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Cambodia, 2021-
2023: A Reader
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 10

July 25, 2023
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Cambodia Reader, 2021-2023

Table of Contents

Introduc+on ......................................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Pressure on Cambodia Could be Counter-Produc+ve ................................................... 1
Is Vietnam Losing Its Best Friends to China .......................................................................... 3
Cambodia as ASEAN Chair & the South China Sea Code of Conduct ................................... 4
Vietnam and Cambodia: 55th Anniversary of Diploma+c Rela+ons...................................... 6
Implica+ons of a Chinese Military Presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base ..................... 7
Vietnam’s Response to China’s Upgrading of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base ....................... 9
Cambodia: Human Trafficking ............................................................................................ 10
Vietnam’s Response to Chinese Encirclement.................................................................... 11
Cambodia and the U.S. Strategic Pivot to Asia ................................................................... 14
U.S. Rela+ons with Cambodia, 2017-2022 ......................................................................... 14
ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 1 ................................................................. 16
ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 2 .................................................................. 19
Will ASEAN and Related Summits be Set Piece Affairs? ..................................................... 21
Cambodia Na+onal Elec+ons Scene Se^er ........................................................................ 23
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ............................................................................................... 25

Introduc2on
This Reader contains fourteen Thayer Consultancy Background Briefs on Cambodia published
between January 2021 and July 2023. Eight of the Briefs analyse Cambodia’s rela+ons with
China, the United States and Vietnam, four focus on Cambodia’s role as ASEAN Chair in 2022,
and the remaining two Briefs discuss human trafficking in Cambodia and domes+c poli+cs on
the eve the July 2023 na+onal elec+ons.

U.S. Pressure on Cambodia Could be Counter-Produc2ve

We're working on a report about a tougher U.S. approach toward the Cambodian government
in recent weeks: notably Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman's visit demanding an
explana+on on reports of a Chinese presence at Ream Naval Base. The U.S. State Department
issued a statement last week about not being allowed full access during a tour of Ream. This
week the U.S. cut funding to the Cambodian government’s Prey Lang forest sanctuary.
Q1. Have you no+ced any recent change in the U.S.'s approach to governments in the region,
especially in terms of pucng pressure on Cambodia?
ANSWER: The Biden Administra+on has been slow to engage with Southeast Asia, such as
filling vacant ambassadorships, a legacy of the Trump Administra+on. U.S. efforts to hold a
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special mee+ng with ASEAN foreign ministers was aborted when U.S. technology failed fieeen
minutes into the virtual mee+ng.
The Biden Administra+on views a Chinese naval lodgment at Ream Naval Base as destabilizing
to regional security. The recent visit by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to
Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand was a dis+nct change of gears as she is the most senior
member of the Biden Administra+on to visit Southeast Asia. Deputy Secretary Sherman
undoubtedly raised China’s regional presence and the U.S. response with her counterparts.
Sherman’s visit to Phnom Penh was aimed in part at pucng U.S. concerns about China directly
to Prime Minister Hun Sen. According to a Media Note issued by the U.S. Department of State,
Sherman met Prime Minister Hun Sen on June 1 and “expressed serious concerns about
the PRC’s military presence and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of
Thailand. She sought clarification on the demolition of two U.S.-funded buildings at Ream without
notification or explanation and observed that a PRC military base in Cambodia would undermine
Cambodia’s sovereignty, threaten regional security, and negatively impact U.S.-Cambodia
relations. The Deputy Secretary urged Cambodia’s leadership “to maintain an independent and
balanced foreign policy, in the best interests of the Cambodian people.”
Sherman requested and got permission for the U.S. Defense A^aché in Phnom Penh, Colonel
Marcus Ferras, to visit the Ream Naval Base. However, Colonel Ferras’ visit became mired in
controversy when Cambodian officials refused to grant him full access.
Deputy Secretary Sherman raised the issue of a Chinese naval presence in Cambodia during
her stop in Bangkok. The media quoted Sherman as saying she had a candid conversa+on with
Hun Sen “about the direc+on Cambodia is headed” including human rights, its an+-
democra+c record, and China’s presence at Ream Naval Base.
Q2. Do you think the change in Administra+on in Washington this year has played a part? Why
do you think the U.S. is taking a tougher approach?
ANSWER: The Biden Administra+on is undertaking a whole-of-government approach to
China’s influence in Southeast Asia, and not focusing narrowly on tariff and trade issues. Biden
Administra+on’s Interim Na9onal Security Strategic Guidance issued in March states
unequivocally that “China… has rapidly become more asser+ve. It is the only compe+tor
poten+ally capable of combining economic, diploma+c, military and technological power to
mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open interna+onal system.”
Q3. Where could these ac+ons be leading? Is there poten+al for further sanc+ons against
Cambodia?
ANSWER: Deputy Secretary Sherman’s visit to Phnom Penh may be viewed as pre-emp+ve,
that is, pucng Cambodia on no+ce of possible consequences if it granted China access to
Ream Naval Base. But there are constraints on what ac+ons the U.S. can take without pushing
Cambodia further into China’s embrace. There is also the prac+cal ma^er that Cambodia will
be ASEAN Chair next year.
According to the State Department’s Media Note, Sherman “assured the Prime Minister [Hun
Sen] that the United States intends to work with Cambodia in its role as 2022 ASEAN Chair
and help ensure it can play a construc+ve role in addressing cri+cal regional poli+cal and
security challenges.”
Q4. And how impacpul do you think this will be on Cambodia?
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ANSWER: U.S. assistance to Cambodia averaged over $112 million annually between 2018 and
2021. The U.S. could cut part or all of this assistance. In fact, this month the U.S. terminated
its aid to Cambodia’s Prey Lang Wildlife Sanctuary because no ac+on has been taken to end
persistent illegal logging. It is unlikely that cucng aid would bring Cambodia to heel as nearly
a quarter of its central budget comes from foreign assistance (China and Japan).
The U.S. could really hurt Cambodia’s economy by stopping it from receiving privileged access
to the American market under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program. The
United States is Cambodia’s largest single export market.
Any U.S. sanc+ons against Cambodia in 2022 when it is ASEAN Chair could prove
counterproduc+ve by undermining ASEAN leadership at a cri+cal juncture. U.S. sanc+ons
could exacerbate cleavages among ASEAN members and open the door for China to further
enhance its influence in the region.
“U.S. Pressure on Cambodia Could be Counter-Produc+ve,” Thayer Consultancy Background
Brief, June 18, 2021. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/513734357/Thayer-U-S-Pressures-
on-Cambodia-Could-Be-Counter-Produc+ve.

Is Vietnam Losing Its Best Friends to China?

