Legal Ethics Reviewer

PALAWAN STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
LEGAL
ETHIC
S
REVIE
WER
Page 1 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
***This is a summary of the 2014 Golden Notes (Legal and Judicial Ethics). The outline is in
accordance to the 2015 Bar Examinations syllabus in Legal and Judicial Ethics.
LEGAL ETHICS
A. Practice of law (Rule 138)
Rule 138- Sec 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or heretofore admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
1. Concept
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. (Cayetano v. Monsod)
a) Privilege
The practice of law is not a natural, property or constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is not a
right granted to any person who demands it but a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. It is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness.
Note: It becomes a PROPERTY RIGHT if there is a contract for ATTORNEY’S FEES.
b) Profession, not business
LAW IS A PROFESSION NOT A TRADE.
The legal profession is not a business. It is not a money-making trade just like a businessman
employing strategy for the purpose of monetary gain. It is a sacred profession imbued with public
interest whose primary objective is public service, as it is an essential part in the administration of
justice and a profession in pursuit of which pecuniary reward is considered merely incidental.
2. Qualifications
Rule 138- Sec 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or heretofore admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
3. Appearance of non-lawyers
GR: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court.
XPNs:
1. Law student practice
2. Non-lawyers in court can appear for a party in MTC.
Note: Sec. 34 of Rule 138 expressly allows pro se practice or the right of a non-member of the bar to
engage in limited practice of law.
Page 2 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunal can represent parties in tribunals such as the NLRC ,
DARAB, Cadastral Courts.
a) Law student practice (Rule 138-A)
A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal, or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions briefs, memoranda, or other papers to be filed MUST BE
SIGNED BY THE SUPERVISING ATTORNEY FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE LEGAL
CLINIC.
NOTE: The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing
members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice
may be a ground for disciplinary action.
b) Non-lawyers in courts
The following are the instances whereby non-lawyers may appear in court:
CASES BEFORE THE MTC:
A party to the litigation, may conduct his own case or litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose.
BEFORE ANY OTHER COURT:
A party may conduct his own litigation personally. But if he gets someone to aid him, that
someone must be authorized member of the Bar.
Note: A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by the same rules in conducting the
trial case. He cannot after judgment, claim that he was not properly represented.
CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE THE MTC:
In a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available, the judge may appoint a
non-lawyer who is a:
-Resident of the province; AND
-Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense.
ANY OFFICIAL OR OTHER PERSON APPOINTED OR DESIGNATED TO APPEAR FOR
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
NOTE: Such person shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the Bar to appear in
any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Party-litigant representing himself.

In civil cases, an individual litigant has the right to conduct his litigation personally.
In criminal cases, in grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always appear
by counsel; he cannot conduct his own defense without violating his right to due process of law.
NOTE: Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside, and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Page 3 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
With regard to juridical persons, they must always appear in court through a duly licensed member
of the Bar, EXCEPT before MTC where they may be represented by their agent or officer who need
not be a lawyer.
Limits on the appearance of non-lawyers

1. He should confine is work to non-adversary contentions;
2. He should not undertake purely legal work, such as the examination or cross-examination of
witnesses, or the presentation of evidence; and
3. His service should not be habitually rendered. He should not charge or collect attorney’s fees.
c) Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals
Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if:
-They represent themselves; or
-They represent their organization or members thereof
-If they are duly accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of
Justice, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.
NOTE: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees.
Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court.
c) Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
1. Proceedings before the SMALL CLAIMS COURT- No attorney shall appear in behalf of or
represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
NOTE: If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his claim or defense and
needs assistance, the court may in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney
to assist that party upon the latter’s consent.
2. Proceedings before the KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY- During the pre-trial

conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from appearing for the parties.
Parties must appear in person only except minors or incompetents who may be assisted by their
next in kin who are not lawyers.
4. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court;
3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney
to the damage of a party;
4. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or
5. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.
*Under section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. Disbarment, however, is the most severe
form of disciplinary sanction, and as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great
Page 4 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
caution, and should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less
severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired.
NOTE: An unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or
impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and validates the action
taken by him.
a) Lawyers without authority
(see above discussion)
b) Persons not lawyers
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW BY PERSONS NOT

LAWYERS
1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court;
3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney
to the damage of a party.
They shall be punished with contempt of court , severe censure and 3 months imprisonment because
of the highly fraudulent and improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and
make a mockery of the administration of justice.
NOTE: A disbarred lawyer still appearing in court is guilty of indirect contempt.
KINDS OF CONTEMPT
1. DIRECT- Consists of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt or
obstruct the proceedings before the court or the administration of justice. Punished summarily.
2. INDIRECT- One committed away form the court involving disobedience or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of the court, or tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct,
interrupt or embarrass the court. Not summary in nature.
3. CIVIL- Failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein. It is remedial in nature.
4. CRIMINAL- Conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in
unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of a court or a judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act. Intent is necessary.
NOTE: Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or
primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power, either by fine payable to the government or
imprisonment or both, it is deemed a judgment in CRIMINAL case.
Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong
inflicted, or by imprisonment as coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for the
benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt will,
if made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
TWO-FOLD ASPECT OF CONTEMPT POWER (1998 BAR)
Page 5 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
1. The proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and
2. To compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court, which he refuses to
perform.
NOTE: A practicing lawyer facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to retire from the
practice of law which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt.
5. Public officials and practice of law
PROHIBITED ACYS OR OMISSIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which
has a pending official business with hi during the pendency thereof or within one year after
termination.
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law.
3. A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
4. A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
NOTE: These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of 1 year after resignation or
separation from public office. The 1-year period shall also apply in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
a) Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. (CPR, CANON 6,
RULE 6.03)
The evil sought to be avoided by this provision is the possibility of a lawyer who just retired,
resigned or separated from the government of using his influence for his own private benefit.
THEORIES RELATING TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT

LAWYERS IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT ON A MATTER IN WHICH THEY INTERVENED
WHEN THEY WERE IN OFFICE
1. ADVERSE-INTEREST-CONFLICT- A former government lawyer is enjoined from representing

a client in private practice in a matter which is substantially related to another matter which the
former dealt with while employed by the government, and if the interests of the current and former
clients are adverse.
2. CONGRUENT-INTEREST-REPRESENTATION CONFLICT- The lawyer is prohibited from

representing a private practice client even if the interests of the government (former employer) and
the new client are entirely parallel.
b) Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions
NOT ALLOWED TO PRACTICE
Page 6 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court

2. Officials and employees of the OSG
3. Government prosecutors
4. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants
5. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
6. Ombudsman and his deputies
7. All governors, city and municipal mayors
8. Those prohibited by special law
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS (1992, 2000

BAR)
1. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally “appear” as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies.
2. Under the Local Government Code, Sanggunian members may practice their professions provided
that if they are members of the Bar, they shall NOT:
A. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party
B. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense commited in relation to his office
C. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official
D. Use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.
3. A retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government, cannot act as counsel:
a. In any civil case in which the government, or any of its subdivisions or agencies is the
adverse party; or
b. In a criminal case wherein the officer or employee of the government is accused of an
offense in relation to his office; nor
c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an
interest adverse to the government, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally
constituted officers.
4. Civil service officers and employees without permit from their respective department heads.
Q: Atty. Eliseo represented Allan in a collection suit against PCSO. After his election as
Sangguniang Bayan Member, the court rendered a decision in for of PCSO. Still, Atty. Eliseo
appeared for Allan in the latter’s appeal; prompting PCSO to question his right to do so. In response,
Atty. Eliseo claimed that the local government code authorizes him to practice law as long as it does
not conflict with his duties. Is Atty. Eliseo correct? (2011 Bar)
A: No, because he cannot appear against a government instrumentality in a civil case.
NOTE: While certain local elective officials (governor, mayor, provincial board members,
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or
engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on punong barangay and the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Since they are excluded from any
Page 7 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. (However, he
should procure prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by the
civil service regulations. ???)
6. Lawyers authorized to represent the government
SOLICITOR GENERAL for the National government, and any person appointed to appear for the
government of the Philippines in accordance with law.
In case of Local Government Units, they are represented by a LEGAL OFFICER who provides
legal assistance and support to the mayor or the governor and represents the LGU in all civil actions
and special proceedings wherein it or any of its officials are involved in an official capacity.
NOTE: In criminal cases, SolGen steps in only when the case has already reached the CA. While it is
with the lower courts it is the PUBLIC PROSECUTOR who represents the government.
DUTIES OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
The Solicitor General, in his discretion, may pursue any of the following actions:
1. Prosecute;
2. Not to prosecute;
3. To abandon a prosecution already started; or
4. To take a position adverse to the People of the Philippines in a criminal case, when he
believes that justice will be served by taking a different stand.
DUTY OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL TO REPRESENT THE OTHER PARTY WHEREBY

TWO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE IN CONFLICT
It is incumbent upon the SolGen to represent to the court what he considers as would legally uphold
the best interest of the government. The other government agency adversely affected, if it still
believes in the merits of its case, may appear on its own behalf through its legal officer or
representative.
7. Lawyer’s oath
I, (name), of (place of birth) do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly nor willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYER’S OATH
By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes the guardian of truth and the rule of law and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Good moral character
Page 8 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
includes, at least, common honesty. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
The lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards
nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep
inviolable at all times.
B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer
DUTIES OF AN ATTORNEY UNDER THE RULES OF COURT (2006 BAR)

1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines;
2. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
3. To counsel and maintain only such actions or proceedings which appear to him to be just and
only such defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
4. To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
5. To employ, for purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by
any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
6. To maintain inviolate the confidence and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets in
connection with his client’s business except from him or with his knowledge or approval;
7. To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and
reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed; and
9. In the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits to the end that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, but by due process of law.
1. To society
a) Respect for law and legal processes
CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
TWO-FOLD DUTY UNDER CANON 1
1. Obey the laws and legal processes.

2. Inspire others to maintain respect and obedience thereto.
CANON 1- RULE 1.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST,

IMMORAL AND DECIETFUL CONDUCT.
DECIETFUL CONDUCT- An act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the fact, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
Page 9 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT- A transgression of any provision of law, which need not be a penal law.
The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential on order to bring his act or
omission within the terms of this rule.
IMMORAL CONDUCT- A conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To warrant
disciplinary action, the act must not only be merely immoral but GROSSLY IMMORAL.
NOTE: GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
INSTANCES OF GROSS IMMORALITY AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES
1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED.

2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge of a woman through a promise of marriage which he did
not fulfill. DISBARRED.
3. Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a married woman with whom respondent lawyer
had an adulterous relation. DISBARRED.
4. Lawyer arranging marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations.
DISBARRED.
5. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing that they have been married civilly to satisfy his
carnal desires. DISBARRED.
6. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine and asked
lady student to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat
of flunking all her subjects. DISBARRED.
7. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 months after he retired, antedating the decision and
forcing his former staff to include it in the expediente of the case. DISBARRED.
ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING GROSS IMMORALITY
1. Stealing a kiss from a client

2. Live-in relationship involving two unmarried persons
3. Failure to pay a loan
GR: A lawyer may not be disciplined for failure to pay a loan. The proper remedy is the filing of an
action for collection of a sum of money in regular courts.
XPN: A deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks.
Having incurred just debts, a lawyer has the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them when
they become due. He should comply with his just obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards to preserve the court’s integrity, since he is an employee thereof.
Q: Patricia and Simeon were teen sweethearts. It was after their child was born that Simeon first
promised he would marry her after he passes the Bar. Their relationship continued and Simeon
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. Patricia learned that Simeon
married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed the 1970 Bar examinations after
four attempts. But before he could take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take
the Lawyer’s oath on the ground of gross immoral conduct. Does the act of Simeon in engaging in
Page 10 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
premarital relations with Patricia and making promises to marry her constitute gross immoral
conduct?
A: The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting permanent
exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does
not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment
the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral conduct is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless act, which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
Q: Catherin and Atty. Rongcal maintained an illicit affair. Catherine filed a case for disbarment
against Atty. Rongcal based on gross immoral conduct alleging that he misrepresented himself to be
single when he was in fact married, and due to the false pretenses she succumbed to his sexual
advances. Will her petition prosper?
A: Yes. Good moral character is a continuing condition in the privilege of law practice. The mere
fact of sexual relation between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative
sanction for such illicit behavior, it is with respect to betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity. Atty.
Rongcal is guilty of immorality in violation of RULE 1.01 that a lawyer should not engage in
unlawful dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. But his remorse over his indiscretion and the fact
of ending the illicit affair mitigates the liability. Hence a penalty of a fine will suffice with a warning
that the same will be dealt with more severely.
NOTE: Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it his public or private activities, which tends
to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
his suspension or disbarment.
MORAL TURPITUDE- Imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one
person owes to another or to society in general which is contrary to the usual accepted and customary
rule of right and duty which a person should follow. The question as to whether an offense involves
moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to decide.
CANON 1- RULE 1.02 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL OR ABET ACTIVITIES AIMED
AT DEFIANCE OF THE LAW OR AT LESSENING CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
(1994,1998 BAR)
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a Notary public, notarized a document already prepared by spouses
Roger and Luisa when they approached him. It stated in the document that Roger and Luisa formally
agreed to live separately from each other and either one can have a live-in partner with full consent
of the other. What is the liability of Atty. Asilo, if any? (1998 Bar)
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for violating Rule 1.02 of the CPR- a lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. An agreement between two spouses to live separately from each other and either one could
have a live-in partner is contrary to law and morals. The ratification by a notary who is a lawyer of
such illegal and immoral contract constitutes malpractice or gross misconduct in office. He should at
least refrain from its consummation.
CANON 1- RULE 1.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MA’S CAUSE.
Page 11 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
The rule is aimed against the practice of barratry, stirring up litigation and ambulance chasing.
BARRATRY VS. AMBULANCE CHASING (1993 BAR)
BARRATRY- An offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or
otherwise; lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of
them. Barratry is not a crime under Philippine laws. However, it is proscribed by the rules of legal
ethics.
AMBULANCE CHASING- An act of chasing victims of accidents for the purpose of talking to the
said victims (or relatives) and offering his legal services for the filing of a case against the person(s)
who caused the accident(s).
NOTE: Volunteer advice to bring lawsuit comes within the prohibition, except where ties of blood,
relationship and trust make it a duty to do so.
Q: Atty. Melissa witnessed the car accident that resulted in injury to Manny, a friend of hers. While
visiting him at the hospital, she advised him about what action he needed to take regarding the
accident. Is Atty. Melissa subject to disciplinary action if she eventually handles the case for him?
(2011 BAR)
A: No. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. In the case at hand, since Atty.
Melissa is a friend of the injured person, she may not be admonished for extending some legal advice
to a friend in need.
CANON1 – RULE 1.04- A LAWYER SHALL ENCOURAGE HIS CLIENTS TO AVOID, END
OR SETTLE A CONTROVERSY IF IT WILL ADMIT OF A FAIR SETTLEMENT
It is the duty of the lawyer to temper his client’s propensity to litigate and resist his client’s whims
and caprices for the lawyers owes duty to the court. A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and
conciliator for compromise rather than an initiator of controversy and predator for conflict.
The rule requires that lawyers encourage settlement only when the same is fair. It should be noted
that the duty and the right of the lawyer is limited to encouraging the client to settle. Ultimately, the
final decision to settle a claim rests upon the client.
b) Efficient and convenient legal services
CANON 2- A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN

EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
The rationale behind this rule is the lawyer’s prime duty to see to it that justice is accorded to all
without discrimination.
CANON 2-RULE 2.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT REJECT, EXCEPT FOR VALID REASONS,
THE CAUSE OF THE DEFENSELESS OR THE OPPRESSED
DEFENSELESS- Those who are not in a position to defend themselves due to poverty, weakness,
ignorance or other similar reasons.
Page 12 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
OPPRESSED- Those who are victims of cruelty, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.
The inability to pay for legal services is not a valid reason to refuse acceptance of a case. This is
because the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making
trade.
RA No. 9999 FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010
PURPOSE:
1. Encourage lawyers and professional partnerships to provide free legal assistance.

2. Solicit the assistance of lawyers and professional partnerships in the private practice of law in
providing quality legal assistance to indigent litigants through a system of tax incentives.
3. Provide relief to the PAO and other associations accredited by the SC from the numerous
cases they handle.
4. Provide indigent litigants the opportunity to acquire the services of distinguished law firms
and legal practitioners of the country for free.
5. Ensure that the right of every individual to counsel, as mandated in the Constitution, is
protected and observed.
The PAO, DOJ and other legal aid clinics accredited by the SC shall refer pauper litigants to
identified lawyers and professional partnerships. PAO, DOJ and accredited legal clinics shall issue a
CERTIFICATION that services were rendered by the lawyer or the professional partnership under
this act. The certification shall include the cost of the actual services given.
CANON2-RULE 2.02- IN SUCH CASES, EVEN IF THE LAWYER DOES NOT ACCEPT A
CASE, HE SHALL NOT REFUSE TO RENDER LEGAL ADVICE TO THE PERSON
CONCERNED IF ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD THE LATTER’S
RIGHTS
Rendering of legal advice includes preliminary steps that should be taken, at least, until the person
concerned has obtained the services of a proper counsel’s representation. Even though no attorney-
client relationship is created between the parties, the lawyer, by providing interim advice preserves
the dignity of the profession by inspiring public faith in the profession.
CANON 2-RULE 2.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNATED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS (1997 BAR)
RATIONALE BEHINDTHE RULE THAT THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS NOT

CONSIDERED AS A BUSINESS (2006 BAR)
1. Relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability
2. Duty of public service
3. Relation to clients with the highest degree of fiduciary
4. Relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort
to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.
Page 13 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Q: Atty. David agreed to give ½ of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent and
he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients. Can he be subjected to disciplinary action?
A: Yes. The agreement is void because it is tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. The
meaning of malpractice is in consonance with the notion that the practice of law is a profession not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others, to do so
would be unprofessional.
NOTE: A general professional partnership with a non-lawyer is VOID. In the formation of

partnership for the practice of law, no person should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or
member who is not a member of the legal profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to
professional discipline.
ADVERTISEMENT
GR: No advertisement by lawyers is allowed. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible
is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
XPNs:
1. Reputable law lists

2. Advertisement or simple announcement of the existence of a lawyer or his law firm posted
anywhere it is proper such as his place of business or residence except courtrooms and
government buildings
3. Ordinary simple professional card
4. A simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable
5. Advertisement or announcement in any legal publication, including books, journals, and legal
magazines and in telephone directories
6. Writing legal articles
7. Engaging in business and other occupations except when such could be deemed improper,
seen as indirect solicitation or be the equivalent of law practice
8. Activity of an association for the purpose of legal representation
9. Notice to other local lawyers and publishing in a legal journal of one’s availability to act as
an associate for them
10. Seeking a public which can only be held by a lawyer or, in a dignified manner, a position of a
full time corporate lawyer
11. Listing in a phone directory, but not under a designation of a special branch of law
RATIONALE FOR THE PROHIBITION
1. The profession is primarily for public service

2. Commercializes the profession
3. Involves self-praise and puffing
4. Damages public confidence
5. May increase lawsuits and result in needless litigation
Page 14 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Q: Atty. Dulcinea writes a regular column in a newspaper of general circulation and articles on
unforgettable legal stories in a leading magazine. Her by-line always includes the name of her firm
where she is a name partner. Would you consider this as an improper advertising? Explain.
A: Atty. Dulcinea’s by-line including the firm name where she belongs is improper because it is an
indirect way of solicitation or is an advertisement of the law firm.
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a lawyer, Atty. A argues that although the calling
card of his businessman friend indicates his law office and his legal specialty, the law office is
located in his friend’s store. DECIDE (2001 BAR)
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition on improper advertising. There is no valid
reason why the lawyer’s businessman friend should be handing out calling cards which contains the
lawyer’s law office and legal specialty, even if his office is located in his friend’s store. What makes
it more objectionable is the statement of his supposed legal specialty.
CANON 2-RULE 2.04- A LAWYER SHALL NOT CHARGE RATES LOWER THAN THOSE
CUSTOMARILY PRESCRIBED UNLESS THE CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT (1997,2005
BAR)
GR: A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed.
XPN: When clients are relatives, co-lawyers, or are indigents. These are valid justifications.
NOTE: What the rule prohibits is a competition in the matter of charging professional fees for the
purpose of attracting clients in favor of the lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does not prohibit
a lawyer from charging reduced fee or none at all to indigent clients.
c) True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services
CANON 3- A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE

ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The practice of law is not a trade like the sale of commodities to the general public where “the usual
exaggerations in trade, when the proper party had the opportunity to know the facts are not in
themselves fraudulent”
Q: Atty. E has a daily 10-minute radio program billed as “Court of Common Troubles.” The
program is advertised by the radio station as a public service feature of those who seek but cannot
afford to pay for legal services. Its sponsors include a food processing company and a detergent
manufacturing firm which share with the radio station the monthly remuneration of Atty. E. Is there
any impropriety in Atty. E’s role under the above arrangement? (1997 BAR)
A: Yes. Giving advice on legal matters through the medium of a newspaper column or radio station
or television broadcast is improper. It would involve indirect advertising and violation of the
confidential relation between the lawyer and the client.
CANON3-RULE 3.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT THE USE OF ANY FALSE,
FRAUDULENT, MISLEADIN, DECEPTIVE, UNDIGNIFIED, SELF-LAUDATORY OR
UNFAIR STATEMNET OR CLAIM REGARDING HIS QUALIFICATIONS OR LEGAL
SERVICES (1997 BAR)
Page 15 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Any false, exaggerating or untrue claims about his qualifications are clearly unethical. Example of
this is when a lawyer makes representation to a prospective client that he has never lost a single case
in his entire career. Certainly, this is impossible for the best lawyers in the country have experienced
losing cases.
EXAMPLES OF ADVERTISEMENTS CONSIDERED DECEPTIVE:
1. Misstatement of fact
2. Suggestion that the ingenuity or the prior record of a lawyer rather than justice of the claim
are the principal factors likely to determine the result
3. Inclusion of information irrelevant on selecting a lawyer
4. Representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or verified.
CANON 3-RULE 3.02- IN THE CHOICE OF A FIRM NAME, NO FALSE, MISLEADING,

