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AVIONICS MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

1 CMM Lagging THY

SB

CMM revisions most of the time lag SBs, so that new part numbers existing in the SBs do not exist in the current
CMM. This is contrary to what EASA/FAA and such regulations requirements, that is using out of date CMM?

Shall OEMs put such a wording that “CMM XX-YY-ZZA is valid for the new POST LRU PN, until next release of
CMM which will cover the SB? Or shall they at least send Temporary revisions for cover page including POST
LRU PN?

Other operator and airframer comments please?

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

2 Withdrawals 1-002-0102- Various OEM All All KLM/AFR KLM

of CMMs 2090
Avionics
Instruments
LLC
Boeing
Airbus

This is an unwanted development in the business: Many OEMs, big and small, have just stopped supplying their
CMMs. These OEMs request that we as an airline prove that our aircraft are actually equipped with their
components. These requests for proof mostly concern components installed on older aircraft types such as B747-
400 or B737. Some of these components have been repaired in our shop for 20 years and now, the OEMs suddenly
halt their CMM delivery. KLM did not experience this with components installed on new aircraft types like A350 or
B787.

Long and on-going discussions have started to escalate the situation with the OEMs sending NDA to sign and
requesting cash advance payment before supplying the CMM. A recent example is Avionics Instruments LLC
(KLM’s B737, B747 and B777 are equipped with P/N 1-002-0102-2090 and we are the first tier operator).

The consequences of this discussion are expensive:

A. CMMs available at KLM do not have current Rev Status and our QA (EASA/FAA) is not allowing that (CMM
must be updated in timely manner).
B. We have to outsource the units (additional costs), negotiate NDA and perhaps even pay for CMM.

This frustrating situation must be stopped! OEMs cannot just stop supplying CMMs and then afterwards request
proof of actually flying that equipment. The proper way to handle this would be to negotiate this in advance rather
than present the airlines with this impossible situation.

Boeing and Airbus: What is your position?

What says PSA in that matter?

What is the acceptable way to prove that aircraft are actually equipped with the concerned LRU (i.e., picture of our
aircraft and/ or purchase contract)?

Other supplier and operator comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

3 Product Support All All Embraer All AFR/KLM AFR

Agreements
ATR

Within Boeing PSAA or Airbus SSC, a process to delegate maintenance to MRO is setting up.

Please may Embraer/ATR describe such process for its parameter?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

4 AMC Discussion All All All All KLM/AFR KLM

Item Conundrum

KLM noticed that some OEMs complain about violation of contract when KLM asks questions concerning
equipment/service/documents from those particular OEMs at AMC conference.

Although the contracts with these OEMs do not include anything specific about AMC conferences and/or explicitly
state that the airline may not join such conferences, these OEMs seem to view the airlines’ questions at AMC as the
uncovering or revealing of their intellectual property.

Consequently, these OEMs’ sales managers file complaints with KLM’s purchasing department and this results in
that management may decide to ban participation at (AMC) conferences because the possible risk of OEM imposed
penalties and/ or lawsuits.

This development is potentially killing the spirit of the AMC conferences and such an attitude is not benefiting AMC
nor aviation community and definitely not improving safety in aviation.

Other operators please provide comment (if any)? Do you experience the same or are we (KLM) an isolated case?

Is there any comment on behalf of OEMs or Airframers?

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

5 Field Loadable Honeywell Airbus Any ETD

Software
Thales Boeing
Rockwell Collins
Teledyne

Etihad would like the main Avionics vendors to share their roadmap and plans in terms of providing Field Loadable
Software (FLS) in electronic format. Please provide details in terms of:

1. Will the vendors create a dedicated website to download the software?

2. Which software and when will it be available for download?
3. Which security measures will the vendor put in place to ensure a safe download?

Other operator comments please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

6 MMC AMC Steering Group

Last year, a discussion was started about MMC (Mechanical Maintenance Conference). Many airlines supported
the idea to launch the MMC. KLM is very interested in a follow-up.

1. What is the current status of MMC?

2. What is decided?
3. When and where will the first MMC take place?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

7 Shop Reports THY

ARINC STANDARDS FOR A SHOP REPORT?

All shops present their maintenance through different formats of Shop Reports, Tear Down Reports or such
names. However, there seems no standardization for avionics LRUs in terms of preparing a Shop Report.

Will AMC participants evaluate the case? What will be the benefit to the avionics industry if we can get a standard
to apply to our current Shop Reports?

