Diplomacy, Organisations and Citizens A European C... - (Part I Conceptual Approaches)

Conceptual Pathways to Civil Society
Diplomacy
Anca Anton
1 Introduction
Fields such as public diplomacy, corporate diplomacy, or citizen diplomacy have

thrived in the last few decades as diplomacy became increasingly democratised and
technology advanced. One of the major areas of interest has been the role of
non-state agents, particularly in public diplomacy. However, the approach in
research has often been one-sided, namely state-centric. Parallel to this approach,
we have seen the proliferation of research adopting various perspectives on non-state
actors, on civil society and its actors. The result has been a quasi-unified research
field under the umbrella of public diplomacy from a state-centric perspective, while
the perspectives on the actions of non-state actors have only been multiplying, with
no apparent focus regarding, in particular, the civil society diplomatic actions. This
chapter proposes civil society diplomacy as the umbrella concept for the plurality of
perspectives, both state-centric and (in particular) society-centric, that are now used
to describe the diplomacy of civil society.
Copyright © 2021. Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.
2 The “Diplomacies” of Non-state Civil Society Actors
When looking into the concepts and definitions that address the diplomacy involving
civil society actors, we can identify two constants:
A. Anton (*)
Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences, University of Bucharest, Bucharest,
Romania
e-mail: anca.anton@fjsc.ro
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 81

S. P. Sebastião, S. de Carvalho Spínola (eds.), Diplomacy, Organisations
and Citizens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81877-7_5
Sebastião, S. P., & Spínola, S. D. C. (Eds.). (2021). Diplomacy, organisations and citizens : A european communication perspective.
Springer International Publishing AG.
Created from leidenuniv on 2023-05-01 23:17:20.
82 A. Anton
1. There is a plurality of perspectives, focusing either on the agent/actor/initiator

(individual or organisational), on the process, on the interest, or on the relation-
ship with the State.
2. The inclusion of public, citizen, civilian, or other similar terms in the name of the
concept does not clarify whether we are referencing the initiator or the target of
the diplomatic endeavours, with some concepts having multiple not necessarily
overlapping definitions, as we observed in the cases of civic diplomacy and
citizen diplomacy.
This plurality of perspectives points to an ongoing, unsettled conceptual explo-
ration, but also to an effervescent diplomatic sphere in search of a unifying identity,
not unlike that of public diplomacy and organisational diplomacy, which both enjoy
a higher degree of scientific consensus regarding actors, processes, and practice.
In order to identify to what extent an umbrella or unifying concept can be
advanced, we need to explore the plurality of perspectives used when discussing
the diplomacies of non-state civil society actors:
– Actor-centric concepts include citizen (people-to-people) diplomacy, people
diplomacy/peoplomacy, polylateral diplomacy, multistakeholder diplomacy,
civilian power, grassroots diplomacy, celebrity diplomacy, as well as a type of
organisational diplomacy, namely NGO (public) diplomacy;
– Interest-centric concepts include public interest diplomacy, private diplomacy,
social diplomacy, public diplomacy, popular diplomacy, societal diplomacy;
– State relationship-centric concepts include participatory diplomacy, non-official/
unofficial diplomacy, track two diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy, bottom-up
diplomacy.
This distribution of concepts into categories takes into account the name of the
concept, not its definition. Furthermore, it is conducted under the assumption that it
points to a focus of the concept, not to a categorical framing. In this chapter, we
discuss a selection of concepts, based on their ability to advance the discussion
towards a unifying, umbrella concept for the diplomatic activities emerging from
civil society non-state actors.

