WAS JESUS ON THE CROSS PUNISHED BY GOD THE FATHER?

– A PHILOSOPHICAL, BIBLICAL, AND THEOLOGICAL

STUDY OF DIVINE PUNISHMENT OF
JESUS ON THE CROSS

by

Yamin Huang

B.S., Tsinghua University, China, 1988

M.S., Tsinghua University, China, 1990
M.S., University of Notre Dame, 1995
Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1998
M.Div., Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2001
Th.M., Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2013

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty

in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY
in Systematic Theology
at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School

Deerfield, Illinois
December 2021
 ABSTRACT

“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” The Lord Jesus’s cry of dereliction on

the cross has puzzled many Christians over the centuries. Instead of discussing the general

theological questions of divine forsakenness or atonement theories, this project focuses on the

penal aspect of penal substitutionary atonement (PSA). Our research question is about divine

punishment of Jesus: Was Jesus on the cross was punished by God the Father? Our work defends

a strong version of PSA: Jesus not only bore divine punishment that sinners deserved, but he was

also punished by God the Father according to the biblical understanding of divine punishment in

the context of the cross.

PSA has faced challenges from many ways since the Socinian rationalistic attack in the

day of the Reformation. Recently even some evangelicals have raised challenges against it. We

have listed five kinds of objections against divine punishment of Jesus in particular. We have

discovered that one of the reasons for the PSA debates is the confusion of a crucial concept,

punishment. Therefore, a philosophical understanding of punishment is necessary in our research

methodology. For this reason, we devote a whole chapter to the study of the nature of

punishment. We have also discovered that the reason for even some conservative evangelical

theologians hesitate to claim divine punishment of Jesus is their fear that it may cause disunity

within the Trinity. Therefore, we set side another chapter to develop a trinitarian theological

framework for this study. Our project, which is similar to William Lane Craig’s philosophical

and theological defense of PSA in general and Simon J. Gathercole’s exegetical argument for the

substitutionary aspect of PSA in particular, focuses on the philosophical, biblical, and theological

defense for divine punishment of Jesus.

iii
 We conclude that the church can affirm divine punishment of Jesus as long as the

following two conditions are satisfied: the concept of divine punishment is biblically and

theologically sound; and it does not violate the central affirmations of orthodox trinitarian

theology. What we mean by divine punishment of Jesus is not only that the sinless Jesus

willingly bore the guilt of human sins and thus God’s punishment that we sinners deserved, but

also that he was punished by God the Father according to the biblical understanding of divine

punishment in the context of the cross. What we affirm in trinitarian theology includes the

ontological and thus volitional unity between the Father and the Son, the inseparable operations

of divine persons in the economy of salvation, and the unity and distinction between the

immanent and economic Trinity.

The primary contribution of this study is to reveal the reasons for current confusions in

the PSA debate in general and divine punishment of Jesus in particular. This study defends that

the view of divine punishment of Jesus is a valid biblical and theological position to hold. Just as

Martin Luther’s breakthrough in his understanding of biblical meaning of divine righteousness

has brought him peace and helped his contemporaries who had hard time understanding divine

righteousness as the good news in the Aristotelian-Ciceronian framework of justice, we hope this

study, with a sound biblical and theological understanding of divine punishment, can help those

who have struggled in accepting divine punishment of Jesus as a valid theological position.

The implication of this study is that divine punishment of Jesus is not a theological idea

we want to shun away from; instead, it is a biblical truth that we should embrace wholeheartedly,

because, with this theological truth, we have a greater understanding and appreciation of our

Lord’s love in his suffering and sacrifice for us sinners.

iv
To Suwen, my dear wife who has supported me with long years of prayer and sacrifice.

To my two lovely children, Anna and Elijah, who have shown me

their constant understanding, patience, and support.

May our Lord remember and bless them!

v
 CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………………………………………………………… viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………..….. ix

Chapter Page

1. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………..….……… 1

The Research Question …….…………...………………………………..….……… 1

A Review of the Literature ……………………………..………………..….……… 4

The Thesis …………….………………………………...………………..….…..… 27

Research Methodology ………………………………....………………..….…..… 27

The Outline ……………………………………………...…….………...….…..… 30

2. THE NATURE OF PUNISHMENT……………..……..………………..…….…..…. 32

The Philosophical Understanding of Punishment .....…….…………..…….…...…. 32

The Biblical Understanding of Punishment ……………….…………..….…..…… 58

3. THE TRINITRIAN FRAMEWORK ………...………………..…………….…..…… 77

The Ontological and Perichoretic Unity ……..…………………………….….…….80

Principles of Inseparable Operations and Distinct Appropriations ………...…….. 112

The Unity and Distinction of the Economic and Immanent Trinity …...……….… 118

4. DIVINE PUNISHMENT OF JESUS: AN EXEGETICAL ARGUMENT….………. 124

A Philosophical Clarification …………….…….….……………..……….……….124

vi
 An Exegetical Argument for Divine Punishment of Jesus ……….....……….….....129

Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………….…159

5. DIVINE PUNISHMENT OF JESUS: A THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT …...……..161

Punishment in a Qualified Sense …………………………………………………..161

A Theological Argument for Divine Punishment of Jesus …. …………….……....165

Answers to the Objections ……………………………………………...………….186

A Clarification of the Uses of Term and Language .………………………………203

Chapter Summary ……………………………………………………………….…203

6. CONCLUSIOINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND A REFLECTION .……...…..…..….…. 205

Conclusions ……………………………………………………………...…….…. 206

Implications ………………………………………………………………………. 215

A Reflection ………………………………………………………………………. 219

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..…………………...…………..…………………….…………………... 220

vii
 ACKNOWLEDMENTS

No project like this can be done single-handedly. I appreciate many people’s support,

encouragement, prayer, wisdom, and guidance in this long journey of study and dissertation

writing. I thank Dr. David J. Luy, my dissertation supervisor, who constantly and patiently

guided my writing process and gave me much encouragement and immediate revision follow-

up especially during the difficult time of pandemic. I thank Dr. Thomas H. McCall for his

willingness to guide me and discuss with me for the formation of the research question and the

preparation of the proposal. He also guided me to some important resources for this project. I

thank Dr. Richard E. Averbeck, the Doctoral Program Director then, for his support,

encouragement, and patience in the process of course work study, proposal preparation, and

dissertation writing. I thank Dr. Eric Tully, the current Doctoral Program Director, for his

prompt response and follow-up in my course work approval and the dissertation defense

arrangement. I thank Brother Bryan Woods in the Academic Doctoral Office (ADO) who has

communicated with me promptly and thoughtfully about the procedure of proposal and defense

preparations and encouraged me in the dissertation writing process. I thank Brother Tyler

Carrera from ADO for the helpful format check and Brother Noah Hoech for his faithful prayer

support and the careful English grammar and style check.

I thank Ms. Zhen Yu, my mother-in-law, for her long years of constant prayer support

and spiritual encouragement. I appreciate some of Trinity Grace Church’s brothers, sisters, the

pastoral team, ministry teammates, deacons, and elders who encourage, support, and pray for

me during my study while I live and serve among them as a brother, a ministry teammate, a

friend, a fellow elder, and a pastor.

May our Lord remember and bless all God’s people who have shown me loving

kindness in my journey of doctoral study.

Soli Deo Gloria.

viii
 ABBREVIATIONS

AB The Anchor Bible

AC The American Commentary: An Exegetical and Theological Exposition of Holy
Scripture

AJT American Journal of Theology

AOTC Apollos Old Testament Commentary

CD Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics. Translated and edited by G. W. Bromiley and T.

F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957–1981

CDP The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Second Edition. Edited by Robert

Audi. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999

CJE Criminal Justice Ethics

BDB The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon with Appendix

Containing the Biblical Aramaic. Edited by Francis Brown, with the cooperation
of S. R. Driver and Charles A. Briggs. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers,
2005

diss. dissertation

DTIB Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible. Edited by Kevin J.

Vanhoozer. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005

EBC The Expositor’s Bible Commentary

EDBT Evangelical Dictionary of Biblical Theology. Edited by Walter A. Elwell.

Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996

EDBW Stephen D. Renn, Expository Dictionary of Bible Words: Word Studies for Key
English Bible Words Based on the Hebrew and Greek Texts. Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Publishers, 2005

EDT Evangelical Dictionary of Theology. Edited by Walter A. Elwell.

Grand Rapids: Baker Academic /Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 2005

EJPR European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

EP The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 8 vols. Edited by Paul Edwards, New York:

Macmillan Publishing Co./The Free Press /London: Collier Macmillan, 1967

ix
EvQ Evangelical Quarterly

IB Interpreter’s Bible

Inst. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Henry Beverage.
Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008

IJPR International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

IJST The International Journal of Systematic Theology

ISBE The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia. Edited by Geoffrey W.

Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986

IVP InterVarsity Press

JBL Journal of Biblical Literature

JEH Journal of Ecclesiastical History

JELS Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

JETS Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society

JSOT Journal for the Study of the Old Testament

JSOTSup Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series

JTS Journal of Theological Studies

LQ Lutheran Quarterly

LW Martin Luther, Luther’s Works. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T.

Lehmann. 55 vols. St. Louis: Concordia and Philadelphia, 1955-76

LXX Septuagint

MT Masoretic Text

NAC The New American Commentary

NEB New English Bible

NIC New International Commentary

NICNT New International Commentary on the New Testament

x
NIDNTT The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology. Edited by Colin
Brown. 3 vols. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986

NIDOTTE New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis. Edited
by W. A. VanGemeren. 5 vols. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997

NIGTC New International Greek Testament Commentary

NJB New Jerusalem Bible

NLT New Living Translation of the Bible

NTS New Testament Studies

OTL The Old Testament Library

PhiloP Philosophical Papers

PNTC The Pillar New Testament Commentary

PP Priscilla Papers

PSA Penal Substitutionary Atonement

RTSFB Religious and Theological Studies Fellowship Bulletin

SJT Sottish Journal of Theology

TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by G. Kittle and G.

Friedrich. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–76

TrinJ Trinity Journal

TT Theology Today

TynBul The Tyndale Bulletin

WBC Word Bible Commentary

WEC Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary

WJK Westminster John Know Press

WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Newen Testament

xi
 Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Research Question

Jesus’s cry of dereliction on the cross, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”

has puzzled many Christians throughout church history. Jürgen Moltmann, based on the

theological legacy of Martin Luther’s theologia crucis, claims that all Christian theology has to

be a theology of the cross.1 Moltmann may have exaggerated a bit when he claims, “All Christian

theology and all Christian life is basically an answer to this question [Jesus’s cry of dereliction]

which Jesus asked as he died.”2 But he is surely right in that Jesus’s cry on the cross is extremely

important for Christians in life and doctrine, especially for our understanding of God and the

trinitarian relationship between the Father and the Son besides our understanding of Christ’s

work for human salvation.3 John Thompson also points out the importance of the divine

abandonment, “Modern theology regards the God-forsakenness and abandonment of the Son by

the Father as a crucial aspect of a trinitarian theology of the cross.”4 There are surely many

difficult theological issues in the trinitarian theology of the cross. For example, How does Jesus

on the cross reveal the nature of God?5 Did God suffer when Jesus was crucified?6 If the triune

1
Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Dowden (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), 7, 25.
2
Ibid., 4.
3
Ibid.; Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 5: “In The
Crucified of God Moltmann’s theology became strongly trinitarian, since he interpreted the cross a trinitarian event
between the Father and the Son.”
4
John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (Oxford University Press: NY, 1994), 50.
5
Moltmann, The Crucified God, 4, 204.
6
Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 152–
71; Moltmann, The Crucified God, 227; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley,
vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 314; T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three
Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 247; Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “God’s Impassible Suffering in the Flesh: The
1
God was involved in the suffering of the Son, how did the Father and the Spirit suffer?7 Was

Jesus on the cross forsaken by the Father?8 One notoriously challenging question of divine

abandonment has to do with the question of divine punishment of Jesus: Was Jesus on the cross

punished by God the Father? If not, then why did Jesus on the cross feel forsaken by the Father?

Some prominent Protestant theologians like Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and

Eberhard Jüngel claim that God-forsakenness has brought “enmity” or at least affected “the

eternal placidity” in the trinitarian life of God, and that in Christ’s obedience “God abandons

himself to death.”9 Even some prominent evangelicals like John Stott, R. T. France, Craig Evans,

Craig L. Blomberg, and Leon Morris think that there is some kind of “separation“ between the

Father and the Son at the cross.10 The word “separation” also appears in the Evangelical Alliance

UK’s official statement on its Commission on Evangelism in 1968.11 There are indeed many

Promise of Paradoxical Christology,” in James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (eds.), Divine Impassibility
and the Mystery of Human Suffering (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 127–49.
7
Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 56.
8
Thomas H. McCall, Forsaken: The Trinity and the Cross, and Why It Matters (Downers Grove: IVP
Academic, 2012), 11; Brace D. Marshall, “The Dereliction of Christ and the Impassibility of God.” In Divine
Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, edited by James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand
Rapids/Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2009), 246–47. Pine Wang, “On Divine Abandonment,” in Christian Life
Quarterly, no. 1 (March 1997) (originally in Chinese: 䊊⯘ₚ漓“媹䡝☢䖃䢺⸂”漓 䐞⍼⩢℉⼺䨫᳿ߊͫ1997 ‫ ٶ‬3
߃).
9
Moltmann, The Crucified God, 151–52, 244–46; Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s
Being Is in Becoming (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 98–103; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 314.
10
McCall, Forsaken, 15–22, 63. For instance, Stott thinks there is a “strife of attributes” within God;
France cautions to use 2 Cor. 5:21 and Gal. 3:13 and later Christological and trinitarian theology to interpret the
dereliction in Mark; Evans thinks that Jesus felt totally abandoned by the Father; Blomberg thinks that Jesus
experienced “spiritual separation” from the Father; Morris thinks that Jesus experienced “broken relationship” with
his Father on the cross, etc.
11
On the Other Side: Report of the Evangelical Alliance’s Commission on Evangelism (London: Scripture
Union, 1968), 65. Quoted in David Hilborn, “Atonement, Evangelicalism and the Evangelical Alliance: The Present
Debate in Context,” in Derek Tidball, David Hilborn and Justin Thacker (eds.), The Atonement Debate (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 23: “The judgment upon sin has been endured for man by Christ. God in Christ has taken
2
profound theological issues involved in Jesus’s cry of dereliction, but in this dissertation project I

will limit my research question to one particular question: Was Jesus on the cross punished by

God the Father? In order to answer this question precisely, we need to address some critical

issues embedded in the question itself like, What do we mean by punishment? Is it appropriate

to claim that Jesus was directly or literally punished by the Father? Does divine punishment of

Jesus imply volitional dissonance between the Father and the Son and thus a rupture of divine

unity? etc. The purpose of this research is not to defend penal substitutionary atonement (PSA) in

general, because many theologians have already done excellent job in this area within recent two

decades.12 Instead, we will focus on what Joshua M. McNall calls “the most controversial aspect

of penal substitution” — the “divine sanction” of Jesus’s punishment.13 Our purpose in this

project is to identify some reasons for the current confusion surrounding these issues within

contemporary theological discourse, to provide a biblically and theologically sound

the initiative in dealing with our sin and with the judgment upon it. By voluntarily giving himself to die upon the
cross Christ suffered the worst that sin can do, including separation from his Father.”
12
David Peterson (ed.), Where Wrath and Mercy Meet: Proclaiming the Atonement Today (Carlisle,
Sumbria, UK / Waynesboro: Paternoster, 2001); Charles E. Hills and Frank A. James III (eds.), The Glory of the
Atonement (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2004); Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross:
Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004); John R. W. Stott, The Cross of
Christ, 20th Anniversary Edition (Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2006); Thomas R. Schreiner in James Beilby and
Paul R. Eddy (eds.)’s The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2006); James I.
Packer and Mark E. Dever, In My Place Condemned He Stood: Celebrating the Glory of the Atonement (Wheaton:
Crossway Books, 2007); Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions:
Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007; Those theologians who defend for
PSA in Derek Tidball, David Hilborn and Justin Thacker (eds.), The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London
Symposium on the Theology of Atonement (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008); Robert A. Peterson, Salvation
Accomplished by the Son: The Work of Christ (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2012); Simon Gathercole, Defending
Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015); William Lane Craig, The
Atonement, Cambridge Elements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Ibid., Atonement and the Death
of Christ: An Exegetical, Historical, and Philosophical Exploration (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2020); etc.
13
Joshua M. McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement: An Integrated Approach to Christ’s Work (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Academic, 2019), 101, 105.
3
understanding of divine punishment of Jesus, and as a result, to deepen our understanding of the

penal aspect of PSA.14

A Review of the Literature

There seems to be some confusion in the theological literature regarding the issue of

divine punishment of Jesus. Some say that the Father did punish Jesus; others insist that we

should not say that. Even among those who affirm the idea of divine punishment, there is no

consensus about what this precisely entails. This state of affairs reflects deeper differences of

opinion concerning the nature of punishment itself and the way in which the unity and distinction

of persons within the Trinity is construed.15 Just as there are “many questions and objections” to

the idea of the atonement in general,16 PSA in particular,17 there are at least five kinds of

criticisms18 of divine punishment of Jesus.

Moral Objections

Some reject divine punishment of Jesus due to moral reasons, because they believe

punishment connotes a form of abuse or violence. In as early as the Reformation era, the

Unitarian theologian Faustus Socinus raised a fierce attack upon PSA which surely includes an

14
Just like what Simon Gathercole has done to deepen our understanding of the substitutionary aspect of
PSA in his recent work, Defending Substitutionary: An Essay on Atonement in Paul. Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2015. He argues in this book that “when Christ died bearing our sins or guilt or punishment, he did so in
our place and instead of us.” (17, italics author’s) He concludes, “In sum, substitution can and should be regarded as
integral to the biblical picture of the atonement.” (111)
15
I am grateful for Dr. David J. Luy’s encouraging confirmation in the direction of clarifying the nature of
punishment and its relationship with the doctrine of the Trinity in this project.
16
Stephen Sykes, The Story of the Atonement (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1997), 50.
17
Brad Jersak, “Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ,” in Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin
(eds.), Stricken by God? Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ (Abbotsford, BC: Fresh Wind Press,
2007), 22–24.
18
There may be other kind of objections, like objection of cultural irrelevancy (i.e., PSA in general, divine
punishment of Jesus in particular, is claimed to be irrelevant even repugnant in our culture today) and objection of
negative practical implications (in legitimating violence and abuse), etc.
4
attack on divine punishment of Jesus. He asserts that the punishment of an innocent, Jesus Christ,

is morally unacceptable according to “any standard of justice: it is worse than inhumane and

savage.”19 Frances Young, an influential British theologian, summarizes the critics’ charges

against PSA to be “immoral, repugnant and sub-Christian. God’s justice … is hardly maintained

by the immoral punishment of an innocent victim instead of the guilty sinner.”20 In the recent

years of heated debate regarding the nature of atonement, some proponents of nonviolent

atonement charge PSA of affirming “divine child abuse.”21 For example, Steve Chalke and Alan

Mann describe the God of PSA is a “God of love suddenly decides to vent his anger and wrath

on his own Son” and claim that “the cross isn’t a form of cosmic child abuse – a vengeful Father,

punishing his Son for an offense he has not even committed.”22 They indirectly charge divine

punishment of Jesus to be cosmic child abuse. Chalke and Mann also apply Walter Wink’s

controversial phrase “the myth of redemptive violence”23 to claim that the violence in PSA can

only produce more violence. “[I]t is like a descending spiral. It begets the very thing it seeks to

destroy. … Violence can never stop violence …”24

19
Faustus Socinus, On Jesus Christ Our Savior, 3.10. Quoted in Craig, Atonement and the Death of Jesus
Christ, 130.
20
Frances M. Young, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (London: SPCK, 1975), 86. Quoted from Christina
A. Baxter, “The Cursed Beloved: A Reconsideration of Penal Substitution,” in John Goldingay (ed.), Atonement
Today (London: SPCK, 1995), 68–69.
21
Rita Nakashima Brock, “A Little Child Will Lead Us: Christology and Child Abuse,” in Christianity,
Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique, ed. Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim,
1989), 42–61. Quoted from Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, Rediscovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in
New Testament & Contemporary Contexts (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000), 30.
22
Steve Chalke and Alan Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 182.
23
Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992). Quoted from Steven Jeffery, et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 235.
24
Ibid., 129.
5
 Evangelical theologian Stephen R. Holmes claims that PSA may have significant

historical and liturgical values, but it can be theologically dangerous.25 He considers PSA to be

once “culturally relevant” but not biblically necessary and “potentially anachronistic”; he praises

Steve Chalke and others’ critique of PSA to be “important and valid.”26 Peter Carnley, an

Australian churchman, claims that the idea of Christ’s death in our place is not a part of Christian

orthodox and that such theology pictures a God “of a morally repugnant kind, whose Son

becomes a helpless victim of his Father’s righteous anger.”27

N. T. Wright, though not denying the penal and substitutionary elements in Jesus’s death,

criticizes the traditional understanding of PSA’s God as being “a detached, capricious, or

malevolent divinity demanding blood, longing to kill someone, and happening to light upon a

convenient innocent victim.”28 J. Denny Weaver, one of the major promoters and defenders of

nonviolence movement, defines “violence” to be any “harm or damage” including “killing – in

war, in murder, and in capital punishment.”29 He is dissatisfied with classic atonement theories

because of the crucial element of violence in all of them. According to his observation, “they

[classic atonement theories] portray an image of God either as divine avenger or punisher and/or

as a child abuser, a Father who arranges the death one child for the benefit of the others.”30

25
Stephen R. Holmes, “Penal Substitution,” Adam J. Johnson (ed.), T&T Clark Companion to Atonement
(Bloomsburg T&T Clark: London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney, 2017), 295.
26
Ibid., “Ransomed, Healed, Restored, Forgiven: Evangelical Accounts of the Atonement,” The Atonement
Today, 282, 284; Ibid., “Penal Substitution,” T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 296.
27
Peter Carnley, in Anglican Messenger, July and November 1991. Quoted in Michael Ovey, “The Cross,
Creation and the Human Predicament,” in Where Wrath and Mercy Meet: Proclaiming the Atonement Today
(Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster, 2001), 103.
28
N. T. Wright, The Day the Revolution Began: Reconsidering the Meaning of Jesus’s Crucifixion (San
Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2016), 232.
29
J. Denny Weaver, The Nonviolent Atonement (Grand Rapids /Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2001), 8.
30
Ibid., “Narrative Christus Victor: The Answer to Anselmian Atonement Violence,” in Atonement and
Violence: A Theological Conversation, ed. John Sanders (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), 7.
6
Therefore, he develops a nonviolent atonement theory — Narrative Christus Victor – and points

out that “every form of the satisfaction motif assumes divinely initiated or divinely sanctioned

violence — the Father needing or willing the death of the Son as the basis for satisfying divine

honor or divine justice or divine law.”31 He claims that his argument “exposes the divine violence

intrinsic to any and all forms of satisfaction atonement, and shows that no amount of redefining

or reinterpreting or supplementing or amending or enriching the satisfaction motif overcomes

that violence.”32 However, he may not realize that the presumption of nonviolence may not be

consistent with any nonviolence defenders’ justification of “violence” (according to their

definition) or punishment in some social and economic situation for the sake of protection, self-

defense or justice, as Hans Boersma rightly points out.33

Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker seem to point out that the problem of PSA being

misunderstood even caricatured is somehow from PSA itself,

“even it is by articulated by its most careful and sophisticated adherents, penal

substitutionary atonement remains susceptible to misunderstanding and even bizarre
caricature. Accordingly, the drama of the death of Jesus becomes a manifestation of
God’s anger – with God as the distant Father who punishes his own son in order to
appease his own indignation. … For others, the atonement theology presents an even
more startling drama in which God takes on the role of the sadist inflicting punishment,
while Jesus, in his role as masochist, readily embraces suffering.”34

Colin Greene claims that the substitutionary death of Christ which “belongs within a legal

framework” should not be understood in “a punitive sense,” otherwise, “Christ becomes the

sacrificial victim who is punished instead of us, the whipping-boy who appeases the wrath of

31
Ibid., 19.
32
J. Denny Weaver, “Narrative Christus Victor: The Answer to Anselmian Atonement Violence,” in
Atonement and Violence: A Theological Conversation, ed. John Sanders (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), 1–2.
33
Ibid., 34.
34
Green and Baker, Discovering the Scandal of the Cross, 30.
7
God, or the exchange mechanism that balances the heavenly ledger.”35 Recently, Philip Hess

points out that the blood of Jesus gives life and salvation, but he sets the blood of Jesus against

appeasing God’s wrath through divine punishment of Jesus for our sins, “The blood of the

Passover Lamb was the blood of Jesus with an idea that God needed to punish him for sins.”36 It

is also not difficult to imagine that this kind of “divine child abuse” objection appears in many

feminist critics’ works.37

Feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson rejects the traditional idea of divine impassibility

which is, “morally intolerable,” and stresses “the compassionate God” who suffers with the

suffering world and gives hope to the hopeless.38 She considers the God who demands Christ’s

death as a payment for sins to be “an angry, bloodthirsty, violent and sadistic father, reflecting

the worst kind of male behavior.”39 Cambridge scholar David Instone-Brewer writes, when he

preaches God punishing Jesus, he feels he is “portraying God as though he was uglier than some

of the amoral Greek and Roman gods. … the holy God as a perpetrator of parental cruelty, which

is regarded as revolting and illegal in every civilised society.”40

35
Colin Greene, “Is the Message of the Cross Good News for the Twentieth Century?”, in John Goldingay
(ed.), Atonement Today (London: SPCK, 1995), 231–32.
36
Philip Hess, Penal Substitution on Trial: How Does the Death and Life of Jesus Save Us? (Mountain
View, CA: Creative Commons, 2020), 166–67.
37
Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, “For God So Loved the World,” in Joanne Carlson Brown
and Carole R. Bohn (eds.), Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique (New York: Pilgrim, 1989), 26;
and Rita Nakashima Brock, “And a Little Child Will Lead Us: Christology and Child Abuse,” in J. C. Brown and C.
R. Bohn (eds.), Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse, 51–53. Quoted from Steve Jeffery et al (eds.), Pierced for Our
Transgressions, 229.
38
Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York:
Crossroad, 1992), 249, 269.
39
Ibid., “Redeeming the Name of Christ — Christology,” in Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology
in Feminist Perspective, ed. Catherine Mowry LaGugna (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993), 124.
40
David Instone-Brewer, “Did God punish Jesus on the Cross?” Accessed on February 7 th, 2021,
https://www.premierchristianity.com/Past-Issues/2016/May-2016/Did-God-Punish-Jesus-on-the-Cross.
8
 Besides all the alleged problems of abuse or violence in the “divine child abuse”

objection, it is said that this kind of objection also presupposes that PSA entails an unacceptable

account of relational distinctions within the Trinity. For instance, Darrin S. W. Belousek points

out the idea that “God the Father punishes God the Son” in Calvin’s PSA and charges Calvin’s

atonement theory of “explicit divine violence.”41 Belousek charges PSA in general of suggesting

“a picture of the Triune God in which the Son is a ‘detachable person’ of the Godhead … from

which the Father can separate himself and remove himself to a distance, over against whom the

Father can stand, upon whom the Father can act for his own sake, to satisfy himself.”42 It seems

to him that punishment necessarily implies volitional conflict between the punisher and the one

punished.43 This is a different kind of objection from moral ones. We will address more about

this kind of charge in the section of theological objections after we address conceptual ones.

Conceptual or Philosophical Objections

Some reject divine punishment of Jesus due to conceptual or philosophical reasons. In the

earthly church, Augustine does not agree to say that God punished Jesus because he defines

punishment as an ill treatment against the offender’s will. Since Jesus died willingly for the

sinner, his death should not be counted as punishment conceptually.44 The second philosophical

objection has to do with the presupposition of certain form of justice in which guilt cannot be

transferred. Immanuel Kant cannot accept that the innocent is punished for the culprit. He writes,

For it is not a transmissible liability which can be made over to somebody

41
Darrin W. Snyder Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace: The Message of the Cross and the Mission
of the Church (Eerdmans: Grand Rapidschigan/Cambridge, UK, 2012), 79.
42
Ibid., 293.
43
Ibid., “In penal substitution perspective, the cross involves the Father acting against or upon the Son and
so reveals God divided against himself.”
44
Augustine, The Trinity 4.13.16. Cf. Adonis Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice: The Cross in Historical
and Cultural Contexts (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 38–39.
9
 else, in the manner of a financial debt (where it is all the same to the creditor
whether the debtor himself pays up or somebody else for him), but the most
personal of all liabilities, namely a debt of sins which only the culprit, not the
innocent, can bear, however magnanimous the innocent might be in wanting
to take the debt upon himself for the other.45

Catholic moral philosopher Mark C. Murphy also adopts this Kantian position. He argues

that PSA is “untenable not for moral but for conceptual reasons.”46 For him, the Father only

imposes the judicial suffering but not the punishment on Jesus. He insists that sinners’ guilt and

thus punishment cannot be transferred to the sinless Jesus. Murphy’s basic assumption is that

“punishment is expressive action, condemning that party punished, and so is not transferable

from a guilty to an innocent party.”47 Eleonore Stump, a Catholic analytic theologian, objects to

all Anselmian kind of atonement theories (no doubt including PSA) due to the alleged injustice

of God’s demanding satisfaction by punishing an innocent substitute. She writes in her recent

work in Oxford studies of analytic theology,

“[A]lthough interpretations of the Anselmian kind means to emphasize God’s justice or

goodness, the account they give of the way in which the penance due or the debt owed is
left unpaid or the penalty deserved is paid seems actually to rest on a denial of
justice. ……How is justice or goodness served by punishing a completely innocent
person or exacting the guilt or forgo getting the sinful to pay what they owe, contrary to
what such interpretations in theory insist on, then why did God not simply do so? What
justice or goodness is served by God’s inflicting someone else’s deserved suffering on an
innocent person who does not deserve it or exacting payment of a moral debt from a
person who does not owe it?48

45
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion and Rational Theology, ed.
A Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 113. Quoted in Simon Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 26.
46
Mark C. Murphy, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment,” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 3
(July 2009): 253–73.
47
Ibid., 253.
48
Eleonore Stump, Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 24.
10
 Most recently Oliver Crisp, an evangelical analytic theologian, also rejects the traditional

argument for PSA due to this conceptual reason in Kantian tradition. Crisp claims that there

seem to be “five systemic problems for the logic of penal substitution.”49 For him, the central one

of these problems is that “it is not possible for the sin and guilt of one individual to be transferred

to another individual.”50 He argues, “If a person is innocent of a crime, that person cannot be

punished for the crime. Punishment is the imposition of some kind of hardship for an offense.

But where a person has committed no offense, no penalty can be applied.”51

The third philosophical objection to divine punishment of Jesus has to do with the

concept of retributive justice. It is claimed that retributive justice is not or at least not primarily a

biblical concept. For instance, Stephen Travis points out his view on divine punishment, “In

Christ and the Judgement of God I argue that in Paul’s understanding of divine judgment ideas

of ‘punishment’ or ‘retribution’ lie on the periphery of his thought.”52 He recognizes the cost of

divine forgiveness, but he denies divine punishment of Jesus with a language of absorption, “in

Christ God himself took responsibility for the world’s evil and absorbed its consequences into

himself. He was not punishing his Son in order to avoid punishing his creatures.”53 Tom Smail

prefers restorative justice to retributive justice, “God’s justice is concerned less with punishing

49
Crisp, “The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited,” in The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London
Symposium on the Theology of the Atonement (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 209.
50
Ibid., 223.
51
Crisp, Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ (Downers Grove: IVP Academic,
2020), 105–112.
52
Stephen Travis, Christ as Bearer of Divine Judgment in Paul’s Thought about the Atonement,” in
Goldingay (ed.), Atonement Today, 21.
53
Ibid., 38.
11
wrong relationships than with restoring right ones.”54 Paul Fiddes claims, “What justice demands

is not payment but repentance; it is finally ‘satisfied’ not by penalty in itself but by the change of

heart to which penalty is intended to lead.”55 For him, God should not demand punishment of

sins, but desires repentance from sinners and forgives them without the punishment of sinners,

let alone the punishment of Jesus. Therefore, for Fiddes, there is no need for God to punish his

Son, he can simply forgive sins. Christina A. Baxter challenges PSA adherents, “If the penal

substitution theory of the atonement really depends on the notion of punishment, then one has to

face the question why this punishment is being meted out.”56 She also points out that “there is

penalty for sin, either for God or for us,” and suggests to revise PSA by moving “from the image

of penalty as punishment to the image of penalty as costliness or debt.” 57

Theological Objections

Still others including some evangelicals who embrace PSA (with 58 or without59 divine

retributive justice) cannot affirm that Jesus was punished by the Father due to certain theological

54
Tom Smail, Once and for All: A Confession of the Cross (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1998), 95.
Quoted from Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 250.
55
Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1989), 104. Quoted from Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced by Our Transgressions, 249–50.
56
Baxter, “The Cursed Beloved: A Reconsideration of Penal Substitution,” in John Goldingay (ed.),
Atonement Today, 70.
57
Ibid., 72.
58
Some evangelicals accept PSA with divine retributive justice. For example, a group of evangelical
leaders who published an article to celebrate the Gospel in Christianity Today can represent this stance. Cf. “The
Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Evangelical Celebration,” in Christianity Today 43, no. 7 (June 14, 1999): 52: “Jesus
paid our penalty in our place on his cross, satisfying the retributive demands of divine justice by shedding his blood
in sacrifice and so making possible justification for all who trust in him.” Quoted from John Sanders, “Introduction,”
in Atonement and Violence, ed. John Sanders (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), xv, vxii.
59
Some evangelicals accept PSA without divine retributive justice. For example, Stephen H. Travis in his
book, Christ and the Judgment of God (Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1986) and his article, “Christ as
Bearer of Divine Judgment in Paul’s Thought about the Atonement,” in Atonement Today, ed. John Goldingay
(London: SPCK, 1995), 21–38.
12
reasons, because for them divine punishment of Jesus implies divine disunity. Augustine, as

Adonis Vidu points out, has tried to avoid any penal notion that “breaks the unity of the work of

the Trinity.”60 Augustine understands Jesus’s death as penal “in the sense that all death is penal,

not in the sense that the Son is therefore punished by the Father.”61 Therefore, Augustine’s

concept of punishment entails divine disunity. His conceptual objection to divine punishment of

Jesus implies his theological objection.

N. T. Wright observes that “on the cross God punishes (not Jesus) but ‘sin’”62 In his

recent work, he continues to insist that “Paul does not say that God punished Jesus. He declares

that God punished Sin in the flesh of Jesus.”63 Simon J. Gathercole points out that Paul specifies

the location of divine condemnation of sin to be in the flesh of Jesus, but Gathercole cannot

affirm further that God punishes Jesus.64 John Stott writes, “We must not, then, speak of God

punishing Jesus or of Jesus persuading God, for to do so is to set them over against each other as

if they acted independently of each other or were even in conflict with each other.”65 For him, the

penal aspect in PSA means Jesus bore the penalty and curse of our sin, but he was not punished

by the Father.66 Michael Horton points out, “The Son did not endure the Father’s rage, but the

60
Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice, 36.
61
Ibid., 40.
62
N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1993), 213.
63
N. T. Wright, The Day the Revolution Began, 287 (italics author’s).
64
Simon J. Gathercole, “Justified by Faith, Justified by His Blood: The Evidence of Romans 3:21–4:25,” in
Justification and Variegated Nomism, vol. 2: The Paradoxes of Paul, ed. D. A. Carson, P. T. O’Brien, and M. A.
Seifrid (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck; Grand Rapids, IL: Baker, 2004), 177. Quoted from Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for
Our Transgressions, 87.
65
John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 20th Anniversary Edition (Downers Grove: IVP, 2006), 151.
66
Ibid., 143, 148.
13
sentence that he agreed from all eternity must be carried out for the sake of his loved ones.”67 For

him, divine penalty does not mean divine wrath. Millard J. Erickson writes, “because the Father

and the Son are one, Christ’s work is also Father’s. Thus, the Father did not place punishment on

someone other than himself.”68 His understanding of the penal aspect in PSA is that “God is both

the judge and the person paying the penalty.”69 Erickson’s theological concern with divine

punishment of Jesus seems to be the possible divine disunity. Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and

Andrew Sach have defended PSA passionately,70 but they only defend a version of PSA that

Christ “took our sin and guilt upon himself and died a cursed death, suffering in his human

nature the infinite torment of the wrath and fury of his Father” and that God punished sin and

evil in the person of the Son, but they cannot further affirm that the Father punishes Jesus.71 Hans

Boersma has defended the unavoidability of divine violence and the necessity of redemptive

violence against nonviolent atonement theories, but he hesitates to affirm divine punishment of

Jesus due to theological reasons.72 Adonis Vidu, an evangelical theologian, embraces PSA and

affirms a trinitarianism which emphasizes divine unity,73 but he hesitates to claim that the Father

67
Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2011), 514.
68
Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 834.
69
Ibid.
70
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 103: “The doctrine of penal substitution states that
God gave himself in the person of his Son to suffer instead of us the death, punishment and curse due to fallen
humanity as the penalty for sin.”
71
Ibid., 104.
72
Hans Boersma, “Violence, the Cross, and Divine Intentionality: A Modified Reformed View,” in
Atonement and Violence: A Theological Conversation, ed. John Sanders (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2006), 62, 64.
73
Adonis Vidu, “The Place of the Cross among the Inseparable Operations of the Trinity,” in Locating
Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2015), 38: “I beg the reader’s understanding that this paper is written precisely from the standpoint of
Latin trinitarianism, for all of its weaknesses.” But now it is well known that the clear Latin-Greek distinction of
14
punishes the Son due to his concern of the lack of trinitarian ground.74 He specifically rejects the

conclusion that the Father directly or unilaterally punishes the Son.75

Although Thabiti M. Anyabwile has expressed his avoidance of blaspheme and his

hesitation to speculate on the inner Trinity, he nontheless writes about the Father’s forsakenness

of the Son this way, “This spiritual forsakenness, spiritual wrath from the Father, occurs deep

down in the very godhead itself … something was torn in the very fabric of the relationship

between Father and Son.”76 It seems to these evangelical theologians who insist on PSA but also

hold implicitly that punishment and wrath may entail volitional dissonance between the punisher

and the punished.77

Another form of theological objection is based on a special understanding of the nature of

God’s love especially in his forgiveness of human sins. For instance, Paul Fiddes insists that

loving God can forgive sins without punishing them.78 Darrin S. W. Belousek claims that divine

forgiveness is God’s gracious gift for humanity. Forgiveness is surely not a human work; it does

patristic trinitarianism in terms of divine unity (i.e., Latin tradition emphasizes divine unity; Greek tradition
emphasizes divine plurality) is not well grounded.
74
Ibid., 28.
75
Ibid., 40. I agree with Adonis Vidu that we cannot affirm the Father punishes the Son directly and
unilaterally in the standard sense of punishment in philosophy of law. But we can still claim divine punishment of
Jesus with a biblically and theologically sound concept of divine punishment.
76
Thabiti M. Anyabvile, “What Does It Mean for the Father to Forsaken the Son? (Part 3)” The Gospel
Coalition Blog, April 4, 2012, https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/thabiti-anyabwile/why-did-the-father-
forsake-the-son-part-3/.
77
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 147–49: “Some defenders of penal substitution recoil at the
thought that God punished His beloved Son for our sins. For example, John Stott advises, ‘We must never make
Christ the object of God’s punishment.’ Even in their ringing defense of penal substitution, Steve Jeffery, Michael
Ovey, and Andrew Sach do not define penal substitution in such a way as to imply that Christ was punished in our
place … Indeed, for many of these theorists, God did not even inflict on Christ the harsh treatment that deserved;
rather Christ voluntarily took upon himself the suffering that we deserved as the punishment for our sons.” (with
original quotations removed)
78
Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1989), 84, 101.
15
not even require Christ’s death for satisfaction as Anselm insists. He argues, “God is the sole and

sufficient provider for our lives in every regard, providing even the means of dealing with our

sins; God the Creator, who gives life to all creatures, is also God the Redeemer, who cleanses

and forgives sins by means of his generous gift.”79 He agrees with Anslem that “humans cannot

make compensation to God for sin by acts of obedience,” but disagrees with him and insists that

even Christ’s death is regarded “as the reducio ad absurdum of the very motion of making

atonement for sin by human compensation to God.”80

Nicholas Wolterstorff critiques Roman jurist Ulpian’s classical definition of justice (“a

steady and enduring will to render to each his or her ius”81) as a source of modern “possessive

individualism”82; he directly points out that Reinhold Niebuhr’s concept of justice (as consisting

of “rendering just judgment in situations of conflict and of meting out justice in case of the

conflict involves an infraction of justice”) “cannot be correct.”83 He develops a concept of justice

which is not just a complement to love but an example of love in the framework of biblical

agapism. Based on this new concept of justice, Wolterstorff claims that complete and full

forgiveness cannot be compatible with punishing the wrongdoers.84 He also adopts the New

Perspective’s approach of interpreting Romans and concludes,

If Christ paid penalty for our sin on our behalf, then we are in fact punished for our sin,
albeit vicariously. And if we were punished for our sin, then we were not declared

79
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 196.
80
Ibid., 196–97.
81
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 85.
82
Ibid., 90.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid., 198.
16
 justified with regard to that sin. The charges were not dismissed. Vicarious punishment
and the Pauline justification are incompatible.85

Therefore, for Wolterstorff God can forgive our sin without the satisfaction of justice. He

opposes divine punishment of Jesus as the means for divine forgiveness and our justification.

In his discussion of forgiveness, reconciliation, and justice, Miroslav Volf argues against

both “forgiveness without justice” and “forgiveness after justice.” He points out that “[t]o forgive

outside justice is to make no moral demands; to forgive after justice is not to be vindictive.”86

Then he develops a “forgiveness beyond justice” starting with a “will to embrace” based on the

Christian obligation to love like our “God of unconditional and indiscriminate love.”87 For Volf,

“[i]f justice were fully done, forgiveness would not be necessary, except in the limited and

inadequate sense of not being vindictive; justice itself would have fully repaid for the

wrongdoing.” Here we can see that even if the death of Christ is important for Volf’s initiative of

new ethics of peace and reconciliation, it serves just as a moral example instead of a vicarious

punishment.

Eleonore Stump’s understanding of divine forgiveness is simply this: no payment for debt

or punishment for guilt is necessary since it (debt or guilt) is forgiven; in other words, for her,

forgiveness and demanding satisfaction are contradictory. She argues against the Anselmian kind

of interpretation of Christ’s death this way,

[T]here are problems internal to interpretation grouped into the Anselmian kind. To start
with one of the obvious ones, contrary to what interpretations of this kind intend, they do
not in fact seem to present God as foregoing anything owed him by human beings or
omitting any of the punishment deserved by human beings. On interpretation of
Anselmian kind, God exacts every bit of what is owned or visits the whole punishment

85
Ibid., 265.
86
Miroslav Volf, “Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice,” in Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin (eds.),
Stricken by God?, 279.
87
Ibid., 280–81.
17
 deserved; he allows none of the debt to go unpaid or the guilt to be unpunished. It is true
that what is owed or deserved is visited on the incarnate Deity; but what his element in
the Anselmian kind of interpretation shows is that God himself has arranged for the debt
to be paid in full or the full penalty to be borne, not that God has agreed to overlook or
forego any part of it.88

For Stump, the loving God can simply forgive humanity without satisfaction of divine justice;

any requirement of satisfaction contradicts divine forgiveness. Therefore, for these theologians,

divine punishment of Jesus is unnecessary for divine forgiveness.

Some reject divine punishment of Jesus also based on their understanding of divine love

as incompatible with divine wrath. This objection does not only claim the needlessness of

punishment, but also love’s inconsistency with punishment. Tom Smail disagrees with John

Stott’s view that a loving God takes initiative to appease his own righteous anger,89 and

complains that Stott does not explain how “two divine attributes of God’s wrath and God’s love”

can “cohere in the same divine nature.”90 For Smail, divine love and divine wrath are two

contradictory divine attributes and cannot coexist. Green and Baker can only accept the

“metaphorical” meaning of divine wrath instead of literal one.91 Belousek can accept the biblical

evidence of God’s personal wrath, but he denies that God’s wrath is necessarily penal. He finds

one incidence in the case of Uzzah’s “inadvertent contact with the holy (2 Sam. 6:6–7; 1 Chron.

13:9–10),” but denies that God’s punishment is due to Uzzah’s sin.92

88
Stump, Atonement, 24.
89
John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 175.
90
Tom Smail, Once for All: A Confession of the Cross (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1998), 87.
Quoted in Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 286.
91
Green and Baker, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross, 53–54.
92
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 211–12.
18
 As a special form of theological challenge, Stephen B. Chapman rejects divine

punishment of Jesus based on his biblical and theological understanding of Israel’s sacrifice.

After having insightfully analyzed five common misconceptions about the atonement, he

concludes with Christian appropriation of this biblical understanding of the Old Testament

sacrifice and writes, “Within this ancient tradition, sacrifice is viewed as primarily reconciliation

with God, but it is also expiatory, representative, and vicarious in nature.”93 But then he claims,

“On analogy with Israel’s tradition of sacrifice, it should not be said that God punished Jesus for

human sin.”94 Chapman’s claim is based on his acceptance of Stephen Travis’s thesis that Jesus

only endured the consequences of our sins instead of bearing our punishment.95

Exegetical Challenges

Brad Jersak asks, “Why did we think God was punishing Jesus?” and responds from his

interpretation of Isaiah 53 to give an answer that we should not think that way.96 He interprets

Isa. 53:3–5 this way: the Servant was not rejected by God, but by men (from v. 3); we thought he

was stricken by God, smitten by him, and afflicted, but our thought was wrong; he was not

stricken by God (v. 4); it was our sins that pierced him and our iniquities that crushed him (v. 5).

Jersak can accept that the Servant here is Jesus because Jesus identifies himself with him, but he

asserts, based on his interpretation above, that “we find out that his [Christ’s] torment is not truly

at the hands of Yahweh or even only our oppressors, but also ourselves.”97

93
Stephen B. Chapman, “God’s Reconciling Work: Atonement in the Old Testament,” in Johnson (ed.),
T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 112.
94
Ibid., 113.
95
Ibid.
96
Jersak, “Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ,” in Stricken by God?, 35.
97
Ibid., 36.
19
 In E. Robert Ekblad’s exegetical paper on LXX’s Isaiah 53, he first points out “The

LXX’s strong identification of the servant with Israel (though the servant is not completely

reduced to collective Israel).”98 Then he compares MT and LXX and points out the absence of

“by God” in “beaten by God” in 53:4 which he regards significantly reflects the LXX translator’s

theology. Then the difference between MT and LXX is obvious: “The MT speaker confess their

mistaken consideration that it was God who stuck, beat and afflicted the servant, … This reading

of the speakers’ speculation concerning God’s possible responsibility for the servant’s suffering

is absent from the LXX.”99 Ekblad continues to exegete LXX’s Isa. 53:5 and points out, “The

servant does not suffer at God’s hands for his own sins. He suffers for “our (the speakers’)

sins.”100 Ekblad’s exegetical work on LXX’s Isaiah 53 challenges divine punishment of Jesus in

two aspects: the identification of the servant as Jesus and involvement of God in the suffering of

the servant.

