CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this study was to examine crash and accident rates for general aviation aircraft based
on aircraft certification to see if variations in certification regulations have an impact on
accidents. The narrative descriptions of the causes that were included in the accident reports
were also examined to see if there were any variations in the qualitative information for the
various certification categories. The certification categories that have been audited are Part 23,
CAR 3, LSA, and E-AB. The following is a list of the causes of the crashes under investigation:
Engine, LOC, and CFIT Damage to structures from January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2011.
The focus of the investigation was the analysis of accidents involving single-engine piston fixed-
wing aircraft of the GA. Mixed methods were used in the study in an analysis using an
explanatory sequence diagram consisting of two steps. In the first phase, quantitative data was
collected and analyzed to respond to the study hypotheses. The second phase involved the
analysis of qualitative data from Narrative portion of incident investigation reports using text
mining techniques.

DISCUSSION
The selection of Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA, E-LSA, and E-AB Certificates of Airworthiness was
based on their ability to represent a variety of governmental controls connected to aircraft
certification. The Part 23 rules were first intended to address the safety concerns of the more
complicated Part 23 aircraft, but they have now evolved into a very thorough and stringent
collection of regulations. Government certification requirements for E-AB aircraft are the least
stringent.
The LSA category is a newer category that uses agreed standards in the certification process. As
this would require a lengthy and costly recertification process, CAR 3 aircraft designed and
manufactured under a simpler set of rules were not retrofitted or modified. Advantage of new
security technologies. The GA fleet consists of more than 200,000 aircraft with an average age of
40 years (FAA, 2009).
Hypothesis testing. The chi-square test and the ANCOVA were the two primary statistical
techniques used to evaluate the eight hypotheses that were part of the study. A discussion of the
hypothesis' statistical significance followed.
In order to evaluate the hypotheses, one to four chi-square tests were run to see if different
accident causes were distributed differently throughout the different basic certification
categories. As a result, the null hypothesis was that there was no discernible difference in
accident rates between Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB aircraft that had LOC, CFIT,
engine failure, or design as the reason in the call year 2004–2011. The chi-square test employed
an accident frequency., but as for activity and number of active aircraft for each category were
not considered. The chi-square test compares observed and expected frequencies. The test
determines whether the expected values deviate significantly from the observed values. The
standard residuals represent the difference between the predicted and observed frequencies. The
individual standardized residuals provide very useful information about the contribution of each
of the predicted and observed frequencies to the overall relationship that statistical measures of
Chi-Square (Field, 2009). Tables C7 through C10 in the appendix show the standard residuals of
the chi-square tests for each cause of the accident.

Population and sample. The study population consisted entirely of single-engine, fixed-wing
piston aircraft with a maximum certified take-off weight of less than 12,500 pounds. The test
consisted of single-engine aircraft crashes Fixed-wing piston aircraft with an MTOW less than
12,500 lbs. The sample airworthiness certificate categories are: (a) standard category, which also
includes normal, utility and aerobatic categories; (b) LSA; and (c) amateur aircraft in the
experimental category. Airworthiness categories excluded from testing are limited, special
flight, interim, transport and unknown. The period used is based on the creation of the LSA
category in 2004 and the production of LSA aircraft started in 2005.
A total of 6,455 accidents met the criteria for initial airworthiness certification in this study.

1. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
between Part-23, CAR-3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB aircraft for accidents where LOC was listed as
the cause. The chi-square test showed that there was a significant difference in accident rates
when LOC was cited as the cause. Postdoc analyzes showed that there was a significant
difference in the Part 23, CAR 3 and E-AB categories; however this showed no significant
difference in accident rates between S-LSA/E-LSA categories for LOC accidents (see Appendix
Table C1). Normalized residuals also showed that the CAR 3 and S-LSA/E-LSA categories had
significant differences in frequency; the Part 23 and E-AB categories showed no significant
residues.
2. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
between Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB aircraft for accidents where CFIT was listed as
a cause. The chi-square test showed that there was no significant difference in the frequency of
accidents in which CFIT was listed as the cause.

3. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
between Part 23, RAC 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, Categories or E-AB for accidents with engine damage
as the cause. The chi-square test showed a significant difference in the frequency of accidents
where engine failure was the cause.

4. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
between Part 23, CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA, or E-AB aircraft for accidents where failure was listed
as the cause. The chi-square test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
when structural failure was cited as the cause.
To address hypotheses five through eight, a series of one-way ANCOVA tests with covariates
(ANCOVA) were performed. This determined if there is a significant difference in accident rates
between aircraft certified under Part23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB where LOC, CFIT,
engine failure or structural failure was listed as the cause after pilot flight time and airframe
hours were changed. The null hypotheses were as follows: There is no significant difference in
the accident rate between Part 23/CAR 3, SLSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft where LOC, CFIT,
engine failure or structure were entered as reason. For this analysis, the RAC 3 and Part 23
categories were combined in one group and the S-LSA and E-LSA categories in another group
because the total annual hours used to calculate the injury rate were not only available for the
combined categories.
5. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference with the incident rate
on Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB certified aircraft for incidents where CFIT was listed
as a cause. The ANCOVA test showed that there was no significant difference in the accident
rate between the aircraft120Part 23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB certified for accidents where
CFIT is listed as a cause.

6. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in the accident rate
between Part-23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft for accidents where the inoperative
engine was replaced as the reason. Still, the test showed that there was a significant difference in
the accident rate between Part-23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft for accidents where
engine failure was listed as the cause. There was also a significant interaction between the
certification basis and the total flight time effects driver; There was no significant correlation
between certification base and cell hours. A pairwise post hoc analysis showed that there are
significant differences between E-AB and Part-23/CAR-3 airplanes and between E-AB and S-
LSA/E-LSA airplanes; however, there was no difference between Part 23/RAC 3 airplanes and
S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes in accident rates where engine failure was reported as the cause.

7. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in accident rates
between Part 23/RAC 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft, for accidents where structural failure is
reported as the cause. The ANCOVA test showed that there was no significant difference in the
accident rate between Part-23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft for accidents where
structural failure was reported as the cause.

8. The null hypothesis test showed that there was no significant difference in the accident rate
Part-23/CAR 3, S-LSA/E-LSA or E-AB aircraft for accidents where the inoperative engine was
replaced as the reason. Still, the test showed that there was a significant difference in the accident
there was no difference between Part 23/RAC 3 airplanes and S-LSA/E-LSA airplanes in
accident rates where engine failure was reported as the cause.
Text mining. The narrative roots of accident reports were examined using text mining. Only
descriptive reasons of crashes where LOC121 is specified as the cause were examined. Three
main sets of words or groups of words were found in the initial examination of occurrences
where LOC was cited as a cause for all aircraft certification categories. The first group was
related to the LOC during takeoffs and landings, the second group was tied to a maneuvering
flight, and the third group was related to poor visibility, adverse weather, and VFR flight into
IMC. A series of terms associated with instrument flight and spatial disorientation were used in
the events in Part 23. A group focused on vision impairment was included in the CAR 3
category.
low meteorological conditions, night flight and VFR under IMC conditions. E-AB and LSA
aircraft did not have poor visibility, severe weather and VFR flight phrases for IMC.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The study's findings demonstrate a considerable difference between E-AB and the other two
major categories, including (a) Part 23/RAC 3 and (b) S-LSA/E-LSA for accidents where engine
damage was cited as the cause. Based on the literature and the findings of this study, The FAA's
attention should be redirected from monitoring E-AB aircraft to allowing professional
organizations to complete E-AB aircraft and conduct flight testing, thereby reducing some
accidents caused by aircraft failure, installation, and flight testing. The FAA should additionally
take into account this authorization for transition training on E-AB aircraft and for enhancing
pilot proficiency on certain E-AB aircraft types. Moreover, in order to decrease the incidence of
engine failure accidents involving E-AB aircraft,, the FAA should require a functional test of
aircraft systems, including the fuel system, before issuing a certificate of airworthiness to the
manufacturer.(NTSB, 2012b).

Three factors make it seem important to concentrate on CAR 3 certified aircraft in order to lower
the accident rate and frequency of LOC accidents in GA: (a) CAR 3 aircraft are the oldest
aircraft in the GA fleet; (b) CAR 3 aircraft were designed and manufactured before the 1960s
and, for the most part, were not updated to take advantage of new technologies; and (c) text
mining analysis revealed that CAR 3 aircraft were involved in LOC incidents involving poor
weather and VFR flight. To prevent LOC mishaps, the use of AOA indicators and autopilot
should be assessed. If the technology proves useful in preventing LOC incidents, the FAA should
enable the retrofitting of the older fleet with safety-enhancing equipment.

