Phibun Songkram and Thai Nationalisme in The Fascist Era

PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA
Author(s): E. BRUCE REYNOLDS

Source: European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2004), pp. 99-134
Published by: Brill
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PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND
THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA
E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
Abstract. During the late 1930s a political style, generally called 'fascist
aimed at mobilising nations in the pursuit of expansionist aims had a p
found impact around the world. Based on the apparent success of German
Italy, and Japan and the impending victory of Francisco Franco's force
the Spanish Civil War, by early 1939 many observers saw fascism as the w
of the future. Among the Asian political leaders strongly influenced by
success of the fascist states was Phibun Songkhram, the military strong
of Thailand, the lone independent nation in Southeast Asia. Phibun and
adviser Wichit Wathakan promoted a jingoistic version of Thai nationalis
sought to militarise the nation, and adopted an aggressive policy towar
neighbouring French Indochina in the wake of France's defeat in June 19
In the short term these actions gave momentum to Phibun's efforts to c
solidate his power and his plans to transform Thai society. Phibun's invo
ment with Japan and the arrival of Japanese troops in Thailand in Dec
ber 1941, however, would lead to his temporary political eclipse in 1944 a
modification of the more extreme elements of his program.
Historians generally regard King Vajiravudh (RamaVI, r. 1910-192

as the father of modern Thai nationalism, but Field Marshal Phib
Songkhram pushed nationalism to a new level of intensity durin
his first tenure as Thailand's premier (1938-1944). Both Thai lead
studied in Europe and their experiences in the West greatly influen
their conceptions of nationalism. In an effort to shore up the posit
of the absolute monarchy, King Vajiravudh adapted concepts
rituals he observed during a long stay in late Victorian Engla
at the height of the British Empire's power In contrast, Phibun,
commoner of modest origins, attended military schools in republi
France during the 1920s, an era of extreme ideological content
during which Italian dictator Benito Mussolini captured the worl
attention. In late 1938 Phibun assumed his nation's leadership at t
height of the 'fascist era' when Italy, Germany and Japan had seiz
the initiative in world affairs.1 Eager to shore up the foundation
1 On the concept of a 'fascist era', see Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism (
York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 3-10.
)) Brill,
Brill, Leiden, 2004Leiden, 2004 EJE AS 3.1
Also available online—www.brill.nl
IOO E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
of the still unstable People's P

absolute monarchy in 1932 an
leader, Phibun readily adopted
Scholars have spilled much in
ical phenomenon of the 1930s
'fascism'. The task is complic
pointed out, nationalism was t
ments were based, a fact that
characteristics.2 One expert, Z
synthesis of organic nationali
olutionary ideology based on a
Marxism, and democracy'.3 H
ological competition of the er
between liberal democracy, com
context of the emergence of m
tury. Smith describes it as 'a th
of modernity with a new form
people in ways radically differe
Despite their inherent natio
shared the general ideological
and Smith. They also influen
from each other's successes.
rial rule in the 1920's. Econom
in the 1930s, both fueled in la
armaments, seemed to demonst
unchecked expansionism in Ma
defiance of the League of Nat
that favourably impressed Hid
sequent aggressions and the w
encouraged Japanese leaders t
the United States and Great Br
2 George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolu

3 Zeev Sternhell, Finther Right Mr Le
ton University Press, 1996), p. 27.
4 Tony Smith, 'Making the World Sa
(Spring 1999): 180.
5 William Henry Chamberlin, Japan
note 11 and Harold James, The End o
sity Press, 2001), pp. 93-94.
6 John P. Fox, Germany and the Far
Press, 1982), p. 79; Ernst L. Presseisen
Diplomacy (The Hague: Martinus N
Stein, Far East in Ferment (London: M
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA IOI
As early as 1934 a Japanese writer suggested that fas

supplanted communism as the strongest ideology of refor
country. Fascism had prevailed, he suggested, because it off
'affinities with our historic traditions of the past' and
ordered social and economic readjustment for the future'.7
words, Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals had come
that the perceived advantages of Soviet-style central plann
be obtained within a corporatist framework that employe
myths to unify and mobilise the nation.
The extent to which fascism's apparent efficacy impress
unsympathetic observers can be found in Peter Drucker's
End of Economic Man, a work that appeared in early 1939, shor
Phibun's ascent to power in Bangkok. 'Within a few short ye
totalitarianism has assumed the proportions of a major wo
tion,' Drucker wrote. 'It has become the only effective polit
in Europe and has reduced democracy to impotent defence i
and externally. Fascist ideology and phraseology are acc
cloak by divergent and incongruous movements all over th
Drucker believed that the communist drive to create a popu
against fascism amounted to its 'complete abdication as a r
ary force, and to virtual renunciation of the promise to be
of the future social order'.8 It appeared to Drucker and ot
fascism had become the wave of the future by offering a 't
a nationalist, spiritualist alternative to two materialist syste
capitalism, widely viewed as a failed system at the height of
Depression, and radical communism with its advocacy o
tional class solidarity and opposition to private property. In
months of 1939 it seemed that a formidable alliance of Italy, Ge
Japan and Francisco Franco's Spain would soon emerge.9
Marcia Reynders Ristaino captured the essence of fascism
to non-communist Asian nationalists in describing its impac
leading figures in the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindan
Jingwei and Tang Liangli. Both, Ristaino notes, 'express
tion for National Socialism's advocacy of a strong nation a
torial government that would integrate economic developm
national goals. To them and other Guomindang leaders,
1 Ä, 'The Rise and Fall of Japanese Communism', Contemporary Ja

(December 1933): 452.
8 Peter F. Drucker, The End of Economic Man (New York: John Day
pp. 3-4.
9 Gerhard Krebs, 'Japanese-Spanish Relations, 1936-1945,' Transactions of the Asi
atic Society of Japan, series 4, vol. 3 (1988), pp. 23-24.
I02 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
emphasis on order and control

strength.'10 As one Chinese pol
Eastman, fascism 'seemed to be
ing the nation'.11 It appeared t
'a "quick" solution to the moder
Ba Maw, who led Burma unde
War II, spoke frankly in his m
not forget the tremendous spe
over the East generally', he wr
leaders were believed to be ir
world order, as they declared t
the East as a whole was longing
Maw further acknowledged tha
especially for those seeking an
in which they were invariably
armies and coloured shirts and
in the centre of it all the shini
his people.'13
The role of charismatic national saviour appealed to many Asian
political figures. Grant K. Goodman has pointed out that even in
the Philippines, where Americans liked to believe they had instilled
democratic values, an increasingly autocratic President Manuel Que
zon 'made no secret of his admiration of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco,
and the Japanese'.14 In Thailand, meanwhile, Phibun would make an
overt attempt to follow the path to personal power and national reju
venation mapped out by Mussolini and Hitler.
Phibun and Fascism
During his stay in France in the 1920s the artillery officer Phibun
Songkhram joined the People's Party, a cabal of young military and
civilian officials. This group subsequently engineered the overthrow
10 Marcia Reynders Ristaino, Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 194.
11 Quoted in Loyd E. Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang China,' China Quarterly,
no. 49 (January/March 1972): 3.
12 Dooeum Chung, Elitist Fascism: Chiang Kaishek's Blueshirts in iggos China (Burling
ton, VT: Ashgate, 2000), p. xi.
13 Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968),
pp. 6, 23.
14 Grant K. Goodman, 'Philippine Bushido,' in Xitobe Inazo: Japan's Bridge Across the
Pacific, ed. J.F. Howes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 130.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA IO3
of the absolute monarchy in Siam (as Thailand was then known) in a

carefully planned, and almost completely bloodless, coup d'etat in June
1932.15 They sought to end the royalist dominance that blocked their
paths to high-level government positions by establishing a constitu
tional monarchy and a transitional National Assembly evenly divided
between members of the ruling clique and indirectly elected represen
tatives. Commenting on these constitutional arrangements, the Times
of London observed that in limiting the power of the electorate the
framers had demonstrated 'a litde of the modern suspicion of democ
racy' in leaving 'some scope for applying the methods of modern dic
tatorships, should such methods be required'. An accompanying edi
torial added that the constitution suggested 'that in practice and at
the outset it will be a one-party Government of mildly Fascist com
plexion'.16
Members of the People's Party were by no means of one mind
politically, but beyond their shared opposition to the absolute monar
chy, they agreed, in keeping both their bureaucratic mentality and the
main political currents of the time, on the need for a strong, active
state. Interestingly, the 'brains' of the group, French-trained lawyer
Pridi Phanomyong—then and later denounced as a communist—
commented favourably on Hitler's assumption of power in arguing
for a sweeping nationalisation scheme in 1933. Citing the lasting influ
ence of Friedrich List's ideas, Pridi wrote that Germany 'recognizes
that the country does well with government running the economy,
and hence has entrusted the government to Hitler, who believes in
the doctrine of government managing the economy itself'.17 Oppo
nents, including fellow members of the revolutionary group, consid
ered Pridi's economic plan too radical and killed it, but subsequent
People's Party governments would consistently use state power in an
effort to promote national economic self-sufficiency.18
The British, who had long exercised dominant economic and
political influence in Bangkok and had enjoyed smooth relations
with the royalist regime, naturally disapproved of such policies. For
example, in 1935 the Times warned that Siam's 'credit and stability
may not be strengthened by the artificial creation of industries, for
15 Judith Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991)
provides an excellent overview of the 1932 coup and Thai politics in the 1930s.
16 The Times (London), 4 August 1932.
17 Pridi Banomyong, Pndi by Pridi, ed. and tr. Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit
(Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2000), p. 106.
18 See Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier (Kuala Lumpur: Ox
ford University Press, 1995), pp. 144-150 on Phibun's economic policies.
104 E- BRUCE REYNOLDS
which its people have as yet shown little incl

by an intensely nationalist and isolationist pol
to the needs of a country that must live by it
and its forests'.19 Yet while the British disliked much about the new
order, they were not inclined to intervene. Instead, the British minister
from 1934, Sir Josiah Crosby, sought to influence the course of events
through friendly persuasion.20
Phibun rose swiftly in the wake of the 1932 coup. After early com
promises and the negative backlash against Pridi's economic plan had
eroded the position of the core group of People's Party, Phibun played
a key role in a second successful coup in June 1933. Later the same
year, he led the suppression of a pro-royalist rebellion. He reaped his
reward by assuming the cabinet's defence portfolio in October 1934
at the age of 37. A vigorous and effective advocate of increasing the
nation's military power, Phibun succeeded in doubling defence spend
ing over a four-year period.21
As he solidified his military power base, Phibun began to reveal
broader ambitions. He declared in a letter published in May 1936
that to rectify the weakness of the nation, 'it is essential that discipline
be maintained; to be quite blunt, one must employ the methods
of dictatorship'. Minister Crosby believed that Mussolini's assault
on Ethiopia had inspired the comments. He later emphasised in a
November 1936 report Phibun's 'spiritual' affinity with the European
dictators. By April 1937 Crosby labelled Phibun and his military
clique 'all powerful, because they have at their command the means
of suppressing by physical force any opposition to their wishes'.22
As Phibun rose to a dominant position and began to emulate the
fascist leaders, Pridi, leader of the civilian faction of the People's Party,
began to incline toward sympathy for the liberal democracies. A visit
to Japan just prior to the attempted military coup of 26 February 1936
in Tokyo apparently had convinced him that association with the
fascist states would only work to the political advantage of Phibun
19 The Times (London), 4 March 1935.