ASSUMED NAME SHALL BE USED. THE CONTINUED USE OF THE NAME OF A
DECEASED PARTNER IS PERMISSIBLE PROVIDED THAT THE FIRM INDICATES IN ALL
ITS COMMUNICATIONS THAT SAID PARTNER IS DECEASED (1994,1996,2001 BAR)
RATIONALE
All the partners have, by their joint and several efforts over a period of years contributed to the good
will attached to the firm name. In the case of a firm having widespread connections, this good will is
disturbed by a change in firm name every time a partner dies, and that reflects a loss in some degree
of the good will to the building up of which the surviving partners have contributed their time, skill
and labor through a period of years.
NOTE: No name not belonging to any of the partners or associates may be used in the firm name for
any purpose.
Continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all
its communications that said partner is deceased. The use of a cross after the name of the deceased
partner is sufficient indication. It is advisable though that the year of death be also indicated.
CANON3-RULE 3.03- WHERE A PARTNER ACCEPTS PUBLIC OFFICE, HE SHALL

WITHDRAW FROM THE FIRM AND HIS NAME SHALL BE DROPPED FROM THE FIRM
NAME UNLESS THE LAW ALLOWS HIM TO PRACTICE LAW CONCURRENTLY
This is to prevent the law firm or partners from making use of the name of the public official to
attract business and to avoid suspicion of undue influence.
CANON 3-RULE 3.04- A LAWYER SHALL NOT PAY OR GIVE ANYTHING OF VALUE TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MASS MEDIA IN ANTICIPATION OF, OR IN RETURN FOR,
PUBLICITY TO ATTRACT LEGAL BUSINESS
This is to prevent some lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage over others through the use of
gimmickry, press agentry or other artificial means.
d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system
Page 16 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
CANON 4- A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND
IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
By reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in
the legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein. Thus, they should participate in
proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve the system, without regard to the
general interests or desires of clients or former clients.
E.g.:
1. Presenting position papers or resolutions for the introduction of pertinent bills in Congress; or
2. Petitions with the SC for the amendment of the Rules of Court.
e) Participation in legal education program
CANON 5- A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,

PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE
PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING
INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
The duty carried with it the obligation to be well informed of the existing laws, and to keep abreast
with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with the basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. Worse,
they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
The latest circular of the SC provides for the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Program of the
IBP. For law practitioners, they have to comply with the 36 hours pf mandatory legal education as a
pre-condition to the non-revocation of license to practice law.
THREE-FOLD OBLIGATION OF A LAWYER
1. He owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge of the laws

2. He owes it to hid profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of high standards of
legal education
3. He owes it to the public to make the law a part of their social consciousness
LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL TASKS
CANON 6- THESE CANOS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS
Lawyers in the employ of the government should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations as their conduct is subject to constant scrutiny of the public.
CANON 6-RULE 6.01- THE PRIMARY DUTY OF A LAWYER ENGAGED IN PUBLIC

PROSECUTION IS NOT TO CONVICT BUT TO SEE TO IT THAT JUSTICE IS DONE. THE
Page 17 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
SUPPRESSION OF FACTS OR THE CONCEALMENT OF WITNESSES CAPABLE OF

ESTABLISHING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS HIGHLY REPREHENSIBLE AND
IS CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION (1992, 1993 BAR)
Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should it be mandatory that the public prosecutor be
present at the trial of a criminal case despite the presence of the private prosecutor? (2001 BAR)
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial of the criminal case despite the presence of a
private prosecutor in order to see to it that the interest of the state is well-guarded and protected,
should the private prosecutor be found lacking competence in prosecuting the case. Moreover, the
primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see to it that justice is done. A private
prosecutor would be naturally interested only in the conviction of the accused.
CANON6-RULE 6.02- A LAWYER IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHALL NOT USE HIS
PUBLIC POSITION TO PROMOTE OR ADVANCE HIS PRIVATE INTERESTS, NOR ALLOW
THE LATTER TO INTERFERE WITH HIS PUBLIC DUTIES
RESTRICTIONS ON LAWYERS WHO ARE ALSO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

DURING THEIR INCUMBENCY
THEY MUST NOT:
1. Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed
by their office unless expressly allowed by law;
3. Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending
official transaction with their office; and
4. Use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not available to the public.
CANON 6-RULE 6.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT, AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT

SERVICE, ACCEPT ENGAGEMENT OR EMPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY
MATTER IN WHICH HE HAD INTERVENED WHILE IN SAID SERVICE (1992,1993,2001
BAR)
The restriction provided under the rule covers engagement or employment which means that he
cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which
he intervened as a public official, except on behalf od the body or authority which he served during
his public employment.
NOTE: Sec 7(b) of R.A. 6713 prohibits former public official or employee for a period of 1 year
after retirement or separation from office to practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
2. To the legal profession
Page 18 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
CANON 7- A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR
a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A)
It is the official national body composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
NOTE: Integrated bar is a state-organized bar, to which every lawyer must belong. As distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. It is a national organization of lawyers created on 16 January 1973 under Rule 138-A,
Rules of Court, and constituted on 4 May 1973 into a body corporate by PD No. 181.
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR
The official unification of the entire lawyer population, and this requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE IBP
1. To elevate the standards of the legal profession;

2. Improve the administration of justice; and
3. Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE IBP INTEGRATION
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege clothed with public interest. Hence, it is fair
and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities. Given the existing bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the
Integrated Bar.
STRUCTURE OF THE IBP BOARD
The House of Delegates shall elect 9 Governors from the 9 regions on the representation basis of 1
governor from each region. Each governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the
Delegates from the Region, provided that no more than one nominee shall come from one chapter.
The President and Executive Vice President, if chosen by the governors from outside of themselves
as provided in Sec 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.
TERM OF MEMBERS OF THE IBP BOARD
Members shall hold office for a term of 1 year from the date of their election and until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than
two terms.
PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION
Page 19 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as may terms as
the number of chapters there are in a region, to give every chapter a chance to represent the region in
the Board of Governors.
KINDS OF ROTATION
1.ROTATION BY PRE-ORDAINED SEQUENCE- Effected by the observance of the sequence of

the service of the chapters in the first cycle, which is very predictable.
2. ROTATION BY EXCLUSION- Effected by the exclusion of a chapter who had previously served
until all chapters have taken their turns to serve. In one case, the SC held that rotation by exclusion
shall be adopted since the elections would become genuine as the opportunity to serve as Governor at
any time is once again open to all, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle.
While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter remains in the
cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court, “the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with,
and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate s expressed through the ballot”.
Transferring to another IBP chapter is not a ground for disqualification to run as IBP
Governor
The same is allowed in the IBP By Laws with the only qualification that the transfer be made not less
than three months immediately preceding any chapter elections.
IBP must be apolitical

No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutor office in the government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any chapter thereof. A delegate, governor, officer, employee of the
Integrated Bar or an officer or employee of any chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective
public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutor office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
(i) Membership and dues
Q: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted a resolution recommending to the Court the
removal of the name Marcial A. Edillon, a duly licensed practicing attorney, from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since its constitution,
notwithstanding due notice. Is Edillon correct in his objection that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the IBP, hence, Sec. 1 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate)?
A: No. To compel a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar Examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well- defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State (In the
Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, Dec. 19, 1980).
Page 20 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: A lawyer does not automatically become a member of the IBP chapter where he resides or
works after becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar. He has the discretion to choose the IBP
Chapter he wants to join (Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. 6052, Dec. 11, 2003).
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office is or, in
the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter (RRC, Sec. 4, Rule 139-A).
Procedure for voluntary termination of membership

A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary
of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court.
Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of
Attorneys (RRC, Sec.11, Rule 139-A).
NOTE: Re-instatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court (RRC, Sec.11, Rule 139-A).
Membership dues
Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof (RRC, Sec. 9, Rule 139-A).
NOTE: Membership dues are not prohibited by the Constitution. The fee is imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the purposes and objectives of the integration (In
the Matter of IBP Membership dues delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, Aug. 3,
1978).
Effect of non-payment of dues

Default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys (RRC, Sec. 10, Rule 139-A) subject to the
requirement of due process (Funa, 2009).
Q: Atty. Llamas, for a number of years, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data
in his pleadings. He only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years
already. Atty. Llamas averred that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under R.A.
7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this
exemption, is the payment of membership dues. Is Atty. Llamas correct?
A: Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof shall warrant the appropriate penalties. It does not matter whether or not Atty. Llamas is only
engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by Atty. Llamas does not
include exemption from payment of membership or association dues (Santos Jr. v. Atty. Llamas,
A.C. No. 4749, Jan. 20, 2000).
NOTE: RA 7432 providing 20% discount to Senior Citizens DO NOT apply to IBP Dues.
Q: Atty. Arevalo sought exemption from payment of IBP dues for the alleged unpaid accountability
for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
Page 21 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the
years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one’s profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA. Is Atty. Arevalo entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law?
A: No. The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua
non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership
in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is
engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allow exemption from payment of
membership dues (Letter of Atty. Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption from Payment of Dues, B.M.
No. 1370, May 9, 2005).
b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
CANON 7-RULE 7.01 - A LAWYER SHALL BE ANSWERABLE FOR KNOWINGLY MAKING

A FALSE STATEMENT OR SUPPRESSING A MATERIAL FACT IN CONNECTION WITH
HIS APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR. (1995,1997,2004,2005 BAR)
The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the bar exams of the fact that he had been
charged with or indicted for an alleged crime, is ground for revocation of his license to practice law.
On the other hand, to be liable for suppressing a fact or information in the application, the
suppression must be:
1. Deliberately or knowingly made; and

2. The fact or information suppressed must be material (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
False statements in the application for admission to the Bar

1. If the false statement or suppression of material fact is discovered before the candidate could take
the bar examinations, he will be denied permission to take the examinations.
2. If the false statement or suppression of material fact was discovered after the candidate had passed
the examinations but before having been taken his oath, he will not be allowed to take his oath as a
lawyer.
3. If the discovery was made after the candidate had taken his oath as a lawyer, his name will be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Effect concealment of a crime which does not involve moral turpitude

Concealment will be taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not the commission of the
crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer. When he made concealment he
perpetrated perjury.
CANON 7-RULE 7.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF ANY PERSON KNOWN BY HIM TO BE UNQUALIFIED IN
RESPECT TO CHARACTER, EDUCATION, OR OTHER RELEVANT ATTRIBUTE.
Page 22 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
The rationale behind the rule goes beyond the personal responsibility to be upright and honest. It
further extends to the lawyer’s responsibility to uphold the integrity and dignity of the profession, by
not blindly issuing certifications in support of applications for admission to the bar of persons known
to him or her to have questionable character, inadequate education or other relevant attributes not
consistent with any or all of the requirements for admission (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
CANON 7-RULE 7.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT

ADVERSELY REFLECTS ON HIS FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW, NOR SHALL HE,
WHETHER IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE LIFE, BEHAVE IN A SCANDALOUS MANNER TO
THE DISCREDIT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004 BAR)
Q: Atty. Perenia got married in 2005. Then he met another woman, Helen; they fell in love and
started living together. Atty. Perenia would even bring her along social functions and introduce her
as his second wife. Is such act unethical?
A: Yes, it violates Rule 7.03 of CPR. The fact that he shamelessly flaunts his mistress constitutes an
act which embarrasses and discredits the law profession since it is his duty and obligation to uphold
the dignity and integrity of the profession. The actuation of Atty. Perenia is contrary to good morals.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws (Vitug v. Roncal, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7,
2006).
Q: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank’s valued clients. In recognition of his loyalty to the bank, he
was issued a gold credit card with a credit limit of P250,000.00. After two months, Atty. Kuripot
exceeded his credit limit, and refused to pay the monthly charges as they fell due. Aside from a
collection suit, Town Bank also filed a disbarment case against Atty. Kuripot. In his comment on the
disbarment case, Atty. Kuripot insisted that he did not violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, since his obligation to the bank was personal in nature and had no relation to his
being a lawyer. Is Atty. Kuripot correct? Explain your answer.
A: Atty. Kuripot is not correct. Section 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely affects his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.”
Q: Explain whether Atty. Kuripot should be held administratively liable for his refusal to settle his
credit card bill. (2005 Bar Question)
A: He may not be held administratively liable. The Supreme Court has held that it does not take
original jurisdiction of complaints for collection of debts. The creditor’s course of action is civil, not
administrative in nature and proper reliefs may be obtained from the regular courts (Litigio v. Dicon,
A.M. No. MTJ-93-806, July 13, 1995). Although lawyers have been held administratively liable for
obstinacy in evading payment of a debt (Constantino v. Saludares, A.C. No. 2029, Dec. 7, 1993; Lao
v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003), there is no obstinacy shown in this case.
c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
Page 23 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS

AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Lawyers, though they may represent different clients, should bear in mind that they are not enemies
but brothers and sisters in their profession (Antiquiera, 1992).
CANON 8-RULE 8.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, IN HIS PROFESSIONAL DEALINGS, USE
LANGUAGE WHICH IS ABUSIVE, OFFENSIVE OR OTHERWISE IMPROPER.
The lawyer’s arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both the court and opposing
counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another (National
Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610).
A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J,
Jan. 21, 1974).
Lack of want of intention is no excuse for the disrespectful language employed. Counsel cannot
escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood
them as meaning (Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967).
Although the Canon that the Rule implements pertains to a lawyer’s dealings with his fellow
lawyers, the Rule is generally worded to apply to anyone in the wider context of a lawyer’s
professional dealings, including his or her clients and witnesses (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
CANON 8-RULE 8.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ENCROACH

UPON THE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER LAWYER; HOWEVER, IT IS
THE RIGHT OF ANY LAWYER, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, TO GIVE PROPER ADVICE
AND ASSISTANCE TO THOSE SEEKING RELIEF AGAINST UNFAITHFUL OR
NEGLECTFUL COUNSEL (1995,1997,2001,2005,2006 BAR)
A person without a retained lawyer is a legitimate prospective client for any lawyer whom he
approaches for legal services. But, as soon as he had retained one and had not dismissed the retained
counsel, efforts on the part of another lawyer to take him as client constitutes an act of encroaching
upon the employment of another lawyer.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal with his counsel.
Any act which is aimed to ease out a previous lawyer with the intention to grab the case is highly
unethical and should be avoided (Antiquiera, 1992).
Exceptions
1. A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness or prospective witness for the
opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party.
2. Any person who seeks relief against an unfaithful or neglectful lawyer may approach another
lawyer for proper advice and assistance. Any advice or assistance extended after proper verification
is not encroaching upon the business of another lawyer for such act is justified under the
circumstances.
Page 24 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Q: Myrna, in a case for custody of children against her husband, sought advice from Atty. Mendoza
whom she met at a party. She informed Atty. Mendoza that her lawyer, Atty. Khan, has been
charging her exorbitant appearance fees when all he does is move for postponements which have
unduly delayed the proceedings; and that recently, she learned that Atty. Khan approached her
husband asking for a huge amount in exchange for the withdrawal of her Motion for Issuance of
Hold Departure Order so that he and his children can leave for abroad. Is it ethical for Atty. Mendoza
to advise Myrna to terminate the services of Atty. Khan and hire him instead for a reasonable
attorney’s fees?
A: Such advice would be unethical. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues (CPR, Canon 8). Specifically, he should not directly or
indirectly encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer (CPR, Canon 8).
Q: What should Atty. Mendoza do about the information relayed to him by Myrna that Atty. Khan
approached her husband with an indecent proposal? (2006 Bar Question)
A: He can advise her to terminate the services of Atty. Khan and/or file an administrative case
against Atty. Khan. It is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel (CPR, Rule 8.02).
Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific performance against DEV, Inc., a subdivision
developer which is represented by Atty. L. Your client believes that the president of DEV Inc.,
would be willing to consider an amicable settlement and your client urges you to discuss the matter
with DEV Inc., without the presence of Atty. L whom he consider to be an impediment to an early
compromise. Would it be alright for you to negotiate the terms of the compromise as so suggested
above by your client? (1997 Bar Question)
A: No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer.” Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Ethics is more particular. “A lawyer should not in any way communicate
upon the subject of the controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him but should deal only with his counsel.” In
the case of Likong v. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994, a lawyer was suspended for negotiating a
compromise agreement directly with the adverse party without the presence and participation of her
counsels.
d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
The rationale of this canon is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court.
There is no violation of this canon if a lawyer employs a paralegal graduate to assist him in the
practice of law since the job of a paralegal is limited to drafting of documents, case management,
etc. (Antiquiera, 1992).
Q: Sanchez alleged that the complaint against him and the supporting affidavits were subscribed and
sworn to before Tupas, the Clerk of Court, who is not a member of the IBP and therefore engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. Is Tupas as Clerk of Court authorized to administer oath?
A: The term "clerk of courts" in Section 41 of the Administrative Code as amended is used as a
general term. The intention of the law is to authorize all clerks of court regardless of whether they
Page 25 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
are clerks of the MTCs, to administer oaths on matter involving official business. As Clerk of Court
of MCTC, Tupas has the authority to administer oath of affidavits of parties and witnesses which are
to be filed in court (Sanchez v. Tupas, A.M. OCA IPI No. 03- 1687-P, Mar. 1, 2004).
CANON 9-RULE 9.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DELEGATE TO ANY UNQUALIFIED

PERSON THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY TASK WHICH BY LAW MAY ONLY BE
PERFORMED BY A MEMBER OF THE BAR IN GOOD STANDING.
The qualifications to be a lawyer is personal and the Bar is an exclusive group of professionals who
possess the requisite qualifications and for whom defined functions are reserved. To delegate the
functions would violate the rationale behind reserving defined functions exclusively for those who
are admitted to the bar.
Although the authority of a lawyer to represent a client cannot be delegated to an unqualified person,
it does not follow however that the retained lawyer is automatically authorized to make such
delegation to a qualified person because a client-lawyer relationship is personal (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
Q: Lorenzo is a lawyer but is suspended in the practice of law due to some unethical acts. He worked
for a law firm owned by one of his friends. Since he has so many cases to handle, Atty. Berenguer
assigned a case to Lorenzo, believing he can handle such easy case. Did Atty. Berenguer violate any
rule?
A: Yes, because he delegates handling of a case to a person suspended from the practice of law.
Under Rule 9.01 of CPR – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
CANON 9-RULE 9.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DIVIDE OR STIPULATE TO DIVIDE A FEE
FOR LEGAL SERVICES WITH PERSONS NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW, EXCEPT:
A) WHERE THERE IS A PRE-EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH A PARTNER OR ASSOCIATE
THAT, UPON THE LATTER’S DEATH, MONEY SHALL BE PAID OVER A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME TO HIS ESTATE OR TO PERSONS SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT; OR
B) WHERE A LAWYER UNDERTAKES TO COMPLETE UNFINISHED LEGAL BUSINESS
OF A DECEASED LAWYER; OR
C) WHERE A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM INCLUDES NON-LAWYER EMPLOYEES IN A
RETIREMENT PLAN, EVEN IF THE PLAN IS BASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, ON A
PROFITABLE SHARING ARRANGEMENT.
The interest promoted by the prohibition is that the independence of the professional judgment of a
lawyer, which the client is paying for, could be at risk if a non-lawyer has direct rights to share in the
legal fees resulting from the exercise of such professional judgment (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Exceptions to Rule 9.02

1. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate to persons specified in the
agreement; (CPR, Rule 9.02, second par., Canon 9) or
NOTE: This exception is in the nature of a bequest. It is still in substance, payment to the deceased
lawyer. His estate and/or assignee could not claim entitlement to the money in their own right but
only by representation (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
2. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; (CPR,
Page 26 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Rule 9.02, third par., Canon 9) or
NOTE: The estate or the heir cannot be made a member of the partnership with the surviving
partners. The legal fees in this case, no longer represent compensation for past
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes a non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan
is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement (CPR, Rule 9.02, fourth par., Canon 9).
NOTE: This is not a division of legal fees but a pension representing deferred wages for the
employees’ past services. This exception is an implicit recognition of the incontestable fact that
lawyers need to, and in fact, depend on non-lawyers for the administrative support functions
necessary to allow lawyers to discharge their legal functions more efficiently (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
Q: You had just taken your oath as lawyer. The secretary to the president of a big university offered
to get you as the official notary public of the school. She explained that a lot of students lose their
identification cards and are required to secure an affidavit of loss before they can be issued a new
one. She claimed that this would be very lucrative for you, as more than 30 students lose their
identification cards every month. However, the secretary wants you to give her one-half of your
earning therefrom. Will you agree to the arrangement? Explain. (2005 Bar Question)
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer
shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal service with persons not licensed to practice
law”. The secretary is not licensed to practice law and is not entitled to a share of the fees for
notarizing affidavits, which is a legal service.
3. To the courts
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is
asserted by counsel.
As officers of the court, lawyers have the primary obligation towards the administration of justice.
To mislead the court is contumacious and clearly a ground for disciplinary action (Antiquiera, CPR,
p. 39).
Requirements of candor
1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital facts which bear on the merit or lack of merit of
complaint or petition.
2. A lawyer shall volunteer to the court any development of the case which has rendered the issue
raised moot and academic.
3. Disclosure to the court of any decision adverse to his position of which opposing counsel is
apparently ignorant and which court should consider in deciding a case.
4. He shall not represent himself as a lawyer for a client, appear in court and present pleadings in the
Page 27 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
latter’s behalf only to claim later that he was not authorized to do so.
CANON 10-RULE 10.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO ANY FALSEHOOD, NOR CONSENT
TO THE DOING OF ANY IN COURT; NOR SHALL HE MISLEAD, OR ALLOW THE COURT
TO BE MISLED BY ANY ARTIFICE.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
The courts on the other hand are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth (Young v. Batuegas, A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003).
NOTE: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice (Garcia v. Francisco, Adm. Case no. 3923, Mar. 30,1993).
Presenting false evidence is not justifiable

Aside from violations of the CPR , the lawyer is also guilty of a crime under ART. 184, Revised
Penal Code, which states, “Any person who shall knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or
testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of false testimony and
shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section”
CANON 10-RULE 10.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY MISQUOTE OR

MISREPRESENT THE CONTENTS OF PAPER, THE LANGUAGE OR THE ARGUMENT OF
OPPOSING COUNSEL, OR THE TEXT OF A DECISION OR AUTHORITY, OR KNOWINGLY
CITE AS LAW A PROVISION ALREADY RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY REPEAL OR
AMENDMENT, OR ASSERT AS A FACT THAT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN PROVED.
If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
CANON 10-RULE 10.03 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
SHALL NOT MISUSE THEM TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. Those who filed multiple or
repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of
their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions
that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor (Pablo R. Olivares etc. v. Atty. Arsenio
Villalon Jr., A.C. No. 6323, Apr. 13, 2007).
Instances when lawyers can be disciplined based on the pleadings he filed

