered back in the opposite direction. This energy is then gathered
b1"sensitive X-ray detectors, and the information gleaned from these sensors is used to generate images like
those shown on the left. The amount of radiation a person receives during the 6-second scan is roughly
equivalent to the radiation
X-RAY Each scan takes 3 seconds and immediately identifies objects a metal detector would miss
The MR-5 has been developed as a standard to a new generation of Explosive Disposal Robots (EDR)
Police, Military, ERI Fire, Nuclear; and other Hazardous Response personnel can utilize the multi-purpose
MR-5. The MR-5 is capable of surveillance, neutralizing, and handling such items as Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs), Hazardous Chemicals, and Radioactive Materials. The MR-5 is an all-weather all-terrain in-
door and Outdoor mobile robot. The MR-5 features the latest robotic and computer technologies packaged
into a mobile robot for hazardous environment operations' The MR-5 is remotely controlled, and consists of
a robust Vehicle and dexterous robot arm. The 6-axis manipulator arm has turret, shoulder, elbow, and a
three-axis Wrist' various end-effectors tools and modular equipment can be attached to the arm. The tools
and modules are quick-connect/disconnect units. The MR-5 is rugged and precise, it is capable of carrying
very large and very small payloads with the same gripper and same dexterity. Also, t can carry a variety of
weapons, sensors and detectors, such as disrupters, lasers, and mine detectors,
IN VISION TECHNOLOGIES EDs MACHINES

All In Vision (i) CTX" EDS machines locate and identify explosive devices concealed in checked baggage.
As the Conveyor moves each bag through the machine, the system produces a scan projection X-ray image.
From this image, the powerful onboard computer determines which areas need "slice" images, taken by the
rotating X-ray source. The (CT) 9000 DSi system is the World's fastest FM-certified Explosives Detection
System (EDS). FAA-certified at542 bags per hour, it features alternate operational modes yielding even
higher throughputs,
As the conveyor moves each bag through the Machine, the system creates a scan projection X-ray
image. From this image, the powerful onboard computer determines which areas need "slice" images, taken
by the rotating X-ray source. Using sophisticated computer algorithms, the CTX 9000 DSi analyses these
images and compares their CT properties with those of known explosives, if a match is found, the system
alarms and displays the object on the screen. The operator views the screen image to determine whether a
real threat exists and then follows established protocols for threat resolution. Explosives Trace Detection
(ETD) An equipment which provides this function is the IONSCAN. IONSCAN provides the capability of
detecting trace amounts of more than 40 explosive or narcotic substances in a quick 8 second analysis. The
Colour-coded display presents instrument status information and results to the operator in an easy to
understand fashion. If detection is made, the specific explosive or narcotic is identified on the display, The
IONSCANG) was widely deployed at Salt Lake City Airport for the 2002 Winter Olympics. In a matter of
days, Over 80 systems were installed at the ticket check-in counters to Screen checked baggage.
ON TRACK ITEMISER
The on Track Itemiser uses on trap mobility spectrometry technology. Trace detection technology makes use
of the minute amounts of vapours given off and the microscopic particles left behind when narcotics and
explosives contraband are packaged and handled. While the analyser technology itself is quite sophisticated,
it is extremely simple to use. Most importantly, it is fast, accurate and sensitive. Just how sensitive?
Billionths of a gram - or the concentration equivalent of dissolving a single packet of sugar in 100 Olympic-
size swimming pools collecting samples for analysis couldn't be simpler. In the case of trace particle
detection, the surfaces of a vehicle or luggage that are suspected of being tainted with contraband are wiped
down with a paper disk known as a sample trap. The trap is then inserted into the desktop analyser. Once
analysed, the contraband substance is identified, along with its relative alarm strength. Visual and audible
indications are provided, and the analysis can be stored and printed for use as court-accepted evidence. For
the case of vapour detection, the portable, handheld analyser "sniffs" the air around the openings of closed
compartments, containers or packages suspected of concealing contraband. The analyser then identifies the
contraband substance and its relative alarm strength. Again, as wi the particle analyser, both visual and
audible indicator are provided, and the analysis can be stored and later printed for use as court-accepted
evidence.
EYEBALLS: A FOOLPROOF ID CARD

It turns out that extensive database identification systems may be largely unnecessary, Humans carry a built-
in identity card, in the pattern of their iris. What's more, the eye can be scanned passively, from a distance of
a few feet away. In late October, Indian Technologies of Moorestown, N.J., and Joh, Erischede Security
Solutions of Haarlem, Netherlands, installed an automated iris recognition border-crossing system at
Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. During the trial period, passengers who are nationals of the European
Economic Cooperation nations can enrol in the iris-recognition system. The system measures 247
independent variables for each iris and stores this information on a so-called Smart Card. The Variability in
iris patterns is so great that it is even different between identical twins,. The chances of two persons having
the same iris code are as low as 1 in 7 billion. One plan being considered would require iris-matched ID
cards for all visitors to the United States One of the most attractive features for immigration officials is that it
would then take less than 2 seconds to Verify each person's identity.
Who's Who When it comes to spotting and stopping known terrorists, the two most widely used tools-video
cameras and photo identity cards-have proved to be technological dead ends. Tests of face ID systems have
thus far been disappointing. In Britain, which was at the Vanguard of the security Camera movement,
independent studies have shown that while Cameras are useful for gathering evidence to prosecute Crimes,
they have done little if anything to prevent crime. More sophisticated safeguards on driver's licenses also
have proved ineffective. California recently suffered national embarrassment as the result of its attempt to
introduce more secure driver's licenses. A network television investigative reporting team revealed that
added security measures, including holograms and online verification of Social Security numbers, failed to
stop fraud by corrupt state workers and only increased the price for illegal licenses, from $1500 to $2300.
New York is becoming one of the most closely watched cities, In Singapore there are more cameras than
police can monitor, so the government plans to buy Computer programs that differentiate innocent and
hostile activity.
EQUTPMENT PRESCREED EY SOLAS 74

Ships security alert system: Each ship must be fitted with a Ship Security Alert System, or "silent alarm",
which when activated will transmit a ship-to-shore security alert that identifies the ship, the ship's location,
and indicates that the ship is under threat or has had a breach of a security, Transmissions from the Ship
Security Alert System must not alert any other ship or sound any alarm on the ship. Further it must continue
until reset. The Ship Security Alert System must be designed to be activated from the navigational bridge
and from one other place on the ship.
Automatic identification system: This is an equipment which was made mandatory through a clause in
SOLAS 74. With the implementation of ISPS Code, the fitment schedule of automatic identification system
has been accelerated.
THE PURPOSE OF MSHAS SHOWN IN THE ILLUSTRATION BELOW IS TO ENSURE

AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION OF SHIPS DENTITY POSITION AND OTHER RELEWANT
DATA OTHER SECURTTY EQUIPMENT
3. During the Ship Security Assessment, the Company Security Officer and Ship Security Officer must
evaluate the need for other appropriate security equipment that may be used to protect the security of the
ship. For example, closed-circuit cameras may be used for surveillance (when personnel are available to
monitor the cameras) or meter detectors and/or x-ray equipment may be appropriate for screening passengers
and their belongings. The Ship Security Plan must identify all the ship security equipment and establish
procedures for inspecting, testing, and maintaining all security equipment in accordance with the equipment
manufacturer’s instructions.
Testing, calibration and maintenance of security Equipment & Systems: It is the duty of the Ship
security officer to ensure that all the security equipment are in a perfect working order at all the times. In
this task, he is to be assisted by the Ships Master and the company. The maintenance routines and
calibrating the equipment.
SHIP SECURITY PLAN

PURPOSE OF THE SHP SECURTTY PLAN
1. Ship Security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures on board the ship
designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship's stores or the ship from the risks
of a security incident. The purpose of the plan is to lay down the responsibilities and the procedures to
prevent and counteract any anticipated threat to the ship, its cargo and crew. The ISPS Code Part Apara
9 states, that each ship shall carry onboard a ship security plan approved by the administration. The plan
lays down precise actions to be taken under various threats situations. It is the duty of the company
security officer to ensure that every ship is provided with a suitable ship security plan. W.e.f.01 Jul
2004, each ship must have a Ship Security Plan that has been approved by the Ship's Flag State or a
Recognized Security Organization which has been authorized by the ship Flag State to review and
approve Ship Security Plans. The Ship Security Plan must outline the protective security measures to be
taken for each of the three different security levels for critical shipboard activities, including controlling
access to the ship, monitoring restricted areas, handling cargo, delivering ship stores, handling
unaccompanied baggage and monitoring the security of the ship.
DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL OF THE SHIP SECURITY PLAN

