IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

AT NEW DELHI.

Civil Appeal No. 1437 of 2019

Indian Premier Bank Pvt. Ltd. … Appellant

v.
Wakanda Investment Corporation …Respondent

Written Submission on Behalf of Respondent

90B,
Counsel for Respondent

i
Contents
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................ii

Statement of Facts.....................................................................................................................iii

I. The Players....................................................................................................................iii

ISSUES RAISED......................................................................................................................vi

Summary Of Arguments..........................................................................................................vii

Arguments Advanced.................................................................................................................1

I. The Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s application
under section 34.....................................................................................................................1

1. Karnataka High Court had the sole jurisdiction over all the subsequent applications
which arose out of that agreement.....................................................................................1

2. The seat of the tribunal being in Bombay does not give Bombay High Court
exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings.....................................................1

II. Restitution Claim............................................................................................................2

(a) The Bank waived its objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the
restitution claim by failing to raise it in the Response.......................................................2

(b) The Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the restitution claim....................3

III. Tort Claim...................................................................................................................4

(a) The Bank was not to entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the first
time in its application under section 34, not having done so in the response, statement of
defence or at any other stage in the arbitration..................................................................4

(b) The Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the tort claim...............................4

PRAYER....................................................................................................................................7

Cases

A v. B [2017] EWHC 3417 (Comm)..........................................................................................3

ii
Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority...................................................................7
Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil Co..............................................................................................5
Dreymoor Fertilizers v. Eurochem Trading...............................................................................4
Harbour Assurance v Kansa General International Insurance.................................................3
Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited & Ors
(2017) 7 SCC 678...................................................................................................................1
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co..................................................................5
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd........................................................................................................6
Olympus Superstructures Pvt Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan........................................................3
Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India......6
Trafigura Beheer BV v. Kookmin Bank Co................................................................................5
Venture Global Engineering LLC v. Tech Mahindra Ltd..........................................................5

Statutes

Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.......................................................................................1

Other Authorities

Fouchard, Phillipe ‘ Fouchard, Gailard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration’,

Kluwer Law International, The Hague, xxxiii, 3, 1999.........................................................4

Books and Journals

A Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration( 4th
edition 2004 ).........................................................................................................................5

iii
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 1437 of 2019

The appellants have approached this Honourable Court under Art.136 of the Constitution of
India, 1950. Subsequently, the leave has been granted by the Court. The Respondent humbly
submits to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.

Civil Appeal No. 1437 of 2019

The appellants have approached this Honourable Court under Art.136 of the Constitution of
India, 1950. Subsequently, the leave has been granted by the Court. The Respondent humbly
submits to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.

iv
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. The Players

Indian Premier Bank Pvt Ltd.- Indian Premier Bank was incorporated in Bangalore in
2009 by three businessmen who are household names in India. It specialises in making loans
to high risk ventures, usually start-ups in sectors that the more conventional banks would
avoid. The Bank had a very high paid-up share capital, which was necessary to balance the
losses that would incur from time to time because inherent risks in the bank’s business model.

Wakanda Investment Corporation(‘WIC’) – WIC is a sovereign wealth fund, created by

the government of Wakanda, under the Wakanda Investment Corporation Act 2013. Its
mandate under the legislation is to invest the assets entrusted to it for generating profits for
the welfare of Wakandan citizens. WIC is led by a Chief Executive Officer who reports to the
Prime Minister of Wakanda.

II. The Equity Derivative Agreement [EDA]

The EDA was entered into by both parties on 18 October 2014. The EDA was aresult of
constant efforts by the Bank to persuade WIC to enter into the agreement. In pursuance of the
EDA, WIC made an upfront payment of 100 million Pounds

To the Bank in exchange for notional exposure to three publicly listed shares chosen by the
WIC itself. The EDA had a term of 30 months. Which implied that the sum payable( if any)
to WIC would depend on the price of the underlying stocks on the date of maturity, i.e., 18
April 2017. Although, it was a risky investment, WIC was prepared to make it because it
believed that the share price of underlying stocks would rise. Besides the standard terms the
EDA also contained the provision as to the governing law and dispute resolution; Clause 19
of the agreement stated that the agreement shall be governed by Indian law and Clause 20
contained the provision relating to dispute resolution.

v
Initially it seemed that WIC would make a good profit, as the price of the underlying stocks
was steadily rising. It seemed that the strike price would be reached and WIC would make a
good profit. But, due to some unforeseen measures taken by the US government, the price of
the underlying stocks fell heavily. As a result none of the underlying stocks could reach the
strike price on maturity date and therefore, nothing was payable to WIC.