Civic Diplomacy
The definition of the term civic—“of or relating to a citizen, a city, citizenship, or
community affairs” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.)—begins to lose clarity when combined
with diplomacy, as civic diplomacy is not the object of a unified definition.
One of the first mentions of civic diplomacy is in the context of international
education. When discussing the revoking by the US State Department of a visa
granted to a Muslim scholar based in Europe and invited to teach a course on Islamic
ethics at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, Philip Altbach assesses that the
USA is losing “the battle for the hearts and minds of the Islamic world [. . .] by
mistreating foreigners” (2004, p. 25). He points out the benefits gained by the USA
from the presence in its universities of top students and scholars from around the
world and lauds the University for “engaging controversial people and ideas in an
effort to stimulate dialog and perhaps mutual understanding [. . .] to successfully
Conceptual Pathways to Civil Society Diplomacy 83
engage with ideas and people from abroad”, a goal he considers should also be
reflected in the practice, not just in the discourse of the USA (Altbach, 2004, p. 26).
While the title of the paper points to non-state actors, the analysis is state-centric,
evaluating US public diplomacy and its failure to openly engage foreign publics.
Academic institutions, while recognised as actors of civil society, are seen as acting
on behalf of the State, even if actions and discourses are not aligned.
This perspective is echoed in Nancy Snow’s analysis of the rise of anti-
Americanism starting with the 2000s and the unsuccessful US public diplomacy
response (2006). She attributes this failure to four factors: (1) the use of official
speak, reinforcing the publics’ expectations of propaganda and spin, (2) not moving
the discussion “into the civic society where people are freer to exchange their views
with their overseas counterparts”, (3) not relying enough on civic engagement, but
preferring the actions of government representatives, and (4) talking more than
listening—an aspect that Nicholas Cull puts at the core of diplomatic practice
(2008, p. 32). The “rise of civic diplomacy” addressed by Snow (2006) in her
analysis places the concept in the realm of public diplomacy: in order to be
successful, the endeavours of the public diplomats need to be fully integrated into
the public sphere and engaged in an authentic dialogue with civil society. Therefore,
the use of civic diplomacy points to a missing piece of the puzzle needed to move
public diplomacy towards new public diplomacy, one in which foreign civil societies
are not just the receptors of information, but actors that are actively engaged (not just
targeted) by the State. According to Ayhan’s taxonomy, this is a traditionalist
approach to public diplomacy, but it shifted from a state-centric to a neo-statist
perspective (2018, pp. 6–8), describing a new space and a new stakeholder that need
to be more efficiently integrated in order to secure diplomatic success. In both the
Altbach and the Snow articles, the term civic diplomacy is mentioned exclusively in
the title as a tentative exploration of a necessary role of non-state actors in the
practice of public diplomacy, pointing to an emerging concept that is not yet
operationalised.
The USC Center on Public Diplomacy appears to adopt this perspective on civic
diplomacy, reflected both in Nancy Snow’s text and in a Jakarta Post article about
the Rohingya and the ASEAN society featured on the CPD blog. It is an opinion
piece quoting a representative of a civil society organisation on the need for
Indonesia to engage in civic diplomacy and involving the people instead of the
governments, an approach that is specific to public diplomacy: “civic diplomacy
involves ‘people to people’ contact through all means, involving social media and
conventional media (press diplomacy) with particular emphases on social (human-
itarian) and concrete cultural activities”. (Pizaro, 2016). We see civil society playing
a more active role while proposing and carving its place in the public diplomacy
actions of the State. Non-state actors continue to be instrumentalised by governmen-
tal authorities, but they appear to be in the position where they can set the agenda or
the course of action, moving from being static actors to dynamic ones, stating their
availability for engagement and demanding to be a part of the diplomatic
undertaking.
84 A. Anton
These views on civic diplomacy point to the US perspective on the transformative

integration of non-state actors into public diplomacy while preserving a core focus
on engaging them to support its foreign policy objectives; concepts such as civic
(public) diplomacy (Cull, 2021, p. 8) and direct diplomacy (Potter, 2021, p. 77) both
acknowledge autonomous civil society actors, but place them under the umbrella of
State interests. Direct diplomacy is particularly becoming increasingly useful in
bypassing the censorship of undemocratic regimes and creating (digital) public
squares that allow the expression of multiple voices and the creation of various
narratives across borders (Mackrael, 2015).
Other geographic areas bring slightly more nuanced views on the concept. The
Finno-Ugric civic diplomacy practiced by the Center for Support of Indigenous
Peoples and Civic Diplomacy “Young Karelia” (2018) shows that “Indigenous
Peoples are asserting their role as diplomats in international processes” (Carpenter
& Tsykarev, 2021, p. 122): they participate in interregional and international events,
they present the experience of indigenous peoples of Karelia, they exchange good
practices with representatives from the civil movements of other Finno-Ugric peo-
ples, and they have a special consultative status with the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations since 2019. The NGO is included in the
diaspora/public diplomacy actions of the Ministry of National and Regional Policy
of the Republic of Karelia, while also defining its civic diplomacy actions as public
diplomacy conducted by a non-state actor, an approach that is in line with Castells’
rejection of the centrality of the State: “public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the
public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the
public” (Castells, 2008, p. 91). This is a society-centric perspective on public
diplomacy (Ayhan, 2018, pp. 11–14), one that falls in line with another definition
coming out of Finno-Ugric civic diplomacy studies (one of the few geographic areas
where the concept of civic diplomacy is used): the diplomacy of Finno-Ugric
non-governmental organisations for regional and international cooperation that can
be seen (1) as an element of civic self-organisation of citizens and (2) as an
instrument of the foreign policy of the Finno-Ugric countries (Nemechkin, 2017,
p. 68). The author validates other civil society actors as being able to perform
diplomatic actions (albeit in an unofficial capacity): “the unofficial activity of
individuals and legal entities (non-governmental organizations) aimed at promoting
cooperation between civil society institutions, peoples and states” (Nemechkin,
2017, p. 71). While having two significant shortcomings (lack of consistency
regarding the source of the diplomatic actions and considering the diplomacy of
non-state actors as “unofficial”), the definition coming out of the Finno-Ugric
movement extracts the civil society organisation from the grip of a state-centric
perspective on civic diplomacy and projects it onto a society-centric background,
giving it agency, an approach that resonates with the definition coming out of the
Republic of South Korea (ROK).
The most consistent and nuanced definition to date of civic diplomacy references
a different geographic area, East Asia: “the independent foreign policy orientations
and diplomatic activities of non-state actors working across borders, whether they
engage States, market entities, or other civil society organizations” (Yi & Hayes,
2015, pp. 333–334). The authors’ option for the use of civic diplomacy reflects the
civilian status of non-state actors and their commitment to civility, as well as the
ethical call of citizenship. The definition falls under the accommodative perspective
of public diplomacy (Ayhan, 2018, p. 14). It points to independent civic diplomacy
originating from civil society, rather than the State, as well as to actions at societal
level informed by civil society networks and aimed at stimulating dialogue and
enabling mutual understanding with no government interference, albeit open to
collaboration with State institutions. At the core of this perspective on civic diplo-
macy is what is understood by the concept of non-state actor and the interests it is
focused on. In Yi and Hayes’ vision, “civic diplomacy puts city and local govern-
ments at the forefront of foreign policy along with civil society organizations,
including transnational religious organizations, in place of governments and corpo-
rations” (2015, p. 335). We observe an expansion of the definition of the non-state
actor, one that goes beyond civil society organisations (CSOs) and corporations in
order to include city and local governments, a peculiar presence since they are
traditionally associated with the State. The authors (Yi & Hayes, 2015, p. 320)
reconcile this tension through the concept of “networked civic diplomacy” (State and
non-state actors including local governments cooperating for people’s security and
ecological security) as an alternative to the official “complex public diplomacy”
(State and non-state actors in competition or collaboration to reach state-based
goals). Therefore, the actors of civic diplomacy are transnational CSOs, civil society
networks, diasporas, local governments, and powerful individuals in leadership
positions in these structures, acting across borders in more than one system at a
time (states, organisations, markets), at different levels and locations, with, for,
against or irrespective of the (state) systems in which they find themselves (Hayes
& Tanter, 2015, pp. 68–69). This networked approach brings to the forefront the
complexity of (transnational) civil societies, placing CSOs at the core of diplomatic
actions that primarily address large-scale, even global peace, security, and sustain-
ability issues in a collaborative way. One must ask, however, if there are other core
diplomatic actors beyond networked transnational CSOs or if diplomatic actions are
possible within an emerging civil society or until a networked level of complexity is