With reference to this ar+cle by Sebas+an Strangio, “In Rare Three-Party Conclave, Vietnam
Pushes Back Against Growing Chinese Influence,” in The Diplomat (September 28, 2021)
(h^ps://thediplomat.com/2021/09/in-rare-three-party-conclave-vietnam-pushes-back-
against-growing-chinese-influence), we request your assessment of the recent rare summit
between the three party leaders of Indo-China.
Do you think this mee+ng was held because China' s growing influence has unnerved Vietnam
and caused it concern at losing influence over long-standing allies Laos and Cambodia? Do
you agree with the author that Vietnam is losing its “best friends” to China?
ANSWER: Rela+ons among the three states of Indo-China (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam or
CLV) and the People’s Republic of China cannot be understood properly as simply a zero-sum
game for influence between Beijing and Hanoi. China and Vietnam are not the only countries
ac+ve in Laos and Cambodia. Thailand, Japan and the United States each have important
interests of their own.
The three CLV states share land borders and are also Mekong riparian states. Each of the CLV
states has substan+al economic and geo-poli+cal interests in the other two states. Because of
their common border they share an interest in controlling the spread of the COVID-19 virus.
Vietnam is an important partner due to historical +es between their ruling par+es and
because of its growing economy. Military officers from Cambodia and Laos are the largest
foreign con+ngents a^ending professional military educa+on and training in Vietnam.
Vietnam has been engaged with its neighbours long before China’s economic rise. From mid-
1991, the ninth na+onal congress gave priority to rela+ons with its neighbours Cambodia and
Laos. Vietnam has promoted development in the triangle formed by Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam.
An historical perspec+ve provides the framework for the recent tripar+te mee+ng of heads of
ruling par+es from Cambodia and Laos in Vietnam, Cambodian People’s Party, Lao People’s
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Revolu+onary Party and Vietnam Communist Party. Vietnam is implemen+ng policy approved
at this year’s thirteenth na+onal party congress. The Poli+cal Report declared that Vietnam
should a^ach “importance to the development of tradi+onal, friendly and coopera+ve
rela+ons with neighbouring countries…” The 13th congress also stressed the importance of
mul+lateralism, par+cularly to deal with development issues in the Lower Mekong.
The tripar+te mee+ng of party leaders on 26 September was preceded three days earlier by
the 8th mee+ng of the respec+ve Na+onal Assembly Commi^ees for External Rela+ons from
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Earlier in the year Laos and Vietnam exchanged high-level visits.
In June, Thongloun Sisoulith, President of Laos and General Secretary of the Lao People’s
Revolu+onary Party, made an official visit to Vietnam. In August, Vietnam’s new President
Nguyen Xuan Phuc made his first overseas official visit to Laos.
China has increased its presence and influence in all three countries because of its economic
growth. China has become an important source of foreign investment. China is also a major
provider of assistance (concessional loans) for infrastructure that exis+ng interna+onal
financial ins+tu+ons like the Asian Development Bank cannot provide.
At the same +me, Vietnam and China have been busily engaging across the full spectrum of
bilateral rela+ons. On 10 September this year, Vietnam hosted the 13th high-level mee+ng of
the Steering Commi^ee for Bilateral Coopera+on.
The argument that Vietnam is losing its “best friends” to China needs to be backed up by
evidence not supposi+on.1 China seeks to develop fraternal rela+ons with Vietnam and Laos
on the basis of their shared socialist ideology. Any a^empt to exclude Vietnam from Laos
would undercut this objec+ve.
If China was trying to nudge Vietnam out of Laos and Cambodia, how does one explain that
Vietnam invests more in Laos than any other country, where it is the third largest investor?
Vietnamese investment shot up by 130 percent year-on-year in 2020. Bilateral trade between
Vietnam and Laos increased by 39 percent this year compared to the same period last year.
As for Cambodia, it is the second largest des+na+on for investment out of 178 countries that
receive Vietnamese investment. Vietnam has put $2.8 billion into 188 projects in Cambodia.
“Is Vietnam Losing Its Best Friends to China?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
September 30, 2021. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/529326796/Thayer-Is-Vietnam-
Losing-Its-Best-Friends-to-China.

Cambodia as ASEAN Chair & the South China Sea Code of Conduct
We are preparing a report about Cambodia's possible role as ASEAN Chair in the nego+a+on
process for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.
What is your assessment on whether it's a good thing if Cambodia can help speed up
nego+a+ons on a COC. Or do you think as China's key ally in ASEAN Cambodia will prevent

1
The term “best friends” and zero-sum approach may be found at: Derek Grossman, “Vietnam Is Losing Its Best
Friends to China,” The Diplomat, November 2, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/vietnam-is-losing-its-
best-friends-to-china/.
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speeding up nego+a+ons should the drae COC text call for observa+on of interna+onal laws
including UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitra+on?
ANSWER: A dis+nc+on needs to be made between Cambodia as ASEAN Chair in 2020 and
Cambodia as one of the eleven par+es to the nego+a+ons on the ASEAN-China Single Drae
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea Nego+a+ng Text (SDNT).
Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair, has no special authority to influence the +me line for nego+a+ons
on the ASEAN-China SDNT. Long ago ASEAN gave up its preroga+ve to reach a common
posi+on on the Code of Conduct prior to mee+ng with China. ASEAN’s concession on this point
means that there are eleven par+es — ASEAN’s ten member states and China.
Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair could, as it did in 2012, refuse to issue the Chair’s Statement
because it objected to wording of paragraphs on the South China Sea. But this is unlikely now
because ASEAN has recovered from this debacle. Since 2013, ASEAN has come up with a
formula+on on the South China Sea that is included in every Chair’s Statement. Cambodia has
been part of this consensus.
Formal nego+a+ons on the SDNT are undertaken by the ASEAN-China Working Group to
Implement the Declara+on on Conduct of Par+es in the South China Sea (WG DOC). This group
operates on the basis of consensus. Cambodia could block consensus. But either it would be
opera+ng alone as a single holdout or presumably siding with China (or some other party) on
a par+cular issue.
In August 2018, China unilaterally pressed for a three-year deadline for the Code of Conduct
(2018 to 2021), in my assessment, because Rodrigo Duterte would be President of the
Philippines (un+l May 2022); Brunei and Cambodia would be ASEAN Chairs in 2021 and 2022,
respec+vely; and the Philippines and Myanmar would be ASEAN country co-ordinator for
dialogue rela+ons with China, from 2018-21 and 2021-24, respec+vely.
ASEAN, however, never formally accepted this. ASEAN developed a well-worn statement that
is repeated every year. For example, Chairman’s Statement of the 38th and 39th ASEAN
Summits (26 October 2021) states, “We… were encouraged by the progress of the substan+ve
nego+a+ons towards the early conclusion of an effec+ve and substan+ve Code of Conduct in
the South China Sea (COC) consistent with interna+onal law, including the 1982 UNCLOS,
within a mutually agreed 9meline (emphasis added).”
The November 2002 Declara+on on Conduct of Par+es in the South China Sea (DOC) stated,
“10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South
China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on
the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective (emphasis
added).”
COVID-19 meant no face-to-face nego+a+ons on the SDNT took place in 2020. China is now
pressing for a conclusion by the end of next year.
The speed of nego+a+ons likely will be determined by the claimant states and their
acceptance or otherwise of the wording of the final SDNT, its legal status, area of coverage,
and enforceability.
The SDNT is replete with references to interna+onal law in general and UNLOS in par+cular.
Provisional agreement has been reached on the Preamble (one page). Point 2 of the Preamble
states:
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Reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Na+ons, the 1982 UN Conven9on on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Treaty of Amity and
Coopera+on in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other
universally recognised principles of interna+onal law which shall serve as the basic norms
governing state-to-state rela+ons (emphasis added).
Nego+a+ons are now focused on the second sec+on General Provisions point one on
objec+ves. This sec+on is two pages long.
There is no men+on of the Arbitral Tribunal set up under Annex VII of UNCLOS or its 2016
Award in the SDNT. The Arbitral Tribunal is oeen misleadingly referred to as the Permanent
Court of Arbitra+on (PCA). The PCA served as the registry for the proceedings of the Arbitral
Tribunal.
“Cambodia as ASEAN Chair & the South China Sea Code of Conduct,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, October 29, 2021. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/536363716/Thayer-
Cambodia-as-ASEAN-Chair-the-South-China-Sea-Code-of-Conduct.