As evident from the text mining analysis of the descriptive cause of accident reports, aircraft in
each category are treated differently and have different needs. Therefore, in order to reduce the
number of LOC accidents in GA, each aircraft certification category must be treated differently.
Words found in each text mining clusters have identified areas where additional training,
technology or awareness is needed to reduce LOC accidents. As can be seen in Table 11, CAR 3
aircraft have the most airframe hours on average; however, the pilot's average flight time did not
differ significantly in both categories. As suggested in the literature, upgrading these older
aircraft to use new technology can help reduce the number of LOC accidents. Cluster based
Words uncovered in text mining analysis, areas to reduce LOC accidents on CAR 3 aircraft
should include: (a) avoidance of VFR flights in IMC, (b) flight decision making, (c ) pre-flight
planning; and (d) work on motion systems, particularly during training flights. In order to reduce
the number of LOC accidents on Part-23 aircraft, emphasis needs to be placed on (a) work on
motion systems, particularly when training flights; and (b) spatial disorientation under instrument
flight conditions. To reduce the number of LOC accidents between E-AB aircraft, emphasis
should be placed on: (a) takeoffs, (b) landings, (c) maneuvers, and (d) low altitude maneuvers.
LOC reduction for accidents involving LSA aircraft, the following areas should be monitored:
(a) traffic operations, particularly during training flights, and (b) maneuvering flights.
Stakeholders such as EAA and ASTM can be contacted to disseminate information and provide
specific training for each specific category such as E-AB and LSA.

Adopting consensus standards for general aircraft certification can be an interesting alternative.
The use of consensus standards has the potential to streamline modernization of GA's aging
aircraft fleet to encourage the timely and cost-effective installation of security updates.
According to the literature, a risk management approach should be taken to analyze whether the
current certification standards are indeed a barrier to installing safety enhancing technologies in
GA fleet (GAJSC, 2012). Installation of autopilot and AOA displays on certified aircraft can cost
five to ten times more than installing these devices on a test aircraft, which can be 10-50% of the
average value of a GA aircraft (GAJSC, 2012).
Recommendations for future research. Future research should examine the impact of using the
technology on preventing LOC accidents and improving aircraft crashworthiness. Some
technologies that have been developed previous research has identified autopilot and AOA
indicators that could reduce LOC accidents in GA (GAJSC, 2012). Devices such as inflatable
seat belts and BRS systems have been identified as potential means of improving aircraft
crashworthiness and survivability (FAA, 2009).

Future research should also focus on examining risk management to determine the best approach
to implementing new technologies in older aircraft. Research should include the cost of any
necessary changes to certification rules and the cost of purchasing and installing new equipment.

Future research may compare crashes caused by LOC where autopilot was available on the plane
to crashes where autopilot was not available on the plane. This study may also include a risk-
benefit analysis of installing autopilots in older aircraft.

Future research could also focus on the impact of AOA indicators on LOC accident prevention.
An experiment can be conducted with specific training with a control group and an experimental
group on the concept of AOA and the use of AOA indicators.

The stall detection and prevention performance of the AOA indicator between a control and
experimental group of pilots can then be compared using a flight simulator or training device.

Further research could focus on whether aircraft equipped with seat belts and/or airbags have
better crashworthiness and survivability. Accidents involving BRSeven devices installed on
airplanes can be tested to see if they have a better survival rate.

Recommendations for Practical. It should be determined whether the BA fleet can incorporate
safety-enhancing technologies using a risk management approach rather than relying on the
current certification criteria. According to text mining analysis results, CAR-3 aircraft have been
involved in unintentional LOCs while flying VFR in IMC, at night, in poor visibility, and in
adverse weather. These aircraft may be safer if autopilot and AOA displays were installed. The
NTSB database should be expanded with more details on regulations governing aircraft
certification as well as a list of the equipment that is typically placed on planes, like: B.
Measurements of the AOA and the autopilot.

In addition, the NTSB database should list any additional wearable technology used, such as
tablets, cell phones, or GPS. Number of active aircraft and annual flight hours should also be
aggregated and certified to have more information for future research. Engine hours are also to
be added to the NTSB accident report database.

CONCLUSION
According to study findings, neither the frequency nor the rate of CFIT incidents was statistically
significantly impacted by GA aircraft certification regulations. According to the literature, the
number of CFIT deaths fell by 60% between 2001 and 2010. (GAJSC, 2012). Electronic
equipment, primarily in the form of handheld gadgets, has considerably reduced the burden of
pilots, which is primarily responsible for the decline in CFIT injuries (GAJSC, 2012).

