The Relation between Law and Morality: Children's Reasoning about Socially Beneficial and

Unjust Laws
Author(s): Charles C. Helwig and Urszula Jasiobedzka
Source: Child Development, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2001), pp. 1382-1393
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654393
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 Child Development, September/October 2001, Volume 72, Number 5, Pages 1382-1393

The Relation between Law and Morality:

Children's Reasoning about Socially Beneficial and Unjust Laws
Charles C. Helwig and Urszula Jasiobedzka

This study investigated children's reasoning about laws and legal compliance. A total of 72 children, 24 each at
6, 8, and 10 years of age, made judgments of law evaluation ("Is it a good or bad law?"), legitimacy of legal reg-
ulation ("Is it OK or not for government to make a law?"), and law violation ("Is it OK or not for people to
break the law?") for three socially beneficial laws (a traffic law, a vaccination law, and a law requiring compul-
sory education for children under 16) and three unjust laws (denial of education to a class of persons, denial of
medical care to the poor, and age discrimination). Participants also evaluated the application of laws in conflict
scenarios in which a socially beneficial law infringed on individual freedom. Results showed that children
considered a number of factors in their judgments, including the perceived justice of the law, its socially bene-
ficial purpose, and its potential for infringement on individual freedoms and rights. The findings showed that
children apply moral concepts of harm, rights, and justice to evaluate laws and to inform their judgments of
legal compliance.

INTRODUCTION
such as "What would happen if there were n
"What is the purpose of laws?" and "Is it eve
The legal code has been identified as a mechanism for
break a law?" Based on their findings, they p
ensuring a just or moral social order (Tapp & Kohl-
a developmental model of legal reasoning par
berg, 1971). A prominent function of rules and laws is
Kohlberg's moral stages (Kohlberg, 1981). T
to bring benefit and prevent harm to both the individ-
Kohlberg found that elementary school-age
ual and the community. Historically, the establishment
tended to exhibit a rule-obeying perspective,
of a formal legal code in a community is often seen as
conventional concern with punishment and
marking its entry into "civilization." Within moral
in which law violation is never seen as accept
philosophy, many scholars have drawn distinctions
majority of middle school-age children and
between law and morality, noting that moral prin-
cents, however, exhibited a rule-maintaining
ciples may be held to be valid independent of their cod-
tive, or a conventional concern with law and
ification within explicit legal systems (Dworkin, 1977;
Those children and adolescents adopted a "m
Gewirth, 1978; Rawls, 1971). At times, the require-
of circumstance," in which law violation is s
ments of morality and law may be perceived to be in
permissible only under extreme conditions, f
conflict. This is seen, for example, in instances of
ple, when obedience leads to serious harm or
civil disobedience, or the principled violation of laws
life. Finally, college students displayed a post
viewed as unjust, which has been an important source
tional or rule-making perspective. This pers
of progressive social and legal change (Arkes, 1986;
recognizes the possibility of a conflict betw
Feinberg, 1980).
rules and the demands of morality. With re
Interest among developmental psychologists in
law violation, undergraduate students conside
the issue of children's understanding of the relations
morality of the rule itself, regardless of its actu
between law and morality led to a number of studies
sequences, and were likely to argue that unj
on this topic in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of this re-
search was conducted within the contextshould
of the not be followed. These patterns are sim
moral
Piaget's (1932) proposition of a shift from heter
developmental stage theories of Piaget and Kohlberg.
or unquestioned respect for authority and rigid
Building on perspectives in ethics that distinguish
ence to rules, to a more autonomous and flexible
morality from the requirements of themorallegal system
orientation in late childhood.
(Hare, 1952; Kant, 1785/1949; Rawls, 1971), Tapp and
Other researchers (Adelson, Green, & O'Neil, 1969;
Kohlberg (1971), for example, sought to investigate
Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; Brown, 1973) examined ado-
the development of the ability to differentiate moral-
ity from law. Tapp and Kohlberg adopted an open-
interview format, in which children, adolescents, and
? 2001 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
college students were posed with general questions,
All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2001/ 7205-0007

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 Helwig and Jasiobedzka 1383