Vietnam and Cambodia: 55th Anniversary of Diploma2c Rela2ons

Vietnam and Cambodia are set to celebrate the 55th anniversary of diploma+c rela+ons on
the 24th of June. We request your insights into the following five ques+ons:
Ques+on 1: How important do you think it was to Vietnam and Cambodia when the two
countries established diploma+c rela+ons on the 24th of June 1967?
ANSWER: In 1967 the war in Vietnam was escala+ng as the United States poured more ground
troops into South Vietnam and sought to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At the same +me,
the U.S. con+nued its air war over North Vietnam.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk consistently followed the path of neutrality and non-alignment
since independence from France in 1953. However, neutrality was difficult to maintain as the
war in South Vietnam spilled over into Cambodia.
Prince Sihanouk made the correct assessment that in the long-term the Democra+c Republic
of Vietnam would prevail and reunify the country. This led to the establishment of diploma+c
rela+ons on 24 June 1967.
Ques+on 2: What is your assessment regarding Vietnam’s role in libera+ng Cambodia from
the Khmer Rouge in 1979?
ANSWER: Vietnam was en+rely jus+fied under interna+onal law in exercising self-defence
against the Khmer Rouge who first a^acked Vietnamese island territory in 1975. There was a
brief hiatus in 1976 when both sides nego+ated on border issues. But in final quarter of 1976
and con+nuing into 1977-78, the Khmer Rouge stepped up their aggression with cross-border
a^acks on Vietnamese villages. Vietnam responded by counter-a^acking but this did not deter
the Khmer Rouge who con+nued to massacre Vietnamese living in the border area.
Vietnamese forces joined with Cambodians who fled the Khmer Rouge regime and together
liberated the country from the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal rule in late 1978-early 1979.
Ques+on 3: Cambodian leaders have repeatedly affirmed that without Vietnam’s help, they
would not have survived. What is your assessment of this?
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ANSWER: I first visited Cambodia in August 1981 and returned regularly in the 1980s. I met
many Cambodian officials who had lived under the Khmer Rouge. I also visited the mass graves
of vic+ms of the Khmer Rouge. If Vietnam had not supported the Cambodian forces opposing
the Khmer Rouge the genocide would have con+nued and hundreds of thousands of
Cambodian would have perished. Cambodian leaders are correct, they would not be alive
today if Vietnam had not intervened.
Ques+on 4: What is your assessment regarding the development of Vietnam-Cambodia
rela+ons over the past 55 years?
ANSWER: In 1989, I accompanied U.S. Senator Dick Clark on a fact-finding visit to Cambodia
just aeer Vietnam withdrew its military forces. Later, in May 1993, I was an accredited
observer for elec+ons conducted under the United Na+ons Transi+onal Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) in Kompong Thom province. I con+nued to make regular visits to
Cambodia since then.
There are two issues that have bedevilled bilateral rela+ons, the demarca+on of the border
between Vietnam and Cambodia and Cambodia’s treatment of the ethnic Vietnamese
community living in that country. At +mes rela+ons have been tense due to hyper-na+onalism
by Cambodians. Over the years these bilateral irritants have been ameliorated.
Ques+on 5: What is your view on the trend and prospects of Vietnam-Cambodia rela+ons in
the years to come?
ANSWER: This year is the Vietnam-Cambodia, Cambodia-Vietnam Friendship Year.
The general trend in the future will be carried out under the expression “good
neighbourliness, tradi+onal friendship, comprehensive coopera+on, and long-term stability”
adopted by both par+es. For example, the demarca+on of the land border is eighty-four
percent complete and both sides are striving to complete this process in coming years now
that both are recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Special Economic Zones have sprung up along the border to facilitate mutually beneficial trade
to exceed $5 billion. Both sides will implement the Master Plan on Vietnam-Cambodia
Economic Connec+vity to 2030 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Coopera+on
Strategy in the Transport Sector for the 2018-2025 period with a Vision to 2030.
Cambodian and Vietnamese military forces cooperate to repatriate the remains of
Vietnamese soldiers who were killed in the figh+ng against the Khmer Rouge. Cambodian
military officers con+nue to a^end Vietnamese military training courses.
And Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will con+nue to work together to develop the Mekong sub-
region.
“Vietnam and Cambodia: 55th Anniversary of Diploma+c Rela+ons,” Thayer Consultancy
Background Brief, May 31, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/576822804/Thayer-
Vietnam-and-Cambodia-55th-Anniversary-of-Diploma+c-Rela+ons.

Implica2ons of a Chinese Military Presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base

We request your evalua+on of reports on the moderniza+on of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base.
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Q1. Cambodia denies that it will grant access to Ream Naval Base on a long-term basis. What
is your evalua+on of the possibility that Ream Naval Base will become a base for the Chinese
navy?
ANSWER: Australia’s new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese remarked on Tuesday, 7 June,
“We’ve been aware of Beijing’s ac+vity at Ream for some +me and encourage Beijing to be
transparent about its intent…” The larger strategic picture is that for several years China has
been consistently seeking naval access to several countries in the region, par+cularly the
South Pacific. Last month, China and the Solomon Islands signed an unpublished security
agreement that likely includes provision for Chinese naval ship visits.
Once China gains a military presence it does not ma^er what term is used to describe it –
lodgement, facility or base. What ma^ers is the capabili+es China deploys and China’s intent.
China’s People’s Libera+on Army Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard and Mari+me Mili+a are
quan+ta+vely larger than any counter-coali+on in the region. China is rapidly closing the
qualita+ve gap.
China has the capability to establish a permanent military presence in Cambodia. Any small
Chinese military lodgement could be quickly expanded. It would appear that the ground
breaking ceremony this week signals a fait accompli and China will be involved in modernizing
Ream Naval Base.
Once construc+on work is completed, the Chinese PLAN likely will maintain a presence.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that China will be given a long-term lease of up to thirty years
with automa+c renewal for another ten years. It is likely that publicity and adverse reac+on
by the United States may result in a revision of the lease.
Q2. What impact will a Chinese naval base in Cambodia have on security in the Indo-Pacific?
ANSWER: China’s military lodgement at Ream Naval Base will create a forward opera+ng base
for the PLAN and China Coast Guard to expand the length and geographic scope of their
patrols par+cularly in the Gulf of Thailand. In other words, Chinese naval and mari+me forces
will be much closer to Thailand, peninsula Malaysia, southwestern Vietnam and Indonesia’s
Natuna Island.
Recently, Vietnam took its first steps to create a professional mari+me mili+a with priority
waters off its southwestern coast to protect its fishermen and marine resources. Chinese naval
and mari+me forces opera+ng from Ream Naval Base could provide support for Chinese
fishing boats opera+ng in waters claimed by Beijing or poaching in the Exclusive Economic
Zones of coastal states, including
Vietnam.
A Chinese naval presence will deter coastal states from taking robust ac+on to curb illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing by Chinese fishing fleets. Also, a permanent Chinese naval
presence will cause coastal states to divert personnel and naval resources to monitor what
the Chinese are up to.
“Implica+ons of a Chinese Military Presence at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, June 8, 2022.
h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/579496761/Thayer-Implica+ons-of-a-Chinese-Military-
Presence-at-Cambodia-s-Ream-Naval-Base.
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Vietnam’s Response to China’s Upgrading of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base

We seek your assessment of current reports that China will establish a military presence at
Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base.
Q1. What do the Vietnamese government and military think about allega+ons that China will
have access to a Cambodian naval base?
ANSWER: The first default posi+on of Vietnamese officials and academic analysts when China
is men+oned is to think the worst. Beyond this knee jerk reac+on these same officials are
more sanguine in private conversa+on They repeatedly refer to an understanding between
Cambodia and Vietnam “of not allowing any forces to use one’s country’s territory to conduct
acts against the other’s security and stability.”
This understanding was publicly reiterated in the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of
Prime Minister Hun Sen’ official visit to Vietnam in October 2019 and in the Joint Statement
issued at the conclusion of the official visit by President Nguyen Xuan Phuc to Cambodia in
December 2021. The la^er Joint Statement declared: “The two sides agreed to strengthen
coopera+on in defence and security based on the principle of not allowing any hos+le forces
to use their respec+ve territories to harm the other’s security…”
These same views are held even aeer the Washington Post broke its news story on 6 June and
ground breaking ceremonies were held two days later.
Q2. Is this a “game-changer” for Vietnam and is there any sign of how Hanoi will respond
following the latest allega+ons this week?
ANSWER: China, and the People’s Libera+on Army (PLA), have been ac+ve in training and
equipping the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces for some +me now. PLA Naval ships have paid
friendly port visits. At the same +me, Vietnam and Cambodia have stepped up defence
coopera+on through a mul+-year protocol covering 2020-24 and a specific Coopera+on Plan
for 2022. On 23 May, for example, General Tea Banh and General Phan Van Giang, defence
ministers for Cambodia and Vietnam, respec+vely, held their first border defence friendship
exchange in Hanoi. Vietnam hosts Cambodian officers in its professional military educa+on
courses.
Defence Ministers from China and Vietnam hold annual friendly border exchanges. Young
Vietnamese officers are regularly hosted by their counterparts in China. The two navies
conduct annual coordinated naval patrols and friendly port visits.
Q3. If reports are true that the deal between Phnom Penh and Beijing is going ahead, is this a
sign that Vietnam has lost all influence on the Cambodian government?
ANSWER: China has given Cambodia a loan to assist it in modernizing the facili+es at Ream
Naval Base. These facili+es are modest: new command centre, mee+ng hall, dining and
entertainment facili+es, sports ground, storage, upgrade for medical facili+es and hospital,
construc+on of a drydock and slipway, two new piers, and dredging. In addi+on, China will
assist in repairing eight legacy ships and two floa+ng docks, improve naval engineering
capacity and provide 36,900 uniforms of various classes for Cambodian naval officers.
The area allocated to Chinese personnel who will be involved in renova+ng Ream Naval Base
is 0.3 square kilometres.
 10

In sum, Vietnam does not view China-Cambodia rela+ons in zero-sum terms. China’s
involvement at Ream Naval Base will not undermine exis+ng and future Cambodia-Vietnam
military coopera+on.
“Vietnam’s Response to China’s Upgrading of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, June 12, 2022.
h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/579497302/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Response-to-China-s-
Upgrading-of-Cambodia-s-Ream-Naval-Base.