Conceptual and Linguistic Confusions

Some theologians accept divine punishment of Jesus because they believe Scripture

affirms that idea101 but their concept of punishment is neither clear nor biblically or theologically

sound. Although it is still in debate whether Martin Luther supports PSA,102 Luther at least

98
E. Robert Ekblad, “God Is Not Blame: The Servant’s Atoning Suffering according to the LXX of Isaiah
53,” in Stricken by God?, 181.
99
Ibid., 189–90.
100
Ibid., 191.
101
Henri A. G. Blocher, “Agnus Victor: The Atonement as Victory and Vicarious Punishment,” in What
Does It Mean To be Saved? Broadening Evangelical Horizons of Salvation, ed. John G. Stackhouse, Jr. (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 68.
102
Some theologians like Timothy George (“The Atonement in Martin Luther’s Theology,” in The Glory of
the Atonement, edited by C. E. Hill and F. A. James III, 263–78. Downers Grove: IVP; Leicester: Apollos, 2004)
and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Jesus – God and Man, 279. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974) agree that Luther
supports PSA. Some other theologians like Gustaf Aulén (Christus Victor: A Historical Study of the Three Main
Types of the Idea of the Atonement, 101–22. Trans. A. G. Herbert. London: SPCK, 1931) and Philip S. Watson (Let
20
clearly states that Christ was cursed by God on the cross. Luther writes, “Christ hung on a tree;

therefore, Christ is a curse of God.”103 He affirms divine punishment of Jesus104 essentially based

on his biblical exposition of Gal. 3:13, but, as a biblical exegete instead of a theological or

philosophical systematician, he does not give a detailed conceptual investigation on

punishment.105 Adonis Vidu may be balanced, agreeing with Timothy George, to say that “for all

the complexity and uniqueness of Luther’s larger soteriology, there are concepts belong to the

penal substitutionary framework,” but due to his “ambivalence with regard to the law” and its

influence in his atonement thought, the legal element (thus PSA and divine punishment of Jesus)

in Luther’s thought “is ultimately subsumed under, though not transcended by, the ontological

victory represented by the resurrection.”106 David J. Luy’s “parabolic structure” (Christ’s

condescension in suffering, curse, death, and then his exaltation in resurrection and triumphant

glory) of Luther’s soteriology confirms this balanced understanding of Luther’s soteriology.107

Karl Barth draws on the support of biblical passages like 2 Cor. 5: 21 and Gal. 3:13 and

reasons that Christ has assumed the fallen human nature and borne the righteous wrath of God,

God Be God, 120. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1947) reject that Luther supports PSA. Ted Peters questions Aulén’s
reading of Luther’s thought on the atonement (“The Atonement in Anselm and Luther, Second Thoughts About
Gustaf Aulén’s Christus Victor,” LQ 24 (1972): 301–14).
103
Martin Luther, Luther’s Works. Vol. 26: Lectures on Galatians, 1535. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and
Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia, 1963), 279: “Therefore Christ not only was crucified and died, but by
divine love sin was laid upon Him. When sin was laid upon Him, the Law came and said: ‘Let every sinner died!
And therefore, Christ, if You want to reply that You are guilty and that You bear the punishment, you must bear the
sin and the curse as well.’ Therefore Paul correctly applies to Christ this general Law from Moses: ‘Cursed be
everyone who hangs on the tree.’ Christ hung on a tree, therefore Christ is a curse of God.”
104
Timothy George, “The Atonement in Martin Luther’s Theology,” in Hill and James III (eds.), The Glory
of the Atonement, 277: “Luther’s thought does not lend itself to any one ‘theory’ of atonement but encompasses the
biblical truths found in both the classic and the Latin types.”
105
Ibid., 268–69.
106
Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice, 16, 118.
107
David J. Luy, Dominus Mortis: Martin Luther on the Incorruptibility of God in Christ (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2014), 167.
21
and thus God the Father has the right to judge him.108 But not all can agree with Barth on

Christ’s fallen human nature.109 Even though Thomas F. Torrance, inheriting Barth’s theological

legacy, claims that Jesus is the judged judge, but he can only say that God takes initiative in

human salvation, bears our sin and guilt, and endures his own wrath.110 He can even write,

“Christ came in the concrete likeness of our flesh of sin, …, condemning sin in the flesh,

numbering himself with transgressors and submitting himself to the judgment of God upon our

sin. … He even became a curse for us.”111 But he does not claim that Christ was punished by

God. C. E. B. Cranfield writes, “God … purposed to direct against His very own Self in the

person of His Son the full weight of that righteous wrath which they [sinners] deserved.”112 But

Cranfield does not give a clear definition of punishment, thus his claim that the Father punished

himself in the Son is vague. John Piper writes, “For if God did not punish his Son in my place,

I’m not saved from my greatest peril, the wrath of God.”113 Similarly, Piper writes in the preface

of a popular book on the passion of Christ, “The ultimate answer to the question, Who crucified

108
Karl Barth, CD, I/2, 151–53; II/1, 152; IV/1, 165ff; 175. T. F. Torrance, “Karl Barth and the Latin
Heresy,” Sottish Journal of Theology 39 (1986), 473–77. Adam J. Johnson, God’s Being in Reconciliation: The
Theological Basis of the Unity and Diversity of the Atonement in the Theology of Karl Barth (London/ New York:
T&T Clark, 2012), 74.
109
Oliver Crisp, “Did Christ Have a Fallen Nature?” IJST 6.3 (2004), 270–88; Kevin Chiarot, The
Unassumed Is the Unhealed: The Humanity of Christ in Christology of T. F. Torrance (Eugene, OR: Pickwick,
2013), 226; Barth, CD, IV/1, 296; Bruce Demarest, The Cross and Salvation: The Doctrine of Salvation (Wheaton:
Crossway, 1997), 157.
110
Thomas F. Torrance, Atonement: The Person and Work of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers
Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 122.
111
Thomas F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, ed. Robert T. Walker (Downers
Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 256.
112
C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, vol. 1
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 216–17. Quoted from Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 246.
113
John Piper, “Foreword” in Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach, Pierced for Our
Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007), 14.
22
Jesus? is: God did.”114 But he does not explain the biblical evidence of the contrast between the

crucifixion of Jesus by the wicked and his resurrection by God.

Daniel J. Hill and Joseph Jedwab argue, against Murphy, for divine punishment of Jesus.

They point out that Jesus’s suffering and death qualifies as punishment even according to

Murphy’s definition of punishment, because, they believe, in Murphy’s definition of punishment,

the one punished does not have to be the one condemned.115 They argue through some practical

examples of representative punishment and award that “it is not a necessary truth that if A

imposes punishment on B, then the punishment thereby condemns B for a supposed failure on

B’s part to measure up to a binding standard.”116 Here Hill and Jedwab’s distinction between

punishment and condemnation is not likely accepted by Murphy who, as an expressivist, regards

condemnation as one of the essential elements of punishment.

Some of the disagreements to divine punishment of Jesus are due to an imprecise use of

terms. For example, legal theorists and theologians disagree on whether the authoritative agent’s

indignation, resentment or anger is an essential feature in punishment. Joel Feinberg117 and his

expressivist follower Mark Murphy118 would answer yes; but Hill and Jedwab would answer

114
John Piper, The Passion of Jesus Christ: Fifty Reasons Why He Came to Die (Wheaton: Crossway
Books, 2004), 11.
115
Daniel J. Hill and Joseph Jedwab, “Atonement and the Concept of Punishment,” in Locating Atonement:
Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 144.
116
Ibid., 145.
117
Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970), 95–118.
118
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 115: “Joel Feinberg suggests that punishment has an essentially expressive
function: whenever punishment is found, it expresses judgments of disapproval and attitudes of indignation and
resentment.”
23
no.119 John Calvin would answer no; P. T. Forsyth would answer yes. Calvin claims that

dereliction of the cross is from Jesus himself rather than an expression of others’ opinion. He

accepts that Jesus was forsaken and punished by the Father but denies the Father’s anger with or

hostility toward Jesus.120 Forsyth agrees with Calvin that God was not angry with Christ. For

Forsyth, we can say that Christ bore the penalty and curse upon our sin; we can even say that

Christ entered the wrath of God, but “[i]t is impossible for us to say that God was angry with

Christ; … To say that Christ was punished by God who was always well pleased by Him is an

outrageous thing.”121 When Forsyth writes, “Consequently Christ could not suffer punishment in

the true sense of the word without having a guilty conscience,”122 he discloses two of his

assumptions: first, divine wrath is essential in divine punishment; second, only those who have

guilty conscience can be punished.

I. Howard Marshall criticizes Wayne Grudem’s use of language of divine fury of wrath

upon Jesus and points out that “[o]ne can see how such language can be misunderstood.”123

Before we can judge who is right, Marshall or Grudem, one thing we need to make sure is

whether they use the shared terms (divine wrath and punishment) with the same meaning. Here

for Marshall, divine wrath means divine hostility, but it is not necessarily in punishment. He, like

Calvin, accepts divine punishment of Jesus but denies divine wrath upon Jesus. He writes, “It is,

119
Hill and Jedwab, “Atonement and the Concept of Punishment,” Locating Atonement, 144: “it does not
seem to us that indignation and resentment are necessary features of punishment at all.”
120
Calvin, Inst. 2.16.11; McCall, Forsaken, 28.
121
P. T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910; Reprinted in USA: Beloved
Publishing, 2017), 53.
122
Ibid., 56.
123
I. Howard Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement: Cross and Resurrection in the Reconciling of God and
Humanity (London: Paternoster, 2007), 71.
24
then, not a case of God being angry with Christ but of God himself in Christ taking on himself

sin and its penalty.”124 But for Grudem, divine wrath upon Jesus and divine

punishment/condemnation of Jesus are the same.125

Noticing the different uses of the term, divine punishment of Jesus, Hill and Jedwab

distinguish three versions: the strong version (“God indeed punished Christ”); the weak version

(“God judicially imposed suffering on Christ”); the intermediate version (“God imposed

punishment on Christ, even though God did not punish Christ.”)126 Joshua M. McNall

distinguishes divine punishment of Jesus (“divine sanction” of punishment in his term) into four

categories: Jesus endured separation from or judgment of God instead of being directly or

actively punished by God; Jesus bored the covenant curses instead of being killed by God; Jesus

“freely took upon himself the divinely sanctioned penalty for human sin”; Jesus became, in

Barthian phrase, “the Judge judged in our place.”127 However, neither Hill and Jedwab nor

McNall distinguishes clearly bearing punishment from being punished.

Let us consider another example of term confusion. For the term, guilt, different legal

theorists and theologians employ it with different connotations. Stump’s use of guilt covers a

wide range of meanings: subjective aspect (the guilty feeling of what a wrong has done in the

past), the factual wrong that has been done in history, legal liability to punishment, and moral

failure.128 Samuel Williston would mean simply “the property or fact having committed the

124
Ibid.
125
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Leicester: IVP/Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 575, 578–79.
126
Hill and Jebwab, “Atonement and the Concept of Punishment,” 140.
127
McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement, 106–107.
128
Stump, Atonement, 44–46.
25
crime,” as Lord Coke famously claims, “Punishment may expire, but guilt will last forever.”129

William Lane Craig disagrees with Williston and understands guilt to only mean “liability to

punishment” in the context of legal and theological discourses.130

In sum, the confusion in the deployment of concept and language contributes one

significant reason for this research. It is impossible to conduct a fruitful debate when the shared

term (like punishment) carries different connotations for different debaters. We will set aside a

whole chapter to define and clarify the crucial concept, punishment, and its related theories of

justice in this project.

In recent literature pertinent to divine punishment, William Lane Craig has provided

some valuable conceptual clarifications in his defense of PSA, especially regarding the definition

and justification of punishment and the relationship between condemnation and punishment.131

In terms of the relationship between God the Father’s moral will and Christ’s crucifixion,

Nicholas E. Lombardo provides a valuable insight in the distinction of logical and ontological

necessity. Most recently Adonis Vidu has argued for the retrieval of the “hard” version132 of the

principle of divine inseparable operations ad extra.133 Craig’s, Lombardo’s, and Vidu’s works

have provided helpful resources for this project.134

129
Craig, The Atonement, 85.
130
Ibid., 89.
131
William Lane Craig, The Atonement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 53–82.
132
The “hard” version of the inseparability principle emphasizes divine unity; the “soft” version of it
merely points out the cooperation and harmony of divine persons in the operations ad extra.
133
Adonis Vidu, The Same God Who Works All Things: Inseparable Operations in Trinitarian Theology
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2021).
134
Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Father’s Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). I am grateful for Dr.
Thomas H. McCall for suggesting William Lane Craig’s and Nicholas E. Lombardo’s recent works to me for this
project. Craig has expanded his original text The Atonement (2018) into a book, Atonement and the Death of Christ,
in 2020. I am also grateful for Dr. David J. Luy for suggesting to me Adonis Vidu’s most recent works on the
inseparability principle of the Trinity in 2021.
26
 The Thesis

This dissertation argues that the church can affirm divine punishment of Jesus as long as

the following two conditions are satisfied: the concept of divine punishment is biblically and

theologically sound;135 and it does not violate the central affirmations of orthodox trinitarian

theology.136 What we mean by divine punishment of Jesus is not only that the sinless Jesus

willingly bore the guilt of human sins137 and thus God’s punishment that we sinners deserved, but

also that he was punished by God the Father according to the triune God’s loving will to save

humanity. What we affirm in trinitarian theology includes the ontological and thus volitional

unity between the Father and the Son, the inseparable operations of divine persons in the

economy, and the unity and distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity.

Research Methodology

All can agree that methods are important for our works. An ancient Chinese proverb says,

“Sharpening your axe will not delay your wood-chopping work”. It is never a waste of time to

talk about methodology before we engage in doing theology. However, not all agree how to do

theology. After reviewing many evangelical theological proposals, Stanley E. Porter and Steven

M. Studebaker point out recently that people have paid much more attention to “What is the task

135
Chapter 2 will address biblical understanding of divine punishment; Chapter 4 will present biblical
argument for divine punishment.
136
Chapter 3 will present three basic trinitarian principles in the central affirmations of orthodox trinitarian
theology; Chapter 5 will present theological argument for divine unity.
137
Guilt is an important legal and theological concept which will be clarified in this project. Here guilt of
human sins does not mean the objective property or fact of having committed sins in history which can never be
erased nor the subjective guilty feeling in human conscience. It means the liability to divine punishment in the
context of (legal) philosophical and theological discourse.
27
of theology?” and “Why does one do theology?” than “How to do theology?”138 Even some good

evangelical methodological proposals like Kevin Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach and

Stanley Grenz’s and Roger Olson’s postconservative theology also focus on “what” and “why”

of theology instead of “how” of it.139

Here are our theological methodology and the way of application to the current project. I

will combine Kevin Vanhoozer’s canonical-linguistic approach,140 Karl Barth’s trinitarian

dogmatic approach, and the interdisciplinary approach described by Telford C. Work.141 With

the canonical-linguistic approach, we emphasize the canonicality and authority of the Scriptures

as the basis of our theologizing on the one hand and do not neglect to discern the biblical

linguistic sensitivity (with a careful historical-grammatical exegesis) on the other hand. We also

adopt the thematic strength of the propositional approach from traditional conservative

theological approach.142 For instance, this approach will be demonstrated in our exegesis of the

texts like Isaiah 53, Zechariah 13, 2 Corinthians 5, and Galatians 3, etc. With the trinitarian

approach, we value the confessional-creedal approach in general and the triune God’s

ontological unity ad intra and the patristic principle of inseparable operations ad extra of divine

persons in particular. With the interdisciplinary approach, we will explain the theological claims

like Jesus was punished God the Father by defining specifically what punishment means in the

138
Stanley E. Porter and Steven M. Studebaker, “Method in Systematic Theology: An Introduction,” in
Evangelical Theological Method: Five Views, eds., Stanley E. Porter and Steven M. Studebaker (Downers Grove:
IVP Academic, 2018), 1–2, 6–7 (italics mine).
139
Ibid., 14–17.
140
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology
(Louisville: WJK, 2005), 16–25.
141
Telford C. Work, “Interdisciplinary Method: Framers and Painters,” in Evangelical Theological
Method: Five Views, eds., Stanley E. Porter and Steven M. Studebaker, 73–92.
142
Sung Wook Chung, “Bible Doctrines /Conservative Theology: Codifying God’s Word,” in Evangelical
Theological Method: Five Views, eds., Stanley E. Porter and Steven M. Studebaker, 31–51.
28
field of legal philosophy and justice and what divine punishment of Jesus means biblically in the

context of the cross. We should be aware that “the final arbiter” of “theological stances” is still

the Scriptures in our interdisciplinary investigation of the concepts like punishment, justice,

guilt, pardon, and forgiveness, etc.143

In terms of how to carry out our methodology concretely in this research, we will adopt a

modified version of Millard Erickson’s ten-step systematic process144 and Gordon Lewis and

Bruce Demarest’s six-stage integrative theological methodology with sensitivity to Vanhoozer’s

post-propositional canonical-linguistic approach.145 Here are our concrete steps: First, defining

the research question or the theological theme for inquiry (divine punishment of Jesus). Second,

learning theological approaches or wisdom from church history (historical theology as a

consulting voice). Third, collecting biblical passages relevant to the research question (Deut.

21:22–23; Isa. 53: 4–6, 10; Zech. 13:7; Rom. 3:25–26, 8:3; Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21). Fourth,

formulating a thesis that is based on the collected biblical materials and without contradicting

other biblical passages or church ecumenical doctrines (in our case, the Nicene-Constantinople

trinitarianism and the principle of inseparable operations ad extra of divine persons). Fifth,

defending the formulated thesis biblically and theologically with responding to the potential

interdisciplinary challenges or objections (especially from the philosophical theories of justice in

our case). Sixth. drawing spiritual and practical implications to Christian life, doctrines, and

ministry.

143
Stanley E. Porter and Steven M. Studebaker, “What Have We Learned Regarding Theological Method,
and Where Do We Go from Here?” in Evangelical Theological Method: Five Views, eds., Stanley E. Porter and
Steven M. Studebaker, 213.
144
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 70–83.
145
Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest, Integrative Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 26.
29
 After stating the “what” and “how” of our research methodology, now let us address the

“why”. Since part of the confusion over the issue of divine punishment of Jesus comes from

different employments of language and different understandings of the nature of punishment, it is

very important for us to clarify the concept of punishment first. We realize that the human

analogy for understanding divine justice and punishment is not always sufficient, therefore we

will explore biblical and theological understandings of punishment and justice. After all, biblical

revelation is the foundation of our theologizing; legal concepts or definitions are just the means

for philosophical clarification, even though they are important in our project. Besides the

conceptual clarification and biblical/theological study on the nature of punishment, we will also

address the issue of divine unity, because we realize that divine punishment of Jesus may seem

to entail inter-personal antagonism between the Father and the Son. The ontological unity within

the Trinity and the patristic principle of inseparable operations of divine persons in the economy

are especially important. At the same time, we need to realize the unity and distinction of the

economic and the immanent Trinity and affirm that divine punishment of Jesus in the economy

cannot entail an ontological or even a volitional disunity in the fracturing of the relationship

between the Father and the Son in the immanent Trinity.

The Outline

This project consists of six chapters in total. Chapter 1 introduces the research question,

reviews the related literature, states the thesis and research methodology, and gives a brief

outline of the project. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with the preliminary issues pertinent to the

central question, Was Jesus punished by the Father?. In Chapter 2, we will discuss the definitions

and justifications of punishment, because some issues are caused by the confusion of definitions,

others are caused by different theories of justice. And before we can make claims about what

30
happens to the Father-Son relationship on the cross, we need to think about the doctrine of the

Trinity especially the unity between the Father and the Son (in Chapter 3), because this divine

unity is our creedal foundation and theologians’ major concern in this study. Chapters 4 and 5

contain the major arguments of this project. Chapter 4 first presents philosophical clarification

and then presents an exegetical argument for a positive answer to the question of divine

punishment of Jesus. Here our goal is modest. We only argue that the crucial biblical texts that

we study seem to support our thesis exegetically. For other texts that may not be supportive of

our thesis and some exegetical challenges, we will give answer in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 first

reminds the reader the qualified sense of punishment which is different from the ordinary

understanding of it and then presents a theological argument for our thesis. After the theological

argument we answer some objections that we have mentioned in Chapter 1 and clarify the

confusion of the uses of terms and language. Finally, I will close this project with conclusions,

implications, and a reflection in the last chapter.

31
 Chapter 2

THE NATURE OF PUNISHMENT

Was Jesus on the cross punished by the Father? The answer to this question depends

partly upon what one means by punishment. This chapter will explore various philosophical

understandings on the nature of punishment and will also reference biblical discussions of the

concept of divine punishment and the principles of divine justice. It will place us in a better

position to answer our main question of divine punishment of Jesus after we have explored these

understandings. The philosophical understandings of punishment and justice help us better

understand the nature of punishment from the legal-philosophical perspective and why different

people understand the issue of divine punishment of Jesus differently. Biblical understanding of

punishment helps us understand the nature of punishment and justice from divine perspective

and better answer the question, whether the death of Christ on the cross is a kind of divine

punishment in God’s view. Both perspectives prepare us to argue for the thesis of this project in

Chapter 4.

The Philosophical Understanding of Punishment

Contexts of Punishment

Before our discussion of the definitions of punishment, it is important to point out that

whenever discussing the issues of punishment, we need to be aware of the contexts. For example,

we understand a parent’s punishment of his or her child for being grounded at home for a whole

day very differently from the state’s punishment of a felony for imprisonment for twenty years.

Analytic philosopher Stanley I. Benn writes,

32
 The word, “punishment” is used in varying contexts. The punishment meted out by the
state to a criminal or by a parent to his children is not the same as the punishment boxers
give or receive. The latter, however, is punishment only in a metaphorical sense, for it
lacks several of the features necessary in a standard case of punishment.1

The context of punishment helps us understand the different meanings of punishment. Igor

Primoratz also points out the significance of various contexts in understanding the concept of

punishment. He reminds us of the importance of studying the word “punishment” in contexts in

order to find out whether we can find “a common Core” about punishment within different

contexts or we may find no connection among them at all, because “God has punished a sinner”

could mean something very differently from “a judge has punished an offender.”2 Part of the

confusions and disagreements in the issue of divine punishment of Jesus is due to the differing

perceived meanings of the term “punishment” in the differing contexts. For example, in our

project, to understand divine punishment of Jesus in legal-juridical context can be very different

from that in the context of biblical-theological context, just as Craig reminds us, “While

analogous to divine justice, human systems of justice will also have features that are significantly

disanalogous to divine justice.”3

Definitions of Punishment

Just like the importance of context for understanding punishment, the definition of

punishment surely affects our understanding of punishment even more. For example, if one

defines punishment in such way that the perceived offender has to be dealt with and another

defines it in such way that the perceived offense (not necessarily the offender) has to be dealt

1
Stanley I. Benn, “Punishment,” in Paul Edwards (ed.), EP, vol. 7 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.
& The Free Press/ London: Collier Macmillan, 1967), 29.
2
Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment (Atlanta Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc.,
1989), 1.
3
Craig, The Atonement, 55.
33
with, then for the latter, any kinds of substitutionary penalties (for instance, penalty for vicarious

liability4) should not be counted as punishment. In addition, it is important to realize that whether

moral justification should be counted as one of the essential elements in the definition of

punishment, because if it is so, then unjustifiable punishment wouldn’t be counted as

punishment.

Legal philosopher Joel Feinberg points out in an influential paper of his on the expressive

function of punishment that when people in the past discussed the issue of punishment, they

often confused the definition of punishment and the justification of it until the 1950s when

analytic philosophers like A. G. N. Flew, Stanley I. Benn, and H. L. A. Hart started

distinguishing them.5 After pointing out Hart’s “five essential elements of legal punishment” —

unpleasant consequences, an offense against the legal norms, an offender, intentionality, an

authority6 — Feinberg himself concisely defines punishment “as the infliction of hard treatment

by an authority on a person for his prior failing in some respect (usually an infraction of a rule or

command).”7 In this seminal work, Feinberg points out that “community’s condemnation” is an

essential element in the nature of punishment; this condemnation as the expressive function of

4
One example of vicarious liability: an employer can be liable to his or her employee’s offence in the legal
point of view.
5
Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970), 95: “Recent influential articles have quiet sensibly distinguished between questions of
definition and justification, between justifying general rules and particular decisions, between moral and legal guilt.”
Besides the pioneering works of the British analytic philosophers (Flew, Benn, and Hart), at the other side of
Atlantic Ocean, American moral and political philosopher John Rawls develops two concepts of rules, the general
moral rule and the particular legal rule, and he applies the distinction of these two concepts in the issue of
punishment in his famous article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” in F. A. Olafson (ed.), Society, Law, and Morality
(Englewood, Cliffs, N. J. 1961).
6
H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 4–5.
7
Ibid.
34
punishment distinguishes punishment from all other kinds of penalties. He writes regarding the

difference between punishment and penalties,

That characteristic, or specific difference, I shall argue, is a certain expressive function:

punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the
punishing authority himself or of those “in whose name” the punishment is inflicted.
Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of
penalties.8

In talking about Feinberg’s insight on the role of punishment as condemnation, Mark Murphy

points out a significant point concerning condemnation,

It would be misleading simply to say that it is just the person who violates the norm in
question: punishment needs not be a total condemnation of the person’s character. Nor
can it just the act, the failing: even penalties are imposed because officials see the failings
as failings, which is in a way to condemn them, and thus we would lose our basis for
distinguishing punishments and penalties. The object of condemnation must be the person
in a particular respect, that is, the person as performer of this act.9

Realizing the important trend of distinguishing the definition of punishment and the

justification of it, legal theorists Hugo Adam Bedau and Erin Kelly state the distinction first and

then give their own definition of punishment,

Defining the concept of punishment must be kept distinct from justifying punishment. A
definition of punishment is, or ought to be, value-neutral, at least to the extent of not
incorporating any norms or principles that surreptitiously tend to justify whatever falls
under the definition itself. To put this another way, punishment is not supposed to be
justified, or even partly justified, by packing its definition in a manner that virtually
guarantees that whatever counts as punishment is automatically justified. (Conversely, its
definition ought not to preclude its justification.)

Punishment under law … is the authorized imposition of deprivations — of freedom or

privacy or other goods to which the person otherwise has a right, or imposition of special

8
Ibid., 98 (italics author’s).
9
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 116. This point is significant in two aspects. On the one hand, it is negative
for this project: the one condemned has to be the offender. This rejects the possibility of substitution in punishment.
On the other hand, it is positive for this project: Condemnation does not apply to the character of the one
condemned. The offender who is legally condemnable is not necessarily morally bad. Therefore, if a certain form of
justice allows vicarious liability (substitution) in punishment, the substitute can be morally sinless, even though he
or she is legally condemned.
35
 burdens — because the person has been found guilty of some criminal violation, typically
(though not invariably) involving harm to the innocent.10

Bedau and Kelly remind us that it is important to distinguish the definition and the

justification of punishment like earlier generation of analytic philosophers.11 Craig also points

out, “A definition of punishment will enable us to determine whether some act counts as

punishment, while a justification punishment will help us to determine whether a punitive act is

permitted or even required, depending on one’s theory.”12 This distinction is important for this

project because these two aspects (definition and justification) are relevant to divine punishment

of Jesus in the challenges to its coherence, especially when the challenges are related to the

definition of punishment. Bedau and Kelly also point out, from their definition of punishment

above, seven essential features of punishment:13 First, punishment is “an authorized act.” Second,

punishment is to deprive the offender of his or her rights. Third, not all harms (for example,

natural disaster) can be counted as punishment “unless they are inflicted by personal agency.”

Fourth, the object of punishment has to be a perceived guilty person who may not be an actual

offender. Fifth, punishment can be defined without explicit moral justification. Sixth,

punishment should be distinguished from non-punitive deprivations (like an offense in the law of

10
Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, "Punishment", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/punishment/
(italics authors’).
11
Besides the earlier works of legal philosophers, Flew, Hart, and Benn on the concept of punishment,
Vincent Geeraets recently also points out two mistakes about the concept of punishment and argues for an inclusive
and justificatory neutral concept of punishment which avoids both of John Finnis’ and Leo Zaibet’s mistakes in
defining punishment. Cf. Vincent Geeraets (2018) “Two Mistakes about the Concept of Punishment,”
in CJE, 37:21–35, DOI: 10.1080/0731129X.2018.1441227.
12
Craig, The Atonement and the Death of Christ, 150.
13
Bedau and Kelly, “Punishment,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/justice-retributive/>.
36
tort or contract) which do not express community’s condemnation. Finally, punishment must be

distinguished from other forms of “punishment” like family discipline.

Igor Primoratz confirms the distinction between the definition and the justification of

punishment and wants to further limit punishment primarily to a legal concept. He defines it “as

an evil deliberately inflicted qua evil on an offender by a human agency which is authorized by

the legal order whose laws the offender has violated.”14 He emphasizes that punishment should

be placed in the category of criminal law, and “implies nothing with respect to its moral

justification.”15 Primoratz, like all other legal positivists,16 does not want to include moral

justification in the definition of punishment.

Recently Alec Walen, writing about retributive justice, summarizes five essential

elements for an act to be counted as punishment:

First, punishment must impose some sort of cost or hardship on, or at the very least withdraw a benefit that
would otherwise be enjoyed by, the person being punished. … Second, the punisher must inflict hard
treatment intentionally, not as an accident, and not as a side-effect of pursuing some other end. … Third,
the hardship or loss must be imposed in response to an act or omission. … Fourth, the act or omission
ought to be wrongful. … Fifth, it is best to think of the hard treatment as imposed, at least in part, as a way
of sending a message of condemnation or censure for what is believed to be a wrongful act or omission.17

From the various above-mentioned definitions of punishment, we can see the nuanced

differentiation of emphasis besides the common features like hard treatment, offence/failure,

intentionality, and authority. Hart’s definition requires both offence and offender; Feinberg’s

definition emphasizes condemnation as an expressive function of punishment and the distinction

14
Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment (Altantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International,
1989), 1 (italics author’s).
15
Ibid., 5.
16
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 25–26.
17
Walen, Alec, "Retributive Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/justice-retributive/>.
37
of punishment from normal penalties; Bedau, Kelly, and Primoratz’s definition inherits the

analytic tradition to exclude moral justification from the definition and requires the guilty person

(not necessarily the offender for Bedau and Kelly) to be one of the essential elements in the

definition; Walen’s definition does not require the offender to be punished but only the offence

has to be dealt with. Difference in the definition of punishment, as we mentioned above, will

affect people’s judgment on whether a certain sentence should be counted as punishment or not.

For instance, most definitions require the offender himself or herself to be punished and thus will

not accept substitutionary punishment; but Valen and Bedau-Kelly’s definitions do not require

the offender himself or herself to be punished and thus allows substitutionary punishment

(according to Valen’s definition) and vicarious punishment (according to Bedau and Kelly’s

definition).

The Application of Definitions

Before we discuss the justification of punishment in general, let us consider a few cases

regarding the application of different definitions of punishment in the recent debate of divine

punishment of Jesus.

Mark Murphy adopts Feinberg’s expressivist definition of punishment in his conceptual

argument against PSA. He paraphrases Feinberg’s definition of punishment as “an authoritative

imposition of hard treatment upon one for the failure to adhere to some binding standard.”18 He

realizes that the three essential elements (hard treatment, authoritative imposition, and failure)

are necessary but not sufficient. For instance, for him, compensation for losses to a victim should

18
Mark C. Murphy, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment,” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 3:
255.
38
not be counted as punishment, because “it is a matter not of criminal law but private law.”19

Murphy expands his definition of punishment later in his work in philosophy of law to include

some basic conditions of punishment: punishment itself as an evil, imposition for a failure,

imposition by a personal authoritative agency, and condemnation of the wrongdoer.20 Murphy

applies his understanding of the nature of punishment to Christ’s sufferings and death. He insists

that the condemnation of the wrongdoer is “non-transferable: one cannot express condemnation

via hard treatment of someone who does not take to be worthy of condemnation.”21 He insists

that the object of punishment should be the wrongdoer not wrongdoing. He also insists that a

criminal’s mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty acts) are essential in order for him or her

to be blamed.22 Murphy cannot accept the concept of imputation which allows our sins and guilt

to be transferrable in his definition of punishment.

Hill and Jedwab basically agree with Murphy’s definition of punishment except for “the

attitudes of indignation and resentment” in the fourth elements of punishment.23 However, they

disagree with Murphy in his application of the definition to Christ’s suffering and death. They

argue, pace Murphy, that the one punished does not have to be the offender or the one

condemned.24

19
Ibid.
20
Mark C. Murphy, Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Balckwell, 2007), 113–16. Quoted from Hill and Jedwab,
“Atonement and the Concept of Punishment,” in Locating Atonement, 141–42.
21
Mark C. Murphy, “Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment,” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 3:
256.
22
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 113. Even Augustine seems to presuppose that for a punishment to be just it
has to be afflicted to a person who possesses guilty mind and guilt act. He writes, “Just as the judge inflicts
punishment on the guilty; yet it is not the justice of the judge, but the desert of the crime, which is the cause of the
punishment.” (De Trinitate, 4.12.15.)
23
Hill and Jedwab, “Atonement and the Concept of Punishment,” in Locating Atonement, 144.
24
Ibid., 144–45.
39
 Although Feinberg’s expressivist definition of punishment (supported by Murphy and

others) is popular, there is hidden danger in it, especially in his distinction between punishment

and penalty. Craig, while admitting that there is no consensus on the sufficient conditions for

punishment, adopts Alec Walen’s characterization of four essential elements of punishment and

adds the fifth element of imposition by authority (“to distinguish from punishment from personal

vengeance or vigilantism”).25 The difference between Walen’s definition of punishment and

Murphy’s is that Walen emphasizes punishment on the wrongdoing whereas Murphy emphasizes

punishment on the wrongdoer. Murphy’s emphasis on the wrongdoer as the object of punishment

leads him to insist on the non-transferrable nature of punishment, and thus he rejects the

substitutionary element in PSA. Craig adopts a typical expressivist definition of punishment

along with the biblical doctrine of imputation. Thus, he can hold both an expressivist

understanding of punishment and the possibility of divine punishment of Jesus (even though he

does not argue for the latter).

Although the distinction between definition and justification has been influenced by legal

positivism,26 it is important in legal discourse especially when we discuss the possibility of the

punishment of the innocent and at the same time we are able to avoid what H. L. A. Hart calls

“the definitional stop” which terminates the legal discussions at the level of definition.27 For

25
Craig, The Atonement, 55–56. Craig uses Walen’s definition of 2014 version which only consists of four
essential elements. Walen adds fifth in his article of the 2020 version.
26
Philip Soper, “legal positivism,” in CDP, 490: “a theory about the nature of law, commonly thought to be
characterized by two major tenets: (1) that there is no necessary connection between law and morality; and (2) that
legal validity is determined ultimately by reference to certain basic social facts, e.g., the command of the sovereign
(John Austin), the Grundnorm (Hans Kelsen), or the rule of recognition (Hart).” Legal positivism, especially hard
positivism, has been challenged by many theories including natural law theories (e.g., Don Fuller’s procedural
natural law theory and Thomas Aquinas’ substantive natural law theory) and even soft legal positivism within legal
positivist camp (Ronald Dworkin). Cf. Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 32–43.
27
Michael S. Moore, “Punishment,” in CDP, 759: “The ‘definitional stop’ argument in discussions of
punishment seeks to tie punishment analytically to retributivism.”
40
example, if a certain form of retributivist justice cannot accept a substitute to be punished for the

offender, then “the definitional stop” argument will claim that this should not be considered as

punishment at all and the argument should stop there. What Murphy does just like that in his

argument against PSA. This is one form of conceptual objection to divine punishment of Jesus.

Being “disappointed and dissatisfied with the unbiblical and anemic theories of the

atonement defended by many contemporary Christian philosophers,”28 Craig engages himself in

this task since there seems to him no satisfactory work that has been done in this area. He surely

welcomes such a distinction in his recent philosophical and theological study of the atonement

with the awareness of the usefulness of this distinction in his philosophical defense of PSA.29

For the application of definitions of punishment, we cannot simply pick what fits our

preference. We need to be aware the context of our discussion and justify our choice of certain

definition of punishment. For our discussion of divine punishment of Jesus, we will examine

later whether God allows a substitute, in his definition of punishment, to be punished for human

sins; if he does, on what condition? Can any human being be a substitute? For these questions,

we need to find the answers from the biblical and theological arguments which are our task in the

later part of this chapter.

Offense/Crime, Guilt, and Punishment

Another issue related to the definition of punishment needs to be dealt with before

dealing with its justification. That is the concept of offense or crime. In philosophy in general,

the question is, What kind of offense (wrongdoing) can be or should be punished? In legal

28
Craig, The Atonement, 2.
29
Craig, The Atonement, 54; Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 150.
41
theories in particular, the question simply, what is crime?30 The significance of this issue in our

project is that if the offence (crime, wrongdoing, sin) is intrinsically inseparable from the

offender to the point that no penal substitution can be allowed, then this understanding of offence

certainly affects the answer to the question, whether Christ can be a penal substitute for our sins?

Legal philosopher Antony Duff gives a positivist definition of crimes “as kinds of

conducts that are prohibited, on pain of threatened sanctions, by the law.”31 M. Murphy points

out that for a conduct to be a crime, its performer has to have both a guilty mind and a guilty

act.32 Duff points out that one of the inadequate views is one represented by the positivist

philosopher Jeremy Bentham who bases the issue of whether and when the crime should be

punished on the utilitarian ground, that is, whether the punishment will produce social good or

happiness instead of just desert of the criminal. Duff defines crimes as “at least, socially

proscribed wrongs – kinds of conduct that are condemned as wrong by some purportedly

authoritative social norm.”33 He points out that crimes should be public wrongs that are usually

dealt with in the criminal court; they are to be distinguished from those offenses that are dealt

with in the civil court, like wrongs according to tort law. The offenses in tort law are indeed

“non-private” in the sense that they are “legally and socially declared as wrongs,” but they can

be dealt with in a private way “in the sense that it is up to the person who is wronged to seek

legal redress.”34 For example, the wrongdoer can appease the victim with financial compensation

30
This issue becomes crucial when we deal with the issue of divine punishment and forgiveness.
31
Antony Duff, “Legal Punishment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/punishment/
32
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 116.
33
Duff, “Legal Punishment.”
34
Ibid.
42
if it is accepted. Duff points out, however, that it is extremely difficult “to give a clear and

plausible account of the distinction between the civil and criminal law, between ‘private’ and

‘public’ legal wrongs.”35 The difficulty of this distinction is just like the one between punishment

and penalty.36 Even though it is difficult to categorize the crimes, it is still possible, for Duff, to

allow certain offenses to be dealt with by substitution. However, it is impossible, in Murphy’s

understanding of offense and offender, to allow penal substitution. David Lewis points out that

our legal system does not allow penal substitution in criminal case but does allow it in civil case

(through fines), and he further argues that certain fines in civil cases can be “just as burdensome

as prison sentence.”37 Philip Quinn shows that penal substitution is not always unacceptable even

in criminal cases.38 This is significant for our project that divine punishment of Jesus is not only

supported by biblical witnesses (we’ll argue this in Chapter 4), but also not always inconsistent

with legal practice in human courts as some opponents of PSA may have assumed.

Punishment and Intentionality

We need to be aware of an important element in the definitions of punishment —

intentionality. This issue is related to this project because the question of whether the Father

35
Ibid.
36
Flemming vs. Nestor in 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 114: “In this case the United
States has allowed past membership in the Communist Party to count as grounds for noncitizens to be deported and
have their social security benefit revoked. This law was passed after Ephram Nestor, a Bulgarian immigrant, had
joined and then left the Communist Party. Nestor was deported and his benefits revoked, and he appealed the
decision to revoke his benefits, holding that this was a punishment imposed ex post facto, in violation of the United
States Constitution. The central question of the se, which reached the Supreme Court, was whether Nestor’s
deprivation of social security benefits counted as punishment. The Court’s decision was that it did not: while there
was indeed a deprivation authoritatively imposed on Nestor because of Nester’s past Communist Party affiliation,
this was not a case of punishment; it was merely a rule that was being use to regulate United States immigration.”
37
David Lewis, “Do we believe in penal substitution?” PhiloP 26 (1997): 203–209. Reprinted in Michael
Rea (ed.), Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, vol.1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 308–13.
38
Philip L. Quinn, “Review of Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy by David Lewis.” Nous 38(4), 722–
30. Quoted in Craig, The Atonement, 78, 102.
43
intends to crucify Jesus is related to the question of, whether the Father punishes Jesus. An

accidental hard treatment cannot be counted as a punishment. Lombardo has developed a helpful

account of intending and willing (especially the distinction between the means with ontological

necessity and the means with ontological and logical necessity) for talking about the problem of

the Father’s will and Christ’s crucifixion.39 He uses an example to illustrate his insight. When a

surgeon wants to remove a patient’s cancerous tumor, he or she will unavoidably cause bodily

harm to the patient, but we cannot say that he or she intends or wills to harm the patient; more

reasonably we should say that the surgeon intends or wills to bring restoration of health by

means of the necessary bodily harm.40 In Lombardo’s terms, we can say that bodily harm to the

patient is ontological necessity not logical necessity of the surgery.

Even with Lombardo’s insight for distinguishing logical and ontological necessity, there

are two problems with the application to the crucifixion, as Adonis Vidu pointed out recently:

Lombardo’s first problem is that “the crucifixion is not logically but ontologically necessary for

God’s ultimate aim.”41 Lombardo’s conclusion seems hard to harmonize with the plainly

scriptural witness of the necessity of Messiah’s death (Luke 24:26; Acts 17:3).42 Lombardo’s

second problem is that his ontological necessity argument “does not do justice to the New

Testament portrayal of Jesus’s death as having penal (or at least a cultic-legal) quality.”43

Following Lombardo’s argument, the conclusion seems to be that, as Vidu points out, “God does

not intend the killing of Jesus, and this killing is simply the work of the powers. God wills

39
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 36.
40
Ibid., 39.
41
Vidu, The Same God Who Works All Things, 232.
42
Ibid., 233.
43
Ibid.
44
without intending Jesus’s death.”44 On the one hand, Lombardo is sure that Jesus’s crucifixion is

“something more than mere historical inevitability”; on the other hand, he is aware that “the New

Testament affirms repeatedly and unequivocally that Christ’s crucifixion is necessary to God’s

plan of salvation.”45 Vidu points out that Lombardo’s proposal “distinguishes between the

Father’s intending the death of Jesus and his willing to let Jesus die at the hands of powers,” the

consequence of the proposal is “lacking an intention of the Father, the crucifixion is not to be

ascribed to him but to the powers alone.”46 This conclusion seems contradictory to the biblical

portrayal of the Father’s active involvement in human salvation through Jesus’s death (Zech.

13:7; Matt. 27:46, etc.). Vidu also points out that another important negligence in Lombardo’s

proposal is the lack of penal or legal quality of Jesus’s death as demonstrated in apostolic

teachings (Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21).47 In sum, although Lombardo’s intention analysis is helpful in

the distinction between logical and ontological necessity, the application of his analysis to the

Father’s will in Jesus’s crucifixion is not successful because it removes the crucial element of

divine intentionality. Hans Boersma is right to claim that “the cross is not an event that is

separated from divine intentionality.”48 And this divine intention is originated in divine unity of

the immanent Trinity, as Vidu writes, “The economic works of God originate in an eternal unity

of intention and execution in the ‘divine counsel.’”49 If the Father’s will is never involved in

Jesus’s crucifixion, we can never call it punishment by the Father. But the situation on the cross

44
Ibid., 234.
45
Ibid., 140–41.
46
Ibid., 234.
47
Ibid., 234–5.
48
Hans Boersma, “Violence, the Cross, and Divine Intentionality: A Modified Reformed View,” in
Atonement and Violence: A Theological Conversation, 51.
49
Vidu, “The Place of the Cross among the inseparable Operations of the Trinity,” in Locating Atonement,
36.
45
is actually the opposite, the Father (and even the whole triune God) is indeed involved with his

intention in the death of his Son (Isa. 53:10) even though the crucifixion is executed by the hands

of the wicked.

Justifications of Punishment

After defining punishment, we now need to investigate the moral bases or justifications

of punishment. The justification of punishment is one of the crucial issues in this project,

because one of the challenges to divine punishment of Jesus, as we have seen in Chapter 1, is

whether God is just or moral in punishing his innocent Son. This is a challenge concerning the

moral justification of punishment. In this section, we will survey of the legal theories on the

justification of punishment.

Philosophers and legal theorists have tried to find a unifying ground for justification, but

they have failed to find one. Benn points out that there are two levels of question in

justifications:50 One level is to accept the general intuition that all wrongdoers must be punished;

the goal of justice then is to justify a particular case of punishment. This is so-called

retributivism or deontological justification. The other level is to question the retributivist

intuition and the practice of inflicting pain or deprivation upon a human being; the goal of justice

then is to justify the institution and the set of general rules for punishment. This is called

utilitarianism or consequentialist justification. Retributivism emphasizes on just deserts; it is

backward looking; it does not concern how much good the punishment will bring to individual or

the society; utilitarianism, on the contrary, is forward-looking; it emphasizes the consequential

good or happiness that punishment can bring to the individuals and society, like deterrence of

future crimes, societal reformation, educational and restorative purpose of the offender, etc.

50
S. I. Benn, “Justice,” Paul Edwards (ed.), EP, vol. 4, 298–302.
46
Issues in Justification

Hart, Duff, Bedau and Kelly point out three justificatory issues or tasks: the aim, the

object, and the means of punishment, i.e., Why is punishment needed? Who is to be punished?

and, How punishment is to be meted out?51 Murphy similarly describes the three justificatory

issues as “the point, target, and amount of punishment.”52

Normative Theories of Justification: Retributive Justice and Utilitarian Justice

In history, philosophers and legal theorists have been making efforts to give normative

theories to justify punishment. Duff points out that “the crucial function of normative theories of

punishment is to provide a crucial standard against which actual practices can be measured —

and found wanting.”53 For the three justificatory issues mentioned above (the aim, the target, and

the means), people come up with two very different kinds of theories of justification:

retributivism and utilitarianism. The former, as mentioned above, emphasizes just deserts, and

the latter emphasizes the consequential social good coming out of punishment. Surely there are

51
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 1–27 (quoted in R. A. Duff’s “Legal Punishment,” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy); Bedau and Kelly also point out the necessity of the aim and the means of punishment:
“we must show that we cannot achieve this goal unless we punish (and punish in certain ways and not in others) and
that we cannot achieve them with comparable or superior efficiency and fairness by nonpunitive interventions.”
(Bedau and Kelly, “Punishment,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy); Duff, “Legal Punishment”: “we
must distinguish at least three justificatory issues. First, what is the ‘general justifying aim’ of a system of
punishment: what justifies the creation and maintenance of such a system — what good can it achieve, what duty
can it fulfil, what moral demand can it satisfy? Second, who may properly be punished: what principles or aims
should determine the allocations of punishments to individuals? Third, how should the appropriate amount of
punishment be determined: how should sentencers go about deciding what sentence to impose? (One dimension of
this third question concerns the amount or severity of punishment; another, which is insufficiently discussed by
philosophers, concerns the concrete modes of punishment that should be available, in general or for particular
crimes.) ”
52
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 117.
53
Duff and Garland, “Introduction: Thinking about Punishment,” in Duff and Garland (eds.), A Reader on
Punishment, 5.
47
also some mixed theories which seek to avoid the theoretical and practical difficulties arising

either from pure retributivism or pure utilitarianism.

The fundamental meaning of retributive justice is that the innocent should not be

punished (negative retributivism) and all evil should be punished (positive retributivism),

although people define justice on different bases.54 History has seen “a revival of positive

retributivism” during the late decades of the twentieth century,55 which should be welcome by

theologians who support penal substitution.56 The task before retributivists is to give reasons for

these fundamental questions: Why does an offender deserve punishment? What does an offender

deserve to suffer? Why does an offender should suffer in certain way?