2. The plan is made based on the security assessment The Plan is required to be developed taking into
account the guidance given in the Part B of the ISPS Code. The Company Security Officer is
responsible to arrange for preparing the Ship Security Plan and submitting the Plan for Flag State
Approval. Ship Security plans may be prepared by a Recognized Security Organization, but when this is
the case, the same Recognized Security Organization may not also review and approve the Plan. Each
Ship Security Plan that is submitted for approval must be accompanied with a Ship Security Assessment
based on which the Ship Security Plan was developed. The Ship Security Assess lent will identify
particular physical and operational features of the ship, including the voyage patterns of the ship, and
potential security threats and Vulnerabilities.
3, Ship Security Plans may be written in the working language of the ship, but a translation in English,
French or Spanish if neither of these languages is the working language of the ship. The content of each
Ship Security Plan will be different from anchor ship depending on a number of factors is also required
the Plan covers. The Ship Security Plan must address the following:
• Measures to prevent unauthorized weapons, dangerous substances, and devices intended to harm
people, the ship or port facilities from being taken on board the ship. ...
• Identification of restricted areas and measures to prevent unauthorized access to such areas
• Measures to prevent unauthorized access to the ship,
• Procedures for responding to see breaches of security, -
• Procedures for responding to security instructions from Port State authorities that may be at
Security Level 3. -
• Procedures for evacuating the ship in case of security threats of breaches of security. -
• Duties of shipboard personnel assigned security responsibilities. -
• Procedures for auditing security activities, -
• Procedures for security training, drills and exercises. -
• Procedures for coordinating ship security activities with port facility security activities, -
• Procedures for periodically reviewing and updating the Ship Security Plan. -
• Procedures for reporting security incidents. -
• Identification of the Ship Security Officer. -
• Identification of the Company Security Officer including 24 hour contact information. -
• Procedures for inspection, testing, calibrating and maintenance of any ship security equipment. -
• Location of the Ship Security Alert system activation points. -

• Procedures, instructions, and guidance on the use of the Ship Security Alert System, Including
instructions for testing, activating and resetting the device and for limiting false alerts. In
addition, all Ship Security Plans should: -
• Detail the organizational structure of security for the ship -
• Detail the relationships with respect to security between the ship, the Company, port facilities,
other ships and Port and Flag States,
• Detail the systems for maintaining continuous communication with the ship and between the
ship and Port facilities. .
• Detail the basic operational and physical security measures that will always be in place for
Security Level. .
• Detail additional security measures that will be implemented without delay for Security Level 2,
and when necessary, for Security Level 3. .
• Provide for the regular periodic review or audit of the Ship Security Plan and for the amendment
of the Plan in response to experience or changing circumstances. .
• Procedures for timely and accurate reporting of breaches of security to appropriate port and Flag
State authorities.
CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES
2 Ship security plans are not subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by a Contracting
Government to carry out control and compliance measures in accordance with regulation 9 of chapter X-
2 of SOLAS-74. If the officers duly authorized by a Contracting Government have clear grounds to
believe that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS-74 or part A
of this Code, and the only means to verify or rectify the non-compliance is to review the relevant
requirements of the ship security plan, limited access to the specific sections of the plan relating to the
non-compliance is exceptionally allowed, but only with the Consent of the Contracting Government or
the master of the ship concerned. Nevertheless, the provisions in the following plan are considered as
confidential information, and cannot be Subject to inspection unless otherwise agreed by the
Contracting Governments concerned.
• Identification of restricted areas and measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to them.
• Procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security including provisions for
maintaining critical operations of the ship or ship/port interface,
• Procedures for responding to security instructions from Port State authorities that may be given
at Security Level 3.
• Duties of shipboard personnel assigned security responsibilities. .
• Procedures for inspection, testing, calibrating and maintenance of any ship security equipment.
• Location of the Ship Security Alert system activation points,
If Ship Security Plans are kept in an electronic format, they must be protected by procedures that
prevent unauthorized deletion, destruction, or alteration. Ship Security Plan must be treated as
confidential and must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. The Master has the
overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions, which, in the professional judgment of the
master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. If, in the professional judgment of
the master a conflict between any safety and security requirements applicable to the ship arises during
its operations, the master shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the
ship. In such cases, the master will implement temporary security measures and shall forthwith inform
the Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government in whose port the ship is operating
of intends to enter. Any such temporary security measures under ISPS Code shall, to the highest
possible degree, be commensurate with the prevailing security level.
IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE 'SHIP SECURITY PLAN

6. It is important to understand that no matter how perfect is the plan, it will be ineffective; unless it is
implemented properly. It is the duty of the ship's security officer to ensure that the plan is implemented
onboard in letter and spirit. He is to ensure that all the personnel on board the ship are conversant with
their security related duties. In order to ensure that the plan is implemented onboard, the ship security
officer should regularly exercise the ship's crew in security exercises and drills. Before commencement
of the exercise, the personnel involved should be briefed on the purpose of the exercise. On completion
a de-brief should be carried out to appraise the personnel of the short comings.
7. An important aspects of the implementation of the ship's security plan is to critically examine it from
the point of view of short comings. It needs to be appreciated that over a period of time the plan may
need to be amended to cater to the changed circumstances. The ship security officer must therefore,
identify these changes and propose remedial measures. He can thereafter in Consultation with the ship's
master propose changes in the ship security plan to the company security officer. As the ship security
plan is a document approved by the administration, the amendments to the plan must be approved. Para
9.3 of Part A of ISPS Code states that amendments to a previously approved plan need to be
accompanied by the Security assessment based on which the amendment has been developed. In a
nutshell, it would suffice to say that the ship security plan is based on an assessment of various security
related factors. As and when any of these factors change, the assessment changes and hence the ship
security plan must be amended to cater for the changes.
8. ISPS Code Part B. Para 9.5 states that CSO & SSO should develop procedures to: -
• Assess the continuing effectiveness of the SSP.
• Prepare amendments to the ship security plan and subsequently get the approval.
SUGGESTED FORMAT FOR SHIP SECURITY PLAN SHIP SECURITY PLAN. NAMAC
Section 1 - Introduction
1. Ship Port and Trading Specific Data.
2. Ship Details,
3. Орегatoг
4. Company Security Officer.
5. Port Facility Security Officer (1).
6. Port Facility Security Officer (2).
7. Background.
8. Administration of the Plan.
9. Distribution List.
Section 2- Policy
1. Company security policy statement.
2. Security objective.
3. Masters discretion.
4. Background.
1. Company security information diagram.

2. Company ship and port facility security organization and reporting chart.
3. Ship security officer,
4. Duties and responsibilities.
(i) Ships master.
(ii) Company security officer.
(iii) Ships security officer.
(iv) Officer of the Watch,
(v). All other ships officer,
(vi) Crew members.
(vii) Port facility.
(viii) Communication.
Chapter 6
THREAT IDENTIFICATIONS, RECOGNITION RESPONSE RECOGNITION, DETECTION
OF WEAPONS, DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES AND DEVICES
1. In order to pre-empt and prevent a terrorist action onboard, it is imperative that the terrorist is prevent
from bringing his instruments of destruction onboard. Further, it is likely that the terrorist will try to
smuggle his Weapons in parts and these parts at first look would look like machinery spare parts or tools
for carrying out repairs onboard. It is therefore important that personnel onboard have at least a basic
knowledge of these instruments and how they look like. AK47 has been one of the most popular arm of
terrorist. Given below are the images of various parts of this gun, you will appreciate that if this gun was
smuggled in parts, it is unlikely that a normal Crew onboard will be able to recognize it.
EXPLOSIVES
2. Any explosive material has the following characteristics: It is chemically or otherwise energetically
unstable. . The initiation produces a sudden expansion of the Taterial accompanied by large changes in
pressure (and typically also a flash or loud noise) which is called the explosion, given below are details
of chemical explosives. There are many other varieties of more exotic explosive material such as
nuclear explosives and antimatter, and other methods of producing explosions, such as abrupt heating
with a high intensity laser or electrical arc.
3. Classifications. Explosives are classified by their sensitivity, which is the amount of energy to
initiate the reaction. This energy can be anything, from a shock, an impact, a friction, an electrical
discharge, or the detonation of another explosive. There are: two basic divisions on sensitivity. ... Low
Explosives (Burns through deflagration rather than detonation wave, are a mixture, are initiated by Heat
and require confinement to create an explosion) and High Explosives (will explode without
confinement, are compounds, initiated by shock or heat, super Sonic reaction, high brisance). "Brisance"
means the shattering effect of an explosion. B'
4. Primary Explosives. They are extremely sensitive and require a small quantity of energy to be
initiated. They are mainly used in detonators to initiate secondary explosives (Examples: Lead azide,
Mercury fulminate lead styphnate, tetrazene,
5. Secondary Explosives - They are relatively insensitive and need a great amount of energy to initiate
decomposition. They have much more power than primary explosives and are used in demolition. The
require a detonator to explode. (Examples: Dynamite, TNT, RDX, PETN, HMX, ammonium nitrate,
tetry, picric acid, nitrocellulose)
6. Detonation - Also called an initiation sequence of a firing train, this is the sequence of events which
cascade from relatively low levels of energy to cause a chain reaction to initiate the final explosive
material or main charge. They can be either low or high explosive trains. Low explosive trains are
something like a bullet-Primer and a propellant charge, High explosives trains can be more complex,
either Two-Step (e.9. Detonator and Dynamite). Of Three-Step (e.g. Detonator Booster and ANFO),
Detonators are often made from.
7. Denolitions skill. When setting up explosives it is possible to shape the charge being use. This allows
the focus of the explosion to be aimed at a narrower focal point and reduces the blast zone of the attack.
An additional skill roll is undertaken following the set-up of the explosives and if successful the Penis
recalculated as if there was 100% more explosive there, The blast Zones are reduced in size as if there
Was 50% less explosives there. For example a 'shaped" kilo of C4 instead of doing BR35, PEN9 to a
4ml&m area will do BR35, PEN13 to a 2пn/4 area.
8. Demolitions Disposal kill - When deactivating explosives, C4 and Dynamite can be undertaken
every 5 rounds/fifteen seconds with an 11 + roll. Failure (unless it is a double 1, of a booby trapped
detonation mechanism), simply means that five rounds have to pass before a second attempt. Black Irish
is a little more complicated, requiring around again with an attempt every 5 rounds. NGC is much more
complicated requiring a roll at -10 with failure causing it to detonate prematurely. This penalty can be
reduced by one point for every minute of study taken prior to the attempt. However the penalty cannot
be reduced to less than-5. Grenades are relatively simple to deactivate requiring a straight roll. A new
attempt can be tried every round. Any device with fuel attached to it adds a further -2 to any attempt to
deactivate the explosive,
9. All attempts to deactivate explosives require the use of a Mechanics kit (CMC Maintenance kit).
Plastic Explosives can be attempted without using a kit at -5. Although they are simpler explosive
devices, the character is unable to use his tools to check whether it has been booby trapped. This penalty
can be reduced by one point for each minute of study given prior to the attempt
Chapter 7
SHIP SECURITY ACTION
Actions required by different security levels

