CONCOM DIGEST

1. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 614, July 10, 2003

FACTS

- Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity.

- Petitioner claims that aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the
JCOC the following functions: (a) to “review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations” (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of
the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections
and in any country determined by COMELEC.

- Section 18.5 of the same law also empowered the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President which
according to Petitioners violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress.

ISSUE:

WON the above mentioned provisions of RA 9189 are violative of the Constitution?

RULING

The court declared the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as
they relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that “[t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval,” and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that “[i]t
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically
vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

Aruelo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 311, October 20, 1993

FACTS

- Gatchalian won over Aruelo during the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan.

- On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition seeking to annul
Gatchalian’s proclamation on the ground of “fraudulent alteration and tampering” of votes in the tally
sheets and the election returns.

- On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition
protesting the same election.

- On June 10, 1992 Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court, giving him five
days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed on June 15,
1992 a Motion to Dismiss.
- The trial court, on the other hand, issued an order dated July 10, 1992, denying Gatchalian’s Motion to
Dismiss and ordering him to file his answer to the petition within five days from notice, otherwise, “a
general denial shall be deemed to have been entered”. The trial court also directed Aruelo to pay the
deficiency in his filing fees, which the latter complied with. Gatchalian filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the order but the trial court denied the same on August 3, 1992.

- On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion
for Reconsideration.

- Earlier, that is on July 23, 1972, Gatchalian filed before the trial court a Motion for Bill of Particulars,
which was opposed by Aruelo. The trial court denied Gatchalian’s motion in an order dated August 5,
1992, a copy of which was received by him on August 6, 1992.

- On August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim, alleging inter alia, that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud and that
were it not for the said fraud, Gatchalian’s margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian
prayed for the dismissal of the petition, the confirmation of his election and the award of damages.

- Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein
only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35,
Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the
filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of
the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

ISSUE

RULING

Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by
the Revised Rules of Court.

- Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before
the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought
before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: “SEC. 2. Applicability—These rules, except Part
VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to
election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.”

- Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings
in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

- Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion for a bill
of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at
least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars.
Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.

- An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office.
Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true
choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election
protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will, expressed in the election of public
officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated.
 MISON vs CA

FACTS

Commissioner of Customs ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo to the claimants, Chan
Chiu On and Cheung after the latter won in a decision by the customs about the illegal seizure of the
vessel by the Phil Navy. Release of the vessel, however, was never effected; it sank while yet in the
custody of the Bureau of Customs.

Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim with the Commission of Audit for the payment of
the value of the vessel. Acting thereon “(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman,” Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu,
Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the claim for the reasons set forth in his registered
letter to the claimant’s lawyer dated November 3, 1977—tioned “Decision No. 77-142.”

IIIB vs CA

FACTS

- “In a letter, respondent CSC through Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required the Secretary of Finance
to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB).

- petitioner Jose T. Almonte, as Commissioner of EIIB, wrote a letter dated March 29, 1989, to
respondent CSC, requesting for confirmation of EIIB’s exemption from CSC rules and regulations with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions invoking as basis for such exemption PD No. 1458
and LOI No. 71.

- CSC denying petitioner Almonte’s request for exemption of the EIIB from the coverage of the civil
service rules and regulations and reiterating its order that petitioner EIIB submit to the CSC all
appointments to career or non-career positions in the Bureau.

- Not having received any compliance from petitioners, respondent CSC, in its Order of December 7,
1990, directed petitioner Jose T. Almonte to immediately implement Resolution No. 89-400, with a
warning that any EIIB official who shall fail or refuse to comply with the said order shall be held liable for
indirect contempt.

- respondent CSC issued another order, requiring petitioner Almonte to show cause why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt for his continued refusal to implement or comply with CSC Resolution No.
89-400 and the Order of December 7, 1990.

- Petitioners in his reply invoked PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71 exempting the EIIB from the coverage of
civil service rules and regulations on appointments and other personnel actions. Petitioner Almonte
prayed that Resolution No. 89-400, the Order of June 4, 1991, and the subsequent orders be set aside.

- Respondent CSC issued an order, finding petitioner Almonte guilty of indirect contempt of the
Commission. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari.
However, on November 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition

ISSUE

IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS COVERED BY CIVIL SERVICE, RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED

P.D. No. 1458 AND LOI No. 71 WHICH EXPRESSLY EXEMPT IT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COVERAGE.

RULING

Petitioner EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as provided by Section
17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.4 Therefore, EIIB is within the ambit of
the Civil Service Law.
 The provisions of PD 1458 provide for the exemption of petitioner EIIB only from Civil Service
Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil
Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to any other matter. The petition for certiorari
was denied

OMBUDSMAN VS CSC

FACTS

- On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. De
Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by the Ombudsman. The CSC
approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they
must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB.