Arguments for and Problems of Retributivism

There are at least three types of arguments for retributivism: The first argument, which is

also the classical philosophical argument for retributivism, is based on Kantian “imperative of

morality”57: universal reason and human right and duty. For Kant, we can only punish a criminal

in poena forensis for what he or she has committed because he believes human beings are

autonomous and should never be treated as means to an end. Benn points out that “[t]he most

thorough retributivists, exemplified by Kant, maintain that the punishment of crime is right itself,

that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, and that justice, or the moral order, requires the

institution of punishment. This, however, is not to justify punishment but, rather, to deny that it

54
Maxie Burch, “Justice,” in EDT, 642.
55
R. A. Duff, “Legal Punishment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
56
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 175–76.
57
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford Philosophical Texts, trans. Arnulf
Zweig, ed. Thomas E. Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 217.
48
needs any justification.”58 The second argument for (especially positive) retributivism is from the

so-called “unfair advantage” theory or “benefits-and-burdens” theory. The line of argument goes

like this: the offender has taken an unfair advantage over the law-abiding citizens by not obeying

the constraints that the law demands, and therefore, it is reasonable to take away such an unfair

advantage by inflicting punishment on the offender. However, this argument is not without

difficulties.59 The third argument is from normative human emotional response to crime. The

universal human experience of resentment or indignation from the victim or the public and the

guilt from the offender justifies certain punishments of the offender. An influential version of

retributivism from emotional response (since Joel Feinberg) is the expressive function of

punishment. Later Antony Duff develops it into a communication theory of punishment.60 For the

expressive or communicative justification of punishment, Duff recognizes its serious issues.61

However, retributivism is not without problems. The first problem is that retributivism

can be perceived of a kind of retaliation. Retaliation is certainly not considered as a virtue. Kant

realizes this natural criticism and points out the distinction between punishment and a private

58
S. I. Benn, “Punishment,” in EP, 29.
59
Andrew von Hirsch, “Censure and Proportionality,” in Duff and Garland (eds.), A Reader on
Punishment, 116–18.
60
Duff, “Retrieving Retributivism,” in Mark. D. White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–24.
61
Ibid.: “However, an obvious and crucial question faces any such justification of punishment as
communicative enterprise. Censure can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could
be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal
community, or by s system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial
meaning. It can, of course, also be communicated by ‘hard treatment’ punishments of the kinds imposed by our
courts – by imprisonment, by compulsory community service, by fines and the like, which are burdensome
independently of their censorial meaning; but why should we choose such methods of communication, rather than
methods that do not involve hard treatment? Is it because they will make the communication more effective? But
why is it so important to make the communication effective — and is there not a serious danger that the hard
treatment will conceal, rather highlight, the moral censure it should communicate?” (quotations in Duff’s text
removed).
49
revenge.62 The second problem of retributivism is hard to decide the severity of punishment

proportionately to the gravity of the offense.63 Because of this kind of difficulty, some theorists

propose to hold a retributivist stance as a general principle for punishment but adopt a utilitarian

approach in deciding its practical measurement.64 The third problem is the hypocrisy of

retributivist punishment. The line of argument is like this: certain Corrupt society may have

influenced even caused an offender to commit some crimes. For example, a thief may steal

because of his extreme poverty and loss of capability of working. However, as Primoratz points

out, the argument of using the social condition as an excuse of shunning personal responsibility

is “untenable,” “misguided,” and “too farfetched to be plausible.”65 Primoratz does add an

important point to the practical implementation of retributivist punishment, that is, the necessity

of considering the social factors in just deserts. The famous true story of New York’s well-

respected former mayor Feirello LaGuardia, I think, can illustrate this point.66 The fourth

argument against retributivist theory is the offender’s right to be punished. Hegel seems to

advance such theory.67 This kind of right sounds odd to many.68 This right is odd because it does

62
Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, 130: “Punishment is not a function which the injured party can undertake on his
private authority, but rather the function of a tribunal distinct from him, which gives effect to the law of a supreme
authority over all those subject to him.” (italics author’s). Quoted from Primoratz’s Justifying Legal Punishment, 84.
63
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 125: “blameworthiness of deed and severity of punishment have two
different levels of measure, and as such cannot be considered equal or unequal to each other; that is simply a
category mistake.”
64
Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 86.
65
Ibid., 97.
66
LaGuardia recognized the moral issue of the society and penalized a destitute grandmother who has
stolen a loaf of bread to feed her two hungry grandchildren, then he himself paid for her and collected extra money
from those in that courtroom as a symbol of penalty for the societal indifference and gave it to the grandmother. Cf.
https://thebl.com/culture/judge-silences-court-with-shocking-sentence-for-bread-thief.html.
67
The interpretation of what Hegel means by “right” in his theory of punishment as the offender’s right is a
debated philosophical issue and beyond the scope of this project.
68
Anthony M. Quinton, Quoted from Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 98.
50
not truly belong to the offender; it actually belongs to the society or the state. It is better to

understand this right as guilt69 or desert.70 The last argument against retributivism is its

incompatibility with pardon. According to the Kantian notion of retributivist justice, all offenses

have to be punished; it leaves no room for mercy or pardon. However, McCloskey points out that

the duty of punishment should not be an absolute one; it should allow mercy and pardon.71

Arguments for and Problems of Utilitarianism

Contrast to retributivism, utilitarianism justifies punishment not by just deserts, but by the

overall good consequence for the society or individuals. Since for utilitarians, punishment itself

is a kind of evil, the consequence of inflicting punishment on the offender has to promote an

overall greater good for society. Jeremy Bentham claims that “all punishment is a mischief … If

it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to excluded

some greater evil”72 Bentham argues for utilitarianism based on his principle of utility that all

human actions and their standard of right and wrong are governed by “two sovereign masters,

pain and pleasure.”73 Mark Murphy concisely summarizes Benthamian justification of

punishment this way, “all decisions are to be made by reference to the promotion of the overall

69
T. Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications, revised edition (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin,
1976), 43. Quoted from Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 98–99.
70
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in Love (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 85–86: “Suppose that one thinks
of punishment of wrongdoers not in terms of the good that punishment might do them but purely in terms of
retribution. Then one would not speak of punishment as something the wrongdoer has a right to but as something he
deserves; punishment is his just desert.” (italics author’s)
71
H. J. McCloskey, “Approach for Punishment,” 255–257. Quoted from Primoratz, Justifying Legal
Punishment, 110, 181.
72
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books, 1988 [first punished 1781]), 170.
73
Ibid., 125 (italics author’s).
51
good of society. … Bentham understands the goods of individuals within a political community

as pleasures and the bads as pains.”74

Historically, there are at least three typical kinds of argument for utilitarianism. The first

argument is punishment for deterrence. On the one hand, punishment can deter people in public

for future offenses because they realize that anyone who is caught in his or her offense will be

punished. This naturally produces an effect of deterrence in general. On the other hand, the

offender himself or herself can be deterred for future offenses by his or her personal painful

experience in punishment. Nigel Walker argues from the Kantian principle of persons as ends

instead of means to support the use of punishment as deterrence to offenders who are treated as

rational and moral beings.75 The second argument for utilitarianism is punishment for

reformation or rehabilitation. Although this is not an easy result from punishment, a utilitarian

could argue that it is possible to expect changes in an offender’s motives, attitudes, moral

orientations, even character from the effect of punishment. For an offender, reformation which

emphasizes moral change is different from deterrence which emphasizes fear of punishment. The

third argument is punishment for incapacitation or disablement. Incapacitation is a relatively

easy method to benefit the society by depriving the offender of his or her physical capability for

doing harm to others. For example, imprisonment can easily disable an offender for hurting

others or society.

The problems with utilitarianism are many. The first and also the most obvious objection

to utilitarianism is to concern the possibility of punishing an innocent or punishing an offender

more than what he or she deserves if that punishment is considered to be able to promote a

74
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 117.
75
Nigel Walker, “Reductivism and Deterrence,” in Duff and Garland (eds.), A Reader on Punishment, 215.
(Originally from N. Walker’s Punishment, Danger, and Stigma, 1980).
52
greater overall social good. Murphy comments, “this is a bad criticism.”76 He argues that no

punishment of the innocent should be included in the general utilitarian rule of good social

consequence. But my response to Murphy is, this may not be so easy to decide when the social

tension comes. High priest Caiaphas’ utilitarian proposal in sentencing Jesus is an illustration

(John 11:49–50). The second line of counter argument is the utilitarian implication: crimes

without bad social consequence may not need to be punished. For example, severe domestic

violence may not be considered to have bad overall consequence to the society. Then should our

law ignore it from the utilitarian point of view? It does not seem right from human intuition or

moral consciousness. The third objection is concerned with the way of determining the amount

of punishment correlated with the overall social good. Empirical data in social and

criminological studies seem unable to confirm the certain correlation, for example, between

capital punishment and the effect of deterrence.77 The fourth objection is to question the state’s

legitimate role in offender’s moral reformation78 and its efficacy.79

One may argue for divine punishment of Jesus by utilitarianism in that the punishment of

Jesus may be not just from the perspective of retributive justice, but it can great benefit of saving

many invaluable souls. Indeed, this is a great benefit for humankind, but can this utilitarian

benefit compromise God’s justice? Sure not, because biblical God is not only good and loving,

but also holy and righteous at the same time. This “quick and easy” way of dealing with the

76
Ibid., 120.
77
Richard Berk, “New Claims about Execution and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?” JELS 2
(2005): 303–30. Quoted from Murphy’s Philosophy of Law, 122, 144.
78
It supposes to be the roles of education and religions instead of law.
79
The empirical data does not provide convincing evidence of efficaciousness.
53
objection to God’s punishment of innocent Jesus does not fit the biblical picture that “God’s

justice must be in some significant measure of retributive justice.”80

Mixed Theories of Justification

We have seen both normative theories of justice, retributivism and utilitarianism, trying

to give their justifications for punishment respectively. We have also seen that both pure

retributivism and pure utilitarianism have encountered theoretical and practical challenges.81 The

natural thought is to find a middle way between these two seemingly opposing views or to

incorporate some elements from these two views to come up with a mixed or synthetic theory of

justification of punishment. The typical middle-way thinking, as Primoratz points out, is to find a

supposed distinction between retributivism and utilitarianism and give them different roles in

justice.82 There are many types of mixed theories, all of which have tried to incorporate both

retributivist and utilitarian elements in these syntheses.83 However, it seems there is no single

80
Craig, The Atonement, 67–69. We will deal with some theologians’ objection to biblical retributive
justice later in the chapter.
81
Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment, 111–12: “Utilitarians tended to depict the retributive view as
irrational, vindictive, and reactionary, and to deny it any intellectual or moral respectability… Retributivists, on the
other hand, pointed out the obliviousness of utilitarianism to the claims of justice as an autonomous principle, and
the consequent tendency of its proponents to accept, and even call for, various types of obviously unjust punishment,
whenever they turn out to be socially useful. … Retributivism is characterized by ‘vindictive barbarousness,’ which
calls for the infliction of suffering for suffering’s sake, while the utilitarian theory is plagued by ‘vicious
opportunism,’ which culminates in the willingness to justify punishment of the innocent, whenever that would be
expedient.”
82
Ibid., 112: “All the attempts have proceeded from a distinction supposedly overlooked, or at least not
fully appreciated, in the preceding debates: ether the distinction between the question of the meaning of the word
‘punishment’ and that of moral justification of what the word stands for, or between the ultimate end of punishment
and the means indispensable for achieving it; or between the rationale of the institution of punishment and the
principle, or principles, governing its application to particular cases. The synthesis is to be accomplished by working
out a division of labor between the two theories, the basis of the distinction seen as crucial.”
83
There are three major types of mixed theories. The first type is based on the natural thought: we can use
utilitarianism as a general aim or principle for the institution of punishment and use retributivism as a special
constraining or limiting mechanism for the particular act of punishment in order to avoid injustice in the imposition
and implementation of punishment (John Rawls, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart). The second type is to put retributivism
as the general aim of punishment and utilitarianist values in the imposition and implementation of the specific
54
mixed theory can convince both camps to accept without reservation. There are ongoing

philosophical debates among the circle of legal theorists.

Punishment, Legal Fiction, and Vicarious Liability

In our project, one of issues that we need to deal with is whether the doctrine of

imputation is acceptable in punishment. We have seen that Murphy does not accept this doctrine

in punishment. In the theological discourse of our sins being imputed to Christ, the common

challenge is that this transaction or imputation is just a “legal fiction” which is often considered

to mean “not real.” For example, Oliver Crisp understands imputation of our sins and guilt to

Christ as “a kind of legal fiction, where God treats Christ as if he were the one guilty of sin,

though he is in fact innocent of any sin.”84 Marcus Borg and John Dominic Crossan deny Apostle

Paul’s idea of divine retributive justice and claim that the doctrine of imputation is just a

“fictional imputation of justice” or God’s pretense instead of a “factual transformation by

justice.”85 However, as Craig discovers from legal literature, “[t]he use of legal fictions is a long

established, widespread, and indispensable feature of systems of law.”86 The function of legal

fictions is often misunderstood as “not real” in the theological circle, actually in legal theory and

practice it does not mean “not real” at all. On the contrary, as Craig points out, “[a] legal fiction

is a device that is adopted precisely in order to bring about real and objective differences in the

world.”87 For example, in the classic case of Mostyn vs. Fabrigas (1774), even though Minorca is

punishment as benefits for the society and the individuals (A. C. Ewing). The third type is a two-level principle:
retributivism as logical principle and utilitarianism as ethical or moral principle (Anthony Quinton).
84
Crisp, Approaching the Atonement, 110 (italics mine).
85
Marcus J. Borg and John Dominic Crossan, The First Paul: Reclaiming the Radical Visionary behind
the Church’s Conservative Icon (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2009), 165. Quoted from Craig’s Atonement and the
Death of Christ, 184.
86
Craig, The Atonement, 62.
87
Ibid.
55
not a part of London geographically, but it was considered as a part of London by legal fiction to

bring out legal justice.88

In the penal practice, one of the common issues related with theological discussion of

PSA is whether it is just to punish the innocent substitute. As we have mentioned Stump’s

challenge in Chapter 1, the offender is said to be not really punished if someone else is punished

in his or her place.89 In civil law, there is the so-called “principle of respondeat superior” which

means the superior is responsible for the offense of the subordinates in some cases.90 For

example, an employee’s violation of the law can be imputed to his or her employer, not because

the employer has done anything wrong legally, but because their relationship in the

employment.91 This principle can also happen in criminal law. For example, in Allen vs.

Whitehead case (1930), the employer was charged criminally guilty because of his employee

allowed prostitution to happen in the café that he owned.92 Craig points out, “Interestingly,

vicarious liability is another case of strict liability, where the superior is held to be guilty without

being found blameworthy, since no mens rea is required.”93 He concludes that we cannot claim

that there is no analogy of the doctrine of the imputation of sins in our life experience.94

Punishment and Pardon

88
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 185.
89
Stump, Atonement, 24.
90
L. H. Leigh, Strict and Vicarious Liability: A Study in Administrative Criminal Law, Modern Legal
Studies (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1982), Quoted in Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 188.
91
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 188.
92
Ibid. 188–89.
93
Ibid., 189.
94
Ibid., 190.
56
 For the issue of divine punishment of Jesus, we do not just need to deal with the major

issue of punishment, but also need to deal with forgiveness related to punishment, because the

purpose of divine punishment of Jesus is to bring forgiveness or pardon to the repentant

humanity. It has been a long-term legal practice in human history that the state or the

representative of the state (like the Emperor or the President) allows to give pardons to the

criminals and to release them from the punishment sentenced. Chief Justice John Marshal gives

an important definition of legal pardon or forgiveness, “A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding

from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whim

it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”95 The purpose

and effect of pardon is to remove the offense and thus the offender’s punishment. Craig points

out that the controversial issue concerning the pardon is whether a pardon can remove the

offender’s guilt.96 Here we can see that the answer depends on what one’s definition of guilt is. If

guilt is defined as the fact of offense that an offender has ever committed, like what Samuel

Williston defines, then it is indelible and surely no pardon can expiate guilt according to its

meaning. But if guilt is defined, as Craig defines, in the theological and legal contexts, the

“liability to punishment,”97 then the power of the pardon can surely remove the guilt. Craig’s

definition of guilt is adopted in our project.

Summary and Conclusions

Contexts and definitions are important in our understanding of punishment, therefore

some confusions in understanding punishment may result from the neglect of different contexts

95
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 [1833]. Quoted from Craig’s The Atonement, 83–84.
96
Craig, The Atonement, 84.
97
Ibid., 89: “It seems to me that the most perspicuous understanding of guilt in this sense is that it is
liability to punishment.” (italics author’s)
57
and definitions. One common and significant mistake related to our project is that people use

legal definition and context to debate about the biblical and theological concept of divine

punishment. In the legal practice, it is helpful to distinguish the analytic definition of punishment

and its moral justifications. There are two major normative theories to justify punishment:

retributivism and utilitarianism. Each theory has its own strengths and also faces its own

challenges as we have mentioned before. Some mixed theories arise and try to overcome some of

the challenges, but no one is completely successful. It seems encouraging for this project that

retributivism has gained revival in the legal-philosophical circle in recent decades, because this

may be helpful for people to accept biblical retributivism.98 Legal fiction is commonly

misunderstood (especially in the theological circle) as “not real,” but its legal function is

precisely the opposite which is to bring a real difference in the world as we have just mentioned.

This can be found in the long-standing legal practice of vicarious liability. Retributivism also

allows a pardon, but this pardon has to be from an authoritative agent. All these discussions will

prepare us for our arguments for divine punishment of Jesus in Chapter 4 and 5.

The Biblical Understanding of Punishment

Having studied the philosophical understandings of punishment, we wonder what God

says about punishment. After all, the central issue in our investigation is divine punishment of

Jesus. Philosophical understanding of punishment prepares us to understand the reason of the

differing views regarding this issue; biblical understanding of punishment gives God’s view of it.

We will discuss biblical meanings of punishment, biblical principles of justice and punishment,

and the relationship between guilt and punishment in this section.

98
Surely not all theologians accept biblical retributivism, we will respond their objections in the next
section of this chapter.
58
 Biblical Meanings of Punishment

Webster’s American Dictionary’s definition of punishment is very close to the biblical

understanding of this term. Punishment was defined in this KJV Bible friendly dictionary as

“[a]ny pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offense, by the authority to which the

offender is subject, either by the constitution of God or of civil society.”99 The meanings of

punishment can include parental discipline of children. The purposes of punishment include

inflicting suffering on the offender and “chastisement or correction.”100

In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word for punishment ‫’( אָ וֶן‬āwen) which means

“iniquity” or “evil” in most of the 230 occurrences also expresses God’s infliction of hardship,

punishment, or chastisement on the offenders against him or his holy Torah.101 For example,

Cain was punished by God when he killed his brother Abel (Gen. 4:13). Priests of Israel should

not profane the holy things contributed to the Lord, otherwise they will be punished (Lev. 22:

15–16). When God’s punishment (chastisement) of his people for their iniquity is finished, he

will not keep them in exile any longer (Lam. 4:22).

Hebrew word ‫( פָּקַ ד‬pāqad) means “attend to, muster, visit, and even visit graciously”

(Gen. 20:1, 50:24, 25; Exod. 4:31) and also means “punish” which express God’s punishment of

sinners for their sins and evil (Exod. 32:34; Isa.13:11; 26:14; Lam. 4:22; 9:9; Zeph. 1:12, etc.).

Hebrew word ‫( נָקַ ם‬nāqam) means “avenge, take vengeance, or entertain revengeful feelings.”102

It can express “Israel’s actions against her neighbor,” but when it uses to describe God, it

99
Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language (1828): “PUNISHMENT.”
100
Ibid.
101
Eugene Carpenter and Michael A. Grisanti, “‫אָ וֶן‬,” W. A. VanGemeren (ed.), NIDOTTE, 1:309–15;
Stephen D. Renn, EDBW, 767–68.
102
BDB, 667–8.
59
expresses God’s appropriate reaction, as a public person, against people who violate his holy

laws.103 ‫( יָסַ ר‬yāsar) means “ to chastise,” “to instruct,” and “to punish” (Lev. 26:18, 28; Jer.

30:11; 31:18; 46:8; Pss. 6:1; 38:1; 39:11; Deut. 8:5; 21:18; 22:18; Prov. 19:18; 29:17, etc.104 It

means Yahweh’s punishment on his rebellious people in the covenant context and parental

discipline and instruction in the family context. Writing about God’s “educative righteousness”

in the covenant context, Walther Eichrodt points out, on the one hand, sin incurs divine

punishment; on the other hand, “God does not mere punish, but by punishing seeks to educate”

and the meaning of divine righteousness is “not exhausted” by retributive justice; but the heathen

will be punished “under his annihilating judgment.”105 William B. Nelson, Jr. points out that

“guilt and punishment were understood to be communal” in the early history of Israel;

punishment can be meted out by God’s direct intervention or through Mosaic judicial system;

most violations of the Ten Commandments can incur severe punishment.106 However, even in the

Old Testament time God has provided a way for forgiveness through Levitical sacrificial system.

On the Day of Atonement, as Paul R. House points out, all kinds of guilt and transgressions can

be removed through the offering of sacrifice and most importantly through the laying hands on

the substitutional lamb sent to the desert, thus “[t]otal atonement has been achieved, no

condemnation or guilt remains, and God’s grace and mercy have overcome sin and its partner,

guilt.”107 Walther Zimmerli connects divine punishment of Isaiah’s Suffering Servant with the

Levitical scapegoat and points out,

103
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 626.
104
EDBW, 767.
105
Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, vol. 1, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1961), 236, 249, 427.
106
William B. Nelson, Jr., “Punishment,” in EDBT, 659–660.
107
Paul R. House, Old Testament Theology (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 1998), 138–39.
60
 Above all, according to Leviticus 16:22, on the great Day of Atonement the scapegoat
chased out into the desert to Azazel, upon which the guilt (and punishment) of the
community is placed, bears away this guilt. Here, too, there is a striking point of contact
with the prophet of the early exilic period, who lay sick for days bearing the guilt of
Israel (Ezek 4:4–8).108

In the New Testament, the Greek word δίκη (dikē) means punishment or penalty. For

example, Paul was punished by a sentence of condemnation (Acts 25:15). Sodom and Gomorrah

were punished by the eternal fire (Jude 7). The Greek word ἐκδικέω (ekdikeō) means punish and

avenge. For example, Apostle Paul will punish the disobedient (2 Cor. 10:6). The martyrs prayed

to God for avenging their blood in the final day of judgment (Rev. 6:10). The Greek word

παιδεύω (paideuō) can mean both “to punish” and “to discipline/educate.” This word can be used

for Jesus’s punishment (Luke 23:16), Moses’s education (Acts 7:22), and the parental discipline

(Heb. 12:6–7). Nelson compares punishment in the Old Testament with that in the New and

points out that there are rare occasions that God directly punishes people like Ananias and

Sapphira in the church era; God will punish or discipline his people through church discipline

(Matt. 18:15–18; 1 Cor. 5:1–5; etc.); and God will punish the unrepentant eternally in the

eschaton (Matt. 25:46; Rev. 20:10–15; etc.).109 One crucial aspect of divine punishment in the

New Testament is divine punishment on the cross which is central in this project. Michael

Horton points out three important features about this punishment:

(1) the cross is rooted in God’s character (love and justice), (2) it was the love of God
that moved him to send Christ, (3) he did not begin to love us after the cross, but from all
eternity (Eph. 1:4). Yet his love had to comply with his justice. The punishment Christ
bore was not an arbitrary act of revenge, but a fulfillment of the standard that God had
established in creation: namely life for obedience, death for disobedience.110

108
Walther Zimmerli, Old Testament Theology in Outline, trans. David Eliot Green (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1978), 223–24. Quoted in Paul House, Old Testament Theology, 291.
109
Nelson, Jr., “Punishment,” in W. A. Elwell (ed.), EDBT, 660.
110
Michael Horton, The Christian Faith, 513–14.
61
Wayne Grudem points out a distinction between discipline and punishment in the context of the

Lord’s Supper (1 Cor. 11:30, 32).111 This distinction is emphasized by legal theorists Bedau and

Kelly too, as we have mentioned before.112 We can take this distinction when we talk about

divine punishment of Jesus, because we do not take the punishment on the cross to mean divine

discipline of God’s people for reformation or correction, but divine curse upon sins and evil that

sinners committed against God.

In sum, biblical punishment in general means God’s infliction of pain and suffering on

the offenders against him and his holy laws, which includes God’s loving discipline and

chastisement of his children for their own good — the sharing of God’s holiness — and the

eternal conscious torment for the disobedient. One unique aspect of divine punishment is the

punishment on the cross which is the focus of our study in our project. We will explore more in

the next section of this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5.

Biblical Principles of Punishment

There are at least four guiding principles of punishment in the Scriptures.113 The first

biblical principle of punishment is that punishment in the Scriptures is based on God’s holy

nature instead of social norms only. Scriptures clearly declare that God is holy and righteous

(Gen. 18:25; Exod. 9:27; 15:11; Lev. 11:44–45; Deut. 32:4; Pss. 96:9; 99:9; Isa. 1:4; 6:3; Job

34:12; Jer. 9:24; Hab. 1:13; 1 Pet. 1:16, etc.). The essence of God is surely holy.114 Righteousness

111
Grudem, Systematic Theology, 810.
112
See Bedau and Kelly’s seventh feature of punishment in Chapter 2.
113
Three of the biblical principles (or “biblical criteria” or “biblical elements”) — principle of guilt or
principle of retribution, principle of proportionality, and principle of equity – are mentioned in Steve Jeffery et al,
Pierced for Our Transgressions, 253–56.
114
Here I do not claim that holiness is the only essential divine attribute. Theologians claim their favorite
divine essential attributes to be more essential or central than others: being (T. Aquinas), love (A. Ritschl), holiness
(A. Coppedge), love in freedom (K. Barth), infinity (D. Scotus), aseity (some Reformed theologians), etc. John
Frame proposes that there is no single one attribute as the only essential or central attribute, but regretfully, he
62
means that God’s moral law is the expression of his holy nature.115 The holiness of God has two

essential qualities: relational and moral qualities.116 Any sins against God’s moral law is against

God himself ultimately, as Richard Watson has “forcefully” emphasized this.117 And this holy

and righteous “God will punish sin, for sin intrinsically deserves to be punished.” (Gen. 2:17;

Exod. 34:7; Deut. 7:10; Ps. 58:11; Rom. 6:23; 12:19).118

The biblical theme of the wrath of God is an exact expression of God’s holy love, as

McCall points out, “God’s righteous wrath is the expression of holy impassible love.”119

Leviticus 19, which is called “a microcosm of the whole legal principle of Scripture,”120 is a good

example of the Old Testament ethics and civil laws which are based on the holiness of Yahweh.

Leviticus 19 first declares the holiness of the Lord, then commands God’s people to obey a series

of holy statutes based on who Yahweh is in honoring parents, keeping sabbath, inhibiting idol

worship, eating of sacrifice of peace offerings, demanding of integrity and justice, eating of the

fruit of trees, shunning of pagan practices, respecting of the seniors, etc. J. A. Motyer points out

that the civil law of the Old Testament is consistent with all other God’s commandments and

himself propose “lordship” as another essential one. Cf. John Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 2002), 392–94; Allan Coppedge, Portraits of God: A Biblical Theology of Holiness (Downers Grove:
IVP, 2001), 16.
115
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 313.
116
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology (Leicester, UK: IVP / Zondervan: Grand Rapids, 2000), 201;
Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. 2: God and Creation, Ed. John Bolt, Trans. John Vriend (Baker
Academic, 2004), 216: “At present everyone acknowledges that the concept of holiness in the Old and the New
Testament expresses a relation of God to the world.”
117
Thomas H. McCall, Against God and Nature: The Doctrine of Sin (Wheaton: Crossway, 2019), 243: “…
sin is contrary to God’s law because the divine law reflects the divine will, and sin is ultimately contrary to the
nature of God because the divine will and the divine nature cannot be separated.”
118
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 314–15.
119
Thomas McCall, Forsaken, 81.
120
J. A. Motyer, “Civil Law and Justice in Bible Times,” in EDT, 264.
63
statutes in that they all are based on “I am the Lord.”121 Indeed, Leviticus 20 continues to

pronounce a series of punishments in the criminal law, all of which are based on the fact that the

holy God has set apart his people for himself (Lev. 20:7, 8,24, 26). Richard E. Averbeck points

out a significant fact about the sin offering that “the blood … was not used to consecrating

people to the Lord … Instead, the priests would use his blood to cleanse … and consecrate the

objects to the Lord…”.122 These two aspects of sin offering (consecration and purification) reveal

the sovereignty and holiness of God. King David has a profound realization in his soul griping

confession that his private sin is ultimately an offense to the holy God himself (Psa 51:4). God’s

moral law is not something detached from himself, as John M. Frame points out, “his moral

standard is simply himself, his person, his nature.”123 Therefore, punishment in the Bible is

inflicted upon the offenders not just because they have violated certain social norms but also

because they have first and foremost offended the holy and righteous God.

One of the implications of this principle is that God’s punishment in the Scriptures is

personal or relational. God’s punishment is different from punishment in human legal system in

that a judge who is a public person124 in administrating justice is not offended personally as a

private person, but God is not a private person, instead he is the Creator, the Ruler, and the

Legislator. Any offenses to the moral laws are offenses to this Lawmaker personally. As a result,

God as a public person will punish the offenders personally (and publicly). This is not like a

private person’s vengeance, but an authoritative administration of justice. Regarding the nature

121
Ibid.
122
Richard E. Averbeck, “Offerings and sacrifices,” NIDOTTE, 4:1005.
123
John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 448.
124
A “Public person” means an individual whose speech and act in a certain public platform represents the
public value or public system like the President in his/her administration, the judge in the legal system, the professor
in the classroom, etc.
64
of divine punishment in the Scriptures, Garry Williams summarizes well, “Both Testaments

suggest that God is in fact so personally and intimately involved in the punishment of sin that we

cannot speak of that punishment as if it takes place through a mechanism apart from the being of

God. Many Old Testament passages show that it is in the personal confrontation with God

himself that sin is punished.”125 Here it is important to realize that divine punishment is personal

and more than “simply in legal terms.”126 Michael Horton, after critiquing the problematic

annihilationist theories of hell, he points out that the personal and everlasting nature of eternal

punishment: “The critical point to be made from Scripture with regard to eternal punishment is

not its degree or duration, but its horrifying reality as God’s personal judgment that is final and

forever.”127

The second biblical principle of punishment is the principle of essentially retributive

justice. Although there are some utilitarian reasons (like deterrence, discipline, and purification)

for punishment in the Scriptures,128 the primary biblical justification of punishment is

retributivism. I will argue for essentially retributive justice and then respond to some objections.

Retributive justice of biblical punishment can be argued from various related aspects: the

holiness of God, the lex talionis principle, capital punishment, and eternal punishment, etc.

Erickson’s statement may not be strong enough but is certainly right when he writes, “there is

125
Garry Williams, “The Cross and the Punishment of Sin,” in David Peterson (ed.), Where Wrath and
Mercy Meet: Proclaiming the Atonement Today (Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 2001), 87–88.
126
Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement, 36.
127
Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2011), 984 (italics mine).
128
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 627; J. A. Motyer, “Civil Law and Justice in Bible Times,”
W. A. Elwell, EDT, 266: “The OT does not seem to say anything about punishment as reformative of the criminal,
even though Leviticus 26:23 reveals that the Lord is moved by a reformatory impulse in punishing his people, and
Deuteronomy 4:36 (using the same verb) teaches that the giving of the law had itself a reformatory aim. But
reformation is not developed in the OT as a theory of punishment.”
65
definitely a dimension of divine retribution in the Bible.”129 He argues for retributive justice from

the Hebrew word for vengeance (‫נָקַ ם‬, nāqam) which means that God administers justice as a

public person instead of personal retaliation as a private person, many passages regarding the

dimension of divine retributivism from the Major Prophet, the idea of divine retributive

punishment even destruction narrative passages in Genesis, and the famous verse on

retributivism in the New Testament, Rom. 12:19, and concludes, “God is a God of justice, and

wrongs will not go unpunished.”130

Charles Ryder Smith may be a little too absolute but essentially right when he claims and

argues for retributivism in the Old Testament justice, “There is no doubt that in Hebrew thought

punishment is retributive. The use of the death penalty is enough to show that.”131 Here we need

to point out that Smith may not be aware that death penalty could serve utilitarian function of

deterrence too.132 The lex talionis principle of Exod. 21:23–25 is clear evidence for retributive

justice. It is important to be reminded that lex talionis is a general principle of judgment or

punishment; it is not an expression of a vengeful spirit but a measurement for the crime to be

justly punished.133 The retributive nature of biblical punishment can also be argued from two

aspects of punishment: capital punishment and eternal punishment. God demands that whoever

sheds other’s blood, his or her blood should be shed, because the victim is an image bearer of

God (Gen. 9:6; Exod. 21:12–14; Lev. 24:17; Num. 35:33; Matt. 26:52; Rev. 6:9–11). Because of

the finality of death in this life, capital punishment or eternal punishment may be used for

129
Ibid., 625.
130
Ibid., 626.
131
Charles Ryder Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Sin and the Ways of God with Sinners (London: Epworth,
1953), 51. Quoted from Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 625.
132
I’m grateful for Dr. David Luy who points this out to me in our personal communication.
133
Leon Morris, “Punishment,” in EDT, 971.
66
deterrence to others, but it surely cannot be used for the reformation or discipline of the

offenders themselves.

The foundation for all kinds of arguments for divine retributive justice is the holiness of

God. Sinners are condemned or punished because they have offended the holy and righteous God

and their punishment should be administered according to the retributive principle. It seems that

the biblical punishment agrees with the expressivist legal theorists. God punishes the sinners so

that the world may know his holy character and the deserved condemnation of their sins (Exod.

7:3–5; 9:14–15; Num. 16:26–30). Leon Morris points out that in the New Testament, the use of

condemnation is more common than punishment; condemnation implies punishment; and only

the atoning death of Christ can remove the punishment.134 Scripture reveals that God punishes

unrepentant sinners. But the reason for the punishment is sin, and the loving God takes no

pleasure in punishing even the wicked (Ezek. 18: 20, 23, 32).

Some theologians raise objections to retributive justice in biblical punishment. Paul

Fiddes argues like this: the purpose of justice is “not payment but repentance,” but retributive

punishment cannot result in repentance, therefore, punishment should not demand

retributivism.135 Here the problem with Fiddes’s argument is the one-sidedly utilitarianism. He

excludes retributivism that we discussed before as an alternative of normative theory of justice.

Fiddes also neglects the overwhelming biblical evidence for retributive justice. Stephen Travis

argues that divine punishment is not primarily retributive where people are “paid back”

134
Ibid.
135
Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation, 104.
67
according to their deeds, but according to their relationship with Christ.136 But Scripture clearly

affirms both aspects of this truth that human beings will be judged according to our deeds and

according to our relationship with Christ. It is not a dichotomy. It is “both and” not “either or”.

The relational language in the divine judgment does not exclude its forensic nature of retributive

justice. Similarly, John Goldingay argues concerning Levitical sacrifice, “The idea of

punishment is from the framework of law rather than the framework of worship, and we get into

difficulties when we mix ideas from the different frameworks such as these.” 137 Tom Smail

claims that “the biblical concept righteousness is best understood neither in terms of criminal

justice … nor in terms of civil justice … but rather in a relational way in terms of the restoration

of right relationships between God and his people.”138 Colin Gunton also argues that the concept

of God’s justice is “transformational rather punitive or distributive.”139

The problem of these arguments is similar: they mistakenly dichotomize the legal and

relational (or legal and liturgical) descriptions of divine justice; using relational or liturgical

language/context to reject different metaphors of the atonement which point to the same reality;

and they also neglect the rich biblical witnesses supporting retributive justice of divine

punishment. While these theologians emphasize on restorative justice, they neglect or reject

retributive justice which is pervasive in the Scriptures. C. S. Lewis has observed that the

humanitarian theory of punishment has removed concept of desert and replaced it with the

136
Stephen H. Travis, Christ and the Judgment of God: Divine Retribution in the New Testament
(Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1986), Preface; “Christ as Bearer of Divine Judgement in Paul’s Thought
about the Atonement,” in John Goldingay (ed.), Atonement Today, (London: SPCK, 1995), 21–38.
137
John Goldingay, “Old Testament Sacrifice and the Death of Christ,” in John Goldingay (ed.),
Atonement Today, 10.
138
Tom Smail, “Can One Man Die for the People?” in Goldingay (ed.), Atonement Today, 89.
139
Colin E. Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian
Tradition (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 188.
68
motivation of deterrence and reformation, and thus results in a horrific injustice: a human being

becomes “a mere object, a patient, a ‘case.’”140

The third biblical principle of punishment is the principle of proportionality: the severity

of punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of offense. The biblical principle of lex

talionis mentioned above is the clearest evidence also for supporting this principle of

proportionality. Mosaic law clearly states that “if the guilty man deserves to be beaten, the judge

should cause him to lie down and be beaten in his presence with a number of stripes in

proportion to his offense” (Deut. 25:2). Some like W. Blackstone and A. C. Ewing have rightly

criticized the absurdity of the literal interpretation of the lex talionis principle and its practical

difficulties in application (like “theft for theft, defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by

adultery”).141 But the biblical hermeneutics surely neither demands nor suggests a literal

interpretation of this principle. For example, the Ten Commandments clearly inhibit murder,

theft, adultery, and forgery (Exod. 20:13–16), how can we be justified to use these evil means to

inflict the offenders who commit the same crime? The non-literal interpretation of the principle

of the lex talionis have been supported from countless leading biblical commentators, both

Jewish and Christian, and leading philosophers, including Kant and Hegel, in their common and

repeatedly rejection of the literal interpretation of it.142

Even though we now have a right understanding of this principle, it is no small challenge

to apply it. There are two levels of challenges: implementation of positive retributivism to all

offenses (the guilty should receive deserve punishment) and the measurement of the gravity of

140
C. S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment,” in God in the Dock (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1970), 287–88.
141
Primoratz, Justifying the Legal Punishment, 85–86.
142
Ibid., 87–89.
69
offense in implementing proportionality principle. For example, for the first challenge, Leo

Zaibert claims that it is “an utterly unmanageable and unrealistic” task for our legal system to

handle the huge amount of criminal injustice.143 For the second challenge, Mark Murphy points

out the “very pressing questions to be dealt with concerning our judgments of proportionality

between crime and punishment”: the unclearness of the scale by which different kinds of

punishments (“deprivations of wealth, liberty, life; inflictions of pains or wounds”) are to be

assessed, and the “unfairness” even “immoralities” in the rationales of determining “the gravity

of the offense?”144 However, whatever is considered unsurmountable or impossible challenges

for human legal system is not a problem to divine justice at all, because God is omniscient and

omnipotent.145

Oliver Crisp has studied the problem, “Does Christ’s work have to have a certain intrinsic

objective moral value in order for it to be acceptable to God as an act of atonement?”146 He

points that there are two views on the Christ’s work in the atonement. The first one is called

acceptatio or acceptation which holds that “God could have accepted some act of atonement that

had less objective moral and forensic value, and still have been just in so doing.”147 The second

one is called acceptilatio or acceptilation which holds that “the value of any act of atonement is

entirely up to God and has nothing to do with any intrinsic merit the action in question

143
Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2006), 161. Quoted from Craig,
The Atonement, 71.
144
Mark Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 131.
145
Craig, The Element, 71.
146
Crisp, “Salvation and Atonement: On the Value and Necessity of the Work of Jesus Christ,” in Ivor J.
Davidson and Murray A. Rae (eds.), God and Salvation: Soteriology in Theological Perspective (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2011), 105.
147
Ibid.
70
possesses.”148 Crisp has argued that these two views are mistaken and argued for a proportional

view of Christ’s work: “God must accept an act that has an objective value at least proportional

to the demerit of the trespass it atones for in order for this act to be morally acceptatable as an act

of atonement.”149 Although Crisp’s philosophical-theological argument is not without contention

as he himself admits,150 his argument overall is valid and is consistent with God’s holy nature

and his just response to sins and with human moral intuition (for instance, debt has to be paid

proportionally in order to be morally acceptable).

The fourth biblical principle of punishment is the principle of equity: different people

should be punished at the same way as long as they commit the same offense. This principle is

based on the fundamental biblical doctrine of the impartiality of God (Deut. 10:17–18; 2 Chron.

19:7; Job 34:19; Mark 12;14; Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:11; Gal. 2:6; Eph. 6:9; Col. 3:25; James2:1; 1

Pet. 1:17). Mosaic law clearly states that the judges should sentence with righteousness and

fairness (Exod. 23:6; Deut. 1:17). It is easy to understand that these judges should not oppress

the poor, the widows, the orphans, and the foreigners (Exod. 23:6, 9; Deut. 10:18; 24:17) or defer

to the great (Lev. 19:15b), but it is significant to notice that they are commanded not to be partial

to the poor either (Exod. 23:3; Lev. 19:15a). J. A. Motyer calls this system “even-handed

justice.”151 Steven Jeffery et al also notice that in the “superficially similar” case in docile bull’s

attack of others (Exod. 21:28–29, 35–36), “purely accidental” and “criminally negligent” are

judged differently to reflect this substantial instead of superficial equity.152 King Saul is surely

148
Ibid.
149
Ibid., 105-106, 114-18.
150
Ibid., 115-17.
151
J. A. Motyer, “Civil Law and Justice in Bible Times,” Walter A. Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of
Theology, 266.
152
Steven Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 254–55.
71
right when he declares that the prince should be punished like others if he commits crime” (1

Sam. 14:38–39). But regretfully his own command (thus law) is not morally justified.

An important application of biblical principle of punishment is Christ’s penal substitution

for sinners. In punishing human sin, at most times God does not allow innocent human beings to

bear punishment for sinners (Gen. 18:25; Deut. 24:16). For example, even Moses and family

members cannot serve as penal substitutes for others (Exod. 32:32–33; Ezek. 18:20). But God,

out of his mercy, allows to postpone his punishment and to transfer it (1 Kgs 9:6–7; 11:12; 2 Kgs

23:26; 24:3–4; Lev. 16; Num. 14:34; Isa. 53; Lam. 5:7; Ezek. 4).153 It is amazing that God allows

one unique Servant of his, as a substitute and representative, to bear human collective sins and

guilt and thus the punishment that sinners deserve (Isa. 53:4–6, 8, 10–12; 2 Cor. 5:14; 1 Pet.

2:24; Heb. 9:28). Here it seems that God reserves a qualified sense of retributive justice for

himself out of his nature of holy love.154 The difference between the general divine punishment

of the wicked and special divine punishment of Jesus is that, on the one hand, the wicked are the

external and independent individuals from the divine Judge, but Jesus is not, he is the second

person of the Trinity. Jesus is not a separate object of punishment from the Father, but willingly

participates (with distinct role155) with the Father in divine punishment for reconciliating the

world to the triune God (John 10:17–18; 2 Cor. 5:19); on the other hand, Jesus is not separate

from the ones that he substitutes and represent; he is punished in his flesh in solidarity with

fallen humanity not for his own sins (because he is sinless) but for the sins imputed to him (2

Cor. 5:21). The Old Testament also demonstrates the corporate responsibility to support

153
Williams, “The Cross and the Punishment of Sin,” 75–81.
154
Craig, The Atonement, 71: “God is only qualifiedly a negative retributivist, …”.
155
In Chapter 3 we will further discuss the Trinitarian persons’ inseparable but distinct operations ad extra.
72
imputation of sins, corporate liability, and corporate punishment based on the deep national

covenant theology, as Joel S. Kaminsky’s meticulous study has shown.156 We will further

investigate this unique or qualified sense of justice in Chapter 5.

Guilt and Punishment

In the English dictionary, the meaning of “guilt” has at least three aspects: “the fact of

having committed a breach of conduct especially violating law and involving a penalty”; “the

state of one who has committed an offense especially consciously”; “feelings of deserving

blame especially for imagined offenses or from a sense of inadequacy” or “a feeling of

deserving blame for offenses.”157 The first sense of guilt is about the reality or fact that someone

has committed an offense, and no pardon or forgiveness can remove this fact or record. The

second sense is about the legal or moral responsibility/culpability of an offense and thus its

liability to condemnation, punishment, or judgment. In this sense, the guilt can be removed after

a proper punishment or a pardon by an authoritative agent. The third sense is about the

existential or psychological feeling of deserving blame for negligence or punishment. This sense

of guilt is often discussed in the psychological context but rarely in the legal, biblical, or

theological context.

In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word group āsham (become or being guilty, bear guilt,

trespassing, and offending, etc.), āshēm (guilty, under judgment or punishment), ashmāh (guilt,

blame, shame), and āshām (guilt offering, blame, guilt) are used primarily in the judicial and

ritual contexts in the Mosaic covenant.158 Eugene Carpenter and Michael A. Grisanti point out

156
Joel S. Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible, JSOTSup 196, eds. David J. A. Clines,
Philip R. Davies, and John Jarick (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 30, 53–54, 65–66, 93–95, 111–
13.
157
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guilt
158
EDBW, 458–59.
73
that the Hebrew verb ‫ אשׁם‬and its cognates “fundamentally refer to the guilt, responsibility, or

culpability that a person must bear for some offense … Although the existential feeling of guilt

likely accompanied offenses, the meaning of ‘feel guilty’ … or ‘realize guilt’ … goes beyond the

objective usage of ’āšām for a person’s legal/moral culpability.”159 For example, Lev. 5:17–19

point out that even the unintentional sin is a guilt and needs to be atoned for and thus forgiven,

because “he [the sinner] indeed has incurred guilt before the Lord.” Regarding the guilt offering,

Richard E. Averbeck points out that even though Jacob Milgrom’s well-receptive distinction

between sin offering and guilt offering (“the asham expiates for sancta desecration, the hattat for

sancta contamination”) is not without problem, he “is right regard to the overall purpose of the

guilt offering. The evidence suggests that its primary purpose was to make atonement for

‘desecration’ of ‘sancta,’ that is, the mishandling of the holy (sacred) things by treating them as

if they were common rather than holy.”160 Guilt offering demands us of treating the holy as holy.

Averbeck also points out the mistake that Milgrom has made in his translation of “āshem” into

“feeling guilty” in Lev. 6:4a, “This translation is doubtful, especially since the person who has

taken a false oath is unlikely to have the kind of repentant heart that Milgram assigns to the

concept of ‘feeling guilty.”161 This is important for our study, because it just confirms our

understanding that guilt in the judicial and ritual contexts in the Scriptures does not primarily

mean an existential or a psychological feeling of guilt.

In the New Testament, the Greek word ἔνοχος (enochos) means “liable to,” “subject to,”

“guilty of,” and “deserving a thing or penalty” in the “judicial indictment” (Matt. 5:21, 22;

159
Carpenter and Grisanti, “‫אשׁם‬,” NIDOTE, 1:553–57; Richard E. Averbeck, “ ‫אָ שָׁ ם‬,” NIDOTE, 1:557–66.
160
Averbeck, “ ‫אָ שָׁ ם‬,” NIDOTE, 1:558.
161
Ibid., 1:561.
74
26:66; Mark 3:29; 14:64; Heb. 2:15; James2:10) and with “spiritual connotation” in Cor.

11:27.162 It seems fair to conclude that even though the guilty feeling and shame accompany us

when we sin (Gen. 3:7, 10; Matt. 26:75; 27:3–5), the primary biblical and theological meaning of

guilt is not a subjective feeling but an objective state of trespass of divine law and thus liable to

divine punishment. Similarly to Craig’s legal understanding of guilt as determined by “a wrong

act (actus reus) and a blameworthy mental state (mens rea),”163 William G. Justice, Jr. states the

meaning of guilt in the legal, moral, and theological contexts as “[t]he state of moral agent after

the intentional or unintentional violation of a law, principle, or value established by an authority

under which the moral agent is subject.”164 Surely in the theological context, the authority under

whom the moral agent is subject is God. In term of the relationship between guilt and

punishment, it seems safe to conclude that “sin brings guilt and results in condemnation”165 and

thus the guilty is liable to punishment (Exod. 34:7); in general, God will punish and only punish

the guilty. But God, as we have mentioned previously, reserves his unique right to punish the

innocent Son who bore our sins and guilt. This unique guilt on Jesus is in the sense that the guilt

liable to punishment on the cross is an imputed legal guilt not an intrinsic moral one. We will

argue for divine punishment of Jesus in Chapter 5.

Summary and Conclusions

Biblical understanding of punishment includes God’s infliction of suffering on the

offenders against him and the parental discipline and instruction. The context determines the

exact meaning. Biblical principles or justifications of punishment include the basis of

162
Friedrich Thiele, “ἔνοχος,” Colin Brown (ed.), NIDNTT 2:142–43; EDBW, 459.
163
Craig, The Element, 87 note 35.
164
William G. Justice Jr., “Guilt,” in EDT, 530.
165
McCall, Against God and Nature, 311.
75
punishment in God’s holiness, God’s personal involvement in punishment, the principle of

retribution, the principle of proportionality, the principle of equity. These principles can be

applied to Christ’s penal substitution for sinners, but we need to pay attention to, at the same

time, the uniqueness of the holy Son of God in this special context of divine punishment. Bible

also declares that sin brings guilt and guilt incurs punishment. But God and God alone can

prepare the means of salvation which is through his holy Son.

76
 Chapter 3

THE TRINITARIAN FRAMEWORK

When we think about divine punishment of Jesus, a natural theological issue comes up:

Does the divine punishment on the cross disrupt divine unity within the life of the Trinity? In

order to study divine punishment on the cross, trinitarian theology should be a natural and

necessary theological resource, as some theologians have pointed it out in the study of

Christology, Soteriology, the atonement, and divine unity.1 John Webster points out the

fundamental importance of the doctrine of God (especially the doctrine of the immanent Trinity)

for the doctrine of soteriology: soteriology is “a derivative doctrine” of “the Christian doctrine of

God”2 and “[t]he bedrock of soteriology is the doctrine of the Trinity.”3 Realizing the

inseparability of God’s act and his being and thus the atonement and the Trinity, Thomas F.

Torrance reminds us helpfully,

Thus we cannot but think of the atonement as a threefold act grounded in and issuing
from the triune God. While the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are personally distinct
from one another, they are nevertheless of one and the same being with one another in
God, and their acts interpenetrate one another in the indivisibility of the one Godhead.4

1
Fred Sanders, “Introduction to Christology: Chalcedonian Categories for the Gospel Narrative,” in Jesus
in Trinitarian Perspectives, eds. Fred Sanders & Klaus Issler (Nashville: B&H, 2007), 3: “To say the truth about
Jesus, we must keep him in trinitarian perspective and say, …, that one of the Trinity died on the cross.” Bruce
Ware, “Christ’s Atonement: A Work of the Trinity,” in Jesus in Trinitarian Perspective, 187: “the Trinity is
necessary for the identity of Christ as the atoning Savior, and the Trinity is necessary also to the efficacy of his
atoning death.” Thomas H. McCall, Forsaken, 31: “Given the centrality and importance of the doctrine of the
Trinity, we should carefully evaluate any claim that there is ‘spiritual separation’ or a ‘rupture’ in the relationship
between the Father and the Son.”
2
John Webster, “‘It was the Will of the Lord to Bruise Him’: Soteriology and the Doctrine of God,” in God
of Salvation: Soteriology in Theological Perspective, eds. Ivor J. Davidson and Murray A. Rae (Farnham, UK:
Ashgate, 2011), 16.
3
Ibid., 18.
4
Thomas F. Thomas, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1992), 113.
77
Divine punishment of Jesus connects these significant theological branches: the doctrine of the

Trinity and the doctrine of the atonement. Many theologians have studied, as Adam J. Johnson

points out, the general relationship between the Trinity and the atonement, including Karl Barth,

Jügen Moltmann, Hans Urs von Balthasar, T. F. Torrance, Bruce Ware, Vincent Brümmer,

Robert Sherman, and Graham McFarlane.5 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen rightly points out,

The salvific and theological meaning of the death on the cross can only be discerned from
the perspective of trinitarian faith. While hardly anyone would contest this claim, it is
also that not any kind of allegedly trinitarian interpretation is appropriate.6

Instead of addressing the general relationship between the Trinity and the atonement, our

goal in this chapter is to provide a trinitarian framework for our specific investigation of divine

punishment of Jesus. Since different theologians have different understanding of divine unity, we

need to look for criteria for judging which account of divine unity is acceptable. Therefore, there

are two tasks in this chapter. The first task is to find a sound concept of divine unity. To decide

whether divine punishment of Jesus contradicts divine unity, we have to be clear about what is

meant exactly by divine unity. The second task is to establish criteria for a sound divine unity.