20 Richard J. Aldrich, The Key to the South (New York,: Oxford University Press,
'993)> PP- 153-156. The British approach in Thailand foreshadowed subsequent
British accommodation to the realities of modern nationalism that led to aban
donment of the old imperial policy of indirect rule through cooperative traditional
monarchs and tribal chieftans. David Cannadine provides insight into the origins of
the policy and its demise in Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Thar Empire (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
21 Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968
reprint), p. 54.
22 Aldrich, The Key to the South, pp. 174, 176.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA IO5
and the army.23 The rivalry between Phibun and Pridi became a
major theme of Thai politics for the next decade and the two are
still controversial figures long after their deaths.
Intellectuals in Thailand and abroad have tended to sympathise
with Pridi. His staunchest backers—contemporary Thai social critic
Sulak Sivaraksa, for example—see Phibun as a selfish, opportunistic,
power-hungry military dictator whose policies placed the nation in
peril and undermined prospects for democracy.24 Dissatisfaction with
such one-sidedly negative portrayals of Phibun led respected Thai his
torian Charnvit Kasetsiri to advocate in the 1990s a re-evaluation of
this important political figure.25 Nigel Brailey had already begun a
revisionist trend in English-language scholarship by portraying Phi
bun as a devoted defender of the nation and the 1932 constitution in
his 1986 book Thailand and the Fall of Singapore. Kobkua Sawannathat
Pian's 1995 biography of Phibun, Thailand's Durable Premier, supported
Brailey's view, describing Phibun as a man of consistent principle.26
Brailey dismissed fascist-like aspects of the Phibun regime as 'super
ficial', based on nothing more than emulation of 'international fash
ion'.27 Kobkua added that comparison of Phibun's programme with
those of the fascist dictators 'could only lead to an academic cul-de
sac' and 'give a distorted view of what the Field Marshal achieved'.28
Certainly Phibun should not simply be caricatured, and Brailey
and Kobkua are right in saying that he periodically paid homage
to the constitutional and democratic ideals of the 1932 revolution,29
even famously building a monument to them. Nonetheless, his actions
clearly reveal his attraction to fascism. This proclivity did, as Brailey
says, reflect 'international fashion', but it was more than 'superficial'.
23 E. Thadeus Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928-1941,' Ph.D. diss.

(University of Washington, 1967), pp. 130-141.
24 For example, see Sulak Sivaraksa, 'The Crisis of Siamese Identity', National
Identify and Its Defenders, iggg-ig8g, ed. Craig J. Reynolds (Chiang Mai: Silkworm
Books, 1991), pp. 41-47.
25 Pravit Rojanaphruk, 'A Portrait in Flux,' The Nation (Bangkok), 2 August 1997.
In 1993 Thammasat University held a conference on Phibun's impact on modern
Thai history. The debate is summarized in Sanitsuda Ekachai, 'Pibul: In search of a
missing link,' Bangkok Post, 5 July 1993.
26 Nigel J. Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1986), pp. 63, 78 and Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 43, 57-67
27 Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, p. 74.
28 Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, p. 103.
29 For example, as late as mid-1940 he made comments to the press favoring the
retention of'democracy', such as it was in Thailand at the time. See Eiji Murashima,
'Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand, 1932-1945,' in
Murashima, Nakharin Mektrairat, and Somkiat Wan tana, The Making of Modern Thai
Politics (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1991), pp. 7-9.
Io6 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
Fascist techniques shaped the character of P

had a significant impact on Thai society and
In particular, Phibun, like Hider, early on
of militant irredentist nationalism as a m
support and mobilising a people he viewe
an early effort to rouse Thai patriotic fe
Ministry supported production of the milit
Thai (The Blood of Thai Soldiers) in 1935
issued maps drawing attention to territory S
imperial neighbours, Britain and France. Phib
propagandist, Wichit Wathakan, began pr
portraying heroic figures from the nation's p
Luat Suphan (The Blood of Suphan) in Aug
values would also be reflected in the lyrics of th
in use today. The song's words, a Thai journ
the significance of sacrifice, the unity of the T
the spirit of nationalistic sacrifice under militar
Kenneth P. Landon, a missionary in Sia
described the efforts of the army and Wich
to develop a warlike political philosophy wh
willing to sacrifice everything for the good
ubiquity of slogans like 'Race, Ruler and
try is Our Home and the Military is Our
'The heart of the propaganda doctrine is t
thing and the individual is nothing.'32 Certa
to tout military values of the past as the an
decadence in each of the three fascist states
partite Pact in September 1940. Mussolini ha
legions, Hitler the Teutonic knights, and the
sacrificing samurai like Kusunoki Masashi
this common pattern suggests, both Phibun
to learn from these successful aggressor states.
30 Scot Barmé, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), pp. 119-124
nine of Wichit's plays from this era appears in Charnv
Government and Its Involvement in World War II', Journ
(1974), pp. 40-41.
31 Sanitsuda, 'Pibul: In search of the missing link'. Su
Identity', p. 47, declared that the anthem lyrics coul
describes them as 'comical and chauvinistic'.
32 Kenneth P Landon, 'The Factor of Increased Japa
p.33 in 'OSS/State Department Intelligence and Res
Occupied Territories During World War II' (Washington
•3
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA I07
These two ambitious, self-made men of humble origins both had

observed the emergence of Mussolini on the world stage in the 1920s
from Europe. While Phibun studied in French military schools from
1924 to 1927, Wichit served as a junior Thai diplomat in Paris,
Geneva and London from 1921 to 1927. Reflecting a life-long infat
uation with powerful leaders, in 1928 Wichit published a book of
biographical sketches entitled Mahaburut (Great Men) that included
admiring chapters on Mussolini, Napoleon (Phibun's personal hero)
and Bismarck.33 Phibun apparently shared Wichit's admiration for the
Italian leader, as journalist Hallett Abend reports that as premier he
'received foreign callers, other than high-ranking diplomats ... under
a huge, life-size, and autographed photograph' of Mussolini.34
Japan's ideological emphasis on monarchy as the focal point of
absolute national loyalty did not accord with the political needs of
Wichit and Phibun, who had reason to denigrate the significance of
their own nation's monarchy, but as avid modernisers they greatly
admired Japan's success in becoming a world power. On more than
one occasion Phibun offered Japan's case as an instructive precedent
in calling for more defence spending.35 He also viewed Japan's power
as a useful counterweight against Great Britain and France. Japan,
eager to gain influence in Southeast Asia and increasingly isolated
after withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, responded
favourably to Thai approaches. Cultural exchanges between the two
countries increased, and a series of Japanese military and naval at
tachés zealously cultivated personal ties with Phibun, Bangkok's rising
star.36
Wichit played a prominent role in strengthening relations with

Tokyo. The earliest evidence of his admiration for Japan was his
inclusion of Meiji Era leader Ökubo Toshimichi in his 1928 book on
the great men of world history. In 1933 the prolific author suggested
seven human qualities the Thai needed to develop in order to create
a great nation, borrowing six of them direcdy from Nitobe Inazö's
Bushido, the Soul of Japan?1 In early 1934, as director general of the
Department of Fine Arts, Wichit launched a campaign to promote
'national culture'—an undertaking with ample precedent in the fascist
countries —he received sympathetic support from the Japanese Lega
33 Barmé, Luang Wich.it, pp. 53-54.