lescents' (ranging from 11 to 18 years of age, across shown that they distinguish a personal domain and
several studies) reasoning about laws in situations view some areas, such as choice of hairstyle, friends,
that involved conflicts between individual autonomy or leisure activities, as beyond the boundaries of legit-
and community or societal benefits (e.g., income tax imate authority regulation. Children early on appear
laws, confiscation of property by the state under em- to develop a critical perspective on authorities and so-
inent domain, and a ban on smoking). The findings cial institutions within their immediate environment,
were interpreted as showing a general progression to- to which they apply moral concepts of rights, harm,
ward an increased awareness of the social benefits of and fairness to evaluate social rules and the com-
laws in late adolescence. This interpretation, how- mands of authorities. Whether and in what ways chil-
ever, may be called into question by contextual varia- dren may extend this critical perspective to other so-
tion in some of the responses that was not sufficiently cial institutions, such as legal rule systems, however,
analyzed or interpreted. For example, in the study byremains to be determined.
Brown (1973), both younger and older adolescents Previous research on legal reasoning has two limi-
(grades 7, 8, 10, and 12) were less likely to advocatetations that may have served to underestimate young
compliance for laws that appeared to be unjust or inchildren's competence in this area. First, the situa-
strong conflict with personal autonomy (e.g., a ban ontions in which children's reasoning was assessed
protest, an army draft) than for laws that appeared to have exclusively taken the form of 'complex con-
promote social goals such as prevention of harm (e.g.,flicts between individual autonomy and social bene-
vaccination laws or a ban on guns). These findings fits (Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; Brown, 1973). Assessing
suggest that when evaluating laws and making judg-reasoning only in complex conflicts, rather than in
ments of compliance, young adolescents and perhapsmore straightforward situations as well, has been
even younger children do consider factors such asshown to underestimate children's and young adoles-
perceived social benefit, as well as impact on personalcents' understanding in related areas such as civil lib-
autonomy, fairness, and rights. According to this in- erties and democracy (Helwig, 1995a, 1997, 1998). In
terpretation, children's reasoning about rule violationaddition, the use of open-ended questions (Tapp &
is multifaceted and takes into consideration the con- Kohlberg, 1971) that require children to generate ex-
tent of the rule-aspects of reasoning that global stage ceptions to laws may have led to production de-
models, such as those advocated by Piaget (1932) and mands resulting in a bias against younger partici-
Tapp and Kohlberg (1971), do not explain well. pants; young children may be able to recognize
This interpretation is consistent with other, more exceptions to legal compliance if given concrete ex-
recent research on children's social and moral judg- amples of unjust laws to evaluate, although they may
ments, in which it was found that children do not not be able to generate such examples spontaneously.
have a unitary orientation toward social rules, but The current study was designed to examine chil-
rather distinguish different types of rules, including dren's ability to distinguish different types of laws in
those about morality and social conventions (Turiel, their social and moral judgments and reasoning, as
1983, 1998). Moral rules involving issues of harm and well as to address the methodological shortcomings
justice are viewed as unalterable and universal, of previous research in this area. The study focused
whereas rules about social conventions-for example, on elementary school children (6-11 years) because
customs or social organizational rules-are judged to this age group has been characterized in previous re-
be variable depending on culture, social context, and search as being oriented toward obedience to law and
social consensus. Moreover, children do not show a authority (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971) or has been ne-
heteronomous orientation toward authority, as sug- glected in other research on reasoning about legal
gested by Piaget (1932). When reasoning about com- compliance (Brown, 1973). Children's judgments and
pliance to an authority figure, such as a teacher in a reasoning were investigated for two types of laws: (1)
school setting, children take into account factors such those that have a clear social goal and relatively min-
as the authority's status, knowledge, and the content imal impact on individuals' autonomy, and (2) those
of the authority's command (Laupa, 1991, 1994; Laupa laws that directly implicate moral concerns of justice
& Turiel, 1986, 1993). For example, Laupa and Turiel and fairness for others (i.e., unjust, discriminatory laws).
None of the previous research on children's judg-
(1986) found that children 6 to 11 years of age rejected
the commands of an authority who is otherwise ments of compliance has contrasted socially benefi-
viewed as legitimate when the commands are likely cial laws with unjust laws directly. The latter
to result in harm (e.g., a teacher's command for chil- category-laws implicating justice or fairness-is es-
dren to continue fighting). Studies of children's con- pecially important for evaluating Tapp and Kohl-
ceptions of personal jurisdiction (Nucci, 1981) have berg's (1971) claim that younger children tend to be-