Comments please?

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

8 e-Documents N/A UTAS All N/A AFR/KLM AFR

Last years after sending repairs order to UTAS shop, UTAS put in hold our orders and asked Air France to modify
our orders by adding some unknown e-documents, in complement of CMM references.

As examples, the UTAS request: “As we use CMM 38-10-03 and supplement E-6074-9, I need the statement “E-
6074-9 and/or OEM Docs” added to the work scope along with the CMM to proceed. As we use CMM 28-42-32 and
supplement E-6074-37. I need the statement “ E-6074-37 and/or OEM Docs” added to the work scope along with
the CMM to proceed.

Air France asked UTAS to provide a copy of these e-documents and to update or temporary update CMMs by
adding their included data. UTAS refused to disclose these e-documents as they contain intellectual properties.

Air France asked Boeing and Airbus to support these requests. The Boeing response was: “The CMM should be a
complete document for repair and if a quick update needs to be made they should use a CMM Temporary Revision
(TR)”

Finally, UTAS updated their CMM. However, Air France lost several months before UTAS sent back our repaired
equipment

Operator and airframer comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

9 Product Several Honeywell A320 Several LHT DLH

Support
A340 AUA
A380 Pool
B737
B747
B777

In October 2013, Honeywell transferred the Order Administration for spare parts from Prague to India. Since that
date, the processes are still much more complicated than they were before. Our administrative work is still much too
high and we are not reaching an acceptable Material flow. We have the most difficulties with SB-Material and
Software Licenses, because the handling and pricing is very special.

LHT expects that the processes will be easier and the parts supply much better very soon.

Honeywell, Airbus, Boeing comments please.

The effort at LHT is still too high. Some cases can be closed by personnel action from the Honeywell Rep. What
action did Honeywell in the last 12 months to provide a better service and what are the next steps?

LHT expects that the processes will be easier if there is a fix contact for the order administration.

******15-011******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

Handling of Spare Honeywell A320 LHT DLH

Parts
A340 AUA
A380 Pool
B737
B747
B777

In October 2013, Honeywell transferred the Order Administration for spare parts from Prague to India. Since that
date, the processes are still much more complicated than they were before. Our administrative work is still much too
high and we are not reaching an acceptable material flow. We have the most difficulties with SB-Material and
Software Licenses, because the handling and pricing is very special.

LHT expects that the processes will be easier and the parts supply much better very soon.

Honeywell, Airbus, Boeing comments please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

10 Airbus AirN@v V3 Airbus Airbus Fleets ETD

In June 2014, Airbus distributed an Airn@v Information Letter that announced the progressive introduction of new
Airn@v v3 platform. The deployment of the new tool would take place in October 2014 for A330/340 fleets,
followed by November 2014 on A32X fleet and finally December 2014 for A380 fleet.

Etihad Airways has suffered the following problems after the implementation of Airn@v v3:
1. Performance deterioration when a number of pages are open.
2. It takes too long to open the application and become operative.
3. Word search is highly slow and inefficient, especially compared with previous version of Airn@v.
4. When filtering the AMM effectivity to a specific MSN, it still shows the sections applicable to other aircrafts
(greyed out). As a result, this increases the number of pages printed. This can be removed thru System
 Preferences  Applicability, which is not intuitive and requires some advanced IT skills.
5. Now it is easier to save into pdf than in previous Airn@v versions (AMM, AWM, IPC...), but still in some
cases the application crash and has to be opened again in order to properly save into pdf.

It is our understanding that when Airbus releases a new tool or software it shall be tested enough to avoid the
operator suffering the problems. Airbus comments please.

Unfortunately, Airn@v v3 has not met Etihad’s expectations and we would like to hear comments from other
operators in case of suffering similar problems.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

11 Mistakes in Airbus Airbus A32X Several ETD

Service Bulletin

Etihad has suffered several inconvenience due to basic mistakes found on Airbus Service Bulletins. For this reason,
we would like Airbus to provide an explanation on the causes that induced these mistakes, which quality process
has Airbus in place to detect and correct them and how Airbus will avoid them to reoccur in the future. Please see
following examples:

1. SB A320-34-1554 (Navigation - MMR - Install Collins MMR GLU 925 PN-430 capable of GLS functions)

This SB requires to perform Pin programming on the Flight Warning Computer (FWC) in order to activate Pin AA-3J
related to the “GPS Installed” function (located in FWC Pin Programming Zone 1). But the SB mistakenly instructed
to change the status of Zone 2 Parity pin AD-10A. As a result, the FWC 1 & 2 were faulty after power up due to
wrong parity.