34 Hallett Abend, Japan Unmasked (New York: Ives Washburn, 1941), p. 85.
35 Bangkok Times and Weekly Mail, 5 April 1934 and Aldrich, Key to the South, p. 175.
36 Flood, 'Japan's Relations With Thailand, 1928-1941', pp. 48-65, 73-75, 90-97.
37 Barmé, Luang Wichit, pp. 53, 87-88. Wichit knew Nitobe personally, having met
him at Geneva where Nitobe worked for the League of Nations.
Io8 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
tion. The following year the Japanese g

of Japan, Korea and Manchukuo by a 35
dancers and musicians.38 A Japanese m
Ishii Itarö, recalled that Wichit possesse
for cultural exchange with Japan'.39
Powerful National Socialist Germany
ling model of all, however, as Phibun s
speech advocating ever-greater military
nation's status and protect it from inva
had 'continued to decline militarily unt
period. He it was who put his heart and
military power.' Phibun added admiri
countries and small countries objecte
she paid no heed to it, and ultimatel
Germany.'40 In December 1941, Phibu
and Germany as 'intellectual allies' in a
journalist Karl Melchers.41
Phibun and his followers blatantly cop
organisation, establishing para-military
and Yuwanari (for girls) in their quest to
joined Yuwachon at the age of 15 for m
female counterparts were prepared to
other military-related support duties. P
German army officer who served both
tional matters and his main personal lia
Italians, assumed leadership of the Yu
long study tour in Germany.42 By coin
Thai premier Khuang Aphaiwong would
Hitler Youth facilities when the invasio
ber 1939.«
Although Brailey has portrayed the Yu
boy scout-like organisation aimed at prom
The Swiss scholar-journalist Dr. Lily A
aim' of the Yuwachon was strengthen
38 Ibid., p. 119. The 1935 cultural mission to Jap

special 'Siam and Japan Cultural Mission' issue of
39 Ishii Itarö, Gaikökan no isshö (The Life of a D
1986 reprint), p. 282.
40 Quoted in Aldrich, Key to the South, p. 175.
41 Bangkok Chronicle, 29 December 1941.
42 Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, pp. 93, 100.
43 Bangkok Chronicle, 30 October 1939.
44 Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, p. 76.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA IOg
consciousness, spirit of sacrifice, and eagerness to serve'. Pointing out

that active duty army officers ran the organisation and that 'almost
purely military methods are used', she went on to describe a mock
battle:
On June 24 [1941], Thailand's National Day a large military display

of the Yuwajon (Yuwachon) took place in Bangkok. On one side
of the square a sort of Maginot Line had been constructed, with
several concrete domes and artificial tank traps. This was attacked by
14- to 18-year-old members of the Yuwajon in a completely modern
manner, with motorized troops, tanks, artillery, and airplanes. The
battle lasted about 40 minutes. The thunder of the artillery duel was
earsplitting, airplane motors roared overheard, and tanks and flame
throwers spat terrifying fire. Finally a large white flag appeared, the
garrison surrendered, the fortifications having collapsed under the
artillery fire and the bombs.
The entire maneuver was carried out by boys; only the airplanes were
manned by regulars.45
A report originated by Japan's Dömei news agency in mid 1943

further emphasised the 'strictly militaristic' nature of the Yuwachon,
pointing out that three years of training with the youth corps was
deemed equivalent to that for a non-commissioned officer in the Thai
army.46 Another Japanese writer had earlier in 1943 reported that the
Luk Sua (Tiger Cubs) programme for younger children had severed
its ties with the British-based international Boy Scouts movement and
was 'developing itself in its own way, but there is very likely to be
a modelling after the Hitler Jugend'.47 In fact, in September 1943,
the Luk Sua and Yuwachon were merged into a National Youth
Organisation that aimed at enlisting all qualified young people from
ages 15 to 22. 'When the objects of the movement are fully realized,'
a Dömei story declared, 'the people of Thailand will all be soldiers'.48
Little wonder that in his memoir, published during World War II,
Crosby characterised the indoctrination of Thai youth 'the most
dangerous' aspect of Phibun's nationalist programme.49
Nazi Germany also offered an appealing model for a Thai govern
ment that strictly censored the press and monopolised radio broad
casting. During World War II the director general of the Thai Pub
licity Department, Phairot Chayanam, acknowledged to journalist
45 Lily Ahegg, 'Thailand—Old and New', The XXth Century (Shanghai), vol. i
(November 1941): 44. The article was reprinted in the Japan Times and Advertiser, 28
March 1942.
46 Nippon Times, 20 July 1943.
47 Nippon Times, 2 February 1943.
48 Bangkok Chronicle, 17 September 1943 and Nippon Times, 21 January 1944.
49 Josiah Crosby, Siam: "The Crossroads (London, 1945), p. 116.
IIO E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
Melchers that his agency h

ganda Ministry. Phairot, who
on a visit to Germany in 193
many, Thailand has centralise
ernment news, enlightenmen
The American missionary La
many was 'made clear' to him
all social levels over the dec
Wichit took a back seat to no one in his admiration for the Nazis.51
A statement he issued as Thai foreign minister in 1943 on the tenth
anniversary of Hitler's rise to power praised the Nazis for resurrect
ing Germany against all odds. Wichit, once aptly dubbed a 'pocket
Goebbels' by Crosby, characterised Hitler as 'a divine person who
fully merits the love and reverence of the whole of the German peo
ple, as well as the praises of the world in general'.52
Wichit's most infamous public advocacy of the Nazi model came
in the wake of an often violent anti Japanese boycott movement, trig
gered by Japan's 1937 invasion of China, within the Overseas Chi
nese community in Bangkok. Concern that resident Chinese either
were, or might become, a fifth column had been a central aspect of
Thai nationalism since the reign of King Vajiravudh. In a famous
1914 article the King had dubbed the Overseas Chinese the 'Jews
of the East', citing their growing reluctance to assimilate and their
penchant for remitting funds back to their homeland.53 Speaking on
the recent German takeover of Austria at Chulalongkorn University
in July 1938, Wichit resurrected the King's analogy and suggested
that the Bangkok government might do well to emulate Nazi policy
toward the Jews in cracking down on the Chinese.54
In fact, the deportation of Chinese activists and restrictive measures
subsequently imposed on the Chinese community by the Thai gov
50 Undated Transcean dispatch circa June 1943, Karl Melchers Papers, Krock
Library, Cornell University.
51 Landon, 'The Factor of Increased Japanese Influence in Thailand', p. 1.
52 Barmé, Luang Wichit, p. 180 and 'Statement of His Excellency Nai Wichit
Wathakan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, on the 10th Anniversary of the
National Socialist Regime in Germany,' Melchers Papers.
53 Walter Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism (Hon
olulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1978), pp. 193-194.
54 Barmé, Luang Wichit, p. 129. Kobkua in Thailand's Durable Premier portrays
Wichit as 'self-appointed ideologue', (p. 104) an extremist whose views on this and
other issues Phibun did not share (pp. 106, p. 152, note 8, pp. 255-256, p. 295).
While Phibun may have publicly distanced himself from some of Wichit's more
outlandish statements, the extent to which the latter's ideas both shaped the Phibun
government's ideology and influenced its actions is strong evidence to the contrary.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA 111
ernment were hardly comparable to the Nazi 'Final Solu

ther, in Thailand, the crux of the issue between the Tha
nese was not racial but cultural, not least because so many in
Thai, including Pridi and even Wichit himself, were part C
The government's goals were to reduce Chinese economic d
and to assimilate Chinese into Thai society, yet as historian
Greene apdy put it, the Chinese served as a convenient 'gri
on which to whet Thai nationalistic feelings'.56
Ironically, China itself provided a second-hand source of
influence for Phibun's nationalist movement, particularly C
shek's New Life Movement, a programme many contemp
servers viewed as fascist-inspired. This programme aime
ang's words, 'to thoroughly militarize the lives of citizens of th
nation so that they can cultivate courage and swiftness, the
of suffering and a tolerance for hard work, and especially
and ability of unified action, so that they will at any time
for the nation'.57 It provided a direct model for the series of
cultural mandates, aimed at regulating proper behaviour an
implemented by Phibun from 1939.58 Chiang had also emu
55 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

Press, 1957), pp. 244-245.
56 Stephen L.W. Greene, Absolute Dreams: Thai Government Under Rama V
(Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1999), p. 71. Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Prem
argues on one hand that 'Nationalism sponsored by Phibun and his go
during the first administration was not in any manner similar to the ultra-n
practised in Mussolini's Italy or Hider's Germany, which insisted upon the
and mastery of their race.' Yet later in the same paragraph she acknowled
Phibun 'Nationalism meant "Thai-ness" and Buddhism which, in turn, p
foundation for uniformity of the national culture and social values, and th
way of life. In other words, Phibun ... believed that a unified state, a mo
criterion of the modern, strong, and dynamic nation, could only be achiev
based on one common faith and one common set of customs and tradition
those of the majority ethnic group, the Thai.' To be sure, 'race' in th
sense was not the issue, as an ethnic Chinese, for example, could gain
by 'acting Thai'. However, 'race' had been loosely and commonly use
late 19th century to refer to the people of a particular nation or ethnic
minorities affected surely viewed imposition of constructed 'Thai' norms
the assertion of the 'supremacy and mastery' of a particular 'race'.
57 Quoted in Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang China', p. 20.
58 On German and Fascist influences on the New Life Movement, see
man, The Abortive Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 19
84 and WJ., Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford, CA: Stanfor
Press, 1984), pp. 176-185. While not denying European 'inspiration' Chu
in Elitist Fascism (for example, pp. 55-66) that fascist influences from Ja
greater importance in China because Chiang and other Japan-educat
military officers admired the discipline and nationalist spirit of the Imp
The most recent counter-argument that the New Life Movement was
112 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
Hitler Youth programme, setti

establishing highly militarised ver
Critics have lampooned vario
ment, including its efforts to
'spitting heedlessly',60 just as t
tate that citizens wear hats in
the end of inculcating modern
behaviour.61 Certainly in Thail
ence. Landon declared in 1949 t
had a 'profound effect' on Th
swing back to the old cultural p
have recognised the lasting imp
alist programme generally and t
It is entirely natural that Ph
shek's programmes. Both were
dramatically change countries
and national spirit. Both wishe
government-led cultural revolut
have come from Phibun's mouth
We must all have the soldier's h
army's organization and discipli
make sacrifices, be sombre and se
influenced appears in A. James Grego