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1384 Child Development

lieve that law violation is never acceptable. In line ing; and 10% (all mothers) were homemakers. The
with recent studies of social reasoning discussed ear- majority (65%) had a university degree, and many also
lier, however, it is expected that when evaluating had some postgraduate education.
laws, children will consider the content. Specifically, Design and procedure. Participants were interviewed
unjust laws are expected to be judged as less worthy individually in one session approximately 25 min in
of compliance than socially beneficial laws, even by length. The interview began with a description of a
younger elementary school-age children. hypothetical country (similar to Canada) and its gov-
As in previous studies (Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; ernment, which had proposed a series of new laws.
Brown, 1973), participants in the current study were Two broad types of laws were contrasted: those with
also asked to make judgments about laws under con- a socially beneficial goal and unjust laws.
ditions in which socially beneficial laws may have im- The socially beneficial laws revolved around three
plications for individual rights and autonomy. The central themes: (1) traffic laws, (2) compulsory vacci-
purpose was to determine whether, in addition to nation, and (3) compulsory education. These themes
showing sensitivity to the perceived social benefits or were chosen to reflect areas in which for many societ-
justice of the laws, children's judgments of compli- ies (including that of the participants) legal restric-
ance would also be responsive to concerns about the tions on the behavior of individuals in the service of
impact of laws on individual rights and autonomy. Is- beneficial social goals do exist, and the curtailment of
sues explored included situations in which socially individuals' autonomy involved in such prohibitions
beneficial laws limited individuals' choice over mat- is likely to be seen as fairly minor. In addition, con-
ters relating to their own physical welfare, or their flicts were described in which the salience of issues of
basic rights and civil liberties, such as freedom of reli- individual autonomy and rights was increased for
gion (Helwig, 1997). laws corresponding to each of the three themes. These
Because of the largely exploratory nature of the conflicts involved issues such as the right to make
particular conflicts examined in the current study, itchoices in situations in which one's own physical wel-
was not possible to make exact predictions about howfare is at stake, or those in which basic rights such as
children would judge and reason about these cases. Infreedom of religion are implicated. The purpose of
general, however, it was expected that applications ofthese manipulations was to determine whether par-
laws entailing conflicts between individual rights andticipants would take into account concerns about the
social purposes would produce compliance judgmentseffects of restrictive laws on individual autonomy in
somewhere between those of the straightforward so-making judgments of legal compliance.
cially beneficial and unjust laws. Conflicts were chosen to represent reasonable and
ecologically valid instances in which each kind of so-
METHOD
cially beneficial law might come into conflict with in-
dividual autonomy. The aim of this exploratory aspect
Participants. The sample consisted of 72 the of study was to determine whether children were
Canadian
children evenly divided into three age groups, broadly sensitive
with to issues of autonomy of various
equal numbers of males and females in each types group:
in their legal judgments of compliance. This ne-
6-year-olds (M = 6,5, range = 5,8-6,11), 8-year-olds cessitated the construction of individual conflicts that
(M = 8,7, range = 8,2-9,0), and 10-year-olds encompassed
(M = 10,7,issues such as harm to the self and con-
range = 10,0-11,0). Participants were drawn cernsfrom
with individual
a rights and civil liberties, appro-
database maintained at the University of Toronto priate to each
con-of the socially beneficial law themes
taining names of families residing in the Toronto (traffic,metro-
vaccination, and compulsory education). Be-
politan area who had agreed to participate cause thein re-
particular autonomy issue (e.g., individual
search. Families in the database were welfare originally
or freedoms) implicated in each conflict nec-
recruited from hospitals and day-care centers essarilyin
varied
theby each kind of socially beneficial law,
region or through mass mailings. Participants the salience
weremanipulations were not intended to be
predominately of European background (76%);either
equivalent 7% in magnitude or quality across the
were Asian and the remainder were of various other different areas. For this reason, comparisons (statisti-
ethnic backgrounds. Sixty-seven percent of parents cal or otherwise) were conducted-and any resulting
elected to provide information about their occupationconclusions were drawn-only between the socially
and education level on a demographic questionnaire. beneficial laws and conflict conditions within each
Of these, 66% were employed in professional, sales, law theme, and not among the conflicts themselves.
managerial, or technical occupations; 17% were em- For traffic laws, the social goal involved protection
ployed in service occupations, trades, or manufactur- of individuals from physical harm. The socially bene-

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 Helwig and Jasiobedzka 1385

ficial traffic law was a restriction on driving at a verydoctors from treating poor people. For age discrimi-
high speed on the highway (a speed-limit law). The nation, a government made up of the elderly passes a
conflict scenario for the traffic law theme described an law that forbids young people from sitting down on
individual who doesn't want to comply with a traffic buses and subways, even when empty seats are readily
law requiring the use of seat belts, arguing that only available.
the individual concerned and no one else will suffer To examine children's evaluations of laws and their
the consequences if seatbelts are not worn during an judgments of legal compliance, three types of judg-
accident. This scenario pits the social goal of protec- ments were assessed for each of the socially beneficial
tion of individuals from harm against individual free- and unjust laws. Participants were asked to evaluate
dom of choice in instances in which the behavior may the law ("Is it a good or bad law?"), to judge the legit-
only have direct harmful consequences to the self. imacy of governmental regulation ("Is it OK or not for
In the vaccination law example, the social goal in- government to make this law?"), and to evaluate the
volved protection of individuals from disease. The so- acceptability of law violation ("Is it OK or not for Mr.
cially beneficial vaccination law was a requirement or Ms. X to [act contrary to law]?"). Judgments of the
that all individuals obtain a chicken pox vaccination. acceptability of law violation were also obtained in
The corresponding conflict scenario introduced a sit- the conflicts that manipulated the salience of auton-
uation in which, as a result of an imperfect vaccine, a omy concerns for each type of socially beneficial law.
small proportion of people will contract the disease. Judgments of law evaluation and legitimacy were not
An individual who is afraid of contracting the disease assessed for the conflict scenarios because they were
from the vaccination refuses to be vaccinated. This less central to the study's major purpose of examining
conflict pits the social goal of public health against in- judgments of legal compliance in relation to prior re-
dividuals' choice in making medical decisions that search (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971), and to avoid redun-
may involve some risk to the self. dancy and excessive interview length. The gender of
For compulsory education, the social goal involved the protagonist in all law violation questions was
ensuring that citizens receive a basic education. The matched to that of the participant.
socially beneficial compulsory education law man- For every question, participants made a qualitative
dated school attendance for all children under the age evaluation (a single good/bad or OK/not OK assess-
of 16. The corresponding conflict scenario described a ment), a quantitative rating on a 7-point scale, and a
hypothetical religion that requires parents to be respon- justification for their evaluations and ratings. Because
sible for their children's education. This conflict pits only one assessment (acceptability of law violation)
the social goal of public education against the parents' was made for the conflicts, the total number of justifi-
right to teach their children at home in accordance cations for this condition was accordingly reduced by
with their religious beliefs. approximately two thirds in comparison with each of
The unjust laws involved the following themes: (1) the socially beneficial and unjust law types. Prior to
denial of education, (2) denial of medical care, and (3) the beginning of the interview, participants were fa-
age discrimination. They were designed to comprise miliarized with two 7-point rating scales, one for the
clear cases of injustice or discrimination (that would good/bad and one for the OK/not OK dimension of
be perceived as such by young children) against cate- subsequent questions. These were similar to those
gories of people carried out by individuals in power- used in other research on children's social and moral
the leaders of the country or the government. In de- judgments (Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnell, 1973;
vising these scenarios, care was taken to avoid actual Helwig & Prencipe, 1999; Leon, 1980). Both scales
instances of discrimination to which children may consisted of a series of rectangles that differed in
have been exposed (e.g., race or gender discrimina- height and color. Using the good/bad scale as an ex-
tion), to remove, as much as possible, any effect of ample, the first three rectangles were colored red and
prior learning about historical cases of unjust or dis- decreased in height from left to right; they corre-
criminatory laws. In each of the three themes the gov- sponded to "very bad," "medium bad," and "a little bit
ernment was described as consisting of people having bad," respectively. The black, middle rectangle was
certain characteristics, such as eye color, wealth, and smallest and corresponded to "in the middle." The
age, who dislike those with opposing or different last three, green rectangles increased in height from
characteristics. Thus, for denial of education, a govern- left to right and corresponded to "a little bit good,"
ment comprised of green-eyed people passes a law that "medium good," and "very good," respectively. Par-
forbids teachers from teaching mathematics to blue- ticipants were first asked to make a qualitative judg-
eyed children. For denial of medical care, wealthy ment ("Is it a good law or a bad law?") and then to in-
members of the government pass a law that restricts dicate on the scale how good or bad the law was. An