When a counsel deliberately:
1. Files an unsigned pleading in violation of the rules;
2. Alleges scandalous matters therein;
3. Fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address (RRC, Sec. 3, Rule 7).
NOTE: A lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a
cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an
instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of
Page 28 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice (Garcia v.
Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, Mar. 30, 1993).
CANON 10-RULE 10.04 A LAWYER SHALL, WHEN FILING A PLEADING, FURNISH THE
OPPOSING PARTY WITH A COPY THEREOF, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE DOCUMENTS
ANNNEXED THERETO. UNLESS A MOTION EX PARTE, HE SHOULD SET IT FOR
HEARING, WITH SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO THE OTHER PARTY.
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Disrespect toward the court would necessarily undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of the court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of
justice by the court.
All lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful
processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be
respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts (Yap-Paras
v. Atty. Paras, A.C. No. 4947, June 7, 2007).
In case of conflict between his duty to the court and his duty to the society and his client, the other
must yield since it is his duty to the court that should take precedence.
Q: Atty. Z criticized the court in a tactful manner, not in any way causing disrespect. Is that allowed?
A: Yes. The fact that a person is a lawyer does not deprive him of the right, as enjoyed by every
citizen, to comment on and criticize the actuations of a judge but it is the cardinal condition of all
criticisms that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety
(Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, Feb. 1, 1989).
NOTE: What a lawyer can ordinarily say against a concluded litigation and the manner the judge
handed down the decision therein may not generally be said to a pending action. The court, in a
pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment and influence in performing the important
duty of deciding it. On the other hand, once litigation is concluded, the judge who decided on it is
subject to the same criticism as any other public official because then his ruling becomes public
property and is thrown open to public consumption.
CANON 11-RULE 11.01 - A LAWYER SHALL APPEAR IN COURT PROPERLY ATTIRED.
As an officer of the court and in order to maintain the dignity and respectability of the legal
profession, a lawyer who appears in court must be properly attired. Consequently, the court can hold
a lawyer in contempt of court if he does not appear in proper attire. Any deviation from the
commonly accepted norm of dressing in court (barong or tie, not both) is enough to warrant a citing
for contempt.
The traditional attires for male lawyers in the Philippines are the long-sleeve Barong Tagalog or coat
and tie. Female lawyers appear in semi-formal attires. Judges also appear in the same attire in
addition to black robes.
Page 29 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
CANON 11-RULE 11.02 - A LAWYER SHALL PUNCTUALLY APPEAR AT COURT

HEARINGS.
Punctuality is demanded by the respect which a lawyer owes to the court, the opposing counsel and
to all the parties to the case (Funa, 2009).
CANON 11-RULE 11.03 - A LAWYER SHALL ABSTAIN FROM SCANDALOUS, OFFENSIVE

OR MENACING LANGUAGE OR BEHAVIOR BEFORE THE COURTS.
The language of a lawyer, both oral and written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the
profession. The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the
same time disrespect to the dignity of the court justice. Moreover, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light (Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719,
Sept. 21, 1993).
The duty to observe and maintain respect is not a one-way duty from a lawyer to a judge. A judge
should also be courteous to counsel, especially those who are young and inexperienced and to all
those appearing or concerned in the administration of justice.
NOTE: The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of the client’s rights, lawyers – even those gifted
with superior intellect, are enjoined to rein up their tempers (Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 79690-
707, Oct. 7, 1988).
CANON 11-RULE 11.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ATTRIBUTE TO A JUDGE MOTIVES

NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR HAVE NO MATERIALITY TO THE CASE.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right
is not dismissed by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated
by a lawyer.
Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because the
Court’s actuations are thrown open to public consumption. Courts thus treat with forbearance and
restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations for courageous and fearless advocates are
the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Post litigation utterances or publications made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into dispute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions
by the SC in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the
morals and ethics of the legal fraternity (In Re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970).
Q: When is public comment and criticism of a court decision permissible and when would it be
improper? (1997 Bar Question)
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to comment on and criticize the decision of a court.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise that right but also to consider it
his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. But such right is subject
to the limitations that it shall be bona fide. It is proper to criticize the courts and judges, but it is
Page 30 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
improper to subject them to abuse and slander, degrade them or destroy public confidence in them.
Moreover, a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality in the case (CPR, Rule 11.04).
NOTE: A lawyer should be reminded of his primary duty to assist the court in the administration of
justice. The relations between counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep
appreciation by one of the duties of the other. It is upon their cordial relationship and mutual
cooperation that the hope of our people for speedy and efficient justice rests (Abiera v. Maceda, A.C.
No. RTJ-91-660, June 30, 1994). If the court official or employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the
evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on
mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions or on the basis of hearsay (Cervantes v. Atty. Sabio, A.C.
No. 7828, Aug. 11, 2008).
CANON 11-RULE 11.05 - A LAWYER SHALL SUBMIT GRIEVANCES AGAINST A JUDGE

TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES ONLY.
Proper venue/forum for the filing of the following cases
If administrative in nature- It shall be filled with the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court
If criminal and not purely administrative in nature- It shall be filled with the Office of the
Ombudsman, also with the OCP
If it involves a Justice of the Supreme Court based on impeachable offense- It must be coursed
through the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with the rules on impeachment
NOTE: An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the
assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty (Santiago III v. Justice
Enriquez, Jr., A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, Feb. 13, 2009).
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS

DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
A lawyer must exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
A lawyer is bound by his oath to serve his client with utmost zeal and dedication and shall conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion (Antiquiera, CPR, p. 50).
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to this Canon (Lim v. Montano, A.C. No. 5653, Feb. 27, 2006).
CANON 12-RULE 12.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT APPEAR FOR TRIAL UNLESS HE HAS
ADEQUATELY PREPARED HIMSELF ON THE LAW AND THE FACTS OF HIS CASE, THE
EVIDENCE HE WILL ADDUCE AND THE ORDER OF ITS PREFERENCES. HE SHOULD
ALSO BE READY WITH THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR COMPARISON WITH THE
COPIES.
Page 31 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
A newly hired counsel who appears in a case in the midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint
himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in the record prior to
his takeover (Villasis v. CA, G.R. Nos. L- 36874-76, Sept. 30, 1974).
CANON 12-RULE 12.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT FILE MULTIPLE ACTIONS ARISING
FROM THE SAME CAUSE (1991,1997,1998,2002 BAR)
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum
shopping. The question is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential
facts and circumstances. If they involve essentially different facts, circumstances and causes of
action, there is no forum shopping (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996).
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment (Foronda v. Atty. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, Aug. 10, 2004).
It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. What is critical is the
vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same relief and in the process creates
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different forums upon the same issues,
regardless of whether the court, in which one of the suits was brought, has no jurisdiction over the
action (Top Rate Construction and General Services v. Paxton Devt. Corp., G.R. No. 151081, Sept.
11, 2003).
Possible consequences of forum shopping

1. Summary dismissal without prejudice unless there is a willful or deliberate forum-shopping (RRC,
Sec. 5, Rule 7).
2. Penalty for direct contempt of court on the party and his lawyer in case of willful and deliberate
forum-shopping (RRC, Sec. 5, Rule 7).
3. Criminal action for a false certification of non-forum shopping and indirect contempt
4. Disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer concerned (RRC, Sec. 5, Rule 7).
CANON 12-RULE 12.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, AFTER OBTAINING EXTENSIONS OF

TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS, MEMORANDA OR BRIEFS, LET THE PERIOD LAPSE
WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE SAME OR OFFERING AN EXPLANATION FOR HIS
FAILURE TO DO SO (2003 BAR)
The court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time to file their
pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or even an
explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so (Achacoso v. CA, G.R. No. L-35867, June 28,
1973).
Asking for extension of time must be in good faith. Otherwise, it is an obstruction of justice and the
lawyer is subject to discipline (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
The same rule applies more forcefully to motion for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion (Edrial v. Quilat- Quilat, G.R. No. 133625, Sept. 6, 2000).
CANON 12-RULE 12.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT UNDULY DELAY A CASE, IMPEDE THE
EXECUTION OF A JUDGEMENT OR MISUSE COURT PROCESSES.
Page 32 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
It is understandable for a party to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law allows it.
However, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party should respond, it must ever be kept in
mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as means for its frustration.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of
his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a
judgment sets at naught the role of the courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality
(Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, GR No. 157911, September 19, 2006).
Lawyers should not resort to nor abet the resort of their clients, to a series of actions and petitions for
the purpose of thwarting the execution of a judgment that has long become final and executory
(Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968).
The writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to
stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute (Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No.
182165, November 25, 2009).
CANON 12-RULE 12.05 - A LAWYER SHALL REFRAIN FROM TALKING TO HIS WITNESS
DURING A BREAK OR RECESS IN THE TRIAL, WHILE THE WITNESS IS STILL UNDER
EXAMINATION.
The rule is designed to uphold and maintain fair play with the other party and to prevent the
examining lawyer from being tempted to coach his own witness to suit his purpose.
Guidelines in interviewing witnesses (2001, 2005 Bar Questions)

1. A lawyer may interview a witness in advance of the trial to guide him in the management of the
litigation;
2. A lawyer may also interview a “prospective witness” for the opposing side in any civil and
criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party;
3. A lawyer must properly obtain statements from witnesses whose names were furnished by the
opposing counsel or interview the employees of the opposing party even though they are under
subpoena to appear as witnesses for the opposite side;
4. If after trial resulting in defendant’s conviction, his counsel has been advised that a prosecution
witness has committed perjury, it is not only proper but it is the lawyer’s duty to endeavor honorable
means to obtain such witness’ reaction, even without advising the public prosecutor of his purpose
and even though the case is pending appeal; and
5. An adverse party, though he may be used as a witness, is not however a witness within the
meaning of the rule permitting a lawyer to interview the witness of the opposing counsel.
NOTE: Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney
in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary and that
they should withdraw from the active management of the case (PNB v. Uy Teng Piao, G.R. No. L-
35252, Oct. 21, 1932).
CANON 12-RULE 12.06 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY ASSIST A WITNESS TO

MISREPRESENT HIMSELF OR TO IMPERSONATE ANOTHER.
Sanctions to a lawyer who instructs a witness to perpetuate misrepresentation

Art. 184, Revised Penal Code provides: The lawyer who presented a witness knowing him to be a
false witness is criminally liable for “Offering False Testimony in Evidence.”
Page 33 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Criminal liability of a witness who makes the misrepresentation

The witness who commits the misrepresentation is criminally liable for “False Testimony” _either
under Art. 181, 182 or 183, Revised Penal Code, depending upon the nature of the case.
CANON 12-RULE 12.07 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ABUSE, BROWBEAT OR HARASS A

WITNESS NOR NEEDLESSLY INCONVENIENCE HIM.
It must be stressed that in dealing with rape cases of children, especially those below 12 years of age,
due care must be observed by the trial court in handling the victim. In fact, more often than not, the
grueling experience in the trial court in the course of direct examination and cross-examination is
more traumatic than the fact of the rape itself. On such occasions, mishandling of victims lead to
psychological imbalances which, if not properly treated by medical experts, will lead to an abnormal
behavioral response against the idea of sex itself and disturbed interaction with the opposite or same
sex.
By subjecting her into explaining whether she was forced or intimidated is excessive. It is because
proof of force and intimidation is unnecessary in statutory rape. Considering that there is a medical
report substantiating the allegations made by the victim, the manner of examination of the victim
must be tempered. Especially in this case since the child is only six years old who remains
uncorrupted (People v. Boras, G.R. No. 127495, Dec. 22, 2000).
CANON 12-RULE 12.08 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID TESTIFYING IN BEHALF OF HIS

CLIENT,EXCEPT:
A) ON FORMAL MATTERS, SUCH AS THE MAILING, AUTHENTICATION OR CUSTODY

OF AN INSTRUMENT, AND THE LIKE, OR
B) ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS, IN CASES WHERE HIS TESTIMONY IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, IN WHICH EVENT HE MUST, DURING HIS TESTIMONY,
ENTRUST THE TRIAL OF THE CASE TO ANOTHER COUNSEL.
The function of a witness is to tell the facts as he recalls them in answer to questions. The function of
an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the
fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness.
Matters to which a lawyer CANNOT testify on (TARCC)

1. When, as an attorney, he is to Testify on the theory of the case;
2. When such would Adversely affect any lawful interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed on him;
3. Having accepted a Retainer, he cannot be a witness against his client;
4. He cannot serve Conflicting interests; and
5. When he is to violate the Confidence of his client.
Matters to which a lawyer CAN testify on (FETAD)

1. On Formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of instrument and the like;
2. Acting as an Expert on his fee;
3. On substantial matters in cases where his Testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel;
4. Acting as an Arbitrator; and
5. Deposition.
Page 34 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence
or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT
It is unethical for a lawyer to give an appearance as if he is capable of influencing judges and court
personnel.
CANON 13-RULE 13.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT EXTEND EXTRAORDINARY

ATTENTION OR HOSPITALITY TO, NOR SEEK OPPORTUNITY FOR CULTIVATING
FAMILIARITY WITH JUDGES.
Giving of gifts to the judges is discouraged as it tends to give an appearance of influencing the
conduct of judicial function or breeding familiarity with judges (Antiquiera, 1992).
It is reprehensible for a lawyer to wrongfully use the name of the law office for the purpose of
“giving more weight and credit to the pleading.” Motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted
upon in accordance with their merits or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the
lawyer filing the same (Rodica v. Atty. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012).
CANON 13-RULE 13.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE
MEDIA REGARDING A PENDING CASE TENDING TO AROUSE PUBLIC OPINION FOR OR
AGAINST A PARTY.
Prejudicial Publicity
There must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by barrage of publicity (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
The restriction does not prohibit issuances of statements by public officials charged with the duty of
prosecuting or defending actions in court.
NOTE: In a concluded litigation, a lawyer enjoys a wider latitude to comment on or criticize the
decision of a judge of his actuation. Thus, it has been held that a newspaper publication tending to
impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending case
constitutes criminal contempt, but the rule is otherwise after the litigation is ended (In re:
Loazano, 54 Phil. 801, July 24, 1930).
Q: Dumbledore, a noted professor of commercial law, wrote an article on the subject of letters of
credit, which was published in the IBP Journal. Assume that he devoted a significant portion of the
article to a commentary on how the Supreme Court should decide a pending case involving the
application of the law on letters of credit. May he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain.
A: Yes, Professor Dumbledore may be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Rule 13.02 of the CPR
provides that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” The Court in a pending litigation must be
shielded from embarrassment or influence in its duty of deciding the case.
Q: Assume Dumbledore did not include any commentary on the case. Assume further after the
Supreme Court decision on the case had attained finality, he wrote another IBP Journal article,
Page 35 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
dissecting the decision and explaining why the Supreme Court erred in all its conclusions. May he be
sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain. (2008 Bar Question)
A: He may not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Once a case is concluded, the judge who
decided it is subject to the same criticism as any other public official because his decision becomes
public property and is thrown open to public consumption. The lawyer enjoys a wide latitude in
commenting or criticizing the judge’s decision, provided that such comment or criticism shall be
bona fide and not spill over the bounds of decency and propriety.
CANON 13-RULE 13.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT BROOK OR INVITE INTERFERENCE BY

ANOTHER BRANCH OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
The reason for this rule is that such action will be contrary to the principle of separation of powers.
All lawyers must uphold, respect and support the independence of the judiciary. This independence
from interference is made to apply against all branches and agencies of the government (Funa,
2009).
The Supreme Court accordingly administered a reprimand to Bumanlag for gross ignorance of law
and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court’s decision
which suspended him for two years from the practice of law (De Bumanlag v. Bumanlag, A.M. No.
188, Nov. 29, 1976).
4. To the clients
Necessity of a contract between lawyer and client

The absence of a written contract will not preclude a finding that there is a professional relationship.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract
may be express or implied.
Three principal types of professional activity of a lawyer (LAP)

1. Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations;
2. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law; and
3. Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
a) Availability of service without discrimination
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
The poor and indigent should not be further disadvantaged by lack of access to the Philippine legal
system.
Lawyer’s right to decline employment (1990, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2006 Bar Questions)
GR: A lawyer is not obliged to act as legal counsel for any person who may wish to become his
client. He has the right to decline employment.
XPNs:
1. A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy (Canon 14).
2. He shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status
Page 36 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
in life or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Rule 14.01);
3. He shall not decline, except for serious and efficient cause like
a. If he is not in a position to carryout effectively or competently; and
b. If he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective clien. (Rule 14.03).
Legal aid cases

Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage, wherein an indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation.
Rationale for establishing legal aid services

Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may and
often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public
service should, therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to
give maximum possible assistance to the indigent and deserving members of the community in all
cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall an injustice (Public
Service. Sec. 1 Art. 1 IBP Guidelines on Legal Aid).
Q: Are there instances where a lawyer has the duty to decline employment? (1993 BAR)
A: A lawyer should decline no matter how attractive the fee offered may be if its acceptance will
involve:
(RACCAA)
1. A violation of any of the Rules of the legal profession;
2. Advocacy in any manner in which he had intervened while in the government service;
3. Nullification of a Contract which he prepared;
4. Employment with a Collection agency which solicits business to collect claims;
5. Employment, the nature of which might easily be used as a means of Advertising his professional
services of his skill; or
6. Any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he or his partner will be an essential
witness for the prospective client.
Reasons why a lawyer may not accept a “losing case”
1. The attorney’s signature in every pleading constitutes a certificate by him that there is good cause
to support it and that it is not interposed for delay, and willful violation of such rule shall subject him
to disciplinary action;
2. It is the attorney’s duty to “counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appears to him
to be just and only such defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law”;
3. A lawyer is not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, for any corrupt motive or interest; and
4. A lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is
intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.
Q: Is there an instance when a lawyer may accept losing case? (1996, 2001, 2002, 2005 Bar
Questions)
a. In criminal case?
b. In civil case?
A:
a) A lawyer may accept a “losing” criminal case since an accused is presumed to be innocent until
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, CPR provides that a lawyer shall not
Page 37 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
decline to represent a person because of his opinion regarding the guilt of said person. Otherwise
innocent persons might be denied proper defense (CPR, Rule 14.01).
b) A lawyer may also accept a losing civil case, provided that, in so doing, he must not engage in
dilatory tactics and must advise his client about the prospects and advantage of settling the case
through a compromise to the extent of representing indigents, defenseless and the oppressed.
(i) Services regardless of a person’s status
CANON 14-RULE 14.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DECLINE TO REPRESENT A PERSON

SOLELY ON ACCOUNT OF THE LATTER’S RACE, SEX, CREED OR STATUS OF LIFE, OR
BECAUSE OF HIS OWN OPINION REGARDING THE GUILT OF SAID PERSON.
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as defense counsel in a lawsuit. In the course of the
proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was an agnostic and a homosexual. By reason thereof,
Atty. DD filed a motion to withdraw as counsel without Mr. BB’s express consent. Is Atty. DD’s
motion legally tenable? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar Question)
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no valid cause to terminate his services. His
client, Mr. BB, being an agnostic and homosexual, should not be deprived of his counsel’s
representation solely for that reason.
(ii) Services as counsel de officio
CANON 14-RULE 14.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DECLINE, EXCEPT FOR SERIOUS AND
SUFFICIENT CAUSE, AN APPOINTMENT AS COUNSEL DE OFICIO OR AS AMICUS
CURIAE, OR A REQUEST FROM THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY
OF ITS CHAPTERS FOR RENDITION OF FREE LEGAL AID.
A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in case, if upon
investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney and that the
services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It
shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown (RRC, Sec. 31, Rule 138).
Counsel de oficio
1. Members of the bar in good standing;
2. Any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, in localities
without lawyers
Considerations in appointing a counsel de oficio

1. Gravity of offense
2. Difficulty of questions that may arise; and
3. Experience and ability of appointee
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
Page 38 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked
whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own
choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request.
A counsel de officio is expected to act with utmost diligence. A mere pro-forma appointment of de
officio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. The
exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de
officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the proper
dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most
compelling and cogent reasons.
(iii) Valid grounds for refusal
CANON 14-RULE 14.03 - A LAWYER MAY NOT REFUSE TO ACCEPT REPRESENTATION

OF AN INDIGENT CLIENT UNLESS:
A) HE IS IN NO POSITION TO CARRY OUT THE WORK EFFECTIVELY OR
COMPETENTLY;
B) HE LABORS UNDER A CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN HIM AND THE
PROSPECTIVE CLIENT OR BETWEEN A PRESENT CLIENT AND THE PROSPECTIVE
CLIENT;
Grounds of refusal of appointment to be a Counsel de Oficio

1. Too many de officio cases assigned to the lawyer; (People v. Daeng, G.R. No. L- 34091, Jan. 30,
1973)
2. Conflict of interest; (CPR, Rule 14.03)
3. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently; (supra)
4. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public office which prohibits
appearances in court; and
5. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell prejudice to the new clients.
6. Health reasons
7. Extensive travel abroad
NOTE: A lawyer may refuse to handle cases due to these valid reasons. However, Rule 2.02 requires
him to give advice on preliminary steps if he is asked until the client secures the services of counsel.
He shall refrain from giving this preliminary advice if there is conflict of interest between a present
client and a prospective one for extending such legal advice will create and establish an attorney-
client relationship between them and may involve a violation of the rule prohibiting a lawyer from
representing conflicting interest.
Q: May a lawyer decline a request for free legal aid to an indigent accused made by a chapter of the
IBP? Explain. (2002 Bar Question)
A: No. Rule 14.02 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and
sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae or a request from the IBP
or any of its chapter for rendition of free legal aid.” He may, decline such appointment only for
“serious and sufficient cause”.
Q: Will your answer be different if the legal aid is requested in a civil case? (2002 Bar Question)
A: The answer will not be exactly the same, because in a civil case, the lawyer can also decline if he
Page 39 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
believes the action or defense to be unmeritorious. He is ethically bound to maintain only actions and
proceedings which appear to him to be just and only such defenses which he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law.
CANON 14-RULE 14.04 - A LAWYER WHO ACCEPTS THE CAUSE OF A PERSON UNABLE
TO PAY HIS PROFESSIONAL FEES SHALL OBSERVE THE SAME STANDARD OF
CONDUCT GOVERNING HIS RELATIONS WITH PAYING CLIENTS (2008 BAR)
**Further, regardless of the agreement Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. had with Ramos with respect to the
payment of his fees, Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. owed it to Ramos to do his utmost to ensure that every remedy
allowed by law is availed of. Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins every
lawyer to devote his full attention, diligence, skills, and competence to every case that he accepts.
Pressure and large volume of legal work do not excuse Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. for filing the petition for
certiorari out of time.
NOTE: The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal (Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974).
b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion to his
interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights.
It demands of an attorney an undivided allegiance, a conspicuous and high degree of good faith,
disinterestedness, candor, fairness, loyalty, fidelity and absolute integrity in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients and an utter renunciation of every personal advantage conflicting in any
way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client (Oparel Sr. v. Abaria, A.C. No. 959, July 30,
1971).
If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit rather than to traverse the incontrovertible (Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, A.C. No.
6424, Mar. 4, 2005)
(i) Confidentiality rule
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated (CPR, Canon 21).
It is one of the duties of a lawyer, as provided for in the Rules of Court, to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client (RRC, Sec. 20 (e), Rule
138).
(ii) Privileged communications
A privileged communication is one that refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of

disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means of which, in so far as the client is
aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Page 40 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
CANON 15-RULE 15.02 - A LAWYER SHALL BE BOUND BY THE RULE ON PRIVILEGE

COMMUNICATION IN RESPECT OF MATTERS DISCLOSED TO HIM BY A PROSPECTIVE
CLIENT (2008 BAR)
Disclosure of a prospective client

The foregoing disqualification rule applies to prospective clients of a lawyer. Matters disclosed by a
prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. It
covers crimes and offenses already committed by the client.
The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the
lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the
lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Requisites of privileged communication
1. There is attorney-client relationship or a kind of consultancy requirement with a prospective
client;
2. The communication was made by the client to the lawyer in the course of the lawyer’s
professional employment; and
3. The communication must be intended to be confidential.
NOTE: The party who avers that the communication is privileged has the burden of proof to
establish the existence of the privilege unless from the face of the document itself, it clearly appears
that it is privileged. The mere allegation that the matter is privileged is not sufficient (People v.
Sleeper, G.R. No. 22783, Dec. 3, 1924; Lapena Jr., 2009).
Client identity
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice. (Regala v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, Sept. 20, 1996).
Coverage of the attorney-client privilege

1. Lawyer;
2. Client; and
3. Third persons who by reason of their work have acquired information about the case being
handled such as:
a. Attorney’s secretary, stenographer and clerk;
b. Interpreter, messengers and agents transmitting communication; and
c. An accountant, scientist, physician, engineer who has been hired for effective consultation. (RRC,
Sec. 24(b), Rule 130)
Duration of privileged communication

The privilege continues to exist even after the termination of the attorney-client relationship.
NOTE: The privilege character of the communication ceases only when waived by the client himself
or after his death, by his heir or legal representative (Lapena, Jr. 2009).
Instances when communication is not privileged

A communication made by a client to a lawyer is not privileged in the following instances:
1. After pleading has been filed because such becomes part of public records.
2. When communication was intended by the client to be sent to a third person through his counsel.
3. When the communication sought by client is intended to aid future crime or perpetration of fraud.
Page 41 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
4. When communication between attorney and client is heard by a third party.