Press, 2000), pp. 75-81. The Thai cultur
Luang Wkh.it, pp. 156-160. The trans
Politics, ig'j2 1957, ed. Thak Chaloemt
Thailand, 1978), pp. 244-254, while th
sook Numnonda, Thailand and the Japa
Asian Studies, 1977), p. 37. Also, see Ko
Sulak argues convincingly in 'The Cri
reforms in Turkey also influenced effo
aspects of culture.
59 Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang
pp. 231-236.
60 Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang China', p. 19.
61 Phibun has claimed an anti-Japanese intent behind his cultural programme
(Thamsook, Thailand and the Japanese Presence 1991-1949, pp 38-39). As I have argued
in 'Imperial Japan's Cultural Programme in Thailand' in Japanese Cultural Policies in
Southeast Asia during World War 2, Grant K. Goodman, ed. (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1991), pp. 93-116, this is true of the period from 1942-1944. However, most of
the cultural mandates predated Thailand's involvement in World War II and reflected
Phibun's desire to militarize and mobilize Thai society.
62 Kenneth P Landon, 'Siam' in The New World of Southeast Asia, ed. Lennox
A. Mills, et el (Minneapolis, 1949), p. Q51.
63 For example, Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 82-83, '34-'35 and Sanit
suda, 'Pibul: In search of the missing link'.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA II3
alert and diligent, secretive, unadorned and simple in habit, all of us

unanimous in our firmness and courage, sacrificing everything for the
collectivity, for the party, for the nation.64
The extent to which Nationalist China's New Life Movement re

flected fascist influences remains controversial, as does the issue of
which countries can truly be considered fascist. Students of compar
ative fascism almost invariably consider Fascist Italy the prototype.65
Most, but not all, experts also consider Nazi Germany 'fascist',66 but
there they tend to draw the line. They disqualify Japan, citing the
absence of a mass-based party and a charismatic dictator, as well as
the 'conservative' nature of the nation's emperor ideology. National
ist China falls short of the 'fascist' category because it, too, lacked a
mass-based fascist party. Also cited as a disqualifying factor is Chi
ang's allegiance to Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. The Phi
bun regime, in contrast, has entirely escaped the notice of the experts
on comparative fascism.67
The drawing of fine lines, based largely on structural differences,
between 'fascist' and 'non-fascist' states is a perfecdy legitimate exer
cise. However, the significance of the high tide of fascism so well
64 Quoted in F. Wakeman, Jr., 'A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Con
fucian Fascism' in Reappraising Republican China, ed. Wakeman, and R.L. Edmonds
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 171. Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Sin
gapore, p. 70 sets Phibun apart from Chiang by arguing that the former was much
less traditional and more amenable to socio-economic reform than the latter. While
there is merit to this argument, I would suggest that the greatest contrast between
the two men was personal charm, a quality that Phibun could muster in abundance,
but which Chiang sorely lacked. Overall, though, I believe that their similarities out
weighed their differences.
65 For example, A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang write in 'Nationalfascismo
and the Revolutionary Nationalist of Sun Yat-sen,' Journal of Asia Studies, vol. 39
(November 1979): 22 that in order to have a basis of comparison it is necessary to
start with 'the ideologues of Italian Fascism, who had indisputable fascist credentials'.
66 Zeev Sternhell makes an argues for considering Nazism separately because of its
extreme racial doctrines in 'Fascist Ideology' in Walter Laquer, ed., Fascism: A Reader's
Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 317.
67 The most comprehensive survey on comparative fascism is Stanley G. Payne,
A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995),
which covers Japan on pp. 328-338. Opposing views on whether or not Japan should
be considered fascist can be found in Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, 'Fascism
and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept,' Journal of Asian Studies,
vol. 39 (November 1979): 65-76 and Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in
Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 333-339. Regarding
China and fascism see Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang China'; Maria Hsiah
Chang, '"Fascism" and Modern China', China Quarterly, no.79 (September 1979): 553
567; Eastman, 'Fascism and Modern China: A Rejoinder', China Quarterly, no 80
(December 1979): 838-842; Chung, Elitist Fascism; and Wakeman, 'A Revisionist View
of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism'.
described by Drucker can only be appreciat

world history perspective that focuses on t
between fascist-style states. As always, there is
the forest by focusing too exclusively on th
trees.
On the issue of the single, mass-based party, it is important to

note that in Italy and Germany these were of greatest importance
during the rise to power of their respective dictators.68 In Japan, the
militarists, already politically influential, gradually gained dominance
through the popularity of their successful expansionist programme
in Manchuria and intimidation of their rivals. Once in the saddle,
they maintained the Meiji constitutional structure intact as a conces
sion to traditional conservatives.69 This precluded the emergence of
a charismatic dictator in Japan and made decision-making and pol
icy implementation cumbersome. Yet, the emperor bestowed unpar
alleled legitimacy on Japan's new order, and the well-propagated
emperor ideology helped inspire a degree of public solidarity and will
ingness to sacrifice for the nation that the European dictators could
only envy.70
Differences among fascist regimes naturally existed because each
had its unique brand of nationalism. Much of the appeal of fascist
ideology lay in the fact that it permitted the exaltation of the particu
lar (selected national traditions and values) to buttress an all-powerful
state.71 Already on or near the top of the political ladder, Chiang
68 Zeev Sternhell notes in a review of France at War: Vichy and the Historians, Sarah
Fishman, et el, eds., American Historical Review, vol. 106 (2001): 1057: 'Mussolini needed
the National Fascist Party in order to gain power, but not in order to govern. Once
in power he did whatever he could to minimize the role of the party, which was a
constant source of anxiety and even political danger to him.' Ian Kershaw writes
in Hitler 1889-10)36 Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 499 that once Hitler
attained power his 'unruly party army, the S.A., had outlived its purpose ... the
S.A.'s 'politics of hooliganism' were a force for disruption in the new state'. As for the
party, Kershaw notes on p. 538 that once in power Hider took 'little interest in the
party as an institution'.
69 Mussolini and Hider also made concessions to win over traditional conserva
tives. On Mussolini, see Roger Eatwell, Fascsim: A History (New York: Penguin Books,
1996), pp. 62-88. On Hider, see Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936 Hubris, pp., 325-329.
Robert O. Paxton bluntly declares in 'The Uses of Fascism,' New York Review of Books,
vol. 42 (November 28, 1996): 49 that 'fascists have so far reached power only by
arrangement with forces clearly in power or close to it'.
70 Paul Brooker argues in The Faces of Fraternalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
iggi) that Japan surpassed other fascist (or to use his term, 'fraternalist') states in
successfully achieving a high degree of'mechanical solidarity'.
71 Quoted in Chung, Elitist Fascism, p. 257 is advice of the British admirer of
fascism, J.S. Barnes: 'Fascists in each country must make Fascism their own national
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA II5
and Phibun were products of Asian and military cultures that stressed
hierarchy and, like the Japanese militarists, naturally sought to effect
mobilisation from the top down, aiming to implement what Dooeum
Chung aptly calls 'élitist fascism'.72 This does not mean, however, that
the goals of the national transformations they sought were less revo
lutionary than or greatly different from those sought by the European
fascist dictators.
Certainly Chiang's failure to create a totalitarian dictatorship in
China was not a consequence of his over-riding allegiance to Sun
Yat-sen's political programme, the Three People's Principles. Sun's
mantle represented the chief source of legitimacy for Chiang's regime
and could not be cast aside, although a few extreme pro-fascists did
advocate doing so. Given the fascist emphasis on nationalism and the
malleable nature of Sun's doctrine there was no need for this. Even
the Chinese Communists, well aware of the advantage of associating
themselves with the 'father' of the Chinese Revolution, proclaimed
Sun's Three People's Principles as their 'minimum' programme.73 In
fact, Chiang's bid for totalitarian rule failed in part because of his
inability to quell factional infighting within his own party and the
persistence of warlordism. Conflict with Japan contributed to both
problems, stymied Chiang's determined effort to eliminate his most
dangerous domestic rivals, the Communists, and ultimately led him
into alliance with the anti-fascists during World War II.
In light of Chiang's failure to consolidate dictatorial rule in China
and the fact that the role of the emperor precluded the emergence
of a charismatic dictator in Japan, Phibun could be viewed as Asia's
most successful Führer.™ Using means inspired by, although far less
brutal than, those employed by Hitler and Mussolini, Phibun consol
idated his power to a very high degree and had considerable success
in militarising Thai society during his first five-and-a-half years as the
nation's leader. Ironically, though, while Chiang's ultimate failure in
movements, adopting symbols and tactics that conform to the traditions, psychology
and tastes of their own land.'
72 Chung points out (Ibid., p. 169) that when Chinese like Chiang looked to
the fascist states for inspiration they 'saw existing political systems of concentrated
powers and not the often anarchic, social-revolutionary forces that preceeded them
and helped drive them to power.'
73 Gregor, A Place in the Sun, pp. 102-103 emphasizes this point without acknowl
edging the main, pragmatic reason why the Chinese Communists took this line. See
Chung, Elitist Fascism, p. 137.
74 Subhas Chandra Bose, leader of the Japanese-sponsored Indian Independence
Movement from 1943-1945, filled the charismatic dictator role well, but never in fact
ruled India.
Il6 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
China resulted in considerable part from

bun's alliance with Japan brought about h
Towards a Fascist Dictatorship
Phibun formally became his nation's lead

the People's Party-dominated National As
the retiring premier, Phraya Phahon P
military officer whose chief contribut
degree of balance between competing
clique. Having narrowly survived three a
haps concerned by the warm welcome th
tee monarch, King Ananda Mahidol, ha
Bangkok in November, Phibun moved fo
tion. In his first broadcast speech he sig
no opposition from the National Assembl
transition to a fully elected legislature ca
could be delayed. Then, in late January 1
Adundetcharat, claiming to have uncover
regime, arrested many supporters of Phibun
Song Suradet. Adun's dragnet also swept
alists, including Prince Rangsit, the yo
adviser. After a behind-closed-doors trial
18 men were executed by firing squads. P
received life sentences. Phibun confiscat
abdicated King Prajadhipok, viewing the
as an non-indicted co-conspirator. He exi
ure in the 1932 coup, to French Indochina75
In support of Phibun's campaign to con
hands, his supporters launched a campaig
extensive National Day celebration in Ju
as the nation's phunam (leader).76 Phibun
July) became another national festival. In
day ceremonies included the swearing
members and the presentation of 'one ant
machine guns, five aeroplanes, 130 gas m
guns' purchased with funds raised by of
75 Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, 112-117 and Suw