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1386 Child Development

analogous scale and procedures were used for ques-
tions involving OK/not OK judgments.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of
six orders of presentation of socially beneficial and
unjust laws. The orders were randomly generated
with the constraint that no more than two laws of the
same type (socially beneficial or unjust) were presented
consecutively. The conflicts were given immediately
after the corresponding straightforward socially ben-
eficial law scenario. Interviews were audiotaped and
transcribed for subsequent analyses.
Coding and reliability. Fifty percent of the inter-
views, evenly distributed across age and gender, were
randomly selected to devise a coding scheme. This
coding system was then used to code the remaining
portion of the interviews; both portions were com-
bined for the analysis.
All qualitative evaluations were coded into three
categories: positive evaluations (e.g., It's a good law;
it's OK to pass it/break it), mixed and conditional
evaluations (e.g., It's both good and bad; it's OK
only if...), and negative evaluations (e.g., It's a bad
law; it's not OK to pass it/break it). Quantitative
ratings were coded as integers on a 7-point scale,
ranging from 1 (very bad law; very much not OK)
to 7 (very good law; very much OK).
Descriptions of justification categories used to
code responses in all questions, as well as examples,
appear in Table 1. The coding system includes a vari-
ety of categories, such as reasons that refer to physical
welfare, fairness/equality, and personal choice. Mul-
tiple justifications were permitted and weighted ac-
cording to the total number given by the participant
for each question.
Seventeen percent of the interviews, evenly dis-
tributed across age and gender, were coded by an in-
dependent judge for comparison with the original
coding. Intercoder agreement for evaluations, expressed
as Cohen's K, was .96; overall K for justifications was .84.
RESULTS
Results are presented separately for ratings by qu
tion type, and for justifications overall. Ratings w
analyzed statistically using analyses of varian
(ANOVAs) on major variables of interest. Beca
the qualitative evaluations were essentially enc
passed within ratings, and provided no additio
information, results for qualitative evaluations will n
be presented. Proportionate usage of justificati
was calculated (collapsed across question type)
corrected for nonnormality with an arcsine transf
mation (Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991). Only ela
rated justifications comprising 10% or more of t
justifications within at least one of the three
groups were analyzed. Post hoc comparisons for
analyses were conducted using Tukey's honestly
nificant difference (HSD) test, with critical value set
p < .05. Preliminary analyses revealed no effects
gender, which was therefore eliminated as a varia
from all subsequent analyses.
Law evaluations and judgments of legitimacy of gove
mental regulation. Table 2 shows means and stand
deviations for ratings of law evaluation and the le

Table 1 Justification Categories

Category Description (and Examples)

Approval / disapproval
Personal choice
Law/rule
Punishment
Physical welfare
Psychological welfare
Knowledge / education
Fairness / equality
Other general consequences
Uncodable / other
Simple affirmative or nonaffirmative judgments of act ("It's not that bad."; "Why not pass a law?").
Reference to personal choice or the individual's right to engage in activity in question. Includes references
to religious freedom ("It's up to her to decide."; "She should be free to practice her religion.").
Reference to the violation of an existing law or rule that forbids the act ("There's a law against that."
"You're not obeying the government.").
Reference to punishment ("You might be arrested and go to jail."; "She might get into trouble.").
Reference to physical welfare or harm ("People will catch chicken pox."; "He will get in an accident and
kill someone.").
Reference to psychological well-being or harm ("He will have hurt feelings.").
Reference to positive or negative educational consequences or academic and vocational goals and purposes,
such as the importance of obtaining knowledge, academic success, or attaining future career goals ("It
will help them get better at school."; "They will grow up to be smart.").
References to fairness, justice or injustice, discrimination, notions of the equality of all people despite
their different characteristics ("You're still human, you're still the same person."; "Everyone should be
treated equally.").
References to miscellaneous consequences such as damage, material consequences, social consequences,
or lack of money; included are only those consequences not accounted for by other categories ("If kids
homeschool, they will have no friends,"; "There will be a war.").
Uncodable responses or those not fitting into other categories.