There are three security levels
• Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall
be maintained at all times.
• Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall
be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a transportation security incident.
• Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be
maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security incident is probable or
imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
The three security levels and the actions required for each level.
LEVEL 1-- NORMAL LEVEL
• In normal level, both ships and port operations are carried out in general way.
• Minimum security measures are always maintained on board and in port.
• Ship and port operations are carried out as per ship and port facility security plans.
• Port facility ensures to keep the ‘no access’ areas under surveillance at all times.
• Ship and port authorities mutually supervise loading and unloading operations of cargo and stores,
ensuring access control and other minimum security criteria.
• Minimum access in the ship is maintained at all times.
LEVEL 2 – Heightened Risk
• In level 2, the threat to the security is higher than the normal level.
• All the routine and cargo operations are carried out with an increase in security measures in both
ships and ports.
• Look outs in no access zones and waterside areas are to be increased by port and ship authorities.
• Access control is maintained all the time with escorting the visitors and use of security equipment
like metal detector etc.
• Communication between port authority and ship administration is always maintained in case of
increase in security level.
• Preparing a full or partial search operation of ship.
• A declaration of security is undertaken between port, state and ship administration.
LEVEL 3 – Imminent danger
Level 3 is imposed when the probability of a security threat to the ship or port authority is at the highest or
imminent and specific protective measures are to be maintained.
In level 3 all ship and port operations are stopped and frequent security rounds and duties are carried out by
both ship staff and port authorities. Boat patrols are done by port state on the water side.
Main propulsion plant is always kept ready for moving the ship out of port if required.
No personnel is allowed to access the ship without the authorization of port state official.
Only one access point is maintained on board at all times.
Preparing a full search operation of ship or under water hull search operation with port facility.
Preparation for evacuation of ship by its staff.
A declaration of security is undertaken between port state and ships administration.
Maintaining security of the vessel/port interface

1 Prior to entering a port, the ship shall confirm that the port is subject to the IPS code and hold the Port
Facility Security Plan. When the port has a Port Facility Security Plan, the CSO or SSO shall liaise with the
PFSO and confirm the security level of both side. When a Declaration of Security is required by Contraction
Government or PFSO, the master shall instruct SSO to prepare this Declaration of Security. When the ship
has a higher security level than that of the port facility, the master shall inform this fact * Contraction
Government and PFSO, and require him to prepare a Declaration of Security to coordinate the appropriate
Security actions. When the port does not hold Port Facility Security Plan the ship shall liaise with
Contracting Government, inform them the ship’s Security level, and require appropriate security measures.
The ship shall request the port to prepare a Declaration of Security.
A ship has to give her security level (SL 1,2 or 3) 24 hours before arrival in port. It is the designated
authority of the government of the flag state that decides about the SL of its ships. The master of the ship can
take extra security measures if he wants, but he cannot put his SL on a higher level. Only emergency safety
measures can overrule he security measures provided in the SSP (ship Security Plan). If the SL of the port
facility is higher than that of the ship, then the SSO (Ship Security Officer) has the obligation to equalize the
security level of the ship when the ship has a higher security level than that of the port facility, the SSO
together with the PFSO (Port Facility Security Officer) have to make up a DOS (Declaration of Security).
It is the designated authority of the government f the port that decides about the SL of the port facilities in
the port area. The Security measures for each SL are written in the PFSP (Port Facility Security Plan).
The security measures are more severe when the SL is higher and also depend on the risk that can be
encountered at the port facility. For instance a dangerous goods terminal, a passenger terminal or a container
terminal will be fenced and guarded. An open bulk terminal, with no dangerous commodities, will only be
fenced and guarded on the ship/shore interface when we have an SL 2 or 3. At security level 1 we have
business as usual, without any economic constraints.
Requirements Unique to the United States
In THE United States, the Coast Guard requires that each vessel and port facility owner or operator ensure
procedures are established for requesting a DoS and for handling DoS requests from the interfacing entity. A
DoS must be completed with regard to any interface involving a cruise ship or a manned vessel carrying
Certain Dangerous Cargoes in bulk. For interfaces involving a cruise ship or a manned vessel carrying
Certain Dangerous Cargoes in bulk , the security needs and procedures are to be coordinated and agreed
prior to arrival and the DoS is to be signed by both the ship and the port facility or another vessel prior to
commencement of passenger embarkation/disembarkation or cargo operation. At Maritime Security
(MARSEC) level 2 or 3, the security needs and procedures are to be coordinated and agreed prior to arrival
and the DoS is to be signed by other the ship and the port facility or another vessel for all interfaces
involving a manned vessel and either a port facility or another vessel. The port facility owner or
operator must ensure that, in the event of a charge in the MARSEG level, any ships moored at the facility
and any ships scheduled to arrive within 96 hours are promptly notified of change and that the DoS are
revised as necessary.
Control Measures
Failure of the ship to complete a DoS when it has interfaced with a port facility or other ship subject to, but
in violation of, the ISPS Code or Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS convention constitutes clear grounds for a port
state control official of a Contracting government to exercising control measures with regard to the ship.
Control measures utilized must proportionate, but may involve:
(1) Inspection of the ship:4
(2) Delaying the ship;
(3) Detention of the ship;
(4) Restriction of operations, including movement within the port; or

(5) Expulsion of the ship from port. For ships intending to enter a port of a Contracting Government,
where there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is in violation of the ISP XI-2 of the SOLAS
Convention, the port state control officials may:
(a) Require rectification of non-compliance prior to entry;
(b) Require that the ship proceed to a specified location in the territorial sea or internal waters of the
nation;
(c) Inspect the ship in the territorial sea of the nation; or
(d) Deny entry into the port. If control measures are exercised, the port state control officials must
forthwith inform in writing the flag Administration of the control measures imposed and the reasons
there of. The port state control officials must also inform the recognized security organization (RSO),
if any, and the international Maritime organization (IMO) when control measures have been
imposed.
Denial of entry into port or expulsion from port may only be imposed where the port state control
officials have clear grounds to believe that the ship poses an immediate threat to the security or
safety of personas or of ships or other property and there are no other appropriate means for
removing that threat.
Summary
Proper use of the DoS is important, not only as a means of coordinating security arrangements between ships
and port facilities, but also as a method of documenting appropriate implementation of the ISPS code and
related maritime security requirements. This becomes crucial when a ship calls at a port facility that is not in
full compliance with the ISPS Code and does not have and an approved security plan. A ship calling at such
a port facility must not only institute additional security measures (as provided for in the ISPS Code
and its ship security plan), but it must also to demonstrate to port state control officials at subsequent , port
call that it took the appropriate steps. The way to demonstrate this full compliance with the ISPS code is to
complete and retain on board a DoS fully documenting the ship’s security measures while at this
non-compliant port facility. Welcome to the new world of security through paperwork.
Execution of security procedures

1 Vessel Security Officer to carry out regular security Inspections which shall include, but are not limited to:
• Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the Ship Security plan, including any
amendments to the plan; (Sample of Ship Security Plan conform to ISPS Code).
• Co-coordination the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with other shipboard
personnel and with the relevant PFSO;
• Proposing modifications to the Ship Security Plan;
• Reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits,
periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance and implementing any
corrective actions;
The SSO should address the following elements on board or within the ship:
• Physical Security;
• Structural Integrity;
• Personnel Protection Systems;
• Procedural Policies;
• Radio and telecommunication system, including computer system and networks; and
• Other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to Persons, property, or
operations on board the ship or within a port facility.
• Ensure the performance of all vessel security duties.
Security measures and procedures at the three security levels