The results of the study indicated that GA aircraft certification rules had a statistically significant
effect on LOC accident rate.LOC was responsible for 1,155 accidents, an accident rate of 0.99
per 100,000 flight hours, or 18% of all accidents between 2004 and 2011, and is the leading
cause of accidents in Georgia. These results are consistent with previous studies and confirm
There is a need to focus on LOC prevention for GAs to reduce the incidence and overall accident
rate of GAs (GAO, 2012; GAJSC, 2012; NTSB, 2012b). CAR 3 certified aircraft were
responsible for 53.5% or 618 accidents where LOC was listed as the cause and was responsible
for 62.65% of all accidents between 2004 and 2011.

Contrary to other categories, CAR 3 aircraft were involved in LOC accidents with poor visibility,
bad weather and nighttime conditions, and VFR flights in IMC conditions, according to text
analysis of the accident reports' qualitative portion. These are the oldest aircraft in the GA fleet
because they were created and produced before 1960. Most frequently, CAR 3 aircraft have not
been modified to benefit from new technologies that can lessen the likelihood of LOC accidents.
According to the research, LOC incidents happen at night and in BMI, if autopilots were
installed in more than 100,000 GA aircraft flying in IFR, those accidents would be decreased by
50%. (GAJSC, 2012).
The study results show that the certification rules for GA aircraft have a statistically significant
impact on the frequency of engine failures. and the injury rate. The results of the study also
showed that there is a difference in accident rates due to engine failure between E-AB and Part
23/CAR 3 airplanes and between E-AB and S LSA/E LSA airplanes; however, there was no
significant difference between aircraft certified to S-LSA/E-LSA or Part 23/CAR 3E-AB rating
that occurs within the first hours of operation of a newly built aircraft or shortly after purchase
by a new owner; Most of these accidents are caused by engine and fuel system design and
installation problems (NTSB, 2012b).

Most E-AB aircraft are built using off-the-shelf kits, and not with original plans or drawings
(NTSB, 2012b). As explained in the literature, the primary goal of the FAA rules for building the
E-AB is to ensure that the majority of aircraft construction is performed by the manufacturer
(NTSB, 2012b). Certificates of Airworthiness are issued by the FAA to the aircraft manufacturer
E-AB based on a documentary review and an individual inspection of the aircraft upon
completion (NTSB, 2012b). Aircraft fuel system is mandated by civil aviation authorities in
other countries but not required by the FAA (NTSB, 2012b).

The study's findings, which are supported by the literature, indicate that the average pilot flight
duration did not significantly differ amongst the various certification categories. Yet, the
research also shows that the pilots of the E-AB aircraft involved in the accident had much less
experience flying the same make and model of average-AB aircraft (NTSB, 2012b). Since E-AB
aircraft cannot be used for charter or rental purposes, including for flight training, locating
instructors and E-AB aircraft that are appropriate for training is a challenge for pilots interested
in conversion (NTSB, 2012b).

The results of the study showed that the GA rules for aircraft certification have no statistically
significant impact on the frequency or rate of accidents due to structural failure. A structural
failure is one of the faults or defects that aircraft certification aims to prevent.

Structural failure is not a major cause of accidents in Georgia and based on the results of this
study, 332 accidents were attributable to accidents due to structural failure, representing an
accident rate of 0.30 per 100,000 flight hours or 5%. of all accidents between 2004 and
2011.Thus, it appears that the FAA was able to minimize the number of accidents caused by
structural failures, no matter how much state licensing oversight it had.
In summary, the GA aircraft certification rules have no statistically significant impact on aircraft
accidents, except for the frequency of LOC accidents and the frequency and rate of LOC
accidents. Regarding the LOC incidents, government oversight seems to have become an
obstacle the implementation and installation of new safety equipment on older aircraft that can
reduce the number of LOC accidents. Regarding engine failure accidents, the oversight of E-AB
category aircraft certification prevents owners of E-AB aircraft from receiving training and
flying skills specific E-AB models and the opportunity for professional organizations to test their
E-AB aircraft in flight. On the other hand, government oversight should aim to ensure that E-AB
aircraft owners carry out functional tests before obtaining a certificate of airworthiness. Function
testing can prevent some of the engine failures that occur during the first hours of operation of
the E-AB aircraft.