III. Arbitration proceedings

On 18 August 2017 , the WIC served a request for arbitration on the Bank. WIC claimed that
the EDA was void because WIC lacked capacity under the Wakandan law to enter into such a
contract, therefore, Bank was under an obligation to make restitution of the sum of 100
million pounds which WIC paid. WIC also claimed that the Bank was liable in tort, according
to Wakanda Business practices Act 2006 ( the 2006 act), to pay damages to WIC for using
unfair business practices to persuade WIC to enter into the contract. WIC also filed an
application in the Karnataka High Court seeking interim measures under section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act( ‘ the 1996 Act’). The relief was granted to WIC.

On 14 September Bank served its response. All the claims advanced by the WIC were denied
by the Bank and, the Bank reserved its right to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over
both the claims. But, the Bank challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in its statement of
defence. The Tribunal heard the oral arguments in Mumbai in April 2018. It was decided;

1- Restitution Claim

(a) The Bank its right to object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, by not raising the
objection in its response.

(b) In any case the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to determine the claim. Also, the
invalidity of EDA does not affect the validity of clause 20 of the agreement.

(c) WIC’s capacity to enter into the EDA was governed by Wakandan law, not Indian
law. Therefore, the EDA was void ab initio.

(d) WIC is entitled to restitution of the payment which it made to the bank.

2- The Tort Claim

vi
 (a) Since, the EDA does not contain any express choice of law for the tort claim, the
tribunal has the discretion to apply the law which it deems fit. The tribunal found
that Wakandan law is the appropriate law, therefore, 2006 Act is applicable

(b) The Bank used unfair business practices to persuade WIC, therefore, the Bank is
liable under section 4 of the 2006 Act

(c) Hence, WIC is entitled to damages of 2 million under section 4 and further 6
million under section 18.

IV. The Bank filed an application under section 34 , in Bombay High Court.

The hearing was conducted on 19th October in and the High Court decided that;

(a) The Bombay High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all
applications arising out of the agreement because the seat of arbitration was
Mumbai.

(b) The Bank could contest the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the first time under
section 34.

V. Subsequently, WIC filed an appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division . The

appellate division held that any application under section 34 could be made only
to the Karnataka High Court.

VI. The present petition

The Bank filed a petition seeking special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, wherein the
leave was granted. Therefore, now the appeals will be heard by the Supreme Court.

vii
 ISSUES RAISED
I.

Did the Bombay High Court have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s application under
section 34 ?

II.

Did the Bank waive its objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the restitution
claim by failing to raise it in the Response ?

III.

If not, did the Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine this claim?

IV.

Was the Bank entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the first time in its
application under section 34, not having done so in the Response, Statement of Defence or at
any other stage in the arbitration ?

V.

If so, did the tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the claim?

VI.

Was the Tribunal’s conclusion that the tort claim is governed by Wakandan law contrary to
public policy of India.?

VII.

In any event, was the Tribunal’s award of damages under section 4 and/or 18 of the 2006 Act
contrary to public policy?

viii
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s
application under section 34.

It has been argued that the Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the
Bank’s application under section 34 because WIC had already filed an application in
Karnataka High Court. Therefore, in accordance with section 42 all the subsequent
applications which arose out the agreement had to be filed in the Karnataka High Court.

II. Restitution Claim

(a) The Bank waived its objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the
restitution claim by failing to raise it in the response.

The Bank did not raise its objection to the tribunal ‘as soon as possible’ which was in
contravention to rule 23.3 of LCIA rules. Also section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act states that ‘if objections are not raised without undue delay or within the prescribed time
framework, ‘it would amount to waiver of the right’. The Bank failed to raise the objection
without undue delay and therefore waived its right to object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

(b) The Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the restitution claim.

Section 16 states that the arbitration clause is a separate agreement from the agreement which
contains the arbitration clause and the validity of the arbitration clause is not affected by the
validity of the contract which contains it. Therefore, the arbitration clause stands even if the
EDA became void, hence, the tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the restitution
claim.

III. Tort Claim

ix
 (a) The Bank was not entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the first time in
its application under section 34, not having done so in the Response, Statement of
defence or at any other stage in the arbitration.