Cambodia: Human Trafficking

Recently, the media gave coverage to Vietnamese workers who escaped from confinement at
a casino in Cambodia and fled to Vietnam by swimming across a river to safety. As a research
plaporm we have followed these and other cases of forced human trafficking and note that
they have increased in frequency.
We are now preparing an major report on human trafficking in Cambodia documented with
sta+s+cs and qualita+ve analysis with the aim of impac+ng on government and public
awareness.
Our researchers found this ar+cle in which you are quoted: h"ps://china.usc.edu/what-chinas-
belt-and-road-ini6a6ve-means-cambodia on the nega+ve impact of China’s Belt and Road
Ini+a+ve on Sihanoukville city where the construc+on of casinos is linked with organized
crime. We request your insights into the following ques+ons:
Q1. What is your informed assessment about human trafficking in Cambodia and
Sihanoukville specifically?
ANSWER: China’s Belt and Road Ini+a+ve (BRI) is Xi Jinping’s personal ini+a+ve. Cambodia has
benefi^ed from the BRI because Prime Minister Hun Sen has supported China. However, once
Chinese companies become involved they pursue their own self-interests. When Chinese
businesses become involved in a dispute with local Cambodian government authori+es
Chinese Embassy officials generally intervene on their side.
The influx of Chinese investment has turned Sihanoukville into a virtual enclave for Chinese
businessmen, workers and tourists. Wealthy Chinese na+onals use their connec+ons with
Cambodian officials to acquire Cambodian ci+zenship in order to advance their own interests,
such as secng up casinos. Local Cambodians were disadvantaged. Chinese criminal gangs
followed the money trail and began opera+ng in Sihanoukville. Their misbehaviour caused
local government officials to complain to the na+onal government.
Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, Chinese ci+zens were recruited by criminal gangs and
trafficked to Cambodia to serve as workers for Chinese businesses. However, this source of
cheap labour dried up for two main reasons. First, when the Chinese government learned
about human trafficking it undertook a massive campaign to educate people how to iden+fy
human traffickers and the risks involved. The government also ins+gated +ghter controls at
airports and China’s borders. Second, the Chinese government pursued a zero COVID policy
that resulted in closing the border and lockdowns that restricted the movement of people.
Q2. How did these casinos turn into online scamming centres?
 11

ANSWER: China’s Zero COVID policy not only cut off the flow of Chinese visitors to Cambodia
but also cut off the funds used for gambling. Chinese-run casinos fell on hard +mes. This
prompted criminal syndicates to move to alternate and more lucra+ve sources of income –
online scamming. The focus on human trafficking now shieed to luring Vietnamese, Thais,
Malaysians and other Southeast Asians into this network through a sophis+cated social media
campaign. Once they arrived in Cambodia their passports were confiscated. They were housed
in closely-guarded compounds and forced to work long-hours in online scamming.
Q3. What are your sugges+ons to prevent the luring of vulnerable people from Vietnam, South
East Asian countries, China and Taiwan into these online scamming networks?
ANSWER: There is no quick fix to elimina+ng human trafficking. At least nine issues need to
be addressed to combat human trafficking of all kinds.
First, all the countries in your ques+on need to review and revise exis+ng laws related to an+-
trafficking to ensure that they are comprehensive.
Second, proscribe worker-paid recruitment fees and conduct unannounced inspec+ons of
labour recruitment agencies to eliminate debt-based coercion.
Third, develop a na+onal system to monitor, collect data and report on suspected cases of
human trafficking.
Fourth, train police and all other relevant government officials, including overseas diploma+c
missions, to iden+fy and inves+gate suspected cases of human trafficking with special
a^en+on to vulnerable groups (children, women, migrant workers, etc.)
Fieh, prosecute, convict, and punish all forms of human trafficking. Provide incen+ves for
vic+ms of trafficking to par+cipate in criminal proceedings.
Sixth, train social workers and support non-government organisa+ons (NGOs) to assist in the
repatria+on and care of trafficking vic+ms.
Seventh, con+nuously conduct a na+onal educa+on campaign on the dangers and risks of
human trafficking and how to iden+fy human traffickers, their means of recruitment, and
poten+al vic+ms.
Eighth, enhance interna+onal law enforcement coopera+on with all relevant states.
Ninth, provide sufficient funding and resources for a Na+onal Ac+on Plan Against Human
Trafficking.
“Cambodia: Human Trafficking,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, September 1, 2022.
h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/594912774/Thayer-Cambodia-Human-Trafficking.

Vietnam’s Response to Chinese Encirclement

We are wri+ng about Vietnam’s security concerns regarding China and what looks like
encirclement. Would you be able to provide some comments to the following ques+ons?
Q1. Vietnam looks increasingly encircled, with Chinese military installa+ons to the east in the
South China Sea; China itself to the north; and the threat of a Chinese military base in
Cambodia, so to the south and west. What is the feeling in Vietnam about this poten+al
encirclement and how has the government responded?
 12

ANSWER: Vietnamese poli+cal and military leaders are well aware of China’s military strength
and growing technological prowess. They adopt a sanguine view of their strategic posi+on; in
other words China’s so-called encirclement of Vietnam presents both opportuni+es and
challenges. As the map of the South China Sea below indicates, while China occupies the
Paracel Islands and has militarized seven features in the South China Sea, Vietnam occupies
twenty-one rocks and reefs, hos+ng between 49 to 51 outposts, in the Spratlys.
In February 2021, the 13th Na+onal Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party approved a
resolu+on to ini+ate Vietnam’s most ambi+ous and far-reaching program to modernize its
armed forces. It called for the crea+on of “compact and strong” Vietnam People’s Army by
2025, the moderniza+on of select “services, corps and forces” by 2030, and then the
moderniza+on of en+re military thereaeer.
Senior military officers wri+ng in Tạp Chí Quốc Phòng Toàn Dân (All People’s Na+onal Defence
Journal) aeer the 13th congress iden+fied the following services, corps and forces that would
be given priority as follows: Air-Defence Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, Signal Force, Electronic
Warfare Force, Technical Reconnaissance Force, Cyber Warfare Force and the Cipher
(cryptology) Force.

Q2. What can Vietnam do to poten+ally break this encirclement? Does it mean more
coopera+on with counter-China countries like the US and Japan? Or is it something Vietnam
knows it has to live with now?
ANSWER: China’s so-called encirclement of Vietnam is incomplete. China has provided a loan
and is assis+ng Cambodia in modernizing its naval base at Ream. But China has not yet
established a formal military base nor deployed naval warships on a permanent basis.
 13

Vietnam and Cambodia have a standing-agreement not to permit foreign military bases on
their territory. For example, in December 2021, at the conclusion of the official visit by
President Nguyen Xuan Phuc to Cambodia, the two leaders issued a joint statedment that
declared: “The two sides agreed to strengthen coopera+on in defence and security based on
the principle of not allowing any hos+le forces to use their respec+ve territories to harm the
other’s security…”
Vietnam and Cambodia are currently implemen+ng a mul+-year protocol covering 2020-24
and a specific Coopera+on Plan for 2022. On 23 May 2022, for example, General Tea Banh and
General Phan Van Giang, defence ministers for Cambodia and Vietnam, respec+vely, held their
first border defence friendship exchange in Hanoi.
While the disposi+on of Vietnam’s modern military is defensive, the 13th congress resolu+on
directed the Vietnam People’s Armed Forces to “proac+vely prevent the risk of war and
conflict from afar” through accurate forecas+ng and +mely ac+on.
Vietnam’s military doctrine is tailored for different geographic areas such as the land border,
islands in the South China Sea and the mari+me domain. There are unconfirmed reports that
Vietnam has placed missile launchers on several of its features in the Spratly Islands.
A year aeer the 13th congress, Russian invaded the Ukraine. This conflict provides lessons to
Vietnam how asymmetric force can be employed against a numerically larger force. Vietnam’s
na+onal defence industry is already capable of producing advanced an+-ship and an+-air
missiles. Vietnam’s People’s Navy includes six Project 636 Varshavyanka or advanced Kilo-
class conven+onal submarines.
In 2019 Vietnam issued a Defence White Paper that declared: “Viet Nam consistently
advocates neither joining any military alliances, siding with one country against another,
giving any other countries permission to set up military bases or use its territory to carry our
military ac+vi+es against other countries nor using force or threatening to use in interna+onal
rela+ons.” Collec+vely these are called the “four no's.”
Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White Paper went on to state, however, “depending on
circumstances and specific condi+ons, Viet Nam will consider developing, necessary,
appropriate defence and military rela+ons with other countries…” Russia has been Vietnam’s
main supplier of military weapons and technology but procurements have fallen considerably
from over US $1.2 billion in 2016 to $30 million 2021. Also, Vietnam has acquired military
weapons and technology from India, Israel, South Korea and the United States. At the same
+me, it has worked closely with Japan’s Self-Defence Air Force on air defence.
Q3. What challenges will Vietnam face?
Vietnam will face two major challenges in mee+ng it military moderniza+on goals First,
Vietnam must restore high-economic growth so it can finance arms procurements of “big
+cket” items. Second, Vietnam must avoid sanc+ons by the United States if it decides to make
major procurements from Russia.
The so-called encirclement thesis posits that China and Vietnam view each other as
adversaries at best and enemies at worst, leaving Vietnam li^le op+on but to align with the
United States. The situa+on is far more complex. China represents the greatest military
challenge to Vietnam because of its material capabili+es. But it is difficult to demonstrate that
China has the intent to pressure Vietnam to subordinate itself to Beijing or a^ack Vietnam
 14