After exchanging 14 communications with Airbus under Tech Request #80090077, Airbus finally admitted the
mistake and provided Defect Report 34-1554-04-001-01 in order to correctly change the value of Zone 1 Parity Pin
AD-5D instead of Zone 2 Parity Pin AD-10A. See below Figure 1 for better understanding of FWC pin programming.
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AVIONICS MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Figure 1: FWC Pin programming printout

2. SB A320-34-1622 (Navigation - Weather Radar - Install Dual Weather Radar):

This SB requires the activation of Pin AB-6A (Weather Radar Transceiver No 2) at the Display Management
Computer Pin programming level. Unfortunately, this SB also instructed to change the value of Pin AB-8D (A/C
type). Consequently, the FLAP/SLAT position shown on the ECAM did not match the actual position on the aircraft
due to incorrect DMC pin programming.

After 30 communications exchanged with Airbus under Airbus Tech Request #80092502 and a 2-days AOG, Airbus
provided TA 80092502/032/2015 in order to reinstate position of Pin AB-8D (A/C type) and properly change the
value of Pin AB-5B (Pin Parity).

3. SB A320-27-1243 (Flight Controls - Elevator Aileron Computer System (ELAC) - Install ELAC B L97+ with data
loading)

The Field Loadable Software for ELAC B L97+ (LRU ident PN 3945129108) comes along with an informative label
(Figure 2) that shall be placed in the front face of the computer after loading the software. On the 7th April 2015,
Etihad communicated to Airbus (Tech Request #80035993) the lack of instructions in order to install such label in
the computer front face after performing the software upload. Airbus’s reply was positive and they confirmed that
they will revise the SB at the next opportunity in order to include the instruction to place the label after software
upload.

Figure 2: ELAC software information label

4. SB A320-27-1252 (Install standard SEC C 126):

Airbus released this SB in Nov 2015 in order to upload the SEC software media PN F1423391 (std 126). This
software comes with informative preloaded software label to be placed in the front face of the computer after loading
the software (see Figure 3).

Even though back in April 2015 Etihad already warned Airbus about the lack of instructions on the installation of
preloaded software label on similar SB A320-27-1243 (ELAC B L97+), the same mistake was repeated again and
 REFERENCE 16-016/MSG-321 - Page 7

AVIONICS MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Airbus missed to include the instructions to place the preloaded label after software upload. After some
communication exchanged under Tech Request #80091174, Airbus recognized that the instructions will be included
in the next SB A320-27-1252 revision.

Figure 3: SEC C software preloaded label location

5. SB A320-23-1570 (Replace VHF data radio Honeywell RTA 44D):

This SB was released in Oct 2015. The SB missed to include in the effectivity the following Etihad MSNs 3693,
3713, 3902, 4066, 4077 & 4124. After exchanging TechRequest #80060717 with Airbus, they initially claimed that
the MSNs did not have concurrent mod 31817 embodied, but later on recognized to have suffered an issue with the
effectivity rule and compromised to include Etihad MSNs on next SB revision scheduled by 1st quarter 2016.

Instead of releasing Technical Adaptation to allow the embodiment of SB 23-1570 on Etihad aircrafts not reflected in
the effectivity, Airbus authorized the installation thru TechRequest #80060717/014.

6. SB A320-27-1252 (SEC C upgrade to std 126):

This mandatory SB is the terminating action of EASA AD 2015-0191 and cancels red Operations Engineering
Bulletin (OEB) No. 50. After embodiment of SB 27-1252, the flight crew is no longer required to perform the
systematic reset of both SEC 1 and SEC 2 one after the other, after both engine start.

Even though the SB has a strong operational impact in the AFTER START Normal Procedure at every flight; the
¨A/C operation affected¨ section says NO and section K ¨Publication affected¨ does not mention any flight ops
documentation.

After communications exchanged with Airbus under TR 80093625, they recognized the mistake and confirmed that
flight ops documents ¨FCOM and QRH¨ are impacted by SB 27-1252.