The competence-competence rule which is envisaged in section 16(1) states that arbitral
tribunals have the authority to rule on their own jurisdictions before any other court. The
competence-competence rule is widely recognised by international conventions. Therefore, if
the Bank is allowed to raise the objection for the first time in its application under section 34,
it would be against the competence-competence rule.

(b) The tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the tort claim

The arbitration agreement encompasses all the contractual and non-contractual claims which
arise out of the agreement. The Tort claim was so closely related to the agreement that even
though it was a non-contractual claim, it arised out of the agreement between the parties.
Therefore, the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the tort claim.

(c) The Tribunal’s conclusion that the tort claim is governed by Wakandan law is not
against the public policy of India.

An arbitral award can be set aside for being in contrary to public policy only on the grounds
laid down in section 34. The Tribunal’s conclusion is not contravention to any of the grounds
laid down in section 34. Also, choice of law is a matter of construction of the contract which
is within the purview of the tribunal. Courts cannot interfere with the arbitral award even if
the tribunal made an error in the choice of law.

(d) The tribunal’s award of damages under section 4 and section 18 of the 2006 Act was
not contrary to public policy of India.

According to section 34, a court while assessing an award on the basis of public policy
cannot act as an appellate court and review the merits of the case. The Tribunal has the sole
jurisdiction over the quantity and quality of evidence used to make an award. Therefore, even
if no evidence was considered while awarding the damages, the award cannot be set aside for
being contrary to the public policy of India.

x
 Arguments Advanced

I. The Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s
application under section 34.

1. KARNATAKA HIGH COURT HAD THE SOLE JURISDICTION OVER ALL THE SUBSEQUENT

APPLICATIONS WHICH AROSE OUT OF THAT AGREEMENT.

An application seeking interim measures had already been filed by WIC in the Karnataka
High Court under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 ( ‘ the 1996 Act). 1
Therefore, in accordance with section 42 of the 1996 Act, Karnataka High Court alone had
jurisdiction over all the subsequent applications which arose out of the agreement. 2 For the
application of this section it is necessary that the application be filed under a section of part 1
of the 1996 Act in a court which has jurisdiction over matters pertaining to International
Commercial Arbitration.

The Karnataka High Court where the application seeking interim measures was filed by WIC
had the jurisdiction to decide the matters relating to International Commercial Arbitration as
it comes within the purview of the word ‘Court’ as defined in Section 2(e) of the 1996 Act. 3
Also, the section under which the application was filed is in the part 1 of the 1996 Act.
Therefore, in accordance with the section 42 of the 1996 Act, Bombay High Court did not
have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s application under section 34.4

2. THE SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL BEING IN BOMBAY DOES NOT GIVE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS.
In  Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited &
Ors5 ,The Supreme Court of India took the view that just the designation of a seat is akin to
an exclusive jurisdiction clause, therefore, if the seat is in Mumbai(as in the present case),
then the Mumbai High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings. But, such
interpretation will run contrary to the intent of the parliament as presumption of exclusive
jurisdiction clause would render section 42 useless.6

1
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 9
2
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 42
3
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 2(e)
4
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 42
5
[2017] 7 SCC 678
6
Antrix case

xi
The obvious flaws in The Supreme Court’s reasoning were put forth by the Delhi High Court
in Antrix Corporation ltd. v. Devas Multemedia Pvt Ltd., Wherein the Delhi Court found that
the existence of two or more competent courts is presumed in section 42 and when the
jurisdiction is seized by one competent court( in the instant case jurisdiction was seized by
Karnataka High Court when application seeking interim relief was filed by WIC), the other
court can no longer exercise its jurisdiction. 7 This rule prevents parallel proceedings.8 Also,
equation of designation of seat with exclusive jurisdiction runs contrary to the intent of the
parliament as it obviates section 42.9

Therefore, in the instant case designation of seat should not be equated with designating
exclusive jurisdiction clause and Bombay High Court should not have exclusive jurisdiction
over the arbitral proceedings.

Hence, in accordance with section 42 , Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to
determine the Bank’s application.

II. Restitution Claim

(A) THE BANK WAIVED ITS OBJECTION TO THE TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE

THE RESTITUTION CLAIM BY FAILING TO RAISE IT IN THE RESPONSE.

