UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL RELATION

1 Albert Einstein was once asked, "Why is it that when the mind of man has stretched so
far as to discover the structure of the atom we have been unable to devise the political means
to keep the atom from destroying us?" He replied, "That is simple, my friend, it is because
politics is more difficult than physics."
2 Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit
of sovereign interests. . . . At times, the absence of centralized international authority
precludes attainment of common goals. . . . Yet at other times, states do realize common goals
through cooperation under anarchy. - Kenneth Oye
3 Politics has been described as the "master science". Because it involves the authoritative
allocation of values, it encompasses almost every human action. Yet if politics holds pride of
place in relations among people in their individual and national lives, there is something of
particular importance in politics among nations.
4 International relations - that is, relations among large and organized groups of peoples -
have existed for several thousand years. The record of efforts to discern meaning or pattern in
these relations is almost as old. Succeeding generations have often considered the times in
which they live to be truly unique. Yet contemporary world politics is different in at least one
profound respect. For the first time in human history, the most powerful states possess the
capability literally to destroy one another and possibly even to obliterate civilization on earth.
5 The questions of international relations are thus demanding. They are:
To provide a basis for understanding international relations.
To demonstrate why the understanding of international relations is quite different from
what mere intuition or common sense alone can suggest.
To explain why international relations differs fundamentally from politics within states.
To analyze the dynamics of post-Word War II international relations, especially the traits
that set it apart from previous eras (even while considering elements of continuity).
To examine the lessons of watershed events that have left their mark not only on
international relations, but on our understanding of it.
To suggest why war occurs and what the principal explanations have to offer.
To assess the implications for America's role in a world that has undergone
profound transformation over the past several decades.

Three Problems of International Relations: The Problem of Anarchy and the Security
Dilemma, The Problem of Order, The Problem of Constraint

The Problem of Anarchy and the Security Dilemma

6 World politics is unique and inherently different from relations within states. Domestic
politics typically unfolds within a system in which some kind of central authority exists for
taking decisions and resolving disputes. In the best circumstances, national governments are
chosen by and are somehow responsive to the will of their people. In other, often far less
agreeable circumstances, the government may represent no more than the will or power of a
single dominant party, ethnic group, military junta, or individual leader. Nonetheless, whether
democratic or dictatorial forms prevail, most national societies exhibit some form of
recognized authority. By contrast, no ultimate authority exists to govern the international
system. In essence, states have no overall arbiter or institution to which they can turn for
settlement of disputes, for enforcement of their rights, or even for effective protection of their
basic security and survival. As a result, the existence of formal anarchy at the international
level conditions state-to-state relations.
7 It is important to appreciate that formal anarchy designates the absence of central
authority in the international system. It does not, however, mean the same thing as disorder or
chaos. These can be a consequence of anarchy, but because some restraints on conflict do
exist, disorder is not necessarily present in the way that a casual understanding of "anarchy"
might otherwise suggest. Formal anarchy does describe the structural condition of the
international system in which states live. As a consequence they face a "security dilemma".
Because of this insecurity, and the nature of the "self-help" system in which they exist, they
feel compelled to arm themselves.
8 The imperatives of the security dilemma not only shape arms races; they also drive
international behavior. Comprehension of this problem facilitates the understanding of why
war occurs, even when policymakers are not always foolish, ignorant, or evil. This insight is
pertinent not only to relations between the superpowers; it also bears upon events in recent
decades such as the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina, the Iran-Iraq War, and the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
9 As a fact of international life, the quest for and maintenance of power plays an inevitable
role in the relations among nations. Indeed, a series of observers in the "realist" tradition have
reminded us that an understanding of international relations and a sound approach to foreign
policy must be grounded on a recognition of the realities of power.
10 State actions, however, can have unintended consequences. While abuses of power and
military aggression are not uncommon, the possession of military force can be a means to
prevent or deter war rather than to cause it. The case of the Soviet-American relationship, in
which the avoidance of a major war, in large part, came to rest upon the existence of a
nuclear balance of terror, is especially compelling. The grave moral dilemmas this has posed
- not least that peace has been maintained at the cost of living under the shadow of a nuclear
apocalypse - have been a pressing consequence of this reality.