achieved.
Citizen (or People-to-People) Diplomacy
Citizen diplomacy is in a fundamentally different conceptual position when com-
pared to civic diplomacy: its definition is stable, it is operationalised, and it is the
focus of extensive research and scientific literature; in addition, people-to-people
(P2P) diplomacy, the label that competes for the conceptual content of citizen
diplomacy, is often presented as a useful nuance rather than a replacement.
“Citizen diplomacy is the concept that every global citizen has the right, even the
responsibility, to engage across cultures and create shared understanding through
meaningful person-to-person interactions” (The Center for Citizen Diplomacy, n.d.).
This perspective saw its most successful incarnation in the case of the United States,
where “public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy inextricably intertwine and overlap
[...] relying on citizen diplomats to act as unofficial ambassadors and build
86 A. Anton
person-to-person relationships [...] that later serve as the context for official dialogue
and negotiations” (Mueller, 2009, p. 102).
In focusing on the person-to-person interactions and relationship-building pro-
cess, citizen diplomacy develops primarily around the individual citizen and its role
in state-centric public diplomacy, not the organisation, seeing the latter as a facili-
tator for additional engagement and a provider of a structured setting, potentially
with strategic relevance. Sharp (2001, pp. 137–141) proposes a typology of citizen
diplomats that underscores the diverse roles played by individuals in relationship
with the State and reflects who or what they are representing and to whom: (1) the
citizen diplomat as a go-between, (2) the citizen diplomat as a representative for a
sectoral, regional, or local economic interest, (3) the citizen diplomat as a lobbyist or
an advocate for a particular cause, (4) the citizen diplomat as a subverter or
transformer of existing policies and/or political arrangements, domestic and/or
international, and (5) the citizen diplomat as an autonomous agent in international
relations. Therefore, we have individuals representing themselves, collectivities at
substate, supra-state, or trans-state levels, communities, organisations (both
non-governmental and commercial), ideas, causes, policies, and states; this repre-
sentation is carried out in front of various state and non-state actors of the interna-
tional community. However, cui bono? The initiator, supporter, or facilitator of such
actions is often the State or a state-like organisational structure, enabling and even
rewarding (U.S. Department of State, n.d.) citizens to be diplomatic actors, acting
either in the interest of the State or of an issue stemming from the complexity of civil
society. The taxonomy proposed by Sharp (2001) brings together state-centric and
society-centric perspectives on the role of the citizen diplomats, as they can be
facilitating, joining, subverting, or transcending existing diplomatic arrangements
set up by the sovereign States system and its institutions.
This diversity of positions that can be occupied by the citizen diplomat is also
reflected in Ayhan’s typology of people-to-people diplomacy (2020). The focus on
representation found in the previous taxonomy gives way to a focus on two dimen-
sions: political influence via bottom-up or top-down processes and the framing of
P2P initiatives as complementary, supplementary, or adversarial to home govern-