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 Helwig and Jasiobedzka 1387

Table 2 Mean Ratings of Law Evaluation and Legitimacy of Regulation by Age, Law Type, and Law

Law Evaluation Question Legitimacy of Regulation Question

Law Type and Law 6-Year-Olds 8-Year-Olds 10-Year-Olds 6-Year-Olds 8-Year-Olds 10-Year-Olds

Socially beneficial laws

Traffic 4.27 (2.75) 5.54 (1.79) 5.96 (1.63) 3.83 (2.66) 5.17 (2.10) 6.21 (1.61)
Vaccination 4.83 (2.35) 5.33 (1.71) 5.00 (1.50) 4.83 (1.95) 5.04 (2.14) 4.65 (1.40)
Compulsory education 3.75 (2.27) 3.58 (1.93) 4.46 (2.06) 3.82 (2.30) 3.92 (2.17) 4.22 (2.19)

Unjust laws
Denial of education 1.79 (1.02) 1.17 (.48) 1.04 (.21) 1.39 (.58) 1.35 (.57) 1.09 (.29)
Denial of medical care 1.29 (.55) 1.29 (.75) 1.21 (.51) 1.96 (1.72) 1.29 (.69) 1.33 (.87)
Age discrimination 1.78 (1.09) 1.63 (1.17) 1.71 (1.08) 2.13 (1.74) 1.74 (1.18) 1.54 (.83)

Note: Higher scores indicate more positive evaluations of laws and governmental prohibition. Ratings were on a 7-point scale, ranging
from 1 (very bad law; government regulation very much not OK) to 7 (very good law; government regulation very much OK). Values in
parentheses are standard deviations.

imacy of government regulation for socially beneficial
and unjust laws. As can be seen in the table, there was
no overlap in ratings of socially beneficial and unjust
laws for either assessment. A 3 (age group) x 2 (law
type) ANOVA conducted on mean ratings for law eval-
uation and legitimacy of regulation, with age group
as a between-group measure and law type (socially
beneficial versus unjust) as a repeated measure, revealed
similar findings for each assessment question. Main
effects for law type were found; F(1, 69) = 442.58, p <
.001, for law evaluation and F(1, 69) = 345.57, p < .001
for legitimacy of regulation; qualified by an Age
Group x Law Type interaction: F(2, 69) = 4.67, p <
.013, for law evaluation and F(2, 69) = 6.56, p < .002,
for legitimacy of regulation. Post hoc comparisons
showed that, as expected, all children rated the so-
cially beneficial laws significantly more positively
than unjust laws, and judged that it was more legiti-
ucation law. Post hoc comparisons between individu
unjust laws showed that all children rated the age d
crimination law less negatively than the denial of med
ical care law. No other comparisons were significan
Law violation. Table 3 contains means and standard
deviations for ratings of law violation of socially bene-
ficial and unjust laws and for ratings of law violation in
the conflict scenarios. As expected, law violation was
seen as most acceptable for the unjust laws (M = 5.36,
SD = 1.55) and least acceptable for the socially bene-
ficial laws (M = 2.41, SD = 1.08), with the conflicts
producing law violation judgments generally in be-
tween the other two types (M = 3.24, SD = 1.12). A 3
(age group) x 3 (law type / conflict) ANOVA was con-
Table 3 Mean Ratings of Law Violation by Age and Law Type/
Conflict

mate for governments to enact regulations involving

Law Violation
socially beneficial laws than unjust laws. The interac-
tions were due to differences between the oldest and
Law Type/Conflict 6-Year-Olds 8-Year-Olds 10-Year-Olds
youngest age groups in judgments of socially benefi-
cial laws; 10-year-olds rated the laws more positivelySocially beneficial laws
than 6-year-olds and judged governmental regulation Traffic 1.96 (1.78) 2.13 (1.63) 1.58 (.93)
Vaccination 2.77 (2.25) 3.46 (2.11) 4.38 (2.00)
as more legitimate than did 6-year-olds.
Potential differences between individual laws Compulsory education 1.74 (1.79) 1.83 (1.34) 1.88 (1.51)
Unjust laws
were explored within each type-socially beneficial
Denial of education 5.83 (1.66) 5.00 (2.08) 5.70 (1.66)
and unjust-in a 3 (age group) x 3 (law) ANOVA con-
Denial of medical care 5.50 (2.36) 5.58 (2.06) 5.75 (1.33)
ducted on ratings for each assessment question.
AgeSig-
discrimination 5.70 (2.01) 4.46 (2.34) 4.75 (1.45)
nificant effects were found for law evaluationsConflicts
only. A
Traffic 1.17 (.38) 1.42 (.72) 1.79 (1.14)
main effect for law alone was found for both socially
Vaccination
beneficial, F(2, 68) = 10.05, p < .001, and unjust laws, 2.95 (2.17) 3.96 (1.85) 4.33 (1.79)
Compulsory education 3.54 (2.17) 4.87 (1.84) 5.17 (1.37
F(2, 68) = 4.91, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons between
individual socially beneficial laws showedNote:
thatHigher
all scores indicate more positive judgments of law violat
children judged the traffic law and vaccination law
Ratings were on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (very much not O
significantly more positively than the compulsory
7 (very ed-
much OK). Values in parentheses are standard deviatio