5. When there is consent or waiver of the client.
6. When the law requires disclosure.
7. When disclosure is made to protect the lawyer’s rights .
NOTE: Even if the communication is unprivileged, the rule of ethics prohibits lawyers from
voluntarily revealing or using to his benefit or to that of a third person, to the disadvantage of the
client, the said communication unless the client consents thereto (RRC, Sec. 3, Rule 138-A).
(iii) Conflict of interest (1991,1992,1993,1994,1997,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,

2008 BAR)
CANON 15-RULE 15.01 - A LAWYER, IN CONFERRING WITH A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT,

SHALL ASCERTAIN AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE WHETHER THE MATTER WOULD
INVOLVE A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER CLIENT OR HIS OWN INTEREST, AND IF SO,
SHALL FORTHWITH INFORM THE PROSPECTIVE CLIENT.
Purpose of “conflict search”

By conducting a conflict search, the lawyer will be able to determine, in the first instance, if he is
barred from accepting the representation through conflicts with his present clients or the lawyer’s
own interest (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Three tests to determine existence of conflict of interest

1. Conflicting Duties - When, on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contest for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when possibility of such situation will
develop.
2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the acceptance of the new relation will prevent a lawyer from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or will invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.
3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained - Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his new relation to
use against the first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment.
Types of conflict of interest

1. Concurrent or multiple representations – Generally occurs when a lawyer represents clients whose
objectives are adverse to each other, no matter how slight or remote such adverse interest may be.
The tests for concurrent or multiple representations are:

a. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;
b. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity or loyalty to the client;
c. Whether the acceptance of new relation would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty; and
d. Whether, in the acceptance of a new relation, the lawyer would be called upon to use against a
client confidential information acquired through their connection.
2. Sequential or successive representation – Involves representation by a law firm of a present client
who may have an interest adverse to a prior or former client of the firm. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
NOTE: What is material in determining whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is
probability, not certainty of conflict. (see discussion on disqualification or limitation of public
Page 42 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
officials in practicing law, congruent-interest representation conflict and adverse-interest conflict).
Being a counsel-of-record of the other party is not a requisite to be guilty of representing

conflicting interests
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of
the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record
--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is
enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty (Artueza v. Atty. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354,
Apr. 22, 2002).
Rule when the lawyer of the corporation and the board of directors of such corporation is the
same
The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the
individual corporate officials. A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent
members of the same corporation's Board of Directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To
do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003).
Q: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A, about a four-door apartment in Manila left by her
deceased parents. A complained that her two siblings, B and C, who were occupying two units of the
apartment, were collecting the rentals from the other two units and refusing to give her any part
thereof. Atty. Z advised A to first seek the intervention of her relatives and told her that if this failed,
he would take legal action as A asked him to do. B asks Atty. Z to defend him in a suit brought by A
against him (B) and C through another counsel. Should Atty. Z accept the case?
A: No. When A consulted him about her complaint against B and C, a lawyer-client relationship was
created between A and Atty. Z. Atty. Z cannot subsequently represent B against A in a matter he was
consulted about. This constitutes conflict of interest. It does not matter if Atty. Z is not handling the
case for A.
Q: Should Atty. Z tell B that A consulted him earlier about the same case? Why? (2002 Bar
Question)
A: Yes. Rule 21.07 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted
about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.” In this case, he has to reveal to B
that he had been consulted by A on the case that B if offering to retain his services, in order to avoid
a possible conflict of interest.
CANON 15-RULE 15.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS

EXCEPT BY WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL CONCERNED GIVEN AFTER A FULL
DISCLOSURE OF THE FACTS.
GR: An attorney cannot represent diverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of
an issue. The proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the
conflicting interest arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight
such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intention and motives were honest
and he acted in good faith.
XPN: Representation of conflicting interest may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation after full disclosure of facts (Nakpil v. Valdez, A.C. No. 2040, Mar. 4, 1998).
Page 43 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: A lawyer may at a certain stage of the controversy and before it reaches the court represent
conflicting interests with the express written consent of all parties concerned given after disclosure of
the facts. The disclosure should include an explanation of the effects of the dual representation, such
as the possible revelation or use of confidential information.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also
after relation of attorney and client has terminated.
Instances when lawyers cannot represent conflicting interest even if the consent of both clients
were secured
Where the conflict is:
1. Between the attorney’s interest and that of a client; or
2. Between a private client’s interests and that of the government or any of its instrumentalities.
Effects of representing adverse interests (DJ-FAC)

1. Disqualification as counsel of new client on petition of former client;
2. Where such is unknown to, and becomes prejudicial to the interests of the new client, a Judgment
against such may, on that ground, be set aside;
3. The attorney’s right to Fees may be defeated if found to be related to such conflict and such was
objected to by the former client, or if there was a concealment and prejudice by reason of the
attorney’s previous professional relationship with the opposite party;
4. A lawyer can be held Administratively liable through disciplinary action and may be held
Criminally liable for betrayal of trust.
CANON 15-RULE 15.04 - A LAWYER MAY, WITH THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL
CONCERNED, ACT AS MEDIATOR, CONCILIATOR OR ARBITRATOR IN SETTLING
DISPUTES.
(iv) Candid and honest advice to clients
CANON 15-RULE 15.05 - A LAWYER WHEN ADVISING HIS CLIENT, SHALL GIVE A
CANDID AND HONEST OPINION ON THE MERITS AND PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE
CLIENT’S CASE, NEITHER OVERSTATING NOR UNDERSTATING THE PROSPECTS OF
THE CASE.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and
best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor
understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success
is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If they find that their client's
cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than to traverse the incontrovertible (Rollon v. Naraval, A.C. No. 6424, Mar. 4, 2005).
CANON 15-RULE 15.06 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT STATE OR IMPLY THAT HE IS ABLE TO
INFLUENCE ANY PUBLIC OFFICIAL, TRIBUNAL OR LEGISLATIVE BODY.
This rule is known as INFLUENCE-PEDDLING. It is improper for a lawyer to show in any way
that he has connections and can influence any tribunal or public official, judges, prosecutors,
congressmen and others, especially so if the purpose is to enhance his legal standing and to entrench
the confidence of the client that his case or cases are assured of victory.
Page 44 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
(v) Compliance with laws
CANON 15-RULE 15.07 - A LAWYER SHALL IMPRESS UPON HIS CLIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS.
**Rule 15.07 obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the
principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the
supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the State, the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense
of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The client's
interest is amply protected by the real estate mortgage executed by complainant. Thus, Atty.
Tiamson failed to live up to this expectation (Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, Sept. 30, 2005).
(vi) Concurrent practice of another profession
CANON 15-RULE 15.08 - A LAWYER WHO IS ENGAGED IN ANOTHER PROFESSION OR

OCCUPATION CONCURRENTLY WITH THE PRACTICE OF LAW SHALL MAKE CLEAR
TO HIS CLIENT WHETHER HE IS ACTING AS A LAWYER OR IN ANOTHER CAPACITY.
This rule is intended to avoid confusion; it is for the benefit of both the client and the lawyer (Funa,
2009).
NOTE: The lawyer should inform the client when he is acting as a lawyer and when he is not,
because certain ethical considerations governing the client-lawyer relationship may be operative in
one case and not in the other (Report of the IBP Committee, p.84).
A party’s engagement of his counsel in another capacity concurrent with the practice of law is not
prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed by such counsel is made clear to the client (New
Sampaguita Builder Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30,
2004).
c) Client’s moneys and properties
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Money collected by the lawyer on a judgment favorable to his client constitute trust funds and should
be immediately paid over to the client. While Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court grants the
lawyer a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his
possession, such that he may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
and apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof, the lawyer still has the responsibility to promptly
account to his client for such moneys received. Failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
The lawyer’s failure to turn over such funds, moneys, or properties to the client despite the latter’s
demands give rise to the presumption that the lawyer had converted the money for his personal use
and benefit. This failure also renders the lawyer vulnerable to judicial contempt under Section 25,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Prohibition of a Lawyer acquiring client property

Pursuant to Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Page 45 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Furthermore, Article 1491 of the Civil Code states that:
“The following persons cannot acquire or purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx
(5) lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they take part by virtue of their profession.” (see NCC)
NOTE: This prohibition is entirely independent of fraud and such need not be alleged or proven. Art.
1491 (5) of the NCC applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property (Ramos v. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210, Dec. 9,
2004).
(i) Fiduciary relationship
CANON 16-RULE 16.01 - A LAWYER SHALL ACCOUNT FOR ALL MONEY OR PROPERTY
COLLECTED OR RECEIVED FOR OR FROM THE CLIENT.
A lawyer must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity, because of the high degree of fidelity and good faith expected on his part (Medina v.
Bautista, A.C. No. 190, Sept. 26, 1964).
Lawyer’s inexcusable act of withholding the property of client and imposing unwarranted fees in
exchange for release of documents deserve the imposition of disciplinary action (Miranda v. Carpio,
A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011).
Q: X sought assistance to the President of the IBP to enable him to talk to Atty. U who had allegedly
been avoiding him for more than a year. Atty. U failed to turn–over to his client the amount given to
him by X as settlement for a civil case. Is Atty. U guilty for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money
and properties of his client that may come into his possession. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he
has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by, his client. The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such,
it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its
fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client (Espiritu vs. Ulep, A.C. No. 5808, May 4,
2005).
Fiduciary duty
The principle that an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to the prejudice or cause
an occasion for loss of a client. The relationship between the lawyer and client is one of mutual trust
and confidence of the highest degree.
Instances when civil liability arises

1. Client is prejudiced by lawyer's negligence or misconduct;
2. Breach of fiduciary obligation;
3. Civil liability to third persons;
Page 46 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
4. Libelous words in pleadings;

5. violation of communication privilege;
6. Liability for costs of suit (Treble Costs) – when lawyer is made liable for insisting on client's
patently unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay litigation
Remedy of the client

Recover property from lawyer, together with its fruits, subject to client’s returning to his lawyer the
purchase price thereof and the legal interests thereon.
Exemption from liability

A lawyer is exempted from liability for slander, libel or for words otherwise defamatory, published
in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are connected with, relevant, pertinent
and material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry.
NOTE: Test of relevancy – The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be palpably
wanting in relation to the subject of controversy, that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy or
propriety.
Criminal liability of lawyers

A lawyer may be held criminally liable if he commits any of the following:
1. Causing prejudice to the client thru malicious breach of professional duty or thru inexcusable
negligence or ignorance;
2. Revealing client’s secrets learned in lawyer’s professional capacity thru malicious breach of
professional duty or inexcusable negligence or ignorance;
3. A lawyer who has undertaken the defense of a client or has received confidential information from
said client in a case may be criminally liable for undertaking defense of opposing party in same
cause without consent of first client; (RPC, Art. 209)
4. A lawyer who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage
of another or who, with intent to cause such damage, shall use any false document may be held
criminally liable therefor; (RPC, Art. 172) and
5. A lawyer who is appropriates his client’s funds may be held liable for estafa.
NOTE: When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose, he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent. His failure either to render an accounting or
to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the CPR (Belleza v. Malaca, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009).
Costs of Suit
GR: Losing client and not the lawyer is liable for costs of suit in favor of prevailing party, the lawyer
not being a party-litigant.
XPN: Where the lawyer insisted on client’s patently unmeritorious case or interposed an appeal to
delay litigation or thwart prompt satisfaction of prevailing party’s just and valid claim, the court may
adjudge lawyer to pay treble costs of suit.
(ii) Commingling of funds
CANON 16-RULE 16.02 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP THE FUNDS OF EACH CLIENT
SEPARATE AND APART FROM HIS OWN AND THOSE OF OTHERS KEPT BY HIM.
Page 47 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Failure of the lawyer to account all the funds and property of his client which may come into his
possession would amount to misappropriation which may subject him to disbarment on the ground of
grave misconduct or a criminal prosecution for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC.
In dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of
the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and account any
circumstances, and should not be commingled with his own or be used by him (Espiritu v. Cabredo,
A.C. No. 5831, Jan. 13, 2003).
(iii) Delivery of funds
CANON 16-RULE 16.03 - A LAWYER SHALL DELIVER THE FUNDS AND PROPERTY OF
HIS CLIENT WHEN DUE OR UPON DEMAND. HOWEVER, HE SHALL HAVE A LIEN OVER
THE FUNDS AND MAY APPLY SO MUCH THEREOF AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
SATISFY HIS LAWFUL FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS, GIVING NOTICE PROMPTLY
THEREAFTER TO HIS CLIENT. HE SHALL ALSO HAVE A LIEN TO THE SAME EXTENT
ON ALL JUDGEMENTS AND EXECUTIONS HE HAS SECURED FOR HIS CLIENT AS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES OF COURT.
Counsel cannot unilaterally retain client’s property for his attorney’s lien
A counsel has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally as lawyer’s lien any amount belonging to
his client which may come into his possession (Cabigao v. Rodrigo, Aug. 9, 1932).
NOTE: While this rule provides that the lawyer has the right to retain the funds of his client as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements known as attorney’s lien and his lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client called charging lien, he is
still duty bound to render an accounting of his client’s funds and property which may come into his
possession in the course of his professional employment In the application of attorney’s lien, a
lawyer shall give notice to his client otherwise, the same might be construed as misappropriation
which may subject him to disciplinary action (Antiquiera, 2007).
(iv) Borrowing or lending
CANON 16-RULE 16.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT BORROW MONEY FROM HIS CLIENT
UNLESS THE CLIENT’S INTERESTS ARE FULLY PROTECTED BY THE NATURE OF THE
CASE OR BY INDEPENDENT ADVICE. NEITHER SHALL A LAWYER LEND MONEY TO A
CLIENT EXCEPT, WHEN IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, HE HAS TO ADVANCE
NECESSARY EXPENSES IN A LEGAL MATTER HE IS HANDLING FOR THE CLIENT.
Prohibition from borrowing money from client

GR: A lawyer is not allowed to borrow money from his client.
XPN: The client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Prohibition of lending money to client

GR: A lawyer is not allowed to lend money to his client.
XPN: When in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client (CPR, Rule 16.04).
Page 48 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: Prohibition from lending is intended to assure the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment, for if the lawyer acquires a financial interest in the outcome of the case the free exercise of
his judgment may be adversely affected. The principle behind Rule 16.04 is to prevent the lawyer
from taking advantage of his influence over the client or to avoid acquiring a financial interest in the
outcome of the case.
d) Fidelity to client’s cause
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Q: Matias Lagramada residing with his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada, was invited by the latter to
accompany him to the police station, supposedly to pick up a refrigerator they were to repair. Upon
their arrival there, Matias was immediately taken in and locked behind bars. Two information were
filed against him only 10 months after the first day of his incarceration. With the assistance of
counsel, Matias pleaded not guilty when arraigned, without raising the invalidity of the arrest. Was
the case properly handled?
A: No. Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them. Matias’ counsel, in the spirit of safeguarding his client’s rights, should
have taken the necessary steps to correct the situation. However, he allowed his client to enter a plea
during the latter’s arraignment without raising the invalidity of arrest. Thus, the former effectively
waived his client’s right to question its validity. Defense counsels are expected to spare no effort to
save the accused from unrighteous incarcerations.
Matias’ counsel should have not only perfunctorily represented his client during the pendency of the
case, but should have kept in mind his duty to render effective legal assistance and true service by
protecting the latter’s rights at all times (People v. Lagramada, G.R. Nos. 146357 & 148170, Aug.
29, 2002).
e) Competence and diligence
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client (Edquibal v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 5687, Feb. 3, 2005).
Degree of diligence required in the profession

The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and attention of a good father of a
family (Lapena, 2009) or ordinary pater familias (Pineda, 2009). He is not required to exercise
extraordinary diligence (Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, Feb. 3, 2005).
(i) Adequate preparation
CANON 18-RULE 18.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT HANDLE ANY LEGAL MATTER
WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION.
A lawyer should prepare his pleadings with great care and circumspection. He should refrain from
using abrasive and offensive language, for it merely weakens rather than strengthens the force of
legal reasoning and detracts from its persuasiveness. In preparing a complaint for damages, counsel
Page 49 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
for plaintiff should allege and state the specific amounts claimed not only in the body of the
complaint but also in the prayer, so that the proper docket fees can be assessed and paid (Fernandez
v. Atty. Novero, A.C. No. 5394, Dec. 2, 2002).
The counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance and
nonfeasance would be binding to his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost
prudence and responsibility in representation (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, A.C. No. 5394, Dec. 2,
2002).
(ii) Negligence
CANON 18-RULE 18.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER

ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND HIS NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION THERE WITH SHALL
RENDER HIM LIABLE (1998,2002)
A lawyer is enjoined not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. It is the duty of the lawyer to serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of the law, the interest of
his client (Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, 516 SCRA 486, 2007).
Negligence of a lawyer
What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to client is incapable
of exact formulation. It will depend upon the circumstances of the case. Also, when he failed to
comply with the clear provisions of the law and the rules.
Instances of negligence by attorneys

Failure to appeal to CA despite instructions by the client to do so constitutes inexcusable negligence
on the part of the counsel (Abiero v. Juanino, A.C. No. 5302, Feb.18, 2005).
Even if a lawyer was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of his client, the former still
had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and consent (Abay v. Atty.
Montesino, A.C. No. 5718, Dec. 4, 2003).
Q: As an incident in the main case, Velasquez appointed his counsel as attorney-in-fact to represent
him at the pre-trial. Counsel failed to appear, hence Velasquez was declared in default. The order of
default was received by counsel but no steps were taken to have it lifted or set aside. Decide.
A: It is binding on Velasquez who is himself guilty of negligence when, after executing the special
power of attorney in favor of his lawyer, he left for abroad and apparently paid no further attention to
his case until he received the decision. There is therefore no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which will warrant a lifting of the order of default. As a general rule, a client is bound by
the mistakes of his counsel; more so by the result of his own negligence
Q: Are the mistakes or negligence of a lawyer binding upon the client? (1998, 2000, 2002 Bar
Questions)
GR: Client is bound by attorney’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case or in the
management of litigation and in procedural technique, and he cannot complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.
XPNs: (LIPIG)
1. Lack of acquaintance with technical aspect of procedure;
2. When adherence thereto results in outright deprivation of client’s liberty or property or where
Interest of justice so requires;
Page 50 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. Where error by counsel is Purely technical which does not substantially affect client’s cause;
4. Ignorance, incompetence, or inexperience of lawyer is so great and error so serious that client,
who has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied a day in court;
5. Gross negligence of lawyer.
NOTE: If by reason of the lawyer’s negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client, the latter
has a cause of action against him for damages. However, for the lawyer to be held liable, his failure
to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence must be proximate cause of the loss.
(iii) Collaborating counsel
CANON 18-RULE 18.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT UNDERTAKE A LEGAL SERVICE

WHICH HE KNOWS OR SHOULD KNOW THAT HE IS NOT QUALIFIED TO RENDER.
HOWEVER, HE MAY RENDER SUCH SERVICE IF, WITH THE CONSENT OF HIS CLIENT,
HE CAN OBTAIN AS COLLABORATING COUNSEL A LAWYER WHO IS COMPETENT ON
THE MATTER.
The lawyer’s acceptance, whether for a fee or not, is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite degree of academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.
He is therefore directed not to take legal services, which he knows or should know he is not qualified
or competent to render except if his client consents, the lawyer can take as collaborating counsel
another lawyer who is competent on the matter.
(iv) Duty to apprise client
CANON 18-RULE 18.04 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP THE CLIENT INFORMED OF THE
STATUS OF HIS CASE AND SHALL RESPOND WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME TO
CLIENT’S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION.
A lawyer should notify his client of the adverse decision while within the period to appeal to enable
the client to decide whether to seek an appellate review. He should communicate with him
concerning the withdrawal of appeal with all its adverse consequences. The client is entitled to the
fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by which his interest is defended or why certain steps are
taken or omitted.
NOTE: The lawyer is obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a client's request for
information. A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by which that client's
interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted. A lawyer who repeatedly fails to
answer the inquiries or communications of a client violates the rules of professional courtesy and
neglects the client's interests (Villariasa-Reisenbeck v. Abarrientos, A.C. No. 6238, Nov. 4, 2004).
Doctrine of imputed knowledge