ISSUE

RULING

It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic
qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification
Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman
that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a
clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority.12 It
goes without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were
conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed
to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

As the Court takes note of the information of the CSC in its Supplemental Memorandum, it holds
that third level eligibility is not required for third level officials of petitioner appointed by the
Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the Constitution vis-a-vis the Administrative Code of 1987 as
discussed above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service
Commission dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The appointment of Jose Tereso U. De Jesus, Jr.,
as well as those of Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente, is hereby ordered made
permanent effective December 18, 2002.
 COMELEC

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS

The respondent was appointed by the President as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections,

The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence.

Respondent argued that the designation made by the President of the Philippines should be
sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:

WON the President violated the constitutional provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the
Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

RULING:

Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as
provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines. x x x The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the
respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be
corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled
by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however wellmeaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on
Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to
make.

Hence, the court tuled that the designation by the Pres of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CAYETANO vs MONSOD

FACTS

Monsod took his oath of office as COMELEC chairman after being nominated by Pres. Aquino
and confirmed by Commission on Appointments (CA).

Petitioner Challenged the validity of the confirmation, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said appointment be declared null and void on the ground of Monsod’s
engagement in the practice of law did not meet the constitutional requirement as COMELEC Chairman
ISSUE:

WON Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC Commissioner?

RULING

The petition was dismissed by the court. According to the court, the Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

FLORES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FLORES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS

Petitioner Roque Flores having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in the
elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 6679.

However, this was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who placed
second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum,
Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting
two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which the
former affirmed.

The petitioner then went to the COMELEC, but his appeal was dismissed on the ground that the
public respondent COMELEC had no power to review the decision of the regional trial court pursuant to
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 which states that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or
metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court;

Issue

RULING:

The court ruled that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in barangay election
appealable to Regional Trial Court, unconstitutional.—The doctrine in that case, although laid down
under the 1935 Constitution, is still controlling under the present charter as the interpretation by this
Court of Article IX-C, Section 2(2). Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that
the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to
the regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
 REYNATO BAYTAN, REYNALDO BAYTAN and ADRIAN BAYTAN, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,

FACTS

Petitioners claimed that Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio of Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City
led them to register to Precint 83-A of the said barangay. Subsequently, they found out that they
registered to the wrong precint. Petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered
anew.

Petitioners sent a letter to COMELEC requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous
registration. On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners’
Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo for evaluation.
Ravanzo in his resolution, recommended filing of information for double registration against petitioners.
In an en banc meeting, the COMELEC affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the COMELEC en banc denied the motion. Petitioners argued that this constitutional
provision requires that election cases must first be heard and decided by a division before assumption of
jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE

WON the case of the Petitioner must be heard and decided by COMELEC Division first before the
COMELEC en banc assume jurisdiction

Ruling

The court ruled that the COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its
administrative powers. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises
both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC’s administrative powers are found in
Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe
how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The
Constitution merely vests the COMELEC’s administrative powers in the “Commission on Elections,” while
providing that the COMELEC “may sit en banc or in two divisions.” Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the
COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Moreover, COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.—The COMELEC’s
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division,
and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion
for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. xxx In sum, the
second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in administrative
cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining whether probable cause exists to charge
petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election Code prohibiting double registration. Hence, the
petition is dismissed.
Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 85285, G.R. No. 87150 July 28, 1989

FACTS

The Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) conducted a sale by public bidding of its fourteen-
year old turbine tanker named “T/T Andres Bonifacio” due to old age and the high cost of maintenance.
Petitioner Danville Maritime, Inc., a Liberian corporation, being the sole bidder with a bid of
US$14,158,888.88 became the winning bid. The PNOC and petitioner executed a “Memorandum of
Agreement” for the sale of the “T/T Andres Bonifacio”. Upon COA’s audit and examination of the said
public bidding, thru its letter-directive, it disapproved the result of the bidding held by the PNOC on the
ground that only one bidder submitted a bid. In the petition for review, Petitioner seeks to set aside the
letter-directive of respondent COA and direct the latter to finally approve the said sale.

ISSUE

WON COA erred when it ordered the re-bidding of the PNOC

RULING

The court has ruled that COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations; Interpretation given by the COA to the term “public bidding” and what
constitutes its “failure” respected.—We see no reason to disturb the intepretation given by the COA to
the term “public bidding” and what constitutes its “failure.” No less than the Constitution has ordained
that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.

There is no showing that in the case at bar the COA committed grave abuse of discretion.—In
the case at bar, there is no showing that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion. COA has clearly
shown its position to the PNOC in its questioned letter-directive advising the latter of its misgivings as to
why the award was given to the lone bidder inspite of regulations previously made known to PNOC and
to top it all, why the PNOC perfunctorily rejected a much higher bid which appears to be more beneficial
to the corporation. Rather than condemn the COA as petitioner proposes, the COA should be
commended for its zeal and care in insuring that the disposition of the subject vessel would be in a
manner most advantageous to the government. A rebidding removes any suspicion that may arise out of
the sale of the vessel to petitioner under present circumstances.