Etihad would appreciate other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected.
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AVIONICS MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

12 Modification Operational Airbus Airbus ETD

Impact (MOI) Fleets

In the Avionics environment, many modifications have a significant operational impact on the aircraft. For that
reason, Airbus compiles a document called Modification Operational Impact (MOI) which summarizes the aircraft
behavior after embodiment of the modification, plus an extract of the flight ops documentations impacted (FCOM,
AFM, MEL, etc…).

For that reason, Airbus used to have a very useful database with all the MOIs available in the following location:
https://w3.airbus.com/crs/A233_Flight_Ops_GN60_Inst_Supp/MOI/index.html

During 2015, apparently Airbus decided not only to remove the above mentioned Database, but to integrate the MOI
documents inside the Technical Follow-Up (TFU). This lead to a significant confusion as the TFU is a document
which, by nature, describes an in service problem suffered by a specific fleet and has nothing to do with a document
that explains the operational impact of a modification.

Serve as example A32X MOI 157068 (introduction of FAC B624), which is available thru TFU 22.66.00.008.

Figure 1: Header of A32X MOI 157068

Etihad requests from Airbus:

1. An explanation as to why the MOI database was removed and linked to the TFUs.
2. To reinstate the MOI database for all Airbus fleets.
3. Remove any link between the MOI and the TFU, as it is misleading to operators.

Etihad would appreciate other operators’ comments and experience in case of being affected.
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

13 Technical Replies Airbus All All ETD

Etihad has been experiencing a decrease in the quality of Technical replies received from Airbus.

1. Sometimes the TechRequest is being replied by different professionals within Airbus until it is answered by
the correct expert. Serve as an example Etihad TR 80030011 & 80036942 with title: ¨On Take Off memo
#SIGNS ON# remains on blue¨.

TR 80030011 had 21 communications and TR 80036942 had a total of 59 communications in order to

confirm, among other things, that certain subtasks of AMM Task 23-73-00-710-017-A 'Operational Test of
the Cabin Signs' were incorrect and required amending.

2. In other occasions, instead of actually replying the question, Airbus requested more and more information.
This tendency takes place especially when the TR is time critical and Airbus keeps asking questions and
requesting additional information in order to gain time.

TR 80090077 was raised under Critical urgency because FWC 1 & 2 showed a FAULT ECAM MESSAGE after
embodiment of several modifications. Even though Etihad’s enquiry about the correct procedure of FWC pin
programming stated on SB 34-1554 at the very first communication (80090077/001), it took a total of 14
communications and 3 days for Airbus to finally release Technical Adaptation (TA) ref: 80090077/011/2015 and
admit the mistake induced in the SB.

In conclusion, Etihad would like to receive from Airbus an explanation on the causes that might have caused this
reduction of quality in technical support.

Other operator’s comments are welcomed in case of experiencing similar problems.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

14 S1000D All Airbus A350 All LHT FIN

Boeing B777X DLH
Embraer Other new age A/C
OEMs

Delivery of Components CMM and VSB in S1000D XML format S1000D is the new standard for documentation and
supersedes ATA iSpec2200. Many engine manufactures and airframers are supporting this standard, like Airbus
does on A350.

One of the biggest advantages of S1000D is the new modular structure, easing the handling/revision process
including quality control. This will apply to the OEM as well to the operator/user of documentation.

LHT fully supports S1000D and is able to manage S1000D Documentation in XML Format. Therefore, we tried to
receive also A350 component documentation in XML format. But our experience is that today no OEM is able to
deliver documentation in XML but only in PDF format.

With ordered B777X we are also expecting the readiness of OEMs to deliver CMMs and VSBs in XML-Format.

Questions:
1. Why is there currently no CMM available for “End-Users” in XML-Format?
2. How can Airbus support FIN/DLH/LHT to solve this issue?
3. What behavior have other operators/MROs experienced?
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AVIONICS MANAGEMENT AND PHILOSOPHY

4. What would be the strategy of Airbus/Boeing/Embraer that the operator is able to select its desirable format
for Component related documentation?

Airbus/Boeing/Bombardier/Thales/Rockwell Collins and others, comment, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

15 CMM N/A Honeywell N/A Various ANA

ANA feels Honeywell CMMs take much more time to ensure contents of CMM for shop maintenance operations due
to CMM quality or deficiency. A similar topic was discussed in 2013 AMC (Item 62), but ANA thinks Honeywell
should take more improving action for CMM verification process.