The knowledge acquired by an attorney during the time that he is acting within the scope of his
authority is imputed to the client. It is based on the assumption that an attorney, who has notice of
matter affecting his client, has communicated the same to his principal in the course of professional
dealings.
NOTE: The doctrine applies regardless of whether or not the lawyer actually communicated to the
Page 51 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
client what he learned in his professional capacity, the attorney and his client being one judicial
person.
Notice to counsel is notice to client, but not vice versa if the latter appeared by attorney
GR: The law requires that service of any notice upon a party who has appeared by attorney shall be
made upon his attorney. Notice sent to a party who has appeared by counsel is not notice in law, it
being immaterial that the client actually received the notice or volunteered to get a copy thereof.
XPNs:
1. Strict application might foster dangerous collusion to the detriment of justice;
2. Service of notice upon party instead of upon his attorney is ordered by the court;
3. Notice of pre-trial is required to be served upon parties and their respective lawyers;
4. In appeal from the lower court to the RTC, upon docketing of appeal.
f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Authority to appear in court is presumed

GR: A lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears.
XPN: On motion of either party and on reasonable grounds, the presiding judge may require an
attorney to prove the authority under which he appears (RRC, Rule 138, Sec. 21).
Voluntary appearance of lawyer without authority

An attorney may not appear for a person until he is in fact employed by, or retained for such person.
An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court, who has misbehaved in his official
transactions (Rule 138, Sec. 26).
Effects of unauthorized appearance

1. The party represented is not bound by attorney’s appearance in the case neither by the judgment
rendered therein;
2. Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the party represented;
3. The adverse party who has been forced to litigate as a defendant by the unauthorized action on the
part of the attorney for the plaintiff may, on that ground, move for the dismissal of the complaint;
and
4. If unauthorized appearance is willful, attorney may be cited for contempt as an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions, and he may be disciplined for professional
misconduct.
Ratification of unauthorized appearance

1. Express – Categorized assertion by client that he has authorized a lawyer or that he confirms his
authorization to represent him in the case.
2. Implied – Where party with knowledge of fact that a lawyer has been representing him in a case,
accepts benefits of representation or fails to promptly repudiate the assumed authority.
Requisites of implied ratification by silence

1. The party represented by the attorney is of age or competent or if he suffers from any disability, he
has a duly appointed guardian or legal representative;
2. The party or his guardian, as the case may be, is aware of the attorney’s representation; and
Page 52 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. He fails to promptly repudiate assumed authority.
Extent of lawyer’s authority in litigation

A lawyer has authority to bind the client in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. The cause of
action, the claim or demand sued upon and the subject matter of the litigation are within the
exclusive control of the client. A client may waive, surrender, dismiss, or compromise any of his
rights involved in litigation in favor of the other party even without or against the consent of his
attorney.
(i) Use of fair and honest means
CANON 19-RULE 19.01 - A LAWYER SHALL EMPLOY ONLY FAIR AND HONEST MEANS
TO ATTAIN THE LAWFUL OBJECTIVES OF HIS CLIENT AND SHALL NOT PRESENT,
PARTICIPATE IN PRESENTING OR THREATEN TO PRESENT UNFOUNDED CRIMINAL
CHARGES TO OBTAIN AN IMPROPER ADVANTAGE IN ANY CASE OR PROCEEDING
(1997 BAR)
Rule 19.01 of the CPR obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor. He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or
institute clearly groundless actions. The act of a lawyer in preventing the execution of the judgment
against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits (Que v.
Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, Dec. 4, 2009).
Under this rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or
cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to
yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.
(ii) Client’s fraud
CANON 19-RULE 19.02 - A LAWYER WHO HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT HIS
CLIENT HAS, IN THE COURSE OF THE REPRESENTATION, PERPETRATED A FRAUD
UPON A PERSON OR TRIBUNAL, SHALL PROMPTLY CALL UPON THE CLIENT TO
RECTIFY THE SAME, AND FAILING WHICH HE SHALL TERMINATE THE
RELATIONSHIP WITH SUCH CLIENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF
COURT(2001 BAR)
The lawyer’s duty to his client does not mean freedom to set up false or fraudulent claims especially
with respect to provisions of law or administrative rules and that while lawyers are bound to exert
utmost legal skill in prosecuting their client’s cause or defending it, their duty, first and foremost, is
to the administration of justice (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: It is an unethical tactic for a lawyer to offer monetary rewards to anyone who could give him
information against a party so that he could have leverage against all actions involving such party
(CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
(iii) Procedure in handling the case
CANON 19-RULE 19.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ALLOW HIS CLIENT TO DICTATE THE
PROCEDURE ON HANDLING THE CASE.
Page 53 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Who has control over the case

1. As to matters of procedure - it is the client who yields to the lawyer and not the lawyer yielding to
the client (Lapena 2009).
NOTE: The basis of this rule is that the lawyer is better trained and skilled in law.
2. As to subject matter - the client is in control.
NOTE: Cause of action, claim or demand, and subject of litigation are within client’s control.
Proceedings to enforce the remedy are within the exclusive control of the attorney.
Authority of counsel to compromise

GR: The attorney has no authority to compromise his client’s case. This is so because the client,
even if represented by counsel, retains exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation. The
client can, of course, authorize his lawyer to compromise his case, and the settlement made by the
lawyer will bind his client.
XPNs:
1. When the lawyer is confronted with an emergency where prompt and urgent action is necessary to
protect the interest of his client and there is no opportunity for consultation with the latter.
2. Settlement of Monetary Obligation to client is full payment in cash.
NOTE: Compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced (NCC, Art. 2028).
Duty of the lawyer in gathering information regarding the case

The lawyer cannot entirely depend on the information his client gave or the time his client wished to
give. The lawyer should take more control over handling the case. Where the client is based
overseas, the lawyer should with more reason, have moved to secure all the legal means available to
him either to continue representing his client effectively or to make the necessary manifestation in
court, with the client’s conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel of record (CPR Annotated,
PhilJA).
Appearance
It is the coming into court as a party either as a plaintiff or as a defendant and asking relief
therefrom.
Kinds of appearance
1. General appearance – When a party comes to court either as plaintiff or defendant and seeks
general reliefs from the court for satisfaction of his claims or counterclaims respectively.
2. Special appearance – When a defendant appears in court solely for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
NOTE: By virtue of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no more
distinction between general appearance and special appearance, in the sense that a defendant may file
a motion to dismiss not only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person but also on some
other grounds without waiving the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Entry of appearance v. Appearance of counsel

Entry of appearance is the written manifestation submitted by the counsel of record to inform the
court that he will act as the counsel of a party made before the date of the hearing while appearance
is the verbal manifestation of the counsel in order for the court to recognize his presence during the
Page 54 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
hearing of the case. (Sec.21, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
g) Attorney’s fees (1990,1991,1992,1994,1995,1997,1998,2005,2006,2007 BAR)
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
GR: Only lawyers are entitled to attorney’s fees. The same cannot be shared with a non-lawyer. It is
unethical.
XPNs: A lawyer may divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law: (CPR)
1. A lawyer undertakes to Complete the unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;
2. There is a Pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money
shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement;
3. A lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in Retirement plan, even if the plan is based,
in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing agreement. (CPR, Rule 9.02)
NOTE: Entitlement to lawyer’s fees is presumed (Funa, 2009). Unless otherwise expressly
stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or compensation and is not
gratuitous (Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 124074, Jan. 27,1997).
CANON 20-RULE 20.01 - A LAWYER SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS

IN DETERMINING HIS FEES:
A) THE TIME SPENT AND THE EXTENT OF THE SERVICES RENDERED OR REQUIRED;
B) THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED;
C) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER;
D) THE SKILL DEMANDED;
E) THE PROBABILITY OF LOSING OTHER EMPLOYMENT AS A RESULT OF
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROFFERED CASE;
F) THE CUSTOMARY CHARGES FOR SIMILAR SERVICES AND THE SCHEDULE OF FEES
OF THE IBP CHAPTER TO WHICH HE BELONGS;
G) THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY AND THE BENEFITS RESULTING
TO THE CLIENT FORM THE SERVICE;
H) THE CONTINGENCY OR CERTAINTY OF COMPENSATION;
I) THE CHARACTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT, WHETHER OCCASIONAL OR
ESTABLISHED; AND
J) THE PROFESSIONAL STANDING OF THE LAWYER.
NOTE: Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement
which is conclusive as to the amount of lawyer’s compensation (Funa, 2009) unless the stipulated
amount in the written contract is found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24,
Rule 138, RRC). In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the basis of
quantum meruit (Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June 8,1995; Funa, 2009).
Kinds of payment
1. Fixed or absolute fee that which is payable regardless of the result of the case.
a. A fixed fee payable per appearance
b. A fixed fee computed upon the number of hours spent
c. A fixed fee based on piece work
d. Combination of any of the above
2. Contingent fee – a fee that is conditioned on the securing of a favorable judgment and recovery of
money or property and the amount of which may be on a percentage basis.
Page 55 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Requisites for the accrual of attorney’s fees

1. Existence of attorney-client relationship; and
2. Rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.
NOTE: A pauper, while exempted from payment of legal fees is not exempted from payment of
attorney’s fees (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-49280, Feb. 26,
1981).
Factors in determining the attorney’s fees (1994 Bar Question)

In determining what is fair and reasonable, a lawyer shall be guided by the following factors: (STIP-
SNACCC)
1. Skill demanded;
2. Time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
3. Importance of the subject matter;
4. Probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
5. Professional Standing of the lawyer;
6. Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
7. Amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;
8. Customary Charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
9. Contingency or certainty of compensation; and
10. Character of the employment, whether occasional or established. (Rule 20.01)
NOTE: Imposition of interest in the payment of attorney’s fees is not justified (Funa, 2009).
Contracts for attorney’s services in this jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different footing from
other contract for the payment of compensation for any other services (Mambulao Lumber Co. v.
Philippine National Bank, 130 Phil. 366).
NOTE: No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, and may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor, unless found
by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (RRC, Sec. 24, Rule 138).
Factors to consider in determining the amount of attorney’s fees in the absence of any fee
arrangement (TINS)
1. Time spent and the services rendered or required – A lawyer is justified in fixing higher fees
when the case is so complicated and requires more time and effort in fixing it.
2. Importance of subject matter – The more important the subject matter or the bigger the value of
the interest of the property in litigation, the higher is the attorney’s fees.
3. Novelty and difficulty of questions involved – When the questions in a case are novel and difficult,
greater effort, deeper study and research are bound to burn the lawyer’s time and stamina considering
that there are no local precedents to rely upon.
4. Skill demanded of a lawyer – The totality of the lawyer’s experience provides him skill and
competence admired in lawyers.
Different types of fee arrangements

1. Retainer’s fee where the lawyer is paid for services for an agreed amount for the case.
Page 56 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
2. The lawyer agrees to be paid per court appearance.

3. Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his services depending on the success of the case. This
applies usually in civil suits for money or property where the lawyer’s fee is taken from the award
granted by the court.
4. Attorney de officio. The attorney is appointed by the court to defend the indigent litigant in a
criminal case. The client is not bound to pay the attorney for his services although he may be paid a
nominal fee taken from a public fund appropriated for the purpose.
5. Legal aid. The attorney renders legal services for those who could not afford to engage the
services of paid counsel.
6. Quantum meruit basis. If there is no specific contract between the lawyer and the client, the
lawyer is paid on quantum meruit basis, that is, what the lawyer deserves for his services.
Kinds of Retainer Agreements on Attorney’s Fees

1. General retainer or retaining fee – It is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as
general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the ordinary business of the client
and referred to him for legal action. The client pays fixed retainer fees, which could be monthly or
otherwise. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer;
2. Special retainer – It is a fee for a specific or particular case or service rendered by the lawyer for a
client.
Q: Atty. Francisco’s retainer agreement with RXU said that his attorney's fees in its case against
CRP “shall be 15% of the amounts collected.” Atty. Francisco asked the trial court to issue a
temporary restraining order against CRP but this was denied, prompting him to file a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals to question the order of denial. At this point, RXU terminated
Atty. Francisco’s services. When the parties later settled their dispute amicably, CRP paid RXU
P100 million. Because of this, Atty. Francisco came around and claimed a 15% share in the amount.
What should be his attorney’s fees? (2011 Bar Question)
A: A reasonable amount that the court shall fix upon proof of quantum meruit which means “as
much as he deserves”.
Instances when the measure of quantum meruit may be resorted to (2007 Bar Question)
1. There is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees agreed upon between the lawyer and
the client;
2. Although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the stipulated fees are found
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court;
3. The contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects of execution;
4. The counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion;
5. Lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; and
6. The client dismissed his counsel before the termination of the case.
Q: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted attorney's fees on the ground that counsel did not
wish to intervene in the process of effecting a fair settlement of the case. Decide. (2001 Bar
Question)
A: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall encourage his
clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement". If a lawyer should
refuse to intervene in a settlement proceeding, his entitlement to his attorney's fees may be affected.
However, if he has already rendered some valuable services to the client, he must be paid his
attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit, even if it is assumed that he is dismissed.
Instances when counsel cannot recover the full amount despite written contract for attorneys’
fees (2006 Bar Question)
Page 57 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
1. When the services called for were not performed as when the lawyer withdrew before the case was
finished, he will be allowed only reasonable fees
2. When there is a justified dismissal of the attorney, the contract will be nullified and payment will
be on the basis of quantum meruit only. A contrary stipulation will be invalid
3. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable, when it is disproportionate as compared to
the value of services rendered and is revolting to human conscience;
4. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what is expressly provided by law;
5. When the lawyer is guilty of fraud or bad faith toward his client in the matter of his employment;
6. When the counsel’s services are worthless because of his negligence;
7. When contract is contrary to law, morals or public policy; and
8. Serving adverse interest unless the lawyer proves that it was with the consent of both parties.
Rationale behind the rule that the court may reduce unconscionable attorney’s fees
1. Indubitably intertwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of the
court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable (Roxas v.
De Zuzuarregui, Jr., G. R. No. 152072, Jan. 31, 2006).;
2. A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court hence fees should be subject to judicial control;
3. Sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for attorney’s fees when they
appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor (Borcena v.
IAC, et. al., G.R. No. 70099, Jan. 7, 1987).
NOTE: A trial judge may not order the reduction of the attorney’s fees on the ground that the
attorney is “below average standard of a lawyer.” The opinion of the judge as to the capacity of a
lawyer is not a basis of the right to a lawyer’s fees (Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, No. L-14277, Apr. 30,
1960).
(i) Acceptance fees
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer
to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. Dissatisfaction from the
outcome of the cases would not render void the retainer agreement for Atty. Jack appears to have
represented the interest of Rose (Yu v Bondal, A.C. No. 5534, Jan. 17, 2005).
NOTE: The expiration of the retainer contract between the parties during the pendency of the labor
case does not extinguish the respondent’s right to attorney’s fees (Uy v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 5280,
Mar. 30, 2004).
(ii) Contingency fee arrangements
Contingency fee contract

One which stipulates that the lawyer will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
ends favorably to the client (Taganas vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118746, September 7, 1995). It is like a
contract subject to a suspensive condition wherein the obligation to pay the counsel is based upon the
outcome of the case.
Contingent fees are sanctioned by the CPE and by the CPR subject to certain limitations (Licudan vs.
CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991).
NOTE: If a lawyer employed on contingent basis dies or becomes disabled before the final
adjudication or settlement of the case has been obtained, he or his estate will be allowed to recover
the reasonable value of the services rendered. The recovery will be allowed only after the successful
Page 58 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
termination of the litigation in the client’s favor (Morton v. Forsee, Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 197; Lapena,
2009, Pineda, 2009).
Rationale for contingent fee contracts

Contracts of this nature (contingent fee contract) are permitted because they redound to the benefit of
the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action,
but no means with which to pay for the legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation (Francisco, 1949)
Limitation of the stipulation regarding contingent fee contract

It must be reasonable based on the circumstance of the case. Contingent fee contracts are under the
supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from just charges.
Its validity depends on the measure of reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances
of the case. Stipulated attorney’s fees must not be unconscionable wherein the amount is by far so
disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated to
the client (Sesbreno vs. CA, G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995).
Q: The stipulation between the lawyer and counsel is as follows, “the attorney’s fees of the Atty. X
will be . of whatever the client might recover from his share in the property subject of the litigation.”
Is the stipulation valid?
A: Yes. The stipulation made is one of a contingent fee which is allowed by the CPE and the CPR. It
does not violate the prohibition of acquisition of property subject of the litigation by the lawyer
provided for in the Civil Code since the prohibition applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer
by his client during the pendency of the litigation. The transfer actually takes effect after the finality
of the judgment and not during the pendency of the case. As such it is valid stipulation between the
lawyer and client.
Acceptance of an initial fee before or during the progress of the litigation detract from the
contingent nature of the fees
The acceptance of an initial fee before or during the progress of the litigation does not detract from
the contingent nature of the fees, as long as the bulk thereof is made dependent upon the successful
outcome of the action (Francisco vs. Matias, January 31, 1964, G.R. No. L-16349).
Q: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a sizeable parcel of land in Quezon City against a
well-known property developer on a contingent fee basis. Laarni asked for 15% of the land that may
be recovered or 15% of whatever monetary settlement that may be received from the property
developer as her only fee contingent upon securing a favorable final judgment or compromise
settlement. Chester signed the contingent fee agreement. Assume the property developer settled the
case after the case was decided by the Regional Trial Court in favor of Chester for P1 Billion.
Chester refused to pay Laarni P150 Million on the ground that it is excessive. Is the refusal justified?
Explain.
A: The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A contingent fee is impliedly sanctioned by Rule
20.01(f)
of the CPR. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees is consideration of the risk
that the lawyer will get nothing if the suit fails. In several cases, the Court has indicated that a
contingent fee of 30% of the money or property that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover,
although the developer settled the case, it was after the case was decided by the RTC in favor of
Chester, which shows that Atty. Laarni has already rendered service to the client.
Q: Assume there was no settlement and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court which
Page 59 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
promulgated a decision in favor of Chester. This time Chester refused to convey to Laarni 15% of the
litigated land as stipulated on the ground that the agreement violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
which prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase properties and rights, which are the object of
litigation in which they take part by reason of their profession. Is the refusal justified? Explain. (2008
Bar Question)
A: Chester’s refusal is not justified. A contingent fee arrangement is not covered by Art.1491 of the
Civil Code, because the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only upon
finality of a favorable judgment. (Director of Lands v. Ababa, No. L-26096, Feb. 27, 1979);
(Macariola v. Asuncion, A.C. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982).
Champertous contract
Is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client in the prosecution of the case that he will bear all
the expenses for the recovery of things or property being claimed by the client, and the latter agrees
to pay the former a portion of the thing or property recovered as compensation. It is void for being
against public policy (like gambling).
NOTE: A champertous contract is considered void due to public policy, because it would make him
acquire a stake in the outcome of the litigation which might lead him to place his own interest above
that of the client (Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, Feb. 12, 1990).
Contingent v. Champertous contract

CONTINGENT CONTRACT- Payable in cash – dependent on the success of the litigation. Lawyers
do not undertake to pay all expenses of litigation. Valid.
CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT- Payable in kind - a portion of the thing or property recovered as
compensation. Lawyers undertake to pay all expenses of litigation. Void.
Q: The contract of attorney's fees entered into by Atty. Quintos and his client, Susan, stipulates that
if a judgment is rendered in favor of the latter, Atty. Quintos gets 60% of the property recovered as
contingent fee. In turn, he will assume payment of all expenses of the litigation. May Atty. Quintos
and Susan increase the amount of the contingent fee to 80%? (2006 Bar Question)
A: No. Atty. Quintos and Susan cannot agree to increase the amount of the contingent fee to 80%
because the agreement is champertous. Even if there is no champertous provision present, the
contingent fee of 80% of the PROPERTY recovered could still be considered as unconscionable,
because it is so disproportionate as to indicate that an unjust advantage had been taken of the client,
and is revolting to human conscience. Contracts for attorney's fees are always subject to control by
the courts.
(iii) Attorney’s liens
Attorney’s retaining lien

A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client who
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
NOTE: A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere
fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees (Rayos v. Hernandez, GR No. 169079, Feb. 12,
2007).
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able to exercise his retaining lien (ALU)
1. Attorney-client relationship;
Page 60 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
2. Lawful possession by the lawyer of the client’s funds, documents and papers in his professional
capacity; and
3. Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or disbursements.
Attorney’s charging lien

A charging lien is the right of a lawyer to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments which he has secured in a litigation of
his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he
shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his fees and disbursements (RRC, Sec. 37, Rule 138).
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able to exercise his charging lien

1. Existence of attorney-client relationship;
2. The attorney has rendered services;
3. Favorable money judgment secured by the counsel for his client;
4. The attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or advances; and
5. A statement of the claim has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof served upon the
client and the adverse party.
NOTE: A charging lien, to be enforceable as a security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires
as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client.
Retaining lien v. Charging lien
RETAINING LIEN
NATURE: Passive lien. It cannot be actively enforced. It is a general lien.
BASIS: Lawful possession of papers, documents, property belonging to the client.
COVERAGE: Covers papers, documents, and properties in the lawful possession of the attorney by
reason of his professional employment.
EFFECT: As soon as the attorney gets possession of papers, documents, or property.
APPLICABILITY: May be exercised before judgment or execution or regardless thereof.
EXTINGUISHMENT: When possession lawfully ends as when lawyer voluntarily parts with funds,
documents, and papers of client or offers them as evidence.
CHARGING LIEN
NATURE: Active lien. It can be enforced by execution. It is a special lien.
BASIS: Securing of a favorable money judgment for client.
COVERAGE: Covers all judgments for the payment of money and execution issued in pursuance of
such judgment.
EFFECT: As soon as the claim for attorney’s fees had been entered into the records of the case
APPLICABILITY: Generally, exercised only when the attorney had already secured a favorable
judgment for his client.
EXTINGUISHMENT: When client loses action as lien may only be enforced against judgment
awarded in favor of client, proceeds thereof/executed.
Q: Upon being replaced by Justice C, Atty. B, the former counsel of the parents of the victims of the
OZONE Disco tragedy, was directed to forward all the documents in his possession to Justice C.
Page 61 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Atty. B refused, demanding full compensation pursuant to their written contract. Sensing that a
favorable judgment was forthcoming, Atty. B filed a motion in court relative to his attorney’s fees,
furnishing his former clients with copies thereof. Is Atty. B legally and ethically correct in refusing
to turn over the documents and in filing the motion? Explain. (1996 Bar Question)
A: Yes. He is entitled to a retaining lien which gives him the right to retain the funds, documents and
papers of his client which have lawfully come to his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursement have been paid (RRC, Sec. 37, Rule 138; CPR, Rule 16.03). He is also legally and
ethically correct in filing a motion in court relative to his fees. He is entitled to a charging lien upon
all judgments for the paying of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which
he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when the records of the court
rendering such judgment or issuing such execution.
(iv) Fees and controversies with clients
CANON 20-RULE 20.02 - A LAWYER SHALL, IN CASES OF REFERRAL, WITH THE