Premier, p. 17.
76 Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 124
celebration, see Barmé, Luang Wichit, pp. 139-144.
istry.77 Phibun's favourite colour (green) and the sign under which he
was born (the cock) became widely recognised symbols of the phunam.
The phrase itself emulated the tides used by Mussolini (II Duce) and
Hitler (Führer), while the World War II slogan 'One nation, Thailand;
one leader, Phibun Songkhram; one aim, victory' echoed the Ger
man trinity of'ein Volk, ein Reich, ein FührerV8 Other wartime slogans
included: 'Hail Phibun Songkhram', 'Our Nation's Security Depends
on Believing in Our Leader', 'The Nation Will Survive If We Believe
in Phibun Songkhram', and 'Save the Nation by Believing in Phibun'.
Cinema patrons had to rise and bow to Phibun's picture, and Wichit
wrote a play likening him to a god capable of performing miracles.79
Phibun also emulated Mussolini in claiming numerous government
positions for himself. By mid 1939 Phibun had promoted himself
to major general and concurrendy held the positions of premier,
commander-in-chief of the army, defence minister, foreign minister,
interior minister, and rector of Chulalongkorn University. His political
enemies naturally came to suspect that Phibun would attempt to
complete his collection of titles by claiming the throne as well.80
Minister Crosby noted that as early as July 1939 Phibun had begun
speaking as a dictator, using first person terms in referring to national
policy.81
Kobkua acknowledges the accuracy of Crosby's subsequent 1940
comment that Phibun had become a 'virtual dictator' whose 'word
was law with the Cabinet', but she accepts his own rationalisation that
international crises made such strongman rule necessary.82 Phibun put
it this way:
I allowed the campaign depicting me as the PAunara/Leader, because I

wished others to believe that we, the people of the whole nation, can
put our trust in one man, namely the Phunam, who must be followed
because of the good deeds he has performed. It is a campaign to
persuade our Thai brothers and sisters to follow the Phunam with a
glad heart, particularly in times of war which we are facing presendy.
Without a leader who commands the trust of the people, how can
77 Bangkok Chronicle, 15 July 1940,

78 This slogan first appeared in the Bangkok Chronicle on 26 August 1942.
79 Numnonda, Thailand, and the Japanese Presence, p. 29 and Kobkua, Thailand's
Durable Premier, p. 135.
80 Thamsook Numnonda refers to Phibun as 'Thailand's uncrowned monarch' by
1939 in 'Pibulsonggkram's Thai Nation-Building Programmeme during the Japanese
Military Presence', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 8 (September 1978): 244.
81 Crosby to Foreign Office, 10 July 1939, File 371-23595-6536/N0. 7486/1860/40,
British Public Record Office, Kew.
82 Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 17-18. She later somewhat incongruously
argues on p. 20: 'In general, Phibun only acted dictatorially after the war began.'
Il8 E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
any foreign country respect our nation an

objective in mind, I have allowed the cam
widely propagated. The campaign is meant
the whole nation can act as one person .. ,83
Kobkua further excuses Phibun's dictator

that none of his colleagues actively op
popular support,84 but these criteria coul
Mussolini or Hitler.
In defending Phibun from the charge of dictatorship, his advocates
also point out that he continued to permit his rival Pridi to hold
the important finance portfolio in the cabinet until the arrival of
the Japanese in December 1941.85 Certainly this reflected Phibun's
unwillingness to shatter the degree of unity that still existed within
the ruling circle and probably is evidence of recognition of Pridi's
considerable talents. There is no doubt, though, that Pridi's influence
on government policy sharply diminished from mid-1939 as military
officers increasingly dominated the cabinet.
The National Assembly continued to function under the Phibun
regime, but the appeal of the government's nationalistic programme,
coupled with a measure of cajolery, bribery, and police intimidation,
turned the body into a veritable 'rubber stamp' for Phibun's policies.86
The point is best illustrated by the Assembly's unanimous approval
of a bill on 19 September 1940 that in normal circumstances would
surely have roused much controversy and opposition. This legislation
added another ten years to the period of transition to full democracy
laid out in the constitution, thereby permitting non-elected govern
ment appointees to occupy half the seats in the legislative body until
1952.87 Even Kobkua acknowledges that Phibun subsequently became
even more 'indifferent' to the Assembly and prone to 'bullying tac
tics'.88
83 Quoted in Ibid., p. 82.

84 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
85
For example, Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore, pp. 67-73 and Kobkua,
Thailand's Durable Premier, pp.182-185. Brailey makes much of Phibun's tolerance of
various reforms promoted by Pridi, but other than the establishment of Thammasat
University, which became a main base of Pridi's political support, they were reforms
that Phibun had no reason to oppose other than on the grounds of simple personal
rivalry. Also, of the reforms Brailey's mentions, only Pridi's last major initiative, the
new tax code was implemented after Phibun became premier.
86 Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp.18, 65-66.
87 Bangkok Chronicle, 20 September 1940. For more on the extension of the transition
period, see Murashima, 'Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in
Thailand 1932-1945', pp. 47-49.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA I ig
Fascist-style Irredentism
In another surprisingly unanimous vote, in 1939 the National Assem

bly had accepted Phibun's proposal to change the country's official
name from Siam to Thailand,89 ostensibly a more accurate transla
tion of the Thai-language name Muang Thai. It was well understood,
however, that this change reflected Phibun's aspiration to reclaim the
nation's 'lost territories' and bring ethnically related peoples in neigh
bouring territories under Bangkok's rule. As Abegg wrote in 1941,
with the name change 'Thailand raises the political claim to embody
in one great empire all Thai and not only the Siamese.'90
Phibun, who had observed the recent expansionist activities of the
fascist powers, understood that success in expanding Thailand's bor
ders would, more than anything else, enhance his prestige and facil
itate the full consolidation of his position.91 He based his territorial
ambitions on the fact that from the latter part of the eighteenth
century the Thai state had rapidly expanded the scope of the lands
over which it claimed suzerainty and accepted tribute. By the mid
nineteenth century Siam's empire included territories from the Malay
Peninsula in the south, to Cambodia in the east, and to the Lao
states in the north. The Thai secured dominant influence in Cam
bodia after more than a decade of fighting with that kingdom's other
ambitious neighbour, Vietnam. Bangkok harshly subjugated the low
land area of Laos following the defeat of the rebellious vassal state of
Vientiane in 1827 and 1828.92
After 1850, however, Great Britain and France wrested almost half
of this empire from Bangkok's control. The Thai particularly resented
89 Bangkok Chronicle, 29 September 1939. Chai-anan Samudavanija, 'State-Identity

Creation, State-Building and Civil Society 1939-1989', in National Identity and Its
Defenders, ed. C J. Reynolds, p. 62 notes that the cabinet itself discussed the change
of name for only ten minutes. One of three ministers with reservations, Thamrong
Nawasawat specifically warned that the new name would be divisive.
90 Abegg, 'Thailand—Old and New,' p. 41.
91 Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 106-107 claims that excepting territories
of the west bank of the Mekong 'Phibun never advertised the enlargement of Thai
territory beyond the status quo.' Perhaps not publicly—surrogates did that for him—
but his government lad claim to all of Laos and Cambodia during the Tokyo
negotiations of 1941, accepted a secret clause in the Japanese alliance promising help
in regaining more 'lost territory', and quite enthusiastically invaded the Shan States
in 1942.
92 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1984), pp. 139-180. For a Lao perspective, see: Mayoury and Pheuiphanh
Ngaosyvathn, Kith and Kin Polities: The Relationship Between Laos and Thailand (Manila:
Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994.
the aggressive actions of the F

torate over Cambodia in 1867. B
spread their country's influence
for a classic episode of gunboat
1893, which forced Bangkok to
on the east bank of the Meko
had gained control over the S
the Thai had attempted, but fa
made additional territorial concessions to France and Britain in the
first decade of the twentieth century in exchange for modifications
in the system of extra-territoriality imposed by the imperial powers,
and the removal of French troops that had occupied Chantaburi and
Trat since 1893. Under a 1904 treaty France acquired control of the
Lao provinces of Sayabouri, opposite Luang Prabang in the north,
and Champassak, opposite Pakse in the south. Three years later the
French obtained the Cambodian provinces of Battambang, Sisophon,
and Siem Reap.95 In 1909 the British negotiated an end to Bangkok's
claim to suzerainty over the northern Malay states of Kedah, Perlis,
Trengganu, and Kelantan.96
The ruling Chakri Dynasty reluctantly ceded its claim to this ter
ritory in the name of national survival. Arguably, averting outright
colonisation made the sacrifice of 176,000 square miles97 (457,600
square kilometres) of peripheral territory, most of it ruled only indi
rectly, worthwhile. The losses rankled nonetheless, and the rise of
nationalist sentiment during the reign of King Vajiravudh raised
hopes that these lands might someday be reclaimed. In mid 1940,
in the wake of Germany's defeat of France, Phibun and his followers
decided that the moment had come.
In the expansive view of Wichit, not only the Lao, the Shan,
and the T'ai peoples in southern China, but even the Cambodians
were 'Thai', the latter a particularly baseless claim that emerged in
the second of his historical dramas, 'Ratchamanu', in 1937. Wichit
estimated the 'Thai' population as high as 60 million,98 but Abegg
considered even a lower estimate of 40 million a wild exaggeration
93 Patrick Tuck, The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese
Independence 1858-1907 (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1995), pp. 13-133.
94 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 182.
95 Tuck, The French Wolf, pp. 215-238.
96 Wyatt, Thailand, p. 206.
97 Ibid., p. 208.
98 Barmé, Luang Wichit, pp. 124-127, 147-149. Wichit later composed an English
language tract justifying his claims regarding the Cambodians, Vichitr Vadakarn
(Wichit Wathakan), Thai-Khmer Racial Relations (Bangkok, 1940).
given that Thailand itself had only 10 to n million ethnic Th