Article 23.3 of LCIA states that the objection to jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal has to be
raised ‘as soon as possible’ but not later than the statement of defence. On plain reading of
the article it seems that the Bank was not at fault in raising the objection to jurisdiction in
Statement of Defence. But, the article was amended in 2014, before that the article did not
use the words ‘ as soon as possible’. Earlier, the article only contained the provision where it
require a party to raise objection not later than statement of defence.

It can be clearly implied from the amendment that the main aim of the rule was not maintain
the status quo, i.e., to allow the parties to raise objection in Statement of Defence, rather it
aimed to shorten the time period for raising the objection. Therefore, the main aim of the
amendment was to emphasise that objection should be raised before the statement of defence.

7
ibid
8
ibid
9
ibid

xii
This view was taken in A v .B, where the tribunal stated that the objection should have been
raised before the statement of defence, because the article requires the parties to raise
objection as soon as possible.10 Hence, in the instant case the Bank waived its right to object
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

(B) THE TRIBUNAL DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE RESTITUTION CLAIM.
The Bank’s primary contention against the tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the restitution
claim was that the EDA was void for want of capacity, therefore, the arbitration agreement
which was a part of the EDA should also be void.

The Bank’s contention does not hold much water because the arbitration agreement is
governed by Indian Law and according to Indian law arbitration agreement is considered to
be a separate agreement, i.e., the arbitration agreement is independent of the validity of the
contract of which it is a part.11 Therefore, the fact that EDA is void does not affect the
validity of the arbitration clause.

The Doctrine of Separability stems from Harbour Assurance v Kansa General International
Insurance.12 It subsequently went on to be adopted by the British arbitration and laws 13 and
the UNCITRAL Model Law14 and therefore became a general principle of International
Commercial Arbitration laws. The Supreme Court of India also recognised this doctrine in
Olympus Superstructures Pvt Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan.15

Therefore, the arbitration tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the restitution claim,
irrespective of the validity of the EDA.

10
A v. B [2017] EWHC 3417 (Comm)
11
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 16(1)(b)
12
[1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 455
13
Arbitration Act 1996
14
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration(1985)
15
 (1999)5 SCC 651

xiii
 III. Tort Claim

(A) THE BANK WAS NOT TO ENTITLED TO CONTEST THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 34, NOT HAVING DONE SO IN
THE RESPONSE, STATEMENT OF DEFENCE OR AT ANY OTHER STAGE IN THE

ARBITRATION.

Section 16(1) of the 1996 act states that a tribunal has the power to rule on its own
jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the widely accepted principle of arbitration, competence-
competence, wherein a tribunal rules on its own jurisdiction.16 Therefore, if the Bank is
allowed to raise the objection for the first time under section 34 it would be a violation of the
competence-competence principle laid down section 16 of the 1996 Act.

(B) THE TRIBUNAL DID HAVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE TORT CLAIM.

According to the clause 20 of the agreement, the tribunal has jurisdiction over all the issues
arising under or out of the agreement. In Dreymoor Fertilizers v. Eurochem Trading the court
held the words ‘arising out of’ encompass non-contractual claims, including pre-contractual
acts( such as bribery) which induced the creation of the contract. 17 In the instant case the tort
was committed before the contract, therefore, it may not arise under the contract, but the tort
arises out of the contract as contract came into being only because of the tort. The tort is a
pre-contractual claim which induced the creation of the contract and therefore, arises out of
the contract.

(c) The Tribunal’s conclusion that the tort claim is governed by wakandan law is not
contrary to public policy.

16
Fouchard, Phillipe ‘ Fouchard, Gailard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration’,
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, xxxiii, 3, 1999.
17
 [2018] EWHC 909 (Comm)

xiv
An arbitral award can be set aside for being contrary to public policy only on the grounds laid
down in section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the 1996 Act. 18 No other grounds shall valid for setting aside
the award. The act expounds that an award would be in contravention to the public policy of
India if-

1- Making of award was induced by fraud or is in violation of section 75 or section 81 or

2- It is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian Law or
3- It is in conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice.19

While applying this section it is to be kept in mind that in recent years the scope of public
policy has been narrowed down by Supreme Court. In Venture Global Engineering LLC v.
Tech Mahindra Ltd. apex court has stated that no other grounds can be used and nor can a
court act like an appellate court and decide on the merits of the issue.20

The instant case the issue relates to the construction of choice of law clause by the arbitral
tribunal. With regard to the choice of law clause-

1- The tribunal was correct in finding that the law which governs the contract does not
apply.
Contractual obligations are distinct from tortious obligations, therefore tortious
obligations are not governed by the law of the contract. 21 This holds true even for
cases where the tort is related to the contract. 22 Therefore, the law which governs the
contract does not govern the tort claim. As no express choice of law was made, the
tribunal had the authority to determine which law to apply according to conflict of law
rules which it considered applicable.23 Therefore, the tribunal’s conclusion that the
tort claim is governed by Wakandan law does not violate public policy.
2- Interpretation of contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine.