CONSENT OF THE CLIENT, BE ENTITLED TO A DIVISION OF FEES IN PROPORTION TO
WORK PERFORMED AND RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED.
This is not in the nature of a broker’s commission.
Lawyer-referral system
Under this system, if another counsel is referred to the client, and the latter agrees to take him as
collaborating counsel, and there is no express agreement on the payment of attorney’s fees, the said
counsel will receive attorney’s fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
The lawyers and the client may agree upon the proportion but in case of disagreement, the court may
fix the proportional division of fees (Lapena, 2009).
CANON 20-RULE 20.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, WITHOUT THE FULL KNOWLEDGE
AND CONSENT OF THE CLIENT, ACCEPT ANY FEE, REWARD, COSTS, COMMISSION,
INTEREST, REBATE OR FORWARDING ALLOWANCE OR OTHER COMPENSATION
WHATSOEVER RELATED TO HIS PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT FROM ANYONE
OTHER THAN THE CLIENT(1997,2003 BAR)
It is intended to secure the fidelity of the lawyer to his client’s cause and to prevent a situation in
which the receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another with the client’s business may
interfere with the full discharge of his duty to his client. (Report of the IBP Committee)
GR: Fees shall be received from the client only.
XPN: A lawyer may receive compensation from a person other than his client when the latter has
full knowledge and approval thereof (Sec. 20 (e), Rule 138).
CANON 20-RULE 20.04 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID CONTROVERSIES WITH CLIENTS

CONCERNING HIS COMPENSATION AND SHALL RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION ONLY
TO PREVENT IMPOSITION, INJUSTICE OF FRAUD (1998 BAR)
GR: A lawyer should avoid the filing of any case against a client for the enforcement of attorney’s
fees.
NOTE : The legal profession is not a money-making trade but a form of public service. Lawyers
should avoid giving the impression that they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish Union and National
Insurance Co., C.A. No. 8977, Mar. 22, 1946). It might even turn out to be unproductive for him for
Page 62 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
potential clients are likely to avoid a lawyer with a reputation of suing his clients.
XPNs:
1. To prevent imposition
2. To prevent injustice
3. To prevent fraud (CPR, Rule 20.04)
NOTE: A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the lawyer, but
the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation for the professional
services he had rendered. If so, the compromise shall be subjected to said fees. If the client and the
adverse party who assented to the compromise are found to have intentionally deprived the lawyer of
his fees, the terms of the compromise, insofar as they prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making
both parties accountable to pay the lawyer’s fees. But in all cases, it is the client who is bound to pay
his lawyer for his legal representation (Atty. Gubat v. NPC, G.R. No. 167415, Feb. 26, 2010),
Ways on how lawyer’s claim attorney’s fees

1. In the same case – It may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer
had been rendered or in a separate action.
2. In a separate civil action – A petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in favor
of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
The determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become
final. Otherwise, the determination of the courts will be premature.
Instances when an independent civil action is necessary to claim attorney’s fees:

1. Main action is dismissed or nothing is awarded;
2. Court has decided that it has no jurisdiction over the action or has already lost it;
3. Person liable for attorney’s fees is not a party to the main action;
4. Court reserved to the lawyer the right to file a separate civil suit for recovery of attorney’s fees;
5. Services for which the lawyer seeks payment are not connected with the subject litigation; and
6. Judgment debtor has fully paid all of the judgment
proceeds to the judgment creditor and the lawyer has not taken any legal step to have his fees paid
directly to him from the judgment proceeds.
7. Failure to exercise Charging Lien
Effects of the nullity of contract on the right to attorney’s fees

If the nullification is due to:
1. The illegality of its object - the lawyer is precluded from recovering; and
2. Formal defect or because the court has found the amount to be unconscionable - the lawyer may
recover for any services rendered based on quantum meruit.
Kinds of lawyer according to services rendered and the compensation they are entitled to
1. Counsel de parte – He is entitled to the reasonable attorney’s fees agreed upon, or in the absence
thereof, on quantum meruit basis.
2. Counsel de officio – The counsel may not demand from the accused attorney’s fees even if he
wins the case. He may, however, collect from the government funds, if available based on the
amount fixed by the court.
Page 63 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. Amicus Curiae – not entitled to attorney’s fees.
(v) Concepts of attorney’s fees
Two concepts of attorney’s fees

1. Ordinary attorney's fee – The reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered to the latter (Pineda, 2009).
NOTE: The basis for this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the
client.
2. Extraordinary attorney's fee – An indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the
losing party in litigation.
NOTE: The basis for this is any of the cases provided for by law where such award can be made,
such as those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and is payable to the client, NOT to the
lawyer unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation
or as part thereof.
(a) Ordinary concept
Q: Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda, who
was represented by Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano. The
parties' proposal for settlement regarding Vinson's visitation rights over their minor child and the
separation of their properties was approved by the court. The marriage was subsequently declared
null and void. Throughout the proceedings counsels and their relatives and friends, availed of free
products and treatments from Vinson’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed him
additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million which he, however, refused to pay. Instead, he
issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as full payment for settlement. Still not satisfied,
the three lawyers filed in the same court a motion for payment of lawyers' fees for P50 million,
which is equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded to Pineda in the case. Are their
claim justified?
A: No. Clearly, what they were demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in the
same case. Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was
an act of unconscionable greed. They could not charge Pineda a fee based on percentage, absent an
express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services
from Pineda’s business more than sufficed for the work they did. The full payment for settlement
should have discharged Vinson's obligation to them.
As lawyers, they should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary
vision of which is justice. It is the lawyer’s despicable behavior in the case at bar which gives
lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for it:
nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident (Pineda v. de Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, Aug. 23, 2006).
(b) Extraordinary concept
Rules on extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees

GR: Attorney’s fees as damages are not recoverable. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify
their award in favor of the winning party.
XPNs: Attorney’s fees in the concept of damages may be awarded in any of the following
Page 64 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
circumstances:
1. When there is an agreement;
2. When exemplary damages are awarded;
3. When defendant’s action or omission compelled plaintiff to litigate;
4. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
a. Plaintiff was acquitted; and
b. The person who charged him knowingly made the false statement of facts or that the filing was
prompted by sinister design to vex him;
5. When the action is clearly unfounded;
6. When defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith;
7. In actions for support;
8. In cases of recovery of wages;
9. In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employee’s liability laws;
10. In a separate civil action arising from a crime;
11. When at least double costs are awarded (costs of suit does not include attorney’s fees);
12. When the court deems it just and equitable; and
13. When a special law so authorizes (NCC, Art. 2208).
Rationale behind the rule that the Court shall state the reason for attorney’s fees in in its
decision
The award of attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception and justify the
grant of such award (Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No. 84751, June 6, 1990).
NOTE: Attorney’s fees must be specifically prayed for and proven and justified in the decision itself
(Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118126, Mar. 4, 1996).
h) Preservation of client’s confidences
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF

HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation nor is affected by the party ceasing to employ the attorney and employ another or any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
(i) Prohibited disclosures and use
CANON 21-RULE 21.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL THE CONFIDENCES OR

SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EXCEPT:
A) WHEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CLIENT AFTER ACQUIANTING HIM OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCLOSURE;
B) WHEN REQUIRED BY LAW;
C) WHEN NECESSARY TO COLLECT HIS FEES OR TO DEFEND HIMSELF, HIS
EMPLOYEES OR ASSOCIATES OR BY JUDICIAL ACTION.
GR: A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences and secrets of his client.
Page 65 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has
been acquired in such capacity (RRC, Sec. 24(b), Rule 130).
XPNs:
1. When authorized by his client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
NOTE: The only instance where the waiver of the client alone is insufficient is when the person to be
examined with reference to any privileged communication is the attorney’s secretary, stenographer
or clerk, in respect to which, the consent of the attorney is likewise necessary.
2. When required by law;

3. When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates by judicial
action.
NOTE: Payment of retainer fee is not essential before an attorney can be required to safeguard a
prospective client’s secret acquired by the attorney during the course of the consultation with the
prospective client, even if the attorney did not accept the employment.
Instances when a lawyer may testify as a witness in a case which he is handling for a client
1. On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
2. Acting as an expert on his free;
3. Acting as an arbitrator;
4. Depositions; and
5. On substantial matters in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
CANON 21-RULE 21.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF HIS

CLIENT, USE INFORMATION ACQUIRED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, NOR
SHALL HE USE HE SAME TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE OR THAT OF A THIRD PERSON,
UNLESS THE CLIENT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSENTS
THERETO.
CANON 21-RULE 21.05 - A LAWYER SHALL ADOPT SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE

REQUIRED TO PREVENT THOSE WHOSE SERVICES ARE UTILIZED BY HIM, FROM
DISCLOSING OR USING CONFIDENCES OR SECRETS OF THE CLIENT.
CANON 21-RULE 21.06 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID INDISCREET CONVERSATION

ABOUT A CLIENT’S AFFAIRS EVEN WITH MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.
CANON 21-RULE 21.07 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL THAT HE HAS BEEN
CONSULTED ABOUT A PARTICULAR CASE EXCEPT TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST.
Acts punished under Art. 209 of the Revised Penal Code (betrayal of trust by attorney)
1. By causing damage to his client, either 1) by any malicious breach of professional duty, 2) by
inexcusable negligence or ignorance
Page 66 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
2. By revealing any of the secrets of his clients learned by him in his professional capacity.
3. By undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first
client, after having undertaken the defense of said first client or after having received confidential
information from said client.
(ii) Disclosure, when allowed
CANON 21-RULE 21.04 - A LAWYER MAY DISCLOSE THE AFFAIRS OF A CLIENT OF THE
FIRM TO PARTNERS OR ASSOCIATES THEREOF UNLESS PROHIBITED BY THE CLIENT.
Professional employment of a law firm is equivalent to retainer of members thereof. In a law firm,
partners or associates usually consult one another involving their cases and some work as a team.
Consequently, it cannot be avoided that some information about the case received from the client
may be disclosed to the partners or associates.
Q: In need of legal services, Niko secured an appointment to meet with W Atty. Henry of Henry &
Meyer Law Offices. During the meeting, Niko divulged highly private information to Atty. Henry,
believing that the lawyer would keep the confidentiality of the information. Subsequently, Niko was
shocked when he learned that Atty. Henry had shared the confidential information with his law
partner, Atty. Meyer, and their common friend, private practitioner Atty. Canonigo. When
confronted, Atty. Henry replied that Niko never signed any confidentiality agreement, and that he
shared the information with the two lawyers to secure affirmance of his legal opinion on Niko’s
problem. Did Atty. Henry violate any rule of ethics? Explain fully. (2008 Bar Question)
A: Atty. Henry violated Canon No. 21 of the CPR by sharing information obtained from his client
Niko with Atty. Canonigo. Canon No. 20 provides that “a lawyer shall preserve the confidences or
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.” The fact that Atty.
Canonigo is a friend from whom he intended to secure legal opinion on Niko’s problem, does not
justify such disclosure. He cannot obtain a collaborating counsel without the consent of the client
(CPR, Rule 18.01).
On the other hand, Atty. Henry did not violate Canon 21 in sharing information with his partner Atty.
Meyer. Rule 21.04 of the CPR specifically provides that “a lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client
of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.” Atty. Henry was not
prohibited from disclosing the affairs of Niko with the members of his law firm. The employment of
a member of a firm is generally considered as employment of the firm itself (Hilado v. David, G.R.
No. L-961, Sept. 21, 1949).
Privileged communication rule with regard to the identity of his client
GR: A lawyer may not invoke privileged communication to refuse revealing a client’s identity.
XPNs:
1. When there is a strong possibility that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice;
2. When disclosure would open the client to civil liability;
3. When government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client and revealing the client’s
name would furnish the only link that would come from the chain of testimony necessary to convict
him.
Reasons why a lawyer may not invoke privileged communication to refuse revealing a client’s
identity
1. Due process considerations require that the opposing party should know the adversary;
2. The privilege pertain to the subject matter of the relationship;
3. The privilege begins to exist only after attorney-client relationship has been established hence it
does not attach until there is a client; and
Page 67 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
4. The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Q: Atty. X was charged of violating Code of Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by
accepting the responsibility of representing Mr. A in the cases similar to those in which he had
undertaken to represent Mr. D and his group, notwithstanding that Mr. A was the very same person
whom Mr. D and his group had accused with Atty. X’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand
letters and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against
Mr. A. Atty. X contends that his lawyer-client relationship with Mr. D ended when he and his group
entered into the compromise settlement. Is his contention correct?
A: No. Atty. X’s contention is not correct. The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of the
date of compromise agreement, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the
implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were
dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution
of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases
not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was still required, but also
because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal
aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code (Samson vs. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013).
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES.
Right to withdraw
GR: A lawyer lacks the unqualified right to withdraw once he has taken a case. By his acceptance,
he has impliedly stipulated that he will prosecute the case to conclusion. This is especially true when
such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of justice.
XPNs: The right of a lawyer to retire from the case before its final adjudication, which arises only
from:
1. The client’s written consent; or
2. By permission of the court after due notice and hearing.
Instances when a lawyer may withdraw his services without the consent of his client (FIC
MOVIE)
1. When the client deliberately Fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
2. When the client pursues an Illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling;
3. When the lawyer finds out that he might be appearing for a Conflicting interest;
4. When the Mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
5. Other similar cases;
6. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct in Violation of these canons and rules;
7. When his Inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; and
8. When the lawyer is Elected or appointed to a public office (CPR, Rule 22.01).
Procedure to follow when withdrawal is without client’s consent

1. File a petition for withdrawal in court.
2. Serve a copy of this petition upon his client and the adverse party at least 3 days before the date set
for hearing.
Page 68 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: He should present his petition well in advance of the trial of the action to enable the client to
secure the services of another lawyer.
If the application is filed under circumstances that do not afford a substitute counsel sufficient time
to prepare for trial or that work prejudice to the client’s cause, the court may deny his application and
require him to conduct the trial.
A lawyer should not presume that the court will grant his petition for withdrawal. Until his
withdrawal shall have been proved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require.
Q: Can a client discharge the services of his lawyer without a cause? (1994, 1997, 1998 Bar
Question)
A: Yes. A client has the right to discharge his attorney at any time with or without a cause or even
against his consent.
1. With just cause – lawyer is not necessarily deprived of his right to be paid for his services. He may
only be deprived of such right if the cause for his dismissal constitutes in itself a sufficient legal
obstacle to recovery.
2. Without just cause
a. No express written agreement as to fees - reasonable value of his services up to the date of his
dismissal (quantum meruit).
b. There is written agreement and the fee stipulated is absolute and reasonable – full payment of
compensation.
c. The fee stipulated is contingent.
d. If dismissed before the conclusion of the action - reasonable value of his services (quantum
meruit)
e. If contingency occurs or client prevents its occurrence – full amount.
NOTE: A lawyer should question his discharge otherwise he will only be allowed to recover on
quantum meruit basis.
Limitations on client’s right to discharge the services of his lawyer

1. When made with justifiable cause, it shall negate the attorney’s right to full payment of
compensation.
2. The attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his right to fees.
3. A client may not be permitted to abuse his right to discharge his counsel as an excuse to secure
repeated extensions of time to file a pleading or to indefinitely avoid a trial.
Conditions for substitution of counsel

1. Written application
2. Written consent of the client
3. Written consent of the attorney to be substituted, or in the absence thereof, proof of service of
notice of said motion to the attorney to be substituted in the manner prescribed by the rules.
Heavy workload as excuse for withdrawal as counsel

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of a counsel. When a
lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his
Page 69 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
utmost attention, skill and competence to it regardless of its significance. Failure to fulfill his duties
will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar (Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C.
No. 6166, October 2, 2009).
CANON 22-RULE 22.01 -A LAWYER MAY WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES IN ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING CASES:
A) WHEN THE CLIENT PURSUES AN ILLEGAL OR IMMORAL COURSE OF CONDUCT IN
CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER HE IS HANDLING;
B) WHEN THE CLIENT INSISTS THAT THE LAWYER PURSUE CONDUCT VIOLATIVE OF
THESE CANONS AND RULES;
C) WHEN HIS INABILITY TO WORK WITH CO-COUNSEL WILL NOT PROMOTE THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CLIENT;
D) WHEN THE MENTAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE LAWYER RENDERS IT
DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CARRY OUT THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVELY;
E) WHEN THE CLIENT DELIBERATELY FAILS TO PAY THE FEES FOR THE SERVICES OR
FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RETAINER AGREEMENT;
F) WHEN THE LAWYER IS ELECTED OR APPOINTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE; AND
G) OTHER SIMILAR CASES.
NOTE: In cases a-e (above), the lawyer must file a written motion with an express consent of his
client and the court shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire.
He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire (RRC, Sec. 26, Rule 138).
Hot Potato Rule

GR: A lawyer may not unreasonably withdraw from representing a client.
XPN: Withdrawal may be allowed if there is a conflict of interest arising from circumstances beyond
the control of the lawyer or the law firm (Black’s Law Dictionary,9th edition).
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception of evidence for the defense, the defendant and
his counsel had a conference where the client directed the lawyer to present as principal defense
witnesses 2 persons whose testimonies were personally known to the lawyer to have been perjured.
The lawyer informed his client that he refused to go along with the unwarranted course of action
proposed by the defendant. But the client insisted on the directive, or else he would not pay the
agreed attorney’s fees. When the case was called for hearing the next morning the lawyer forthwith
moved in open court that he be relieved as counsel for the defendant. Both the defendant and the
plaintiff’s counsel objected to the motion. Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer legally
justified in seeking withdrawal from the case? Why or why not? Reason briefly.
A: Yes, he is justified. Under rule 22.01 of the CPR, a lawyer may withdraw his services “if the
client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canon and rules”. The insistence of the
client that the lawyer present witnesses whom he personally knows to have been perjured, will
expose him to criminal and civil liability and violate his duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Q: Was the motion for relief as counsel made by the defense lawyer in full accord with the
Page 70 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
procedural requirements for a lawyer’s withdrawal from a court case? Explain briefly. (2004 Bar
Question)
A: No, his actuation is not in accord with the procedural requirements for the lawyer’s withdrawal
from a court case. Whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause to withdraw from a case, he cannot just
do so and leave the client in the cold unprotected. He must serve a copy of his petition upon the
client and the adverse party. He should, moreover, present his petition well in advance of the trial of
the action to enable the client to secure the services of another lawyer.
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance as counsel for the accused Y after the
prosecution rested its case. The reason for the withdrawal of Atty. X was the failure of accused Y to
affix his conformity to the demand of Atty. X for increase in attorney's fees. Is the ground for
withdrawal justified? Explain. (2000 Bar Question)
A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01 (e) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to
pay the fees for his services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement. In this case, the client has
not failed to pay the lawyer's fees or to comply with the retainer agreement. He has only refused to
agree with the lawyer's demand for an increase in his fees. It is his right to refuse as that is part of his
freedom of contract.
CANON 22-RULE 22.02 - A LAWYER WHO WITHDRAWS OR IS DISCHARGED SHALL,

SUBJECT TO A RETAINER LIEN, IMMEDIATELY TURN OVER ALL PAPERS AND
PROPERTY TO WHICH THE CLIENT IS ENTITLED, AND SHALL COOPERATE WITH HIS
SUCCESSOR IN THE ORDERLY TRANSFER OF THE MATTER, INCLUDING ALL
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE PROPER HANDLING OF THE MATTER.
Duties of a discharged lawyer or one who withdraws

1. Immediately turn-over all papers and property to which the client is entitled; and
2. To cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the case.
C. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rules of Court)
1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers
Rationale of disciplining errant lawyers

Practice of law is in the nature of a privilege. Hence, the same may be suspended or removed from
the lawyer for reasons provided in the rules, law and jurisprudence.
NOTE: A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct professionally or privately
(Cruz v. Atty. Jacinto, Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000).
Nature of the power to discipline

The power to discipline a lawyer is JUDICIAL in nature and can be exercised only by the courts. It
cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive departments.
NOTE: The power to disbar and to reinstate is an inherently judicial function (Andres v. Cabrera,
SBC- 585, Feb. 29, 1984).
Powers of the Supreme Court in disciplining lawyers (WARD-SIP)

1. Warn;
2. Admonish;
Page 71 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. Reprimand;
4. Disbar;
5. Suspend a lawyer; [Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court (RRC)]
6. Interim suspension; and
7. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
Powers of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts

They are also empowered to: (WARSP)
1. Warn;
2. Admonish;
3. Reprimand;
4. Suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Sec 27, Rule 138 until further
action of the Supreme Court in the case; (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B) and
5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
NOTE: The CA and RTC cannot disbar a lawyer.
Other sanctions and remedies

1. Restitution;
2. Assessment of costs;
3. Limitation upon practice;
4. Appointment of a receiver;
5. Requirement that a lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination;
6. Requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses; and
7. Other requirements that the highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the purposes
of the sanctions.
Forms of disciplinary measures (WARCS-DIP)

1. Warning – an act of putting one on his guard against an impending danger, evil, consequence or
penalty;
2. Admonition – a gentle or friendly reproof, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or counseling on a
fault, error or oversight; an expression of authoritative advice;
3. Reprimand – a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person at fault by
his superior officer or the body to which he belongs;
4. Censure – official reprimand;
5. Suspension – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s right to practice his profession as a lawyer for a
certain period or for an indefinite period of time:
a. Definite;
b. Indefinite – qualified disbarment; lawyer determines for himself how long or how short his
suspension shall last by proving to court that he is once again fit to resume practice of law.
NOTE: Indefinite suspension is not cruel. Indefinite suspension put in his hands the key for the
restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer (Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614, June
29, 2000).
6. Disbarment – it is the act of the Supreme Court of withdrawing from an attorney the right to
practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys;
NOTE: A disbarred lawyer cannot be disbarred again (Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391,
Page 72 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
November 23, 2010).
7. Interim Suspension – it is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending
imposition
a. Suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime”;

b. Suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious
injury to a client or public
8. Probation – it is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions.
a) Sui generis
Sui generis in nature
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own (sui generis). They are distinct
from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases (In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654,
Feb. 18, 1970; Funa, 2009).
NOTE: The purpose and the nature of disbarment proceedings make the number of defenses
available in civil and criminal actions inapplicable in disciplinary proceedings.
b) Prescription
There is no prescriptive period for the filing of a complaint against an erring lawyer
Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and
of no legal effect for being ultra vires (Heirs of Falame v. Atty. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876, Mar. 7,
2008).
Q: May Atty. Gutierrez be disbarred for the second time?