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1388 Child Development
ducted on mean law violation ratings, with law type/
conflict as a repeated measure. A main effect for law
type/conflict was found, F(2, 68) = 124.73, p < .001,
qualified by an Age Group x Law Type/Conflict in-
teraction, F(4, 138) = 3.28, p < .013. Post hoc compari-
sons conducted between law type/ conflict conditions
within each age group indicated that for 8- and 10-
year-olds, socially beneficial and unjust laws and con-
flicts were all significantly different from one another;
for 6-year-olds, all were significantly different from
one another except for the comparison between so-
cially beneficial laws and conflicts.
Differences in ratings of law violation among indi-
vidual laws within each of the socially beneficial and
unjust law types (but not for the conflicts) were ex-
plored in a 3 (age group) x 3 (law) ANOVA, with law
as a repeated measure. For socially beneficial laws, a
main effect for law was found, F(2, 68) = 15.63, p <
.001. Post hoc comparisons between individual so-
cially beneficial laws showed that all children rated
violation of the vaccination law as more acceptable
than violation of the traffic law and compulsory edu-
cation law. For unjust laws, a main effect for law also
was found, F(2, 68) = 4.62, p < .013. Post hoc compar-
isons between individual unjust laws showed that vi-
olations of both the denial of medical care law and de-
nial of education law were more acceptable than
violation of the age discrimination law. No other com-
parisons were significant.
To explore the manipulation of issues of individual
autonomy represented by the conflict scenarios, Tukey's
HSD was used to compare judgments of law violation
within each age group between each of the straight-
forward socially beneficial laws and the correspond-
ing conflict scenario. Differences were found within
the compulsory education and traffic law scenarios
only. As expected, children in all age groups rated vi-
olations of compulsory education laws as more ac-
ceptable when the laws conflicted with religious free-
dom. Contrary to expectations, however, for traffic
law scenarios, younger children (6- and 8-year-olds)
judged it more acceptable to violate a socially beneficial
speed limit law than to violate a seat belt law that
posed a conflict between public welfare and individual
autonomy and choice. Differences between the traffic
law scenarios for the 10-year-olds were in the expected
direction, but did not reach statistical significance.
Age comparisons conducted within each conflict
on ratings of law violation revealed differences only
for the compulsory education conflict. Ten-year-olds
and 8-year-olds were more likely than 6-year-olds to
view violation of compulsory education laws that
conflicted with religious freedom as acceptable.
Justifications. Table 4 presents the mean percentage
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of use of justifications by law and conflict scenarios.
Four justification categories fit the analysis criterion
of 10% or more of total justifications in at least one age
group: physical welfare, fairness/equality, knowledge/
education, and personal choice. A 3 (age group) x 9
(law/conflict scenario) ANOVA, with law / conflict
scenario as a repeated measure, was performed on
arcsine-transformed proportions of usage for each of
the four categories. Main effects for law/conflict sce-
nario were found for physical welfare, F(8, 62) =
145.80, p <. 001; fairness/equality, F(8, 62) = 67.89,
p < .001; knowledge/education, F(8, 62) = 175.04, p <
.001; and personal choice, F(8, 62) = 10.41, p < .001.
Significant post hoc comparisons for these main ef-
fects are found in footnotes in Table 4. The results pre-
sented in the table indicate that children's justifica-
tion use reflected the types of social benefits and harms
or fairness and justice concerns implicated in each law /
conflict scenario. For example, physical welfare was
used more in judging the traffic law and vaccination
scenarios, fairness/equality was used more in judg-
ing the unjust scenarios, and references to knowl-
edge/education were mentioned more in reasoning
about the denial of education and compulsory educa-
tion scenarios. Personal choice was used more in rea-
soning about vaccination laws and (somewhat less
so) in the compulsory education law scenarios.
Two significant interactions also were found. For
physical harm, a significant Age Group x Law/Conflict
Scenario interaction, F(16, 126) = 1.83, p < .04, was
found. Post hoc comparisons revealed that 6-year-
olds made more references to physical welfare for the
age discrimination law scenario than did 10-year-olds
(57% versus 23%, respectively). For fairness/equality, a
significant Age Group x Law/Conflict interaction,
F(16, 126) = 7.33, p < .001, was found. Post hoc com-
parisons revealed greater use of fairness/equality by
older children when reasoning about unjust laws.
Ten-year-olds were more likely than 6-year-olds to
refer to fairness or equality when reasoning about the
denial of education law (50% versus 17%), the denial
of medical care law (36% versus 10%), and the age
discrimination law (45% versus 7%). In addition, 8-
year-olds were more likely than 6-year-olds to refer to
fairness/equality when reasoning about the age dis-
crimination law (35% versus 7%).
DISCUSSION
This study examined elementary school chi
soning about laws and law violation. Previo
of legal reasoning have examined either
between moral and legal judgments using
to general, open-ended questions about law
Table 4 Frequencies of Justification by Law Type/Conflict and Law