A few examples:

In various CMMs:
ANA is noticing that Honeywell CMMs revised in recent years are showing only equipment part/model number and
nomenclature on Special Tools, Fixtures, and Equipment and Consumables section (e.g., 8050A DMM, 465B
oscilloscope, 8640B RF signal generator, MX-80 printer, etc.), while other vendors are listing required characteristic
for the test equipment.

If the specified equipment on CMM is outdated, ANA exhausts many resources to specify equivalent alternatives
because ANA must scrutinize the required characteristics from Testing section.

ANA would like Honeywell to include the required characteristics for the test equipment on CMM.

CMM 34-42-33 Rev.11, ALA-52A Radio Altimeter

Many typographical/editorial errors are found on test procedure, troubleshooting chart and drawing (e.g., “Arrow key
on test panel is incorrectly shown as “t” in test procedure,” Referring test step number in troubleshooting procedure
is incorrect, “Polarity of diode is not shown on drawing,” etc.).

CMM 34-55-31 Rev.13, RVA-36A VOR/Marker Receiver

1. In “Test Frequency Selection” test procedure, SDI bit is incorrectly specified. SDI bits 9 and 00 should be 9
and 10.
2. In Repair NAV Receiver Module page, force value at soldering FL601 is deficiently specified as 50 ±5
pound, while correlated service bulletin specifies 5.0 ±2 pound.

In either CMM deficiency, ANA has raised discrepancy report through Honeywell MyAerospace website and
requested Honeywell to provide their technical view, but Honeywell is just sending automatic reply: "Your
discrepancy will be reviewed and a response will be provided as soon as possible" or “This discrepancy has been
sent to Honeywell engineering for review and will be incorporated if found valid,” and keeping silent. ANA has also
raised similar inquiries on AeroTech Support, but their response is "Create a discrepancy report on MyAerospace
website."

In addition to this topic, ANA understands the discrepancy reporting system on MyAerospace website does not have
an input field concerning “priority” or “due date for Honeywell’s feedback.” How does Publications team prioritize the
discrepancy report from operators? In some cases, ANA requires Honeywell’s rapid response to create an internal
bulletin to make a correction on test requirement.

ANA would like Honeywell to review the current reporting system and to clarify which team is responsible to provide
technical view on CMM errors or deficiencies: AeroTech Support or Publications?

Other operator and vendor comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

16 CMM Revisions N/A N/A All N/A AAL

AAL has noticed that some suppliers are much better at detailing their CMM revision highlights than others. Revision
highlights are very important to operators that perform their own maintenance to assure we stay in compliance with
the latest revision of the CMM.

Reviewing the ATA Spec 100, it states about Letter of Transmittal for CMM Revisions, “For digital CMMs, each copy
of a revision or reissue to a CMM shall include a transmittal section which describes the revision (highlights).”

We are finding that several suppliers are not providing adequate highlights. See Figure below cut out of a supplier's
CMM. This supplier’s last 3 revisions for this CMM have all had the exact same useless “highlights.” This supplier
updated nearly 100 pages out of 164 in their CMM, and only stated “Revised/Added Data.” Engineers must then go
page by page to see what information was changed.

AAL asks that suppliers check their publications department and assure that they provide adequate highlights
whenever CMM’s are updated.

Do the airframers have anything in their support agreements that define what type of highlights should be provided?
Is there any recourse that an operator has when a specific supplier continues to provide subpar CMM revisions?

Operator, supplier, and airframer comments?

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

17 New SB and CMM Revision None All All All JAL

JAL does not understand why a new SB can be issued without CMM revised in order to include the new SB. It
happens sometimes in SBs issued by various vendors.

Many agenda were submitted by many operators in the past AMC concerning to bad and poor
organization/coordination of part supplying, documentations and relation with inner or related part’s/aircraft SB
associated the SB’s modification. This agenda turns simply the spotlight on the issues of a new SB and related CMM
in the same vendor.

It is demanded that a new SB and related CMM should be released at the same time. Sometimes CMM does not
include the P/N modified by an SB. CMM is not revised to include the test procedure and the IPC changed by an SB.
CMM does not show correct test facility and test software corresponding to an SB. This mismatch between an SB
and the CMM causes many confusion and paying efforts on operator’s side.

Other operator comments, please. Please introduce measures from vendors who coordinate internal
documentations smoothly.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

18 Service Bulletins All OEMs All All KLM/AFR KLM

Airframers

Service Bulletins issued by OEMs, in general, can be improved by including a more elaborate substantiation as to
why the proposed modification should be accomplished – or more precise: how the proposed modification enhances
the product.