because of some existen+al provoca+on to China’s core interests. Any armed conflict between
China and Vietnam would have global implica+ons and result in the disrup+on of trade via the
South China Sea on which China is dependent.
“Vietnam’s Response to Chinese Encirclement,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
September 1, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/594907943/Thayer-Vietnam-s-
Response-to-Chinese-Encirclement.

Cambodia and the U.S. Strategic Pivot to Asia

We are preparing a study of Cambodia-U.S. rela+ons. We request your assessment of the
following:
Where does the United States place Cambodia in its strategic pivot to Asia?
ANSWER: Currently, Cambodia occupies an elevated if not priority place in the Biden
Administra+on's Indo-Pacific Strategy because it is ASEAN Chair for 2022. The U.S. hopes to
see its rela+ons with ASEAN raised to a comprehensive strategic partnership at the end of the
year and by necessity the U.S. must work with Cambodia to achieve this goal.
Cambodia also has a special role in U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy because it is a Mekong riparian
state along with Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. The Biden Administra+on has doubled down on
suppor+ng the sustainable development of the Mekong River out humanitarian and strategic
considera+ons.
Finally, Cambodia's rela+ons with China are of concern to the Biden Administra+on whose
Na+onal Security and Indo-Pacific strategies iden+fy China as the United States' main
compe+tor and rival. The Biden Administra+on is concerned about the possibility of a Chinese
military lodgement at Ream Naval Base and is pressing diploma+cally for more transparency
on this issue. The U.S. is mo+vated to offer Cambodia incen+ves to lessen its dependence on
China for development assistance.
United States strategy towards Cambodia, however, is bedevilled by U.S. promo+on of
democracy and human and labour rights that has support in the U.S. Congress. Legisla+on
before the U.S. Congress could undermine U.S. diploma+c efforts to engage with Cambodia
under Prime Minister Hun Sen.
“Cambodia and the U.S. Strategic Pivot to Asia,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
September 13, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/596158672/Thayer-Cambodia-and-
the-US-Strategic-Pivot-to-Asia.

U.S. Rela2ons with Cambodia, 2017-2022

We are wri+ng a report about President Biden's 12-13 November triop to Cambodia for the
US-ASEAN summit. This would be the first visit by a US president since President Barrack
Obama in November 2012. We request your assessment on Unite4d States rela+ons with
Cambodia since 2016.
Q1. What do you think are the President Biden’s goals for this trip? What are Cambodia's
goals?
 15

ANSWER: President Joe Biden will go to Phnom Penh to demonstrate U.S. respect for and
engagement with ASEAN, ASEAN-centrality and the role of ASEAN mul+lateral ins+tu+ons in
the security of the Indo-Pacific Region. Biden’s presence will also give him a chance to meet
with Indonesia’s president who will assume the ASEAN Chair for 2023 at this November
summit.
President Biden will also a^empt to shape the discussion by offering coopera+on across the
spectrum of non-tradi+onal security issues so dear to ASEAN’s own agenda. He will also try to
assuage those ASEAN leaders who are swayed by China’s rhetoric that the U.S. is the root
cause of regional instability. Biden will repeat long standing U.S. policy that the United States
will cooperate with China where it can but resist China where it must.
Cambodia has been adept at using its role as ASEAN Chair to claw back some interna+onal
respectability. Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed his foreign minister as ASEAN Special Envoy
to Myanmar to get movement on ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus. And Cambodia has been
rela+vely vocal in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Hun Sen milked his role as ASEAN
Chair at the US-ASEAN Special Summit hosted by President Biden earlier this year.
Q2. What has changed in the US-Cambodia rela+onship since Obama's visit, and how do you
think Biden's trip will compare to Obama's in tone/substance?
ANSWER: Human rights played a greater role under President Obama than his successor
Donald Trump. President Obama personally pressed Hun Sen on this issue in November 2012
when they met face to face.
Under the Biden Administra+on Cambodia occupies an elevated if not priority place in U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy because Cambodia is ASEAN Chair for this year. Biden expects to see U.S.
rela+ons with ASEAN raised to a comprehensive strategic partnership in November and by
necessity the U.S. has had to work with Cambodia to achieve this goal. Therefore the Biden
Administra+on has been more muted in raising human rights concerns than president Obama.
Q3. How has the rela+onship changed in the past five years, since the dissolu+on of the
Cambodia Na+onal Rescue Party (CNRP) and the claims against Kem Sokha of a U.S.-led "color
revolu+on" against Hun Sen? How do the Kem Sokha allega+ons impact rela+ons now?
ANSWER: U.S.-Cambodia rela+ons deteriorated markedly during the Trump Administra+on as
Hun Sen turned to China in response to U.S. and western responses to his suppression of the
democra+c opposi+on. Hun Sen downgraded defence rela+ons in 2017. In 2018, Hun Sen
turned to China for arms aeer the U.S. cut its aid to Cambodia. In June 2018 the U.S. imposed
sanc+ons on Hun Sen’s bodyguard.
In 2019, the U.S. a^empted to re-engage Cambodia to wean it from China. General Hun
Manet, one of Hun Sen’s Sons who graduated from West Point, was invited to a^end the U.S.
Pacific Area Special Opera+ons Conference.
The Biden Administra+on doubled down on suppor+ng the sustainable development of the
Mekong River out humanitarian and strategic considera+ons to undercut Chinese influence.
Because Cambodia is a Mekong riparian state along with Thailand, Laos and Vietnam it
benefi^ed from this U.S. policy ini+a+ve.
The Biden Administra+on’s Indo-Pacific strategies iden+fies China as the United States' main
compe+tor and rival. The Biden Administra+on also is concerned about the possibility of a
 16

Chinese military lodgement at Ream Naval Base. The U.S. has lobbied Cambodia to be more
transparent.
Over the last eighteen months the U.S. has adopted soeer diploma+c style to engage with
Hun Sen. However, legisla+on before the U.S. Congress promo+ng democracy and human and
labour rights in Cambodia could undermine these efforts.
“U.S. Rela+ons with Cambodia, 2017-2022,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October
31, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/605435952/Thayer-U-S-Rela+ons-With-
Cambodia-2017-2022.

ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 1

We are wri+ng a preview of the ASEAN Summit next week and request your apprecia+on of
the main issues expected to come up, par+cularly as they pertain to Cambodia and regional
security.
Q1. What are the main issues, especially regarding regional security, that will likely be
discussed and debated among ASEAN member states at the summit in Phnom Penh next
week?
ANSWER: In many respects the agenda for ASEAN Summits is a set piece affair because the
broad outline of issues covered under ASEAN Community Building and ASEAN External
Rela+ons form a predictable template that is passed on from year to year. For example,
proposals from the three ASEAN communi+es – Poli+cal-Security, Economic and Socio-
Cultural – are passed up line, approved by the ASEAN Ministerial Mee+ng and then presented
to the Summit.
ASEAN is required to hold two summits a year but allowance is made for countries with limited
human resources to hold the summits back to back. Cambodia will host the 40th and 41st
Summits from 10-13 November.
Among the issues under ASEAN Community Building to be considered by the ASEAN Summit
are ASEAN Community Post-2025 Vision, Review of the implementa+on of the ASEAN Charter,
ASEAN’s response to COVID-19, ASEAN connec+vity, Ini+a+ve for ASEAN Integra+on, sub-
regional coopera+on, and the ASEAN junior fellowship program within the ASEAN Secretariat.
The most conten+ous issues will be considered under the umbrella of ASEAN External
Rela+ons, such as the situa+on in Myanmar and the war in Ukraine. Other issues that will be
raised – Timor-Leste’s applica+on for membership, ASEAN centrality and rela+ons with
dialogue partners, South China Sea, and denuclearisa+on of the Korean peninsula generally –
are not conten+ous. ASEAN leaders have worked out a boiler plate statement on each issue
that is repeated almost verba+m annually.
The situa+on in Myanmar will be par+cularly conten+ous because ASEAN’s Five Point
Consensus has failed to get trac+on. Some countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, are likely to call
for stronger measures. The United States reportedly will make a major interven+on.
Q2. Where will Cambodia stand on these issues?
ANSWER: Cambodia stands full square behind all the ASEAN Community Building proposals
under considera+on. It is a par+cular advocate of ASEAN connec+vity and measures to reduce
the development gap among ASEAN members.
 17

Cambodia is likely to oppose stronger measures against Myanmar. Cambodia has been
outspoken in its cri+cism of Russian aggression in Ukraine and is posed to exchange
ambassadors with Ukraine. Cambodia has proposed itself as the venue for talks between
Russia and Ukraine.
The Philippines is most likely to raise recent incidents in the South China Sea involving China.
Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair, will let the consensus principle prevail and it is highly unlikely
ASEAN leaders will alter the wording of their sec+on on the South China Sea.
Q3. What will the points of conflict over these issues be among ASEAN states and other
na+ons, such as the U.S., China and Russia?
ANSWER: These issues are likely to surface at the East Asia Summit among China, Russia and
the United States.
Clearly, the U.S. will square off against Russia and China on the situa+on in Myanmar and the
war in Ukraine. The U.S. will call for stronger measures, Russia and China will oppose this. The
U.S. and China will exchange verbal volleys each accusing the other of destabilising security in
the South China Sea. Russia and China will oppose stronger measures against North Korea.
Q4. Could you evaluate Cambodia's leadership of ASEAN this year? What did Cambodia do
well and what could it have done be^er in leading the associa+on?
ANSWER: When Cambodia took the gavel to become ASEAN Chair for 2022, it proposed as its
slogan for the year “ASEAN A.C.T.: Addressing Challenges Together.” Cambodia pledged to
expedite the process of ASEAN community building. Cambodia nominated three priori+es: (1)
strengthening ASEAN centrality and unity; (2) implementa+on of all agreed measures under
the ASEAN Economic Community; and (3) strengthen human resource development with a
par+cular focus on women and youth. Cambodia achieved a pass mark in advancing all three
of its priori+es.
The most conten+ous issue was Cambodia’s handling of the “situa+on in Myanmar.” ASEAN
commentators and analysts are divided on this issue. Cambodia’s cri+cs assert that Hun Sen
gave legi+macy to the military junta by visi+ng that country. Cri+cs argue Hun Sen
overreached by appoin+ng his Foreign Minister as ASEAN Special Envoy who visited Myanmar
twice with nothing to show for his diploma+c interven+on. Finally, cri+cs rounded on Hun Sen
for issuing a statement on recent mass killings in Myanmar without naming the guilty party.
Cri+cs argue now is the +me to make contact with the Na+onal Unity Government, the main
opposi+on group to the military.
On the other hand, other observers argue nothing much could have been done. They give Hun
Sen credit for engaging with the junta and for appoin+ng a Special Envoy. They also credit Hun
Sen for keeping Myanmar inside the ASEAN tent so to speak by suspending its par+cipa+on at
ASEAN mee+ngs but not formally expelling Myanmar from ASEAN.
Q5. So far, many observers have said ASEAN's Five Point Consensus on Myanmar has failed.
What should ASEAN states do to stop the conflict and hold the Myanmar government and
other actors accountable for crimes and human rights viola+ons? What is ASEAN likely to
achieve on Myanmar this year or next?
ANSWER: ASEAN could start by naming and shaming the military junta. ASEAN could a^empt
to find a so-called non-poli+cal leader to represent Myanmar at ASEAN mee+ngs. ASEAN could
 18

make contact with the Na+onal Unity Government and funnel humanitarian assistance
directly to it.
ASEAN and other like-minded states could lodge claims of crimes against humanity before the
Interna+onal Criminal Court. ASEAN could press the UN Security Council to ins+gate a global
embargo on the sale of weapons to Myanmar. Finally, ASEAN could take steps to expel
Myanmar from ASEAN and isolate it interna+onally.
The bo^om line, however, is that none of these measures are likely to have a major impact on
the ongoing conflict in Myanmar. The UN cannot take effec+ve ac+on because either or both
China and Russia will likely exercise their veto. ASEAN members are unlikely to reach
consensus of sterner measures.
Reportedly Indonesia, the incoming ASEAN Chair for 2023, is drawing up a road map to assist
ASEAN in achieving its Five Point Consensus.
Q6. The South China Sea is oeen a conten+ous issue among ASEAN members, picng some
na+ons opposing China's claims against others who back China. Do you expect to see any new
developments on how ASEAN states discuss, debate and speak out about the South China Sea
and conflic+ng claims by China and ASEAN na+ons, such as Vietnam and the Philippines?
ANSWER: ASEAN has a well-worn template for its policy on the South China Sea that covers
all the bases on issues and concerns by claimant states. Because of its generality it is repeated
each year and it is unlikely any major change will be made this year.
ASEAN last statement on the South China Sea notes that “concerns were expressed by some
Ministers on… serious incidents in the area… which have eroded trust and confidence,
increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.”
ASEAN then calls for “self-restraint in the conduct of ac+vi+es that would complicate or
escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and avoid ac+ons that may further complicate
the situa+on.” ASEAN also calls for the peaceful se^lement of disputes under interna+onal
law including the United Na+ons Conven+on on the Law of the Sea.
ASEAN’s annual statement on the South China Sea normally concludes by no+ng that ASEAN
is “encouraged by the progress of the substan+ve Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”
and men+ons whatever mee+ngs were held in the last calendar year.
China’s party General Secretary Xi Jinping just received Vietnam’s party leader Nguyen Phu
Trong in Beijing. The media reported that both leaders agreed that their dispute in the South
China Sea could affect bilateral rela+ons. The joint statement issued aeer their talks included
thirteen points. Point 9 included four lengthy paragraphs on the South China Sea outlining the
principles and ac+ons each side would take to maintain “peace and stability.” In sum, Vietnam
is unlikely to raise conten+ous South China Seas issues at the ASEAN Summit.
The Philippines, on the other hand, has been quite vocal under newly elected President
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. about Chinese transgressions affec+ng Philippine sovereignty and
sovereign jurisdic+on. President Marcos is most likely to raise his concerns at the Summit. This
will not affect the wording of the ASEAN Chair’s Statement aeer the Summit because its
language is all encompassing.
“ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 1,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
November 4, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/605993907/Thayer-ASEAN-Summits-
in-Cambodia.
 19

ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 2

ASEAN leaders will gather in Cambodia for a series of summit mee+ngs. We request your views
on the following ques+ons:
Q1. In your view, what are the most important achievements of ASEAN coopera+on over the
past 55 years? How has Viet Nam contributed to these achievements?
ANSWER: ASEAN has a^ained five major achievements. First, it internalized four norms known
collec+vely as the ASEAN Way – dialogue and consulta+on, consensus, non-interference and
moving at a pace comfortable to all. ASEAN members renounced force by adop+ng the Treaty
of Amity and Coopera+on. Second, ASEAN expanded beyond its first five founding members
to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia and is likely to add Timor-Leste.
Third, ASEAN has become highly ins+tu+onalized with regular ministerial mee+ngs and
leaders’ summits. ASEAN established a permanent Secretariat in Indonesia and adopted a
Charter to formalize rela+ons among its members. Fourth, ASEAN promoted regional
integra+on through the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and expanded this to Community
Building based on three pillars – Poli+cal Security, Economic, Socio-Cultural. Fieh, ASEAN
formalized rela+ons with other states through dialogue and sectoral partnerships and by
establishing ASEAN-led mul+lateral ins+tu+ons: ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia
Summit (EAS), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Mee+ng Plus (ADMM Plus), Expanded ASEAN
Mari+me Forum, and the Asia-Europe Mee+ng.
Vietnam has been a leader in ASEAN with ini+a+ves to reduce the development gap between
less developed members and more developed members. A Vietnamese senior official, Le
Luong Minh, successfully served as ASEAN Secretary General. And, as ASEAN Chair, Vietnam
proac+vely led a region-wide effort to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.
Q2. Could you evaluate the significance of these summit mee+ngs in the face of major
headwinds like the Russia-Ukraine war, Myanmar situa+on, strategic compe++on among
major powers, and rising infla+on across the world.
ANSWER: ASEAN’s interna+onal importance rests on its convening power to hold annual
mee+ngs of a network of ASEAN-related mul+lateral ins+tu+ons, such as ASEAN Plus 1, ARF,
EAS, ADMM Plus, which the major powers a^end.
ASEAN Summits provide the opportunity for ASEAN Plus 1 mee+ngs with government leaders
to deal specifically with bilateral ma^ers. The EAS is the major leaders led ins+tu+on in the
Indo-Pacific and it serves as a strategic dialogue forum on poli+cal, economic and security
issues. ASEAN by itself cannot solve global problems on its own but it can promote dialogue
and consulta+on among its dialogue partners.
ASEAN func+ons by consensus decision-making and therefore its Chairman’s statements are
oeen general. ASEAN members vote differently on various resolu+ons considered by the UN
General Assembly. Although ASEAN members agreed on a Five Point Consensus to deal with
the situa+on in Myanmar, it has been unable to influence the military junta.
ASEAN, however, has been able to agree on an ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN will
not take sides in major power compe++on and expects major powers to support ASEAN unity
and centrality in the region’s security architecture.
 20

ASEAN performs much be^er in dealing with economic issues through free trade agreements
with China, Australia-New Zealand, Japan, India, South Korea and Hong Kong as well as the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Q3. What are the core principles that ASEAN should adhere to regardless of the regional and
interna+onal situa+on?
ANSWER: ASEAN should follow the core principles and norms in (1) the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence), (2) the ASEAN Way (inclusivity, dialogue and consulta+on, consensus,
non-interference, and moving at a pace comfortable to all), and (3) the Treaty of Amity and
Coopera+on (peaceful se^lement of disputes, renuncia+on of the threat or use of force and
promo+on of the rule of law).
Q4. What should ASEAN and Viet Nam do to maintain its central organizing role in the region’s
emerging architecture? How should ASEAN navigate in the current fast and unpredictable
changing environment?
ANSWER: ASEAN and Vietnam should be more proac+ve in asser+ng ASEAN unity and
centrality at a +me of heightened tensions among the major power. Specifically, this means
not being passive and reac+ve to developments, but proac+ve in promo+ng ini+a+ves to
resolve outstanding problems.
The situa+on in Myanmar is a prime example. It is clear that the military junta is not yet ready
to work with the ASEAN Special Envoy to implement the Five Points Consensus. ASEAN should
debate a number of op+ons including but not limited to: naming and shaming the military
junta, iden+fying a non-poli+cal leader to represent Myanmar at ASEAN mee+ngs, make
contact with the Na+onal Unity Government and funnel humanitarian assistance directly to
it, consider lodging claims of crimes against humanity before the Interna+onal Criminal Court,
press the UN Security Council to ins+gate a global embargo on the sale of weapons to
Myanmar, and finally take steps to expel Myanmar from ASEAN and isolate it interna+onally.
Q5. What do you expect from these summit mee+ngs?
ANSWER: ASEAN should hold two separate summit mee+ngs in a calendar year. ASEAN has
permi^ed its less developed members who lack the human resources to hold the two summits
back to back. This is what will happen in Phnom Penh next week. This means there will be a
+me lag in reviewing the implementa+on of programs and a compression of decision-making.
ASEAN summits are predictable because the final agenda is invariably the result of intensive
work at lower levels, senior levels and ministerial levels. There are two major baskets of issues
the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits will consider: ASEAN Community Building and ASEAN
External Rela+ons.
The ASEAN Summits will take note of and approve recommenda+ons on the ASEAN
Community Post-2025 Vision, Review of the implementa+on of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN’s
response to COVID-19, ASEAN connec+vity, Ini+a+ve for ASEAN Integra+on, sub-regional
coopera+on, and the ASEAN junior fellowship program within the ASEAN Secretariat.
The ASEAN Summits will discuss the following issues in ASEAN’s external rela+ons: Timor-
Leste’s applica+on for membership, ASEAN centrality and rela+ons with dialogue partners,
the situa+on in Myanmar, the war in Ukraine, South China Sea, and denuclearisa+on of the
 21

Korean peninsula. The situa+on in Myanmar will be a key issue with Malaysia and Indonesia
pressing for a harder line. Indonesia, the ASEAN Chair for 2023, is reportedly draeing a road
map to implement the Five Point Consensus and ASEAN leaders will endorse this ini+a+ve.
“ASEAN 40th and 41st Summits in Cambodia – 2,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
November 9, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/607112613/Thayer-ASEAN-40th-
and-41st-Summits-in-Cambodia-2.

Will ASEAN and Related Summits be Set Piece Affairs?

Q1. What will be the highlights of the ASEAN Summits in poli+cal terms (such as possible
bilateral mee+ngs, agreements, etc.)?
ANSWER: ASEAN’s end of year summits are usually set piece affairs. ASEAN mandates two
summits a year. In the case of less developed countries that lack human resources, the host
country, Cambodia in this case, is permi^ed to hold the two summits back-to-back. Cambodia
will host the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits back to back from 10-13 November.
The ASEAN and related summits provide an opportunity for leaders to hold separate bilateral
mee+ngs. These are useful especially in cases where rela+ons are strained. The bilateral
mee+ngs also provide an opportunity for partners to update each other and to confer on
future ac+ons and ini+a+ves.
The situa+on in Myanmar and the lack of progress in implemen+ng ASEAN’s Five Point
Consensus will be a hot topic at the ASEAN Ministerial Mee+ng (AMM) of foreign ministers
immediately prior to the Summits. Malaysia is expected to make a strong interven+on. Either
consensus will be reached at the AMM on the way forward, or leaders’ will have to resolve
disagreements.
Cambodia has taken a highly public an+-Russian line and as ASEAN Chair has arranged for
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelentsky to give a virtual address. Ukraine’s Ambassador will
sign the Protocol to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Coopera+on (TAC) in Southeast Asia on the
non-use of force. Spain will also accede to the TAC.
Indonesia is reportedly preparing a road map to implement the Five Point Consensus on
Myanmar so it is likely ASEAN leaders will agree to let the incoming ASEAN Chair have the
running on this conten+ous issue.
In addi+on to the ASEAN Summits, there will be ASEAN Plus One summits with dialogue
partners (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia [Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov will a^end in person, while Vladimir Pu+n will appear virtually], United Na+ons
and the United States); ASEAN Plus Three Summit (with China, Japan and South Korea); and
the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS is likely to witness a conten+ous debate over the war in
Ukraine between the U.S. and its allies and China and Russia.
ASEAN and the United States are expected to raise their rela+ons to a comprehensive strategic
partnership on a level with Australia and Japan who were given that status last year.
Q2. Do you expect to par+cipants divided into blocs? If so, which blocs and which countries?
Which countries do you expect to stay more neutral?
ANSWER: The East Asia Summit is the only mee+ng where ASEAN meets with all of its eight
dialogue partners. They are divided into two groups (1) the United States and its allies and
 22