ment’s direct public diplomacy activities. We see again government-sanctioned
public diplomacy actions that involve citizens put in the same conceptual category
(albeit different subcategories) as diplomatic actions initiated and delivered by civil
society actors seeking foreign political influence; the common denominator is citizen
involvement, while the distinction lies in the interest: while top-down initiatives
serve the public interest as defined by the State, bottom-up initiatives serve private
interests of civil society actors who ultimately aim to advance a public interest
agenda defined outside the control of the state. This perspective on people-to-people
diplomacy appears to favour two-way communication (Grunig & Grunig, 2008) and
the acceptance of the citizen as a strategic diplomatic actor, not a mere instrument of
the governmental diplomatic corps; however, the juxtaposition of people-to-people
and diplomacy is due to the presence of the citizen in the diplomatic process as an
agent and as a target, not to the pre-eminence of the interest of the individual or the
CSO as the structural cells of civil society.
At the core of people-to-people diplomacy and, particularly, at the core of citizen

diplomacy, lies the role of private individuals defined by their rapport with the State,
whether they act on its behalf or try to advance an agenda that appears autonomous.
In discussing the emergence of citizen diplomacy in the EU–China relations, Fulda
(2019, p. 199) compares diplomats and citizen diplomats from the perspectives of
state-centric public diplomacy and society-centric citizen diplomacy, hinting that the
latter emerges from civil society with close to no EU support. He recommends the
establishment of an EU–China People-to-People Dialogue Support Facility that
would contribute to the linking of the European and Chinese civil societies (Fulda,
2019, p. 210); however, this again places citizen diplomacy in the state-centric
perspective. The authenticity of direct interaction and communication between
individuals is often instrumentalised by the State in order “to break the traditional
one-way, asymmetrical communication” (Yu, 2015, p. 44)—no direct intervention is
needed, as the State can simply act as a catalyst, enabler or designer of the context in
which citizens interact and forge relationships in order to preserve the authenticity
and maintain the credibility of its citizens.
Discussing a state-centric conceptualisation of citizen diplomacy becomes chal-
lenging when discussing individuals whose identity is embedded in multiple national
public spheres (Lee, 2020) or engage in bottom-up digital initiatives (Samuel-Azran
et al., 2019). It further advances the difficulty in identifying what is specific to citizen
diplomacy beyond being performed by individual citizens and does not raise the
profile of CSOs, who take a back seat to the individual actor in the discussion about
this type of diplomacy.
People Diplomacy
People diplomacy is often used as a synonym for citizen diplomacy or people-to-
people diplomacy (Shemesh, 2012) and exchanges (Fulda, 2019), thus referring to
the involvement of citizens in State-led initiatives or to the synchronicity between
civil society-led actions and public diplomacy goals. However, it can also be seen as
diverging from both public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy when referred to, under
South Korean influence, as peoplomacy (Choi, 2019). According to Choi, people
diplomacy “refers to domestic interaction between a government and its own

society” (2019), in opposition to other types of diplomacy which have foreign
counterparts, either governments, citizens, or other diplomatic actors. In addition,
people diplomacy is not restricted to specific projects or activities (as is the case of
conventional diplomacy and political/economic affairs or citizen diplomacy and
mutual exchanges), but rather covers any and all activities of interest to citizens,
under the reservation of governmental opposition. From this perspective, the focus
of people diplomacy is to secure “the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy by
obtaining the constituency’s consent through strengthening the people’s participa-
tion and expanding communication with the people in the process of foreign policy”
(Choi, 2019). Therefore, people diplomacy can also be understood as the specific
actions of governmental and diplomatic institutions to engage their domestic public
in the construction and implementation of foreign policy.
88 A. Anton
Participatory Diplomacy
People diplomacy bears a strong resemblance to participatory diplomacy, a config-
uration of government–society relations aimed at policy coordination between
foreign affairs and citizens (Melissen & Kim, 2018) through which the State
moves from the public information to the two-way communication model (Grunig
& Grunig, 2008), although it remains to be analysed on a case by case basis whether
the communication is symmetrical or asymmetrical; in this chapter, we included this
type of diplomacy among the State relationship-centric concepts. Participatory
diplomacy is fundamentally dialogic and in the age of social media the online public
expects a default attitude of engagement from government and (public) diplomacy
institutions (Seib, 2016, p. 9). Both types of diplomacy are built on the participatory
principle (Altman & Shore, 2014; Arsenault, 2009; Pamment, 2016) of (digital)
public diplomacy as state-led diplomacy and respect Cull’s rule that public diplo-
macy should be linked to foreign policy. However, this particular way of defining
people diplomacy and participatory diplomacy falls short on one fundamental
dimension of any diplomatic actions: they are not aimed at foreign governments or
publics, the key term here being foreign. And, while they address foreign policy, it is
that of the domestic diplomatic institutions, not of those situated abroad. Therefore,
is there really a need for the use of the term diplomacy when other concepts such as
citizen engagement or public consultation better underline the domestic nature of
this dimension of public and citizen diplomacy? Our position is that the term diplo-
macy should not be used freely and indiscriminately, leading to a loss of meaning
and to it becoming an umbrella concept that covers everything and means nothing.
The specificity of diplomatic actions carried out in relation to foreign actors across
borders should be kept at the core of the diplomacy concept, whatever transforma-
tions it may go through.
Polylateral Diplomacy
Polylateral diplomacy further develops the state-centric approach specific to citizen
diplomacy, but puts an emphasis on the strategic integration and collaboration rather
than on the tactical instrumentalisation of non-state actors, aiming at a “purposeful
partnership” (Spies, 2019, p. 180) and the development of a State/non-state actors