A more elaborate substantiation would include Cost of Ownership information as well as information about
improvement of MTBUR/MTBF. The relation between LRU failures and SB enhancements is, generally spoken,
difficult to establish for Airlines.

In today’s environment where maintenance/ repair of LRUs is not necessarily done by the Airlines themselves
anymore, more transparency is needed and better and more elaborate information in Service Bulletins contributes to
that much needed transparency. This includes the true benefits for the Airlines using that subject LRU. More
transparency also benefits the OEM as the airline can easily and more timely decide to incorporate the SB.

KLM would like to know:

 Comment from Airlines: Do you agree?
 Comment from OEMs: Are you able to provide the requested data?
 Comment from Airframers: Can you support the idea?
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

19 AD Note All Airbus LHT DLH

Boeing
Bombardier

AD-Notes are issued frequently and are necessary to improve the safety conditions of an aircraft during operation.
An AD may be issued, i.e., due to design deficiencies, maturity issues, or new/revised authority requirements.

If an AD is effective, we often run into discussions of cost which have to be generally burden by the operator,
especially if a design deficiency exists our customers expect to have the AD accomplished FOC. Discussions with
TC-Holder and System Integrator/Component Manufacturer showed that there is a differential point of view of who is
responsible for that unlike situation.

Question:
 To make it finally clear to everyone, what is the general process and indication to determine who has to
burden the cost?

Airframer, OEM and other operators comment please…

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

20 Obsolescence N/A Various OEMs All All KLM/AFR KLM

of SFE
Boeing

Some OEMs are announcing obsolescence of SFE equipment but airframers do not supply any data regarding
these obsolete components. KLM is aware that at “MyBoeingFleet” provides a neat list of items which are going to
be obsolete in near future and solution to that problem (section Supplier Customer Support)
https://www.myboeingfleet.com/SMSCS/HomePage.aspx

Frequently, the OEM announces a component obsolescence, but the aforementioned list at MyBoeingFleet does not
change – the component obsolescence is not included in this list.

KLM thinks that OEMs also need to inform air framers because the air framers have the obligation to comply with the
OEM’s obsolescence management plan. Sometimes, it seems that the OEMs just issue the announcement to check
the general opinion of all parties involved, scout the environment and then either decide to go ahead with the
obsolescence management plan or to pool back.

Operators please comment: Are you noticing the same behavior of OEMs?
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

21 Aging Fleet Various Various OEMs All All KLM/AFR KLM

Boeing

With an aging fleet and new aircraft to be added to the current fleet, KLM feels that more and more components are
becoming obsolete; some OEMs are announcing soon-to-become-obsolete LRUs in Service Information Letters and
even in visits by tech reps. Other OEMs only admit to pending obsolescence after confrontation. KLM has brought
up a few examples of LRUs which have become obsolete and the problems that this has caused.

KLM’s fleet contains new and older aircraft – the fleet is comprised of several different configurations and this in and
of itself offers enough challenges without even taking the obsolescence issues into account.

Air framers are more than happy to provide new LRUs or complete new systems to replace the older, obsolete LRUs
on new aircraft. However, often these new LRUs/systems are only available as a forward fit. Retrofits are not
available or not feasible (for the air framers). KLM believes that other operators flying a mixed fleet (i.e., comprised
of older and new aircraft) may experience this problem as well.

KLM would like to know if other operators experience this problem:

1. What LRU/ system is becoming obsolete and on what aircraft type?
2. Is an air framer’s solution (retrofit) available? If not, will you consider STC solution for replacement?

Airframers please comment.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

22 Moisture Sensitive N/A N/A All All KLM/AFR KLM

Device (MSD)

Moisture Sensitive Device (MSD)

In last couple of years, the use of MSD Integrated Circuits (ICs) has increased from zero to a lot. At KLM, an internal
document was issued to handle these MSD devices. This document is based on J-STD-033A issued by JEDEC,
which can be found on the internet.