In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. the Supreme Court of India held that
the construction and interpretation of a contract is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal even
if it concerns the determination of a question of law.24 Also, even an erroneous construction is

18
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 34(2)(b)(ii)
19
ibid
20
[2017] 13 SCALE 91 (SC)
21
Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil Co.[1983] 1 WLR 1136
22
Trafigura Beheer BV v. Kookmin Bank Co.[2006] EWHC 1921 (Comm)
23
A Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration( 4th edition
2004 ) 66
24
[2006] 11 SCC 181

xv
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.25 Therefore, the courts cannot interfere with decision of
the tribunal even if it made an error in determining the choice of law.

In the instant as case the tribunal’s conclusion that the tort claim is governed by Wakandan
law does not violate public policy because; firstly, the tribunal’s decision that tort claim is
governed by Wakandan law was well within its jurisdiction; second, the decision is not in
contravention to any of the grounds laid in section 34 (2) (b) (ii) 26; third, while interpreting
public policy courts cannot examine the awards on merits of the issue.

(d) The Tribunal’s award of damages under section 4 and 18 of the 2006 Act was not
contrary to public policy.

According to section 34 (2) (b) (ii) an award is in conflict with public policy of India only if –

1- Making of award was induced by fraud or is in violation of section 75 or section 81 or

2- It is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian Law or
3- It is in conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice.27

No other grounds shall used for examining the violation of public policy of India.28

In the instant case the award can be said to be in contravention to public policy on the basis
of 2 and 3. The appellant may argue that the award was against the fundamental policy of
Indian law as it did not consider any evidence for determining WIC’s actual loss, and the
award is in conflict with the most basic notions of justice as section 4 and 18 allow for very
high amount of penalty.

[A]. TRIBUNAL HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY OVER THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF EVIDENCE.
Section 19(4) of the 1996 Act empowers the tribunal to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of evidence. Also in Ssangyong Engineering &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India the Supreme Court of India
held that an award cannot be set aside even if it is made on the basis of such evidence that
does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind.29

25
MSK Projects Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan[2011] 10 SCC 573
26
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 34 (2) (b) (ii)
27
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 34(2)(b)(ii)
28
MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [2019] 4 SCC 163
29
[2019] SCC 677

xvi
Also, while examining the scope of public policy a court act as an appellate court to review
the order on its merits.30 Therefore, in the present case the tribunal’s award of damages under
section 4 and section 18 was not contrary to public policy of India.

[B] THE SUBSTANCE OF SECTION 4 AND 18 OF 2006 ACT IS NOT AGAINST THE PUBLIC POLICY
OF INDIA.

While examining the validity of an arbitral award on the basis of public policy, it is
imperative to note that an award can be said to be in contravention to public policy of India
only on the grounds laid down in section 34 of 1996 act. 31 Section 4 and section 18 of the
2006 act are not contrary to any of the grounds given in the section 34. Section 4 and section
18 seem to be too excessive but this cannot be a ground for concluding that they are contrary
to the public policy of India.

PRAYER
Wherefore in light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

I. Bombay High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the Bank’s application
under section 34;
II. Restitution Claim;
(a) The Bank waived its objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the
restitution claim by failing to raise it in the response;
(b) The Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the restitution claim;
III. Tort Claim;
(a) The Bank was not entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the first
time in its application under section 34, after not having done so at any stage
in the arbitration;
(b) The Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the tort claim;
(c) The Tribunal’s conclusion that tort claim is governed by Wakandan law was
not contrary to the public policy;
(d) The Tribunal’s award of damages under section 4 and 18 of the 2006 act was
not contrary to public policy;

30
Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority [2015] AIR 620 (SC)
31
Arbitration and Conciliation Act1996, s34

xvii
And pass any other order that this Honourable Court may deem fit in the interests of justice,
equity and good conscience.

90B, Counsel for the Respondent.

xviii