For present purposes we will adopt a revised version of the criteria of divine unity advanced by

Jeffery E. Brower, Michael C. Rea, Thomas H. McCall, and Michael L. Chiavone. This results in

a sound and balanced model of divine unity7 — an ontological and perichoretic unity. These two

tasks will prepare us to prove that there is no necessary contradiction between divine unity and

divine punishment of Jesus according to this ontological-perichoretic divine unity. And this

5
Adam J. Johnson, God’s Being in Reconciliation, 59–60.
6
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Christ and Reconciliation, Vol. 1 of The Constructive Christian Theology for a
Pluralistic World (Grand Rapids / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2013), 345.
7
This “sound and balanced model” is based on the criteria that will be established a little later in this
section according to a revised set of criteria of Brower-Rea, McCall, and Chiavone.
78
conclusion will be crucial for us to answer one of the theological challenges of divine

punishment of Jesus in Chapter 5, that is, the claim that divine punishment of Jesus disrupts

divine unity.

For the question of broken unity, there are some theologians, like Moltmann and Jüngel,

who read the cross event into the immanent Trinity and are willing to radicalize their trinitarian

theology to allow some kind of separation within the Trinity.8 Some theologians that we have

mentioned in Chapter 1 have raised their theological concerns about divine unity in divine

punishment of Jesus.9 However, this study will be guided by the orthodox trinitarian theology

especially the orthodox doctrine of divine unity established in the “the most universally accepted

Christian creed,”10 — the Nicaea-Constantinople Creed. Even though evangelicals do not have a

distinctive theology of the Trinity, by and large we can accept Nicene trinitarianism as our

foundation and orthodoxy.11

Jeffery Brower and Michael Rea12 and Thomas McCall13 have spelled out some helpful

basic theological desiderata for judging any trinitarian proposal to be acceptable. The important

purpose of these criteria is to maintain the strongest sense of divine unity (biblical Monotheism)

8
Moltmann, The Crucified God, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Dowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1974),
152: “The cross of the Son separates God from God to the utmost degree of enmity and difference.” Eberhard
Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute
Between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 203, 328; Ibid., The
Doctrine of the Trinity, 98–103.
9
Two theological concerns (divine unity and the nature of God’s love in forgiving human sins) have been
discussed in Chapter 1.
10
Justo L. Gonzalez, The Story of Christianity, Vol. 1: The Early Church to the Dawn of the Reformation
(San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1984), 165.
11
Roger E. Olsen, The Westminster Handbook to Evangelical Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2004), 279.
12
Jeffrey E. Bower and Michael C. Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22
(2005), 59. Quoted in Thomas McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 46.
13
Thomas McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 86.
79
and the robust notion of personal distinction among Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We will study

these criteria in detail later in this section. By these criteria we will affirm biblical divine unity

and personal distinction and rule out some problematic and weak models of divine unity. We will

prove that the ontological and perichoretic unity is an acceptable divine unity for trinitarian

orthodoxy and crucial for this project.

Besides a sound account of divine unity, there are two other trinitarian principles are

important for our project too. Three trinitarian principles, among which two are from classical

Nicene trinitarianism and one from the twentieth century’s renewed interest in trinitarianism,14

are crucial for our study of the relationship between divine punishment of Jesus divine

punishment of Jesus and divine unity. The first is the triune God’s ontological and perichoretic

unity among the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the second is the doctrine of the

inseparable operations regarding the triune God’s work in the economy of salvation, or the rule

opera ad extra sunt omnia indivisa;15 the third is the unity and distinction of the economic and

immanent Trinity. These three trinitarian principles are crucial for us to argue against those who

claim that divine punishment of Jesus breaks divine unity, especially the unity between the

Father and the Son at the dark moment of crucifixion.

The Ontological and Perichoretic Unity

14
Theologians disagree on the issue whether the renewed interest in trinitarianism in the twentieth century
is a true “renaissance” or “revival.” For example, Roger E. Olson and Christopher A. Hall call the twentieth century
“revival and revitalization” as “one of the great surprises” in their concise survey book, The Trinity (96–97) in 2002;
Stanley J. Granz narrates this revival with excitement in his Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in
Contemporary Theology (1–5, 33) in 2004. However, Lewis Ayres locates this so-called “revival” with great
reservation in his Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (404-14).
15
Adam J. Johnson, God’s Being in Reconciliation, 78. Here I adopt two of Karl Barth’s three trinitarian
principles from his study of divine atonement.
80
 That God is one is declared as early in Scripture as the Shema of Israel (Deut. 6:4–5). The

Prophets proclaim the same unique God (Isa. 45:5, 14, 18, 21, 22, etc.). The New Testament

apostolic proclamation naturally continues this monotheistic faith even though Christ is

worshiped as the one Lord (1 Cor. 8:4, 6; 1 Tim. 2:5–6; James 2:19, etc.).

However, divine oneness is understood in a variety of ways. Some hold to a too strict

unity that excludes triunity (like Sabellians, Arians, and the Eunomians). Some hold to a too

loose “generic unity” which results in tritheism (like Joachim of Fiore’s collective unity16). Some

hold to a certain kind of social unity (like Moltmann17) which may not be strong “enough”;18

some hold to different forms of social unity from some more sophisticated forms of social

trinitarianism, but whether their proposals are successful or not is still debatable.19 Some hold to

a numerical (instead of generic) unity in relative trinitarianism (like Peter van Inwagen), but “not

all philosophical theologians find RT [Relative Trinitarianism] persuasive.”20 Some hold to a

robust unity (“nothing less than numerical oneness”21) from another version of relative

trinitarianism through the metaphysics of material constitution (like Jeffery E. Brower and

Michael C. Rea), but “[w]orries about the coherence of RT have not yet been put to rest.”22

As we have seen from above, the issue of divine unity is still in debate today, but for this

project I will try not to insist on certain specific kind of divine unity but rather hold to a divine

16
McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 81.
17
Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 175.
18
Thomas H. McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on
the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2010), 158–60.
19
Ibid., 12–39.
20
Ibid., 43.
21
Ibid., 46.
22
Ibid., 55.
81
unity that is orthodox and acceptable by most of Christian churches and traditions past and

present, just like what Kevin Giles does in the current heated debate about eternal

subordinationism among evangelicals.23 After establishing criteria for judging what orthodox and

acceptable unity is, I will argue that an ontological and perichoretic unity is the sound account of

divine unity. The difference between my summary of trinitarian orthodox and Giles’s is that

while Giles’s summary and commentary are more generic with paying special attention to the

problem of eternal subordinationism, my narrative and commentary are specific with divine

unity, especially between the Father and the Son. In addition, I add an important trinitarian

principle– the unity and distinction between the economic and immanent Trinity.

In this section, I will first survey divine unity from scriptural witnesses, then I will

establish criteria based on the works of Brower-Rea, McCall, and Chiavone for judging what

kind of trinitarianism (especially the account of divine unity) is sound and acceptable. Here we

will see different theologians understanding divine unity differently. I will give eight kinds of

accounts of divine unity and check them one by one by the established criteria. We will see that

some accounts of unity will be ruled out without difficulty; the weaknesses of some other

accounts will be exposed; and finally, a well-balanced account of divine unity — ontological and

perichoretic unity can pass all checks of the established criteria and thus it becomes our choice

— a sound and acceptable account of divine unity.

Scriptural Witnesses of Divine Unity

Let us first start by arguing that divine unity or oneness is biblically based both in the Old

and the New Testaments. As we have mentioned above, divine unity is clearly stated in the

Hebrew’s monotheistic faith declared in the Shema. The Shema is “the foundational truth of

23
Kevin Giles, “The Orthodox Doctrine of the Trinity,” PP, vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2012.
82
Israel’s religion.”24 Divine unity, for Hebrews, is not just a theological statement, it is also at the

center of the national and personal religious life of Israelites in their “worship, devotion, and

obedience.”25 Malcolm B. Yarnell III laments that religious truth has been reduced to a series of

“static propositions” rather than maintaining a “dynamic relationship” in history.26 Israel’s Shema

is not like that; it is not just a theological confession but also “the center of the devotional

practices.”27 It is important to point out that this divine oneness (Hebrew ‘echad in Deut. 6:4)

should not be understood as a singular monad, but, as Peter Toon points out, a unity which

contains plurality similar to the unity (the same Hebrew ‘echad) of a couple in marriage (Gen.

2:24).28 Catholic theologian Walter Kasper helpfully points out that divine unity is “far more than

a quantitative and numerical unity,”29 it is a qualitative unity. He further points out two aspects of

this qualitative unity: singleness and uniqueness.30 God’s revelation through Isaiah repeatedly

emphasizes on divine uniqueness: “I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god”

(Isa. 44:6); “Is there a God besides me? There is no Rock; I know not any” (Isa. 44:8); “I am the

LORD, and there is no other, besides me there is no God; … there is none besides me; I am the

LORD, and there is no other” (Isa. 45:5, 6); “And there is no other god besides me, a righteous

24
Samuel R. Driver, Deuteronomy, 3rd ed., International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2000), 89. Quoted in Malcolm B. Yarnell III, God the Trinity: Biblical Portraits (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2016),
58.
25
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 348.
26
Malcolm B. Yarnell III, God the Trinity, 68.
27
Ibid., 58.
28
Peter Toon, Our Triune God: A Biblical Portrayal of the Trinity (Wheaton: Victor Books, 1996), 98.
29
Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 239.
30
Ibid.: “The singleness and uniqueness of God is qualitative. God is not only one (unus) but also unique
(unicus); he is as it were unqualified uniqueness. For by his very nature God is such that there is only one of him.
From the nature of God as the reality that determines and includes everything his uniqueness follows with intrinsic
necessity. If God is not one, then there is no God. Only one God can be infinite and all inclusive; two Gods would
limit one another even if they were somehow interpenetrated. Conversely: as the one God, God is also the only God.
Singleness of God is therefore not just one of the attributes of God, rather his singleness is given directly with his
very essence.”
83
God and a Savior; there is none besides me” (Isa. 45:21). Commenting on Isa. 45:3b–8, John D.

W. Watts points out, “The theological emphasis continues to be that Yahwah is one in creating

the world, ruling over history, and redeeming Israel.”31 Zechariah uses divine oneness to

emphasize on divine uniqueness at the Day of the LORD: “And the LORD will be kind over all

the earth. On that day, the LORD will be one and his name one.” (Zech. 14:9).

Divine unity is revealed in both the Old and the New Testaments. Herman Bavinck points

out, “The N. T. contains the true development of the O. T. trinitarian ideas. This N. T. revelation,

however, is much clearer: it does not consist in abstract reasoning concerning the being of God,

but God manifests himself in the incarnation, in word and in deed. As in the O. T. so also in the

N. T. God’s unity is emphasized.”32 Jesus himself proclaims the Shema to a scribe when he

points out the Great Commandment (Mark 12:29) and divine unity between the Father and

himself in an astonishing revelation (John 10:30) and in his high priest’s prayer (John 17:21–23).

Here Jesus includes himself within the Shema. Pannenberg points out, “God of Jesus is none

other than the God of Jewish faith, …, the God whom Israel confesses in the shema …”33

Apostles in the New Testament continue to proclaim this divine oneness and uniqueness in their

monotheistic faith (Rom. 3:30; Gal. 3:20; 1 Tim. 2:5; 1 Cor. 8:4, 6; Eph. 4:6; James2:19).

Especially Paul clearly affirms the monotheistic faith of the Shema in 1 Cor. 8:6, “… there is one

God, the Father from who are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ,

through whom are all things and through whom we exist.” Kevin Giles points out, “Paul

continues to affirm monotheism, but he does not think of God’s oneness as a solitary or unitary

31
John D. W. Watts, Isaiah 34–66, WBC, vol. 25 (Waco: Word Books, 1987), 157.
32
Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendrickson (Edinburgh, UK/ Carlisle, PA: The
Banner of Truth Trust, 1997), 263–64.
33
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 260.
84
sense.”34 For Paul here, divine unity clearly includes at least the unity of the Father and the Lord

Jesus; he will surely include the Holy Spirit in this divine unity in his triadic expressions of

divine persons.35 We may need to be careful when we say Paul here “revised” and “redefined”

the Shema,36 but we can see that he “provides a formula that retains and advances the Shema.”37

The New Testament continues to reveal the divinity of the Father, the Son, the Holy

Spirit, and furthermore, as Erickson points out, “[i]n several places in Scripture the three persons

are linked together in unity and apparent equality.”38 The biblical canon progressively reveals the

unity of the triune God as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit besides the divinity, equality,

and the personality of the three divine persons. That is why Brandon D. Crowe and Carl R.

Trueman can conclude that “faithful exegesis of biblical texts necessitates a trinitarian reading of

the biblical texts, especially in the New Testament, where the doctrine is more fully revealed

than in the Old Testament.”39 There is clearly no contradiction for these early Jewish disciples to

proclaim the Shema and the lordship of Jesus Christ in their worship at the same time. Richard

Bauckham’s study on the early Jewish monotheism shows the insistence of the Shema does not

exclude Jesus within the divine identity, “…from Jesus’s relationship of sonship to God it

34
Giles, “The Orthodox Doctrine of the Trinity.”
35
Ibid.: “In this text [1 Corinthians 8:5–6] Paul only mentions the Father and the Son, but it is evident from
his many triadic comments that the one God is in fact the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Rom 15:16; 1 Cor
12:4–6; 2 Cor 13:13; Eph 4:2, 18–20, etc.).”
36
N. T. Wright, “One God, One Lord: How Paul Redefines Monotheism,” Christian Century (27
November 2013), 24. Quoted in Yarnell III, God the Trinity, 81.
37
Yarnell III, God the Trinity, 81.
38
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 355.
39
Brandon D. Crowe and Carl R. Trueman, “Introduction,” in Crowe and Trueman (eds.), The Essential
Trinity: New Testament Foundations and Practical Relevance (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2017), 20.
85
redefines the divine identity as one in which the Father and Son are inseparably united in

differentiation from each other.”40

As to how it is theologically possible to integrate these two claims (the uniqueness of

God and the divinity of Christ) within one monotheistic faith, it is up to the early church fathers

to struggle and figure it out, as some historians and theologians have well narrated.41

Furthermore, when early fathers figure out the divinity and equality of Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit, the perplexing challenge is, in what sense can we claim that God is one. This is a long and

difficult journey “toward a trinitarian monotheism” which is settled at the ecumenical councils of

Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381) and continues to develop in the following centuries.42 No

matter what kind of divine unity we choose, we cannot involve the repudiation of the Old

Testament monotheism.

In order for us to acquire a sound and acceptable account of divine unity, we have to pay

attention to the distinction/plurality, divinity, and equality of divine persons. Although divine

plurality or personal distinction is hinted in the Old Testament (Gen. 1:26; 11:7; Isa. 6:8; etc.), it

becomes more clear in the progressive revelation of the New Testament (Matt. 28:19–20; John

1:1–2; 2 Cor. 13:14; Eph. 4:6; 1 Pet. 1:2; etc.), especially the Gospel account of the relationship

and interaction between the Father and the Son (Matt. 3:17; 17:5; John 1:14; 3:16–17, 35; 14:24;

40
Richard Bauckham, “Biblical Theology and the Problem of Monotheism,” in Craig Bartholomew et al
(eds.), Out of Egypt: Biblical Theology and Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 228. Quoted
in McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 72; Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the
New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 4.
41
For examples: Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the
New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 1–59; Larry. W. Hurtado, One
God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988.
42
Yarnell III, God the Trinity, 77–83.
86
16:28; 17: 13, 20–23; etc.). The deity/divinity of the Father “is scarcely in dispute.”43 Even

though the divinity of Christ may be the first theological storm in church history, there are quite

a few biblical passages which have attested to the divinity of Christ (John 1:2; Phil. 2:6; Col.

1:15; Heb. 1:2; etc.). Divinity of Christ rules out the early church’s Arianism and today’s

Jehovah Witnesses. The divinity of the Holy Spirit, though not claimed as direct or explicit, has

strong biblical support especially in Acts 5:3–5 where to lie to the Holy Spirit is claimed to lie to

God. Since we understand the divinity without tiers or levels, we can claim that divine persons

are equal too. Erickson also points out that “[i]n several places in Scripture the three persons are

linked together in unity and apparent equality.”44 The equality of divine persons will rule out all

kinds of subordinationism including today’s Grudem-Ware functional subordinationism.45

Besides monotheistic unity, personal distinction, divinity, and equality, Scripture also

demonstrates the co-dwelling or interpenetration of the three persons within the trinitarian life

(John 14: 10, 11). Church fathers call this relationship perichoresis, “which teaches that each

hypostasis of the Trinity has its being in the other two.”46

In sum, besides the divinity and equality of the three persons (Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit), biblical trinitarianism affirms a robust unity which is expressed in the Old Testament

monotheism, a robust personal distinction which is expressed in their mutual interactions, and a

perichoretic communion which expresses their mutual love and interpenetration.

Criteria for Trinitarianism in General and Divine Unity in Particular

43
Erickson, Christian Theology, 350.
44
Ibid., 355.
45
Graham Cole, “The Trinity without Tiers: A Response to the Eternal Subordination/Submissiveness of
the Son Debate,” in Michael F. Bird and Scott Harrower (eds.), Trinity without Hierarchy (Grand Rapids: Kregel
Academic, 2019), 279–80.
46
Phillip Cary, “Historical Perspectives on Trinitarian Doctrine,” RTSFB, Nov/Dec, 1995.
87
 To be biblical, everyone has to admit that God is one. However, different groups of

theologians understand divine oneness/unity in different senses in church history. After we have

established the biblical basis for acceptable trinitarianism in general and divine unity in

particular, we need to explore some different understandings of divine unity. There are a few

different versions of divine unity in church history: generic or collective unity, social or

perichoretic unity, monarchian unity (unity based on the monarchy of the Father), simple unity,

substantial or ontological unity. These different notions of divine unity are not necessarily

exclusive. For example, perichoretic or social unity is a kind of generic unity; substantial or

ontological unity is a kind of simply unity, etc. Some accounts of unity show both elements of

ontological and perichoretic unity, but not all accounts have a balanced view of unity according

to some criteria (which we will discuss). We will examine different kind of accounts of divine

unity and try to find out what notion of divine unity that the trinitarian orthodoxy affirms, and

thus it will become one of the central theological principles for the issue of divine punishment of

Jesus.

Before we examine different notions of divine unity, we need to be clear what criteria we

will use for the work of examination. As we have mentioned above, Brower and Rea propose

five desiderata for any trinitarianism to be acceptable:

(D1) An acceptable doctrine of the Trinity is clearly consistent with the view that Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are divine individuals, and that there is exactly one divine
individual.
(D2) It does not conflict with the natural reading of either the Bible or the ecumenical
creeds.
(D3) It is consistent with the view that God is an individual rather than a society, and
that the Persons are not parts of God.
(D4) It is consistent with the view that classical identity exists and is not to be analyzed
in terms of more fundamental sortal-relativized sameness relations like being the
same person as.

88
 (D5) It carries no anti-realist commitments in metaphysics.47

In Brower-Rea desiderata, D1 is an important criterion about oneness and threeness, but

“individual” and “individuals” in D1 have to be clarified, otherwise, if they mean the same thing,

it seems to be a contradiction. Traditionally, the first “individual” here means “persons”

(hypostases); the second “individual” means to be of one essence/substance. It is important for

any trinitarianism to be biblically sound and to meet creedal orthodoxy, but the “natural reading”

in D2 is ambiguous. The better requirement may be “careful reading with sound hermeneutical

principles.” It is not hard to see that D1 and D3 need to be integrated in some way: why cannot

the three individuals form a society?

For any trinitarian account to be acceptable, it surely has to avoid the charge of tritheism

on the one hand and modalism on the other hand. Thomas Morris rightly reminds us,

In understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, the challenge is to balance the distinctness
and the persons with the real unity of the divine nature, a unity sufficient to justify the
Christian insistence that monotheism has not been utterly abandoned, that, in the words
of Deuteronomy, “The LORD our God is one God” (Deut. 6:4). … Modalism and
polytheism are the Scylla and Charybdis between which all orthodox accounts of the
Trinity must steer.48

After analyzing historical heresies which fall either tritheism or modalism, similarly to but more

clear than Brower and Rea, McCall proposes four-point criteria for any trinitarianism to be

acceptable: monotheistic criterion, robust notion of personal distinction, consubstantiality

(homoousios) and the full divinity of three persons, and “the strongest possible account of divine

unity or oneness.”49 For McCall’s desiderata, only one criterion may need to be clarified, i.e.,

47
Jeffrey E. Bower and Michael C. Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22
(2005), 59. Quoted in Thomas McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 46.
48
Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 175.
49
Thomas McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 86.
89
“ ‘persons’ in the more normal use of term.”50 He has argued for, to be consistent with his criteria

of the robust distinction of divine persons, the “I-Thou” account of trinitarian relationships. But

the responses differ: Paul Molnar charges (without argument) McCall’s proposal of being close

to tritheism; Stephen Holmes thinks McCall proposal to be successful in general but

“misleading” and “unrecognizable” particularly in “I-Thou” relationship.51 McCall has indeed

given rejoinder with clarification to these responses. If McCall could emphasize on the

uniqueness of divine personhood from human personhood in the “I-Thou” relationship and the

inseparability of centers of consciousness and action among divine persons, his proposal may

avoid such unnecessary misunderstandings and worries like those from Molnar and Holmes.

Specifically for any notion of divine unity to be evangelical, Michael Chiavone’s

dissertation proposes, besides basic logical coherence and consistency, three kinds of criteria.52

The first criterion is historical criterion which especially focus on the Nicene orthodoxy

(Athanasius’s homoousions as its Core) and its development by the Cappadocians, Augustine,

Anslem, Aquinas, and Barth; the second criterion is biblical/theological criterion which includes

biblical monotheism (the Shema as its Core and three divine persons to be incorporated into

God53) and divine attributes closely connected with the one divine ousia /substantia; and the third

criterion is the Chalcedonian Christological orthodoxy which aims to prevent the kind of

heresies of Apollinarianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism.

50
Ibid.
51
Paul D. Molnar, “Response to Thomas H. McCall”; Stephen R. Holmes, “Response to Thomas H.
McCall”; Thomas H. McCall, “Rejoinder Comments and Clarification”; in Jason S. Sexton (ed.), Two Views on the
Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 146–49, 138–43, 156–58.
52
Michael L. Chiavone, The One God: A Critically Developed Evangelical Doctrine of Trinitarian Unity
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009), 5–33.
53
Ibid., 28: “To summarize, a biblical doctrine of the unity of God must allow the unashamed unity of
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit without interfering with their interactions.”
90
 Chiavone’s criteria for divine unity are helpful in general for a balanced consideration of

divine unity and personal distinction, especially it includes the Nicene orthodoxy as its Core,

biblical monotheism, and divine attributes which are ascribed to divine essence. However, his

criteria have at least two problems that need to be pointed out. The first which is a minor

weakness is the confusion of the categories. While Chiavone rightly lists “historical” as one

independent category, he combines biblical witnesses with theological criterion but lists

“Christological” which supposes to be included in the “theological” category, as one independent

category. The second which is more serious is his criterion of unity rests on both the monarchy

of the Father and the single divine essence without clarification. The third is the implication of

his theological criterion is to allow the personal distinction, agreeing with Zizioulas, to be

ontological.54

Based on the comments on Brower-Rea, McCall, and Chiavone’s trinitarian criteria, I

now propose three kinds of criteria for any trinitarianism in general and divine unity in particular

to be acceptable, besides obvious requirements of logical coherence and consistency. The

proposal has to be biblical, theological, credal, even though there is an overlapping of category

between the second and the third criteria.

The first criterion (C1) is to be biblical. To be biblical, the proposal must be consistent

with the biblical monotheism (with the Shema as its Core) and biblical witness of personal

distinction among three divine persons. To be biblical, the proposal must also reserve a place of

divine mystery,55 especially in the questions like, How can three divine persons be one? How

distinct can three divine persons be to allow mutual love? Are there three distinct centers of

54
Chiavone, The One God, 201.
55
McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 227–29.
91
consciousness and action? How can three centers of consciousness and action be united as one

divine will? Since people have different understandings of certain notions (for instance, divine

oneness), we need other criteria to guarantee C1 (on unity).

The second criterion (C2) is to be theological. To be theological, the proposal must have

a sound theological understanding of the Scriptures instead of just natural human understanding.

We should understand theologically the two key concepts (essence and person) in trinitarianism

in order to avoid any heresies or unbalanced conclusions. For instance, the triune God is one but

not unitary one; the triune God is three persons, but three persons are not parts of God. To be

theological also means that it does not carry any anti-realist commitment to metaphysics.

The third criterion (C3) is to be creedal. To be credal, the proposal must be consistent or

at least not contradictory to any major ecumenical creeds related with trinitarianism in church

history,56 like the Nicene-Constantinople Creed and the Chalcedon Creed. These creeds affirm

the divinity and equality (homoousios) of the three persons and the ontological (essential,

substantial) divine unity. The theological development of the Nicene trinitarianism by John of

Damascus has an important contribution to divine unity, that is, it’s perichoretic unity based on

the ontological unity. To be creedal also means to take the classical understanding of identity

which allows numerical sameness without identity, instead of taking “a more fundamental sortal-

relativized sameness.”57

Having established these criteria for testing acceptable trinitarianism in general and

proposal of divine unity in particular, now we can examine some different accounts of divine

56
Ibid., 229.
57
Ibid., 46.
92
unity in church history and try to rule out some problematic account of unity, point out

inadequacies in some accounts, and come up with an acceptable account of divine unity.

Let us first consider the generic unity.58 This account of unity is ruled out due to its

violation of C1 or C3. In church history, the proposal of divine unity can appear in the form of

collective, social, or perichoretic form. An easy example of generic unity is humanity. John,

James, and Peter are three human individuals, but they possess one essence of common

humanity. This kind of generic unity is too loose for divine unity, because the human individuals

are not only distinct but also separated: they possess separate centers of consciousness and will.

But divine persons are distinct but not separate in their consciousness and will. Joachim of Fiore

worries about “the divine essence as a quaedam summa res”59 which may result in a fourth divine

entity (Quaternity) in Peter Lombard’s trinitarianism and proposes a collective account of divine

unity. Fiona Robb describes Joachim’s collective trinitarianism this way: “three ten pieces

designate the three Persons, of whom each is perfect God. A thirty piece, which is the collection

of denarii, designates the Trinity of one substance, because the perfect God is the Trinity and

perfect God is each individual Person.”60 Here is the problem with Joachim’s model from his

analogy is divine persons are the parts of the whole (divine essence), their collective unity is very

different from biblical monotheism. It violates C1.

Another generic account of divine unity, Moltmann’s perichoretic social unity, does

overcome the part-whole problem in Joachim’s account of collective unity, by noticing the

58
The meaning of terminology like generic or numerical unity can be vague sometimes, but the context is
important for deciding what the true meaning really is. (Cf. Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 292–93.)
59
Ibid., 79.
60
Fiona Robb, “The Fourth Lateran Council’s Definition of the Trinitarian Orthodoxy,” Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 48 (1997): 27. Quoted in McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 81.
93
biblical witness of mutual indwelling or interpenetration of divine persons. He locates divine

unity in John Damascene’s concept of perichoresis.61 But since Moltmann has rejected the

Nicene ontological divine unity,62 his account of unity violates C3. George Hunsinger,63 Thomas

McCall,64 Richard Bauckham,65 and Wolfhart Pannenberg66 have all pointed out the problems of

Moltmann’s trinitarianism. It is good for Moltmann to see the advantage of perichoresis in divine

unity, but he unwisely and mistakenly forgoes the Nicene ontological unity and thus violates C3.

The second kind of unity is the divine unity of Relative Trinitarianism (RT). We will see

the unity of pure form of RT violates C3 (classical identity and no commitment to an anti-realist

metaphysic). Peter Geach formulated the relative identity which is different from the classical

(absolute) identity.67 His thesis, as McCall summarizes it, is that “absolute identity is

inexpressible; even though a language may have predicates expressing indistinguishability by the

predicates it contains, a language cannot express indistinguishability simpliciter.”68 Relative

identity does not need to satisfy three essential properties (reflexivity, transitivity, and

symmetry), but holds that all equivalence and identity relations are relative.69 The advantage of

this new identity is that “[s]ome entity may be the same as another relative to some sortal, but

61
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 175.
62
Ibid., 10.
63
George Hunsinger, “Review of Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and The Kingdom,” in Thomist 47 (1983):
131.
64
McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 164–66.
65
Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 167.
66
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 334.
67
Peter Geach, Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 238–49.
68
McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? 39.
69
Ibid., 39–40.
94
truly be distinct relative to another sortal.”70 When this relative identity applies to trinitarianism,

it seems to give a logically satisfactory claim that three divine persons are distinct but they can

be one God. Peter van Inwagen even applies the relative identity to claim that the “person” in

trinitarianism can take the everyday meaning of human person. This relative identity does avoid

modalism, but risks at tritheism. Many theologians have pointed out the problems of relative

identity. Three major problems with RT are, the risk of modalism, a commitment to an anti-

realist metaphysic, and difficulty to explain how the absolute distinct three persons can be one

God.71 This kind of unity clearly violates C3 and thus should be ruled out.

The third kind of divine unity is the monarchian unity which is based on the monarchy of

the Father. This account of unity cannot pass either C2 (equality) or C3 (perichoresis). This kind

of unity is popular among trinitarianism in the Eastern tradition, but it also appears in the West

sometimes. In the early patristic era, Origen’s well-known contribution to trinitarianism is his

doctrines of the eternal generation of the Son from the Father and the eternal origin of the Son,

which reject the wrong claim that there was a time when the Son was not. Origen insists, as

Gerald O’Collins notes, that this eternal generation does not “entail a division of the divine

substance or essence (ousia).”72 Origen rightly uses hypostases to describe three divine persons,

but he emphasizes the transcendence of the Father, the ultimate principle. But he, unfortunately,

degrades “the real divinity of the Son and the Spirt,”73 and leads to a kind of subordinationism.

Thus the monarchian account of unity violates C2 (equality).

70
Ibid., 41.
71
Ibid., 43–45, 106–110.
72
Gerald O’Collins, The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity (New
York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1999), 110.
73
Ibid., 111.
95
 Although Eastern father Athanasius also holds divine unity in the monarchy of the Father,

but he can avoid Origen’s problem by insisting on the homoousios of Father and Son.74

Athanasius emphasizes that the Son is intimately and inseparably united with the Father. There is

no Father without the Son just as there is no Son without the Father. In his polemics against

Tropici, Athanasius emphasizes on the divinity of the Spirit who “proceeds” from the Father and

is “given” by the Son. He insists on the close relationship among Father, Son, and Spirit. For

divine unity, Athanasius emphasizes on the Father as the principle (arche) of divine life (the

Father as the only begotten) and trinitarian operations ad extra: “The Father does all things

through the Son in the Holy Spirit. Thus the unity of the holy Triad is preserved.”75 There is an

order (taxis) within the Trinity (“from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit”) in all pro-

Nicene fathers, but this ordering does not mean hierarchy or the difference of rank among divine

persons.76 Athanasius’s divine unity can pass all tests of C1, C2, and C3.

John Zizioulas develops an account of divine unity based on both the monarchy of the

Father and the communion of the divine persons. If both Moltmann and Pannenberg have paid

much attention to the concept of perichoresis in divine unity, Zizioulas’s proposal is far more

radical; it could be called the peak of “the triumph of relationality.”77 He proposes an ontology of

74
Letham, The Holy Trinity, 127: “… Athanasius was not alone in defending the truth [orthodox
trinitarianism]. Nevertheless, we can hardly exaggerate his contribution to the refinement and the crystallization of
Trinitarian dogma.”
75
Athanasius, Letter to Serapion, 1.27. Quoted in O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 130.
76
Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 207: “For all pro-Nicenes the Father is presented as first in an order in the
Godhead, and as the source of Son and Spirit”; Letham, The Holy Spirit, 400: “… the orthodox and Arians used the
word taxis in different ways. The Arians used it to support their heretical idea that the Son was of lesser rank or
status than the Father. The pro-Nicenes used to the word in the sense of a fitting and suitable disposition, not a
hierarchy”; T. F. Torrance, Christion Doctrine of God, 176: “by position and not by status, by form and not being,
by sequence and not power, for they are fully and perfectly equal.”
77
Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2004), 117.
96
personhood. He exalts perichoresis of trinitarian relations (“communion”) to the status of

ontology based on his understanding of patristic thought78 (especially Athanasius’s

contribution79): “it is communion which makes things ‘be’: nothing exists without it, not even

God.”80 For Zizioulas, God is “an event of communion”;81 “even God exists thanks to event of

communion.”82 For him, to be is to in communion; “being is constituted as communion.” 83 To be

a person is not to be an individual, but to be in relationship with others. In his radical proposal,

Zizioulas identifies hypostasis with ousia (person with being).84 Olson, Hall, and McCall point

out the inconsistency or incompatibility of Zizioulas’s two theses: the perfect communion of

three persons and the monarchy of the Father as a person.85 Ayres points out Zizioulas’s lack of

“a meaningful engagement with pro-Nicene Trinitarianism.”86 In sum, for Zizioulas, personhood

is ontology, therefore divine unity is perichoretic and ontological; at the same time, he bases

divine unity in the monarchy of the Father. Therefore, Zizoulas’s account of unity violates C3

and thus should be ruled out.

The unity based on the monarchy of the Father is not a unique thought in the East,

Augustine’s unity in the West can be discussed in this category. We will see that Augustine’s

78
John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY:
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 16: “The creation of this ontology was perhaps the greatest philosophical
achievement of patristic thought.”
79
Ibid., 85.
80
Ibid., 17.
81
Ibid., 15.
82
Ibid., 17.
83
Ibid., 101.
84
Ibid., 39. (italics author’s)
85
Roger E. Olson and Christopher A. Hall, The Trinity, Guides to Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2002), 114; McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? 197–204.
86
Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 413–14.
97
unity satisfies all C1, C2, and C3, thus it is acceptable. For Augustine’s contribution to the

doctrine of divine unity, the Augustinian scholarship has different voices. Some think Augustine

has mistakenly located divine unity in divine substance/essence and deviates from the Eastern

tradition before him (George L. Prestige,87 Gould Bray,88 Thomas Marsh,89 Colin Gunton.90)

However, not all Augustinian scholars agree these criticisms of Augustine’s trinitarianism. Basil

Studer notices Augustine’s effort to prove the equality of divine persons and his attempt to relate

this divine equality with divine unity, then points out that Augustine’s trinitarianism is actually

closer to the Eastern tradition than what it appears.91 O’Collins points out that one of

“Augustine’s enduring legacies was his sense of the divine persons being reciprocally relational

realities.”92 M. R. Barnes supports Studer’s view; his own rereading of Augustine also points out

the continuity of Augustine’s trinitarianism with the Nicene tradition and his divine unity which

is based on divine persons’ inseparable operations ad extra.93 Phillip Cary points out that

87
George L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London, UK: SPCK, 1952), 237. Quoted in Letham, The
Holy Trinity, 185.
88
Gould Bray, “The Filioque Cause in History and Theology “ TynBul 34 (1983), 115–16. Quoted in
Letham, The Holy Trinity, 185.
89
Marsh, The Triune God, 132. Quoted in Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 44.
90
Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 41–42.
91
Basil Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of Early Church, trans. Matthias Westerhoff, ed.
Andrew Louth (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 174: “In spite of all this an attentive reader of main
trinitarian texts cannot fail to notice that his line of thought progresses from Father, Son and Spirit to the one God.
Precisely because for him the three persons are entirely equal, and thus inseparable in being as well as in action, they
one single God. Thus Augustine represents a mode of explaining the trinitarian faith which is closer to the eastern
tradition than it as first sight appears.”
92
O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 135–38.
93
M. R. Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall,
and Gerald O’Collins (eds.), The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 154: “… Augustine’s basic frame of reference for understanding the Trinity is the appropriation of
Nicaea. That appropriation takes place within a polemical context, and, moreover, involves rearticulating the creed
of Nicaea in terms which were not originally part of that text. In Augustine’s time, the most important of such
articulations is that ‘the unity of the Trinity is found in its inseparable activities or operations.’”
98
Augustine actually accepts divine unity of Cappadocians and starts with looking for category for

personal distinction (“three what?”).94 Ayres recognizes the early Augustine’s use of Neoplatonic

philosophy, but he rightly points out that Augustine’s mature trinitarianism uses the grammar of

simplicity (the essence is identical with the attributes) to argue that “there is nothing but the three

coeternal and consubstantial persons.”95 Besides humble recognition of the incomprehensibility

of divine essence through human knowledge,96 Augustine stresses the unity, equality and

distinction of the three divine persons.97 Augustine also stresses the inseparable operations ad

extra of divine persons (which will be discussed with more detail in the next section), and this

inseparableness is based on divine unity in the Father instead of substance, a unity which is

maintained by the Holy Spirit as the bond of love uniting the Father and the Son.98 Olson and

Hall point out, “Perhaps surprisingly, in light of current debate, Augustine proceeds to locate

unity of the persons, not in the divine essence, but in the Father.”99 From this unity, surely it is

easy to induce that Augustine will maintain, besides oneness of being, oneness of will (volitional

94
Phillip Cary, “Historical Perspectives on Trinitarian Theology,” Religious and Theological Studies
Fellowship Bulletin (November–December 1995): 9: “Augustine begins where the Cappadocians leave off:
accepting their answer to the question ‘why not three gods?’ he proceeds to ask ‘three what?’ His concern is to
elaborate the distinctions between the three on the assumption that they are one God. Augustine never uses the
divine essence per se as his starting point.” Quoted in Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 45.
95
Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 365, 381.
96
Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991), 8.4.7; 14.27.50, etc.
97
Ibid., 1.4.7: “Father Son and Holy Spirit in the separable equality of one substance present a divine unity;
and therefore they are not three gods but one God; although the Father indeed the Father has begotten the Son, and
therefore he who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son is begotten by the Father, and therefore he who is the Son
is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and the Son,
himself coequal to the Father and the Son, and belonging to the threefold unity.” 1.6.13: “… he [the Holy Spirit] is
not only God … but also true God; therefore absolutely coequal to the Father and the Son, and consubstantial and
co-eternal in the oneness of the three.”
98
Ibid., On Christian Teaching, trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), 10.
99
Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 46.
99
unity) within the Godhead who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.100 To conclude, even though

Augustine also holds the unity based on the monarchy of the Father, his view of unity is

acceptable by our criteria C1–C3.

The fourth kind of unity is volitional unity or unity of will. Surely the ontological unity

entails volitional unity. But there are some theologians in church history who mere recognize

divine volitional unity instead of ontological unity, some others who not only recognize

volitional unity but also insist on the essential/ontological unity. For instance, Marcellus in the

West insists on mere volitional unity; Athanasius in the East insists on not only volitional unity,

but all the more the ontological unity.101 According to Khaled Anatolios’s insightful

categorization of two kinds of trinitarian theologies in the fourth century: unity of being and

unity of will, Athanasius’s trinitarianism clearly belongs to the category of unity of being.102

Indeed, Athanasius has made a great contribution to the doctrine of divine unity by declaring the

ontological unity of the divine persons instead of just volitional unity (“unity of will”). Unity of

will does not pass C1 and C3. But we should be aware that since the ontological unity entails

volitional unity, the volitional unity is also important in our project: the Father and the Son,

though genuinely distinct as divine persons, are not separated in essence thus in their will and

action even in the darkest moment of the cross.

100
Ibid., The Trinity, 2.5.9.
101
Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 152.
102
Ibid., 30–31: “My proposal is to distinguish between theologies that spoke of the unity of the Trinity as
a unity of being and those that spoke of a unity of will. … The essential distinction, from within the common ground
of confession of the Trinity as differentiated unity, was whether the divine Trinity was united according to a unity of
being, or by unity of will. … Thus Alexander, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians, despite undeniable differences and
developments, all designated the relation between Father and Son in terms of unity of being, Arius, Asterius,
Eusebius, and Eunomius, again despite all their divergences, insisted that the relations between Father and Son
pertained to will, not to being.”
100
 The fifth and sixth kinds of unity are about two unbalanced accounts of unity. These two

kinds of unity that we will describe remind us that it is possible to fall into a pitfall in many

different ways according to our criteria. The fifth kind of unity is one which is strongly

ontological but not enough perichoretic. It can barely pass C3. Anslem’s, Barth’s, and Rahner’s

accounts of divine unity can fall into this category.

Anselm emphasizes divine unity of essence and does not neglect divine plurality,103 but

he hesitates to use “persons” for all three (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). The relationship

between Father and Son is just as mind and thought; they are strictly one in intellectual essence

or being, and the Holy Spirt is the bond of their mutual love,104 but their perichoretic communion

is neglected by Anselm. Therefore, Anslem’s unity cannot pass the test of C3.

Barth clearly pronounces that his doctrine of divine unity is based on Scripture and

consists of three divine persons.105 He equates the lordship of God with the Nicene ousia106 and

further points out that divine unity is not “a mere unity of kind or a mere collective unity,” but a

simple and “numerical unity of the essence of ‘persons’.”107 George Hunsinger helpfully

summarizes that Barth’s divine unity has three senses, “personal, ontological, and dominical. …

God is one as a single acting Subject.”108 Barth’s doctrine of divine unity is strong in the simple

essence, but it is hindered by his concept of personhood as “modes of Being” (Seinsweise)109

103
William J. La Due, The Trinity Guide to the Trinity (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003), 66.
104
Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 56.
105
Barth, CD, 1/1, 348.
106
Ibid., 349.
107
Ibid., 350.
108
George Hunsinger, “Karl Barth’s Doctrine of the Trinity, and Some Protestant Doctrines after Barth,” in
Emery and Levering (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 299.
109
Barth, CD, 1/355.
101
Even though Barth’s ontological unity consists of divine threeness110 and even perichoresis,111

but his concept of personhood limits the extent of perichoretic communion among three

“persons” (modes of being) within the Trinity. Therefore, Barth’s account of unity falls into this

unbalanced category: it is strong in ontological unity and but weak in perichoretic unity.

Rahner is afraid that too much focus in divine unity of simplicity may lead to the neglect

of salvation history.112 One of Rahner’s influential and yet controversial contributions to

contemporary trinitarianism is what is later called Rahner’s Rule (“The ‘economic’ Trinity is the

‘immanent’ Trinity, and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”113 Against

Boethiusian and Cartesian individualist understanding of personhood, Rahner understands divine

persons as three “distinct manners of subsisting” or “distinct modes of subsistence.”114 He

distinguishes divine persons from human persons. Although Rahner can use “person” to refer to

threeness, for him, “there are not three consciousnesses; rather, one consciousness subsists in a

threefold way. There is only one real consciousness in God, which is shared by Father, Son, and

Spirit, by each in his own proper way.”115 According to Rahner’s understanding of personhood,

“there is properly no mutual love between Father and Son, for this would presuppose two

acts.”116 We understand that Rahner wants to maintain divine unity in both essence and will

110
Ibid., 1/349.
111
Ibid., 370: “Since John of Damascus … this insight has found in the doctrine of perichoresis
(circumincessio, passing into one another) of the divine persons. That states that the divine modes of being mutually
condition and permeate on another so completely that one is one is always in the other two and the other two in the
one.”
112
Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 98.
113
Rahner, The Trinity, 22.
114
Ibid., 103–105, 109.
115
Ibid., 107.
116
Ibid., 106 (italics author’s).
102
(consciousness and freedom), so he keeps ontological unity. But Rahner’s concept of person is

still in the shadow of Aquinas’s “individuum vagum” and needs further development in order to

accommodate at least to the biblical witnesses of genuine love between the Father and the Son,

because each divine person is fully God and his consciousness should be real and their mutual

love should be real too. Gilles Emery,117 Walter Kasper,118 and Robert Letham119 have concerned

about Rahner’s account of unity. I share O’Collins’s concern about Barth’s and Rahner’s concept

of personhood, “if we do not use personal language when speaking of and to God, will we finish

up saying less rather more about God?”120

In sum, both Barth’s and Rahner’s ontological unity is strong, but their perichoretic unity

is not enough. According to C3, this kind of unity should be judged to be not balanced.

The sixth kind of unity is strongly perichoretic but not enough ontological. It can pass C3

but not C1. Moltmann’s and Pannenberg’s accounts of unity can fall into this category. We have

seen previously the problem of Moltmann’s social unity. His perichoretic unity indeed

demonstrates the mutual indwelling and interpenetration of divine persons, it is not enough to

guarantee ontological unity.

Pannenberg values, like Moltmann, the trinitarian relationality (“mutual self-

distinction”121), but he is more careful than Moltmann about divine unity. Pannenberg does not

reject Nicene unity of essence, but he does not derive divine plurality from the essence of the one

117
Gilles Emery, The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God (Washington D.C.
The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 110.
118
Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 289; Pannenberg, Systematic Theology. vol. 1, 319.
119
Robert Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 2004), 294: “When the term person is rejected or heavily qualified, one ends up with abstractions that
less than personal.”
120
O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 191.
121
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 308–319.
103
God in order to avoid either modalism or subordinationism.122 His concept of essence is

relational and consists of robust trinitarian relations. He is dissatisfied with Barth’s concept of

person as “mode of being” and Rahner’s “distinct manner of subsisting,” and claims that the

persons should be “living realizations of separate centers of action.”123 For divine persons to be

self-differentiated and reciprocally related, the genuine mutual trinitarian relations must be more

than just the relations of origin; it includes, for example, the Father’s handing over his kingdom

to the Son and the Son’s returning his kingdom to the Father at the eschaton.124 Like Moltmann,

Pannenberg finds the concept of perichoresis to be crucial for divine unity, but he points out that

perichoresis, contra Moltmann, is never intended to guarantee divine unity but to presuppose the

unity on other basis like the Father. However, for Pannenberg, the Father’s deity is dependent on

the Son, and thus three divine persons are reciprocally related. His account of unity is located at

the divine essence which consists of perichoretic communion of the three divine persons;125 this

unity is not detached from the divine persons’ common working in the economy of salvation.

Although Pannenberg has tried to establish divine unity from essence as spirit, field, or love, his

ideas have been criticized at least to be ambiguous.126 Pannenberg’s trinitarianism should not be

charged of clear tritheism since he has accepted Nicene unity of essence, but his concept of

personhood certainly shows tri-theistic tendency. To avoid of the charge of tri-theistic tendency,

Pannenberg’s idea of unity of three divine persons may need to be revised as inseparable centers

122
Ibid., 298.
123
Ibid., 319.
124
Ibid., 312–13, 320.
125
Ibid., 334: “the divine essence as the epitome of the personal relations of Father, Son, and Spirit.”
126
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2007), 142.
104
of consciousness and action. Therefore, in conclusion regarding divine unity, Pannenberg’s

account of divine is clearly perichoretic but not clearly ontological. It is at least unbalanced

according to C1.

The seventh kind of unity is the affirmation of both ontological and perichoretic unity.

As we have seen the divine unity in Athanasius’s and Augustine’s accounts, we will also see in

the Cappadocians’ and T. F. Torrance’s accounts.

The Cappadocian fathers develop the doctrine of divine nature in their battle against

Arians, Sabellians, and Eunomians. Even though their theologies have different emphases, but

they all defend for the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, especially Basil defends divine

unity (homoousios of three divine persons) against Sabellians’ charge of his perceived tritheism.