A: No. The SC held that while the IBP recommended to disbar Atty. Gutierrez for the second time,
we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence and neither do we have a
law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while
Gutierrez’s infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, they cannot disbar him anew (Yuhico v
Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, Nov. 23, 2010).
2. Grounds
Specific grounds for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer

1. Deceit;
2. Malpractice;
3. Grossly immoral conduct;
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Violation of oath of office;
6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
7. Corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so (RRC,
Sec. 27, Rule 138);
8. Non-payment of IBP membership dues (Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Llas, Adm. Case No. 4749, January
20, 2000).
Page 73 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
HOWEVER, The statutory enumeration is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of SC
to suspend or disbar a lawyer (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967). HENCE, the grounds
enumerated are NOT exclusive.
Lawyer’s misconduct committed prior and after admission to the bar and its effects
1. Prior to admission to the bar - acts of misconduct prior to admission include those that indicate
that at the time the lawyer took his oath, he did not possess the required qualifications for
membership in the bar. Consequently, the cancellation of his license is justified.
2. After admission to the bar - those which cause loss of moral character on his part or involve
violation of his duties to the court, his client, to the legal profession and to the public.
NOTE: Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006).
Disbarment is merited when the action is not the lawyer’s first ethical infraction of the same nature
(Que v. Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, Dec. 4, 2009).
Legal malpractice
It consists of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as a lawyer of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake,
and when such failure proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort (Tan TekBeng v.
David, A.C. No. 1261, Dec. 29, 1983).
Other statutory grounds for suspension and disbarment of members of the bar
Other statutory grounds include:
1. Acquisition of interest in the subject matter of the litigation, either through purchase or assignment
(NCC, Art. 1491);
2. Breach of professional duty, inexcusable negligence, or ignorance, or for the revelation of the
client’s secrets (RPC, Art. 208);
3. Representing conflicting interests (RPC, Art. 209).
Other grounds for discipline

1. Non-professional misconduct
GR: A lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity.
XPN: Where such is so gross as to show him to be morally unfit for office or unworthy of privilege,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the Roll of Attorneys. (2005 Bar
Question)
NOTE: The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct as its effect transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large.
2. Gross immorality – An act of personal immorality on the part of a lawyer in his private relation
with opposite sex may put his character in doubt. But to justify suspension or disbarment, the act
must not only be immoral, it must be grossly immoral (Abaigar v. Paz, A.M. No. 997, Sept. 10,
1979).
Page 74 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: Cohabitation per se is not grossly immoral. It depends on circumstances and is not necessary
that there be prior conviction for an offense before lawyer may be disciplined for gross immorality.
If the evidence is not sufficient to hold a lawyer liable for gross immorality, he may still be
reprimanded where evidence shows failure on his part to comply with rigorous standards of conduct
required from lawyers.
3. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude – All crimes of which fraud or deceit is an
element or those inherently contrary to rules of right conduct, honesty or morality in civilized
community.
4. Promoting to violate or violating penal laws
5. Misconduct in discharge of official duties – A lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as government
official.
However, if the misconduct is in violation of the CPR or of his oath as a lawyer or is of such a
character as to affect his qualifications as a lawyer, he may be subject to disciplinary action such as
disbarment (Collantes v. Renomeron, A.C. No. 3056, Aug. 16, 1991).
NOTE: This rule does not apply to impeachable officials like SC justices, members of constitutional
commissions and Ombudsman because they can be removed only by impeachment.
6. Commission of fraud or falsehood; and
7. Misconduct as notary public
NOTE: By applying for having himself commissioned as notary public, a lawyer assumes duties in a
dual capacity, the non-performance of which may be a ground for discipline as a member of the bar.
3. Proceedings
Characteristics of disbarment proceedings

1. Sui Generis –
a. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they are investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers.
b. Not a civil action because there is neither plaintiff nor respondent, and involves no private interest.
The complainant is not a party and has no interest in the outcome except as all citizens have in the
proper administration of justice. There is no redress for private grievance.
c. Not a criminal prosecution because it is not meant as a punishment depriving him of source of
livelihood but rather to ensure that those who exercise the function should be competent, honorable
and reliable so that the public may repose confidence in them.
NOTE: A disbarment proceeding may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, A.C. No. 2884, Jan. 28, 1998). However, if the complainant
refuses to testify and the charges cannot then be substantiated, the court will have no alternative but
to dismiss the case. (2000 Bar Question)
2. The defense of “double jeopardy” cannot be availed of in a disbarment proceeding;

3. It can be initiated motu proprio by the SC or IBP. It can be initiated without a complaint;
4. It is imprescriptible;
5. Conducted confidentially;
6. It can proceed regardless of the interest or the lack thereof on the part of the complainant; and
Page 75 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
7. It in itself constitutes due process of law.

8. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced
in another action;
9. In pari delicto rule not applicable;
10. No prejudicial question in disbarment proceedings;
11. Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the alternative; and
12. Monetary claims cannot be granted except restitution and return of monies and properties of the
client given in the course of the lawyer-client relationship.
Three-fold purpose of confidentiality of disbarment proceedings

1. To enable the court to make its investigation free from extraneous influence or interference;
2. To protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting publication of such charges
pending their final resolution (Albano v. Coloma, A.C. No. 528, Oct. 11, 1967);
3. To deter the press from publishing charges or proceedings based thereon for even a verbatim
reproduction of the complaint against an attorney in the newspaper may be actionable.
NOTE: The confidentiality of the proceedings is a privilege which may be waived by the lawyer in
whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, as by
presenting the testimony in a disbarment case or using it as impeaching evidence in a civil suit
(Villalon v. IAC, G.R. No. L-73751, Sept. 24, 1986).
Offices authorized to investigate disbarment proceedings

1. Supreme Court (RRC, Sec. 13, Rule 139-B)
2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigator (RRC, Sec. 2, Rule 139-
B)
3. Office of the Solicitor General (RRC, Sec. 13, Rule 139-B)
Purposes of disbarment
1. To protect the public
2. To protect and preserve the legal profession
3. To compel the lawyer to comply with his duties and obligations under the CPR.
The burden of proof is upon the complainant and the SC will exercise its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes his case by the required quantum of proof which is clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence (Aquino v. Mangaoang, A.C. No. 4934, Mar. 17, 2004).
PROCEDURE FOR DISBARMENT
BAR MATTER NO. 1960 (MAY 1, 2000)

AMANEDMENT OF SEC. 1, RULE 139-B OF THE ROC
Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the:
1. Supreme Court motu proprio; or
2. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
Page 76 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IBP

The IBP Board of Governors may motu proprio, or upon referral by the Supreme Court, or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government service; Provided, however, that all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, that charges filed against Justices and Judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded
to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication.
Propriety of a motion for reconsideration
1. A party can no longer file a motion for reconsideration of any order or resolution of the
Investigating Commissioner, such motion being a prohibited pleading.
2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the
Board of Governors (BOG) can be entertained, an aggrieved party can file said motion with the BOG
within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt thereof by said party.
3. In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction
less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall
become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished the Supreme Court.
4. If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue
a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall
first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case
records to the Supreme Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for
reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution
with the entire case records for appropriate action.
NOTE: Lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or
their respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact details. In
case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential address appearing
in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of
administrative proceedings against him (KeldStemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel Mas, A.C. No. 8010, June
16, 2009).
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

1. In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceeding when the
interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor
General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-B, RRC,
save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court
(RRC, Sec. 13, Rule 139-B)
NOTE: Reference of the Court to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory (Zaldivar
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79590-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, Oct. 7,1988).
NOTE: Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under Rule 139-B, RRC.
The Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring
cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
Page 77 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
lower court. In such case, the report or recommendation of the investigating official shall be
reviewed directly by the Supreme Court (Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1626, February 12,1990;
Funa, 2009).
2. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations
together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the
Supreme Court (RRC, Sec. 14, Rule 139-B).
Effect of lawyer’s death in an administrative proceeding against him

1. Renders the action moot and academic, but
2. The Court may still resolve the case on its merit in order to clear publicly the name of the lawyer.
Effect of the desistance or withdrawal of complaint or non-appearance of complainant in

disbarment proceedings
The desistance or the withdrawal of the complainant of the charges against a judge/lawyer does not
deprive the court of the authority to proceed to determine the matter. Nor does it necessarily result in
the dismissal of the complaint except when, as a consequence of the withdrawal or desistance no
evidence is adduced to prove the charges.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in cases of dismissal of judges or disbarment of
lawyers (1996, 2003 Bar Questions)
This principle or doctrine applies to both judges and lawyers. Judges had been dismissed from the
service without need of a formal investigation because based on the records, the gross misconduct or
inefficiency of judges clearly appears (Uy v. Mercado, A.M. No. R-368-MTJ, Sept. 30, 1987).
The same principle applies to lawyers. Thus, where on the basis of the lawyer’s comment or answer
to show a show-cause order of SC, it appears that the lawyer has so conducted himself in a manner
which exhibits his blatant disrespect to the court, or his want of good moral character or his violation
of the attorney’s oath, the lawyer may be suspended or disbarred without need of trial-type
proceeding. What counts is that the lawyer has been given the opportunity to air his side (Prudential
Bank v. Castro, A.M. No. 2756, June 5, 1986).
Mitigating circumstances in disbarment

1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste, A.M.
No. 632, June 27, 1940);
2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);
3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991);
4. Apology (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L- 33672, Sept. 28, 1973);
5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, G.R. No.
L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967);
6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;
7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
8. Personal or emotional problems;
9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;
11. Character or reputation;
12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;
13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
14. Interim rehabilitation;
Page 78 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

16. Remorse;
17. Remoteness of prior offenses (IBP Guidelines 9.32).
NOTE: Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand,
suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired (Amaya v. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996, Feb. 7,
2005).
Aggravating circumstances in disbarment

1. Prior disciplinary offenses;
2. Dishonest or selfish motives;
3. A pattern of misconduct;
4. Multiple offenses;
5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules
or orders of the disciplinary agency;
6. Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary
process;
7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
8. Vulnerability of victim;
9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and
10. Indifference to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines 9.22)
Guidelines to be observed in the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of
law
1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel; and
3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;
4. Discipline of Filipino lawyers practicing abroad
If the Filipino lawyer is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law by a competent court or
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has been admitted as an attorney, and a ground
therefor includes any of the acts enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the RRC, such disbarment or
suspension is a ground for his disbarment or suspension in the Philippines (Lapena, 2009).
NOTE: The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (SC Resolution date 21 February 1992
amending Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC).
Judgment of suspension of a Filipino lawyer in a foreign court

The judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically
result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are
not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a
Page 79 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the
basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. Such judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer
(Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
Q: Atty. LA is a member of the Philippine Bar and the California Bar in the United States. For
willful disobedience of a lawful order of a Superior Court in Los Angeles, Atty. LA was suspended
from the practice of law in California for one (1) year. May his suspension abroad be considered a
ground for disciplinary action against Atty. LA in the Philippines? Why? (2002 Bar Question)
A: The suspension of Atty. LA from the practice of law abroad may be considered as a ground for
disciplinary action here if such suspension was based on one of the grounds for disbarment in the
Philippines or shows a loss of his good moral character, a qualification he has to maintain in order to
remain a member of the Philippine Bar.
D. Readmission to the Bar
Reinstatement and its requirements

Reinstatement is the restoration of the privilege to practice law after a lawyer has been disbarred.
The applicant must, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character – a fit and proper
person to practice law.
NOTE: The power of the Supreme Court to reinstate is based on its constitutional prerogative to
promulgate rules on the admission of applicants to the practice of law (1987 Constitution, Sec. 5[5],
Art. VIII).
1. Lawyers who have been suspended
Q: Raul Gonzales was found guilty of both contempt of court in facie curiae and gross misconduct as
an officer of court and member of the bar. For this, he was suspended indefinitely. After more than 4
years from his suspension, Gonzales filed an ex-parte motion to lift his suspension from the practice
of law, alleging that he gave free legal aid services by paying lawyers to do the same as he could not
personally represent said clients; pursued civic work for the poor; brought honor to the country by
delivering a paper in Switzerland; that he has a long record in the service of human rights and the
rule of law; his suspension of 51 months has been the longest so far; states his profound regrets for
the inconvenience which he has caused to the Court; sincerely reiterates his respect to the institution
as he reiterates his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer. May his suspension be lifted?
A: Yes. Gonzales’ contrition, so noticeably absent in his earlier pleadings, has washed clean the
offense of his disrespect. His remorse has soften his arrogance and made up for his misconduct.
Gonzales’ suspension has given him ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways,
rehabilitate himself, and thus, prove himself worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of
membership of the Bar. His motion was granted (Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690- 707, April
7, 1993).
Lifting of suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s decision
The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s
decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession (J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Atty. de Vera, et al. and Atty. de Vera v. Atty. Encanto, et al.).
Page 80 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge
that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the
Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution
lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law (Maniago v. Atty. De
Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010).
Guidelines to be observed in case of lifting an order which suspended a lawyer from the
practice of law
The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court, the same to be observed in the matter of
the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
2. Lawyers who have been disbarred
Requirements for judicial clemency for disbarred lawyers and judges

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have elapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to the legal scholarship and the development of the legal system), as well as potential
for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Supreme Court’s guidelines in reinstatement

1. The applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment;
2. The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred;
3. His conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec. 18,
1990);
4. His efficient government service (In re: Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17, 1910);
5. Applicant’s appreciation of the significance of his dereliction and his assurance that he now
Page 81 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
possesses the requisite probity and integrity; and

6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his loved ones (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No.
144, Feb. 24, 1989).
NOTE: Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests on the discretion of the court
(Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec. 18, 1990). The court may require
applicant for reinstatement to enroll in and pass the required fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school (Cui v. Cui, In Re: Resian, A.C. No. 270, Mar. 20, 1974).
Effects of reinstatement
1. Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a
previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964);
2. Recognition of moral rehabilitation and mental fitness to practice law;
3. Lawyer shall be subject to same law, rules and regulations as those applicable to any other lawyer;
and
4. Lawyer must comply with the conditions imposed on his readmission.
Effect of the executive pardon granted by the President

If during the pendency of a disbarment proceeding the respondent was granted executive pardon, the
dismissal of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the executive pardon is absolute or
conditional.
1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the disbarment case will be dismissed.
2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be dismissed on the basis thereof.
NOTE: To be reinstated, there is still a need for the filing of an appropriate petition with the
Supreme Court (In re: Rovero, A.M. No. 126, Dec. 29, 1980).
Q: X filed proceedings for disbarment against his lawyer, Atty. C, following the latter’s conviction
for estafa for misappropriating funds belonging to his client (X). While the proceedings for
disbarment was pending, the President granted absolute pardon in favor of Atty. C. Atty. C, then,
moved for the dismissal of the disbarment case. Should the motion be granted?
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to wipe out the conviction as well as the
offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if
such proceeding is based solely on the fact of such conviction (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100, Feb.
18, 1976).
But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of the
penal consequences of his act and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch
as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess good moral
character (In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922).
NOTE: In the light of recent court pronouncements that a lawyer may be disciplined even for non-
professional misconduct, one may argue that a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and subsequently receives absolute pardon, may still be proceeded against under the Code
of Professional Responsibility even if the acts of which he was found guilty did not involve
professional misconduct (A modification of In Re Lontok, supra). The ground for the petition for
disciplinary action under the Code must, however, not be founded alone on the conviction but must
be based on the acts committed by the lawyer which rendered him morally unfit to be a member of
the bar (Aguirre, Legal and Judicial Ethics. A Pre-week Reviewer, 2006 Edition).
Q: X, a member of the Bar, was charged with and found guilty of estafa, for which he was sentenced
Page 82 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party for the amount Involved. Not having
taken an appeal from the judgment of conviction, upon finality thereof he was taken into custody to
serve sentence. A month after he was incarcerated, he was granted pardon by the Chief Executive on
condition that he would not commit another offense during the unserved portion of his prison
sentence. Soon after X’s release from custody after being pardoned, the offended party in the
criminal case filed a Complaint for Disbarment against X in the Supreme Court. X set up the defense
that having been pardoned thus he may not be disbarred from the practice of law anymore. Is X’s
contention tenable? (1999 Bar Question)
A: X’s contention is not tenable. He was granted only a conditional pardon. Such conditional pardon
merely relieved him of the penal consequences of his act but did not operate as a bar to his
disbarment. Such pardon does not reach the offense itself. Hence, it does not constitute a bar to his
disbarment. (In Re GutierrezbA.C. No. L-363, July 31, 1962; In re Avancena, A.C. No. 407, Aug. 15,
1967). Furthermore, the acts of X leading to his conviction may be used to show that he does not
possess the necessary requirement of good moral character for continued membership in the Bar (In
re Valloces, A.C. No. 439, Sept. 30, 1982).
3. Lawyers who have been repatriated
Q: Dacanay practiced law until he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention to his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His
application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen. Dacanay later on reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225. Did Dacanay lose his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship? Can he automatically practice law upon reacquiring
Filipino citizenship?
A: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of R.A. 9225.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with
R.A. 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine
bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from the SC the authority to do so, conditioned on:
1. The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. The payment of professional tax;
3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education, this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments; and
4. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay,
B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 17, 2007).
E. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Page 83 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
1. Purpose
MCLE ensures that members of the IBP are kept abreast with law and jurisprudence throughout their
career, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

1. Composition:
a. Retired Justice of the SC – to act as Chairman, who is nominated by the SC
b. IBP National President – acts as the Vice-Chairman
c. 3 other members – nominated by the Philippine Judicial Academy, UP Law Center and
Association of Law Professors, respectively
2. Members are of proven probity and integrity
3. Compensation as may be determined by the SC
4. The initial terms of each of the 3 members shall be 5, 4, and 3 years respectively
2. Requirements
Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every 3 years at least 36 hours of
continuing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows:
1. 6 hours – legal ethics
2. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills
3. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution
4. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence
5. 4 hours – legal writing and oral advocacy
6. 2 hours – international law and international conventions
7. Remaining 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee on MCLE
MCLE for a newly admitted member of the bar

Starts on the first day of the month of his admission. (Bar Matter No. 850, Sec. 5, last par.)
Classes of credits
1. Participatory credit – Attending approved education activities like seminars, conventions,
symposia, and the like; speaking or lecturing, or assigned as panelist, reactor, or commentator, etc. in
approved education activities; teaching in law school or lecturing in bar review classes.
2. Non-participatory – Preparing, as author or co-author, written materials (article, book or book
review) which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in
the ordinary course of his practice or employment; editing a law book, law journal or legal
newsletter.
3. Compliance
Non-compliance of the MCLE

1. Failure to complete education requirement within the compliance period;
2. Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
within the prescribed period;
4. Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within 60
days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
5. Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; or
Page 84 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
6. Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
NOTE: Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given 60 days from date of notification to file a response.
4. Exemptions
Persons exempted from the MCLE

1. The President, Vice-President and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of
the judiciary, incumbent members of Judicial Bar Council, incumbent members of the MCLE
Committee, incumbent court lawyers who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs
of continuing judicial education (Amendment to Bar Matter 850, Resolution\ of the Court En Banc,
July 13, 2004);
4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Dept. of Justice;
5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
10 years in accredited law schools;
11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
12. Governors and Mayors because they are prohibited from practicing their profession
Other parties exempted:
1. Those who are not in law practice, private or public;
2. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
Request for exemption under special circumstance

If there is a good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement, member may file a
verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post-
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of
the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with procedure to be
established by the Committee on MCLE.
NOTE: Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under
oath and supported by documents.
Q: Atty. Mike started teaching Agrarian Reform and Taxation in June 2001 at the Arts and Sciences
Department of the Far Eastern University. In 2005, he moved to San Sebastian Institute of Law
where he taught Political Law. Is Atty. Mike exempt from complying with the MCLE for the 4th
compliance period in April 2013? (2011 Bar Question)
A: No, since he has yet to complete the required teaching experience to be exempt.
5. Sanctions
Page 85 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Consequences of non-compliance
A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the 60-day period shall be listed as
delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon recommendation of the Committee on
MCLE.
NOTE: The listing as a delinquent member is an administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the Committee on MCLE. B.M. No. 1922, which took effect on January 1,
2009, requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records.
6. Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service
The mandatory Legal Aid Service mandates every practicing lawyer to render a minimum of 60
hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants yearly.
Purpose
The rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to the society as agents of social change and to the
courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less privileged members of
society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal service by
members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration
of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants (Sec. 2, B.M. No. 2012).
Scope
It shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services in
all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where the
assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other members of the legal
profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (B.M. No. 2012,
Sec 3).
Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of parties in
courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
Legal aid cases

It includes actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and administrative in nature in
whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal representation (B. M.2012, Sec.
4[c]).
Requirements for mandatory legal aid service

Under the Rule, a practicing lawyer, among others, shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court or the
Legal Aid Chairperson of one’s Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Chapter for cases where the
lawyer may render free legal aid service:
1. Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of 60 hours of free legal aid services to
indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within the period of 12 months, with a
minimum of 5 hours of free legal aid services each month. However, where it is necessary for the
practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than 5 hours in one month, the excess hours
may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding periods (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a] first par.).
Page 86 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
2. The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within 10 days of the last
month of each quarter of the year. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a] third par.)
3. A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of Court
attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case. (B.M. 2012, Sec.
5[b])
4. Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within
the Court’s jurisdiction. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[c])
5. The IBP chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned lawyer.
The IBP Chapter shall also submit compliance reports to the IBP’s National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) for recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days
after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers. (B.M. 2012, Sec.
5[d])
6. Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies the
number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance
period. (B.M. 2012, Sec 5[e])
Sanctions in case of non-compliance with the rule on mandatory legal aid service
1. At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA), to explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed
number of hours.
2. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA
shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be
declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing.
3. Upon approval of the NCLA’s recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the
erring lawyer as a member not in good standing.
4. The notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay P4,000.00 penalty which shall accrue to
the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
5. The “not in good standing” declaration shall be effective for a period of 3 months from the receipt
of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors.
6. During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel.
7. Provided, however, that the “not in good standing” status shall subsist even after the lapse of the
3-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
8. Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least 3 consecutive years
shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the Committee on
Bar Discipline. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 7)
NOTE: The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by the
Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO (non-governmental organizations) or PO
(people’s organizations) shall be a ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of Court
or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal and administrative charges
against the malfeasor (B.M. 2012, Sec. 7[e]).
F. Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended) (1996, 2005, 2007 BAR)
Purpose of the Notarial Law

1. To promote, serve, and protect public interest;
Page 87 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
2. To simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries public; and
3. To foster ethical conduct among notaries public (Sec. 2, Rule I, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
Effect of notarized document