relationship (Murray et al., 2011, p. 712). In contrast to other types of diplomacy, a
polylateral approach recognises the diversity of non-state actors coming from both
the commercial and civil society arenas: NGOs, multinational corporations, the
media, and individuals (Spies, 2019, pp. 165–173). The relationship between the
State and the non-state actors “involves some form of reporting, communication,
negotiation, and representation, but not mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent
entities” (Wiseman, 1999, p. 41).
Multistakeholder Diplomacy
Multistakeholder diplomacy bears resemblance to polylateral diplomacy in that it too
addresses the “continually evolving patterns of diplomacy” (Hocking, 2006, p. 15)
from the perspective of the democratisation and privatisation of the diplomatic arena.
The MDS model, nevertheless, is not state-centric, but rather “a reflection of a much
more diffuse, network model” (Hocking, 2006, p. 20), similar to the networked
complexity of civic diplomacy (Yi & Hayes, 2015). The multistakeholder model of
diplomacy is not, however, a society-centric model, welcoming diverse diplomatic
practices and interests as a reflection of the multiple spheres of authority (Zürn et al.,
2018) in contrast to the State as the central diplomatic authority. In terms of actors
and, to some degree, in opposition to polylateral diplomacy, multistakeholder
diplomacy is focused on organisational rather than on individual non-state actors,
both commercial and coming from the third sector: non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), international businesses, and civil society groups (Aguirre Valencia, 2006,
p. 85).
3 Civil Society Diplomacy: A Concept Proposal

3.1 Convergence and Focus: From Civic Diplomacy to Civil
Society Diplomacy
Diplomacy proved to be a very conceptually prolific field, with societal transforma-