Access to the ship
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to the ship, where the
following may be applied:
• check the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirm their reasons for doing so by
checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets,
• in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that designated secure areas are established in
which inspections and searching of persons, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects,
vehicles and their contents can take place;
• in liaison with the port facility the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded car carriers,
ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the
frequency required in the SSP;
• segregate checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal
effects;
• segregate embarking from disembarking passengers;
• identify access points that should be secures or attended to prevent unauthorized access;
• secure, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to which passengers
and visitors have access; and
• provide security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, and establish procedures for
reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and emphasize the need for vigilance.
At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The frequency of such
searches, including random searches, should be specified in the approved SSP and should be specifically
approved by the Administration. Such searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close
proximity to it.
Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of ship’s personnel should not be required to
search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully
takes into account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to protect against a
heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control, which may include:
• assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorized access;
• limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and the means of
adequately securing them;
• deterring waterside access to the ship, in liaison with the port facility, providing boat patrols;
• establishing a restricted area on the shore – side of the ship, in close cooperation with the port
facility;
• increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicles being
embarked or loaded onto the ship;
• escorting visitors on the ship;
• providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-
emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities and stressing the
need for increased vigilance; and
• carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.
Security Level 3
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security
incident or threat. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-
operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:
• Limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
• Granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat;
• Directing of persons on board;
• Suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;
• Suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries etc;
• Evacuation of the ship;
• Movement of the ship; and
• Preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.
• Embarkation of persons and their effects
• Searches of personnel seeking to board ship are conducted at the discretion of the SSO, in
accordance with the applicable Security level. Persons refusing to comply with this policy will be
denied access to the ship.
• Searches can be random and shall be undertaken by the port facility in close cooperation with the
ship and in close proximity to it. (Note: The Company should set a frequency for these searches at
each Security Level.)
• All items brought on board the ship are/subject to control, monitoring, inspection and search.
• Persons refusing to comply with this policy will be denied access to the ship.
• Everyone boarding the ship, including visitors, contractors, and crew are subject to be checked for
the carriage of weapons, ammunition, incendiaries and explosives, narcotics and paraphernalia.
• Carry-on articles will be inspected in accordance with the applicable Security Level.
• A designated secure area on board or in liaison with a port facility is established to conduct
inspections and screening of people, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles
and the vehicles contents.
• Ship personnel are not required to engage or be subjected to screening, or the person or of personal
effects, by other ship personnel, unless security clearly requires it. Any such screening must be
conducted in a way that takes into full account individual human rights and preserves the individual’s
basic human dignity.
• In liaison with the port facility, ensure a defined percentage of vehicles to be loaded aboard car
carriers, RO-RO and passenger ships are screened prior to loading {The company should assign what
percentage is appropriate}
• Checked persons and personal effects are segregated from unchecked persons and personal effects.
• In liaison with the port facility, ensure that all unaccompanied vehicles to be loaded on passenger
ships are screened prior to loading.
• Monitor restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons have access.
• Restricted areas shall only be accessed by ship’s company;
• Restricted areas shall only be accessed by ship’s company shore staff, contractors,vendors, and other
visitors as authorized by the Master. All restricted areas are secured by means of door lock keypad,
the combination of which is changed quarterly and after every dry and wet dock availability period.
Combinations are
• only issued to personnel authorized access to these restricted spaces. All other areas without such
locks are to be secured by means of key lock. Access to keys is permitted to only authorized
personnel.
• Monitor deck areas and areas surrounding the vessel The ship should have the capability to monitor
the ship, the restricted areas on board and areas surrounding the ship.
Such monitoring capabilities may include use of:
• Lighting;
• Watch-keepers, security guards and deck watches including patrols; and automatic intrusion detection
devices should activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or
monitored.
The SSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level and the means of
ensuring that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the
possible effects of weather conditions or of power disruptions.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied which may be a combination
of lighting, watch keepers, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment to allow ship’s
security personnel to observe the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in particular.
The ship’s deck and access points to the ship should be illuminated during hours of darkness and periods of
low visibility while conducting ship\port interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage when
necessary. While underway, when necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent
with safe navigation, having regards to the provisions of the International Regulations for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea in force. The following should be considered when establishing the appropriate level and
location of lighting:
• The ship’s personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side and the
waterside;
• Coverage should include the area on and around the ship;
• Coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and
• Coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied to enhance the
monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include:
• Increasing the frequency an detail of security patrols;
• Increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and surveillance and equipment;
• Assigning additional personnel as security lookouts; and
• Ensuring coordination with waterside boat patrols, and foot or vehicle patrols on the shore-side, when
provided.
Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security incidents. When
necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be accomplished by coordinating with the port facility to
provide additional shore side lighting.
Security Level 3
incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in
close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:
• Switching on of all lighting, or illuminating the vicinity of the ship;

• Switching on of all on board surveillance equipment capable of recording activities, or in the vicinity of
the ship;
• Maximizing the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record;
• Preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and initiation of measures, including the
slow revolution of the ship’s propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.
Security aspects of cargo handling and of vessel stores.

The security measures relating to cargo handling should:
• Prevent tampering; and
• Prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored on board the ship.
The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the port facility, should include
inventory control procedures at access points to the ship. Once on board the ship, cargo should be capable of
being identified as having been approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be
developed to ensure that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during cargo handling,
which may include
• Routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo operations;
• Checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation;
• ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board car carriers, ro—ro and
passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in
the SSP; and
• checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering Checking of cargo may be accomplished
by the following means:
§ visual and physical examination; and
§ using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical device, or dogs.
When there are regular, or repeated, cargo movements the CSO or SSO may, in consultation with the port
facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargoes covering off- site checking,
sealing , scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to
the agreed with the PFSO concerned.
Security Level-2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during cargo
handling, which may include:
Detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces;
• intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded;
• intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car- carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and
• increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.
Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:
• increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination;
• increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and
• co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in accordance with
an established agreement and procedures.
Security Level 3
• suspension of the loading or unloading of cargo; and
• verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances carried on board, if any, and their
location.
The security measures relating to the delivery of ship’s stores should:
• ensure checking of ship’s stores and package integrity;
• prevent ship’s stores from being accepted without inspection;
• prevent tampering ; and
• prevent ship’s stores form being accepted unless ordered. For ships regularly using the port facility it
may be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering
notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There should always be some way of
confirming that stores presented for delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered
by the ship.
Security Level 1
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during delivery of ship’s
stores, which may include:
• checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board;
• ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship’s stores.
Security Level 2
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures
• To be applied during delivery of ships stores by exercising checks
• Prior to receiving stores on board and intensifying inspections.
Security Level 3
• subjecting ship’s stores to more extensive checking;
• preparation for restriction or suspension of handing of ship’s stores; and

• refusal to accept ship’s stores on board the ship.
Security Communication must be readily available

Procedures and equipment for communicating responses to security threats and communicating with port,
port state, and flag State must be readily available at all times Security Personnel must have ready access to
communications to transmit electronic notices of arrival, crew lists, certificates and records, as well as
maintenance of a continuous ship to port security communications to various authorities ship to flag, ship to
shore, SSO to security personnel etc. Appropriate and timely communication is essential during an
emergency. The ERP( Emergency response Plan) should identify clear communication channels within the
ship and externally. As part of your ERP, the vessel should maintain internal and external notification lists
that contain information on all appropriate entities to be contacted, including their names, titles, mailing
addresses, e-mail addresses, all applicable land line and cellular phone numbers, and these lists should be
updated as necessary. In a major event ( e.g. a terrorist attack), it may not be possible to use normal channels
of communication.
Provisions need to be made for an efficient and fail-safe form of communication to be available during
conditions when the use of normal means may not be possible.
An effective two-way communication system with the CSO is to be provided so that any unlawful act against
the ship or person can be reported immediately using the appropriate format and must provide the following
information:
• Location of ship ( Lat/ Long/ Time)
• Name 7 Nationality/ Dates and Place of Birth of Victim
• Name /Nationality/Dates and Place of Birth of Person(s) committing unlawful act.
• Nature and extent of severity of injuries sustained ,if any.
• VHF radios are employed as the primary means of communication, with ship intercom/phone used as a
backup
Maintain radio contact during operations:
• Within the ship---- radio contact will be maintained between bridge or control room for al ingress and
egress points.
• Between ships--- radio contact will be maintained between ships in port at all times to relay security
concerns.
• Between ship and port---radio contact will be maintained between Port personnel and Company
Representatives at all times to relay security concerns.
Privately owned, hand held radio communication devices are not authorized for use on board this ship.
Failure to comply will result in confiscation and retention of radio.
Distress and Duress: Procedures for indicating that the SSO or Security Officer is in distress, or is
communicating under duress are the responsibility of the SSO.
Appropriate ship’s personnel are trained in these procedures.