partners (Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India) and (2) China-Russia
who formed a “partnership without limits”.
The EAS is likely to witness a conten+ous debate on the war in Ukraine between the U.S. and
its allies and China and Russia. This is most likely to occur at the leaders’ retreat. ASEAN
members will not take sides. Except for the EAS, all of the mul+lateral ASEAN-related mee+ngs
and summits are based on the principle of consensus. The Chair’s Statement is non-binding
and masks disagreements. The ASEAN Plus One summits are also set piece affairs.
Q3. What do you think could be the best possible outcome of the summit and, on the contrary,
the worst possible outcome?
ANSWER: The best possible outcome would be for ASEAN to reach consensus on the situa+on
in Myanmar and further steps to pressure the military junta to begin implemen+ng the Five
Point Consensus. ASEAN could open a dialogue with the Na+onal Unity Government and
con+nue to suspend Myanmar’s par+cipa+on at ASEAN mee+ngs. ASEAN needs to take ac+on
that will a^ract the support of its dialogue partners or risk being marginalised.
The worst outcome on the situa+on in Myanmar would be for China and Russia to break ranks
with ASEAN and con+nue to conduct business as usual with the military junta.
Q4. What needs to happen for Indonesia to be sa+sfied with the results of the summit?
ANSWER: Indonesia would be very glad if ASEAN leaders’ endorsed its ini+a+ve to write a
drae road map for dealing with the situa+on in Myanmar. Otherwise, Indonesia wil pick up
where Cambodia lee off and con+nue to implement programs and ini+a+ves that are
currently underway or newly approved.
Q5. Do you expect China to play a major role by media+ng between the U.S. and Europe and
Russia, especially now that Pu+n has confirmed he is not a^ending?
ANSWER: Bilateral mee+ngs in Bali are very important, although not technically part of the
ASEAN process. The expected bilateral mee+ngs between Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping and
President Xi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese are significant because both sets
of rela+ons are currently strained. These mee+ngs could mark a reset in bilateral rela+ons
towards a more construc+ve direc+on.
China will come under pressure from all sides to use its influence on Pu+n to pursue a peaceful
se^lement of the war in Ukraine. China recently warned Pu+n not to use nuclear weapons. It
is unlikely that China would assume a high-profile role as peacemaker due to the risks of failure
and possible aliena+on of Pu+n.
Q6. The White House confirmed that Xi and Biden will meet on Monday, ahead of the G20
summit. What outcomes do you expect from the first mee+ng between these leaders?
ANSWER: Usually summit mee+ngs at this level are prepared long in advance. This one was
agreed at short no+ce. Biden and Xi will meet Monday (14 November) prior to the G20 summit
in their first face to face mee+ng as presidents.
This mee+ng is all about resecng rela+ons that have nose-dived since Speaker Nancy Pelosi
visited Taiwan in May. Xi suspended dialogue with the United States on climate change, an+-
drug efforts and military rela+ons. The Biden Administra+on recently imposed export controls
on semiconductor technology.
 23

President Biden spoke at a press conference on 9th November and said he wanted to “lay out
what each of our red lines are. Understand what he believes to be in the cri+cal na+onal
interest of China… [and] whether or not they conflict with one another.”
Both leaders will raise issues of mutual concern such as Taiwan, North Korean missile tests
and the war in Ukraine. Biden has already indicated he will raise China’s harmful economic
prac+ces and human rights. Xi will likely raise economic issues such as Trump-era tariffs and
recent U.S. export controls on semiconductor technology.
According to a U.S. official there won’t be any joint statement or deliverables. The mee+ng
primarily is aimed at keeping communica+on open, discussing how to manage bilateral
rela+ons and iden+fying areas where the U.S. and China can work together.
“Will ASEAN and Related Summits be Set Piece Affairs?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
November 11, 2022. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/607113879/Thayer-Will-ASEAN-
and-Related-Summits-Be-Set-Piece-Affairs.

Cambodia Na2onal Elec2ons Scene Se[er

We request your analysis of the following issues prior to Cambodia’s na+onal elec+ons on 23
July.
Q1. Is this elec+on special compared to previous ones given that there is a rumoured
transi+on of power to take place with Prime Minister Hun Sen stepping down in favour of his
eldest son Hun Manet?
ANSWER: Cambodia’s na+onal elec+ons on 23rd July appears to be a two-step process. The
first step will replicate the 2018 na+onal elec+ons when the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)
won all 125 seats in the Na+onal Assembly. The CPP’s victory was a foregone conclusion aeer
the opposi+on Cambodian Na+onal Rescue Party was declared illegal. In February this year
the opposi+on Candlelight Party was similarly declared illegal.
The second step appears to be a carefully orchestrated genera+onal transfer of power from
the present ruling elite to their children. The most notable example is Hun Manet, son of
Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was selected in 2021 by the CPP to be the next Prime Minister.
Accounts on Cambodia’s social media +p a Cabinet reshuffle. Hun Sen is expected to re+re
and become head of the CPP where he will yield power behind the scenes. Hun Manet will
step up and replace his father.
Q2. What elec+on outcome will Vietnam prefer: Cambodia under Hun Sen or a democra+c
Cambodia?
ANSWER: Vietnam prefers “the devil you know to the devil you don’t know.” When Cambodia
was a func+oning mul+-party system, the opposi+on Sam Rainsy Party adopted policies that
were hos+le to Vietnam, such as cri+cizing the border treaty between Vietnam and Cambodia.
Cambodia’s opposi+on party was also close to pro-democracy ac+vists in western countries.
Vietnam has worked pragma+cally with Hun Sen to maintain good bilateral rela+ons. Since
the chances of Cambodia becoming a mul+party democracy are extremely remote, Vietnam’s
main concerns are that Cambodia remains poli+cally stable and does not fall into China’s orbit
at Vietnam’s expense.
 24

Q3. The unfinished demarca+on of their land border has caused persistent tensions between
the two countries. How will this problem shape Cambodia’s domes+c poli+cs? Has the border
agreement also contributed to the lingering suspicion among certain Cambodians about
Vietnam’s expansionist inten+ons?
ANSWER: Vietnam and Cambodia signed a border agreement in 1983 at a +me when
Vietnamese military forces and advisors were s+ll in Cambodia. The major poli+cal opposi+on
par+es have argued that the treaty was imposed on Cambodia and Vietnam gained
Cambodian land unfairly. In October 2009, members of the Sam Rainy Party staged
demonstra+ons along the border and removed border posts in Svay Rieng province.
Since 1983, the Vietnam-Cambodia Joint Commi^ee on Land Border Demarca+on and Marker
Plan+ng has maintained, repaired and erected new markers to demarcate the border.
Approximately eighty-four percent of the border has been demarcated. At the most recent
mee+ng in June 2022, Cambodia and Vietnam agreed to nego+ate new border regula+ons.
Aeer the July na+onal elec+ons, when the CPP is expected to return to government, it should
be business as usual in border demarca+on. While some sec+ons of the Cambodian
popula+on may harbour suspicions of “Vietnamese expansionism” the border issue is unlikely
to be a major problem in bilateral rela+ons as the opposi+on Candlelight Party has been
declared an illegal organisa+on. The new government in Cambodia can protect na+onal
sovereignty by renego+a+ng a border treaty with Vietnam as an equal.
Q4. Ethnic Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia remained a long-standing problem that has
been exploited to fuel na+onalist and an+-Vietnamese sen+ments in Cambodia. Is this s+ll the
case? Will Hun Sen use this to gain public support?
ANSWER: There are an es+mated 400,000 to 700,000 ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia
of whom ninety percent are stateless. The opposi+on Cambodian Na+onal Rescue Party
(CNRP) played on ethnic differences to bolster domes+c poli+cal support. This put the Hun
Sen government in a difficult posi+on and it responded with a mixed policy of documenta+on
and registra+on on the one hand and evic+on, reloca+on and deporta+on on the other.
The CNRP and its successor have been declared illegal thus undercucng their efforts to
poli+cize the ethnic Vietnamese issue in domes+c poli+cs. The ethnic Vietnamese issue has
been muted in the 2023 elec+ons.
Hun Sen and his CPP has not played the an+-Vietnamese card and is unlikely to do so.
Academic research indicates that the majority of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, even if they
are stateless, support the CPP and that those who are legally registered will vote for the CPP.
“Cambodia Na+onal Elec+ons Scene Se^er,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 18,
2023. h^ps://www.scribd.com/document/660110730/Thayer-Cambodia-Na+onal-Elec+ons-
Scene-Se^er.
 25

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra.
He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered
in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.
Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in
Political Science (B.A. 1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971)
and a PhD in International Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He
studied Thai language at The University of Missouri at Columbia (intensive summer 1966),
Vietnamese language at Yale (1969-71) and Cornell (intensive summer 1970), and Lao and
Vietnamese languages at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (intensive summer 1971).
Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political Science,
Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in the Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
ANU to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of
Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii. He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original
contributor to the Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic Co-
ordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
 26

at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations Observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School flag bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and in Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
27