tions only enhancing the proliferation of new terms aimed at describing the numer-
ous realities of the diplomatic arena. However, while prolific, the field cannot boast
excessively about the clarity of or the consensus on the terminology it generates. Of
course, this is not the situation across the board, as concepts like public diplomacy
and corporate diplomacy are defined and used to refer to the diplomatic endeavours
of States and companies aimed at foreign publics. As the last arrival in diplomacy
and the one with the least resources, the third sector is not yet in a position to
command such a degree of conceptual consensus. The high number of concepts
referencing or referring to diplomacy involving non-state civil society actors can,
however, be seen as an expression of the dynamics, the plurality of perspectives, and
the structural diversity of the sector. Each of the concepts we analysed in this chapter
brings a different, nuanced perspective on the practice of diplomacy, the role of the
diplomatic actor, the interests at play, or the relationship between “the producers and
the consumers of diplomatic outcomes” (Hocking, 2006, p. 17).
The nuances brought forward by each of these concepts enrich the field and
enable additional and in-depth analysis, but are also an expression of a partial
perspective on the field: each of them addresses a process, an actor, a relationship,
an approach, a space, or an interest, but none of them captures the totality of
perspectives offered by the others or acts as an umbrella concept for the diplomacy
involving non-state civil society actors.
A few come close.
Public diplomacy, seen as the diplomacy of the public and of the global civil
society, not of the government (Castells, 2008) is a primary candidate. However, the
term lacks clarity as to who is the initiator and the receiver of the diplomatic act
unless provided with the context or additional information, an issue it shares with
state-led public diplomacy; furthermore, this definition lost the conceptual
90 A. Anton
popularity contest, as the state-centric definition is the primary way in which the
concept is understood and used both professionally and in academia.
Public interest diplomacy (Arbour, 2009) may be another suitable candidate but,
in addition to the issues generated by the presence of the word public, it has a
contradiction it may find difficult to overcome: while addressing (international)
public interest (understood as the interest of the public), the main actor in the
implementation of this type of diplomacy is represented by the civil society organi-
sations which, while acting on issues of the public sphere, are part of the private
sector and, therefore, are driven by private interests. The alignment of the private
interests of the organisation and the public interests expressed and validated in the
public sphere may or may not happen, an undesirable unpredictability from a
potential umbrella concept.
Both polylateral and multistakeholder diplomacy come close to being a suitable
fit. However, polylateral diplomacy, while inclusive in terms of actor diversity, is
state-centric and does not see civil society actors as the main driving force behind
diplomatic actions. Multistakeholder diplomacy is neither State- nor society-led,
projecting a networked, diffuse approach; this model, while nuanced and adaptable
to society-led diplomatic agendas, lacks specificity to and focus on the third sector. If
our objective is to identify a viable umbrella concept, then specificity is essential.
Civic diplomacy was the initial contender in this selection process, having been
included as one of the core concepts of the MARPE Diplo project (2020) which
aimed to develop a European public, corporate, and civic diplomacy curriculum and
body of knowledge (MARPE Network, n.d.). However, we propose to use civil
society diplomacy (CSD) as an umbrella concept instead of civic diplomacy. This
transition will bring clarity regarding the source, the producer of diplomatic actions;
additionally, it will situate the discussion about public-led diplomatic interests,
goals, and actions in a society-centric paradigm rather than in a state-centric one:
civic is related to the citizen and to the idea that one must follow the laws and rules
put forth by the State (so civic diplomacy would still be state-centric to some
degree), while civil society refers to associations or communities that work above
and beyond the State (so civil society diplomacy would not be state-centric and
would not put the interest of the state at the centre of its actions).
3.2 Differentiation: Civil Society as a Complex System
Civil society diplomacy is a proposal for an umbrella concept mirroring the diplo-
matic actions of the State, on the one hand (conventional diplomacy and public/
citizen diplomacy), and those of organisations in general and companies in partic-
ular, on the other. However, due to the fundamentally different nature of civil society
by comparison to the State or to an organisation, there is a series of differences that
need to be pointed out as they will substantially impact the type of diplomacy each
system will practice.
States and organisations are established, rule-oriented structures that try to pre-
serve the status quo and their integrity. In terms of simple and complex systems
(Hayes & Tanter, 2015, p. 49), they tend to equilibrium, have controlled decision-
making processes, a lower number of agents that collaborate, and seek/deliver
predictable outcomes. In contrast, civil society is a complex system that tries to
change and improve its environment, is dynamic and dissipative, has a decentralised
approach to decision-making, involves many agents, delivers surprising outcomes,
“is multidimensional and employs multiple mechanisms and strategies” (Whall &
Pytlak, 2014, p. 453), adapted to the engagement of each actor with each of its target
audiences. Therefore, civil society diplomacy should not be explored using the
mould of traditional, public, or even corporate diplomacy. The state and the corpo-
ration are well defined in their roles, structures, objectives, and modus operandi.
Civil society does not work in the same way and neither does its diplomacy; instead,
it is fluid, diffuse, less structured, and, to some extent, unpredictable if we try to
anticipate its dynamics using models developed for other societal systems. Using
civil diplomacy as the umbrella concept we have been looking for means moving
forward from applying a state/organisational approach to a system (civil society) that
plays by other rules, that has a “fluidity” (Scott-Smith, 2014, p. 7) that is difficult to
contain in the somewhat rigid structures and processes of the state-centred public
diplomacy or the organisational-centred diplomacy.
The “diplomacies” of non-state civil society actors explored in this chapter point
to a plurality of perspectives that can be brought together only by accepting their
diversity and variation while adopting an inclusive conceptual approach. Civil
society is similar, from this perspective, to “the international system, itself a dynamic
complex system that is not controlled centrally and constitutes an open-ended,
evolving structure” (Harrison, 2006, p. 27).
3.3 Definition: The Components of Civil Society Diplomacy

In defining civil society diplomacy (CSD), the diplomatic non-state actors (NSAs)
should be seen as “producers of diplomatic outcomes” (Hocking, 2006, p. 17)—they
are not only actors, but also action agents. The reference to civil society allows for a
certain amount of liberty in defining, in time, who the NSAs are: if potential trans-
formations of the civil society generate the rise of new actors, no conceptual
realignment will be needed, they will simply be integrated into the diplomatic
actions arising from civil society. This openness also applies to the diplomacy
practiced by each actor or to processes: CSD includes under its conceptual umbrella
grassroots diplomacy, civil society organisations (CSO) diplomacy, NGO diplo-
macy, celebrity diplomacy, and various forms of state-centric public diplomacy like
citizen, people-to-people, participatory, unofficial, track two, and diaspora diplo-
macy. We do not include among the agents of CSD subnational or regional govern-
ments practicing paradiplomacy, nor commercial organisations practicing corporate,
business, or organisational diplomacy; these non-state actors can engage or be
92 A. Anton
Fig. 1 The action agents of

civil society diplomacy
CSOs
civil
networks society individuals
diplomacy
movements
engaged by action agents of CSD, as proposed by Yi and Hayes (2015) in their

development of networked civic diplomacy, but their goals, interests, and legitima-
tion mechanisms will differ from those of the CSD agents. In addition, we do not
include anti-diplomatic or violent non-state actors (such as terrorist groups, pirates),
as civil society is and should remain a system of civility. In our discussion about civil
society diplomacy agents we take into consideration individuals acting at an interna-
tional level, as well as Castells’ taxonomy of global civil society forms of organi-
sation and action (2008, pp. 83–87):
– Local civil society actors that practice civic engagement and nurture the growth of
global civic diplomacy: grassroots organisations, community groups, labour
unions, interest groups, religious groups, and civic associations,

– Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a global or international frame of
reference in their actions and goals—act outside government channels to address
global problems,
– Social movements that aim to control the process of globalisation—build net-
works of action and organisation.
Therefore, civil society diplomacy is performed/carried out by various agents:
civil society organisations (CSOs), transnational civil society networks, transna-
tional movements, and/or individuals emerging from civil society for societal inter-
ests, causes and issues, and acting across borders (Fig. 1).
CSO diplomacy is a type of organisational diplomacy (see chapter “From Cor-
porate to Organisational Diplomacy” in this book). We opted for the use of this term
as it defines the organisation based on what it is (an organisation emerging from the
public sphere and the civil society) rather than on what it is not (non-governmental or
not-for-profit). CSO diplomacy is at the core of CSD, but not all CSOs engage in
diplomacy and not all the activities of a CSO are diplomatic. International CSOs
interact across borders with foreign counterparts, public opinion, market-driven
actors, or governments on a spectrum going from “deliberate confrontation to
strategic cooperation” (Spies, 2019, p. 166). CSOs can act both domestically and
internationally, on multiple levels and locations (Hayes & Tanter, 2015, p. 69), in an
effort to maximise impact and gain home validation for foreign actions.
When discussing the action agent(s) of a type of diplomacy, the concepts
of legitimacy, accountability, interest, and representation are at the centre of the
discussion (Table 1). The legitimacy of a civil society agent (CSA) is different than
that of a government, obtained as the result of a vote, or of an organisation, obtained
through a charter. While the State has democratic legitimacy, CSAs can obtain
support, validation, and, therefore, legitimacy, by (1) showing effectiveness, by
(2) being transparent, participative, and consensual, and by (3) proving that they
represent the common values of the general public, linked with universal values in
the case of global actions (La Porte, 2012, p. 453). The mechanisms for obtaining or
claiming legitimacy depend on the type of legitimacy, on whether it is traditional,
charismatic, or legal-rational, according to Weber, and on the source of legitimacy:
convention, contract, universal principles, sacredness, expertise, popular approval,
personal ties, and personal qualities (Matheson, 1987, pp. 200–205). Other perspec-
tives identify the source of civil society diplomacy agents’ (CSDA) legitimacy in
“their expertise, size, effectiveness, and ability to achieve outcomes, rather than in
legally codified sources of authority” (Gregory, 2016, p. 23). Therefore, we can
identify which can be the source of legitimacy for civil society agents, particularly
for those whose identity is not necessarily anchored in an organisation (individuals,
networks, movements) or structurally stable (movements, networks).
Legitimacy is a prerequisite for the transformation of CSA into diplomatic agents,
as well as for their accountability, but the structure, interest, and modus operandi
diversity of civil society diplomacy agents (CSDAs) calls for conditions to this
transformation: the actor should be minimally institutionalised (“have a basic orga-
nization, clear objectives, stable representation, and coordinated activity”) and its
objectives should be political, expressing “a desire to have a permanent influence on
policies, procedures, and international relations” (La Porte, 2012, pp. 449–450).
Taking into account these conditions of both the internal configuration of the
organisation and the external configuration of intent and actions, we can state that
there also is a need for dual legitimacy for each CSDA as far as the source is
concerned. This duality of legitimacy comes from the duality of representation
performed by CSDAs, “organized around two dimensions: who or what is being
represented and to whom [. . .] whether they try to work for, with, against, or in spite
of existing diplomatic arrangements with a view to facilitating, joining, subverting,
or transcending them” (Sharp, 2001, p. 137).
CSD can be seen as the equivalent of State public diplomacy, but originating in
the public sphere, performed by civil society agents and serving the (global) public
interest that is not conditioned by the state-defined national interest. This similarity
of the process allows for similarity of diplomatic aims, namely to “listen” (Cull,
94 A. Anton
Table 1 The transformation of civil society actors (CSAs) into civil society diplomacy agents
(CSDAs)
CSA/CSDA CSOs Networks Movements Individuals
Legitimacy type Legal-rational Legal-rational Traditional Charismatic
Legitimacy source Contract/char- Universal prin- Universal principles Personal
ter ciples Popular approval qualities
Popular Expertise Institutionalisation Personal ties
approval Size capability Popular
Expertise Networking Effectiveness approval
Size capability Expertise
Effectiveness Effectiveness Sacredness
Effectiveness
Interest Private Private Public Private
Public Public Public
Institutionalisation Mandatory, Necessary, Optional, but neces- Optional, but
variable networked sary for diplomatic necessary for
Present from Developed in agentry diplomatic
the start time, if Developed in time, if agentry
necessary necessary Developed in
time, if nec-
essary
Ambassadors
for State and
non-state
actors
Diplomat Legal repre- Formal/informal Self-appointed/infor- Themselves
sentative or mandatee(s) mally approved, visi-
formal ble/vocal individuals
mandatee(s) or groups (ad-hoc
leadership role, pos-
sible
institutionalisation
process)
Behaviour regard- Facilitate/join/subvert/transcend
ing existing diplo-
matic
arrangements
Diplomatic goals Build legitimacy for themselves and for the cause/issue/actors they are
representing/Listen to their publics/Understand cultures, attitudes, and
behaviour/Build and manage relationships/Influence opinions and actions to
advance their interests and values
Addressee of the State(s)/Profit and not-for-profit organisations and local governmental
action structures in other countries/Public opinion in other countries/Other civil
society diplomacy agents/Media/Armed anti-diplomatic non-state actors
Official access to Variable High when No Low
(global/interna- institutionalised
tional) governance and co-opted in
and policy- state-based
making networking
(continued)
Table 1 (continued)
CSA/CSDA CSOs Networks Movements Individuals
Engaged by the Yes Yes No Yes
State as CSDA
(+/– as public
diplomacy/citizen
diplomacy actor)
Modus operandi Lobbyinga/Media relations/Community relations/(Social media) advocacy/
Negotiationa/Networking/Visits/Events/(Consultation) meetingsa/Issues
Managementa/Celebrity engagement
a
If minimal institutionalisation is achieved
2008, p. 32) to publics, “understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour, build and
manage relationships, and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests
and values” (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). In addition, civil society diplomacy agents need
to pursue one more goal: build legitimacy for themselves and for the cause/issue/
actors they are representing. Furthermore, three more conditions (besides minimal
institutionalisation and politically-bound objectives) for the transformation of CSA
into diplomatic agents arise from this equivalence: activities must have diplomatic
objectives, communication with foreign publics or the international community must
be the main tool of the initiative, and the initiatives must be for public rather than
private interests (Ayhan, 2018, p. 13).
The similarities we mentioned between civil society diplomacy (CSD) and State
public diplomacy (PD) enable cooperation between state and non-state actors,
bringing together various combinations of state, civil society, and market-driven
agents/diplomats in order to create hybrid networks addressing a variety of interna-
tional issues: trans-governmental networks, polylateral networks, cosmopolitan net-
works, and private governance networks (Gregory, 2016, pp. 17–18).
4 Conclusion
Diplomacy, no matter its source, is increasingly focused on “mobilizing and linking