KLM extracted some data from the JEDEC document and customized this to suit the KLM procedure and process.
Our QA is forcing us to keep JEDEC’s J-STD-033A controlled even when the internal KLM MSD policy and
procedure have not been changed. Therefore, our question:

1. Is it really necessary to have all reference documents, called out in our documentation, controlled (revision
service and check of latest revision)? Please note that the JEDEC document itself is not used; KLM only
applies the internal MSD procedure and process.
2. Is there a desire to start a working group and issue ARINC spec for MSD (similar to ESD)?
3. Is there any experience at other shops (MRO or OEM) with MSD and are those procedures based on
JEDEC J-STD-033A specification?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

23 MSD/Storage Data All Airbus Airbus LHT DLH

Thales FIN

Airbus has issued the MSD-document which includes various information for storage of components, expendables,
and consumables (e.g., shelf life time, periodic checks…).

Acc. disclaimer of the MSD Document: “Data supplied with the MSD are for information only and do not constitute a
part of the approved standard aircraft material documentation. MSD data originate from the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) and are provided by Airbus with the aim of supporting inventory control and planning. As the
MSD is produced periodically based on OEM information, it is the obligation of the end user to check the final validity
of the data against the original documentation provided by the relevant OEM.”

Therefore, we cannot use MSD Data without crosschecking the data with the OEM. This also contradicts our
experience that OEMs start to delete similar information in their CMMs and vocally refer to the MSD instead.

Nevertheless, we also have found differential or just missing information when we compared MSD-data with
corresponding CMM-data.

Questions:
 What does AIRBUS mean with “original Documentation”?
 Where shall LHT find original storage/operational data for components, if not in the CMM (not talking about
MS-items, ALS…)?
 With this situation, are we still in compliance with S1000D/iSpec2200?

Airbus, Boeing, OEM, and other please comment.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

24 TSDP All All All All AFR/KLM AFR

In case of lack of available TSDP, Both Boeing PSAA and airbus SSC forecast to propose a development plan for
new TSDP as described in ARINC 625 report when, and if, requested by customer airlines:

Boeing PSAA: Seller will also provide to Boeing a TSDP Development Plan for these Products.

Airbus SSC: The Supplier shall supply the TSDP (Technical Support and Data Package) and submit to the
Purchaser a TSDP development plan before start of detailed design of the Items and/or Components.

Please, may airframes be reminded of the process to know, define, and complete such a development plan?

Other operator and supplier comments, please?

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

25 Connected Aircraft Boeing B787-9 00 EVA

B787-10
B777-300E

New generation aircraft (B787 or A350) has different technology, like IT or e-Enabling. EVA will operate B787 on
2018. As new B787 operators, Entry Into Service engagement is critical. Airlines may need organization changes or
define new job functions.

1. Are other operators seeing similar issues?

2. Can airframe OEMs provide guidelines to help operators?
3. How can airframe OEMs help operator engage new generation aircraft?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

26 Estimation of Man Hours Airbus A32X 12 ETD

On several occasions, Etihad has requested to Airbus an estimation of the Man Hours involved in the
accomplishment of A320 AMM Task 12-21-13-100-001-A (Cleaning of the Avionics Compartment and the Cockpit).

In all cases, Airbus has refused to provide the Man Hour estimation by providing the following statement: “The man
hours are difficult to evaluate due to the number of associated cross references called in this task with different
configuration management it could have between several aircrafts.”

Regardless of Airbus’s lack of support, during 2015, Etihad decided to plan and perform a full Avionics compartment
cleaning on A32X fleet with a scheduled interval of 6 years. Below pictures shows the amount of dust, sand, and
contamination to which a Middle East operator aircraft is exposed.

For further information and better evaluation of the contamination level, Etihad is changing the Avionics Fan filter
every 1,500 FH, which is a reduced interval in comparison with Airbus Maintenance Program scheduled interval of
3,600 FH. Furthermore, the Avionics compartment cleaning task (including removal, installation, and testing of all
related computers) has taken to Etihad around 48 man hours on a 16-hour ground time.

In conclusion, we hope the above information will help Airbus to develop a proper and complete single AMM task
that includes the removal, installation and testing of all Avionics compartment computers and provide a Man Hour
estimation, along with proper recommendations to operators exposed to similar climate environment to the Middle
East.

For further information, refer to Airbus FAIR item 15.0330.

Other operator’s comments are welcomed in case they also perform the Cleaning of the Avionics Compartment.

Pictures taken from ETD A320 MSN 3050, which began service in 2007:
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

27 Control Panel 1019439-1-001 Nord-Micro B737NG 21-31 WJA

WestJet would like to know if vendors (in this case, Nord-Micro) have a policy regarding rogue components and at
what stage do they implement it?