a total population of 14 million.99 In a May 1938 newspaper art
Wichit made clear the motives for his claims by arguing that the
to Thailand's expansion was emulation of Joseph Goebbels' ad
propaganda campaign that convinced the world that the Ger
and Austrians were one people and paved the way for Anschluss.100
World events during the early months of Phibun's administrat
encouraged a belief that the status quo in Southeast Asia c
and probably would, be altered. Fascist forces were on the Marc
Europe, as Franco, backed by Mussolini and Hitler, claimed vict
in the Spanish Civil War; the Germans absorbed Czechoslova
and Italy invaded Albania. Closer to home, Japan not only occup
Hainan and the Spradey Islands, but instituted a humiliating blo
ade around the British concession in the Chinese city of Tianjin.
Accordingly, Phibun paid close attention during the summer
1939 as Japan's leaders debated alliance with Germany and Italy
and his followers saw clear advantages in associating Thailand w
this potential bloc of rising powers. Finance Minister Pridi point
lamented to a friend that he had 'put his money on the wrong h
in advocating reliance on the democratic countries and that his p
and influence had waned accordingly.101
The situation did not develop as expected, however. The Japan
hesitated and Hitler reached out instead to the Soviet Union, Ja
sworn enemy, setting the stage for the invasion of Poland and
outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of September. Phib
responded by adopting a neutral stance toward the European
and accepting a French proposal for a non-aggression treaty. Ph
agreed to negotiations in hopes that French preoccupation with
European conflict would enable him to bargain for modifica
of the Thailand-French Indochina border along the Mekong Riv
Under the existing treaty, the French held all islands in the ri
placing the international boundary half way between any island
the Thai shore, rather than at mid-channel as is usually the
The Thai had attempted previously, but without success, to rec
this anomalous situation that created navigational problems dur
the dry season.
Although the French colonial authorities opposed even the slig
concession, the harsh realities of the European situation now ind
99 Abegg, 'Thailand—Old and New', p. 41.

100 Barmé, Luang Wichit, pp. 127-128.
101 Crosby to London, 11 August 1939, FO 371-23595 (F9143/1860/40), Br
Public Record Office, Kew.
Paris to agree to discuss these m

time the two sides signed the n
France faced imminent defeat
withdrawal from the war, Phib
was simultaneously pressuring
stationing of Japanese forces
golden opportunity to recover a
territories'.
Brushing aside French pleas fo
aggression treaty, in August 19
ante, asking for two French-co
bank of the Mekong River, Say
the Thai sought a French pledg
to Bangkok if they were for
unleashed a diplomatic offensive
claims and to put pressure on
in Indochina, remained contem
French government at Vichy, d
demands.103
The first public indication of a
tactics to force a confrontation
government suddenly announ
people now residing in foreign l
country without paying alien r
the towns along the border with
102 Kobkua (Thailand's Durable Prem

memorandum, that the French had agr
treaty that mid-river would become th
including return of the two Laotian
deal. While it is true that the French
recalcitrant about concessions to Thai
seems inconceivable that any French
of such substantial territories. Further
made no assertion of such a broken F
British and American ministers in the
commitment to return the west bank
capitalize on it in their diplomatic initi
103 E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Jap
Press, 1994), pp. 33-37 and Stowe, Siam
Durable Premier, pp. 255-261) empha
defensible eastern border along the riv
this, but it had no immediate practical
were in no position to threaten Thai
decided to occupy Thailand his army h
no matter where the border might be
104 Bangkok Chronicle, 7 September 1
the official line that all Lao and Cambodians were Thai, the measure
aimed to create instability on the border by inducing an exodus of
unhappy citizens out of French Indochina. Within two weeks, the
Thai press was claiming that 'hundreds' of refugees had crossed the
border.105 In early October came reports that Indochinese police had
murdered a Thai merchant in Vientiane and that the French had
fired on a Thai plane, allegedly flying along the Thai side of the
border. Hanoi retorted that the Thai plane had machine-gunned a
French position 45 miles inside Indochina.106
In publicly setting forth the Thai territorial demands at a press
conference on the afternoon of 13 September, Phibun claimed they
were based on humanitarian concerns for the fate of 'Thai' people
'very eager to rejoin their brethren'.107 Ten days later he revealed the
French refusal to accept the Thai demands, but called for a calm
public response and professed hope for a negotiated settlement.108
In his public appearances and in his conversations with West
ern diplomats Phibun projected the image of a moderate leader
under extreme pressure from the army and the public to rescue the
oppressed 'Thai' in Indochina. A man of consummate charm, Phi
bun invariably displayed a mild and pleasant manner in his meetings
with foreign diplomats. He played the part so well that the recently
arrived American minister, Hugh G. Grant, became convinced that
Phibun actually had lost control of events.109 However, the Japanese
military attaché, Col. Tamura Hiroshi, who was much closer to Phi
bun and his followers, later reported that the premier's power actually
had peaked at this time because the public strongly supported his
policies, permitting Phibun to act 'in a dictatorial way'.110
Although he misjudged Phibun's role, Grant, who had witnessed
the Italian invasion of Albania, did recognise fascist methods when he
and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution (Richmond, Surrey, UK:
Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 118—119 that the Thai authorities had taken a lenient
attitude towards Indochinese crossing into Thailand since 1937.
105 Bangkok Chronicle, 16 September 1940.
107 Bangkok Chronicle, 14 September 1940.
108 Bangkok Chronicle, 23 September 1940 and Transocean dispatch of 27 September,
1940, Melchers Papers.
109 Grant to Hull, 4 and 12 October 1940, Record Group 59, 751G.92/52 and
751G.92/61, US National Archives, College Park, MD. Brailey, Thailand and. the Fall
of Singapore, p. 91 and Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, p 352, note 11 both believe
that Phibun was the victim of chauvinist pressure in the fall of 1940.
110 War History Research Office of the National Institute for Defense Studies, ed.,
Maree shinkö sakusen (The Advance in Malaya) (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1966),
P- 149
124 E- BRUCE REYNOLDS
saw them and was certainly correct in sug

been inspired by Hitler's approach to retak
Grant's negative response to the Thai act
ton, which was maintaining diplomatic tie
ment, to adopt a hostile stance toward T
sharply with the British position, as Crosb
about Phibun's methods, pursued an appe
maintaining good relations. Crosby preferr
der region to a Japanese occupation.
Well-orchestrated demonstrations deman
the French began in Bangkok from i Octob
issued by the Thai Blood party—linked t
by the government—challenged the Tha
for past and present humiliations by becom
'More than 10,000' Yuwachon rallied on the
'to demonstrate their allegiance to the n
their commander, Prayun, declare that alt
the Thai did not fear war.113 On the morn
personally greeted a group of over 3,000
University students, speaking to them Mus
cony of the Defence Ministry. German corr
of witnessing an 'awakening of the national
the afternoon, over 5,000 people joined i
students from the University of Moral an
Thammasat University) Phibun also addresse
Following a new French rejection of Th
saw an even larger march of an estimated
by the Thai Blood group. Miss Thailand j
Melchers' account suggests that a party-lik
Thai Blood circulated fliers demanding tha
Laos and Cambodia, offer an apology fo
47 million baht in compensation. The gr
French failed to comply within a week.
the impression that the demonstrations we
111 Grant to Hull, i October 1940, 751G.92/41, R

Archives.
112 Transocean dispatches of 2 and 4 October 1940

Siam Becomes Thailand, p. 57.
113 Bangkok Chronicle, 5 October 1940 and Transocea
Melchers Papers.
114 Bangkok Chronicle, 8 October 1940 and Transocea
Melchers Papers.
appear before the crowd. In a prepared statement he expressed

his appreciation for public support and suggested that matters were
approaching a climax.116
Behind the scenes, in the wake of the Japanese move into the
Tonkin area of Indochina (22 September) and the conclusion of the
Tripartite Pact that created a Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis (27 Septem
ber), Phibun realized that Thailand could achieve its territorial goals
only with active Japanese support. He also knew, from his ongo
ing contacts with the Japanese military and naval attachés, that the
Japanese push for closer relations reflected a strong desire to use
southern Thailand as the launching point for a future attack on
British Malaya. Accordingly, without consultation with his cabinet,
Phibun suggested to the Japanese naval attaché on 30 September
that he would not oppose future Japanese landings on the southern
Thai coast if the Japanese assisted him in regaining territory from
the French. The leaders of the Japanese army and navy responded
eagerly and persuaded the Japanese cabinet to approve this secret
bargain.117 Meanwhile, Phibun dispatched Prayun to Berlin, ostensi
bly to look after Thai students, but in fact to line up German and
Italian support for Thailand's demands. His departure sparked specu
lation that Thailand was about to join the Axis, reports denied by the
deputy foreign minister, Direk Chayanam.118
Confident of Japanese backing, Phibun intensified the confronta
tion with the French. In a 20 October speech he still held out hope
of a settlement, but cited past Thai military heroes and spoke openly
of preparations to use force as a last resort. He described a French
departure from Indochina as inevitable, and he criticised the colonial
authorities in Indochina for subordinating and discriminating against
the residents of Indochina. Phibun's speech sparked another series of
demonstrations from 22 October.119
November brought more border clashes, increased war prepara
tions, and the articulation of two key arguments aimed at further ral
lying domestic support for an aggressive stance. First, Wichit, citing
116 Bangkok Chronicle, 12 and 15 October 1940 and Transocean dispatches of 12 and
14 October 1940, Melchers Papers.
117 Matsumoto Shun'ichi and Andö Yoshirö, eds., Mhon gaiköshi: nanshin mondai
(Japanese Diplomatic History: The Southern Advance Issue) (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 268
269.
118 Transocean dispatch of 14 October 1940, Melchers Papers and Bangkok Chronicle,
14 October 1940.
119 Bangkok Chronicle, 21 and 23 October 1940 and Transocean dispatches of 20 and
22 October 1940, Melchers Papers.
Phibun's views, argued that a nation must b

The author of a letter to the editor endorsed this social Darwinian
assessment of the world scene, noting that small nations were being
gobbled up by the powerful.120 Direk sounded the second theme when
he declared in a public speech on 27 November: 'Population is an
indispensable factor of a state, and the principle is that people of the
same racial stock and origin should live together in accordance with
the law of nature. This principle is recognised and accepted by the
various states in Europe, but has seldom been applied, thus causing
difficulties. So long as the people of the same race, culture and
civilisation do not live together there can be no peace or happiness
in the world.'121
Not surprisingly, the government effort to rouse anti-French sen
timent affected Thai attitudes toward other foreigners. For example,
a Dane, VB. Nolgaard, encountered hostility from customs officials
and railway personnel while travelling through the country. When he
commented on this to a friend, a long-time Bangkok resident, the
man responded that 'It has all changed in the last few weeks; only
Germans and Japanese are treated differently'. Soon Thai Christians
came under public and government pressure to convert to Buddhism.
On a Buddhist holiday on 11 February 1941 nearly a thousand peo
ple, most of them Roman Catholics, including some 'very prominent
officials', publicly announced conversion to the national religion.122
His forces strengthened by equipment deliveries from Japan and
bearing yet another new title as supreme commander of the armed
forces, Phibun launched an invasion of Indochina in January 1941.
His armies occupied the two Lao provinces on the west bank of
the Mekong and advanced across the Cambodian border. However,
the Thai navy suffered a stinging defeat at the hands of the French
in the Gulf of Thailand on 17 January.123 Phibun, well aware of
the weaknesses of his armed forces, wasted little time in calling on
120 Bangkok Chronicle, 4 November 1940.