Communications with terminal operator’s personnel will be coordinated through the ship’s agent with
preference given to VHF radio and/or telephone. For security purposes, direct communications links are
established between ship personnel and the security personnel in the port facility.
Those links are subject to periodic testing and failure to maintain communication is to be reported to the
SSO.
SSOs communicate directly with the CSO, via telephone or e-mail as necessary to co-ordinate shipboard
security operations and support requirements, and provide updated port contact information.
• Ship’s Call Sign
• Satcom Numbers: Telephone:
• Fax: Telex:
• IMO No:
Chapter 8
Emergency Preparedness, Drills and Exercises
General
Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in assigned security duties at all Security
Levels and the effective implementation of the Ship Security (SSP). They must enable the Ship Security
Officer( SSO) to identify any related security deficiencies that need to be addressed.
The SSO must ensure that at least one/ security drill is conducted at least every 3 months, except when a
vessel is out of service due to repairs or seasonal suspension of operation, provided that in such cases a drill
must be conducted within one week of the vessel’s reactivation. Security drills may be held in conjunction
with non-security drills where appropriate.
Execution of contingency plans
Contingency Planning. An essential part of security is the preparation of contingency plans in response to
incidents which could occur and the planning of measures introduced in response to any increase in the level
of threat. These plans need to cover different levels of response from the company (operator/ owner) and
the master, officers and crew. They might also encompass the establishment of a “Threat Level” procedure,
identifying various measures which might be adopted by vessels in response to the perceived level of threat
to the vessel in a vessels in response to the perceive level of threat to the vessel in a particular place, at a
particular time.
1. Action in case of a breach of security
Respond to security threats or breaches of security and maintain critical ship and ship-to-facility interface
operations, including:
• Prohibit entry into affected area;
• Deny access to the ship, except to those responding to the emergency;
• Stop cargo-handling operations; and I
• Notify shore side authorities or other ships of the emergency;
2. Contingency plans for:
Hijacking-is the forcible seizure of a means of transport by terrorist or criminal group as a way of furthering
their cause, reaching their objective, making good their escape or even using the ship itself, and/or its cargo,
as a threat or as weapon. Aircraft have been hijacked by a single person armed only with imitation weapons
and, in the right place one armed person could be enough on a ship. However, a planned terrorist hijack of a
vessel is much more likely to involve a group with real weapons. The major task facing the would—be
hijackers is to board the vessel with their weapons, and security measures aimed at preventing this should be
introduced when the threat level warrants it.
Measures devised in respect of threats from piracy or armed robbery should be appropriate.
The key objective must be to prevent unauthorized access to the vessel.
Although in most parts of the world the threat of this kind of action is low, shipping companies and masters
need to have a range of measures available to introduce as and when the threat level warrants it. Terrorists
may seek to board a vessel by infiltration, ruse or assault. In each case the best defenses for both the
deterrence and prevention of unauthorized access are crew awareness and control of access to the vessel and
to key points on the vessel such as the bridge, engine room and communication facilities.
In port, if the threat warrants it, access points should be manned, in certain circumstances by two persons,
who should be fully briefed on their duties, the action to take in the event of an incident or emergency and
the planned response to an alarm. They need to be provided with a torch, a whistle to summon assistance and
communications to remain to touch with the Duty Officer. They need to hold a full list of all crew members,
shore officials and expected visitors. All visitors should be asked to identify. Strangers should be challenged.
Vessels at anchor should regularly check anchor cables and hawse pipe covers.
At sea, hijackers may try to gain access to the vessel, particularly close to land or in narrow waters where
maneuverability is limited. Attempts Could be mounted from small boats, dhows, junks, fishing, boats that
appear to have broken down or by any means that relies on the traditional assistance which seafarers offer
each other. The best protection against this sort of ruse is an awareness of the possibilities and keeping a
sharp look-out for small behaving suspiciously or approaching. Should a master decide to allow people to
board, this should be one at a time , each one searched if necessary, while a good look-out is maintained on
the other side of the ship. Particular care needs to be exercised during the hours of darkness when a
surreptitious approach could be carried out more easily.
When underway: If there is any doubt about the identity or motive of craft attempting to attract attention,
their actions should be ignored. If it is safe to do so, and circumstances warrant it, speed should be increased
and/or navigation lights and upper deck lighting extinguished. Attempts should be made to identify or
photograph any craft behaving strangely and details reported ashore by the speediest means available. If
another vessel approaches the ship at sea in a suspicious or threatening manner:
• Increase speed and alter course if sage to do so: give no opportunity for the other vessel to come
alongside and make no response to messages by radio, light or loud hailer.
• Keep personnel clear of the upper deck.
• Note details of the other vessel and photograph it if possible.
• At night, direct searchlights at the approaching vessel and switch off upper deck lighting: if safe to do
so, navigation lights should also be switched off.
Report details of any harassment to the company and, if appropriate, to a representative of the government
claiming authority over the area. A terrorist assault is more likely to occur in harbor than at sea. If the
measures recommended for controlling assess are in force and prove inadequate, it will demonstrate the
determination and ruthlessness of the terrorists involved. Unless the terrorists are very poorly armed and
equipped, no attempt should be made to resist an armed terrorist assault.
If despite all efforts at deterrence and prevention a vessel is hijacked, the master and crew should try,
wherever possible, to prevent any loss of life.
• Bomb threat: Ships are vulnerable to explosive or incendiary devices:
• In accompanied passenger cars, freight vehicles or coaches
• In unaccompanied vehicles, export cars or semi- trailers

• In mis-declared cargo
• Carried on board by current passengers, or by those from a previous sailing leaving a timed device
• In luggage placed in a baggage trolley
• In ship's stores
• In the post
• Carried on board by shore workers in port
• Carried on board by contractor's personnel.
Travelling as a foot passenger, the saboteur has to contend with customs and immigration authorities, and
with being challenged by ship's staff if he attempts to disembark prior to sailing. There is also the possibility
that a determined terrorist may plant a device and remain on board.
In addition to bomb threats, the potential use of radiological, biological and chemical weapons against ships
and the people on them, although unlikely, should also be considered.
• Unidentified objects/ explosives on vessel
• Covert entry and quick- plant device.
• The saboteur wishing to attack a ship alongside to cause specific damage or immobilize particular
equipment may wish to board the ship undetected, plant an explosive or incendiary device and
disembark before it detonates. Sabotage attacks differ from
• Hostage- taking attacks in that there are no negotiations over demands. If publicity is the saboteur's aim,
it is likely that the incident will be "claimed" after the event.
Sabotage attacks of this sort are likely to be directed at the ship of a particular nationality, against the
shipping company's policies, or the justification may be entirely local. Since saboteurs on this type of
mission need to board and leave the ship without being detected, access control arrangements may not
always deter them. To guard against this type of attack, vulnerable compartments should be locked and
watch-keeping personnel should make random visits to look for signs of tampering. A saboteur need not only
use explosive or incendiary devices, he may try to damage the vessel's machinery. Extra vigilance is needed
immediately, prior to sailing, or following a bomb warning. Crew members should immediately be
suspicious of unexpected objects in unusual places.
Sabotage by remotely controlled or delayed action device-
The saboteur may use some convenient means of concealing and smuggling on board delayed- action bombs
or incendiary devices in passenger's or crew's baggage, in deliveries of ship's stores or as mis declared cargo.
Crew members should be warned not to accept packages from strangers and made aware that devices could
be introduced in seemingly innocent receptacles. Gas cylinders or oxygen bottles, for example, make ideal
containers for explosive devices. Deliveries which have been cleared could be bound with colored tape for
departmental identification, or automatically strapped using polypropylene strapping tape.
Damage to/ destruction of facility