Furthermore, they face the same question that Athanasius has struggled, that is, how to

understand the differentiated unity within the Trinity? The Cappadocians develop the idea of

interpersonal communion among divine persons.127 Olson and Hall point out that “we find in the

Cappadocian theology an early imitation of the perichoresis, or ‘cyclical movement,’ the being-

in-one-another of the Trinity.”128 This understanding of divine unity and plurality indeed goes

beyond Athanasius’s and is further developed by John of Damascus in the eighth century as the

doctrine of perichoresis.129 Here we can see that the Cappadocians’ significant contribution to the

doctrine of divine unity is their deep understanding of divine unity as a perichoretic unity. This

127
O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 131–32: “Where they [the Cappadocians] went beyond Athanasius was
in developing their language of thee coequal and coeternal hypostaseis or persons/subjects sharing the one divine
ousia or essence/being/substance. At the heart of God, the Cappadocians saw an interpersonal communion or
koinonia, with communion as the function of all three divine persons and not simply the Holy Spirit.”
128
Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 132.
129
Ibid.: “we find in the Cappadocian theology an early intimation of the perichoresis, or ‘cyclical
movement,’ the being-in-one-another of the Trinity. In a unique ‘coinherence’ or mutual interpenetration, each of
the trinitarian persons is transparent to and permeated by the other two.”
105
unity is surely different from the solitary oneness. Even though the Cappadocians have

developed the perichoretic unity, they still affirm the unity of being as they embrace the doctrine

of homoousios in the Constantinople Council (381). Furthermore, they also emphasize on the

inseparable operations ad extra, which will be elaborated in the next section. One important

point worth noticing is that Basil the Great, like Athanasius, emphasizes that the inseparable

operations ad extra demonstrates divine unity ad intra.130

Thomas F. Torrance does not break new ground in the doctrine of divine unity,131 but in

the contemporary wave of return to the economy and relationality, he is able to maintain a good

balance by reminding the importance of the immanent Trinity.132 Torrance’s trinitarianism is

deeply rooted in the Nicene tradition (especially through the Cappadocians and Athanasius) and

is strongly influenced by his mentor Barth in his emphasis on revelation and by Rahner in his

focus on salvation history. But he is dissatisfied with Barth’s and Rahner’s concepts of

personhood, and understands person as “substantive relations” or “onto-relations”: “Persons are

not just modes of existence but hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what

Father, Son and Holy Spirit are coherently in themselves and in their mutual objective relations

with and for one another.”133 Based on this new understanding of personhood, Torrance develops

130
Basil the Great, Letter 189, in St. Basil, Letters, vol. 2 (186–68), trans. Sister Agnes Calare Way
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press, 1969), 31: “It is very necessary for us to be guided in our
investigation of the divine nature by its operations . … If we consider the operation (energeia) of the Father and of
the Son and of the Holy Spirt to be one, differing or varying in no way at all, it is necessary because of the identity
of the operation for the oneness of the nature (phusis) to be inferred.” Quoted in Gilles Emery, The Trinity: An
Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God, trans. Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University Press, 2009), 93.
131
Torrance does give a distinctive proposal regarding the monarchy of the Trinity: in the whole
perichoretic communion instead of the person of the Father. Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of
God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 174.
132
Letham, The Holy Trinity, 367–68; Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, 208.
133
T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 157.
106
his balanced understanding of divine unity: the unity in the Trinity and the Trinity in unity. Two

concepts are crucial for Torrance: homoousion and perichoresis. The homoousion of the Father,

the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for Torrance, expresses

the fact that what God is “toward us” and “in the midst of us” in and through the Word
made fresh, he really is in himself; that he is in his internal relations of his transcendent
being the very same Father, Son and Holy Spirit that he is in his revealing and saving
activity in time and space toward mankind.134

This concept of homoousion, which is regarded by Torrance as “ontological foundation for

Christian theology,”135 helps him understand the immanent Trinity from revelation in the

economy of salvation, but also prevents him read all economic experiences back into the

immanent Trinity like what Moltmann does. The concept of perichoresis with the onto-relational

concept of personhood helps Torrance express in a dynamic and rich way the mutual indwelling

and interpenetration of three divine persons: “the three divine Persons are inseparably

interrelated in being and act through a mutual indwelling and a mutual movement toward and for

one another in the homoousial Communion of the Holy Trinity which they constitute.”136

After summarizing Torrance’s onto-relational nature of personhood, Paul D. Molnar

points out, “Each of the Persons is wholly and completely God but each is hypostatically

interconnected with the other in such a way that together they constitute the indivisible unity of

the Trinity.”137 These two concepts help us avoid Arian and Sabellian tendencies in

trinitarianism, because we cannot image a Trinity without an ontological unity and an unity

134
T. F. Thomas, The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church, 2nd
Edition (London/New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 130.
135
Alister E. McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 158.
136
T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 130.
137
Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance : Theologian of the Trinity (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 61.
107
without perichoretic trinitarian relationships.138 In addition, Torrance’s concept of person enables

him to avoid Barth’s and Rahner’s Sabellian tendency (through Torrance’s onto-relational

personhood) on the one hand and Pannenberg’s tritheistic tendency (through Torrance’s

inseparably interconnected personhood) on the other hand. Torrance’s trinitarianism is well-

balanced. To conclude, Torrance’s divine unity is a good example of balanced doctrine of divine

unity: robust ontological unity and strong perichoretic unity. It surely passes all tests of C1–C3.

The last kind of unity is simple unity. Here simplicity means that God has no parts in his

being. He is essentially simple and whole. This account of unity surely emphasizes C2 (in

simplicity), but it may be weak for C1 (in personal distinction) and C3 (perichoresis). Ayres

describes Augustine’s understanding of divine simplicity this way, “For the mature Augustine,

there is one truly simple being, God…”139 For all the created things, they are composed of parts.

The essence of the created things is different from its attributes. But for Augustine, God is

completely different from the created order. “God’s simplicity is just to say God ‘is’ what God is

said to ‘have’: when we say that God lives or is good we should understand that as meaning that

God is life itself or goodness itself.”140 In other words, Augustine identifies divine attributes with

divine essence.

One example of application of DDS (doctrine of divine simplicity) in Augustine’s

trinitarianism is that divine generation does not cause part-whole problem. The Father generates

the Son without division in eternity. Here we do not deal with many criticisms of DDS.141 But we

138
Ibid., 173–74.
139
Ayres, “Augustine on the Trinity,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, 126.
140
Ibid.
141
Vallicella, William F., "Divine Simplicity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/divine-simplicity/>.
108
need to be aware that even though not all versions of DDS can past our criteria, for example,

strict identification of divine persons with divine essence results in Modalism. But there exists

certain version of DDS which can be consistent with the orthodox doctrine of divine unity.

McCall points out at least three forms of DDS: strict DDS (S-DDS), formal DDS (F-DDS), and

generic DDS (G-DDS).142 In these three kinds of DDS, McCall has convincingly argued that

certain form of DDS (like formal DDS) is compatible with trinitarian orthodoxy, because

according to the classical trinitarianism, divine persons are “genuinely and irreducibly distinct”

and yet “ontologically and logically inseparable.”143

Theological criterion C2 regarding divine simplicity is important for this project. One

important issue regarding divine punishment of Jesus is whether divine wrath/punishment

contradicts divine love. Divine simplicity will guarantee that there has been never contradictory

between divine holiness (divine wrath, divine punishment) and divine love (divine grace, mercy,

and forgiveness). Divine wrath over sin (even in the flesh of Jesus) never contradicts divine unity

of love (between the Father and the Son).

Summary and Application

What, then, do we learn about the doctrine of divine unity from our long discussion

above? From our discussion of various accounts, we have discovered that some accounts of

divine unity are not acceptable and hence we should avoid; some accounts are unbalanced so that

we can improve; some accounts are well-balanced so that we should affirm and adopt.

We have found that not all accounts of unity can pass the test of three criteria that we set

in the beginning of this section. Some accounts (like generic and collective unity) are not

142
Thomas H. McCall, “Trinity Doctrine: Plain and Simple,” in Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (eds.),
Advancing Trinitarian Theology: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 54–55.
143
Ibid., 56–57.
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acceptable because the proposed unity is so loose that it cannot pass the test of the Nicene creed

of ontological unity; some accounts (like social perichoretic unity) seem to overcome the

problem of generic unity, but it is still not strong enough. Some accounts (like volitional unity)

have paid good attention to the divine unity in consciousness and will, but this kind of unity is

still not strong enough, if it is not based on the more solid foundation of ontological unity. Some

accounts are unbalanced: they are either strongly ontological but not enough perichoretic (like

Anslem’s, Barth’s, and Rahner’s unity, and some forms of the monarchian unity) or strongly

perichoretic but not enough ontological (like Moltmann’s and Pannenberg’s unity). But there are

some good and balanced accounts of divine unity in church history (like Athanasius’s,

Cappadocians’, Augustine’s, and T. F. Torrance’s). Therefore, this balanced account (ontological

and perichoretic unity) is affirmed and adopted for this project.

We conclude that the classical Nicene orthodoxy’s divine unity is ontological unity, a

unity of divine being (ousia/substance/essence) and it certainly entails volitional unity – oneness

of divine will. We can also conclude that perichoretic unity is inherent in the Nicene orthodoxy

and allows a natural development (John of Damascus) that is consistent with the biblical

witnesses. This development allows the genuine distinction of divine persons who are of three

uniquely distinct centers of consciousness and action on the one hand but does not neglect the

inseparable divine oneness of essence and will on the other hand. As to what it means by oneness

(unity) in terms of simplicity, we have different versions of doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS).

Certain type of formal DDS is consistent with the orthodox divine unity.

How do we apply the conclusion above to our project of divine punishment of Jesus? One

of greatest concerns with divine punishment of Jesus is divine disunity. Now since divine unity is

ontological, the first and second persons have never been separated ontologically in the inner life

110
of the Trinity, they are surely not separated volitionally (in their common love toward and saving

purpose of human salvation) as a result, even though the Son has endured the Father’s

punishment, or to use the stronger version, the Son was punished by the Father, in the Son’s

fresh for human sins at the moment on the cross. Perichoretic unity allows the Father and the Son

to play distinctive and yet inseparable roles in the divine punishment on the cross.

Based on our conclusion here, we can point out that some of accounts should be counted

as out of bounds. For instance, if there is any ontological rupture between the Father and the Son

(like Moltmann’s account), that account of unity should be rejected. Since ontological unity

entails volitional unity, if any account exposes the conflicting wills between the Father and the

Son in divine punishment, that account should also be rejected.

Another one concern about divine punishment of Jesus is morality of the Father in

punishing his Son. From DDS, if the Father is not loving or just at that moment of the cross,144

then he is a loving or just God. Such account should be rejected. If any account exposes conflict

between divine love and divine wrath (at the moment of the cross), then such account is not valid

either.145 Therefore, in order for any defender of PSA to avoid the objection from divine unity

and divine simplicity, he or she needs to demonstrate clearly that the Father and the Son are one

in essence and thus in volition; the account of divine punishment of Jesus should not violate the

simplicity of divine nature: the holy love of God.

The Principles of Inseparable Operations and Distinct Appropriations

Divine unity ad intra has seen heatedly debated and finally secured by the church in the

formative fourth century. Divine unity ad intra naturally entails divine unity in divine operations

144
See the moral objections in Chapter 1.
145
See the theological objections in Chapter 1.
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ad extra. It is very important for this project to affirm that the Father and the Son are united in

their work in the world especially divine punishment of Jesus at the moment of the cross. This

affirmation reminds us to understand divine punishment of Jesus in a unique way: the divine

punishment on the cross is drastically different from the ordinary punishment in the human legal

courts. This is one of reasons that there exist so many disagreements even among the

evangelicals.

The Principle of Inseparable Operations

Since divine punishment of Jesus is an issue in the economy of salvation (though it is

related with divine unity in the immanent Trinity), now let us consider divine operations ad

extra. The doctrine or principle of inseparable operations ad extra (opera trinitatis ad extra sunt

omnia indivisa, the external operations of the Trinity are always undivided) is based on divine

unity ad intra in the one essence which is common to all three persons. Kyle Claunch rightly

points out, “This doctrine, often expressed by the Latin axiom, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt

indivisa has been a staple of orthodox Trinitarian theology for centuries.”146

In church history, Augustine is probably the most rigorous defender for this principle, but

before him, some church fathers (like Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary of Poitiers,

Ambrose) have also noticed it. At the same time, pro-Nicene trinitarians also discover trinitarian

distinctions ad intra and the distinctive roles of divine persons in the economy of salvation. This

is the issue of distinct personal appropriations ad extra. The difficulty in understanding the

inseparable operations and yet distinct appropriations at the same time is just like that in

understanding one God in three persons, Father, Son and Spirit. It takes revolutionary theological

146
Kyle Claunch, “What God Had Done Together: Defending The Historic Doctrine of The Inseparable
Operations Of The Trinity,” JETS 56, no. 4 (2013), 781.
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thinking and even creative terminology (just like Tertullian’s distinction of substantia and

persona in the West and Basil’s distinction of ousia and hypostasis in the East) to make a

doctrinal breakthrough.

That Irenaeus insists that Christ and the Holy Spirit are “two hands” of God may give

people’s impression that the Son and the Spirit could work separately or independently in the

economy of salvation. Athanasius’s rigorous insistence of ontological unity of the Trinity ad

intra will not allow such separation or independence in the personal work of the Trinity ad extra,

“The Father does all things through the Word in the Holy Spirit.”147 He also writes, the Trinity is

“identical with itself and indivisible in nature, and its activity (energeia) is one.”148 Gregory of

Nyssa also points out, “We are not told that the Father does anything by himself in which the

Son does not cooperate or that the Son has any isolated activity apart from the Holy Spirit”

because “[e]very activity originates from the Father, proceeds from through the Son, and is

brought to the perfection in the Holy Spirit.”149 Ambrose argues for both the inseparable

operations and one volition, “If then the peace of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one,

the grace one, the love one and the communion one, the working is certainly one, … And not

only is the operation … one but also there is one and the same will, …”150 Hilary of Poitiers

defends the inseparableness of work of the Father and the Son, “the Son asserted that He could

147
Athanasius, Letter to Serapion, 1.27. Quoted in O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 130.
148
Ibid., 1.28. Quoted in Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea, 143.
149
Gregory of Nyssa, To Ablabius, On Not Three Gods, 47.21–48.2. Quoted in O’Collins, The Tripersonal
God, 134.
150
Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, 1.12, 131; 2.10, 101. Quoted in Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 369.
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do nothing by Himself except what He saw the Father doing … all the Father does the Son does

in the like manner.”151

Before Augustine, the Nicene Creed has intimated the principle of inseparable operations

according to Letham, “The Father is the maker of all things, while the Lord Jesus Christ is the

one thorough whom all things came into existence, and the Holy Spirit is the Lord and giver of

life. Creation is a work of the whole Trinity; all three persons are actively involved in the

creation of all that is made.”152

Augustine states the principle of inseparable operations as the Catholic faith, “according

to our Catholic faith, the Trinity is … as so inseparable that whatever action is performed by it

must be thought to be performed at the same time by the Father and by the Son and by the Holy

Spirit.”153 In the early part in his The Trinity, Augustine points out, “Father and Son and Holy

Spirit in inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity,” at the same time, he points

out that not all three persons was incarnate, was crucified, ascended to heaven, but “just as the

Father and Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably.”154 Based on these

statements, Claunch helpfully summarizes Augustine’s trinitarianism into four affirmations,

First, the three persons constitute one God, and the locus of divine unity is found in “the
inseparable equality of one substance.” Second, the real distinction between the persons,
such that “he who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father
nor the Son” is found in eternal relationships of origin … Third, divine actions in the
economy of salvation can be appropriated to one particular person as distinct from the
others. … Fourth, the inseparable unity of the one divine substance entails the conclusion
that the actions of the three persons are inseparable …155

151
Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, 7.17–18. Quoted in Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 369.
152
Letham, The Holy Trinity, 174.
153
Augustine, Letters, 11.2. Quoted in Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 369.
154
Ibid., The Trinity, 1.2.7.
155
Claunch, “What God Had Done Together: Defending The Historic Doctrine of The Inseparable
Operations Of The Trinity,” JETS 56, no. 4 (2013), 787–88.
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 While Ayres has provided historical argument for Augustine’s inseparable principle,

Claunch argues that this principle of Augustine’s is also both theologically coherent and

biblically faithful,156 and concludes that “Augustine’s Trinitarians theology became the standard

of orthodox Trinitarian reflection in the West for the next 1,500 years. Therefore, Augustine’s

doctrine of inseparable operations is the historic orthodox doctrine.”157 Now the difficult issue is,

as mentioned above, How do we understand the inseparable operations of the Trinity ad extra

with the obvious distinct works of the divine persons in the incarnation of the Son (not all three)?

We cannot argue for no distinction in operations ad extra since biblical witnesses have supported

otherwise. Then can we just say that three divine persons play different roles and collaborate

together? O’Collins points out rightly that this understanding will lead to tritheism.158 James,

John, and Peter can collaborate together, but their works can be separated. Just like what Basil

the Great and Tertullian have made a breakthrough in trinitarianism by introducing different

terms for substance and person, Augustine uses actus to refer the common action that three

divine persons involve and terminus to refer the distinct term that particular person does as the

subject.159 Ayres points out from Augustine’s exegesis of John 5:19 that for Augustine there is

always only one divine action but due to different order in the Trinity ad intra, there can be

distinct operations ad extra for each person.160

156
Ibid., 785.
157
Ibid., 792.
158
O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 146.
159
Augustine, Sermons, 52.4.8. Quoted in O’Collins, The Tripersonal God, 220.
160
Ayres, “Augustine on the Trinity,” in Emery and Levering (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity,
132–33.
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 The Principle of Distinct Appropriations

Thomas Aquinas develops Augustine’s and his immediate predecessors’ (Bonaventure

and Albert the Great) trinitarian thought in his doctrine of distinct appropriations.161 To serve his

general aim of trinitarianism which is to know God, Aquinas intends his doctrine of

appropriations to know particular divine persons better through the means of our general

knowledge of essential attributes.162 There are, for Aquinas, two orders of knowledge, the

common knowledge of divine essence and the proper knowledge of divine persons. We have to

use the clearer knowledge regarding the common essence to illuminate the less clear knowledge

of persons. He defines appropriations similarly to Albert’s, “To appropriate is nothing other than

to draw what is shared toward what is proper.”163 For Aquinas, the doctrine of appropriations is

not just to describe the operations of divine persons in the economy of salvation, but also to

know the distinction within the inner trinitarian life. He distinguishes four regions for

appropriations (the first is “God as to his being”; the second is “God in his unity”; the third is

“God in his operation”; and the fourth is “God in his relations with the creatures”).164 What we

normally talk about divine operations ad extra is, for Aquinas, the third region of appropriations.

Aquinas distinguishes source and modes of divine operations to solve the thorny issue of

inseparable and distinct operations, as summarizes well by Emery, “The three divine persons act

inseparably, in virtue of their common divine nature, and the whole Trinity is the source of all

their works. But each person acts within the distinct mode of his relations to the other person

161
I appreciate Dr. David Luy’s guidance for suggesting me to pay attention to Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine
of appropriations.
162
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, q. 32; q. 39, a. 7. Quoted in Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas
Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 328–29.
163
Ibid., De Veritate, q. 7, a. 3. Quoted from Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 326.
164
Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 334.
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within this common action.”165 For example in the case of creation, all three persons join the

common work of creation, but the subjects or actors of creation are distinct. The Father (as the

principle) creates through the Son as the Word and Image (the formal principle) in the Holy Spirt

as Love and Gift. After studying Aquinas’s distinct modes of and unity in action in the case of

creation, Emery helpfully concludes,

In conclusion, while clearly emphasizing the divine persons’ unity of action, the unity of
their principle of action, and the unity of three persons in their relationship to created
effects, this doctrine invites us to spot a relational mode of action which belongs to each
person in a distinct way; this mode of action consists in the intra-Trinitarian relation.166

Early church pro-Nicene fathers like Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary of Poitiers, and Augustine

and medieval theologians like Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and especially Aquinas help us

through the principles of inseparable operations and distinct appropriations to have clear

understanding on how the divine operations ad extra can be inseparable and yet distinct. These

two aspects of divine action have been embraced and defended in the following Reformation era

and modern time in the works of John Calvin, John Owen, Herman Bavinck, and Charles Hodge,

etc.167

Summary and Application

The historical survey of the doctrine of inseparable operations helps us draw two

important conclusions. First, this principle is indeed an orthodox trinitarian teaching and thus

should be accepted as our guiding principle in our discussion of any divine work in this world

even including divine punishment on the cross. Second, the principle of inseparable operations

165
Ibid., 349.
166
Ibid., 355 (italics author’s).
167
Claunch, “What God Had Done Together: Defending The Historic Doctrine of The Inseparable
Operations Of The Trinity,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 56, no. 4 (2013), 781.
117
does not exclude certain divine person to work in some special way while all three of them are

involve in that work. For example, Jesus can be punished by the Father for our sins, but he also

involves in the process of divine punishment with his voluntary bearing of human sins.

How do we then apply these principles of inseparable operations and distinct

appropriations to our current project? First, since divine punishment is one of divine operations

in the world, it is, according to the principle of inseparable operations, the common work of three

divine persons. In other words, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit all three have been involved in this

work of punishment. Therefore, the focus of divine punishment of Jesus is not the opposition

between the Father and the Son, but the united work of punishment of three divine persons on the

sin and evil of the world. This principle can apply with the principle of divine unity in the

previous section to point out that divine punishment of Jesus is not two individuals’ work of

opposition of will or of intention of offense and punishment, but one God’s loving willingness of

self-sacrifice in the form of the second person of Godself to be punished by the first person of

Godself. This unifying work of punishment is within one God and as one united work.

Second, we should not neglect that fact at the same time, according to the principle of

appropriations, it is only (the human) Jesus who was punished by the Father, although all three

divine persons have been involved in this punishment. There is no divine punishment within the

eternal life of the Trinity since there is no bearing of sins within the eternal Trinity. Divine

appropriations allow the possibility of one person of Godself in the economy of salvation to be

punished by the other without breaking the unifying work of the Trinity in divine punishment on

the cross.

The Unity and Distinction of the Economic and Immanent Trinity

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 To address the issue of divine punishment of Jesus, we have to clarify the relationship

between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, after all divine punishment of Jesus

happens in the economy of salvation, but there is no divine punishment within the immanent

Trinity. The question, whether the divine punishment or forsakenness in the economy affects

divine unity in the immanent Trinity, relates with the issues of the unity and distinction of the

economic and immanent Trinity. To relate this current issue with previous issues of divine unity

and inseparable operations, Pannenberg’s insight is significant, as Grenz points out, “the unity of

God in threeness of the persons provides the basis of the unity of the immanent Trinity and the

economic Trinity, and the unity of the divine life lies in the activity of the three persons on

behalf of one another merely in the idea of perichoresis (contra Moltmann).”168 In other words,

divine unity provides the basis for both unities, the unity of the immanent and economic Trinity

and the unity of operations or activities of distinctive divine persons.

Although Karl Rahner is not the first one in church history who addresses the issue of the

relationship between the economic and immanent Trinity,169 his statement (Rahner’s Rule) is

surely the most influential (and controversial) one. Being dissatisfied with the situation that the

doctrine of the Trinity, “despite of their orthodox confession,” has no practical bearings in the

Christian life and vast religious literature, Rahner wishes to make better connection between

trinitarianism and the salvation history. His famous rule or axiom that the economic Trinity is the

168
Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, 98–99.
169
Many early church fathers like Tertullian, Athanasius, Cappadocians, Augustine, medieval theologians
like Thomas Aquinas, Gregory Palamas, Eastern orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky and Dumitru Staniloae
have addressed this issue. Cf. Letham, The Holy Trinity, 338–55; Chun-Hyun Baik, The Holy Trinity – God for God
and God for Us: Seven Positions on the Immanent-Economic Trinity Relation in Contemporary Trinitarian
Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 32–61.
119
immanent Trinity and vice versa170 is his attempt to emphasize the importance of the economic

Trinity in contemporary trinitarianism. For him, the immanent Trinity must retreat to the

background, as Olson and Hall point out, “the only purpose of speaking God’s immanent triune

being is to guard against dissolving God into history and to protect God’s transcendence and the

graciousness of salvation.”171 Responses to Rahner’s bold claim about the relationship of the

economic and immanent Trinity are divided. Fred Sanders categorizes the theologians, in terms

of their responses to Rahner’s Rule, into two groups, “the radicalizers” and “the restricters”: the

former accept it as an ontological principle and identify the economic Trinity with the immanent

Trinity (Piet Schonnerberg, Hans Kung, Jurgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Robert

Jenson), and the latter accept it with restriction as an epistemological principle (Yves Congar,

Walter Kasper, Hans Urs von Balthasar, T. F. Torrance, and Paul Molnar).172

Chun-Hyun Baik picks eleven sapient contemporary theologians’ stances on the

relationship of the economic and immanent Trinity and helpfully summarizes into seven

positions: First, Barth’s position of “mutual correspondence” treats the economic Trinity as “the

epistemological gateway” to the immanent Trinity; Second, Rahner himself identifies the

immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity; Third, Moltmann’s “doxological and eschatological

unity,” Pannenberg’s “futurist and eschatological unity,” and Jenson’s “eschatological unity in

the temporal narrative” regard the immanent Trinity to be fully realized when the economic

Trinity reaches the eschaton; Fourth, both Leonardo Boff and William N. Pittenger consider the

immanent Trinity to be “much more than” the economic Trinity; Fifth, Joseph A. Bracken

170
Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Crossroads, 2002), 22.
171
Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 98.
172
Fred Sanders, The Image of the Immanent Trinity: Rahner’s Rule and the Theological Interpretation of
Scripture. Issues in Systematic Theology, vol. 12 (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 108–98.
120
immerses the economic Trinity into the immanent Trinity; Sixth, Marjorie H. Suchocki and

Catherine Mowry LaCugna emphasize on “a relational ontology” and absorb the immanent

Trinity into the economic Trinity; lastly, Jung Young Lee’s “mutual inclusiveness” position

holds that the immanent and economic Trinity are mutually inclusive.173 Surely Baik’s study is

not exhaustive, but he points out insightfully the necessity of mystery in the relationship between

the immanent and economic Trinity.174

From Baik’s study, we can conclude at least that the economic Trinity is very crucial as

an epistemological principle for us to know the immanent Trinity, but we should not jump too

quickly to conclude that the economic Trinity can be ontologically identified with the immanent

Trinity, because this way the immanent Trinity may lose transcendence and sovereign freedom.

One example is Moltmann. He belongs to the group of “the radicalizers” who identifies the

economic Trinity with the immanent Trinity. He reads the cross event into the inner life of the

Trinity175 and concludes that the abandonment of the cross “separates the Father and the Son”

and that “it is a stasis within God – ‘God against God.’”176 Even Pannenberg who belongs to the

same group sees the danger of Moltmann’s approach.177 T. F. Torrance rightly points out the

oneness of the economic Trinity with the immanent Trinity, but he emphasizes on the distinction

between them for the sake of divine freedom which is lost in Rahner’s Rule,

All this [the transcendent freedom, nature and mystery of God’s eternal being] warns us
that we cannot think of the ontological Trinity as if it were constituted by or dependent on
the economic Trinity, but must rather think of the economic Trinity as the freely

173
Baik, The Holy Trinity – God for God and God for Us, 130–33.
174
Ibid., 3–4.
175
Moltmann, The Crucified God, 190–91.
176
Ibid., The Crucified God, 151–52; The Trinity and the Kingdom, 160: “the cross has a retroactive effect
on the Father and causes infinite pain.”
177
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 331.
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 predetermined manifestation in the history salvation of the eternal Trinity which God
himself was before the foundation of the world, and eternally is.178

Paul D. Molnar also points out the root of Rahner’s problem179 and the damages of his identity

thesis, one of which is the loss of divine freedom.180 Therefore, in this project, I will avoid the

identity position, instead I accept unity of the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity and at

the same time the distinction of both.

Now let us have a summary and apply this principle of the unity and distinction of the

economic and immanent Trinity in our project. To do that, we should not read all Jesus’s

economic experiences (like his punishment and forsakenness) into the immanent Trinity. For

example, we should not read pain and death of Jesus into the eternal second person of the

Trinity; we should not read divine punishment and divine forsakenness of Jesus in the economy

into the immanent trinitarian relationship. This way, we can avoid the conflict of divine

punishment of Jesus with the doctrine of divine unity. Further discussion of the application this

principle to our project will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Now let me summarize the whole chapter which includes three major trinitarian

principles and see how this preparation can be helpful for our main arguments in Chapter 5.

These three principles can be applied to any divine work including divine punishment in the

economy. The first principle, the doctrine of divine (ontological and perichoretic) unity, aims to

safeguard the unity in the eternal or immanent Trinity, because some theologians have

questioned this unity due to the brutal reality of divine punishment and even Jesus’s own words

178
T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 108–9.
179
Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity (London / New York: T&T
Clark, 2002), 103–5.
180
Ibid., 126.
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of divine forsakenness. The second principle, the inseparable operations (with appropriations) in

the economy, aims to safeguard the unity among divine persons in the economy. This principle

aims to distinguish divine punishment of Jesus from ordinary human punishment and thus will be

used to argue for the uniqueness of divine punishment of Jesus from other conception of human

punishment. Because some theologians have used the ordinary legal concept of punishment to

oppose the unique divine punishment. The third principle, the unity and distinction of the

economic and immanent Trinity, aims to explain why the seemingly broken relationship between

the Father and the Son in the economy does not have to conclude, as some theologians do, that

there is an eternal brokenness in divine unity.

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 Chapter 4

DIVINE PUNISHMENT OF JESUS : AN EXEGETICAL ARGUMENT

Chapters 4 (an exegetical argument) and 5 (a theological argument) are the center of this

project. Chapter 2 has prepared the philosophical and biblical conceptions of punishment and

justice for these two chapters. Chapter 3 has prepared the trinitarian theological framework for

our theological argument in Chapter 5. This chapter will focus on the exegetical argument for

divine punishment of Jesus in the economy of salvation. Before we do that, we clarify a

philosophical understanding on the nature of punishment. After we finish the exegetical

argument, we will close this chapter with a short summary.

A Philosophical Clarification

Since people often have different understandings or misunderstandings of term or

concept in their dialogues, debates, or arguments, it is important for us to clarify two crucial

concepts in our inquiry of the current issue (Whether is it the Father’s will to punish Jesus?),

punishment and divine will. We do not hide our own understanding of punishment and divine

will. Our main purpose of this clarification is to let readers know that our definition of

punishment allows to include imputation and substitution in the special context of divine

punishment of Jesus, even though we realize that it need not, even ought not, to do so in the

general context of divine punishment of the wicked. The second purpose of this clarification is

for term clarification, because some affirm the Father’s will to punish Jesus while others reject it,

but the disagreement sometimes is due to the different intended meanings of the term (“will”).

Let us first clarify the concept, punishment. The fundamental conviction of retributive

justice is that the innocent should not be punished (negative retributivism) and all sin should be

124
punished (positive retributivism).1 We have discussed the various concepts of punishment and

theories of justice in Chapter 2. Now before we start the exegetical argument for divine

punishment of Jesus, we need to clarify the meaning of punishment in this context, because, as

we have noticed in Chapter 2, the context may affect the meaning of punishment.2

From the philosophical understanding of justice or punishment, for those who do not

accept transferability of sins and guilt (like Murphy and Crisp), the just Father should surely not

punish the sinless Christ (Crisp), or the suffering of Christ on the cross should not be counted as

punishment conceptually at all (Murphy). For those who accept the doctrine of imputation and

thus the transferability of sin and guilt (like Hill, Jedwab, and Craig), they can claim that Christ

can be legally punished by God for the sins of others.

Then what do we mean by punishment in our argument? In both sections of the

exegetical (in this chapter) and theological (in the next chapter) arguments, we mean punishment

according to the biblical sense which has been discussed in Chapter 2 where we have pointed out

that the continuity and discontinuity between biblical and human justice. For continuity, it is just

for all sins or crimes to be judged or punished; for discontinuity, it is just for God to justify the

repentant sinners (Rom. 3:25) while it is unjust for the state to justify the repentant criminals.

One significant point of continuity is that it is usually not just for God or the state to allow a

human substitute to be punished for the offender except in the special case that the vicarious

liability is acceptable. Therefore, in this section of the exegetical argument when we claim that

Rom. 3:25–26 supports divine punishment of Jesus, what we mean by that is to allow imputation

and substitution to be included in the definition of punishment. Furthermore, in some definitions

1
Maxie Burch, “Justice,” in EDT, 642.
2
Chapter 2, Section 1.
125
of punishment like Augustine’s, it requires a hard treatment against the offender’s will,3 but our

understanding of punishment in the context of divine punishment of Jesus does not require the

volitional conflict between the judge and the judged.

With all these clarifications, we can come up with a definition of divine punishment of

Jesus this way: God the Father intended to inflict hard treatment in the flesh of Jesus on the cross

through the hands of the wicked for the sins we deserved with the Father-Son common loving

will to save humanity. Divine justice is demonstrated in that Jesus was legally liable to divine

punishment because God imputed human sins to Jesus on the cross. Divine grace and mercy are

demonstrated in that God can accept his holy Son to be the substitute for sinful humanity.

With this clarification of the concept of divine punishment of Jesus, we hope to argue that

the key biblical texts we investigate indeed support our thesis of divine punishment of Jesus. And

with this understanding of punishment, we will further show the philosophical coherence for the

claim of divine punishment of Jesus in the next chapter, just like what Craig does for the

philosophical coherence for PSA.4

Second, let us clarify the concept of divine will. There are two major thoughts about the

categorization of divine will(s). Many theologians allow two kinds of divine wills. For example,

Erickson distinguishes divine will as God’s “general intention” and God’s “specific intention.”

The former is the will that is pleased by God; the latter is the will that is permitted by God.5

Sometimes the former is called God’s “active will” and the latter “permissive will”; or former

3
Augustine, The Trinity, 4.13.16.
4
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 144, 147–263.
5
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 387.
126
“antecedent will” and latter “consequent will.” For instance, God is pleased to will or desire that

all may be saved (2 Pet. 3:9), but God permits sin and evil to occur and spread in the world.

Other theologians reject such categorization. For example, Nicholas E. Lombardo

recognizes this traditional distinction of divine wills, but he promotes a single divine will in his

systematic analysis of intention and willing with an application to the Father’s will in Christ’s

crucifixion.6 His thesis is that Christ’s crucifixion is consistent with and ontologically necessary

in God’s plan for human salvation, but God does “not want (thus will) the actual crucifying” in

the sense that God does not actually cause Christ to be crucified.7 In Lombardo’s definition,

divine will is actually only the active will. Therefore, when Lombardo says, it is not the Father’s

will (or God’s will) to crucify Christ, what he means is, it is not the Father’s active will (in

Erickson’s term) to do so.

However, as we have pointed out in Chapter 2 (in the section on punishment and

intentionality), Lombardo’s application of intention analysis to Christ’s crucifixion is

problematic: He has neglected the Father’s active role or imitate involvement in Christ’s

crucifixion. From his analysis in Christ’s crucifixion, it is the wicked powers instead of the

Father who is the agency of it. This conclusion clearly contradicts biblical teaching on divine

agency in divine reconciliation. 2 Cor. 5:19 (ESV) teaches that “in Christ God was reconciling

the world to himself.” Harris has argued for the more accurate translation, “It was God who was

reconciling the world to himself.”8 No matter what versions of translation, it is hard to escape

divine agency in Christ’s reconciling work. Harris points out that “the idea of God’s being

present and active in Christ through whom he (God) effected reconciliation accords with Paul’s

6
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 21–41, 80–92.
7
Ibid., 142.
8
Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 440.
127
conviction of the essential link between the person and the work of Christ.”9 He further confirms

a trinitarian conviction, “Ubi Christus, ibi Deus, Where Christ is (active), there God is

(active).”10

Therefore, when we talk about the crucifixion in the context of divine punishment, we

cannot accept what Lombardo claims about Christ’s crucifixion as “the non-intended side effect

of what he [God] does intend.”11 We can surely say, God wills to punish the Son as the means

for his ultimate purpose of human salvation and the glory of the triune God, because the

Scriptures (Isa. 53:10 and Zech. 13:7) clearly confirm that. For example, Garry Williams writes,

Isaiah 53:10 plainly states that the crushing of the Servant was the ‘will of the LORD’,
even though it was also a ‘perversion of justice’ (v. 8). The tension between these
statements is hard to unravel unless we think of some kind of double agency whereby the
Servant suffers by the evil will of men and also by the pure will of God. … Furthermore,
the idea that it is God who wills the punishment of the servant fits with the wider use of
the expressions sābal ‘āwōn and nāśā ḥēt’ from 53:11–12 to denote a punishment
imposed by God himself, as we have seen with Cain, the woman guilty of adultery, or
Israel in exile.12

Here we can see God’s intentionality in this context of punishment. And this seems to be God’s

active and sovereign will as confirmed by Acts 2:23, 3:18, and 4:28. That God allows his Son to

be crucified is ultimately for human salvation and his glory.

For even though there is a “clash of intentions” between the Father’s will and wicked

people’s will in Lombardo’s analysis of Jesus’ crucifixion,13 the punishment of Jesus is the

Father-Son’s united purpose14 as the means to achieve human salvation even though Lombardo

9
Ibid., 442.
10
Ibid., 443.
11
Ibid., 232.
12
Garry Williams, “The Cross and the Punishment of Sin,” in David Peterson (ed.), Where Wrath and
Mercy Meet, 79–80.
13
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 139–140.
14
It may be said only one divine will in the Latin trinitarian term.
128
himself is unwilling to admit it.15 We can see why some evangelicals hesitate to accept divine

punishment of Jesus because of the seemingly lack of the ultimate intentionality in the Father

like what Lombardo thinks. However, if we can accept Valen’s definition of punishment, the

biblical doctrine of imputation of sins and guilt, and what we just defined about divine

punishment of Jesus, then divine punishment of Jesus should not be an issue conceptually. We

will respond to the conceptual challenges in detail later in the next chapter.

The Biblical Argument for Divine Punishment of Jesus

The biblical argument for divine punishment of Jesus in this section does not argue that

all Scriptures require us to conclude that God punished Jesus; instead, our goal here is modest.

We will identify and study the key biblical texts that have led theologians to draw this

conclusion. We will also show that the exegesis of these key texts will convince us that divine

punishment of Jesus is compatible with orthodox trinitarianism. Here we will not list those

biblical evidence that Jesus was punished by the wicked persecutors, but only list the biblical

evidence that may lead to the conclusion that Jesus was punished by God (for us sinners).

Although each of these biblical texts that we will study has many exegetical issues, our purpose

for the exegetical studies in this section will focus on the issues relevant to our central thesis,

divine punishment of Jesus.

Crucifixion as a Symbol of Divine Curse or Punishment

Scripture clearly states that those who were crucified or hanged on the tree were cursed

by God (Deut. 21:23; John 19:31; Gal. 3:13). David W. Chapman’s meticulous study on the

Jewish perceptions on crucifixion in antiquity confirms that crucifixion was a horrendous

15
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 232: “God does not intend his Son’s crucifixion as a means to an end.”
129
punishment for criminals and perceived by Jews as a curse by God.16 Richard B. Gaffin, Jr. also

points out, “Death is God’s judicial reaction to sin, which is to say, death is penal.”17 That is why

some people in Jesus’s time were so sure that Jesus was indeed cursed or punished by God for

his blasphemy (Matt. 9:3; 26:65; Mark 14:64; John 10:33; 19:7). We realize that human justice is

not always the same as divine justice. But God can use human judicial system to reflect his

righteous judgment. Writing about the biblical metaphors for the atonement, Henri Blocher

realizes that [i]n order to say that Jesus was condemned Coram Deo, one has to cross all the

metaphorical distance from B to A, an enormous, maybe an infinite distance!”18 But he points

out that “is it not a teaching of Scripture that human judges have been instituted to be the

representatives of God,ʾĕlōhīm‫אֱ_הִ ים‬, not only images of him as judges, but also his instruments,

even if pagan and unworthy, to mete out divine justice.”19

Deuteronomy 21:22–23

What is the biblical view of crucifixion? Is the crucifixion a sign of curse (punishment or

judgment) by God? The answer to these questions with the right understanding the nature of

Jesus’s crucifixion will be helpful for our project. Deut. 21:22 commands that the Corpse of a

criminal with capital punishment should not be hanged for all night, i.e., it should be buried on

the same day. The reason is “anyone who is hanged on a tree is under God’s curse” (Deut.

21:23). Although we know that crucifixion and curse are somehow related, Scripture does not

tell us what the exact relationship between them is. David Chapman points out that the fact of

16
David W. Chapman, Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2008), 94–96, 177.
17
Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., “Atonement in the Pauline Corpus: ‘The Scandal of the Cross’, “ in C. E. Hill and
F. A. James III (eds.), The Glory of the Atonement (Downers Grove: IVP; Leicester: Apollos, 2004), 151.
18
Henri Blocher, “Biblical Metaphors and the Doctrine of the Atonement,” JETS 47, no. 4 (2004), 642.
19
Ibid., 642–43 (italics author’s).
130
hanging on a tree shows divine curse, but does not point out the exact relationship between them,

“The reason given for burying the body is that the body bears a curse from God (as clear from

the fact that it was suspended in this penal fashion); and this curse could defile the land given to

Israel by God.”20 Eugene H. Merrill points out, “Why an individual who was put on such display

[hanging on the tree] was considered especially as cursed is not clear.”21 Richard D. Nelson

further asks a question of cause and effect between them, “Is the body accursed due to the fact

that it is hanging and thus a public example to be reviled, or is it hanging exposed because of its

accursed state as the Corpse of a criminal?”22 Peter C. Craigie seems to have given a clear answer

long ago, “The body was not accursed of God (or lit. ‘curse of God’) because it was hanging on a

tree; it was hanging on a tree because it was accursed of God.”23 The conclusion seems to be that

the person is crucified because he or she is cursed by God and the shameful penal suspension of

the body is just a factual demonstration of divine curse that has happened.

One significant exegetical issue related to this project is the interpretation of the phrase,

“the curse of God” ( ‫)קִ לְ לַת אֱ_הִ ים‬: Is the genitive subjective or objective?24 If it is subjective, then

it means “cursed by God”; if it is objective, then it means “a curser of God,” hence the one

hanged on the tree is a blasphemer of God. Grammatically “God” could be subjective genitive or

objective genitive in this phrase. Some interpretations take objective genitive (for instance,

Symmachus’s “propter basphemiam Dei”25; Josephus’s focus on the blasphemers by blending

20
Chapman, Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion, 121.
21
Eugene Merrill, Deuteronomy, NAC, vol. 4 (Nashville: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1994), 296.
22
Richard Nelson, Deuteronomy, OTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 2002), 262.
23
Peter Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 285.
24
Ibid., 147.
25
Ibid., 122.
131
Deut. 21:22–23 and Lev. 24:1626) from the influence of the rabbinical interpretations, but most

Christian translations and interpretations understand this phrase as “cursed by God” from the

influence of the LXX (κεκατηραμένος ὑπὸ θεοῦ which means “has been under the curse of

God”) and Galatians 3:13b (ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμάμενος ἐπὶ ξύλου, “Cursed is everyone who

is hanged on a tree.”).27 For instance, the contemporary commentator J. G. McConville admits

that his interpretation (“accursed by God”) is due to the influence of LXX and Gal. 3:13.28 One

of the problems in the interpretation of “cursing God” is that not all criminals who are hanged on

the tree are blasphemers (2 Sam. 21:1–14). Here “the curse of God” is an expression of God’s

punishment or judgment over the criminals who rebel against God’s law (Deut. 27:15–26), as

Earl S. Kalland comments on Deut. 21:22–23, “The criminal was under the curse of God, that is,

under the indictment of death by God’s judgment.”29

Now the interpretative issue is, Whether the rabbinical and Protestant approaches are

anachronistic? After all, they have read the later theology or ideology into the original text. From

the hermeneutic of view, we admit that if we handle an ordinal text with a general hermeneutic

principle, then we should surely not interpret it this way. But we, as stated in our theological

methodology, have committed to the canonical-linguistic approach which allows the clearer

biblical text from the whole cannon to illuminate or interpret the more “ambiguous” one. Here

we realize that biblical theologians and systematic theologians may disagree with the

canonical/theological interpretation of Scripture. J. M. Lieu points out that reading Deut. 21:22-

26
Ibid., 136.
27
Ibid., 120.
28
J. G. McConville, Deuteronomy, AOTC, vol. 5, ed. David W. Baker and Gordon J. Wenham (Leicester,
UK: Apollos /Downers Grove: IVP, 2002), 325.
29
Earl Kalland, “Deuteronomy,” in EBC, vol. 3, ed., Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992),
134.
132
23 in canon and reading in community can be very different.30 For the interpretations of ‫קִ לְ לַת‬

‫ אֱ_הִ ים‬in Deut. 21:23, Daniel I. Block, an Old Testament scholar, points out that both objective

(“cursing God”) and subjective (“accursed of God” or “God’s curse”) interpretations are ancient,

and the apostle Paul surely takes subjective interpretation according to Gal. 3:13.31 Another Old

Testament scholar Duane L. Christensen also suggests, “It is better to follow the traditional

interpretation ‘accursed of God,’ as read by the apostle Paul (see Gal 3:13).”32 We should surely

avoid the hermeneutically irresponsible anachronistic approach in interpretation which reads the

meaning(s) from later era into the original texts, but if we can take canonical/theological

approach which accepts that the one divine Author inspires all Scriptures, then we seem to have

no problem taking the subjective interpretation of ‫ קִ לְ לַת אֱ_הִ ים‬as “God’s curse” in Deut. 21:23.

As to whether curse of the law in Gal. 3:13 is the same as the curse of God, we will

discuss this issue when we engage in the exegesis of Gal. 3:13 later. Stephen D. Renn

summarizes well regarding the meaning of “the curse of God”:

Deut. 21:23 indicates that being hung on a tree after execution for a capital offense
symbolized a terrible divine curse. This punishment undoubtedly highlighted the heinous
nature of the crime and was intended as a deterrent to others lest they come under the
same divine judgment and rejection. It is this very text that the apostle Paul quotes in Gal.
3:13 to indicate the true nature of Christ’s own death by crucifixion in becoming a “curse
for us.”33

Isaiah 53: 4–6, 10

30
J. M. Lieu, “Reading in Canon and Community: Deuteronomy 21.22–23, A Test Case for Dialogue,” in
The Bible in Human Society: Essays in Honour of John Rogerson (ed. M Daniel Carroll R et al, JSOTSup 200;
Sheffiled: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 317-34. Quoted in Daniel I. Block, Deuteronomy, The NIV Application
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 501.
31
Daniel I. Block, Deuteronomy, The NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012),
501.
32
Duane L. Christensen, Deuteronomy 21:10-34:12, WBC 6B (Nashville : Thomas Nelson Publishers,
2002), 489.
33
Renn, EDBW, 230.
133
 There are definitely many exegetical issues and not-yet answered questions in Isaiah 53,34

even including the important PSA-related issue, whether the Servant’s suffering is

substitutionary. But our focus here, to be relevant to our project, is not even the substitutionary

suffering; instead, our focus is the penal aspect of the suffering, especially the Servant’s penal

suffering under God. We will investigate two issues in Isaiah 53: Who is the suffering Servant?

Was he punished by God?

For the first issue, Who is the Servant? The identity of the Isaiahic Servant is a “hotly

debated” issue.35 Indeed, even the Ethiopian eunuch in the Bible asked Philip the evangelist the

same question when the eunuch read Isaiah 53 (Acts 8:3–35, especially 8:34). Isaiah scholarship

may have different voices regarding the identity of the Servant: the second Isaiah (S. Mowinckel,

B. Janowski), a second Moses (K. Baltzer), Jehoiakim (E. Sellin), or a leprous rabbi (B. Duhm),

a dying and rising god (H. Gunkel), etc.36 But this issue should not be a trouble for evangelical

scholars who fully accept the authority of Scripture. The canonical interpretation has clearly

identified the Isaiahic suffering Servant with Jesus Christ. First, Philip provided his answer (thus

biblical answer) by preaching Jesus to the eunuch: “Philip began that very passage of Scripture

34
D. J. A. Clines identifies six answered questions: “Who is ‘he’? What did he suffer? Did ‘he’ die? Who
are ‘we’? What let ‘we’ to change minds about the Servant? Who are ‘they’?” Cf. D. J. A. Clines, I, He, We, and
They – A Literary Approach to Isaiah 53, JSOTSup 1 (Sheffied: JSOT, 1976), 25–39. Quoted in Gary V. Smith,
Isaiah 40–66, 431.
35
Sue Groom, “Why Did Christ Die? An Exegesis of Isaiah 52:13–53:12, “ in Tidball, Hilborn, and
Thacker (eds.), The Atonement Debate, 96.
36
S. Mowinckel’s publication of his view which identifies the Servant with Isaiah the prophet has evoked a
serious of serious scholarly discussions in 1940s. Cf. C. R. North, The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah (Oxford,
1948), 6–116; H. H. Rowley, The Servant of the Lord and Other Essays on the Old Testament (Oxford, 1965), 3–93;
F. F. Bruce, The Book of Acts, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 176–77; Gary V. Smith, Isaiah
40–66, NAC 15B, 430–31. Bernd Janowski, “He Bore Our Sins: Isaiah 53 and the Drama of Taking Another’s
Place,” in Bernd Janowski and Peter Stuhlmacher (eds.), The Suffering Servant and Isaiah 53 in Jewish and
Christian Sources, trans. Daniel P. Bailey (Grand Rapids/ Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2004), 48 [originally
published as Der leidende Gottesknecht by Mohr Siebeck, 1996].
134
and told him the good news of Jesus” (Acts 8:35). If this Servant is not identified as Jesus, what

good news Philip can preach to the eunuch?37 Second, the New Testament apostles consistently

affirm that this suffering Servant is Jesus Christ (Matt. 8:16–17; John 12:37–41; Rom. 10:16–17;

1 Pet. 22–25); Third, most important of all, Jesus identified himself to be the suffering Servant

(Luke 4:17–22; 22:36–38).

Now let us tackle the second issue, Was the suffering Servant punished by God? Isa. 53:4

points out the Servant was thought to be “stricken by God.” Although from the context of the

passage, that he was stricken by God is not a right understanding, because it is contrasted with

the truth that the Servant “was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities.”