121 Bangkok Chronicle, 28 November 1940.
122 Landon, 'The Factor of Increased Japanese Influence in Thailand,' pp. 7, 24
27; Crosby, Siam, pp. 199-120; and 'Thailand Hails Border Victory', The Christian
Century, vol. 58 (15 February 1941): 436. Kobkua, Thailand's Durable Premier, pp. 132—
133 acknowledges that this effort to impose Buddhism as the national religion was not
only a failure, but was counter-productive, particularly in the predominantly Muslin
southern provinces.
123 Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, pp. 166-169 details the course of the war. An
interesting account from a French soldier stationed in Laos is Pierre Boulle, The Source
of the River Kwai (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1966), pp. 27-36.
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA \T]
Japan to bring the war to a quick halt and in accepting the proffered
mediation. The French, who had earlier refused mediation, accepted
under Japanese duress.124
Hoping for full Japanese support for Thai claims at the Tokyo
peace conference, Phibun sought not only the territories the Thai
army had occupied, but demanded the cession of all of Cambodia
and Laos. Here he ran afoul of internal differences on the Japanese
side. Army officers, covetous of bases in Thailand, were inclined
to meet the Thai desires; the foreign minister, Matsuoka Yösuke,
refused. While willing to support limited Thai demands, he wished to
maintain a working relationship with the French colonial authorities.
Matsuoka believed a more balanced approach would enable him to
play the Thai and French off against each other. 'The Thai think
like the Chinese,' Matsuoka declared. 'They talk big, so you have to
haggle and bargain with them.'125
Excessive Thai expectations, French intransigence and Matsuoka's
determination to control the outcome made the peace negotiations
protracted and difficult. Matsuoka came under attack from impa
tient army officers, forcing him to fight a rearguard political bat
tle as he simultaneously struggled to bring the Thai and French to
an agreement. To Phibun's dismay, Matsuoka ultimately prevailed
on all fronts. Not only were Thai territorial gains limited to the
Lao provinces of Sayaboury and Champassak and the Cambodian
provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap, but they were required to
compensate the French for their assets in the ceded territories and
to maintain a demilitarised zone on the Thai side of the border.126
Although the rubber stamp National Assembly unanimously accepted
the settlement on 19 June, one legislator had the temerity to question
Phibun about the latter two points. The Premier would only say that
in the first instance the Thai did not 'desire to hurt the feelings of the
French', and in the second, it 'permitted them to save face'.127
Dampened expectations notwithstanding, Phibun made the most
of the situation. He placed captured military equipment and caged
French prisoners of war on public display, and in March he presided
124 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, pp. 43-45. One quality that set
Phibun apart from some certain other dictators was a realistic appreciation of the
limited power of his military forces.
125 Quoted in Imperial Army General Staff, ed., Sugiyama memo (Tokyo, 1967),
p. 183.
126 Flood, 'Japan's Relations With Thailand,' pp. 415-584 provides the most exten
sive coverage of the mediation.
127 Bangkok Chronicle, 10 and 20 June 1941.
over a three-day celebration.128 He soon

victory monument, a structure formally u
in 1942.129 Then, in July 1941, less than t
that he would not accept a higher rank in t
Phibun promoted himself to the ranks of f
fleet, and marshal of the air force.130 He
Siem Reap, one of the Cambodian provin
settlement.
Having delivered to Phibun more territo
conquered, Japanese military officers felt
their part of their secret bargain and e
to reciprocate. To their disappointment, h
nervously to the advance of Japanese troop
in July 1941.131 With territory in hand an
of falling completely under Japan's sway, P
Britain and the United States to deter fur
Japan's dismay, he declared Thailand's abso
that an invasion from any quarter would
tance, even to the point of implementing
Obviously, he wished to avoid the dangers
secret promise.133
The Unhappy Alliance
By the beginning of December 1941, Phib

would move and that he could expect no e
the British and Americans. He recognised
to the Japanese would destroy the basis of
and would, at best, force him into exile. S
proclaimed neutrality policy and uncertai
128 Transocean dispatch of 12 March 1941, Melcher

129 Bangkok Chronicle, 23 June 1942. Sulak, 'The C
suggests it should be renamed 'the Monument of Sh
130 Bangkok Chronicle, 9 July 1941 and Bangkok Time
131 Tamura Hiroshi, 'Tamura bukan memo,' No. 2
Studies, Tokyo and Asada to Foreign Minister, 4 S
Vol. 2, Japan Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo.
132 The Thai government's line was spelled out
by government announcers 'Nai Man' and 'Nai K
Chaloemtiarana, ed., Thai Politics, 1932-1957, pp.
Thai people in war' passed the National Assembly on
August, 1941).
133 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance.
cess of the Japanese offensive against the Allies, he dared not declare
open allegiance to the Japanese side. Behind the scenes, he tried to
gain assurances that Japanese troops would stay away from Bangkok,
but the Japanese army refused.
Phibun dealt with his dilemma by leaving Bangkok so that he could
not be found when local Japanese representatives came to demand
that he keep his secret promise of free passage. Accordingly, Thai
forces, following standing orders, resisted the Japanese landings in
southern Thailand for several hours before Phibun re-appeared on
the morning of 8 December 1941. At that point he ordered a cease
fire and granted free passage for the Japanese. The brief resistance
provided grounds for a later claim that he had kept his pledge to resist
invasion, but had bowed to overwhelming force to save the nation
from annihilation.134
Now, however, Phibun had to deal with Japanese diplomats dis
mayed by his vanishing act and army officers bitter over the unan
ticipated resistance from the Thai army. Under heavy pressure to
accept a full alliance, concerned that the Japanese might move to
disarm his troops, and impressed by Japan's early successes, including
the sinking of the British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse, Phi
bun agreed to the treaty on 11 December. Despite their unhappiness
with his behaviour, the Japanese granted Phibun a quid pro quo for full
co-operation—a vague pledge that they would facilitate the further
recovery of Thai 'lost territory'. In January 1942 Phibun declared war
on Great Britain and the United States.135
Wichit, who became deputy foreign minister in December 1941
and assumed the ministerial portfolio during 1942, pushed strongly
to make Thailand a full member of the Axis alliance. Beyond his per
sonal enthusiasm for the European fascist states, Wichit hoped that
this would enhance Thailand's standing, and that a closer connection
with Germany would give Bangkok more leverage in dealing with
Tokyo. However, firm Japanese resistance ultimately doomed his ini
tiative.136
Phibun still hoped that he might establish a partnership with the
Japanese that would enable him to create his own mini-empire as a
subsidiary of Japan's. His vision, however, did not accord with that of
the Japanese leaders. With their troops now operating freely in Thai
land they saw less necessity than before to cater to Phibun's desires.
134 Ibid., pp. 81-96.

135 Ibid., pp.103-111.
136 Direk Jayanama (Chayanam), Slam and World War II, ed. Jane G. Keyes (Bang
kok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1978), pp. 76-78.
13O E. BRUCE REYNOLDS
They considered Manchukuo the model for

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a
accept Japan's leadership and priorities wit
Japanese had once viewed Thai independ
nationalism as advantageous to their inte
problematic.137
That his relationship with the Japanese
expectations became evident to Phibun duri
war. Japanese reluctance to employ Thai
Burma provided one clear indication. Phibu
pation because he hoped to lay claim to t
the Tenasserim region, a strip of land on
in southern Burma, had been under Thai co
thaya period and thus was considered 'lost te
rugged Shan states in the north, was popula
peoples, and, as previously noted, had bee
cessful Thai military campaign in the 1850s
the Thai army an active role in the invasion
Japanese sent its forces to the north to guar
much pleading, and at a time (May 1942) wh
was virtually over, did the Japanese permit
the Shan states. Even then the Thai were ke
were not permitted to annex the occupied terri
The negative economic impact of the allian
illusioned and embittered the Thai. Particula
Phibun administration was Tokyo's dogged
baht, which before the war had been wor
to a one-to-one exchange rate. Of even g
quence, however, were demands that the Th
all local currency required by Japanese fo
Japanese loan requests inevitably ballooned w
the Thailand-Burma Railroad and prepared f
tack. The inability of the Japanese to provid
and other manufactured products further f
a flourishing black market.139
137 E. Bruce Reynolds, 'Anomaly or Model? Indep

pan's Asian Strategy, 1941-1943,' in The Japanese Wa
Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N
!996)= PP- 249-260.
138 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, pp
139 Ibid., 122-129 and William Swan, 'Thai-Japan M
of the Pacific War,' Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 23 (1989):
PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA I3I
Conflicts between Thai citizens and Japanese soldiers also con