The Problem of Order

11 The above assumptions about international anarchy and the quest for security are
essential to an effective understanding of international relations; nonetheless they are not by
themselves sufficient. And here it is necessary to go well beyond the older realist approach.
International relations involves much more than anarchy and conflict. Power politics and
realist perspectives fall well short of providing a comprehensive basis for the understanding
or conduct of international relations and foreign policy. Imperatives of cooperation and order
are also compelling. International institutions and rules do exist, and despite their limitations
these too shape the international environment, especially in the economic realm. Indeed, the
behavior of individual states is often constrained in security as well as economic realms, in
ways that the anarchy model does not adequately predict.
12 The effort to restrain or to limit conflict and to seek cooperation has a long - albeit often
unsuccessful - history. International law, efforts to create global organizations, the more
limited actions of regional integration, and even alliances are examples of such behavior.
13 Attempts to achieve order and prevent war have been especially urgent in the aftermath
of major wars. Thus the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 gave way to the Congress of
Vienna, which shaped the balance of power in Europe for much of the nineteenth century.
The conclusion of World War I in 1918 led to the Versailles Peace Conference and the
creation of the League of Nations-which aimed to deter aggression through collective action.
And the Allied victory in 1945, ending World War II, brought about the establishment of the
United Nations.
14 Each of these efforts failed in the end to satisfy the aspirations with which it was created.
Yet these and other repetitive efforts to enlarge the realm of international order suggest that it
would be a mistake to conceive all world politics strictly in terms of international anarchy and
the struggle for power.
15 The search for international order in the aftermath of conflict can also be observed in
clashes more limited than continental or world wars. For example, the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis, with the glimpse of the nuclear abyss it revealed to both the United States and the
USSR, gave way to a temporary easing of relations between the two superpowers and the
signing in 1963 of the limited test ban treaty. In another important case, the 1973 Yom
Kippur War set in motion a process that ultimately led to the 1978 Camp David Agreements
and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
16 Indeed, even in the midst of open conflict, countries often observe recognized rules of
behavior, such as diplomatic immunity. The April 1984 example of the British government
allowing Libyan "diplomatic" personnel to leave the country, after they had fired upon
demonstrators and killed a policewoman outside their London embassy, is a modern case in
point.
17 Nor are attempts at order exclusively aimed at preventing military threats. The aftermath
of World War II led to a comprehensive series of arrangements enhancing international
economic order and cooperation. Partly in reaction to disastrous events of the 1920s and
1930s (which included grave economic depression, massive unemployment, severe political
instability, and the rise of fascism), the industrial democracies succeeded in creating a series
of arrangements and institutions shaping their international economic relations. These
agreements, established in large part through American leadership, led to an unprecedented
degree of international cooperation and to unparalleled economic growth and increases in
trade and investment.
18 Frictions within these and other "international regimes" intensified during the 1970s and
1980s, as the relative degree of American dominance (or hegemony) decreased-along with
the United States' ability and willingness to pay the costs of regime maintenance. Based on
historical experience, the demise of these arrangements might have been anticipated.
However, member countries have thus far managed to preserve the existing international
economic order and prevent their economic competition from escalating to the kind of
disastrous rivalry (competitive currency devaluations, banking collapses, punitive tariff and
trade barriers) that marred the 1930s and undermined the prosperity of all countries.
19 The advanced industrial democracies have succeeded in maintaining economic
cooperation not only because of a learning experience attributable to the lessons from a half-
century ago. They have also done so because continuation of the existing institutions and
rules (such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, European Community) has become a means of promoting their own national
interests and because established institutions can take on a momentum of their own.
20 In sum, the imperative toward international order embodies compelling economic
dimensions as well as security ones. Together, these elements make the component of order
as much a feature of international relations as the pervasive anarchic environment in which
states exist.

The Problem of Constraint

21 Owing to the impact of modernization, a series of transformations of international

relations have occurred. The changes include - among others - the extension of international
relations from a largely European-centered system to a global level; the increased penetration
of domestic societies; the vastly expanded scope of state activity; and the growing importance
of international transactions (trade, investment, technology, communications) for most
societies. These and other factors impose a substantial interdependence and entangle most
countries in a series of ordered relationships that they do not fully control. This leads, in turn,
to the third basic problem, that of constraint.
22 If the simultaneous problems of anarchy and order are the dominant features of
international relations at a systemic level, the problem of constraint nonetheless impinges
greatly on state activity at the national level. In fact, most countries do not enjoy full
autonomy in either security or economic realms. It is thus vital to understand the problem
their governments face in seeking to influence the external factors impinging on their own
societies.
23 International relations are molded by the interpenetration of domestic politics and foreign
policy as well as by the interrelationships of politics and economics.