We understand this topic has been addressed several times at the AMC mostly for poor performing components. In
this case it is somewhat different: the component in question is very reliable. 30% of all our removals are driven by 2
serial numbers: both qualify as rogue units. In most cases, the fault could not be reproduced during testing and the
units is returned “No Fault Found”.

In cases like this, WestJet likes to work with the vendor to confirm the failure and provide a detailed history of the
component and its on-wing performance along with the performance of the aircraft system after the component was
replaced. We can then confirm that replacing the part was the last repair to the system and the root cause of the
defect. Retuning a rogue component with a “No Fault Found” as a repair is unacceptable.

Other supplier and operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

28 Temporary All Rockwell Collins All 34 KLM/AFR KLM

Revisions

KLM has noticed a relatively large number of Temporary Revisions (TR) included in Rockwell Collins’ CMMs.
Rockwell Collins promised a few times at AMC to work on it and reduce amount of TRs and incorporate the data of
these TRs into the concerned CMMs.

KLM would like to be informed about the status of this project because currently, there is no noticeable difference
with the past situation.

Rockwell Collins comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

29 Cockpit LRUs Various Various Various Various LHT DLH

Over the time LRUs are getting signs of aging and normal wear and tear which are only cosmetic issues and have
no impact on fit, form and function. A simple example might be some slight scratches on an LRU display, slightly
missing color around knobs and push buttons of an individual LRU which is installed in the cockpit.

This cosmetic wear might be acceptable and not require any repair or touch-up in the work shop, but sometimes the
aircraft technicians are becoming insecure if these minor issues are still acceptable or not, although a release to
service certificate comes with it. This might impact the aircraft maintenance, clarification effort, and unnecessary
NFF and removals.

One solution might be to reference this kind of cosmetic damage in the release to service certificate, so that the
aircraft technicians know that this topic was evaluated and nothing which was overseen or a result of bad handling
during transportation. This is unfortunately not a common practice. There is no Industry standard defining cosmetic
issues, but it might be beneficial having one.
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 Do you have the same experience with LRUs that you are repairing in your own shops, at OEMs, or other
MROs?
 Would you see a benefit of having an ARINC standard for defining acceptable cosmetic issues? Or defining
it in OEM SIL for cockpit components?

Other operators, OEMs and airframers, please comment.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

30 Packaging All OEMs All All KLM/AFR KLM

Requirements

Recently we had an audit and they found that Elta ELT was not transported in proper package. By further
investigation we have found that also some other items were not compliant with CMM packaging instructions.
Instead of checking every CMM (and we have thousands of them) we are investigating if there is a generic source of
information about packaging. ATA 300 is for example referencing the T-file.

Therefore, our question to Boeing, Airbus, OEM’s and Operators:

Is there a generic file (something like RSPL or T-File database) where we can find the data about packaging
requirements of LRUs?

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

31 Flight Control Unit 398500-1009 Parker Hannifin Q400 LHT

Several Flight Control Units from Parker got damaged because of a Bombardier AMM instruction. AMM subtask 27-
00-01-750-001 referring to the installation of this unit states the following: “If a part of the red band on a connector
shows after the connector is fully tightened, do the procedure that follows: NOTE: Do this procedure only on the
FCECU connectors on which you see a part of the red band after the connector is fully tightened. (1) Make sure that
the connector is fully tightened.”

According to Parker this tightening leads to a damage. In the end, the LHT and its operators are urged to take the
cost burden of the replaced seals. Although, operators are performing work in accordance to the Q400 AMM. LHT
believes that the occurring costs should be covered by Bombardier due to the defective design.

Question:
 Who would be in charge for taking the cost burden due to a failure of caused by faulty AMM information?

Bombardier, Parker, and other Q400 operators comment please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

32 Self Lift PDU-2-Inch 43212-11 Goodrich B777 50-21-90 LHT

43212-12 B787
43212-15

The stated PDU often gets removed with a broken connector (small crack). If this failure occurs the whole PDU is
considered as BER, because there is no repair method to exchange / repair the connector. Therefore, almost every
PDU has to be replaced with a new one.

LHT is seeing more and more units that are supposed to be “repairable” but have to be handled as expendables due
to missing repair procedures or highly integrated designs.

Question:
Are the airframers aware of this development? How are operators and MROs supposed to ensure a cost effective
maintenance under these circumstances?

Airframers and operators comment please.