tributed to Thai disillusionment with the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Proud of their nation's independence and well aware that Japan had
invaded its territory, most Thai resented the Japanese military pres
ence. Exacerbating their resentment was the fact that few Japanese
soldiers, many of whom had previously served in China, considered
the Thai equal allies. Clashes inevitably resulted.140
Only after a deadly fight between Thai citizens and Japanese
soldiers on 18 December 1942 and reverses in the Pacific theatre
did Japan's leaders begin, in early 1943, to recognise the need for
a more accommodating attitude toward the Thai and other Asians.
Looking for a way to make good their promise to assist further in the
recovery of Thailand's 'lost territories' they decided to give Thailand
the portion of the Shan states already occupied by the Thai army and
the four northern Malay states over which Bangkok had once claimed
suzerainty.141
Tokyo sought to maximise the impact of the cession by having
Prime Minister Töjö Hideki reveal the decision to Phibun in person
during Töjö's visit to Bangkok in early July 1943. Phibun's subdued
response reflected his keen awareness of the sagging war fortunes of
Japan and the Axis. In February 1943 he had sent representatives
from his army in the Shan states to negotiate secretly with the
Nationalist Chinese in Yunnan Province. He subsequently infuriated
the Japanese by refusing to attend the November 1943 Greater East
Asia Conference in Tokyo, the capstone event of Japan's effort to
improve relations with the members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.142
Concerned about meeting the fate of Italy's Mussolini, Phibun
focused his efforts on building a new capital in the remote northern
town of Petchabun. His true motive, establishing a military stronghold
from which he could operate independently, was lost on no one,
including the Japanese. Other Thai politicians, now anticipating an
Allied victory, viewed Phibun's project as futile and increasingly
viewed him, because of his alliance with Japan, as a national liability.
Leaders of the Thai navy and Police Chief Adun had begun distanc
ing themselves from Phibun.143
140 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, pp. ioi, 106-107, 136—137
141 Ibid., pp. 154-155 and Reynolds, 'Anomaly or Model?', pp. 263-268.
142 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, pp. 155-160, 163-168 and Naka
mura Aketo, Hotokoe no Shireikan (The Buddha's Commander) (Tokyo: Shühösha,
1958), pp. 73-91.
143 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, pp. 161-162, 169-172.
Relations between Phibun and the Japan

badly by July 1944 that the Japanese actua
tic political enemies in shoving him out of
that he had painted himself into a politic
retired to his suburban Bangkok residence
new Thai government, headed by Khuang A
facade of co-operation with the Japanese, w
established radio contact with the Allies an
underground force that could rise in suppo
Khuang also released political prisoners and
or modify Phibun's fascist-inspired programm
Japanese unwillingness to cater fully to Ph
in 1941 and 1942 when they enjoyed a posi
Japanese whatever chance they had to estab
with Thailand's leader. The Japanese were n
Phibun excessively ambitious, but they wer
conceit. In claiming sole leadership of Gr
purely selfish policies, and holding up Manc
within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japa
other Asian peoples to pursue their own nat
These difficulties in the relationship betw
anese exemplified the problems inherent in
between Axis states. It paralleled the situati
rior national strength forced the proud
rassing and uncomfortable position of su
to Hitler. Moreover, the strong sense of ra
side made Germany and Japan uneasy be
ning. Hitler's self-indulgent, unilateral decision
attack the Soviet Union further undermine
chief European ally.
As Chiang Kai-shek once told his follow
fascist spirit was national self-confidence',
believes that his own nation is "best of all"
history and superior culture of any countr
ultra-nationalists make particularly difficult
144 Ibid., pp. 183-198. As Kobkua notes in Thailand's

to Phibun's credit that in the end he chose to go quie
after realizing that in the face of Allied hostility and
the Thai navy and police, and much of the civilian
hopelessly stacked against him.
145 Quoted in Wakeman, 'Confucian Fascism,' p. 170.
Conclusion
The strong fascist influence on the Thai nationalism promoted by the

Phibun Songkhram regime in the late 1930s and the expansionist poli
cies it pursued is apparent. Given Phibun's strong ambition and the
international trends at the time he came to power, this influence is not
surprising. He and his sympathisers have suggested that his policies
were merely defensive efforts to protect national interests in troubled
times, but this was hardly the case. Phibun, like other contemporary
dictators, came to view charting his nation's course as a matter of per
sonal destiny leading him to see his personal interests as the nation's.
His attempt to turn a lightly populated state with a dearth of industry
into a regional military power aided his own political ascent, but was
doomed to failure. His aggressive policies toward French Indochina
served his short-term political purposes, but brought the country lit
tle advantage. Thailand needed to develop its already extensive ter
ritories, not add more. Although some Lao and Cambodians pre
ferred Thai domination to French rule, most wanted true indepen
dence. Phibun's secret commitment to Japan and the damage to Thai
American relations wrought by the border war greatly complicated
his subsequent attempt to take a neutral position in the developing
regional showdown. Possession of the recovered territories made post
war reconciliation with France difficult. The Thai were reluctant to
return these lands, less because of their inherent value than because
the chauvinistic attitudes promoted by the Phibun regime made it so
politically difficult.
No alternative Thai leader or policy could have averted occupation
by and subordination to the Japanese in December 1941, but Phi
bun's decision to leap onto the Japanese bandwagon backfired badly.
Within a year he recognised his error and attempted to reverse course,
but it was too late. Fortunately for Thailand and Phibun, the war
ended before the land war reached its borders and Pridi had con
siderable success in ameliorating Allied anger over the alliance with
Japan. It is this relatively favourable outcome—which could not have
been confidently predicted by anyone—that has made it plausible to
argue that Phibun's alliance served the national interest by making
the Japanese occupation less unpleasant than it might otherwise have
been.
Only extraordinary luck and curious twists of fate permitted Phi
bun ultimately to escape prosecution as a war criminal and re-emerge
as Thailand's leader again in 1948.146 Chast

Phibun declared that he had mellowed an
he had been in his younger days.147 He wou
1957, but would never be able to assert the
he had enjoyed in his earlier tenure. Kobku
Phibun as 'a cautious, realistic, and astut
purpose appeared to be none other than sim
he managed to restore some aspects of his o
resurrecting the name he had chosen for t
reversion to Siam, the nation became Thail
In a final irony, the aging phunam sought,
invent himself as a democrat in his final effor
thrown by army rivals in 1957, Phibun fled
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, advised by th
engineered Thai nationalism in support of a
An incident during Phibun's 1955 world t
second long tenure as the nation's leader pro
The trip, which marked his first departur
1927, notably included a visit to Spain w
orated Franco and declared his admiration for the venerable dicta
tor.150 One can easily imagine why Phibun so respected Franco. The
Spanish dictator had ridden the fascist wave to power but avoided
Phibun's wartime fate by keeping the Axis states at arm's length. The
crafty Franco had succeeded where Phibun had failed, maintaining
his power into the post-war era without interruption.
San José State University, California

ereynold@sjsu.edu
146 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government
in Thailand, 1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997) covers Phibun's
second tenure at premier.
147 Skeptics were unconvinced. See: Bangkok Post, 22 April 1948.
149 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok:
Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), pp. 179-186.
15° Frank Q. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1965), p. 141.

Phibun Songkram and Thai Nationalisme in The Fascist Era

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Phibun Songkram and Thai Nationalisme in The Fascist Era

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PHIBUN SONGKHRAM AND THAI NATIONALISM IN THE FASCIST ERA

Author(s): E. BRUCE REYNOLDS

Historians generally regard King Vajiravudh (RamaVI, r. 1910-192

of the still unstable People's P

2 George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolu

As early as 1934 a Japanese writer suggested that fas

1 Ä, 'The Rise and Fall of Japanese Communism', Contemporary Ja

emphasis on order and control

Phibun and Fascism

of the absolute monarchy in Siam (as Thailand was then known) in a

which its people have as yet shown little incl

19 The Times (London), 4 March 1935.

23 E. Thadeus Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928-1941,' Ph.D. diss.

Fascist techniques shaped the character of P

30 Scot Barmé, Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation

These two ambitious, self-made men of humble origins both had

Wichit played a prominent role in strengthening relations with

33 Barmé, Luang Wich.it, pp. 53-54.

tion. The following year the Japanese g

38 Ibid., p. 119. The 1935 cultural mission to Jap

consciousness, spirit of sacrifice, and eagerness to serve'. Pointing out

On June 24 [1941], Thailand's National Day a large military display

A report originated by Japan's Dömei news agency in mid 1943

Melchers that his agency h

ernment were hardly comparable to the Nazi 'Final Solu

55 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

Hitler Youth programme, setti

influenced appears in A. James Grego

alert and diligent, secretive, unadorned and simple in habit, all of us

The extent to which Nationalist China's New Life Movement re

described by Drucker can only be appreciat

On the issue of the single, mass-based party, it is important to

China resulted in considerable part from

Towards a Fascist Dictatorship

Phibun formally became his nation's lead

75 Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, 112-117 and Suw

I allowed the campaign depicting me as the PAunara/Leader, because I

77 Bangkok Chronicle, 15 July 1940,

any foreign country respect our nation an

Kobkua further excuses Phibun's dictator

83 Quoted in Ibid., p. 82.

In another surprisingly unanimous vote, in 1939 the National Assem

89 Bangkok Chronicle, 29 September 1939. Chai-anan Samudavanija, 'State-Identity

the aggressive actions of the F

given that Thailand itself had only 10 to n million ethnic Th

99 Abegg, 'Thailand—Old and New', p. 41.

Paris to agree to discuss these m

102 Kobkua (Thailand's Durable Prem

saw them and was certainly correct in sug

111 Grant to Hull, i October 1940, 751G.92/41, R

112 Transocean dispatches of 2 and 4 October 1940

appear before the crowd. In a prepared statement he expressed

Phibun's views, argued that a nation must b

120 Bangkok Chronicle, 4 November 1940.

over a three-day celebration.128 He soon

The Unhappy Alliance

By the beginning of December 1941, Phib

128 Transocean dispatch of 12 March 1941, Melcher

134 Ibid., pp. 81-96.

They considered Manchukuo the model for

137 E. Bruce Reynolds, 'Anomaly or Model? Indep

Conflicts between Thai citizens and Japanese soldiers also con