(Isa. 53:5). It is significant to notice that the contrast here is not between “stricken by God” and

“ not stricken by God” but between “stricken by God for his own sins” and “stricken by God for

the sins of others.” If the contrast is the former, then the author will correct us, “No, he is not

stricken by God.” But Isa. 53:4 corrects our mistaken thought of considering him to be stricken

by God for his own sins. Geoffrey W. Grogan agrees that the onlookers drew a “grievously

wrong” conclusion that “the Servant was suffering for his own sins at the hand of God.”38 The

speakers (“we”) continue to use strong words (like “pierced through”, “crushed”, and

“wounded”, “stricken”, etc.) to describe the Servant’s suffering, even including penal word and

phrase (“punishment” and “the Lord has laid on him the iniquity”).39 Gary Williams has argued

37
Some Protestant theologians like Morna D. Hooker and Bernd Janowski do not think so. Cf. Morna D.
Hooker, Jesus and the Servant: The influence of the Servant Concept of Deutero-Isaiah in the New Testament
(London: SPCK, 1959), 150–51; Bernd Janowski, “The Suffering Servant and Isaiah 53 in Jewish and Christian
Sources.” For the reassessment of Hooker’s exegesis, Mikeal C. Parsons gives an convincing alternative canonical
interpretation. Cf. Mikeal C. Parsons, “Isaiah 53 in Acts 8: A Reply to Professor Morna Hooker,” Willian H.
Bellinger, Jr. and William R. Farmer (eds.), Jesus and the Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998), 104–19.
38
Geoffrey W. Grogan, “Isaiah,” EBC, vol. 6, 303.
39
Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah 40–66, 387.
135
that the Hebrew phrase nāśā’ ‘āwōn (“to bear sins or iniquities”) has a clear reference to a

punishment by God himself.40 Craig has confirmed that “to bear the sins” (nāśā’ ḥēṭ’) or “to

carry the iniquities” (sābal ‘āwōn) in the Old Testament means “to be held liability to

punishment” or “to endure punishment.”41 He confirms “[t]he punitive nature of the Servant’s

suffering” through a group of phrases in Isa. 53:5, 6, 8. Henri A. G. Blocher also confirms that

the legal language is dominant in Isaiah 53 and “it is implied in the phrase ‘to bear sin or

iniquity,’ meaning liability to the corresponding punishment.”42 Therefore, although Isaiah 53

does not exclude human’s unjust judgment against the Servant (like 53:8), it shows clearly from

our exegesis that the Servant was indeed punished by God and suffered under God’s

punishment.43 Although the substitutionary nature of the Servant’s suffering is not our focus in

our project, we still mention it here that the Servant’s punishment is for us instead of himself

(Isa. 53: 4a, 5, 6b, 8b, 11b, 12b). Gary V. Smith insightfully points out,

The speakers wrongly concluded that he was suffering afflictions that were justly sent by
God for the sins he had committed. Their perspective is partially right and partially
wrong, for God did smite him (cf. 53:10), but their understanding of why he was smitten
was wrong (he was not being punished for his own sins.)44

40
Gray Williams, “The Cross and the Punishment of Sin,” in David Peterson (ed.), Where Wrath and
Mercy Meet: Proclaiming the Atonement Today (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2001), 69–74.
41
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 41. Even though Baruch J. Schwartz challenges this scholarly
consensus. Cf. Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature, “ in Pomegranates and Golden Bells:
Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom, David P.
Wright, David Noel Freedman, Avi Hurvitz (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 8–9. Quoted in Craig,
Atonement and the Death of Christ, 41.
42
Henri A. G. Blocher, “Atonement,” in DTIB, 74.
43
Contra Brad Jersak, “Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ,” in Stricken by God. ed. Brad
Jersak and Michael Hardin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 36–37. Jersak mistakenly argues that the subject of the
punishment is not the Lord. He cannot harmonize his conclusion with other exegesis of Isa. 53:10 even just in this
context.
44
Gary V. Smith, Isaiah 40–66, 450.
136
Smith here clarifies an important truth that the Servant was indeed punished by God, but he was

not punished for the sins of his own but of others. John N. Oswalt confirms the real contrast here,

“We had thought God was punishing this man for his own sins and failures, but in fact he was

pieced through as a result of our rebellion; he was crushed on account of our twistedness.”45

Smith further points out that the common meanings of the word paga in v. 6 are “to touch, meet,

fall on, strike, encounter” and its use with “the iniquity” to explain the load that the Servant

bears. This clearly “supports a penal substitutionary role for the Servant.”46 Isa. 53:6 points out

the reason why the Servant was punished by the Lord, because it is the Lord who imputes others’

sins to the Servant.

Isa. 53:10 plainly points out that it was Lord’s will to crush the Servant. We have pointed

out previously that this will is the Lord’s permissive will instead of active will. It is reasonable

here to conclude that it is the Lord’s sovereign will to crush or punish his Servant for certain

purpose. However, the Lord’s will to crush the Servant is neither his direct nor his ultimate

purpose, but just the means to achieve the Lord’s higher purpose of human salvation and ultimate

purpose of his own glory. The Lord’s sovereign will to crush his Servant does not exclude that

the Lord may use other agency (like human beings) to achieve his purpose (Acts 2:23; 4:27–28).

Williams notices “a kind of double agency” (“the evil will of men” and “the pure will of God”)

in Isa. 53:10 which points out the Lord’s will to crush his Servant and in Isa. 53:8 which points

out the “perversion of justice” imposed on the Servant from men.47 When God punishes those

who have sinned against him, he shows his personal and holy displeasure or wrath against

45
John Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66 (Grand Rapids /Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1998),
387.
46
Smith, Isaiah 40–66, 452.
47
Williams, “The Cross and the Punishment of Sin,” in Peterson (ed.), Where Wrath and Mercy Meet, 79.
137
them.48 But for his Son, the Father does not have conflict of will against the holy Son49 even in

his holy wrath,50 for they are one ontologically and thus volitionally. The Servant agrees with the

Lord and voluntarily offers his own life to be a guilt offering. The Lord delights not in the

Servant’s crushing itself, as Lombardo has shown, but in the result of crushing he brings

salvation, as Isa. 53:10b confirms. Oswalt points out that the Servant knew that he suffered from

the hand of the Father as an ultimate and good purpose of human salvation.51 Smith’s integral

summary regarding God’s ultimate yet shocking desire in the life of his Servant is worth a

lengthy quotation:

God was pleased that the Servant’s death would pay the price required for reparation so
that guilt could be removed and a new relationship restored with sinners. God wants the
reader to know that the rather strange things recorded in this tragic message about the
Servant did not occur just as a regrettable accident or without some predetermined
forethought. In fact, to the surprise of some, God’s purposeful desires will be fulfilled
through all these events. Thus the earlier hints about God’s involvement in individual
aspects of the life of the Servant (causing iniquity to fall on him in 53:6) applies also to
the “crushing” (53:5) and “grief, sickness, suffering) (53:3) of the Servant. God’s
punishment of sin, his love for others, and his plan to ultimately establish his worldwide
kingdom required the removal of guilt to form a holy people (cf. 4.3–4).52

In sum, the important confirmation from Isaiah 53 for the divine punishment of the

Servant and the New Testament identification of the suffering Servant with Jesus seem to

confirm the conclusion that Jesus was indeed punished by God, not for his own sins but for the

sins of many. One of the reasons that it is hard for some to interpret God’s harsh dealing with his

48
David H. McIlroy, “Towards a relational and trinitarian theology of atonement,” in EvQ 80, no. 1 (2008),
21–23.
49
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 8: “the three divine Persons share one undivided will, just as they are one
undivided substance.”
50
McCall, Forsaken, 88: “the righteous wrath of the Father is the same righteous wrath as the righteous
wrath of the Son.”
51
Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66, 401.
52
Smith, Isaiah 40–66, 457–58.
138
Servant in Isa. 53:4–6 and 53:10 is that they have rejected the possibility of the divine

punishment of the Servant (who is identified with Jesus Christ) in their theology.

Zechariah 13:7 (Matthew 26:31; Mark 14:27)

There are many challenging exegetical issues in Zech. 13:7 throughout church history.53

The exegetical issues relevant to our project are two major ones: Who is the shepherd in Zech.

13:7? What does the Lord do to this shepherd? George L. Klein points out that the first issue, the

identity of the shepherd, is perhaps the most difficult one.54 Surely not all scholars can take the

canonical approach in their theological methodology. As we have mentioned before, we take

canonical-linguistic theological approach in this project. Since Jesus identifies himself to be the

shepherd in the New Testament (Matt. 26:31 and Mark 14:27), we like all those who take the

canonical theological approach can accept that the identity of the shepherd here is the Messiah of

Israel. The literary context in Zechariah provides a clue to confirm that the shepherd in Zech.

13:7 (who is the Lord’s shepherd and whose suffering is associated with the trials of God’s

people) is different from the one in Zech. 11:7 (who is identified as “worthless shepherd”). But

even recognizing the different kinds of shepherds55 and closeness of this shepherd (in Zech. 13:7)

with the Lord, Carol L Meyers and Eric M. Meyers still identity this shepherd (in Zech. 13:7) to

be a Dividic ruler in sixth century BC.56 Klein, recognizing Jesus’s personal identification with

the shepherd before his crucifixion, has settled the true identity of this shepherd in Zech. 13:7 to

be “no other than the pierced one in 12:10,” who is Jesus Christ himself.57

53
George L. Klein, Zechariah, NAC, 385.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid., 387.
56
Carol Meyers and Eric Meyers, Zechariah 9–14: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary,
AB, 25C (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 386.
57
Klein, Zechariah, 386–87.
139
 For the second issue, What did the Lord do to this shepherd? The key is to understand the

Hebrew phrases ‫רֹ ﬠִ י‬-‫עוּרי ﬠַל‬

ִ ‫“( חֶ ֶרב‬Awake, O sword, against my shepherd”) and ‫הָ רֹ ﬠֶה‬-‫הַ š אֶ ת‬

“strike/smite my shepherd”). The Hebrew word ‫“ חֶ ֶרב‬functions as a metonymy for the death

accomplished by the sword.”58 The context of the phrase “the sword of the Lord” in Jer. 47:6–7

helps identify its meaning as divine judgment or punishment. When the sword is used with š ַ‫ה‬

(“strike” or “smite”) in Zechariah 13, its meaning is clearly judgment or punishment. Although

Zech. 13:7 only tells us the Lord’s command to the sword to awake and strike the shepherd and

the little ones, Jesus himself points out the subject of the striking is God himself and identifies

himself with the shepherd in Zech. 13:7 (Matt. 26:31; Mark 14:27). George L. Klein rightly

points out, in Zechariah 13 “God himself will wield this sword of judgment.”59 A group of

theologians who defend PSA also confirm the agency of God in Jesus’s suffering on the cross,

“The remarkable thing about the text in Zech. 13:7 from which Jesus quotes is that God is the

agent of the shepherd’s suffering. Jesus is categorical: the afflictions that lie ahead of him, …,

come from his Father’s hand.”60 Joel Marcus also notices the “divine responsibility for the attack

on the shepherd” and “the divine role in the wounding of the shepherd.”61 Even though we have

noticed divine agency in wounding the Shepherd, we have to observe one significant fact here –

— that is, the closeness of the Shepherd with the Lord; the Shepherd is “the man who is close to

me” (Zech. 13:7). Klein reminds us to pay attention to the theological significance of the term

58
Ibid., 385.
59
Ibid.
60
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 73.
61
Joel Marcus, “The Old Testament and the Death of Jesus: The Role of Scripture in the Gospel Passion
Narratives,” in John T. Carroll and Joel Green (eds.), The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 1995), 225–26. Quoted in Gary Williams, “Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms,” in
The Atonement Debate, 180.
140
 ִ ‫ﬠ ֲִמ‬, amiti). It “paints a uniquely intimate relationship with the Lord
translated “close to me” ( ‫יתי‬

himself.”62

In sum, it seems reasonable to conclude from Zechariah 13:7 with the New Testament

quotations that God punished the Shepherd who is identified with Jesus Christ as “the pierced

one” (Zech. 12:10; John 19:37) on the cross.

Romans 3:25–26

The immediate context of Rom. 3:25–26 is Rom. 3:21–26 in which Paul talks about

God’s righteousness and justification. The reason we study this text is that Rom. 3:25–26 reveals

both divine integrity which demonstrates divine justifying act to be consistent with divine

character of “just-ness” and “consistency”63 and divine means by which human beings can be

justified through Christ’s atoning sacrifice on the cross. Our goal here, by examining the two

significant issues in the atonement (Christ’s atoning sacrifice and God’s integrity), is to show

that God demonstrates his integrity (justice and mercy) in punishing human sins through the

atoning sacrifice of his Son.

The first issue is about the atoning sacrifice. In order to understand the significance of

what Christ did for sinners on the cross, we have to understand how the holy God would respond

to human sins. We have seen from the Scriptures that the holy God responds to sin and evil with

his holy wrath. Divine wrath does not like human or pagan gods’ unstable or capricious emotion,

instead, it is, as McNall summarizes Tony Lane’s fine description of divine wrath, “simply the

just outflow of his settled opposition to evil, and an outworking of God’s essential love and

62
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 73.
63
Douglas J. Moo, Romans (Grand Rapids / Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1996), 218–19; Ibid., Romans,
2nd Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 239, 261.
141
holiness.”64 As D. A. Carson, following Leon Morris, points out that Rom. 1:18–3:20, the larger

context of Rom. 3:21–26, has shown God’s holy wrath against human sin and evil, “the flow of

argument that takes us from Romans 1:18 to Romans 3:9–20 leaves us no escape: individually

and collectively, Jew and Gentile alike, we stand under the just wrath of God, because of our

sin.”65 Even though Douglas J. Moo points out ἱλαστήριον (hilastērion) can mean both

“expiation” and “propitiation,” he confirms that “the conclusion that hilastērion includes

reference to the turning away God’s wrath is inescapable.”66 Both Carson and McNall also

confirm that ἱλαστήριον can mean both expiation and propitiation.67 Therefore, we cannot escape

the conclusion that one of the purposes of Christ’s propitiatory sacrifice is to appease God’s holy

wrath against human sins. After stating the problem of human ungodliness and unrighteousness

which incurs God’s wrath (1:18), Paul in Rom. 3:21–26 is ready to provide the solution. The

only clue we can find, as Leon Morris has pointed out long ago and Carson can confirm here, is

from the word ἱλαστήριον (hilastērion) (“a propitiation” (ESV), or “a sacrifice of atonement”

(NIV)).68 For Morris, “to propitiate” means to appease, assuage, turn aside divine wrath (often

through sacrifice).69 Robert A. Peterson rightly points out the commonality and differentiation of

expiation and propitiation: “Both are accomplishments of Jesus’s death on the cross but they

64
Tone Lane, “The Wrath of God as an Aspect of the Love of God,” in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better:
Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 138–67. Quoted in
McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement, 110.
65
D. A. Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26: God Presented Him as a Propitiation,” in Charles E. Hill
and Frank A. James III (eds.), The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical and Practical Perspectives
(Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2004), 120.
66
Moo, Romans, 235; Ibid., Romans, 2nd Edition, 257.
67
Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” 130; McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement, 112.
68
Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 169.
69
Ibid., “Propitiate, Propitiation,” in ISBE, 1004.
142
have different directions and have different aims. Propitiation is directed toward God and

expiation is directed to sin. Propitiation is the turning away from God’s wrath, and expiation is

the putting away of sin.”70 McNall also confirms such a differentiation.71

It is well known that C. H. Dodd interprets ἱλαστήριον only as “expiation” (the removal

of guilt of sin) from LXX’s interpretation of the Hebrew kipper and removes the classical

meaning of ἱλαστήριον as “the appeasement of the wrath.”72 Friedrich Büchsel also only takes

interpretation of “expiation” because he judges that “God” here should only be the subject

instead of the object.73 But he neglects the difference of divine justice and human justice while

the similarity of them is well-recognized. For divine justice, God himself can be both the subject

and object of propitiation, even though it is unthinkable for human justice. It is also hard to

imagine in the pagan propitiatory sacrifice to the gods who are always the object.

Leon Morris, Roger R. Nicole, J. I. Packer, John Stott, and others have forcefully

defended the classical meaning of ἱλαστήριον74 as the appeasement of divine wrath against

70
Robert Peterson, Salvation Accomplished by the Son: The Works of Christ (Wheaton: Crossway, 2012),
85.
71
McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement, 111.
72
Everett Harrison, “Romans,” in EBC Vol.10, 44; Renn, EDBW, 766: “hilasterion is found only three
times in the New Testament. Each occurrence has a great deal of theological significance and refers to the ‘atoning
sacrifice’ of Jesus Christ. It is this sacrifice that paid the penalty for the sins for the people of God in their entirety
— past, present, and future. This substitutionary atonement appeased, or “propitiated,” the wrath of God once and
for all.”
73
Friedrich Büchsel, “ἱλαστήριον,” TDNT 3: 320.
74
H. –G. Link points out, “The adj. hileōs or hileōn, is the Attic form of hilaos or hileos, kindly, gracious,
and a parallel word to hilaros, cheerful (cf. Lat. hilaris)”. In Plato’s work, “it meant originally cheerful, joyous”;
later in Xenophon’s work, it meant “gracious, benevolent.” Link further points out that “hileos is chiefly used of
rulers and gods; in connection with gods the phrase helio poiein, to make gracious, is found” in Plato’s work. Link
points out the classical meaning of hilastērion in Greek inscriptions is “a propitiatory gift for the gods.” Cf. NIDNT,
5:148–49.
143
human sins.75 The Greek word ἱλαστήριον can surely mean “expiation,” but “propitiation” should

not be removed from its meaning. Erickson also confirms that “Paul’s idea of the atoning death

(Christ as ἱλαστήριον – hilastērion) is not simply that it covers sin and cleanses its Corruption

(expiation), but also that the sacrifice also appeases a God who hates sin and is radically opposed

to it (propitiation).”76 Here propitiation, as Carson reminds us, is different from the appeasement

of pagan gods, because in the pagan practice, human beings are the subject to appease gods’

wrath; but in Scripture here, God himself talks initiative (in Christ) to remove his own wrath.77

Because God can be loving and holy at the same time (due to the simplicity of God): he can be

the holy subject to demand his satisfaction of justice and loving subject to initiate the

reconciliation, and he can be, at the same time, the loving object to be the means (the atoning

sacrifice) to achieve the goal of human salvation. Stott summarizes well, “God took his own

loving initiative to appease his own righteous anger by bearing it his own self in his own Son

where he took our place and died for us.”78

God presented Christ as the propitiatory sacrifice who has paid a great price, that is, “in

his blood” (v. 25). Douglas Moo rightly argues and is confirmed by D. A. Carson that the

propositional phrase “in his blood” should modify “a propitiation” instead of “faith.”79 Then the

message of v.25 here is clear, as Moo points out, “Christ’s blood is the means by which God’s

75
Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 136–56; Roger Nicole, “C. H. Dodd and the Doctrine of
Propitiation,” Westminster Theological Journal 17 (1954–55):117–57; J. I. Packer, Knowing God, 20th Anniversary
Edition (Downers Grove: IVP, 1993), 185; John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 20th Anniversary Edition (Downers
Grove: IVP Books, 2006), 171–73.
76
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 828–29.
77
Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” in Hill and James III (eds.), The Glory of the Atonement, 131–
32.
78
Stott, The Cross of Christ, 20th Anniversary Edition, 172.
79
Douglas Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 237; Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” in Hill and
James III (eds.), The Glory of the Atonement, 136.
144
wrath is propitiated…. the salvation is secured, … the purpose is to designate Christ’s death as a

sacrifice.”80 We can thus conclude that God appeased his wrath by sacrificing his Son as the

atonement for human sins. Now, the natural question is, Is God just then?

Another important theme in this context related to our project is God’s integrity: All

God’s works is consistent with his character, especially his grace, mercy, and justice. Before we

jump into the philosophical and theological discussion about the moral issue (in the next

chapter), How can the just God punish his sinless Son?, we need to find out what Scripture says

about God’s integrity. If God forbore the sin of the past generations, leaving sin unpunished, is

he just? Scripture (v. 26) clearly claims that even though he forbore the sins of the past, God is

still just. Scriptural reason here is that, because God is now dealing with these sins that he

forbore in the past in the blood of his Son. God did not just forgive sins by ignoring them,

instead, he has dealt with them justly according to his integrity (especially retributive justice)

because all sins have to be punished somehow, and the shedding of Christ’s blood is necessary

(Lev. 17:11; Heb. 9:22). This is divine justice. Craig states well about what divine justice

demands,

The demands of God’s justice were not really satisfied by the elaborate sacrificial system;
rather, God in His forbearance just overlooked the sins of previous generations until He
set forth Christ as a hilastērion. Christ having been offered, the demands of God’s justice
are satisfied, even with respect to future sins, so that no further satisfaction need to be
made.81

Furthermore, Scripture also gives a reason why God did this: grace (v. 24) and mercy (26). God,

out of his love and mercy, dealt with human sins by means of the atoning death of Jesus Christ.

This demonstrates God’s integrity: he does not violate his character of justice and mercy. As to

80
Moo, Romans, 237.
81
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 69–70.
145
how to understand the seemingly injustice (like allowing the substitutionary punishment)

philosophically and theologically, we will deal with them in the next chapter.

We need to pay attention to the relationship between divine wrath and divine punishment

here, because it is closely related to our overall argument for divine punishment of Jesus. Divine

wrath expresses God’s personal displeasure, judgment, or punishment against sin and evil. C. H.

Dodd takes an impersonal view of divine wrath as the consequence of human sins and “mainly as

events,”82 but Leon Morris disagrees with him and argues for the personal nature of divine wrath,

“In the Bible the wrath of God is intensely personal.”83 J. I. Packer also claims the personal

nature of divine wrath as divine love, “The wrath of God is as personal, and as potent, as his

love; and just as the blood-shedding of the Lord Jesus was the direct manifesting of his Father’s

love toward us, so it was the direct averting of his Father’s wrath against us.”84 William C.

Robinson summarizes the personal nature of divine wrath this way,

Wrath, anger, and indignation are integral to the biblical proclamation of the living God
in his opposition to sin. While God’s love is spontaneous to his own being, his wrath is
called forth by the wickedness of his creatures. … In the OT wrath is the expression of
the personal, subjective free will of Yahweh, who actively punishes sin, as in the NT it is
the personal reaction of God, not an independent hypostasis. In the face of evil the Holy
One of Israel does not dodge the responsibility of executing judgment. The most poignant
word about God’s punishment is the wrath of the Lamb who took upon himself and bore
the sins of the world.85

McCall points out the scriptural view of divine wrath against sins of two dimensions:

Divine wrath is directed against ‘wickedness’; it is opposed to the evil affections and the
behaviors of human sinner as they violate each other and the pillage of God’s creation. It

82
C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 22. Quoted in Leon
Morris, The Atonement: Its Meaning and Significance (Leicester, England; Downers Grove: IVP, 1983), 154.
83
Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 133–36; Ibid., The Atonement: Its Meaning and
Significance, 155.
84
J. I. Packer, “Introduction: Penal Substitution Revisited,” in J. I. Packer and Mark Dever (eds.), In My
Place Condemned He Stood: Celebrating the Glory of the Atonement (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007), 35.
85
William C. Robinson, “Wrath of God,” EDT, 1303–4.
146
 also stands in diametric opposition to ‘godlessness,’ for it is directly pointed at all
creaturely rejections of their Creator and Sustainer. This double-pronged focus is well-
attested in both the Old and New Testaments.86

And he further points out clearly the personal nature of divine wrath and the non-contradiction of

divine mercy at the same time, “The wrath of God is sometimes depicted in intensely personal

terms in the Old Testament. …God’s wrath is not detached and impersonal; nor it is the polar

opposite to his love and mercy.”87

In sum, the important biblical message from Rom. 3:25–26 is that God is just in

punishing human sins on his Son to appease his holy wrath; and God is gracious and merciful in

justifying sinners in the death of his Son. As Herman Bavinck succinctly summarizes the

harmony of divine justice (righteousness) and grace in Rom. 3:25–26 except that he understands

hilastērion as expiation only,

the righteousness is not viewed as being in conflict with his grace and love. After all, the
righteousness of God was demonstrated not in that by it sinners were punished for their
transgressions but in that by it Christ was put forward as an expiation by his blood, so
that in the forgiveness of sins God himself nevertheless proved righteous and at the same
time could justify the believer.88

Romans 8:3

There are a few significant exegetical and theological issues in this single verse, like

whether νόμος (nomos) in v. 3a is Mosaic law or general law as “a binding authority”? How did

Christian gain the spiritual freedom? Did Christ take a sinful nature in the incarnation? What

does it mean “he [God] condemned sin in the flesh”? etc.89 But we will focus on the last issue,

86
McCall, Forsaken, 50.
87
Ibid., 52–53.
88
Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Sin and Salvation in Christ, vol. 3, ed. John Bolt, trans. John
Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 369.
89
Moo, Romans, 477–81; Harrison, “Romans,” EBC vol. 10, 86–87; Morris, Romans (Leicester, England:
Apollos /Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988) 301–3.
147
the meanings of “condemned” and “flesh” in the phrase κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί

(ESV: “he condemned sin in the flesh”) because the right interpretation of this phrase will

confirm our understanding of divine punishment of Jesus. How is that so?

First, the meaning of κατακρίνω is “to condemn”; the meaning of its noun κατάκριμα is

“punishment, condemnation.”90 Even though the condemn (condemnation) Greek word group is

neither originated nor limited to the legal arena, they often convey the divine or human

judgment, punishment, and condemnation in legal and judicial sense.91 They can mean “passing

sentence”; when God is the subject, they can mean both “passing sentence” and “execution.”92

The immediate context, “There is no condemnation (κατάκριμα) for those who are in Christ

Jesus” (Rom. 8:1) and “the righteous requirements of the law” (Rom. 8:4), confirms this judicial

understanding. Moo clarifies that even though condemnation in Rom. 8:1 does not exclude the

implication of removal of the power of sin, but this word “strongly suggests that Paul here is

thinking only the believer’s deliverance from the penalty that sin exacts.”93 Morris also confirms

the “forensic” understanding of condemnation here.94

Second, What does σαρκί in the phrase “ἐν τῇ σαρκί” mean here? It possibly means

“sinful man” as NIV understands it. Then the logic of 8:1–4 is a little strange: Since there is “no

condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus” (v. 1) and “the righteous requirement of the law

is fully met in us” (v. 4), if we are still condemned in sinful man, then what purpose for God to

send his Son? (v.3). A more natural interpretation for σαρκί here should be Jesus’s flesh in which

90
Hartmut Beck, “κρίμα,” NIDNTT 2:362.
91
Ibid., 362–68.
92
F. Büchsel, TDNT 3:951; Moo, Romans, 480, note 51; Morris, Romans, 300.
93
Moo, Romans, 472–73.
94
Morris, Romans, 300.
148
God condemned human sin. Leon Morris confirms, “It was what Jesus did ‘in the flesh’ that

condemned all sin.”95 N. T. Wright emphasizes that here it is sin (not Jesus) to be punished by

God, but Simon Gathercole points out that the location of condemnation is the flesh of Jesus.96 If

we can accept imputation in 2 Cor. 5:21 that Jesus is identified as sin, as we will show a little bit

later, then the punishment of our sin in the flesh of Jesus and the punishment of Jesus for our sin

mean the same thing or reality. Therefore, Wright’s distinction is not necessary, rather,

Gathercole’s emphasis is more to the point here: God condemned sin in the flesh of Jesus, in

other words, God condemned the flesh of Jesus, for human salvation.

Galatians 3:13

Galatians, what Leon Morris calls “Paul’s charter of Christian freedom,” “has exercised a

great influence on the Christian church through the centuries.”97 In Galatians 3, especially in the

section of Gal. 3:6–14, Paul argues for justification by faith alone through the example of

Abraham’s justification by faith (vv. 6–9) and the inability of works of the law to achieve

justification (vv.10–14, especially v. 11).98 The important reason in Paul’s argument related to

our project is that the human effort to achieve justification only incurs divine curse instead of

95
Morris, Romans, 303.
96
N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Indianapolis, IN:
Fortress, 1993), 213; Simon Gathercole, “Justified by Faith, Justified by His Blood: The Evidence of Romans 3:21–
4:25,” in D. A. Carson, P. T. O’Brien, and M. A. Seifried (eds.), Justification and Varigated Nomism, vol. 2: The
Paradoxes of Paul (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 177. Quoted in Steve Jeffery and et al,
Pierced for Our Transgressions, 86–87.
97
Leon Morris, Galatians — Paul’s Charter of Christian Freedom (Downers Grove: IVP, 1996), Book title
and preface.
98
We are justified not by ethnic identification with Jews but by our personal faith in Christ. Pace Hans
Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2004), 172; Peterson, Salvation Accomplished by the Son, 97, Note 37; Alister E. McGrath’s contrast of
E. P. Sanders’s “covenantal nomism” (thus the New Perspective’s view on “the ethnic boundary”) and traditional
Lutheran understanding of “the works of the law.” Cf. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of
Justification, Third Edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 25–32.
149
blessing, but Christ who bore our curse can redeem us from the curse of the law (v. 13). Now

there are two exegetical issues related to our project: the first is, How do we understand the

“curse” (vv. 10, 13)? (Is “the curse of the law” different from “the curse of God”?); the second

is, How do we understand “Christ … becoming a curse for us” (v.13)? or, In what sense Christ

became a curse?

For the first issue, “Is the curse of the law the curse of God?”, scholars divide in this

issue. Some commentors like Ernest de Witt Burton,99 Raymond T. Stamm and Oscar Fisher

Blackwelder100 distinguish “the curse of the law” from “the curse of God” to avoid the perceived

offense of the curse of God against the lawbreakers. Others takes “the curse of the law” and “the

curse of God” to mean the same reality. Wilhelm Mundle intimates that the curse of the law is

the curse of God: “The curse of the law signifies being surrendered to the judgment and wrath of

God, which includes the whole of sinful humanity (Rom. 1:18; 2:5).”101

While realizing some commentators’ view of distinction, James Montgomery Boice

writes,

Still, the law is God’s law, an extension of his character and will, and it is a failure to
keep the law that brings man under God’s wrath. There is another way to avoid the wrath
of God, as Paul has shown. There is mercy in the work of Christ. Nevertheless, if a man
will not come to God on the basis of the atonement made by Christ, he must be judged by
his works measured against the law’s standard and be condemned.102

99
Ernest Burton, “Redemption from the Curse of the Law,” AJT, Nov. 1907, pp. 624–46; Ibid., A Critical
and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921. Quoted from James
Montgomery Boice, “Galatians,” in EBC, vol. 10, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), 422,
459.
100
Raymond T. Stamm and Oscar Fisher Blackwelder, The Epistle to the Galatians, IB, vol. 10. New York:
Abingdon, 1953. Quoted from Boice, “Galatians,” in EBC, vol. 10, 422, 459.
101
Wilhelm Mundle, “καταράομαι” in NIDNTT 1:417.
102
James Montgomery Boice, “Galatians,” in EBC, vol. 10, 459.
150
Büchsel confirms that the curse of the law here “is also the curse of God, for the Law is the

revelation of God. … To be a sinner is to stand already under the wrath and condemnation of

God, not just to move forward to it.”103 F. F. Bruce realizes that Paul’s understanding of “curse”

in Gal. 3:13 is supported from Deut. 21:13 and 27:26, and affirms that Christ “underwent the

penalty prescribed for the covenant-breaker,” but due to Christ’s life-long obedience to God, he

thinks Paul avoids to claim that Christ was cursed by God, leaving intentionally unanswered to

the question, “By whom Christ was cursed?”104 Ronald Y. K. Fung points out similarly, “By

bringing these two texts [Deut. 21:23 and 27:26] together and interpreting the latter in terms of

the former, Paul understands Jesus’s death on the cross (to which a curse was attached according

to Deut. 21:23) as a bearing of the curse of God incurred (according to Deut. 27:26) by all who

fail to continue in obedience to the law.”105 Here both Bruce and Fung can affirm that Christ bore

the curse or penalty of God for us, but they hesitate to affirm that God was “accursed by God”

for they both think it is significant here for Paul to drop “by God” in LXX’s Deut. 21:23.106 Mary

A. Willson points out “the penal substitutionary basis of Jesus’s redemption” but she does not

affirm he was punished by God.107 For Richard N. Longenecker, the curse of the law means the

curse of God; as to why Paul’s omits “by God” after “curse” in Gal. 3:13, he thinks Paul could

either “avoid saying directly that Christ was cursed by God” or “highlight the absolute nature of

the curse itself.”108 Other possibility, as Michael Wilcox proposes, could be the Bible version that

103
Friedrich Büchsel, “ἀρά, καταράομαι, κατάρα, ἐπικατάρατος, επάρατος” TDNT 1:450–51.
104
F. F. Bruce, Galatians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 164–66.
105
Ronald Fung, Galatians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 147–48.
106
Bruce, Galatians, 165–66; Funk, Galatians, 148.
107
Mary A. Willson, “Cursed Is Everyone Who Is Hanged on a Tree”: Paul’s Citation of Deut 21:23 in Gal
3:13,” TrinJ 36 NS (2015): 217.
108
Richard Longenecker, Galatians, WBC, vol. 41 (Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 121–22.
151
Paul remembered does not have “by God.”109 But no matter what possibility, Longenecker

affirms Martin Luther’s “an exchange of curse”: “Thou Christ art my sin and my curse, or rather,

I am thy sin, thy curse, thy death, thy wrath of God, thy hell; and contrariwise, thou art my

righteousness, my blessing, my life, my grace of God and my heaven.”110 Craig also confirms the

exchange of curse in terms of imputation of sin,

It is hard to understand this [Christ became a curse for us] in any other way than the
imputation to Christ of our sins and consequent condemnation before the righteous Judge.
He accepts as his own our legal status of condemned criminals and then endures our
punishment to liberate us from such a state of condemnation.111

Therefore, it seems to be exegetically and theologically warranted to affirm that since

God’s law expresses God’s will, the curse of law should be the curse of God.

The second issue is, In what sense was Christ cursed for us? Some scholars do not see the

vicarious nature of Christ’s death. Ernest Burton only sees the death of Christ as an expression of

God’s true attitude toward humanity and thus fails to see the vicarious nature of Christ’s

redemption.112 Similarly, James D. G. Dunn understands the nature of the curse here “primarily

with that attitude which confines the covenant promise to Jews as Jews.”113 Timothy B. Combis,

even in the post-New Perspective time, still insists that Paul’s argument of curse is limited to the

109
M. Wilcox, “‘Upon the Tree’ – Deut 21:22–23 in the New Testament.” JBL 96 (1977), 85–99.
110
Martin Luther, A Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, trans. P. S. Watson (London:
James Clarke, 1953), 283. Quoted in Longenecker, Galatians, 121.
111
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 76.
112
Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. Cf. Boice, “Galatians,”
in EBC, 461.
113
James Dunn, “Works of the Law and the Curse of the Law,” NTS 31 (1984–85), 536. Quoted in Fung,
Galatians, 148.
152
Jews not all humanity.114 Others insist that Paul here is communicating a crucial message of the

penal substitutionary nature of Christ’s atonement. Leon Morris clearly points out that Christ’s

death is divine judgment on sin, “Although Paul has some strong things to say about the law,

they really boil down to this: the law can never bring salvation. If there is a curse of the law, then

that ultimately, in Paul’s though, comes from God, and represents the divine judgment on sin.”115

Although F. F. Bruce cannot affirm Christ’s death was cursed by God, he is sure, with the

support from 2 Cor. 5:21, that Paul’s message about Christ death is substitutionary, “what he

[Paul] does make plain is that the curse which Christ ‘became’ was his people’s curse, as the

death which he died as their death.”116 Longenecker points out the purpose of Paul’s quotation of

Deut. 21:23 is to show the vicarious nature of Christ’s curse for humankind’s spiritual blessing,

“to show how Christ’s bearing of mankind’s curse nullifies all thoughts of legalism and to set up

his conclusion regarding the blessing of Abraham and the promise of the Holy Spirit in v 14.”117

After talking about the modern misunderstandings of Paul’s message of Christ death, Herman N.

Ridderbos concludes that for Paul, one of the true aspects of Christ’s death on the cross, as the

curse of God, is to satisfy divine justice. He writes,

From all this it should be apparent how little justice modern theological thought does to
Paul’s presentation of these matters when, for example, it talks of a God who does not
deal with people on “a basis of legalism” and of a Christ who has set people free from the
“fiction” of a curse of God. The reference to Deuteronomy 21 is intended precisely to
point the reality of the curse and, in connection with it, to set for the Christ’s redemption
as a satisfaction of the justice of God.118
114
Timothy Combis, “Arguing with Scripture in Galatia,” in Mark W. Elliott, Scott J. Hafemann, N. T.
Wright, and John Frederick, (eds.), Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in
Paul’s Letter (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 82–90.
115
Leon Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 55.
116
Bruce, Galatians, 166.
117
Longenecker, Galatians, 123.
118
Herman Ridderbos, The Epistle of Paul to the Churches of Galatia, NIC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1953). Quoted in Boice, “Galatians,” in EBC, vol. 10, 461.
153
 In sum, the exegesis of Gal. 3:13 shows that Christ’s death is the penal substitutionary

atonement for human sins. As to whether Christ was cursed (punished) by God, some New

Testament scholars can affirm the conclusion (for satisfaction of divine justice), but some

hesitate to do so.

2 Corinthians 5:21

The critical exegetical issue in 2 Cor. 5:21 which is relevant to our project and is also the

most challenging issue in this verse is how to understand the Greek phrases ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν

(literally, “he [God] made him [Christ] to be sin”; or according to Murray J. Harris’s translation:

“…God caused Christ, …, to be sin”119). The difficulty of interpretating this phrase can be seen

from Harris’s words, “we penetrate to the center of the atonement and stand in awe before one of

the most profound mysteries in the universe.”120 To interpret ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν, we should, first

of all, be aware of the immediate literary context of v. 21 is vv. 14–21 in which Paul is talking

about God in Christ who was reconciling the world to himself at Christ’s death; second, we

should be aware of the identity of Christ as sinless one; third, we should be aware that v. 21

provides the means of reconciliation (v. 18) and the reason for God not to count our trespasses

against us (v. 19). Now the critical exegetical and theological issue related to our project is the

means of divine reconciliating work: How does God achieve his work of reconciliation in Christ

by making the sinless Christ to be sin? In order to tackle this theological issue, we need to

unpack the meanings of a few Greek words or phrases in 2 Cor. 5:21.

119
Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 449.
120
Ibid., 451.
154
 Let us first understand the phrase τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν (“the one who knew no sin”).

Here Christ is described as someone who did not know sin. This phrase surely does not mean

that Christ is ignorant of sin; instead, he knows people’s hearts and thoughts. Here γνόντα means

a kind of knowing through relationships and experiences.121 The Greek phrase γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν

means an experiential knowledge of sin with moral awareness by personal participation or

involvement which carries the Hebrew concept of knowledge (‫)יָדַ ע‬.122 Surely Christ has no such

personal involvement of knowledge of sin, because he is sinless. This has been testified

throughout the New Testament (John 7:18; 8:46; Acts 3:14; Heb. 4:15; 7:26; 1 Pet. 1:19; 2:22;

3:18; 1 John 3:5, etc.).

Secondly, let us understand ἐποίησεν in the phrase ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν. What is God’s

role here in “he (God) made or caused him (Christ) to be sin”? We have surely seen the divine

initiative here, but when did this divine causation or appointment happen? There are two views:

at the incarnation (when Christ assumed human nature) and at the cross (when Christ was

crucified).123 The key, as Harris points out, is that in Rom. 8:3 Paul points to the similarity

instead of identity when he was sent in sinful fresh.124 If Christ took sinful nature, how can he

remain intrinsically sinless? The exegesis on Rom. 8:3 seems to conclude that Christ did not

assume sinful human nature in his incarnation125 but took sins of humanity on the cross. Even

though it is true that there is no mentioning of the cross here, but the immediate context,

121
E. D. Schmitz, “Knowledge, Experience, Ignorance,” in NIDNTT 2: 390–406.
122
Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 450; Terence E. Fretheim, “‫ ”ידע‬in NIDOTE 2: 409–14;
Renn, EDBW, 567–68.
123
Ibid., 451; Regretfully, out of the fear of reasoning in vicious circle, Craig, following Turretin, also
takes the view of the incarnational identification (Cf. Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 205–206).
124
Ibid., 452.
125
Moo, Romans, 479–80; Harrison, Romans, EBC, vol. 10, 87.
155
especially vv. 14–15, has made it clear that Paul is talking about God’s appointment of Christ for

the work of reconciliation at the cross event instead of the incarnation.

Thirdly, the understanding of ἁμαρτίαν (sin) in the phrase ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν (“he made

him to be sin”) is crucial for our understanding God’s work of atonement in Christ. There are

many different interpretations of this word in the history of interpretation.126 Harris summarizes

them as four interpretations of ἁμαρτίαν: sin offering, sinner, sin bearer, and sin.127 For the first

interpretation, there is a long history of interpretation for “sin offering” or “sacrifice for sin”, as

David E. Garland points out, “From the time of Ambrosiaster and Augustine, interpreters have

argued that Paul means that Christ became a ‘sin offering.”128 Harris also list some recent

proponents (Leopold Sabourin, F. F. Bruce, Peter Stuhlmacher, R. P. Martin, C. H. Talbert).129

This interpretation also fits well with Isa. 53:10 and overall Pauline Christology (Christ as the sin

offering in Rom. 3:25 and 1 Cor. 5:7). Erickson seems to support the substitutionary and

sacrificial interpretation with referencing to Isaiah 53, John 1:29, Gal. 3:13, Heb. 9:28, 1 Pet.

2:24, etc.130 Several Bible versions (NEB, NIV, NJB, NLT) either take the interpretation of “a

sin offering” or keep it in the margin as an option for interpreting ἁμαρτίαν. The Old Testament

scholar Richard Averbeck also opines, “From an OT cultic perspective the translation sin

offering makes more sense. One did not something sinful on the altar in the tabernacle…”131

126
Stanislas Lyonnet and Leopold Sabourin have provided a rich history of interpretation of 2 Cor. 5:21 in
their work, Sin, Redemption, and Sacrifice: A Biblical and Patristic Study, AB, vol. 48 (Rome: Biblical Institute,
1971), 185–296.
127
Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 452–54.
128
David Garland, 2 Corinthians, AC, vol. 29 (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1999), 300.
129
Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 452, note 185.
130
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 830.
131
Richard E. Averbeck, “‫ ”חֵ טָּ ּאת‬in NIDOTE 2:101.
156
However, the weakness with this interpretation is that it seems hard for ἁμαρτίαν to take two

different meanings in the same verse, “sin offering” in 5:21a and “sin” in 5:21b.132 Paul Barnett

also points out that “ἁμαρτίαν in τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν in the first half of the verse cannot

mean ‘sin offering’ remains a strong reason to exclude ‘made sin’=‘sin offering’ in the

second.”133 From the contrast of the imputation of sin and the imputation of righteousness, this

interpretation (as a sin offering) seems to destroy “the parallel structure of the sentence.”134

For the second interpretation: God made Christ to be a sinner. Is this conclusion possible?

Surely no. As we have seen from our study of Rom. 8:3 above, Christ did not assume sinful

human nature. Christ has demonstrated himself to be sinless in his whole life, he cannot be a

sinner intrinsically and personally. Christ was punished like a sinner, but he is not a sinner.

For the third interpretation, God made Christ to be a sin-bearer. This interpretation seems

possible. Christ indeed bore the penalty of our sins and endured God’s wrath against sin on the

cross. But is that enough for divine justice? If Christ just bore our consequence of sin that would

have been punishment upon us but did not punish anyone, then how did God satisfy his justice?

To be made sin here seems to mean more than to be a sin-bearer.

The fourth interpretation just faces this issue. This interpretation understands “God

treated Christ as if he were sin; or, in pregnant personification of sin.”135 This interpretation

understands that God reckons human sin to the account of the sinless Christ and satisfactorily

132
Hebrew ‫ חֵ טָּ ּאת‬can mean both sin and sin offering (Cf. Richard E. Averbeck, “‫ ”חֵ טָּ ּאת‬in NIDOTE 2:93–
103). LXX usually translates it into περὶ ἁμαρτίας (“for sin” or “that which is for sin” or “sin offering”), but Greek
word ἁμαρτία cannot have both meanings (sin and sin offering) as the Hebrew word ‫ חֵ טָּ ּאת‬does.
133
Paul Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians. NICNT (Grand Rapids /Cambridge, UK:
Eerdmans, 1997), 314, note 65.
134
Garland, 2 Corinthians, 300.
135
Harris, 2 Corinthians, 453.
157
handles the contrast of v. 21a (counting human sins to Christ) and v. 19b (not counting human

sins against humankind). Hence, Christ who is imputed with human sin, even though he is sinless

personally, received God’s just punishment.136 The weakness of this interpretation is that

Scripture does not clearly state that Christ was reckoned or imputed as sin in this context. But as

a modest position, we at least can take this interpretation as one of the options without excluding

especially the long-standing interpretation of “sin offering” or “sacrifice for sin.”

Fourthly, the purpose clause v.21b provides another contrast: γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ

(“they became righteousness of God”) (v. 21b) vs. ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν (“he made him to be sin”)

(v. 21a). The message is clear that human sins are imputed to Christ so that God’s righteousness

through Christ can be imputed to humans. This is so-call “double imputation.”137 Craig may be

too absolute to exclude the possibility of the exegetical option which interprets “sin” as “sin

offering” in 2 Cor. 5:21a, but his affirmation of imputation in this text is worth of our attention,

How else can this startling statement [Christ was made to be sin] be plausible understood
than as the affirmation that God imputed ours to Christ, so that despite his perfect
goodness, he was legally guilty before God for our wrongdoings? There is no exegetical
warrant for trying to dilute the force of this statement by taking it to mean that God made
Christ to become a sin offering for our sake.138

Furthermore, v. 21b points out that we were not just legally imputed with, but also became

God’s righteousness in Christ as new creation. Mark A. Seifrid summarizes well, “Paul here

describes the reality of the new creation in a manner that emphasizes the transference and

136
Ibid.; Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 75–77.
137
Harris, 2 Corinthians, 455.
138
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 76–77.
158
exchange that takes place in salvation. God made Christ to be what we are in order that we may

‘become’ the righteousness of God ‘in him.’”139

In sum, 2 Cor. 5:21a reveals God’s way of accomplishing his work of reconciliation in

Christ which is through imputation, i.e., the transference of human sins to Christ’s account and

thus no reckoning of human trespasses any longer. After being imputed with human sins, Christ

is legally liable to punishment before God even though he is personally sinless. Therefore, Christ

can be legally punished by God for human sins so that those who are united with Christ can be

imputed with even become “God’s righteousness” (2 Cor. 5:21b). Robert A. Peterson

summarizes well, “The logic of 2 Corinthians 5 is that God condemned our sins in the death of

his sinless Son so that we may be justified and reconciled to him … This ‘great exchange’ is a

reality for all who are ‘in him,’ that is, united to Christ by faith.”140

Chapter Summary

Now let us summarize our conclusions from our exegetical studies above. First, the one

who is hanged on the tree (crucified) is cursed or punished by God. Thus Christ who bore the

curse of God for our sins is punished by God. Second, God’s wrath is his holy response to human

sins; he will punish sins with justice. Third, God punished his holy Servant (who is identified as

Jesus Christ) in the place of us for our salvation. Fourth, God punished Christ on the cross

because God imputed human sins to him, so that God’s righteousness can be imputed to those

who are united with Christ.

139
Mark Seifrid, The Second Letter to the Corinthians, PNTC, ed., D. A. Carson (Nottingham: Apollos,
2014), 262.
140
Robert A. Peterson (rev. ed.), Calvin and the Atonement (Fearn, Foss-shire: Mentor, 1999), 38. Quoted
in Carson, “Atonement in Romans 3:21–26,” in Hill and James III (eds.), The Glory of the Atonement, 134.

159
 Therefore, the conclusion of this chapter is not that all Scripture has to lead to conclusion

of divine punishment of Jesus, but that the key biblical texts that we have studied have helped

theologians draw this conclusion, or that, modestly speaking, the theologians can affirm through

these key texts and their exegesis that divine punishment of Jesus is compatible with orthodox

trinitarianism. As to whether there are other biblical texts or different exegesis of these same

texts that may draw different conclusions, we will handle this issue as an exegetical challenge to

our thesis in the next chapter.

160
 Chapter 5

DIVINE PUNISHMENT OF JESUS : A THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

We have presented, in Chapter 4, an exegetical study of some key biblical texts that have

led theologians to support divine punishment of Jesus. Now we will, in this chapter, further

clarify the meaning of punishment based on the philosophical clarification of it in Chapter 4,

then present a theological argument for divine punishment of Jesus. Afterwards we will offer our

answers to the challenges and objections mentioned in Chapter 1, which include the moral

objections, the philosophical or conceptual objections, the theological objections, the exegetical

challenges, and challenges of terminological and linguistic confusions.1 Finally, we will conclude

this chapter with a short summary.

Punishment in a Qualified Sense

When people talk about punishment, they usually assume that the one punished has mens

rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty acts).2 Murphy points out that “punishment need not be a

total condemnation of the person’s character. … The object of condemnation must be the person

in a particular respect, that is, the person as performer of this act.” 3 For this reason, a criminal

must be condemned by his or her guilty mind and guilty acts. In addition, the criminal is usually

punished reluctantly or passively; he or she may agree to the sentence of punishment, but he or

she has definitely no active role in the sentencing. However, we will see in this section that this

is not the case in biblical understanding of “punishment” in divine punishment of Jesus. Divine

punishment of Jesus is the triune God’s punishment of human sins in the flesh of Jesus. It is the

1
Cf. Section of A Review of Literature in Chapter 1.
2
Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 113.
3
Ibid., 116 (italics author’s).
161
inseparable work of three divine persons. Here we will first demonstrate from Scripture that

Jesus is holy and righteous, therefore he has neither guilty mind nor guilty acts. Secondly, we

will see that Jesus’s being crucified by the wicked is contrasted with being raised by the Father;

therefore, it is Father’s permissive instead of active will in crucifying Jesus. Thirdly, we will

demonstrate that Jesus voluntarily joined Father’s will by being punished for sinners; therefore,

Jesus was not punished by the Father in the ordinary sense (for his own sins and with

unwillingness); he was punished by the Father in a unique sense in that Jesus and the Father have

unified intention. Fourthly, even though Jesus’s punishment is similar to the ordinary punishment

in that the punishment is proportionate to the offense, its uniqueness is that Jesus’s finite hour of

punishment on the cross has an infinite measure of significance to satisfy God for human

offenses while human punishment only has a finite measure proportionate to the finite offense.