Law Type/ Conflict

Socially Beneficial Laws Unjust Laws C

Justification Compulsory Denial of Denial of Age

Category Traffic Vaccination Education Education Medical Care Discrimination Traffic V

Approval / disapproval 3 3 4 2 3
Law/rule 7 4 2 4 4 6 5
Punishment 7 2 1 3 3 7

Physical welfarea 65 54 2 0 57 35
Psychological welfare 1 2 1 2 1 2
Fairness / equalityb 0 1 0 34 23 2
Knowledge / educationc 0 3 71 46 0 0
Personal choiced 9 24 13 3 4 10 3
Other general consequences 4 2 1 1 3
Uncodable/other 4 6 5 4 2 4

Note: Values are mean percen

justifications in the conflict
comparisons for main effects
a Traffic law > compulsory e
vaccination conflict > denial
sory education conflict; den
bAll unjust laws > all socially
c Compulsory education and
flict.

d Vaccination > all unjust laws, traffic law, and traffic law conflict; vaccination conflict > denial of education, denial of medical care, and traffic law conflict; compulsory
compulsory education conflict > denial of education and traffic law conflict.

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1390 Child Development

violation (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971), or legal reason- laws of both types. In general, socially beneficial laws
ing mainly or exclusively in the context of complex were supported by reference to their beneficial effects
conflicts implicating both social benefits and individ- on individuals' welfare, whereas unjust laws were re-
ual rights (Adelson & O'Neil, 1966; Brown, 1973). The jected on the basis of their harmfulness or unfairness.
present study sought to examine legal judgments Children also considered the type and severity of the
by comparing and contrasting laws that have socially consequences or issues raised by each law in making
beneficial purposes with unjust laws, and by examin- judgments of the law's legitimacy and the need for
ing reasoning in situations that entail conflicts be- compliance. For example, the discriminatory law deny-
tween social benefits and individual rights and au-ing young people seats on public transit was evalu-
tonomy. This strategy is similar to one pursued in ated less negatively and was judged less acceptable to
other research on children's judgments of societal, po- violate than laws denying classes of persons rights
litical, and moral concepts such as civil liberties and to education and medical care.
democracy, and has proven successful in uncovering Children's judgments and reasoning also dis-
new competencies in elementary school children's played sensitivity to issues of individual rights and
understanding in these areas (Helwig, 1997, 1998; autonomy implicated in specific applications of laws.
Helwig & Kim, 1999). The results of the present study This was especially apparent in the conflict between
reveal that children's reasoning about laws is multi- compulsory education and freedom of religion, in
faceted and that children consider a number of factors which parents object to state compulsory education
in evaluating laws and making judgments of legallaws because of a rule in their religion requiring them
compliance. These factors include whether laws are to be responsible for their children's education. Al-
perceived to be just or unjust, whether they are seen though children otherwise endorsed compulsory ed-
as having a clear socially beneficial purpose, and ucation laws and believed violation of such laws to be
whether they implicate issues of individual autonomy wrong, most older children believed it would be ac-
and rights. ceptable for individuals to violate a mandatory school
The multifaceted judgments and reasoning uncov- attendance law if it conflicted with the requirements
ered in the present study are better accounted for by of their religion. In justifying this exception, children
recent perspectives on moral judgment that empha- appealed to issues of individual freedom and choice
size domain distinctions and context specificity in so- over religious matters, and to parents' prerogative
cial and moral judgments (Helwig, 1995b; Turiel, and capacity to exercise responsibility for their chil-
1998) than by traditional global stage theories of moral dren's education. Older children appeared to have a
judgment (Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932). Young chil- greater appreciation of the importance of religious free-
dren did not show a unitary orientation toward laws dom and parental autonomy and were critical of gov-
characterized by an emphasis on punishment, authority, ernment intrusion into the religious and family sphere
and rigid obedience to existing laws, as would be ex- in this instance. These findings parallel those from
pected by global stage theories. Even 6-year-olds con- studies of children's developing conceptions of free-
sidered the content of the law and made clear distinc- dom of religion (Helwig, 1997) showing that with age,
tions between unjust and socially beneficial laws in the religious freedom of children is increasingly seen
reasoning about laws and legal compliance. Children as legitimately regulated by familial authorities (e.g.,
at all ages evaluated socially beneficial laws more parents), but not by governments or school authori-
positively, and judged that it was more legitimate for ties. Prior research (Helwig, 1997), however, investi-
governments to impose socially beneficial laws than gated conceptions of religious freedom only in straight-
unjust, discriminatory legal regulations. Consistent forward or "prototypical" examples, in which freedom
with their law evaluations, and as hypothesized, chil- of religion did not conflict with other social goals. The
dren judged the violation of unjust laws as more ac- present study indicated that children sometimes en-
ceptable than the violation of socially beneficial dorse and give priority to freedom of religion, even in
laws-indeed, most children maintained that it complex conflicts in which this civil liberty may con-
would be acceptable to break unjust laws. In their rea- flict with other social goals that children recognize as
soning, children drew on concepts in the moral do- important, such as state jurisdiction and control over
main (Turiel, 1998), such as harm, equality, and rights, matters of education.
to critically evaluate a variety of proposed laws and Children's judgments about a variety of laws in the
to place limits on the perceived obligation to obey present study could be accounted for by their emerg-
legal rules. Children were sensitive to the impact of ing moral concepts of rights, harm, and individual
laws on individuals' psychological, physical, and in- freedom, although how these concepts were applied
tellectual welfare and used these concepts to evaluate and coordinated in particular situations appeared to