External sabotage- Major damage to a ship and facility can also be caused by a saboteur reaching the hull,
either from another vessel or underwater and placing an explosive device in a vulnerable area. The saboteur's
objectives in mounting such attacks can be block berths or narrow channels, or to immobilize a particular
vessel or damage a facility. Such attacks require considerable knowledge and technical skill and lie within
the capability of only fairly sophisticated terrorist groups. To be effective, some precision is required in
placing the charges and this requires trained swimmers.
Preparedness and contingency planning measures to provide protection include:-
• Over-the- side lighting giving an even distribution of light on the whole hull and waterline;
• Keeping a good watch from the deck, to look out for bubbles (divers), floating refuse ( which may hide
swimmers) or small boats. All approaching boats should be challenged. If unidentified, they should be
prevented from coming alongside;
• A boat patrol, carried out at frequent but irregular intervals and towing barbed wire or fish hooks, is an
effective defense against frogmen or swimmers;
• If the ship is known to be under attack from swimmers, turning propellers ahead and astern turbulence
in the water and makes swimming more difficult;
• If it is thought likely that a device has been fixed to the outside of the hull below the water-line, the
assistance of local authorities should be sought.
Some of the above measures may seem fanciful or far-fetched, but they have all been used in the past with
some success and are included to show the sort of protective measures which are needed when the threat
demands it.
Piracy and other depredations
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) requires ships security assessments (SSA) and
ships security plans (SSP) to be periodically reviewed, audited, and amended in response to experience or
changing circumstances.
Recognizing that civilian and commercial vessels operating in pirate infested waters off Somalia or in the
Gulf of Aden constantly take risk- based measures to mitigate the threat of pirate attacks and boarding's, it is
recommended that as Counter Piracy Action Measures Vessels in those areas operate at their fastest speeds -
those operating under 16 knots with a low freeboard (less than six meters) should consider themselves at
extremely high risk.
• Vessels that are unable to out run pirate vessels should change course repeatedly (consistent with safe
navigation) and conduct night time transits.
• Vessels should take measures including, where necessary, changing their operational procedures to
make it more difficult for pirates to board their vessels while underway.
• Obstacles should be placed in the way to prevent or delay the pirates gaining vessel control in the event
that pirates board the vessel.
• Examples may include safe- areas for crews to muster and physical barriers to control areas.
• Vessels to use appropriate non- lethal measures such as netting, wire, electric fencing, long- range
acoustical devices, and fire hoses to prevent boarding.
• Vessels should take on properly certified unarmed security consultants on vessels transiting the region.
Such consultants should be encouraged to provide security measures, including intelligence reports for
vessels in transit, on-board training and non- lethal use of force capabilities, and night vision
equipment.
• Vessels, in appropriate circumstances take on properly screened and certified third- party security
providers with firearms, operating in compliance with applicable coastal, port, and flag State laws to
provide an effective deterrent to pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.
Other self- protection measures to avoid detection, attack, boarding and hijack by pirates can be to:
Stay outside high threat area, Navigate in rough seas, Continuous area- wide threat awareness,
Circumnavigation, AIS and LRIT switched on, Military Convoy, Massive water Curtain, Speed > 18 knots,
Razor wire/ Spikes Group transit, Ejectable obstacles (e.g. timber)
Extra lookouts, Freeboard > 8 m Towed obstacles ( alongside/ aft of ship), water HOSES Night Vision
Goggles, Evasive Maneuvers, Laser guns, Sound blasters, Dummy lookouts, Restrict access, CCTV' Restrict
movements inside, Personal Protection Gear Deny use of ship's tools, Deploy smokescreen inside Report
movements to authorities Stowaways Ship owners and Masters face the problem of identifying the presence
of stowaways before a ship leaves port or preventing their boarding the vessel in the first place.
However, most stowaways are only discovered once a vessel has sailed. Dealing with an incident involves
the Master and owner in time consuming negotiations with club, agents and authorities. The cost alone from
disruptions to the ship's schedule alone can be considerable.
There are a number of preventive measures the Master and crew can take before the ship enters port, during
the stay in port and after departure. Therefore a thorough risk assessment should be considered; identifying
the potential hazards present in the ship's area of operation, the physical surroundings of the ship upon
loading! Discharging and potential hazards present on board the ship Vessel's surroundings and port areas
Normally the ship owner has little or no influence on port security and has to concentrate on preventing
stowaways from gaining access to the ship. Stowaways are typically able to gain access to the ship due to
inadequate security and watch keeping, or, are hidden in containers which are subsequently loaded on board,
while these are at the terminal.
As far as security and watch keeping inadequacy are concerned, a number of measures can be taken
depending on the potential risk of stowaways in the particular port. The core strategy is to ensure that no
unauthorized personnel are able to gain access to the ship, and that all those who have been authorized to
board disembark before sailing. Given the pressure often put on watchmen, the best solution is to have two
watch keepers at each entrance. However, with the small numbers of crew serving on modern ships this is
usually not a feasible alternative, the choice being either to recruit local guards, or to arrange for the
temporary attachment to the ship of a professional maritime security officer.
Engaging guards or a maritime security officer may seem extravagant. However, if the threat is
considerable the costs involved could well be justified. Repatriation of stowaways also gain access to ships
by hiding in containers, cars or other types of cargo units subsequently loaded on board. If the voyage is
short the unit will probably be unloaded undisturbed, but more frequently the stowaways are discovered and
ways have to be found to provide them with food and of releasing them.
The chances of discovering stowaways secreted away in cargo stored at the terminal will depend on the time
available to undertake a thorough search and the amount of money the owner is prepared to spend.
Obviously not every container or car can be checked. Whilst soft top containers can be inspected quite
easily, this is not the case with standard steel top containers.
Sophisticated equipment is available to search for stowaways in containers; however, these gadgets are
expensive and will normally be used by the port security authorities as opposed to ship owners and
operators.
Port security- Many ports have adequate security; whilst at others security is non- existent. Whatever the
circumstances, it is not recommended to rely solely on port security. The stowaway business is so financially
attractive that to rely on local security staff merely offers an easy path for a potential stowaway. It is
sensible, however, to ensure that the agent knows of your full intention not to sail with stowaways on board,
and that he is repeatedly asked to ensure that all safety measures available at the port are mare to work in the
interest of the ship. The crew has little or no influence on port security and has to focus on preventing
stowaways from gaining access to the ship. The high risk threat is from ports and terminals where the ISPS
Code is not being implemented in a thorough manner. The task of preventing the stowaways from coming on
board in these ports is more difficult and it is here that Masters and ship owners must focus their efforts.
Crews should be issued the correct instructions and A procedures to enable the ship to provide a determined
deterrent, and stopping stowaways from boarding.
Reducing the risk - port area
• Given the myriad of people who often surge on board when a ship arrives in port, a pass system can be
of valuable assistance.
• Ask the agent if the port is capable of providing adequate security. If not, the agent can be asked to
arrange additional protection.
Risk assessment and preventive measures
If there are doubts as to the efficiency of locally supplied guards in ports where a large number/ of
stowaways are known to board vessels, the short- term employment of a professional maritime security
officer should be considered.
If stowaways are discovered during the search, the immigration authorities should be notified immediately in
order that the stowaways can be removed from the ship.
Reducing the risk- Access points
Review procedures to ensure that there is a watchman on duty at every access point which have to remain
unlocked whilst the vessel is in port and that this watchman is familiar with the procedures when visitors,
repairmen, stevedores etc., wish to come on board. The simple rule is: "no unauthorized personnel come
on board, and all authorized personnel disembark before sailing". Check to ensure that all locks are locked
and that places which cannot be locked are sealed with tamper- proof or wire seals.
Different harbors and ports have different access points that are commonly used.
In general; some access point entries can be:
• Climbing the mooring ropes,
• Climbing from the sea using hooks,
• Boarding the vessel as stevedores with fake dock identification papers. At some ports stevedores are
supposed to wear special clothing with branded overalls and helmets. Bear in mind that stowaways
may have access to these overalls and helmets too.
Recent stowaway interviews have revealed that crew on board have also been involved in the safe passage of
stowaways. On a some ships stowaways have had to pay a "ticket" to one of the crew on board. Consider
offering financial rewards to those crew members who discover and prevent stowaway incidents and ensure
that all crew members are aware of the advantages of preventing stowaways sailing with the ship. Check
security equipment, close- circuit television, alarms and locks.
Security drills and exercises
1 Requirement for conducting drills and exercises:
The Company Security Officer and The Ship Security Officer must have knowledge and have received
training, taking into account the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS code.
Drill and exercise requirements
• General- Drills and exercises must test the proficiency of vessel personnel in assigned security duties at
all Security Levels and the effective implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP). They must enable
the Ship Security Officer (SSO) to identify any related security deficiencies that need to be addressed,
alarms, and notification of law enforcement authorities.
• If the vessel is moored at a facility on the date the facility has planned to conduct any drills, the vessel
may, but is not required to, participate in the facility is scheduled drill.
• Drills must be conducted within one week whenever the percentage of vessel personnel with no prior
participation in a vessel security drill on that vessel exceeds 25%.
Drills and Training for Rest of Ship's Crew
In addition to the specific training for personnel that are involved in implementing security actions, all of the
ship's crew should receive security awareness training as part of their general orientation and training
activities. This awareness training should issues such as:
• Limiting discussion about specifics of the ship ( e.g., cargo, routes, equipment, crew size) with non---
company personnel to those personnel that need to know in order to service the ship
• Reporting suspicious acts or behavior related to the ship both on/near the ship and when personnel are
on shore leave
• Protection of company---supplied identification cards or other documentation A high level of
awareness by company personnel of these simple measures can help prevent the ship from becoming
an easy target.
Chapter 9
Security Administration
Documentation and records
Records should be available to duly authorized officers of Contracting Governments to verify that the
provisions of the Ship Security Plans are being implemented.
Records may be kept in any format but should be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.
All documents that shall be available on board at all times
Records of the following activities addressed in the Ship Security Plan must be kept on board at all times
and be made available to the government authorities upon request for at least the time frame covering the
previous 10 ports of call.
--Training, drills and Exercises;
--security threats and security incidents;
--breaches of security
--changes in security level;
Communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats to the ship or to port
facilities the ship is in, or has been;
--internal audits and reviews of security activities;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Assessment;
--periodic review of the Ship Security Plan;
--implementation of any amendments to the plan; and
--maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment, if any including testing of the ship security
alert system.
Annual internal audits of the SSP. For each annual audit, a letter certified by the SSO stating the date the
audit was completed
--Annual periodic reviews of the SSA and the SSP maintained.
--Required security records must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.
--Records must be kept in the working language or languages of the ship or translation in either English,
French or Spanish.
--Security related records required under the international requirements and any additional records
specified by a classification society shall be kept for 5 years to allow ‘ internal audit review and to
provide evidence of program compliance for periodic verification.
Chapter 10
Anti – Piracy Awareness
Risk Awareness: - Prior to entering area of risk
Appraise the strength and vulnerabilities of crew and ships
Prior to transiting the high Risk Area, ship operators and Masters should carry out a through Risk
Assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, based on the latest
available information. The output of the Risk Assessment should identify measures for prevention,
mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary
measures to combat piracy. It is important that the Risk Assessment is ship and voyage specific, and not
generic.
Know the Anti-Piracy Measure