Fifthly, even though God is an absolute positive retributivist (who holds that all sins should be

punished), but he is only a qualified negative retributivist (who holds that no innocent should be

punished except for his self-sacrificial punishment in his Son).

Scripture reveals the Lord’s holy dealing with his people. He has to deal with sin which is

against God, nature, and reason.4 The Lord hears the cry of the righteous, but the wicked he will

condemn (Ps. 34:19–22). Scripture, at the same time, reveals the moral and spiritual perfection of

Jesus (Heb. 4:15). Jesus is also called the Righteous Branch or the Holy and the Righteous One

(Jer. 23:5; 33:15; Matt. 27:19; Luke 23:47; Acts 3:14; 22:14; 1 Pet. 3:18). Since Jesus is the holy

and righteous one, he surely has no guilty mind and guilt acts. It is not right for the Holy and

Righteous One to be judged or punished in the ordinary retributive sense that he is judged or

4
McCall, Against God and Nature: The Doctrine of Sin (Wheaton: Crossway, 2019), 218–44.
162
punished due to his own sins. The qualified sense of punishment is that Jesus was punished not

for his own sins but for the sins that were imputed to him.

Numerous scriptural passages in Acts (2:23–24, 3:13–15, 4:10, 5:30, etc.) have set a clear

contrast between Jesus’s being crucified by the wicked and his being raised from the dead by

God according to God’s sovereign purpose. McCall points out, “Peter draws a sharp and

deliberate contrast between what sinful people have done and what God has done.”5 These

biblical texts have demonstrated that it was men not the Father who “unilaterally” and directly

crucified Christ,6 but Christ’s crucifixion is in the Father’s sovereign will through the human

hands.

Jesus on the cross was punished by the Father not as a reluctant or passive martyr; he

knew the Father’s ultimate will, which is the one will of the triune God, to save humanity. God

plans and accomplishes to reconcile the world to himself in Christ (2 Cor. 5:19). When Christ

came to this world, he clearly knew his mission and expressed his willingness to obey the

Father’s will (Heb. 10:7, 9) by bearing human sins (Isa. 53:4–6, 8, 10–12; 1 Pet. 3:18). Jesus’s

life was taken to be the substitutionary atonement (2 Cor. 5:21) not out of reluctance or passivity,

but under his own authority, out of his volunteering submission, and in his loving communion

with the Father (John 10:17–18).

Jesus’s punishment is similar to the ordinary punishment in that the punishment is

proportionate to the offense. The punishment that Jesus endured is proportionate to the gravity of

all human offense to God in God’s retributivist justice (Ps. 69:9; Rom. 15:3; 2 Cor. 5:14; 1 John

5
McCall, Forsaken, 96.
6
Adonai Vidu, “The Place of The Cross among the Inseparable Operations of the Trinity,” in Locating
Atonement, 40–41.
163
2:2).7 Aquinas, while refusing Anselmian necessity of retributive punishment of Jesus, shares the

principle of proportionalism. He succinctly writes, “A greater sin, all things being equal,

deserves greater punishment.”8 But the uniqueness of Jesus’s punishment is that because the

infinite worth of his dignity in his divinity, his short time of suffering on the cross can have

infinite measure of value before God and thus can satisfy God’s holy wrath due to human

offense. Although Gerrish is overall dissatisfied with Charles Hodge’s atonement theory in the

alleged over-emphasizing Christ’s passive obedience in his death over his active obedience in his

life,9 Gerrish’s comment on Hodge’s view on proportionate punishment and divine grace is

insightful. He points out Hodge’s helpful distinction of pecuniary and penal satisfactions for sin

and then the reasonableness of the requirements for “a just equivalent.” He writes,

Penal substitution must, to be sure, be a real and adequate satisfaction, not merely
something graciously accepted as such…: it must be proportionate to the crime. But it is
not an exact quid pro que. In actual fact, because of his divine-human personality Christ’s
sufferings were more than enough to effect satisfaction …; and when we say that the
satisfaction was a matter of grace, we mean, not that God assigned it a value it die
inherently have, but that God the Father was by no means bound to provide a substitute
for fallen humanity at all, and the Son was not bound to assume the priestly office. Of
course, since the demands of justice are met, they cannot be enforced again…, and in this
sense there remain at least analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt.
But, properly speaking, the satisfaction is not the payment of a debt, but a just equivalent
for the crime of sin: penal substitution ‘must bear adequate proportion to the crime
committed,’ but it ‘may be different in kind …10

One significant difference between the ordinary legal punishment from Jesus’s punishment is

that God does not allow human substitutes to be punished for others, but he reserves the right for

7
Murphy, The Philosophy of Law, 124: “…retributivists affirm a principle of proportionality in
punishment.”
8
Aquinas, ST, 1.2, Q 105, art. 2, ad. 9. Quoted in Adonis Vidu, Atonement, Law, and Justice, 73.
9
B. A. Gerrish, Thinking with the Church: Essays in Historical Theology (Grand Rapids / Cambridge, UK:
Eerdmans, 2010), 91–98.
10
Ibid., 188. I appreciate Dr. David Luy for pointing this reference to me.
164
himself to be self-punished in the second person of the Trinity for humanity.11 It is important for

us to bear in mind these qualified senses of punishment in our context of theological argument

for divine punishment of Jesus. Now we will argue for our central thesis in six steps.

A Theological Argument for Divine Punishment of Jesus: Six Steps

We have presented a modest version of exegetical argument in the last chapter, that is,

some key biblical texts have led theologians to draw the conclusion of divine punishment of

Jesus. The exegetical evidence has further shown that the reason for this divine punishment of

Jesus is that God has imputed our sins to Christ on the cross and by his penal death God has

imputed his righteousness to us who are in Christ. Now we will argue for divine punishment of

Jesus theologically, that is, How does God maintain his integrity (what he does is completely

consistent with his divine nature of holy love) in his punishing Jesus for our sins by imputing our

sins to him? We will argue in the following six steps. First, the biblical God is a holy and just

God. Second, the holy and just God has to punish sin (with his holy wrath) to satisfy the

demands of retributive justice. Third, since God is a sovereign King, Legislator, and Ruler of the

universe, he has the authority to decide when and how to execute his punishment against sin.

God, out of grace and mercy, decides to send his Son to be our penal Substitute. Fourth, God

imputes our sin to his holy Son, so that his Son, though sinless personally, is legally liable to

divine punishment. Fifth, the imputation is acceptable for God because of our union with Christ.

11
We have shown, in Chapter 2, that Ezekiel has insisted on the personal moral responsibility and does not
even allow the father to be punished as a substitute for his son, and that God even does not allow Moses to be
punished for his people. At the same time, we should not forget, as mentioned in Chapter 2 too, that our legal system
can accept the superior to be punished for the subordinate in the case of vicarious liability which is human analogy
for Jesus’s punishment, as both a substitute and a representative, for his people who are spiritually united with him
by faith. Cf. Craig, Eleonore Stump’s Critique of Penal Substitutionary Atonement Theories, Faith and Philosophy
36, no. 4 (2019), 530.
165
Finally, as a result, God’s wrath is appeased (propitiated); our sins are forgiven; and God’s

integrity is maintained. And furthermore, God’s righteousness is imputed to us in Christ.

Steps 1 and 2: Holiness of God and the Necessity of Punishment

We have argued biblically the first two steps in Chapter 2. Now we will elaborate Step 1

regarding the necessity of satisfaction for sins in punishment. We have argued in Chapter 2 that

the biblical God is a morally pure God in his holiness, righteousness, and justice; and this holy,

righteous, and just God will necessarily punish sin according to his nature.12 God’s response to

sin and evil, as we have argued in Chapter 4 (on Rom. 3:25–26), is his holy and personal wrath

against sin. We often tend to trivialize our sins as imperfections, limitations, weaknesses, or

mistakes, but the biblical view of sin is primarily an offense to the holy God (Ps. 51:4). McCall

emphasizes, “Recognizing that sin is always and foremost against God is vitally important.”13

Horton also confirms, “Sin is a crime committed against a person, not just a principle; … Only

when we are confronted with God in his holiness do we really understand something of the

weight of sin (Isa 6:1–7).”14 T. F. Torrance reminds us to be careful when we talk about sin and

despair as the background for the cross and insightfully points out, “Rather is the Cross itself the

background in which sin is shown up and the despair of man is exposed to which the Cross is the

answer and the remedy.”15 Divine wrath does not only express divine attitude or emotion towards

sin and evil, but also, more importantly, reveals his just action to punish them.16

12
Chapter 2 (The Nature of Punishment), Section 2 (The Biblical Understanding of Punishment), pp. 55–
58.
13
McCall, Against God and Nature, 237 (italics author’s).
14
Horton, The Christian Faith, 428.
15
T. F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Jesus Christ (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Shock, 2002), 157.
16
W. C. Robinson, “Wrath,” in EDT, 1304.
166
 It is crucial for the theological argument (for divine punishment of Jesus) to deal with the

issue of the satisfaction of divine justice, so let us elaborate it biblically here and confirm it.

Scripture clearly declares that the holy and just God himself will act according to his holy law

and also requires others to conform to his holy law.17 Therefore, he will seriously deal with sin

(Gen. 2:16; Rom. 6:23), as Erickson clearly points out that “Deuteronomy 7:10, Psalm 58:11,

and Romans 12:19 all indicate that God will punish sin, for sin intrinsically deserves to be

punished…. The justice of God means that he administers his law fairly, not showing favoritism

or partiality.”18 Does just God necessarily punish sin then? Scripture seems to reveal two

principles: divine justice demands necessarily all sins to be punished; divine mercy allows and

provides a special means (a Substitute) to satisfy the demands of justice. For the first principle,

Scripture affirms that the holy and just God considers sin seriously and he will punish the wicked

with his holy wrath. Exod. 34:7, after the revelation of God’s compassion and graciousness,

clearly declares, “Yet he [the Lord] does not leave the guilt unpunished, …”. Prophet Habakkuk

cries out to the Lord, “Your eyes are too pure to look on evil; you cannot tolerate wrongdoing”

(Hab. 1:13a). Heb. 9:22 demands the necessity of the shedding of blood for sin to be forgiven

except for some rare situations.19 Leon Morris has studied the biblical meaning of blood and

concluded that “it seems tolerably certain that in both the Old and the New Testaments the blood

signifies essentially the death.”20 George Ladd’s study also confirms this conclusion, “We

conclude that the ‘blood’ in separation from the flesh does not mean life but death, life

17
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 314.
18
Ibid., 314–15.
19
F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 226–27.
20
Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 122.
167
surrendered in sacrifice.”21 Therefore, Heb. 9:22 demands the necessity of death to satisfy divine

justice in order for God to forgive sin. In order words, before God forgives sin his justice has to

be satisfied. Otherwise, if he can forgive sin without satisfaction, then the blood which signifies

the death is not necessary. If God can forgive sin without the demands of justice, then Christ died

without necessity. Herman Bavinck eloquently surveys the Scriptures and writes about God’s

“vindictive or retributive justice,”22

God by no means holds the guilty to be innocent (Exod. 20:7; Neh. 1:3ff.); he does not
spare the wicked (Ezek. 7:4, 9, 27; 8:18; 9:10). He does not regard persons or take bribes
(Deut. 10:17), his judgment is impartial (Job 13:6–12; 22:2–4; 34:10–12; 35:6–7). He is
righteous and all his judgements are righteous (Ps. 119:137; 129:4); the punishment of
the wicked is often ascribed to God’s righteousness (Exod. 6:5; 7:4; Ps. 7:11; 9:4–8; 28:4;
62:12; 73; 96:10, 13; 2 Chron. 12:5–7; Neh. 9:33; Lam. 1:18; Isa. 5:16; 10:22; Dan. 9:14;
Rom. 2:5; 2 Thess. 1:5–10). It is also true, however, that the punishment of the wicked is
usually inferred from God’s wrath, and that the righteousness of God especially comes to
the fore in Scripture as the principle of salvation for God’s people.23

For the second principle, even though God’s justice demands the necessity of punishment of sins,

his mercy determines the manner of punishment. He graciously presents his Son as a propitiatory

sacrifice to appease his holy wrath against sin. And Scripture declares that God’s righteousness

includes both his justice in punishing sin and his justification of the repentant sinners (Rom.

3:25–26). Bavinck rightly calls the latter “soteriological character of God’s righteousness.”24

Step 3: Divine Sovereignty and Love and the Necessity of Divine Punishment of Jesus

The third step is the key one in our whole argument. Since God is the sovereign King and

Ruler of the universe, he certainly has the supreme authority to decide how to administer

21
George Eldon Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, Revised Edition, ed. Donald A. Hagner (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 467.
22
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:222.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 2:224.
168
punishment of sin and evil. He himself is also the Lawmaker who is not subjected to the external

legal constraint. But the God of Scripture is not like the capricious and arbitrary pagan gods but

acts according to his nature of holy love, because he does not deny himself. One of the aspects of

divine nature in the context of judgment or punishment is divine justice. When we talk about

justice, we have to make sure whose justice? Alasdair MacIntyre points out two different ideas of

justice: Aristotelian justice which is human-oriented (closely related the rationality and wisdom

in human polis, “no place for divine creator or a divine lawgiver and no place for any human

telos beyond that to be attained by mortals before death”) versus Augustinian justice which is

God-centered (human being, “as created by God, required by God to obey his just law and

destined for eternal life in society with him”).25 In our theological argument for divine

punishment of Jesus, what we concern is only divine justice which is different, as we have seen,

from human justice in many ways. Since we are talking about God’s justice, we have to ask what

God thinks to be just?26 God has revealed his idea of justice from Scripture. As a just and

righteous Judge, God has to punish sin. The biblical revelation about the reality of divine wrath

and the necessity of appeasement or propitiation through divinely acceptable sacrifice (ultimately

in Christ of the cross) have evidently demonstrated this truth.27 However, as a sovereign King

and Ruler, God has the supreme right to decide when and how to punish sin. Scripture has

demonstrated that God, out of his great mercy and patience, has postponed punishment or spared

25
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1988), 123, 163.
26
Some theologians have taken the ordinary sense of punishment in retributive justice which results in a
great challenge in affirming divine punishment of Jesus even though they can affirm PSA in general (John Stott,
Crisp Oliver, Eleonore Stump, Mark Murphy, Joshua McNall, etc.). Here, as we have consistently emphasized, we
want to see how God sees punishment and justice in the context of divine punishment of Jesus on the cross. We
remember that the context affects the understanding of punishment.
27
Leon Morris, The Atonement: Its Meaning and Significance (Leicester, England; Downers Grove: IVP,
1983), 151–76; John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 104–11.
169
full punishment of sins (2 Kgs 17:7–23, 24:3, 4; Isa. 28:21; Rom. 3:25–26; 2 Pet. 2:9; etc.); he

even allows his Servant to be the Substitute for the atonement for others’ sins (Isa. 53:6; 2 Cor.

5:21; Gal. 3:13; 1 Pet. 2:24, 3:18; etc.). And for God, he is just and the justifier by saving others

through a Substitute (Rom. 3:26; 1 Pet. 2:23–24). Is it necessary for God to send his Son to be

our penal Substitute? Yes. Because God desires to save humanity out of his grace and mercy (2

Pet. 3:9), but if he punishes humanity, all of us will perish. It seems to violate God’s loving

nature for him to punish all sinners and sentence them all to eternal death, even though his holy

nature is satisfied. Therefore, God, in his profound love and mysterious wisdom, sent his Son to

be punished for us and in our place.

Now the question is, How can God remain just when he sent Jesus to be punished as our

Substitute? There are a few proposals for answering this question. First, Divine Command

Theory answers that God can decide what is moral and just since he is the governing Ruler and

whatever his commands is right.28 For example, Alvin Plantinga points out “God himself is the

origin of moral constraints. It is his will, his command or approvals, that determine what is right

and wrong, morally acceptable or morally objectionable.”29 This answer is of course logically

self-coherent, but the worry about it is whether what God demands is right according to certain

“ordinary moral norms.”30 The philosophical challenge here is similar to Plato’s “Euthyphro

Dilemma.”31 Second, Anselmian Satisfaction (or Compensation) Theory answers that “sin is

28
Michael W. Austin, “Divine Command Theory.” Assessed on February 10, 2021,
https://iep.utm.edu/divine-c/
29
Alvin Plantinga, “Comments on ‘Satanic Verses: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ,’” in Michael Bergmann,
Michal J. Murray, and Michael C. Rea (eds.), Divine Evil?: The Moral Character of God of Abraham (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 113. Quoted in Craig, Eleonore Stump’s Critique of Penal Substitutionary
Atonement Theories,” Faith and Philosophy, 36, no. 4 (2019), 530.
30
Lombardo, The Father’s Will, 86–88.
31
“The Euthyphro Dilemma” in Wikipedia: “The Euthyphro dilemma is found in Plato’s
dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro, ‘Is the pious (τὸ ὅσιον) loved by the gods because it is
170
basically failure to render God his due,”32 Christ’s death satisfies or “compensates for and sets

right what is wrong” in dishonoring God.33 One of the challenges for this answer is that it seems

unjust for God to leave the sinners unpunished. As Louis Berkhof poignantly points out, “This

theory really has no place for the idea that Christ by suffering endured the penalty of sin, and that

his suffering was strictly vicarious.”34 For the sake of divine justice, punishment is more

reasonable than compensation. That is why the Reformers develop PSA to address the issue of

divine justice instead of Anselm’s divine honor. Third, Penal Substitutionary Theory answers

that God sent his Son to die a penal death in the place of sinners to satisfy his own justice.35 One

of the challenges for this answer is that divine justice seems to be different from the human

justice in the strict sense, as we have noticed in the beginning of this chapter, especially the

transferability of guilt and thus punishment.

The Divine Command answer can be accepted only with balanced awareness that what

God commands is consistent with his nature of holy love and in his rectoral justice. As John

Feinberg addresses the concern of the possible injustice of God’s rules, “God’s rectoral justice

means that he has ordained rules that are morally right, and they are fair because they are not

impossible to obey, … God’s moral governance is also fair in that God’s punishments are

appropriate to our crimes.”36 Besides the emphasis of the seriousness of sin and the holiness of

pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?’” Assessed on February 10, 2021,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma.
32
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 815.
33
Katherine Sonderegger, “Anselmian Atonement,” in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 191.
34
Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Combined Edition (Grand Rapids /Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans,
1996), 386.
35
Thomas Schreiner, “Penal Substitution View,” in James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (eds.), The Nature of
the Atonement: Four Views, 67.
36
John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 346.
171
God, Anselmian theory should be appreciated for its emphasis on the necessity of satisfaction

(“satisfactio”), even though what he meant was actually compensation which breaks from the

long standing patristic traditional emphasis of the Christus Victor motif. For the Penal

Substitutionary answer, although it has encountered challenges from many aspects, some capable

theologians have faced them and provided forceful and satisfactory answers.37 Now, our focus

here is not to repeat these defenses for PSA, even not to repeat the defense of the important penal

aspect of PSA; our focus is to argue theologically why it is necessary for God to punish Jesus on

the cross for saving us.

Our line of argument is like this: the wrath of God is the holy God’s natural reaction

against sin and evil; the wrath of God has to be propitiated or satisfied; the satisfaction has to be

punishment instead of compensation; it is necessary for the holy and loving God to punish Jesus

his Son in order to save humanity. Most PSA defenders have done the first two points; some

have done the last point. As to the third point, Hill and Jebwab have explored the conditions of

the third point but due to space limit, they cannot elaborate it.38 Craig, following Hill and

Jedwab, has differentiated the strong version (Jesus was punished by God) from the intermediate

version (Jesus bore our punishment39) of divine punishment of Jesus and insightfully points out,

Unfortunately, a penal substitutionary theory that does not affirm that God punished
Christ for our sins seems less promising when it comes to satisfying the demands of
God’s justice. Penal substitutionary theories hold that the satisfaction of divine justice,
whether by a necessity of God’s nature or by a free choice of God’s will, is a
precondition of God’s pardon and salvation of sinners. Here the superiority of a theory
involving Christ’s punishment emerges over penal substitutionary theories according to
which God does not punish Christ. For it is hard to see how divine justice could be

37
Cf. Chapter 1, Page 3, Note 12.
38
Hill and Jedwab, “Atonement and the Punishment of the Cross,” 140, 149–50.
39
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 149: “On such a understanding, Christ bore the suffering that,
had it been inflicted upon us, would have been our just desert and, hence, punishment. In order words, Christ was
not punished but he endured the suffering that would have been our punishment had it been inflicted on us.”
172
 satisfied by Christ’s voluntarily taking suffering upon himself if it were not a punishment
meted out for our sins.40

Craig has pointed out a significant direction that PSA theory without divine punishment of Jesus

is “less promising” and the “superiority” of divine punishment of Jesus. Craig insightfully

criticizes Blaine Swen’s non-necessitarian argument that Christ was not punished by God but

bore the suffering of sinners,41 but Craig himself does not provide his argument for this

“promising” and superior form of PSA, because the major goal of his work, Atonement and the

Death of Christ (2020), is to provide an argument for the philosophical coherence of PSA instead

of theological argument for divine punishment of Jesus.

Here, we will focus our theological argument on the third point above: Jesus did not just

endure punishment that the sinners deserved, but he was also punished by God. Many like Leon

Morris and John Stott have done beautiful jobs in addressing the wrath of the holy God against

sin and defending for the necessity of propitiation or appeasement to divine wrath. Now let us

first go to Step 3 to address the necessity of punishment. Scripture clearly declares, as we have

mentioned above, that the holy God cannot tolerate and has to deal with sin. How does God deal

with sin then? Can he just forgive it without satisfaction? After all, he has commanded his people

to forgive the enemies and pray for the persecutors (Matt. 5:43–48; Luke 6:27–36). If we humans

are required to forgive without satisfaction, why can’t God?42

Here Hugo Grotius’s insight on public person is helpful. Grotius, a well-known Dutch

jurist, responds the Socinian challenge against PSA with important theological and legal insights

in his work, A Defense of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction and Christ, against

40
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 198.
41
Ibid., 196. Cf. Blaine Swen, “The Logic of Divine-Human Reconciliation: A Critical Analysis of Penal
Substitution as an Explanatory Feature of Atonement,” PhD diss., Loyola University, 2012.
42
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 535–41.
173
Faustus Socinus (1617). Craig has provided a good summary of Grotius’s thought and his

argument against Socinus.43 Here we just list some of the Grotius’s key ideas in his defense for

PSA, especially related with our project for divine punishment of Jesus. First, Christ’s death is to

demonstrate God’s retributive justice and his deliverance of humanity from divine punishment

due to their sins. Second, a creditor is related with private law, but a ruler and a judge are related

with the public law; God is the Judge and the Ruler; he is not a private person. As a Judge, God

is a public person who necessarily punishes all sins. Third, as the Ruler of the universe, God

possesses the authority of relaxation of the law in terms of how and when to punish sins. Craig

points out, “Grotius thus combines a view of justice as retributive with the possibility of

relaxation of the law by an authority.”44 Four, God can relax his law and forgo the demanding of

punishment for the weightier reason like the salvation of humanity.

Now the challenge is, if God requires us to forgive without punishment, why can’t he?

The problem of this challenge is that we human beings are private persons, we can forgo the

hurts or offenses by our personal choice without offending any legal or moral norms; but God, as

the King and Ruler, is a public person. Any offense to him is to offend a legal or moral system.

Just like a judge, as a private person, he can forgive any personal offense without offending legal

norms; but as a public person (in the position of a judge in the courtroom), he has no right to

forgo the criminal’s crimes. He has to follow the legal or judicial procedure to deal with the

criminal. Therefore, sin has to incur divine punishment. God has to punish sin to be satisfied, as

Scripture says, “without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness” (Heb. 9:22b). And this

43
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 137–42.
44
Ibid., 140.
174
blood has to be Jesus’s (Rom. 3:25) because the blood of animals cannot cleanse sins (Heb.

10:4). Calvin confirms the necessity of the blood of Christ for the remission of sin,

Men are shut off from the sight of God because of the fact that since He is justly wroth
with them all, there is no reason for them to promise themselves any favour from him
until He has been pacified. The one way of pacifying is by the atonement of blood, and
hence no pardon for sin can be hoped for unless we bring blood. This happens when we
find refuge by faith in the death of Christ.45

Then the natural question arises, Is God then subordinate to a standard system of justice

outside of himself? For example, Green and Baker criticize Charles Hodge’s model of PSA for

boxing God in “an abstract concept of justice” like “late-nineteenth-century American notions of

justice.”46 They further charge PSA in general of forcing God to do something that he does not

want to do (like killing his Son) due to “a certain standard of justice.”47 Are these kinds of

charges valid? I do not think so. Here the central issue is the relationship between God and the

law. We have pointed out before that God’s law is the expression of his holy character; it is not

an external law that is outside of or superior to God. The holy law of God has never been against

his own nature of holy love; instead, it reflects God’s own perfect holiness. As Steve Jeffery et al

point out,

God’s law, then, is not external to him, but intrinsically reflects his own perfect
righteousness and holiness. … Moreover, when God punishes sin, he is not reluctantly
conforming to the dictates of an arbitrary set of regulations that he would rather ignore:
he is acting in conformity with his own justice and righteousness.48

45
John Calvin, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews and the First and Second Epistles of St
Peter, trans. William B. Johnston; eds., David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1963), 127.
46
Green and Baker, Rediscovering the Scandal of the Cross, 147.
47
Ibid., 169.
48
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 302.
175
Therefore, there is no inconsistency for God to act according to the law that God himself issues,

after all, he cannot violate himself (2 Tim. 2:13).

Here an important issue needs to be clarified. As we have mentioned before, there are

three versions of understanding about Christ’s death: death as suffering but not punishment

inflicted by God (the weak version); death as endurance of punishment inflicted by God but not

as being punished by God (the intermediate version); death as being punished by God (the strong

version). Not many PSA defenders can accept the weak version because it denies the punitive

nature of Christ’s suffering. James Denny, though a clear defender of the substitutionary

atonement, defends PSA indirectly according to J. I. Packer. Denny defends for the weak or

intermediate version of it: Christ’s death as punishment against sin not upon him.49 I. Howard

Marshall does not reject the “fundamentalist” term, PSA, as a historical inheritance. He can

accept that Christ bore the pain, suffering, and even penalty of our sins, but he clearly denies the

necessity of the Father’s appeasement or propitiation by his Son and avoids using the terms of

violence and punishment in Christ’s death. Therefore, he suggests to adopt a moderate phrase,

“substitutionary suffering and death.”50

Most of PSA defenders have accepted the intermediate version and some have accepted

the strong version, but there are indeed some contemporary theologians like Daniel J. Hill,

Joseph Jedwab, and William Lane Craig, besides Luther and Owen in the past, who support the

strong version. Joshua M. McNall points out that “…while it has been asserted that evangelical

accounts of penal substitution have never claimed that God punished Christ, the fact remains that

49
J. I. Packer, “What Did the Cross Achieve?” in Packer and Dever, In My Place Condemned He Stood,
80–81.
50
I. H. Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement, 51–52, 66, 69, 73–75.
176
several influential voices have said exactly this.”51 Now, the crucial question is, What is the

differentiation between the intermediate and the strong version? In order words, Is bearing

punishment the same as being punished? Here we have found the confusion in theologians’ use

of language. Many theologians who adopt the intermediate version of Christ’s death use the

phrase “Christ bore our punishment” to mean that Christ bore our suffering that would have been

punishment if it had been inflicted on sinners, but they cannot accept that Christ was punished by

God. Craig points out, “Some defenders of penal substitution recoil at the thought that God

punished His beloved Son for our sins.”52 For instance, P. T. Forsyth can claim that “Christ

entered the wrath God” and “bore God’s penalty upon sin,” but he forcefully rejects the idea that

Christ was punished by God.53 Similarly, it is no problem for John Stott to write that “Jesus

Christ did indeed bear the penalty of our sins,” but he warns that “[w]e must not, then, speak of

God punishing Jesus…”54 Here, for Stott, bearing penalty does not mean being punished.

Erickson can surely accept that “Jesus bore our sins” and even Jesus bore “the punishment that

would have been ours,” but he does not feel comfortable to accept that the Son was punished by

the Father, even though he is willing to claim that the Father punished himself 55 Here for

Erickson, bearing punishment does not seem to mean being punished. Steve Jeffery, Michael

Ovey, Andrew Sach have forcefully defended for PSA; they can claim that “God gave himself in

the person of his Son to suffer instead of us the death, punishment, and curse due to fallen

humanity as the penalty for sin” and “the Lord Jesus Christ died for us – a shameful death,

51
McNall, The Mosaic of Atonement, 105–6.
52
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 147–48.
53
P. T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (Pickerington, OH: Belove Publishing, 2017 [originally 1910]), 53, 56.
54
Stott, The Cross of Christ, 151.
55
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 830, 833, 834.
177
bearing our cruse, enduring our pain, suffering the wrath of his own Father in our place,”56 but

they haven’t defended divine punishment of Jesus. Craig points out, they “do not defend penal

substitution in such a way as to imply that Christ was punished in our place.”57 For Jeffery et al,

even though they do not reject divine punishment of Jesus, they do not claim or argue for it

either.

However, some other theologians use “bearing punishment” and “being punished”

interchangeably. For instance, for Herman Bavinck, there is no difference between Jesus’s

bearing of our sins or punishment and his being punished by God.58 Although Packer does not

state clearly that God punished Jesus, his use of language of Jesus’s endurance of divine

punishment is close to mean that. He uses “In My Place Condemned He Stood” as a book title to

express Jesus’s death as divine condemnation. He quotes with approval Charles Wesley’s poem

which states,

The Lord in the day

Of his anger did lay
Our sins on the Lamb, and he bore them away;
He died to atone
For sins not his own,
The Father hath punished for us his dear Son.59

Here it seems that “Christ bore our sins” and “Christ was punished by the Father,” for both

Charles Wesley and J. I. Packer, have a similar meaning, if not exactly the same.60

56
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 21.
57
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 148.
58
Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 393–98.
59
Packer and Dever, “Epilogue: Christ-Centered Means Cross-Centered,” in Packer and Dever (eds.), In
My Place Condemned He Stood, 147 (italics mine).
60
I. Howard Marshall, Aspects of Atonement, 68; John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 150–51; Craig, The
Atonement, 53; Ibid., Atonement and the Death of Christ, 147–49.
178
 Even though there are many passages in Scripture, as we have studied before, which have

pointed to divine punishment Jesus, many PSA theologians still hesitate or reject the theological

claim that Jesus on the cross was punished by God the Father. The reasons for this hesitation or

rejection vary. Some like Forsyth cannot accept Christ being punished by God because God “was

always well pleased” with him.61 Some like Stott may be afraid that divine punishment of Jesus

may cause a “conflict” within the trinitarian life, etc. We will discuss the objections, challenges,

and worries later in this chapter when we deal with objections of divine punishment of Jesus

especially within the circle of the PSA defenders.

The theological argument for divine punishment of Jesus focuses on what Scripture has

been revealed and how to argue for this claim based on the theological interpretation of the

biblical texts Chapter 4 and the biblical understanding of divine justice that has been laid out in

Chapter 2. We do pay attention to what secular legal theorists say about punishment and justice,

as we do in Chapter 2, but our argument is based on what God’s view of punishment and justice

is from the biblical witnesses. With our previous preparations, now we can argue for this claim

as follows. The holy God, as a Judge, will necessarily react against sin with his holy wrath. This

means that he will necessarily punish sin. Without the punishment of sin, God’s holy nature

cannot be satisfied because he cannot violate himself. As to how God deals with the one who

commits sin in order to fulfil divine justice or how PSA satisfies divine justice, Craig’s nuanced

formulation of this issue is helpful. He revises the standard of divine justice supported by many

theologians (“Unless the person who committed a wrong is punished for that wrong, divine

justice is not satisfied.”62) to the new one (“Unless a person who is liable for a wrong is punished

61
Forsyth, The Work of Christ, 53.
62
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 197.
179
for that wrong, divine justice is not satisfied.”63) Craig’s revision is based on the legal insight of

vicarious liability.

One the one hand, the holy God has to punish sin or the one who is liable; on the other

hand, God, as a Ruler, can decide when and how to punish. God can delay punishment as long as

sin is to be punished (Rom. 3:25–26). This does not compromise God’s retributive justice. But

out of God’s nature of love and mercy, he predestinates some of humanity to be saved (Eph. 1:4).

If God punishes all humankind, his justice can be satisfied but then no one can be saved. Hence,

God, in his sovereign free will, will find some other means to be punished for sin. Out of his

profound and mysterious wisdom and mercy, God sent his sinless Son to be punished for human

sin. If Jesus only endured the consequence of punishment without actually being punished, then

no one is punished for sin and sin is not punished at all, thus God’s holy justice is not satisfied.

Therefore, Jesus is necessary, in this sense, to be punished by God for human salvation. Then is

just for God to let Jesus be the one who is liable to punishment for human sins? Next let us

further argue for the justification of divine punishment of Jesus through the imputation of our sin

to Jesus and the union of Jesus with the believers.

Steps 4 and 5: The Imputation of Sin and the Union with Christ

The natural question is, How does God remain just when he punished a sinless Substitute

in the place of others? Now let us provide the theological reason how God can punish Jesus

without violating his just nature. Here we need to affirm two theological truths: the doctrine of

imputation and the doctrine of the union with Christ. Rom. 4:3 clearly declares the biblical truth

of justification, which is forcefully confirmed by the Reformers, as B. A. Gerrish points out,64

63
Ibid., 199.
64
B. A. Gerrish, “Atonement and ‘Saving Faith’”, 183, note 6: “It was very important for Calvin that Christ
did not endure just ‘any kind of death,’ but rather a criminal’s execution, so that ‘this is our acquittal: the guilt which
180
that our righteousness is imputed or reckoned to our account by God, not by our works but

through our faith in Jesus Christ who took upon himself the punishment we deserved. Abraham

is a great example of this truth (Gen. 15:6). People may doubt, Is faith counted as meritorious

work to win God’s favor? But here, as George Ladd points out, “it is Paul’s main concern to

refute the idea that salvation is based in any way on human works or merit.”65 The imputation of

righteousness to the repent sinners is by God’s sovereign grace. The imputation has another

essential aspect, that is, the imputation of our sins to Jesus Christ,66 as our exegesis on 2 Cor.

5:21 in the previous section has demonstrated. When God imputes our sins to Jesus on the cross,

Jesus becomes legally guilty, and thus he is legally liable to punishment, even though he is

personally and intrinsically sinless. Therefore, in legal sense it is not unjust for God to punish

Jesus.67 This is not because Jesus’s own willingness to be the penal Substitute,68 but because of

the divine imputation of guilt of human sins to him.

The doctrine of imputation of our sins to Jesus has been well received by Christians.69

Luther has argued for PSA even divine punishment of Jesus based on the doctrine of forensic

imputation. He opposes, in his expounding Gal. 3:13, the theologians of glory’s hesitation about

held us liable to punishment was transferred to the head of the Son of God.’ (Inst. II.xvi.5). Justification consists in
forgiveness and the ‘imputation of the righteousness of Christ’ (ibid., III xi.2), hence, we are righteous “not in
reality, but by imputation (ibid., 11).” 184: “Substitution I take to mean the view that Christ was punished for our
sins in our stead, so that it is no longer necessary for us to be punished ourselves. … Imputation I here take to mean
the view that Christ’s righteousness is reckoned to the sinner who has faith.” (italics author’s)
65
Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, 491.
66
Here we do not discuss the imputation of Adam’s sin to humanity. For a detailed survey and the balanced
evaluations of different historic views on original sin and original guilt, please refer to Thomas McCall, Against God
and Nature: The Doctrine of Sin, 149–205.
67
Craig, “Is Penal Substitution Unjust?” IJPR 83 (2018), 231–44.
68
Tom Smail is certainly right to point out that the willingness of the innocent party cannot justify the
punishment. Cf. Smail, “Can One Man Die for the People?”, Goldingay, Atonement Today, 85.
69
We have addressed this doctrine in Chapter 2.
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the fittingness of Christ being accursed by God on the cross, instead he claims unswervingly that

Christ became the curse of God in his judgment against our sin, “He has and bears all the sins of

men in His body—not in the sense He has committed them but in the sense that He took these

sins, committed by us, upon His own body, in order to make satisfaction for them with His own

blood.”70 Luther even boldly claims, “Ipse Deus Percussit et punivit Christum.” (“God himself

struck and punished Christ.”)71 It is very clear that Luther’s reason for such a bold claim, as

shown in his famous commentary on Galatians, is based on the forensic imputation of our sins to

Christ.72

The exact nature of imputation is surely a mystery, as Robert K. Johnston points out.73

But God as the King and Ruler of the universe, he can have authority to impute legal guilt to

Jesus in order for him to be justly qualified as our penal Substitute. God’s decision for this

imputation is neither arbitrary nor circumscribed by the external norms but according to his

nature of holy love. There are two reasons for God for divine imputation to be justified:

trinitarian unity between the Father and the Son and the spiritual union between Jesus the repent

sinners. First, It is not unjust for God to allow imputation, because God and Jesus are not two

independent persons, but ontologically inseparable within the one identity of the triune God, as

we have demonstrated this truth in Chapter 3. It is honorable for the triune God to sacrifice

himself. Therefore, it is not unjust for God to sacrifice himself for humanity, just like no injustice

70
Luther, LW 26:277. Quoted in Timothy George, “The Atonement of Martin Luther,” 273.
71
Luther, Werke: Kristische Gesamtausgabe: Volume 40, Part III (Weimar Ausgabe), ed. J. K. F. Knaake
(Weimar: Böhlous, 1930 [original 1543/44]), 715. Quoted in Daniel Hill and Joseph Jedweb, “Atonement and the
Concept of Punishment,” in Locating Atonement, 151.
72
Martin Luther, Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, trans. Theodore Graebner (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1939), 63–64.
73
Robert K. Johnston, “Imputation,” EDT, 600–601.
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in the sacrificial love of a loving mother to bear punishment or to be punished for her children.

Second, It is not unjust for God to impute the repent sinners’ sins to Jesus, because Jesus and

those who are “in Christ” (en Christo) are united spiritually as one corporate body in God’s eyes.

Scripture describes this identification or union of Christ with Christians as spiritual and organic

union (1 Cor. 12:13; Gol 3:27; John 14:20, 15:1–6; Eph. 1:22–23; 4:12–16; 5:23–32).74 The

wife’s debt is the husband’s debt because they are one legally and financially. As Luther

confirms this truth in a famous analogy of the “joyous exchange” in his The Freedom of a

Christian,

Christ is God and man in one person. He has neither sinner or died, and he is not
condemned; his righteousness, life, and salvation are unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent.
By the wedding ring of faith he shares in the sins, death, and pains of hell which are his
bride’s. as a matter of fact, he makes them his own and acts as if they were his own and
as if he himself had sinned; he suffered, died, and descended into hell that he might
not swallow him up, these were necessarily swallowed up by him in a mighty duel.75

Brian A. Gerrish even claims that this joyous exchange is the center or presupposition of the

Reformers’ (Luther and Calvin) theology of atonement from which they develop the theme of

victory and substitution. And Gerrish further points out that for the Reformers, by this joyous

exchange, “our sins are transferred to Christ and punished in his death by substitution, and his

righteousness is in turn transferred to us by imputation.”76 David Luy also confirms the centrality

of joyous exchange in Luther’s soteriology, “Luther’s soteriology is often expressed in terms of a

joyful exchange, … the metaphor itself furnishes something like an organizational nerve center

for Luther’s understanding of redemption.”77 Therefore, it is legally just for God to punish Jesus

74
John F. Walvoord, “Identification with Christ,” EDT, 588.
75
Luther, LW 31:351–52.
76
Brian A. Gerrish, “Atonement and ‘Saving Faith’”, in TT 17, no. 2 (July 1960): 181–82.
77
Luy, Dominus Mortis, 164, note 2.
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who has borne the sins of those who are united with him and thus received the spiritual benefit of

this joyous exchange. Even though theologians have been debating on the nature of the union:

the natural union through the incarnation of Christ (Francis Turretin, Craig, etc.) and spiritual or

mystical union (Calvin, Steve Jeffery, Michal Ovey, and Andrew Sach, etc.), the spiritual or

mystical union which is accomplished by the Holy Spirit may be more appropriate in the context

of the believer’s new identity in Christ by the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit.78 From these

two aspects of unity (Jesus’s trinitarian unity with the Father and Jesus’s spiritual union with the

believers) we can see that it is not unjust or immoral for God to punish Jesus, just like in the

legal punishment in the context of vicarious liability that we have investigated in Chapter 2,79

Jesus bore our guilt of sin as the head of the corporate body of the believers and was thus

punished by God.

Step 6: The Forgiveness of Sins and Divine Integrity

Since our sins were imputed to Jesus and he was thus punished by God as our Substitute, God’s

holy wrath against sin is appeased, his holy nature is satisfied, and hence he can pardon or

forgive all our sins. If even human justice can accept vicarious liability in certain situations, as

we have discussed it in Chapter 2, then it is far more reasonable for the loving and gracious God

to grant us forgiveness of sins through the penal substitutionary death of Jesus with whom we are

united.

Now the natural challenge arises: Since our sins have been punished to the full extent,

why is divine forgiveness of sins necessary? In history, Socinus has argued that satisfaction of

78
Calvin, Inst., 1.3.1; Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 146–47; 242–44; Craig,
Atonement and the Death of Christ, 203–206.
79
Cf. Chapter 2, Pages 51–52.
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divine justice is not logically compatible with divine forgiveness of sins, as Craig points out.80

The reason is very simple for Socinus, if all debts have been paid, there is no need of forgiveness

from the creditor. Stump raises a similar objection. She argues by first defining mercy as “a

matter of foregoing at least some of what is owed”; and she continues, “According to the penal

substitution theory, God exacts the full extent of the punishment due for human sins, God allows

none of it to go unpunished.”81 Stump herself has realized that PSA proponents can answer that

“God’s foregoing what owed to God consists precisely in God’s not requiring that human beings

endure the punishment for the sins but instead enduring it in the person of Christ.”82 But Stump

does not think this is acceptable because, for her, “no part of what is owed is left unpaid or

unpunished”83 or “no part of the punishment due is omitted.”84 Craig reminds us of Grotius’s

insight that God’s mercy has been manifested in allowing a substitute to pay the penalty for

sinners. Craig points out what Stump has already realized, that is, in Craig’s words, “What God

forgoes is punishing sinners in their proper persons; instead, out of His love for them He bears

their punishment Himself.”85 Here we can see divine forgiveness or mercy not in keeping part of

human sins being unpunished but in punishing human sins in the second person of the triune God

himself. Therefore, there is no incompatibility between the fullness of divine punishment of sins

and the necessity of divine forgiveness of sins.

80
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 207.
81
Stump, Atonement, 77.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid., 24.
84
Ibid., 77.
85
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 208.

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 Furthermore, God not only forgives our sins through Jesus’s death, but also imputes us

righteousness to us. Through this double imputation of sin and righteousness, it demonstrates

that God remains holy in his dealing with sin and remains gracious and merciful in his self-

sacrificial substitution in his Son. Therefore, the strict punishment of sins, though preserving

divine justice, sacrifices divine love by destroying all humankind; forgiveness of sins without

punishment compromises divine holiness and justice; only divine punishment of Jesus can

maintain divine integrity of holy love.

In sum, the theological argument for divine punishment of Jesus is based on God’s nature

of holy love. On the one hand, God necessarily reacts against sin according to his holy nature. As

a sovereign King and Ruler, God has the authority to decide when and how to punish sin. On the

other hand, God is gracious and merciful, he wills and desires to save humanity. Due to the

divine nature of holy love, God has to punish sin but would not punish humanity, because his

punishment will result in a complete destruction of all humankind. Therefore, God, out of his

great loving self-sacrifice and profound wisdom, sent his Son to be our penal Substitute for

satisfying God’s demands of justice, and thus our sins are forgiven. God can do so without

violating his holy justice because the Father and the Son are united as one in his trinitarian life

and the Son and the believers are united as one in their spiritual union.

Answers to the Objections

If we say PSA has been controversial within the evangelical circle, we are sure that

divine punishment of Jesus is more controversial, because even some zealous defenders of PSA

like John Stott and Millard Erickson have hesitated to accept this strong version of PSA —

divine punishment of Jesus. Our focus here is not objections to PSA in general, because some

theologians, as we have mentioned before, have done beautiful jobs of defense. Instead, our

186
focus in this section is the objections or challenges specifically related with divine punishment of

Jesus. We have listed the different categories of objections in Chapter 1, now we will answer

them one by one.

An Answer to the Moral Objections: Injustice and Violence

The typical moral objection claims that it is unjust or immoral for God to punish an

innocent one, Jesus Christ. This “sharp and complete” rationalistic objection has been raised by

Faustus Socinus and his followers since the Reformation era.86 This Socinian “withering attack”

at PSA exerts huge influence on the contemporaries, thinkers in the following eras and even

today. It may be no exaggeration for Craig to say that “Socinus’ critique of penal substitution

remans today unsurpassed in terms of its depth and breath.”87 Another form of moral objection is

to claim that it is violent or cruel for the Father to punish his innocent Son, as we have listed

many challengers in Chapter 1.88 Even though there is a nuanced differentiation between these

two forms of objections (the first concerns injustice; the second concerns violence), they both

raise the objections of morality to divine punishment of Jesus.

To answer the objection of injustice, we first need to be aware of the critics’ assumptions

of what justice is. Sometimes people involved in a certain debate may have different definitions

or presuppositions about the basic concepts like punishment and justice. That is why we have

spent a whole chapter (Chapter 2) discussing definitions and justifications of punishment and

related theories of justice. We will answer conceptual objections a little bit later. Throughout this

project, we have been pointing out the similarity and the difference between divine justice and

86
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:347.
87
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 128.
88
Chapter 1, Section 2 (A Review of Literature).
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human justice. When people complain that it is unjust for God to punish an innocent, what they

really mean is that it is unjust according to their own standard of justice, or the human strict

standard of justice. For example, they insist that no transference of guilt is allowed; no

substitution is allowed. The justice that we are defending is divine justice according to Scripture;

and we will demonstrate that this biblical justice is philosophically coherent even according to

human reason.89 For God, it is reasonable to administer what he thinks to be just in his universe.

We have pointed out that God commands that no human being treat others with injustice. Each

one should take his or her own responsibility. No innocent one should normally be punished.90

We know that Jesus is innocent. But if he is only an independent human being without any

special connection with the Father and other human beings, then it is surely unjust for the Father

to punish him no matter according to divine justice or human justice. But this is not the case.

Jesus, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 3, is ontologically and thus volitionally one with the

Father within the trinitarian life. We cannot treat the Father and Jesus as two independent

subjects in their dealing with human salvation. Fred Sanders insightfully points out the

misdirected attention in our thinking of the dereliction on the cross is to be to the Father-Son

tension; instead, the right focus should be on God-man relationship.91 The Socinian type of

objections fail to be aware of this difference. Socinus, as a Unitarian theologian, does not admit

Jesus’s divinity, let alone the second person of the Trinity, he thus surely cannot accept

trinitarian unity of the Father and the Son. He can only treat Jesus as an independent innocent

89
Similar to what William Lane Craig has done in demonstrating philosophical coherence of PSA in his
Atonement and the Death of Christ.
90
Exception can be found in the case of vicarious liability. Cf. Chapter 2, Section 1.
91
Fred Sanders, “Godforsaken for Us.” The Gospel Coalition, April 9, 2020. Assessed on February 17,
2021, https://ca.thegospelcoalition.org/article/godforsaken-for-us/
188
human, his theological error unavoidably leads to his unawareness of the distinction between

divine and human justice. But for those who do accept the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of

the Trinity, their mistake is not to realize that the Father and the Son are actually one not only in

their identity but also in their operation as we have seen in Chapter 3. The Father and the Son are

inseparable in their work for our salvation, even in the midst of divine punishment of Jesus.

Therefore, divine punishment of Jesus is, as we have just mentioned above, more like what a

self-sacrificial mother does for her children than an unjust judge punishes another independent

innocent individual.