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 Helwig and Jasiobedzka 1391

vary considerably according to context. Children's tice of the rule itself-although children did not al-
judgments did not show a developmental shift from ways explicitly articulate their reasoning about obedi-
giving priority to individual rights to recognizing and ence in these terms.
Development in the ability to articulate more ab-
giving priority to the social benefits of laws, as sug-
stract moral principles in reflective moral judgment
gested by Adelson and O'Neil (1966). In contrast, the
results showed a complex pattern in which children
may help to account for some of the discrepancies be-
sometimes endorsed individual rights and autonomytween the findings of the current study and those of
over social benefits and sometimes subordinated Tapp and Kohlberg (1971). Indeed, children's reason-
ing about obedience to unjust laws did show a devel-
rights to social benefits and issues of harm, consistent
with patterns found in political science surveysopmental
(Mc- progression toward increased reference to
Closky & Brill, 1983) and developmental research moreon abstract principles of justice with age. When
evaluating unjust laws, the youngest participants
reasoning about rights and civil liberties (Helwig,
concentrated on the concrete consequences of the law
1995a, 1995b). For example, although older children
in the present study tended to give priority tosuch as harm to one's educational interests and future
indi-
vidual rights over social goals when reasoning career,
about or to one's health and welfare. In contrast,
older children more often articulated overarching
conflicts involving religious freedom, in reasoning
about traffic laws-including seat belt laws that principles
only of fairness and equality when judging the
implicated issues of harm to the self-childrenunjust
gave laws, and, correspondingly, were less likely to
priority to the social goal of prevention of harmrefer
andto the types of concrete consequences mentioned
advocated obedience to these laws. Similarly, al-
by younger children. As children move into adoles-
though children were concerned about the social cence,
goalthey may develop a more reflective awareness
of preventing harm-as reflected, for example, of thein existence, justification, and conditions of appli-
their judgments about traffic laws-they were cation
lessof moral principles and concepts (Moshman,
1995, 1998). The open-ended questions and complex
willing to advocate obedience to mandatory vaccina-
examples used in previous research may be drawing
tion laws entailing restrictions of individuals' auton-
omy to make personal decisions about invasiveon and tracing, at least in part, the development of
med-
ical procedures than they were for other sociallymoral reflection and metacognitive reasoning abilities
beneficial laws. Rather than indicating a clear devel- to emerge in late childhood or adolescence.
expected
opmental movement toward either a rights- or welfare-The findings of the present study revealed that chil-
dren's judgments of laws and obedience, like their
based orientation with age, the present study's findings
judgments of authority in school and in other social
revealed contextual variation in children's judgments
that could only be accounted for by considering contexts
the (Laupa & Turiel, 1993), are circumscribed by
specific issues brought to bear in contexts in moral
which concepts of harm, justice, and rights. This is not
concepts of harm and rights were implicated. to say, however, that children always separate issues
As noted earlier, no evidence was found in the of cur-
law and morality or always subordinate legal or so-
rent study for the rule-obeying perspective that cialTapp
conventional considerations to moral concerns.
The present study investigated children's reasoning
and Kohlberg (1971) identified in elementary school
children's legal reasoning. Nor could children's about laws that were unjust or served no moral pur-
re-
pose. of
sponses be characterized in terms of the "morality Although the current study showed that in
circumstance" found by those researchers mainly thesein cases children distinguished morality and law
their middle school sample, in which laws mayand used concepts of fairness, rights, and welfare to
be vi-
olated only in dire circumstances such as whenevaluate
life is laws, children may subordinate morality
to law
at stake. Children at all ages in the current study rec-in more complex situations in which it may be
ognized exceptions to legal obedience not only indifficult
life- to discern the relevant moral issues or in
which beneficial laws or other social conventional
threatening circumstances, such as in denial of medical
care to the poor, but also when laws involved considerations
non- are especially salient. Included here
life-threatening discrimination (e.g., denial of may
educa-be situations in which laws that usually have a
tional opportunities), and even when the conse- moral purpose are in conflict with other moral prin-
quences of the discrimination were fairly minor, ciples,
as inas, for example, in Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma,
the case of young persons denied seats on in which obeying a law against stealing is pitted
public
transportation. Children in this study exhibitedagainst
a pat-the value of human life (Kohlberg, 1981). Fur-
ther
tern of response consistent with a "morality of the research that examines reasoning about different
rule"
model (Tapp & Kohlberg, 1971), in which obedience types of laws and other social conventional concepts,
judgments are governed by prior judgments of the and their possible conflicts with. moral concepts and
jus-

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1392 Child Development

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