Factors to be considered in the Risk Assessment should include, but may not be limited to, the following:
Crew Safety
• The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew. Care should be taken, when
formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to the accommodation, that
crew members will not be trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of another type of
emergency, such as, for example fire.
• Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster Point of Citadel. (See Section
8.13 )
• Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded to the crew who may be
required to remain on the bridge during a pirate attack, recognizing that pirates increasingly fire at
the bridge of a vessel to try to force it to stop. ( See section 8.3)
Freeboard
• It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the lowest point above the
waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often on either quarter or at
the vessel’s stern.
• Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres have a much
greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with less.
• A large freeboard will provide little or no protection if the construction of the ship provides access to
pirates seeking to climb onboard, and thus further protective measures should be considered.
Speed
• One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun the
attackers and /or make it difficult to board.
• To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been
proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate tactics and techniques may develop to
enable them to board faster moving ships.
• Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots where they are capable of
greater speed, throughout their transit of the High Risk Area.
• It is very important to increase to maximum safe speed immediately after identifying any suspicious
vessel and as quickly as possible in order to try to open the CPA ( Closest Point of Approach) from
any possible attackers and /or make the vessel more difficult to board.
• If a vessel is part of a ‘Group Transit’( see section 7.9 for further details of Group Transits) within
the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor(IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted.
• It is recommended that reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and
MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance regarding pirate attack speed capability.
Sea State
• Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs), even where they are supported by larger
vessels or Motherships which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea states.
• It is likely to be more difficult to operate small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above. A large
freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.
Understanding the contents of the Best Management Practices( BMP)
The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices ( BMP) is to assist ships to avoid , deter or delay
piracy attacks in the High Risk Areas. Experience and data collected shows that the practices content in the
BMP can and will make a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy. The
potential consequence of not following BMP can be severe. There have been instance of pirates subjecting
their hostages to violence and other ill treatment. The average length of a hijacking of vessel and her crew is
over 7 months.
For the purposes of the BMP the term piracy includes all acts of violence against ships, her crew and cargo.
This includes armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the ship, wherever this may take
place. Somali pirates have to date, sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo and crew and hold them until a
ransom demand is paid. Not all ship Protection Measures discussed in BMP4 may be applicable to every
ship type.
Some of the salient points to remember as per BMP:-
• Do not be Alone:- Use the Internationally recommended Transit corridor (IRTS) and group transit
scheme or independent convoy & keep AIS turned on.
• Do not be detected :- Keep track of NAVWARNS and visit relevant websites for known pirate
operating location. Use navigation lights only.
• Do not be Surprised :- Increased vigilance-lookouts, CCTV and Radar 4) Do not be Vulnerable :-
Use visible ( deterrent) and physical (preventive) ship protection measures. These could include:
Razor wire, use of water foam etc. Provide additional personal protection to bridge teams.
• Do not be Boarded : - Increase to maximum speed & maneuver vessel.
• Do not Controlled :- Follow well practiced procedures and drills. Deny use of tools, equipment,
access routes
Pirates business module
• The pirates always carry out surprise attacks and catch the vulnerable vessels unaware when such
vessels are under prepared to repel pirate attacks. Commonly, two small high speed (up to 25 knots)
open boats or
• ‘Skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching from either quarter or the stern. Skiffs are frequently
fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single 6hp engine.
• Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of different boat configurations. To date whatever the
configuration the attack phase is carried out by skiffs.
• Pirate Action Group boat configurations include:
• Skiffs only- usually two
• Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing 2 or more attack skiffs.
• Motherships which have included the very largest of merchant ships, fishing vessels and dhows.
• These Motherships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their own crew onboard as
hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to
operate over a much
• larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind the
Motherships. Where the size of the Mothership allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried
onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by Naval/ Military forces.
• Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades(RPGs) in an effort to
intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to board. The use of these
weapons is generally focused on the bridge and accommodation area. In what are difficult
circumstances, it is very important to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing where possible, and using
careful maneuvering to resist the attack.
• Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked to enable one or more
armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight ladders and ropes, or a long
hooked pole with a knotted climbing rope to climb up the side of the vessel being attacked.
• Once onboard the pirate ( or pirates) will generally make their way to the bridge to try to take control
of the vessel. Once on the bridge the pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable
further pirates to board.
• Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks have taken place
early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, particularly clear moonlit nights,
but night time attacks are less common.
• The majority of piracy attacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have planned and trained in
advance of the passage and applied the BMPs.
Chapter 11
Pirate Attack
Examine the implication of piracy attack
If the crew of a vessel suspects that it is coming under a pirate attack there are specific actions that are
recommended to be taken during the approach stage and the attack stage. It should be noted that the pirates
generally do not use weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel, therefore any period yup
until this stage can be considered as ' approach', and gives a vessel valuable time in which to activate her
defenses and make it clear to pirates that they have been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist. Once
under pirate attack with a fear of siege the crew may face following situation:-
• Extreme fear, shock and panic
• Sense of physical vulnerability
• Fight amongst crew members
• State of Shock
Statistics have been gathered to understand how people have reacted in crisis situation in all walks of life.
There is no specific research currently available for piracy related incidents but it is envisaged that reactions
experienced are likely to be broadly similar. It is stated that in an emergencies, human behavior may be
categorized in three groups:-
• Group 1:- 60% may do little, or may engage in appropriate behaviors, whilst awaiting the initiatives
of others.
• Group 2:- 25% may act rationally, perhaps attacking the threat, closing doors or warning others.
• Group 3:- 15% may be almost totally paralyzed by the seriousness of the situation.
Assess how to defend the crew and the ship
Watch keeping and Enhanced Vigilance
Prior to entering the High Risk Area, it is recommended the preparations are made to support the
requirement for increased vigilance by:
• Providing additional lookouts for each Watch. Additional lookouts should be fully briefed.
• Considering a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize alertness of the lookouts.
• Ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team, preferably anti glare.
• Considering use of night vision optics.
• Maintaining a careful Radar Watch.
Well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the vessel can give an impression of great
numbers of people on watch
Enhanced Bridge Protection
The bridge is usually the focus for any pirate attack. In the initial part of the attack, pirates direct weapons
fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If they are able to board the vessel the pirates usually try to
make for the bridge to enable them to take control. The following further protection enhancements might be
considered:
• Kevlar jackets and helmets available for the bridge team to provide a level of protection for those on
the bridge during an attack. (If possible, jackets and helmets should be in non-military color).
• While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying glass can be provided by
the application of security glass film, often called Blast Resistant Film.
• Fabricated metal, (steel/aluminum), plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing
door windows, which may be rapidly secured in place in the event of an attack.
• The after part of both bridge wings, (often open), can be protected by a wall of sandbags.
• The sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected with a double layer of chain
link fence which has been shown to reduce the effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens
are also available.
Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces
It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have managed to board a vessel and
are typing to enter accommodation or machinery spaces. It is very important to recognize that if pirates do
gain access to the upper deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the
accommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly recommended that significant effort is
expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the pirates access to the accommodation and the
bridge.
• All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should
be properly secured to prevent them being opened by pirates.
• Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing doors and hatches in order to afford
the ship the maximum protection possible.
• Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned compartment, it is essential
that it can be opened by a seafarer trying to exit by that route. Where the door or hatch is locked it is
essential that a key is available, in a clearly visible position by the door or hatch.
• It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used
for routine access when required, their use being strictly controlled by the door or hatch.
• Consideration should be given to blocking or lifting external ladders on the accommodation block to
prevent their use, and to restrict external access to the bridge.
• Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity, ensure all clips are fully
dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing such as with wire strops
may enhance hatch security.
• Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to
windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the window.
• Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery
spaces and store rooms should be set out and practiced.
Physical Barriers
Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached and long hooked
poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it
as difficult as possible to gain access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an
attacking pirates.
Razor Wire
Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only when carefully deployed. The
barbs on the wire are designed to have a piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting
appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and type will vary considerably.
Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be effective. Three main types of razor wire are commonly available:
• Unclipped (straight strand)
• Spiral (like a telephone cord) and
• Concertina (linked spirals).
Water Spray and Foam Monitors