Foreign policies often result from the pulling and hauling among divergent domestic forces
within a society, as well as from the maneuvering among different bureaucracies or actors
inside a government. Moreover, the interaction of states is deeply affected by the impact of
international factors on domestic policy and vice versa, as well as of politics on economics
and economics on politics.

24 The contemporary realities of interdependence and of the penetration of the state limit the
ability of national governments to control fully their own destinies. Other things being equal,
these limits are usually more entangling for states that are more rather than less developed,
for states that are smaller rather than larger, and for societies that are economically and
politically open rather than closed.
25 The degree of development is important because modernization means movement away
from traditional and less complex forms of social organization. Among the changes involved
are specialization, differentiation of function, economic growth, prosperity, longer life
expectancy, and the spread of science and technology. These tend to stimulate increased
contact with the outside world, in trade, communications, and a wide range of matters
affecting daily life. The physical size of a country, in terms of land area and population, is
also significant.
26 Finally, the nature of economic and political systems also shapes the degree of exposure
to the outside world and thus to constraint. A country with a market economy and a
democratic and competitive political system will be less autarkic. That is, it will be less self-
contained economically. However, although autarky provides a greater degree of insulation
from outside influences, it does so at an enormous price in terms of efficiency and living
standards, since countries forgo the opportunity to import goods or services where these are
available more cheaply elsewhere. Moreover, autarky often entails a serious cost in terms of
human liberty.

Constraint on State Behaviour

27 Anarchy and order are fundamental characteristics of the international system. State
behavior within this system is shaped by these and other conditions of the international
environment. While states continue to exercise important matters of choice in their external
conduct, they nonetheless remain more subject to constraints than is often appreciated.
Several key features are worth highlighting here because of their enduring importance.
28 The sources of constraint are not only external. Democratic states typically find that their
foreign policies require domestic support if they are to succeed. This means not only popular
acceptance, but often legislative support and the backing of influential pressure groups.
Constraints shape not only international behavior; policies thought of as primarily domestic in
scope are often significantly affected by a state's position in the international environment.
Thus domestic politics and foreign policy frequently become intertwined, as do issues
otherwise considered economic or political in nature. To be sure, constraints are far more
pronounced for small states than for larger and more powerful ones, yet even the superpowers
can be significantly affected.
29 In the case of the United States, in addition to obvious areas such as national security and
strategic nuclear deterrence, such important matters as economic growth, unemployment, the
balance of trade, exchange rates, energy prices, the environment, and immigration are deeply
affected by external circumstances.
30 Even the Soviet Union, during the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s, and despite a far
greater degree of economic and political closure toward the external world and dictatorship
by the Communist Party, was unable to act without significant constraints on its behavior.
Many of these constraints were economic and technological. The USSR maintained an
overall military budget at least as great as that of the United States, yet it did so with
technology that lagged significantly behind the West and Japan. The increasing costs of
foreign military and political commitments were a significant drain on a limited economic
base. Major competing demands also came from other sectors: seriously inadequate housing
and agriculture, energy exploration and development to arrest a decline in oil production and
deal with difficulties in civilian nuclear power, public health (e.g. in response to declining life
expectancy), demands for the modernization of domestic industry and technology, and efforts
to cope with inadequate supply of modern consumer goods.
31 A decline in world prices for exports of energy and of gold in the mid-1980s proved costly
to the Soviets. So, too, did expenditures for pro-Soviet regimes in Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola,
Nicaragua, and the drain of a long war in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Soviets, by their power
and size as well as their efforts to exert hegemony around their periphery, mobilized a
remarkably broad and diverse array of opposition. This ranged from endemic discontent in
Poland and much of Eastern Europe, to Asian and Middle Eastern opposition to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, to opposition by China and Japan in the Far East. Ultimately, while
external constraints did not by themselves determine the transformation in Soviet policies
undertaken by Gorbachev, they undoubtedly had major impact in shaping the dramatic
choices he made.