‘networks’ of private actors to promote particular causes” (Scott-Smith, 2014, p. 3).
When the initiator of this mobilisation is the State, we call it public diplomacy; when
the initiator is an organisation (for-profit or not-for-profit), we call it organisational
diplomacy; when the initiator is a civil society actor, we call it civil society
diplomacy (CSD). The diplomatic agents will need to fully understand the nature,
legitimacy source(s), interest, objectives, target public(s), and modus operandi of the
systems they develop in order to have a comprehensive, strategic approach to their
communication. The development of all perspectives is necessary in order to
empower civil society to develop its own independent, substantiated approach to
diplomacy, organisations to be responsible according to their licence to operate, and
the States to have a more open approach at diplomatic and international governance
96 A. Anton
levels, reflecting and integrating the transformations and the democratisation of the
public sphere.
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Anca Anton (anca.anton@fjsc.ro) is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Journalism and Communi-
cation Sciences, University of Bucharest, teaching marketing, corporate PR, and digital writing. She
collaborates with the Faculty of Business Administration and the Faculty of Foreign Languages
(University of Bucharest) for various BA/MA English-taught courses: intercultural communication

and negotiation, public relations and strategic communication for businesses and organisational
culture. Her research interests cover digital and strategic communication, organisational commu-
nication and public and civil society diplomacy. She has published in Styles of Communication
and the Romanian Journal of Journalism and Communication. She has extensive experience in
EU-funded projects, specialising in communication and marketing consultancy; in addition, she
initiated and is the coordinator of a nationally awarded environmental volunteering project since
2006. Anca Anton has been part of the MARPE team since 2012 and is the Romanian coordinator
within the MARPE Diplo project. She is also a member of EUPRERA and the Romanian PR
Association.

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Conceptual Pathways to Civil Society

Fields such as public diplomacy, corporate diplomacy, or citizen diplomacy have

2 The “Diplomacies” of Non-state Civil Society Actors

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 81

1. There is a plurality of perspectives, focusing either on the agent/actor/initiator

civil society non-state actors.

These views on civic diplomacy point to the US perspective on the transformative

possible within an emerging civil society or until a networked level of complexity is

P2P initiatives as complementary, supplementary, or adversarial to home govern-

At the core of people-to-people diplomacy and, particularly, at the core of citizen

diplomacy “refers to domestic interaction between a government and its own

partnership” (Spies, 2019, p. 180) and the development of a State/non-state actors

3 Civil Society Diplomacy: A Concept Proposal

Diplomacy proved to be a very conceptually proliﬁc ﬁeld, with societal transforma-

3.2 Differentiation: Civil Society as a Complex System

3.3 Deﬁnition: The Components of Civil Society Diplomacy

Fig. 1 The action agents of

engaged by action agents of CSD, as proposed by Yi and Hayes (2015) in their

unions, interest groups, religious groups, and civic associations,

Diplomacy, no matter its source, is increasingly focused on “mobilizing and linking

Aguirre Valencia, R. (2006). The role of non-state actors in multistakeholder diplomacy. In

ity. Retrieved from http://nuorikarjala.ru/en/motion/projects/ﬁnno-ugorskie-narody-karelii-

(University of Bucharest) for various BA/MA English-taught courses: intercultural communication

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