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in deterring or delaying pirates
attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can make it difficult for a pirates skiff to remain alongside and
makes it significantly more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include:
• Fire hoses and foam monitors - Manual operation of hoses and foam monitors is not recommended as
this is likely to place the operator in a particularly exposed position and therefore it is recommended
that hoses
• And foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover likely pirate access routes.
Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode but by utilizing baffle
plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
• Water cannons - These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc thus protecting a
greater part of the hull. Many of these have been developed from tank cleaning machines.
• Ballast pumps – Where possible to do so ships may utilize their ballast pumps to flood the deck with
water thus providing a highly effective water curtain over the ship’s side. This may be achieved by
allowing ballast tanks to over-flow on to the deck, by using existing pipework when in ballast
condition, or by retrofitting pipe work to allow flooding of the decks whilst in loaded condition. Care
must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not over-pressurized causing damage to the hull and
tanks, or vessel stability compromised. If in doubt it is recommended that the relevant Classification
Society be contacted for advice.
• A Steam – Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam has also been found to be very
effective in deterring attacks.
• A Water spray rails – some ships have Installed spray rails using a Glass Reinforced Plastic (GAP)
water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water curtain to cover larger areas.
• A Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel’s standard Fire Fighting Equipment (FEE)
stock. Foam is effective as it is disorientating and very slippery making it difficult to climb through.
The following points are also worthy of note:

• Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors are in a ready
state, requiring just the remote activation of fire pumps to commence delivery of water.
• Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel’s sea water systems whilst on
passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to utilize all pumps additional power may be
required and therefore these systems should also be ready for immediate use.
• Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the results achieved by the
equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable areas.
Alarms
Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel screw that a piracy attack has commenced
and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to
it. If approached, continuous sounding of the vessel’s foghorn/whistle distracts the pirates and as above lets
them know that they have been seen. It is important to ensure that:
• The piracy alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms, potentially leading to the crew
mustering at the wrong location outside the accommodation.
• Crew members are familiar with each alarm, Including the signal warning of an attack and an all
clear, and the appropriate response to it.
• Exercises are carried out prior to entering the High Risk Area.
Piracy High Risk Areas
Maneuvering Practice
Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area will be very beneficial and will
ensure familiarity with the ship’s handling characteristics and how to effect anti-piracy maneuvers whilst
maintaining the best possible speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked before practicing this is too late!)
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Once an attack is underway and pirates are firing weaponry at the vessel, it is difficult and dangerous to
observe whether the pirates have managed to gain access. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of
monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position:
• Consider the use of CCTV cameras to ensure coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop
deck.
• Consider positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected position.
• Further CCTV monitors could be located at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel (see section 8.13)
• Recorded CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack
Upper Deck Lighting
It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:
• Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the poop deck,
consistent with Rule 20(b) of the international Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea.
• Search lights for immediate use when required.

• It is, however, recommended that ships proceed with just their navigation lights illuminated, with the
lighting described above extinguished. Once pirates have been identified or an attack commences,
illuminating the lighting described above demonstrates to the pirates that they have been observed.
• Navigation lights should not be switched off at night.
Approach Stage
If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the distance. Try to steer a straight course to
maintain a maximum speed. Initiate the ship’s pre-prepared emergency procedures.
• Activate the Emergency Communication plan
• Sound the emergency alarm and make a ‘Pirate Attack’ announcement in accordance with the Ship’s
Emergency Plan.
• Report the attack Immediately to authorities ashore. Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS).
Which will alert your Company Security officer and Flag State. Make a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF
Ch.16.
Attack stage
• Reconfirm that all ship’s personnel are in a position of safety.
• As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small alteration of helm whilst
maintaining speed to deter skiffs form lying alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding
attempt. These maneuver’s will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs.
• Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a
vessel’s speed.
Coping in a hostage situation
Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment

Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than personal weaponry. It is
important to try to deny pirates the use of ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry into the
vessel. Tools and equipment that may be of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location.
Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck Small arms and other weaponry are often directed the
vessel and are particularly concentrated on the bridge, accommodation section and poop deck.
• Consideration should be given to providing protection, in the form of sandbags or Kevlar blankets, to
gas bottles (i.e. oxy-acetylene) or containers of flammable liquids that must be stored in these
locations.
• Ensure that any excess gas bottles or flammable materials are landed prior to transit.
If the Pirates take Control

• Try to remain calm.
• Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the SSAS has been
activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.
• Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the bridge the pirates are likely
to be aggressive, highly agitated, and possibly under the influence of drugs (including khat, an
amphetamine like stimulant), so remaining calm and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the risk of
harm.
• If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be stopped and all way taken off
the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so). All remaining crew members should
proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point with their hands visible.
Chapter 12
The Release Process
Discuss the additional danger associated with the release process.
• On Board
• The ship will sail to a safe port where criminal debriefing and other debriefs will be conducted.
• The Master or his replacement should take command of the vessel.
• The seafarers need to resume their normal onboard routines and duties.
• Seafarers should have direct communication with family members as soon as possible for just a short
time which will allow all crew to call quickly.
• During this call seafarers should be encouraged not to talk about the piracy incident but about
themselves and their families.
• Seafarers should receive medical care and be prescribed appropriate medication.
• The ship should be provided with disinfectants, cleaning materials and toiletries remembering to
encourage the crew not to clean away forensic evidence.
• The seafarers should be provided with clothing.
• The Master should encourage crew to talk and share their feelings amongst themselves and if possible
to make notes.
• Post-Release Response Ashore
The company should consider:

• Gathering together the crew.
• Providing interim hotel accommodation for the crew.
• Providing practical support such as haircuts, personal hygiene and clothing.
• Providing medical and emotional support.
• Arranging operational debriefs.
• Allowing further communication with families.
• Making available personnel trained to provide practical and emotional support.
Chapter 13
Sea Farers Family
Enables seafarers to consider what they may wish to share with their family concerning the risk of piracy
• The seafarers Family Possible Reactions during a Crisis are Confusion, Uncertainty, Worry, Fear,
Anxiety, Shock, Anger, Distrust etc, Including concerns regarding financial situation, Family strife and
loss of trust with the company.
• The reactions of the family following an attack or during a hostage situation are very similar to those
of the seafarer. There will be a confusion ofinformation as for the first few days there may be little or
no communication from the ship. This will lead to feeling of uncertainty, worry, fear, anxiety, shock,
anger and loss of faith with the company. There will be need for credible information from the
company and other support. It is important that the seafarers family is in contact and is supported by
the company/agent at this time.
• Ensure that the family has the correct contact details of the company in the event of a piracy attack.
Ensure that the company has the up-to –date family contact details.
• Seafarers and their families need to ensure that they have contact details of the company in the case of
a piracy attack. They also need to make sure that the company has up to date family contact details.
• Seafarers should know of their legal rights and contractual entitlements during and after a period of
piracy.

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CHITKARA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL

SECURITY TRAINING FOR SEAFARERS WITH

Chandigarh-Patiala National Highway, Punjab 140401.

2 Maritime Security Policy 0.75

3 Security Responsibilities 1.25

4 Ship Security Assessment 1.0

5 Security Equipment 1.0 0.25

6 Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response 1.0 0.5

7 Ship Security Actions 0.5 0.25

8 Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises 1.0

9 Security Administration 0.5

10 ANTI PIRACY - Piracy Awareness

12 The Release Process 0.5

13 Seafarer’s Family 0.7

Assessment and Feed Back 0.5

TOTAL 13.0 1.0

CURRENT SECURITY THREATS & PATTERNS

SHIP & PORT OPERATIONS AND CONDITIONS

v Lack of expertise in implementation:

v Likely implementation Scenario:

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION OR NON-ACTION BY THF SHIP SECURITY OFFICER:

HANDLING SENSITIVE SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

RECOGNIZED SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

3. Contracting Governments may authorize a recognized security organization (RSO) to undertake

4. Conducting port facility security assessment required by the Contracting Government.

6. When delegating specific duties to a RSO, Contracting Governments, including Administrations,

Ship's Manager / Operator. (Name and Address):

THE PORT FACILITY

SHIPSECURITY OFFICER (SSO)

COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER (CSO)

• Ensuring Consistency between security requirements and safety requirement;

PORT FACILITY SECURTY OFFICER (PFSO)

VESSEL PERSONNEL WITH SPECIFIC SECURITY OUTIES

RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

QUALITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

• Deterrent controls reduce the likelihood of a deliberate attack

7. The Ship Security Assessment shall include at least the following

ON-SCENE SECURITY SURVEY

• Security surveillance equipment.

SECURITY ASSESSMENT DOCUMENTATION

SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS AND THEIR OPERATIONAL

IN VISION TECHNOLOGIES EDs MACHINES

EYEBALLS: A FOOLPROOF ID CARD

EQUTPMENT PRESCREED EY SOLAS 74

THE PURPOSE OF MSHAS SHOWN IN THE ILLUSTRATION BELOW IS TO ENSURE

SHIP SECURITY PLAN

DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL OF THE SHIP SECURITY PLAN

• Location of the Ship Security Alert system activation points. -

IMPLEMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE 'SHIP SECURITY PLAN

1. Company security information diagram.

Actions required by different security levels

Maintaining security of the vessel/port interface

(4) Restriction of operations, including movement within the port; or

Execution of security procedures

Security measures and procedures at the three security levels

• Switching on of all lighting, or illuminating the vicinity of the ship;

Security aspects of cargo handling and of vessel stores.

• preparation for restriction or suspension of handing of ship’s stores; and

Security Communication must be readily available

Appropriate ship’s personnel are trained in these procedures.

• In unaccompanied vehicles, export cars or semi- trailers

Damage to/ destruction of facility