Now how about the injustice of sinners without being punished for their sins? The

important aspect that we should not ignore is the union of Jesus with the repent sinners. When

we claim that Jesus died for the sinners, we should not forget that Jesus and the repent sinners

are united as one corporate body. Even human justice allows the concept of vicarious liability, let

alone the justice of the gracious and merciful God. Jesus was punished as a Substitute and a

Representative.92 When Jesus was punished, he was punished on our behalf. In that sense, in

God’s eyes, our sins have been dealt with through Jesus’s representative punishment. God’s

justice is satisfied. Therefore, it is not unjust or immoral for God to punish Jesus for our sins

according to the divine nature of holy love. Craig summarizes it well,

Christ was punished in our place and bore our suffering we deserved, but he also
represented us before God, so that his punishment was our punishment. Christ was not
merely punished instead of us; rather, we were punished by proxy. For that reason, divine
justice is satisfied.93

To answer the objection of violence, we also need to be aware of the understanding and

assumption about violence in the Nonviolence Movement. For example, J. Denny Weaver’s

92
Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 16.3; Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 204.
93
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 204–205.
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assumption in his Narrative Christ Victor model of the atonement is “the rejection of violence,

whether the direct violence of the sword or the systemic violence of racism or sexism.”94 Weaver

uses “‘violence’ to mean harm or damage.”95 It is easy for us to detect Weaver’s understanding

of violence which is only negative and destructive side. Weaver also complains that all three

classic theories of the atonement accept “divinely required and sanctioned violence” as the basis

of Jesus’s saving work and thus portrays the Father as an avenger, punisher, and an abuser, as we

have pointed out in Chapter 1. He also complains about the assumption of the retributive justice

in the satisfaction atonement and PSA.96 He identifies punishment as abuse. When we look at

Weaver’s argument, one of the weaknesses is his negative assumption of violence and retributive

justice. Another weakness is about his theological methodology: his selective use of biblical

witnesses. For example, he uses Jesus’s teaching and life example on nonretaliation or

nonviolence97 but avoids his wrathful cleaning of the temple and his teaching on the violent

eternal judgment; he emphasizes on the imagery of “the nonviolent conqueror — the slain lamb”

in Rev 6–798 but avoids the violent divine Conqueror on the white horse in Rev 20. Boersma

points out the inconsistence in Weaver’s argument when we face the unavoidability of the

presence of violence even in the midst of our hospitality and when we encounter the need of a

certain degree of violence for protecting the marginalized in the society. Theologically, a God of

love has to react with anger when his love is violated.99 To answer the wholesale rejection of

94
Weaver, The Nonviolence Movement, 7.
95
Ibid., 8.
96
Ibid., 7–8.
97
Ibid., 34–46.
98
Ibid., 20.
99
Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross, 34–35, 46–49.
190
violence in the atonement, Boersma convincingly argued for the necessity of “redemptive

violence” in God’s work for human salvation and closes with these words,

Underlying much of this study has been the appeal to paradox: all acts of hospitality in
history share in the limited and conditional character of creation and require, as such,
some degree of violence. I have argued that this violence can be redemptive and does not
need to detract from the hospitable character of these acts. I have made the case that
God’s hospitality on the cross implies such redemptive violence, and that human
hospitality requires a certain degree of violence as well. I have also maintained that it is
only in the in eschatological resurrection of Christ, completed on the last day, that his
violence comes to an end and God ushers in his unconditional or absolute hospitality.
Only the telos of this resurrection is sufficient justification for all good violence, whether
divine or human.100

If people complain against the divine use of violence for achieving human salvation, they should

be also aware that it is not only necessary to have “redemptive violence” in God’s plan for our

salvation, but also unavoidable for God to employ violence in his judgement against sins and evil

of the world. Simon Zahl has noticed the long-term caricaturing of certain atonement theories to

be violent, cruel, and unjust and points out that this kind of academic rejection of PSA has

neglected long history of Christian traditions and experiences, “The vehemence of reactions

against substitutionary and forensic models over the centuries has often obscured recognition of

their sheer effectiveness in a wide variety of contexts and over many centuries.”101

In sum, if we can accept the biblical concept of divine justice, then it is not problem at all

to accept that it is not unjust or immoral for God to punish Jesus for our salvation, just like if we

can accept the biblical (Pauline) concept of righteousness as “rediscovered” by Martin Luther, it

100
Ibid., 257.
101
Simeon Zahl, “Atonement,” in N. Adams, G. Pattison, and G. Ward (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Theology and Modern European Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 637. Quoted in Simon
Gathercole, Defending Substitution, 25.
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is not problem to proclaim that the righteousness of God is the good news for the sinners for

salvation.102

An Answer to the Conceptual or Philosophical Objections

There are at least two different forms of conceptual or philosophical objections to divine

punishment of Jesus, as we have pointed out in Chapter 1. The first form is Kantian objection of

transferability of guilt and punishment (M. C. Murphy, E. Stump, and O. Crisp, etc.); and the

second form is the objection to the concept of retributive justice as biblical one (S. Tavis, T.

Smail, P. Fiddes, C. A. Baxter, etc.). For the first form of the conceptual objection, for example,

Crisp insists on the untransferability of the sin and guilt between two individuals: “liability to

guilt cannot simply be transferred from one individual to another.”103 He also thinks even though

some of problems of PSA may be overcome, the central problem of PSA (thus also the issue of

divine punishment of Jesus) which is the transference of sin and guilt is still fatal: “the central

problem with the penal substitution remains: it is not possible for the sin and guilt of one

individual to be transferred to another individual.”104 For this form of the conceptual objection,

we have to realize that biblical justice allows the imputation of guilt of sins. We have noticed

that Kantian objection insists that the one to be punished has to have guilty mind and guilty act;

no guilt can be transferred from one to another. Now we can respond this claim from biblical and

102
Alister E. McGrath has narrated that Martin Luther had encountered great difficulty in understanding
iustitia Dei (the righteousness of God) as the good news in the late medieval era under the pactum-theology of the
via moderna. There were two interpretations of iustitia Dei at that time: the righteousness of God as “God’s
faithfulness as his faithfulness to the promises of mercy and grace” within the context of the pactum-theology and
the righteousness of God as “God’s rendering to each man his due (reddens unicuque quod suum est)” which is in
the same as the Aristotelian-Ciceronian sense of justice. There is no good news at all in the latter sense of divine
righteousness or justice. Cf. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 100–
19.
103
Crisp, “The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited,” in The Atonement Today, 218.
104
Ibid., 223.
192
philosophical perspectives. We have demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter that the

imputation is a biblical doctrine: God imputes our sins to his Son and his Son’s righteousness to

the believers. Actually, it may be more challenging for some to accept the biblical imputation of

original guilt from Adam to humankind than the imputation of our sins to Christ. From human

reason and experiences, the imputation of our sins to Christ is more like God’s self-sacrificial act

which is noble and praiseworthy. It is legally acceptable that some guilt can be transferred to

others with the biblical and legal understanding of the corporate moral responsibility such as in

the case of vicarious liability as we have seen in Chapter 2. Therefore, transference of guilt and

sin is biblically sound and philosophically coherent.

For the second form of the conceptual objection, we need to investigate what is the

biblical and theological teaching about divine justice: Is retributive justice biblical? We have

pointed out in Chapter 1 that some theologians reject that divine justice is retributive. In Section

2 of Chapter 2 we have addressed the issue of this objection when we discuss the biblical

principle of divine punishment and justice. We have pointed out that the first problem of this

form of objection is to unnecessarily and mistakenly dichotomize the relational and liturgical

images of sacrifice with the legal images of it; the second problem of this objection is to neglect

or ignore the overwhelming biblical witnesses for supporting divine retributive justice. After

surveying the biblical teaching on justice, Steve Jeffery et al summarize,

It is evident from these descriptions that those who criticize penal substitution on the
grounds that biblical justice is concerned with restoring relationships, not exacting
retribution, are in effect arguing that the corrective theory, not the retributive theory,
expresses the biblical view. They are correct in what they affirm but wrong in what they
deny. Correction is a valid biblical reason for punishing wrongdoing. So also is
deterrence, for that matter. However, as we turn to the Scriptures, we should find it
impossible to exclude retribution from the picture.105

105
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 253.
193
 In sum, for these two forms of the conceptual objections, we have to be clear what the

critics really mean by punishment and justice before we engage the discussion with them on the

issue of divine punishment of Jesus. Actually, if these critics insist on their own concept of

punishment and justice which require no transference of guilt and thus no transference of the

liability to punishment, then it is for sure that they cannot accept the death of Jesus as being

punished by God according to their definition of punishment. As to those who reject the

retributive justice, they cannot explain away the pervasive biblical evidence that supports for

retributive justice. Therefore, we affirm that Jesus on the cross was punished by God according

to the biblical understanding of divine punishment.

An Answer to the Theological Objections

There are at least three forms of theological objections as we have pointed out in Chapter

1: divine punishment of Jesus may cause trinitarian disunity; God can forgive our sins without

satisfaction; loving God cannot be angry with his Son. Let us deal with these forms of

theological objections here.

The first form of theological objections can be found easily from PSA opponents, but

even some strong PSA proponents worry that divine punishment of Jesus may cause the potential

disunity among the inner Triune life. For example, Darrin W. S. Belousek, a PSA opponent,

challenges PSA in many areas, one of which is divine disunity. He charges PSA of describing

“atonement being made by means of a violent intra-Trinitarian transaction: the first person of the

Trinity, God the Father, punishes the second person of the Trinity, God the Son, to satisfy the

first person.”106 Then he further charges PSA that “the cross involves the Father acting against or

upon the Son and so reveals God divided against himself” and that PSA “implies a Trinity

106
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 293.
194
composing not only distinct but separable, even conflicting persons – quite contrary to the

ecumenical creedal affirmation of Nicaea and Constantinople.”107 Paul Fiddes charges PSA of

depending for “its logic upon a strong individualization of Father and the Son as independent

subjects, which makes it hard to speak of the one personal reality of God who becomes

vulnerable for love’s sake within his creation.”108 Tom Smail’s criticism against PSA’s problem

on trinitarian disunity can be applied to divine punishment of Jesus. He thinks “the distinction of

the Father who is propitiated and the Son who propitiates” creates “an illegitimate Trinitarian

schism between the Father and the Son.”109 As we have seen in Chapter 1 that even some PSA

defenders like John Stott, Michael Horton, and Millard Erickson hesitate to defend further divine

punishment of Jesus. Stott hesitates to affirm divine punishment of Jesus because he is afraid that

this divine punishment implies the ontological disunity and even volitional conflict within the

Trinity, especially between the Father and the Son. Horton affirms that Jesus is willing to be

sentenced but does not endure the Father’s wrath. Erickson is reluctant to affirm it because his

understanding of divine unity does not allow him to say that the Father punishes the Son.

No matter from the perspectives of PSA opponents or proponents, the common worry is

that the idea of divine punishment of Jesus may cause trinitarian disunity and even volitional

conflict within the Trinity. Our answer is to this worry is based on the three basic principles that

we have defended in Chapter 3: the ontological and perichoretic unity of the Trinity, the

inseparable operations of divine persons ad extra, the unity and distinction of the immanent and

economic Trinity. All parties mentioned above can affirm the divine unity and thus avoid divine

107
Ibid.
108
Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation, 108.
109
Tom Smail, Once for All, 86. Quoted in Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 281.
195
volitional conflict. But from Belousek’s argument, we can see clearly that he assumes that

punishment or forsakenness necessarily implies separation of being and even conflict of will; the

Father and the Son cannot have consensus of will in something like punishment and forsakenness

by the meaning of the terms.110 The problem in Belousek’s criticism is the assumption of disunity

or conflict within the concept of punishment. But Scripture claims both divine punishment of

Jesus or Jesus’s endurance of punishment and divine unity between the Father and the Son at the

same time. He cannot see the uniqueness of divine punishment which does not undermine divine

unity. For Stott, Horton, and Erickson, etc., they can accept Christ’s endurance of the

consequence of God’s punishment or God’s punishment itself (the weak or intermediate version

of PSA), but they cannot accept that Christ was punished by God. The deep reason seems to be

the presupposition that divine punishment of Jesus entails necessarily breaking of divine unity

(in being and will). Both Stott and Erickson have exposed their worries about this disunity no

matter in being or will of the Trinity, as we have mentioned.

Although Besoulek agrees with Steve Jeffery et al about “a mutuality of relationship

between distinct persons,” he cannot accept that the subjection of one divine person to the other

in the Trinity. What Besoulek claims here is right, but he seems to neglect one important truth in

his argument against PSA through the trinitarian unity, that is, the subjection of Jesus to the

Father, no matter in his obedience or punishment, in the economy does not entail his subjection

to the Father in the immanent Trinity. Therefore, here he is not aware of the distinction between

the economic and immanent Trinity and claims that PSA implies that “it is something imposed

and inflicted by the Father upon and against the Son.”111 But what he just says is right in the

110
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 292–95, 306.
111
Ibid., 296.
196
economy of salvation that Jesus on the cross was punished by the Father as a substitute and

representative of the sinners, but this is not true in the immanent Trinity. Belousek rightly

disagrees with Moltmann and has a realization that we should not read all economic events into

the Trinity,112 but he does not distinguish the punishment of the Son in eternity and that of Jesus

in the flesh on the cross for human sins. Stott seems to have the similar worry and thus hesitates

to support divine punishment of Jesus.

Here we need to clarify the distinction between the divine punishment of the eternal Son

and divine punishment of Jesus on the cross. Our project argues for the latter but denies the

former, because the Father and Son have never separated from each other, no matter in the

immanent Trinity or the economic Trinity, as we have argued extensively in Chapter 3. To

answer the critics who claim that divine punishment of Jesus breaks trinitarian unity, we have to

be aware that the Father and the Son are distinct persons who can act upon the other (God loves

or punishes Jesus; Jesus obeys his Father) but the same time they are inseparable in being ad

intra and operations ad extra (the Father and the Son are inseparable in their act of punishment

even though their roles are asymmetric). The principles of personal appropriations and

inseparable operations allow different divine persons to take different roles in their common

work in the economy (like human salvation through divine punishment of Jesus) without

breaking their unity.

Another reason that we can claim here both of the Father-Son’s inseparability and the

Father’s punishment of Jesus on the cross is due to distinction of the immanent and economic

Trinity. Divine punishment of Jesus cannot be read into the immanent Trinity. Jesus as the

incarnate Son of God can suffer the penal death for sinners in the economy of salvation without

112
Ibid., 307.
197
breaking his eternal unity with his Father as the eternal Son of God, because Jesus is not only

never separated in his work of salvation with his Father, but also never separated from his Father

in his being as the second person of the Trinity. However, many evangelicals including some

PSA strong defenders hesitate to claim divine punishment of Jesus due to their undifferentiated

worry that punishment in the economy may cause division in the immanent Trinity. This worry is

unnecessary and harmful. This mistake is similar to the Grudem-Ware’s reading of the economic

subordination of the Son to the Father in obedience into the immanent Trinity to be the eternal

subordination in the current heated debate.113

The second form of theological objections is to claim that it is not necessary for God to

punish Jesus because God can forgive our sins without satisfaction of justice or punishment of

sin. According to this view, God can, out of his great love and mercy, simply forgo the demands

of justice to forgive our sins. We have seen such argument in E. Stump, P. Fiddes, and others, as

we have mentioned in Chapter 1. Stump thinks that to forgive is not to demand payment; if

payment is demanded, then there is no need of forgiveness at all. She writes, “To forgive a

debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due,” but PSA requires that “God does exact every

bit of the debt owed him by humans; he allows none of it go unpunished.”114 Here Stump seems

to confuse human creditor’s forgiveness with divine Creditor’s.

The main issue with this form of theological objection is that their view of divine love

and forgiveness is unbiblical. They dichotomize or set against each other two essential divine

attributes: divine love (mercy) and divine holiness (justice). For example, Stump argues against

113
Michael Bird, “Theologians of a Lesser Son,” in Michael Bird and Scott Harrower (eds.), Trinity without
Hierarchy: Reclaiming Nicene Orthodoxy in Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic, 2019), 9–12.
114
Stump, “Atonement according to Aquinas,” in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian
Faith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 62. Quoted in Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced by Our
Transgressions, 263.
198
Anselmian kind of atonement this way, “God’s forgiveness, like God’s love, is unilateral and

unconditional. It does not depend on anything; … God’s love and forgiveness … are there for

every human person, even those who are unrepentant wrongdoers.”115 Even when Stump’s

account of forgiveness in her The Atonement was challenged later by Brandon Warmke, she still

insists that “God’s forgiveness is not conditional on a wrongdoer’s repentance of his sins” and

that “forgiveness is unconditional as regards the sinner’s attitude towards his own sins.”116 For

Stump, there is no need of satisfaction of justice in the atonement because God is love and he can

thus forgive all sinners even including the unrepentant ones. This understanding of divine love

and forgiveness does not seem to be the biblical teaching. A simple biblical fact can suffice as a

counterargument: God will definitely punish unrepentant sinners for eternal death in hell in the

Last Day. As we have argued that divine love is holy love; God’s love does not conflict with his

holiness. From philosophical point of view, Stump’s concept of divine forgiveness is like a

private person’s forgiveness. This has been exposed from her analogy in her argument of

unconditional divine forgiveness through private persons’ examples (Eleanor Roosevelt’s

forgiveness of Franklin Roosevelt and Paula’s forgiveness of Jerome).117

Similarly, another challenger Belousek considers forgiveness as a “divine gift” which is not

under “economy of exchange, promised on the principle of retribution, but rather an economy of

grace, flowing from the generosity of God.”118 He also argues for a divine forgiveness beyond the

115
Stump, Atonement, 101.
116
Ibid., “The Doctrine of the Atonement: Response to Michael Rea, Trent Dougherty, and Brandon
Warmke,” EJPR 11, no 1 (2019), 182, 184.
117
Ibid., 182–184.
118
Belousek, Atonement, Justice, and Peace, 197.
199
law.119 This view of divine forgiveness, no matter Stump’s or Belousek’s, cannot account for the

clear biblical witnesses of God’s punishment of sins as Judge and Ruler. Biblical God is a loving

Father and righteous King and Judge at the same time. Any offense to him has to incur severe

consequence of judgment, because God is a public holy person and cannot deny himself. After

having outlined Stump’s argument against Anselmian atonement theory and pointed out the fatal

problems in her concept of forgiveness and her argument, Craig summarizes, “God’s forgiveness

is, indeed, unconditional in the sense that it requires nothing of sinners, but that does not imply

that it is not based on Christ’s satisfaction of divine justice on behalf of sinners.”120 And we

should recognize the plain biblical truth that without repentance, the sinner cannot receive divine

forgiveness. Belousek quotes I. H. Marshall with approval on the view of forgiveness “as

requiring no restitution or retribution from the sinner, but as resting on something that God in his

mercy has done to make it possible… The conferral of forgiveness costs the sinner nothing but

costs God everything.” But Belousek is not sensitive to, even though he also quotes from

Marshall, the cost of God here, the sacrificial death of his Son for the sinner.

It is, indeed, by God’s mercy we are conferred divine forgiveness without cost

(retribution) from us, but God has paid a great deal of cost for us to fulfill his retributive justice,

for he cannot deny himself. Divine forgiveness does not contradict divine justice. Cynthia L.

Rigby surveys three kinds of relationship between forgiveness and the atonement (forgiveness

without atonement, forgiveness requiring atonement, and forgiveness inviting atonement) and

119
Ibid., 199–207.
120
Craig, Atonement and the Death of Christ, 162–65.
200
concludes that “atonement might be understood to be an essential component of forgiveness,

rather than altogether unnecessary or that which makes forgiveness possible.”121

The third form of theological objections is to assume that loving God cannot be angry

with his Son. This form of objection exposes a more general theological presupposition that love

and wrath are contradictory emotions and cannot coexist. There have been many treatments

about the topic of harmony of divine love and holiness from the principle of divine simplicity, as

we have mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3. Jeremy J. Wynne insightfully points out, in his talk

about “a thick concept of love,” not only the capability but also the necessity of wrath just

because of love, “When genuine love is confronted with unrighteousness, it not only can be but

must be angry.”122

One issue related with the theological objection to divine punishment of Jesus is Jesus’s

dereliction on the cross. Even though some commentators and theologians have been troubled by

divine unity in Jesus’s dereliction, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are never separated in the

immanent Trinity; they enjoy an eternal ontological and volitional unity (cf. Chapter 3). It is

unimaginable to have brokenness within the intimately related life of the Trinity; otherwise God

would no longer be the triune God.123 As McCall points out “…there is exactly one triune God

whose divine persons are necessarily related (thus not ‘parts’ in any sense) in a perichoretic

‘relation of mutual profound love.’”124 Even though Jesus was punished even forsaken to the

121
Cynthia L. Rigby, “Forgiveness,” in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 453–57.
122
Jeremy J. Wynne, “Wrath,” in T&T Clark Companion to Atonement, 810.
123
Bruce D. Marshall, “The Dereliction of Christ and the Impassibility of God,” in Divine Impassibility and
the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids/Cambridge, UK:
Eerdmans, 2009), 275.
124
McCall, “Relational Trinity: Creedal Perspective,” in Jason S. Sexton (ed.), Two Views on the Doctrine
of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 132.
201
wicked by the Father in the economy of salvation, the Father and the Son are united eternally -

not only in their will of mutual love but also in the perichoretic triune being. The patristic rule of

divine external operations confirms that all three divine persons work together even in the

suffering of the Son on the cross. Even though Jesus himself agrees to bear our sins and thus to

be punished on the cross by the Father, there is never a tension or separation between the Father

and the Son within the immanent Trinity.125 After surveying the major theological voices

regarding the cry of dereliction on the cross in church history, McCall concludes,

We should not understand it [the cry of dereliction] to mean any abandonment of the
humanity that Christ came to take on himself and to save. And we should not understand
it to mean that the communion between the Father and the Son was disrupted or that the
Trinity was in any way “broken.” We should, however, take the cry of dereliction as a
powerful expression of the identification of the Son of God with us and our predicament.
And we should understand it to mean that what the Father abandoned the Son to was
death at the hands of sinful people. So while the abandonment is real, it in no way implies
a loss of contact or relationship between the Father and the Son.126

An Answer to the Exegetical Objections

We have mentioned the exegetical challenges from Isaiah 53 (MT or LXX). From our

exegetical work on Isaiah 53 in Chapter 4, we can see that the issue in MT text (Isa. 53:4–5)

about the servant’s suffering is not about whether the servant was stricken by God or not but

about why the servant was stricken by God (for his own sins or sins of others?). Jersak seems to

be mistaken here by identifying the issue as whether servant was stricken by God. We also have

pointed out that the canonical view of the identity of the servant of Isaiah 53 is clearly Jesus as

he himself has confirmed it. Ekblad’s denial of the identity of the servant as Jesus is not

125
Adonis Vidu, “The Place of the Cross among the Inseparable Operations of the Trinity,” in Locating
Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2015), 36.
126
McCall, Forsaken, 27.
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acceptable by evangelicals. His view is even contradictory with Brad Jersak in the same volume

(Stricken by God?) which is against PSA.

A Clarification of the Uses of Term and Language

As we have pointed out in Chapter 1 that some theologians use the same term or concept

to mean different things. For example, I. H. Marshall and Grudem use wrath to mean not exactly

the same thing: Marshall means hostility but not necessarily punishment; Grudem means

punishment and condemnation. Murphy, Crisp, etc. use the concept of punishment for those

criminals who have guilt mind and guilt act and allow no transference of guilt and sin; but

biblical concept of divine punishment, as we have seen, allows penal substitution. These

different uses of term, concept, and language have caused significant confusion in the theological

debate in general and the discussion of divine punishment of Jesus in particular. That is why, I.

H. Marshall would like to argue for PSA with awareness of “the problem of terminology.”127 It is

his good desire for clarifying the terms for better communication among the debaters, but some

essential difference of view may not be easy to flatten out. It may be able to clarify the concept

of punishment in Tavis’s and Smail’s penal view of the atonement that Christ bore judgment but

not punishment, but to deny the retributive justice as biblical view is surely not acceptable.

Chapter Summary

Just like a right understanding of biblical righteousness can bring breakthrough and thus

peace to Luther (Rom 1:17; 3:26), a right understanding of divine punishment of Jesus can help

us not feel perplexed with the unified work of the Father and the Son for our salvation. We have

seen the biblical evidence which seem to support divine punishment of Jesus in Chapter 4 and we

have argued that it is sound theologically too in this chapter. The strong biblical and theological

127
I. H. Marshall, Aspects of the Atonement, 7.
203
supports enable us to answer the objections or challenges from different aspects. The crucial

thing to be aware is that when people reject divine punishment of Jesus, we have to ask what

they mean by punishment and what theory of justice they hold. For some, it may be blasphemous

to even think about divine punishment of Jesus; for some others, it may be uneasy to claim this

thesis; but for us, it has strong biblical and theological supports to claim that Jesus on the cross

not only has endured divine punishment but also was punished by God. At least we can modestly

claim that divine punishment of Jesus out of his holy love can be compatible with biblical

understanding of divine punishment and orthodox trinitarianism.

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 Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND A REFLECTION

In this concluding chapter, we would like at first to recapitulate briefly what we have

covered in the previous chapters and list some conclusions about God and the atonement which

are related with divine punishment of Jesus. Then we will point out how these theological

understandings may imply in our practical Christian life. Finally, we will conclude this chapter

and thus our whole project with a brief reflection.

We were motivated to search an answer to Jesus’s cry of dereliction on the cross and

began this research project by proposing a research question of divine punishment of Jesus: Was

Jesus on the cross punished by God the Father? Then we searched the literature and found out

that there had been many differing voices regarding this issue, even among evangelicals who

have firmly embraced PSA. We found out that part of the reasons for the disagreements is their

different understandings or definitions of the terms, especially the term, punishment. Therefore,

we have studied the nature of punishment and pointed out people’s different definitions of

punishment and biblical understanding of divine punishment in Chapter 2. We also realized that

one of the major worries regarding divine punishment of Jesus is the potential disunity between

the Father and the Son if one holds that the Son was punished by the Father. Therefore, we felt

the need to establish a sound theological framework which is the trinitarian framework in

Chapter 3. Chapters 2 and 3 have prepared for our major argument for divine punishment of

Jesus in Chapter 4 (exegetical argument) and Chapter 5 (theological argument). Certainly, there

are some challenges and objections (moral, philosophical/conceptual, theological, exegetical) to

our thesis, divine punishment of Jesus. We have answered for these different types of challenges

and objections in the last section of Chapter 5.

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 Conclusions

Here are some conclusions that we have affirmed in this study regarding the triune God

and the atonement. First, God of holy love should be the source or foundation of any sound

theory of the atonement. Biblical God is a God of holy love. The cross has surely demonstrated

that God is love. Scripture clearly declares that God is love and he so loved the world that he

even sent his only Son to save us (1 John 4:8–10; John 3:16; Rom. 5:8). The cross does not only

demonstrate the Father’s love by sending his Son, but also the Son’s love by his own willingness

to come and give his life for us (John 10:11; 13:1, 34; 15:13; 1 John 3:16). The Holy Spirit also

shows his love for us in his grief over our sins (Eph. 4:30), his intercession with deep groanings

for us (Rom. 8:28), and his participation in Christ’s atoning death (Heb. 9:14). God’s love

revealed on the cross is the outflowing of the eternal perichoretic love within the Father, the Son,

and the Holy Spirit.1 Traditionally, God’s love can be categorized into three types, as Francis

Turretin describes,

Frist, there is the love of benevolence by which God willed good to the creature from
eternity; second, the love of beneficence by which he does good to the creature in time
according to his good will; third, the love of complacency by which he delights himself in
the creature on account of the rays of his image seen in them.2

Erickson uses four dimensions to describe God’s love: benevolence, grace, mercy, and

persistence.3 No matter whether Turretin’s three-fold categorization or Erickson’s four-

dimension description of God’s love is complete, the distinctions that they point out at least

reflect the different aspects or variations of God’s love in Scripture. The important aspect of

God’s love related to our project is that even the propitiatory work of the Son, which is normally

1
T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 162–3.
2
Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1:242. Quoted in Frame, The Doctrine of God, 415.
3
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 318–23.
206
understood to reflect God’s holy wrath, is declared by Scripture to demonstrate God’s love (1

John 4:10). Both Torrance and Stott insightfully point out that Christ’s atoning propitiation

demonstrates God’s love for us. In Stott’s words, “God does not love us because Christ died for

us; Christ died for us because God loved us.”4

The cross not only demonstrates God’s love but also God’s holiness. God’s love isn’t like

human love in that there is no conflict among divine attributes5 while there exists definitely

conflict of emotions within a human heart. As we have seen in Scripture, the holy God has to

deal with sin seriously due to his holy nature. He has to punish all sins (or the one who is liable

to sins) due to his nature of holiness and righteousness. Out of his grace and mercy, God can

postpone judgment or punishment, but he will deal with them eventually (Rom. 3:25, 26). The

cross is where God’s love and holiness (or mercy and wrath) meet. Erickson expresses well in

his address on unity of God’s love and justice,

Actually, love and justice have worked in God’s dealing with human race. God’s justice
requires that there be payment of the penalty for sin. God’s love, however, desires
humans to be restored to fellowship with him. The offer of Jesus Christ as the atonement
for sin means that both the justice and the love of God have been maintained. And there
really no tension between the two.6

Here we should notice that divine attributes of love and holiness (justice) belong to both the

Father and the Son. In McCall’s words, “The holy justice of the Father is the same holy justice of

the Son. The love of the Son is the same as the love of the Father.”7 Any unbalanced emphasis of

either one of these two essential divine attributes (love and holiness) will result in inadequacy

4
Stott, The Cross of Christ, 174; Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 245. Quoted in McCall,
Forsaken, 90–91.
5
Contra Stott, The Cross of Christ, 130.
6
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 324–25.
7
McCall, Forsaken, 81.
207
even heresy in the atonement theory. Stott concludes with a good balance of divine judgment and

mercy,

there is no possibility of persuading, cajoling or bringing God to forgive us, for we

deserve nothing at his hands but judgment. Nor, as we have seen, has Christ by his
sacrifice prevailed upon God to pardon us. No, the initiative has been taken by God
himself in his mercy and grace.8

In McCall’s concise words, “God’s holy love is the source of atonement.”9 Any sound theory of

the atonement has to lay its foundation on the right conception of God who is both holy and love.

Our thesis of divine punishment of Jesus has taken the heed that any neglect of the dimension of

holiness in the theory of the atonement will definitely result in serious theological problems. D.

A. Carson points out, the Christian concept of the love of God is “very different from what is

meant in the surrounding culture” and “the love of God has been sanitized, democratized, and

above all sentimentalized.”10 He claims,

I don’t think that what the Bible says about the love of God can long survive at the
forefront of our thinking if it is abstracted from the sovereignty of God, the holiness of
God, the wrath of God, the providence of God, or the personhood of God – to mention
only a few nonnegotiable elements of basic Christianity.11

Second, God the Father is not an abusive and violent deity as some have claimed; instead,

his loving kindness towards humanity has been demonstrated in his initiative in human salvation

and the sending of his Son to accomplish it. As we have seen some charges against PSA, one of

which is the caricature of God the Father as a violent abuser in PSA. But as we have defended

PSA previously, this charge has no biblical or theological ground. For example, the argument in

the moral objection to PSA (and thus divine punishment of Jesus) is based on the presupposition

8
Stott, The Cross of Christ, 173. Quoted in McCall, Forsaken, 89.
9
McCall, Forsaken, 89.
10
D. A. Carson, The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000), 10–11.
11
Ibid., 11.
208
that anyone who punishes the innocent is an abuser. Now since PSA claims that the Father

punishes the innocent Son, they argue, the Father must be an abuser. This argument, as we have

pointed out, has a serious flaw in that it ignores the clear biblical witnesses for the love of the

Father who initiated human salvation and sent his Son, violates the clear biblical teaching of

imputation of sins, and neglects the distinction between the legally imputed sin and intrinsic

moral sin. Human sins were legally imputed to Christ on the cross, but he is morally pure and

clean. The Father and the Son are not two independent persons; instead, they are distinct and yet

inseparable. Scripture clearly reveals that God reconciles the world to himself in and through

Christ (2 Cor. 5:18, 19). God the Father does not persuade, force, or abuse his Son to save

humanity, but accomplishes human salvation with his Son (and his Spirit) in their unfathomable

perichoretic love and unity and their common love for us.

Third, Jesus Christ is not the Father’s whipping boy; instead, he has voluntarily sacrificed

himself to do the Father’s will in accomplishing human salvation. As we have seen, some have

described Jesus in PSA as a whipping boy, an abused object, when he was crucified on the cross.

This description of Jesus is far away from the biblical witness. In Scripture, although he was sent

by the Father, Jesus himself claimed clearly that he sacrificed his life by his own authority and

willingness (John 10:17, 18; Heb. 10:7). In theology, although he was punished by the Father for

human sins, this punishment has never been incompatible with any orthodox trinitarianism. For

Jesus, there is no conflict at all between his being sent by his Father and his authority in laying

down his life for human salvation. One common mistake in some people’s thinking about God’s

work in human salvation, as Steve Jeffery et al point out, is to take the Father and the Son as two

independent subjects.12 Actually, any orthodox trinitarianism will insist on the ontological unity

12
Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced for Our Transgressions, 279–81.
209
of divine persons: three divine persons are distinct and yet inseparable and thus their work in

economy of salvation is inseparable too. In divine punishment of Jesus, the Father is still the

loving Father and Jesus is still the beloved Son. They are united as one as they always are even

in the midst of dark moment of the cross when the Father has to punish Jesus in his flesh for the

imputed sins of humanity. There is no inconsistency between divine punishment of Jesus and any

orthodox trinitarianism which insists on the ontological and thus volitional unity of divine

persons.

Fourth, Even though the divine abandonment was genuinely felt by Jesus on the cross,

divine unity between the Father and the Son has never been severed even in this dark moment.

There is never a rupture in the being of the triune God and there is never a moment of conflict of

volition between the Father and the Son. Jesus was punished and died on the cross as a man by

the Father, but Jesus as the second person of the Trinity has never been separated from the Father

in being or will, because they are always one and always love one another within their eternal

perichoretic fellowship. Herman Bavinck writes, “Also on the cross Jesus remained the beloved

Son, the Son of his Father’s good pleasure … Precisely in his suffering and death, Christ offered

his greatest, most complete obedience to the will of the Father.”13

Fifth, Any sound theory of the atonement has to deal with the gravity of sin. Without

dealing with sin seriously, any atonement theory will expose inconsistency or contradiction with

the doctrine of God’s holiness. Even though Anselm’s theory of atonement has inadequacies as

we have seen, he is certainly right in insisting to deal with sin seriously. No matter Anselm’s

dealing with sin by compensation to God’s honor or the Reformers’ dealing with sin by

punishment of sin for God’s justice, they are right in dealing gravity of sin in the atonement

13
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:389. Quoted in McCall, Forsaken, 88.
210
theory. The unavoidable and pervasive biblical witnesses on the wrath of God point to the

seriousness of sin and the necessity of dealing with it by the holy God. Unrepentant sinners are

under the wrath and consequentially the serious judgment of the holy God.14 Leon Morris

summarizes this truth concisely, “the wrath of God stresses the seriousness of sin.”15 Different

theories of the atonement have been raised in the centuries to interpret biblical witnesses on

Christ’s teaching, Christ’s compassion, Christ’s victory over Satan, etc. for answering the crucial

question of the atonement, How can Christ’s death save us? None of the theories can avoid the

central issue of gravity of sin. Without dealing with sin in the substitutionary death of Christ,

there is no complete revelation in Christ’s teaching, no true power of moral influence, no need of

Christ’s compassion, no valid redemption for humanity, no victory over Satan and evil powers,

and no human salvation at all. Therefore, it is natural to claim that PSA is the “central” or

“foundational” of the atonement.16 The central reason for this claim is the serious consequence of

sin for offending the holy and righteous God (Ps. 51:4). Some may not be comfortable to accept

the thesis of divine punishment of Jesus, but they will surely not deny our insistence on dealing

the gravity of sin seriously in the atonement.

Sixth, There is no inconsistency between divine punishment of Jesus and orthodox

trinitarianism as long as we understand divine punishment in biblical sense. People disagree

about the claim of divine punishment of Jesus for various reasons, one of which is the differing

understandings or definitions of punishment. Biblical understanding of punishment has affirmed

that divine punishment of Jesus is nothing incompatible with any sound theological teaching of

14
McCall, Against God and Nature, 323–37.
15
Morris, The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross, 156.
16
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 818; Demarest, The Cross and Salvation, 166; Schreiner,
“Penal Substitution View,” in The Nature of the Atonement, 68.
211
the Trinity, especially when we have paid enough attention to the unity and distinction of

economic and immanent Trinity. The common mistake is to read the cross event into the

immanent Trinity and result in an unnecessary worry of divine disunity. Our hesitation, struggle,

or even objection to accept divine punishment of Jesus is similar to Martin Luther’s struggle in

understanding God’s righteousness as the Good News for sinners. People in Luther’s time

rejected divine righteousness as the Good News in their understanding divine righteousness

(justice) in Aristotelian-Ciceronian framework of justice. Luther’s breakthrough in understanding

of divine righteousness is rooted in biblical understanding of righteousness and justice instead of

popular legal-judicial understanding of righteousness and justice at that time. Today, if

theologians hesitate or reject divine punishment of Jesus, some may be due to the moral reason

(loving Father should not punish the innocent Son), majority of serious evangelicals are due to

conceptual concerns (their legal-judicial understanding of punishment and justice instead of

biblical ones) and their mistake of reading everything (especially divine forsakenness and divine

punishment) of the cross event into the immanent Trinity.

Seventh, we have to recognize the mystery within the triune God’s eternal life and divine

unity in the midst of divine punishment of Jesus. Any sound theology not only has to recognize

the limitation of human knowledge, but also has to keep divine mystery in a proper even an

essential place like “the lifeblood of the dogmatics.”17 Scripture clearly teaches the importance of

letting divine mystery remain a mystery. Jesus clearly affirmed the work of the Holy Spirit but

kept its process as a mystery (John 3: 8). Moses requested to see God’s glory but was rejected by

God (Exod. 33:18–23), and he learned to set boundary between “the secret things” and “the

things that are revealed” (Deut. 29:29). We human beings should not peer into the divine secret

17
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:29.
212
out of curiosity. Some of the inhabitants of Beth Shemesh were struck by God “because they

looked into the ark of the LORD” (1 Sam. 6:19). Divine mystery is not, as Graham Cole

distinguishes, a puzzle, nor a riddle, nor a problem, even nor a mustērion in the New Testament

sense, but it is about “an epistemological claim about an ontological reality” and expresses our

“epistemic humility.”18 Cole summarizes, “the mystery of God stems from his transcendence as

the Creator, his invisibility, his hiddenness, and his incomprehensibility.”19 Even those who

emphasize the importance of the rigor of rationality in theologizing or apologetic defense of faith

recognize the importance of divine mystery. For example, Thomas McCall who is an analytic

theologian himself reminds the trinitarian theologians that they “should be clear about the place

of ‘mystery’.”20 Norman Geisler reminds us in the volume of encyclopedia of apologetics to keep

mystery a proper place and points out that “mystery goes beyond reason but not against reason,”

he also gives two obvious examples of divine mystery: the Incarnation and the Trinity.21 J. I.

Packer has listed many other mysteries like “God’s sovereignty in creation, providence, and

grace; …the inspiring of the Holy Scriptures; the ministry of the Holy Spirit in the Christian and

the church,” etc., and points out that “theories about any of these things that used human

analogies to dispel the dimension of mystery would deserve our distrust, just as rationalistic

theories about the cross do.”22

18
Graham A. Cole, He Who Gives Life: The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2007),
41.
19
Ibid., 46.
20
McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?, 227.
21
Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
1999), 515.
22
Packer, “What Did the Cross Achieve?” in My Place Condemned He Stood, 58.
213
 For our project, we should be aware of the mystery of the Trinity. We have to keep the

epistemic humility in the effort of answering the question, How can three divine persons be one?

We also have to be humble to recognize our limitation in answering these questions like, How

can Jesus in his flesh feel genuinely to be forsaken by the Father while there remains intimate

perichoretic loving fellowship in the inner trinitarian life? and How does the sinless Christ

participate in the triune God’s punishment of sin in the flesh of Jesus himself? How can Jesus’s

two wills remain united in his endurance of divine punishment on the cross? We can only

recognize both side of biblical witness, but the mystery of divine unity especially in the dark

moment of the cross remains. It is right to insist that faith seeking understanding on the one

hand, but we have to keep epistemic humility and keep mystery in an appropriate place in our

understanding on the other hand.23 If we try to say clearly about things that Scripture

intentionally keeps hidden in order to satisfy our human rationality, we may have fallen in the

trap of fallacy or even heresy. J. I. Packer has shown a historical lesson that the Reformed

theologians themselves became also rationalistic in the process of their battle against Socinian

rationalistic attack upon the Reformers.24 Friedrich Nietzsche who is no friend to Judeo-

Christianity has a good reminder to us here, “He who fights with monsters should be careful lest

he thereby become a monster.”25 Packer positively points the benefit of keeping the mystery of

the atonement: “it will keep us from rationalistic pitfalls and keeps us progress considerably.”26

23
Cole, He Who Gives Life, 56.
24
Packer, “What Did the Cross Achieve?” in My Place Condemned He Stood, 55–56.
25
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Aphorism 146, trans.
Helen Zimmern (London: George Allen & Unwin, Fourth Editionk, 1923. First published Great Britain in 1907), 97.
26
Packer, “What Did the Cross Achieve?” in My Place Condemned He Stood, 64.
214
Vanhoozer also wisely reminds us of the mystery of the cross, “The death of Jesus exceeds our

attempts to explain it.”27

Having emphasized the importance of divine mystery, we should also be aware that our

acknowledgement of divine mystery does not allow us to be open to mysticism, skepticism, or

even nihilism, because God himself has made himself known to us (Heb. 1:1–2). We can have

true and reliable knowledge about God and our salvation because of God’s own revelation.

Therefore, as Cole reminds us, we should keep “both the importance of epistemic humility and

yet confidence in God’s revelation.”28

Implications

To know God better is to help us to love God better. Augustine’s distinction between

sapientia and scientia, theological knowledge contributes to the spiritual wisdom for the love of

God.29 Bavinck also reminds us the aim of dogmatics is to know God, so “dogmatics does not

become a dry and academic exercise, without practical usefulness for life.”30 The claim of divine

punishment of Jesus has some important practical implications in our Christian life, even though

some of the implications have been affirmed by theologians who embrace PSA.31

First, when we realize that God is not only loving but also holy in his dealing with our

sins, we should respond to God’s love with gratitude and reverential fear. We do not know what

true love is until we know that his Son gave his life for us; God’s love has been demonstrated in

27
Vanhoozer, “Atonement in Postmodernity: Guilt, Goats and Gifts,” in The Glory of the Atonement, 396.
28
Cole, He Who Gives Life, 53.
29
David K. Clark, To Know and Love God, 36–37; 208–215; etc.
30
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:29.
31
John Stott, The Cross of Christ, 249–328; Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd Edition, 840; Demarest,
The Cross and Salvation, 194–99; Steve Jeffery et al, Pierced by Our Transgressions, 307–24.
215
this: while we were still sinners his Son died for us (John 3:16; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 3:16). The only

appropriate response to the love of God is that we should love him wholeheartedly and give our

life for him.

We should not neglect God’s holiness in our salvation. God holiness exposes our

sinfulness. There are only two ways for humankind before the holy God: to accept God’s way of

deliverance or to be justly judged to eternal death. We have to realize that nothing we do can

propitiate God’s holy wrath against our sins. In our hopeless and helpless situation, God sent his

Son to save us. To the holy God, we should respond with reverential fear; for his gracious

deliverance, we can only respond with gratitude and consecration. We should fear God

reverentially but not be afraid of him, because “God’s wrath is not arbitrary or capricious but is

the necessary response to the violation of his justice, righteousness, holiness, and goodness.”32

The only appropriate way to approach the holy and loving God is to worship him with

gratefulness and reverential fear. The author of Hebrews expresses this well, “Therefore, since

we are receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken, let us be thankful, and so worship God

acceptably with reverence and awe, for our ‘God is a consuming fire.’” (Heb. 12:28–29).

Second, we should see the gravity of our sins from the price that the Son of God has paid.

We have mentioned Torrance’s insight that it is not from sins that we have committed that we

are aware how grave our sins are, instead, it is from how great price the Son of God has paid we

see how grave our sins are. The consequence of our sins is God’s wrath and our perishing.

Scripture says, “we were by nature children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3). God does not have to save us,

but when God decided to save us, the great price that God paid has to be the sacrifice of his own

dear Son. Salvation of humanity with total depravity costs dearly to the holy and loving God.

32
Horton, The Christian Faith, 499.
216
God sacrifices himself in Christ to pay the penalty of sins that we sinners deserved. The thesis of

divine punishment of Jesus stresses with balance the holiness of God and thus the seriousness of

sin in the necessity of punishment, at the same time the love of God for us in God’s gracious

provision of Jesus as our penal Substitute. Our total depravity reminds us of the great

Reformation affirmations of solo Christo and sola gratia of our salvation and our sola fide to

accept it. Our wholehearted thanksgiving and total devotion of life to God should be the only

appropriate way of response to this salvation of free grace for hopeless sinners like us.

Third, we should love God the Father the same way as we love our Savior Jesus Christ. A

sound theology of God and the atonement, as we have argued, should not view God the Father as

an angry, abusive, and violent deity and only Jesus Christ as loving Savior as though the Father

is not. We should not forget that it is the Father who initiated the salvation and sent his Son to

accomplish it. And we, at the same time, should not forget that Jesus himself voluntarily came to

die for accomplish his Father’s will. He is not the Father’s whipping boy and a passive victim.

The love and mercy of the Father should not be diminished by his holy dealing of sins in divine

punishment of Jesus because the three divine persons work together for our salvation. Our

salvation is out of the united loving will of the triune God.33 And at the same time, we should not

forget to show our reverential fear to our Savior Jesus too, because he is also the holy and

righteous King and Judge. We should cultivate a holy and healthy affection towards the holy and

loving triune God. Many years ago, a Notre Dame professor who loved and discipled a group of

Chinese students including myself expressed her struggle of emotional difficulty in loving the

Father the same as loving the Son because of divine punishment of Jesus on the cross. I hope this

33
Even though how the three persons are united in the triune God’s one will is a divine mystery and still
debated among the social and classical trinitarians. Cf. Jason S. Sexton (ed.), Two Views of the Doctrine of the
Trinity.
217
implication of our study can be a helpful remedy for this kind of well-intentioned and yet

distorted spiritual affections.

Fourth, we should a profound sense of security and peace in our salvation. We know the

holy and righteous God demands satisfaction for offense of sins. Scripture declares, “It is a

dreadful thing to fall into the hands of the living God” (Heb. 10:31). But God himself has

provided the means of salvation, the death of his own Son. The sinless Christ was punished by

the Father and has fulfilled the demanding of the punishment of sins. John Calvin writes under

the title “Christ has provided full satisfaction”: except for Christ, “there is no other satisfaction

whereby offended God can be propitiated or appeased … since he alone is the Lamb of God, he

also is the sole offering for sins, the sole expiation, the sole satisfaction.”34 Therefore, for us,

“there is no condemnation in Christ” (Rom. 8:1). This is indeed the mercy of God. For those who

do not enjoy the assurance of salvation, A. W. Tozer first asks, “Could our failure to capture the

pure joy of mercy consciously experienced be the result of unbelief or ignorance, or both?” and

then he encourages believers, “We must believe that God’s mercy is boundless, and free, and

through Jesus Christ our Lord, available to us now in our present situation.”35 In divine

punishment of Jesus, the loving work of the triune God, our sins are completely dealt with and

forgiven, therefore we should have true assurance of salvation and eternal peace as long as we

have truly repented from our sins and accepted Jesus Christ as our Lord and Savior.

Fifth, we should be humble in front of divine mystery. Augustine kept humble before the

mystery of the Trinity; Anselm kept humble before the mystery of the atonement. Our humble

attitude should be the same: to acknowledge our limitation in our reasoning and theologizing

34
Calvin, Inst., 3:4:26.
35
A. W. Tozer, The Knowledge of the Holy (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1961), 92.
218
even though we strive for the rigor of rationality for the good purpose of clarity. We should

remain epistemic humility as a spiritual virtue in our spiritual walk especially as a theological

scholar; keep reminding ourselves, God is God, we are not.

A Reflection

“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” Throughout the centuries, The Lord

Jesus’s cry of dereliction has puzzled many believers who genuinely love their Lord but do not

understand this unfathomable mystery of his suffering. Just like many saints in the Bible and

church history who cry out to God in their profound distress, Jesus suffered in his humanity the

same perplexity and dereliction. He genuinely felt forsaken by his God. But, as we see, from the

whole passion narrative, this is just a moment of dereliction in his humanity. At last, Jesus knew

he has accomplished his mission (John 19: 30) and expressed his ultimate trust in his Father

(Luke 23: 46). Even though Jesus was judged or punished by the Father for our sins, the Father

and the Son love are always one within their eternal loving perichoretic fellowship. There is no

division or separation within the loving Trinity even at the moment of the cross. Jesus’s death on

the cross is motivated by the Father’s loving initiative to save humanity and Jesus’s own love for

humanity and his loving obedience to the Father’s will. Jesus suffered as an atoning sacrifice and

endured God’s judgment on sin and evil to satisfy God’s holy justice by the power of the Holy

Spirit. As we talk about God’s love today, we should not assume the sentimental emotion of

human love which changes moment by moment. We should grasp the profound love of Christ

from the suffering and punishment that he has endured on the cross in our place and for our sake.

Indeed, the triune God’s love is a mystery. May we, the saved sinners, offer ourselves out of

love, thanksgiving, and amazement, as living sacrifices, to the holy and loving God who is the

Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. To him and him alone be the glory, forever and ever.

219
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