A document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document (RRC, Sec. 19, Rule 132) and
may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved (RRC, Sec. 30, Rule 132).
1. Qualifications of notary public
Notary public
A person appointed by the court whose duty is to attest to the genuineness of any deed or writing in
order to render them available as evidence of facts stated therein and who is authorized by the statute
to administer various oaths.
NOTE: “Notary Public" and "Notary" refer to any person commissioned to perform official acts
under the rules on Notarial Practice (Sec. 9, Rule II, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Qualifications of a notary public

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner must be:
1. A citizen of the Philippines;
2. Over 21 years of age;
3. A resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year and maintains a regular place of work or business
in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
4. A member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
5. Has not been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude (second par.,
Sec. 1, Rule III,2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, A.M.).
Commission
It refers to the grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to the written evidence of the authority
(Sec. 3, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Issuance of notarial commission

A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified person who submits a
petition in accordance with the Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, first par., Sec. 1,
Rule III).
Two kinds of duties

1. Execution of formalities required by law; and
2. Verification of the capacity and identity of the parties as well as the legality of the act executed
Duties of a notary public

1. To keep a notarial register
2. To make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by the law
3. To send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of court within the first 10 days of the month
next following
4. To affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission, as required by law
Page 88 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
5. To forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court
6. To make report, within reasonable time to the proper judge concerning the performance of his
duties, as may be required by such judge
7. To make the proper notation regarding residence certificates (Sec. 240, Rev. Adm. Code).
Lawyers as notary public

GR: Only those admitted to the practice of law are qualified to be notaries public.
XPNs: When there are no persons with the necessary qualifications or where there are qualified
persons but they refuse appointment. In which case, the following persons may be appointed as
notaries:
1. Those who passed the studies of law in a reputable university; or
2. A clerk or deputy clerk of court for a period of not less than two years.
Prohibition against the RTC judges to notarize

Section 35, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court as well as Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Notarization
of documents is considered a practice of law.
The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently
incompatible with the official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the
Regional Trial Court.
Authority of MTC judges to notarize and its limitation

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex-officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties. They may not, as notaries
public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts
and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges.
However, MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries
public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act within the competence of a
regular notary public, provided that:
1. All notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer
2. Certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit.
Their authority to notarize is limited to their sala. Hence, they cannot notarize documents filed in
another town because it will be considered as practice of law.
Q: Vicente Batic charged Judge Victorio Galapon Jr. with engaging in unauthorized notarial practice
for having notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale between Antonio Caamic and Lualhati Ellert. Under
the deed of sale, Lualhati Ellert, was described as single. At the time of Galapon’s notarization of the
Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in Dulag, Leyte. Judge Galapon claims that he did not
prepare the document and that his participation was limited to its acknowledgment, for which the
corresponding fee was collected by and paid to the clerk of court. Are MTC judges like Judge
Galapon absolutely prohibited from acting as notaries public?
A: No. While Judge Galapon explains that he sincerely believed that when no notary public is
available, the MTC may act as ex-officio notary public, provided the fees shall be for the
government, such is not enough to exonerate him from liability. His acts do not fall under the
exception because at the time of his notarization of the Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in
Page 89 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Dulag, Leyte (Vicente Batic v. Judge Victorio Galapon Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-99-1239, July 29, 2005).
Clerk of court as notary

Clerk of court may at as notary public, provided he is commissioned and has been permitted by his
superior. Such consent is necessary because the act of notarizing a document is a practice of law.
2.Term of office of notary public
Term of office of a notary public (1995 Bar Question)

A notary public may perform notarial acts for a period of 2 years commencing the 1st day of January
of the year in which the commissioning is made until the last day of December of the succeeding
year regardless of the actual date when the application was renewed, unless earlier revoked or the
notary public has resigned under the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Rules of Court (A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC, Section 11, Rule III).
NOTE: The period of 2 years of a notarial commission will commence at January first regardless of
when it was really granted and will end at exactly 2 years from said date of commencement up to
December of the 2nd year. Ex. Atty. Antonio applied for and was given notarial commission on 12
November 2010, such term will expire on 31 December 2011 (2011 Bar Question).
Q: Juan dela Cruz was commissioned as a notary public in 2001. His friend asked him to notarize a
deed of absolute sale sometime in 2004, to which he agreed free of charge. A complaint for
malpractice was filed against him. Is Juan dela Cruz guilty of malpractice?
A: Yes. Absent any showing that his notarial commission has been renewed, his act constitutes
malpractice because at the time he notarized the document, his notarial commission has already
expired. It is not a defense that no payment has been received. The requirement for the issuance of
the commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. In fact, Juan’s act
also constitutes falsification of public document.
Expired Commission
A notary public may file a written application with the Executive Judge for the renewal of his
commission within 45 days before the expiration thereof. A mark, image or impression of the seal of
the notary public shall be attached in the application (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, first par., Sec. 13, Rule
III).
NOTE: If a person is applying for a commission for the first time, what he files is a petition and not
an application.
Failure of the notary public to file an application for the renewal of his commission
Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the name of the notary public in the
register of notaries public and may only be reinstated therein after he is issued a new commission
(A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, second and third pars., Sec. 13, Rule III).
NOTE: The Executive Judge shall, upon payment of the application fee, act on an application for
renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If the application is denied, the
Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 14, Rule III).
3. Powers and limitations
Page 90 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Powers of a notary public

A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial acts: (JAO-CAS)
1. Acknowledgements;
2. Oaths and affirmations;
3. Jurats;
4. Signature witnessings;
5. Copy certifications; and
6. Any other act authorized by these rules (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Section 1(a), Rule IV)
Notarization of a private document

Notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. A notarized
document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public
must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents (Dolores dela cruz, ET AL V. Atty.
Jose Dimaano, Jr., September 12, 2008, A.C. No. 7781).
Acknowledgment
Refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;
NOTE: A notary public cannot perform a notarial act over a document that has missing pages, or that
contains blanks that should be filled-in prior to the notarial act.
2. Is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
3. Represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed
the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity (Sec. 1, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-
13-SC).
Q: “Before me personally appeared this 30th of August 2010 Milagros A. Ramirez, who proved her
identity to me through witnesses: 1. Rosauro S. Balana, Passport UU123456; 1-5-2010/Baguio City;
and 2. Elvira N. Buela, Passport VV200345; 1-17-2009/Manila. “Both witnesses, of legal ages,
under oath declare that: Milagros A. Ramirez is personally known to them; she is the same seller in
the foregoing deed of sale; she does not have any current identification document nor can she obtain
one within a reasonable time; and they are not privy to or are interested in the deed he signed.” What
is the status of such a notarial acknowledgement? (2011 Bar Question)
A: Valid, since it is a manner of establishing the identity of the person executing the document.
Jurat
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
2. Is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice;
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
4. Takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document (A.M. 02-
8-13-SC, Sec. 6, Rule II).
Page 91 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: A jurat is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made. The claim or belief of Atty. Dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was not
necessary for the jurat because it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this had been his
belief since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has been making a mockery of the
legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and others authorized by law to administer oaths
or to take acknowledgments should not take for granted the solemn duties appertaining to their
offices. Such duties are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest (Gamido v.
Bilibid Prisons Officials, G.R. No. 114829, Mar. 1, 1995).
Acknowledgement vs. Jurat
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
a. Act of one who has executed a deed, in going to some competent officer or court and declaring It
to be his act or deed.
b. The notary public or officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and he is the same person who executed
it and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed.
c. Two-fold purpose: To authorize the deed to be given in evidence without further proof of its
execution, and, to entitle it to be recorded.
d. Where used: 1. To authenticate an agreement between two or more persons; or 2. Where the
document contains a disposition of property.
e. E.g. The acknowledgement in a deed of lease of land.
JURAT
a. That part of an affidavit in which the notary public or officer certifies that the instrument was
sworn to before him.
b. It is not part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was properly made.
c. Purpose: Gives the document a legal character
d. Where used: 1. Affidavits; 2. Certifications; 3. Whenever the person executing makes a statement
of facts or attests to the truth of an event, under oath
e. E.g. An affidavit subscribed before a notary public or public official authorized for the purpose
NOTE: In notarial wills, acknowledgement is required, not merely a jurat.
Signature witnessing
Refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.
14, Rule II).
Q: Is a notary public authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on an
instrument or document presented for notarization? (1995 Bar Question)
A: Yes. It is also within the powers of a notary public, provided:
1. The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
2. Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
3. The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: “thumb or other mark affixed by (name
of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary
Page 92 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
public”; and
4. The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment,
jurat or signature witnessing. (Sec. 1(b), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
Q: Is a notary public authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or
make a mark on an instrument or document? (1995 Bar Question)
A: Yes. It likewise falls within the powers of a notary public, provided:
1. The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
2. The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of 2 disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
3. Both witnesses sign their own names;
4. The notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by notary in the presence of
(names and addresses of person and 2 witnesses)”; and
5. The notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 1(c),
Rule IV).
Copy certification
Refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
1. Is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor
publicly recordable;
2. Copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
3. Compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
4. Determines that the copy is accurate and complete (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 4, Rule II).
NOTE: The document copied must be an original document. It cannot be a copy itself.
Notarial certificate
Refers to the part of, or attachment to a notarized instrument or document that is completed by the
notary public which bears the notary's signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization as provided for by the Rules on Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-
13, Sec. 8, Rule II).
NOTE: “Loose notarial certificate” refers to a notarial certificate that is attached to a notarized
instrument or document.
Limitations to the performance of a notarial act

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document is:
a. Not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
Sec. 2(b)(1), RuleIV).
b. Not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
Sec.2(b)(2), Rule IV)
c. The document is blank or incomplete; (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.6 (a) Rule IV)
d. An instrument or document is without appropriate notarial certification (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 6,
Rule IV).
Q: Engineer Cynthia de la Cruz Catalya filed an application for building permit in connection with
the renovation of a building situated on a lot owned by her brother Rolando de la Cruz. One of the
Page 93 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
documents required in the processing of the application was an affidavit to be executed by the lot
owner. Since Rolando de la Cruz was a resident abroad, an affidavit was prepared wherein it was
made to appear that he was a resident of Leyte. Atty. Francisco Villamor notarized the purported
affidavit. According to him, a Chinese mestizo appeared in his law office one time, requesting that
his affidavit be notarized. Said person declared that he was Rolando de la Cruz. Atty. Villamor then
asked for the production of his residence certificate, but he said, he did not bother to bring the same
along with him anymore as, he has already indicated his serial number, in the jurat portion together
with the date of issue and place of issue. Did Atty. Francisco Villamor commit a violation of notarial
law?
A: Yes. It is the duty of the notarial officer to demand that the document presented to him for
notarization should be signed in his presence. By his admission, the affidavit was already signed by
the purported affiant at the time it was presented to him for notarization. Atty. Villamor thus failed to
heed his duty as a notary public to demand that the document for notarization be signed in his
presence (Traya Jr. v. Villamor, A.C. No. 4595,Feb. 6, 2004).
Disqualification of a notary public to perform a notarial act

A notary public is disqualified to perform notarial act when he:
1. Is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
2. Will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest,
cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by the Rules on Notarial Practice and by
law; or
3. Is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 3, Rule IV).
NOTE: The function would be defeated if the notary public is one of the signatories to the
instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves
himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very
purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted (Villarin v. Sabate,
A.C. No. 3224,Feb. 9, 2000).
Instances when notary public may refuse to notarize

1. The notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral;
2. The signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public reasonable
doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction requiring a notarial act;
3. In the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will; (A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC, Sec.4, Rule V) or
4. If the document or instrument to be notarized is considered as an improper document by the Rules
on Notarial Practice.
NOTE: Improper instrument/document is a blank or incomplete instrument or an instrument or

document without appropriate notarial certification (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 6, Rule V).
Affirmation or oath
1. Appears in person before the notary public;
evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
3. Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document (Sec.
2,Rule II, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Page 94 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9406

MARCH 23, 2007
Officers allowed to administer oaths

1. President;
2. Vice-President;
3. Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
4. Members of the Judiciary;
5. Secretaries of Departments;
6. Provincial governors and lieutenant-governors;
7. City mayors;
8. Municipal mayors;
9. Bureau directors;
10. Regional directors;
11. Clerk of courts;
12. Registrars of deeds;
13. Other civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines whose
appointments are vested in the President and are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments;
14. All other constitutional officers;
15. PAO lawyers in connection with the performance of duty; and
16. Notaries public (Sec. 41)
Duty to administer oaths

Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public, municipal judges and
clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute certificates save in matters of official
business or in relation to their functions as such; and with the exception of notaries public, the officer
performing the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by law
(Section 42).
NOTE: P.A.O. Lawyers now have the authority to administer oaths, provided it is in connection with
the performance of their duties. The fiscal or the state prosecutor has the authority to administer
oaths (RA No. 5180, as amended by P.D. 911).
4. Notarial register
A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound
book with numbered pages.
NOTE: Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his
notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission. (Father
Ranhilio C. Aquino Et. Al., s. Complainants, Vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua, Respondent. A.C. No. 5095,
November 28, 2007, En Banc)
Signing or affixing a thumbmark in the notarial register

At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be signed or a thumb or other mark
Page 95 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
affixed by each:
1. Principal;
2. Credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal; and
3. Witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by the notary public on behalf of a
person physically unable to sign (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 3,Rule VI).
Rules in case of loss, destruction or damage of notarial register

1. In case the notarial register is stolen, lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable or
illegible as a record of notarial acts, the notary public shall, within ten (10) days after informing the
appropriate law enforcement agency in the case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by
any means providing a proper receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail and also provide
a copy or number of any pertinent police report.
2. Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or death of the notary public, the notarial
register and notarial records shall immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive Judge (Sec.
5, Rule VI, A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 5, Rule VI).
The notary public may refuse the request of inspection for register of deeds
If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or wrongful
motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to any entry
or entries therein (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 4(c), Rule VI).
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization
Jurisdiction of notary public

A notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court.
Under the Notarial Law, the jurisdiction of a notary public is co-extensive with the province for
which he was commissioned; and for the notary public in the city of Manila, the jurisdiction is co-
extensive with said city. Circular 8 of 1985, however, clarified further that the notary public may be
commissioned for the same term only by one court within the Metro Manila region.
“Regular place of work or business” of a notary public meaning

The regular place of work or business refers to a stationary office in the city or province wherein the
notary public renders legal and notarial services (Sec. 11, Rule II, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
Rules with regard to jurisdiction of notary public

GR: A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his jurisdiction and his regular place of
work or business.
NOTE: Outside the place of his commission, a notary public is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act (Guerrero v. Bihis, 2007).
XPNs: A notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in the following sites, other than
his regular place of work or business, located within his territorial jurisdiction:
1. Public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be administered;
2. Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents
requiring notarization;
Page 96 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
3. Hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is confined
for treatment
4. Any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under detention
(A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 2, Rule IV).
5. Such other places as may be dictated because of emergency.
NOTE: It is improper for a notary public to notarize documents in sidewalk since it is now required
that a notary public should maintain a regular place of work or business within the city or province
where he is commissioned. The SC evidently wants to eradicate the practice of “fly by night”
notaries public who notarized documents in “improvised” offices.
6. Revocation of commission
Who may revoke the notarial commission

1. The Executive Judge of the RTC who issued the commission on any ground on which an
application for commission may be denied (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,Sec. 1, Rule XI); or
2. By the Supreme Court itself in the exercise of its general supervisory powers over lawyer.
Grounds for Revocation

The executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for any ground on which an application for a
commission may be denied. In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or
impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:
1. Fails to keep a notarial register;
2. Fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
3. Fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days of the
month following;
4. Fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5. Fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
6. Fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
7. Fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
NOTE: "Principal" refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the subject of
notarization.
8. Fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;

9. Executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10. Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; and
11. Commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes
good cause for revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction (Sec. 1, Rule
XI,Rule on Notarial Practice).
NOTE: Functions of notary public – violations: suspension as notary not for the practice of law
(Villarin v. Sabate, A.C. No. 3224,Feb. 9, 2000).
7. Competent evidence of identity
Competent evidence of identity

Competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of an individual based on the following:
1. At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
Page 97 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
and signature of the individual such as but not limited to those enumerated in the law.
2. The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual,
or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who
each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
(Amendment to Sec. 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Feb. 19, 2008).
NOTE: Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known
to the Notary Public (Amora, Jr. v. Comelec, G.R. No.192280, Jan. 25, 2011).
8. Sanctions
Punishable acts under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who knowingly:
1. Acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
2. Obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official records of a notary
public; and
3. Solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official misconduct.(Rule on
Notarial Practice, Sec. 1, Rule XII).
NOTE: Notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore constitutes malpractice, if
not the crime of falsification of public documents (St. Louis Laboratory High School Faculty And
Staff V. Dela Cruz , A.C. No. 6010. August 28, 2006).
G. Canons of Professional Ethics
The Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE) was framed by the American Bar Association in 1908 and
were adopted in the Philippines in 1917 and subsequently revised in 1946. It is one of the sources or
the main basis of our legal ethics at the present which is the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). While the CPE is superseded by the CPR, the CPE continues to be an invaluable source of
knowledge and understanding of legal ethics.
NOTE: Most of the provisions of the Code of Professional Ethics are incorporated in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Only those topics not considered incorporated are included to prevent
redundancy.
Q: Can a lawyer stipulate with the client that a portion of the latter’s interest in the property subject
of the litigation be conveyed to the former as payment for his services?
A: No. The same is prohibited both by the CPE and the Civil Code. The CPE provides that a lawyer
should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
Likewise, the Civil Code provides that prosecuting attorneys connected with the administration of
justice cannot acquire by purchase properties in litigation to which they exercise their respective
functions (Canon 10 CPE; Art. 1491, NCC).
Q: Is it proper for a lawyer to write articles in a newspaper and the like for publication?
A: A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in which he gives information upon
the law; but he could not accept employment from such publication to advice inquiries in respect to
their individual rights (Canon 40, CPE).
Page 98 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
Q: May a lawyer interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or
criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party?
A: Yes. In doing so, however, he should scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated to induce the
witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to affect his free and untrammeled
conduct when appearing at the trial or on the witness stand (Canon 39, CPE).
Q: Mr. A disclosed to his lawyer that he had been bribing one of the court officials to destroy the
evidence of the other party to tilt the disposition of the case in his favor. If you are Mr. A’s lawyer,
what will you do?
A: When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, upon the court or
party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and should endeavor to rectify it
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the
injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps. (Canon 41, CPE).
Furthermore, if the client failed or refuses to rectify the same, he shall terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the Rules of Court (Canon 19.02, CPR)
II. JUDICIAL ETHICS
The branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be observed by all judges
in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for adjudication which conduct must be
demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, competence, independence and freedom from improprieties.
This freedom from improprieties must be observed in both the public and private life of a judge –
being the visible representation of the law.
A judge is a public officer who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority; A public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in accordance with law (People v. Manantan,
G.R. No. L-14129, Aug. 30, 1962).
Proper judicial deportment
1. Attitude toward counsel – He must be courteous especially to the young and inexperienced, should
not interrupt in their arguments except to clarify his minds as to their positions, must not be tempted
to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment, may criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of a lawyer but not in an insulting manner.
2. Attitude toward litigants and witnesses– He must be considerate, courteous and civil, must not
utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case.
Proper judicial conduct
Judges and justices must conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion and be free
from appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge of official duties
but also in their everyday lives.
Q: In several policy addresses extensively covered by media since his appointment on December 21,
2005, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban vowed to leave a judiciary characterized by "four Ins"
and to focus in solving the "four ACID" problems that corrode the administration of justice in our
country. Explain this "four Ins" and "four ACID" problems (2006 Bar Question).
A: Chief Justice Panganiban vowed to lead a judiciary characterized by four Ins: Independence,
Integrity, Industry and Intelligence; one that is morally courageous to stand its ground against the
Page 99 of 154
SCHOOL OF LAW
onslaughts of influence, interference, indifference and insolence; and that is impervious to the plague
of ships - kinship, relationship, friendship and fellowship.
He identified four ACID problems that corrode justice in our country; namely, (1) limited Access to
justice by the poor; (2) Corruption; (3) Incompetence; and (4) Delay in the delivery of quality
judgments.
NOTE: Then Chief Justice Panganiban also asked for the employees of the Judiciary for three things
encapsulated by the Code DHL: Dedication to duty, Honesty in every way, and full loyalty to the
judiciary and to the Supreme Court
Q: The Chief Justice also said that the judiciary must "safeguard the liberty" and "nurture the
prosperity" of our people. Explain this philosophy. Cite Decisions of the Supreme Court
implementing each of these twin beacons of the Chief Justice (2006 Bar Question)
A: The twin beacons of LIBERTY and PROSPERITY constitute the core judicial philosophy of
Chief Justice Panganiban. He “advances the view that liberty must include the freedoms that
prosperity allows. In the same manner, prosperity must include liberty, especially the liberty to strive
for the ‘good life’ according to a person’s conception”. He further said that the Judiciary can
contribute to the advancement of liberty and prosperity by adopting two standards of judicial review:
“that in litigations involving civil liberties, the scales should weigh heavily against the government
and in favor of the people. However, in conflicts affecting prosperity, development and the economy,
deference must be accorded to the political branches of the government.”
In the case of Lumanlaw v. Peralta, GR No. 164953, February 13, 2006, a decision penned by the
Chief Justice himself, the Court ordered the release of a detainee who had been imprisoned at the
Manila City Jail for almost two years but had not yet been arraigned.
In the case of Republic, et al. v. Judge Gingoyon and Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., GR No. 166429, February 1, 2006, the Court upheld PIATCO’s right to be paid Php300 billion
before the Government can take over the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
facilities.
A. Sources
The two sources of judicial ethics

a. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore Draft);
Focuses on the institutional and personal independence of judicial officers. Contains eight norms of
conduct that judges “shall follow”.
b. Code of Judicial Conduct
Concerned primarily with the institutional independence of the judiciary. Contained three guidelines
explaining what judges “should do” * Canon 1 of the 1989 Code created a weaker mandate.
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore Draft)
The New Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) for the Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1,
2004 supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Provided, however,
that in case of deficiency or absence of specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial
Page 100 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Ethics and Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character (2007, 2009 Bar
Questions).
This was adopted from the universal declaration of standards for ethical conduct embodied in the
Bangalore Draft as revised at the Round Table Conference of Chief Justices at the Hague.
The purpose of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is to update and
correlate the code of judicial conduct and canons of judicial ethics adopted for the Philippines, and
also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with the universal clamor for a universal code of judicial
ethics (See aforementioned "four Ins" and "four ACID" problems by Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban).
NOTE: The New Code contains 6 Canons and 44 Rules.
Q: One of the foundations of the Bangalore Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct is the importance
in a modern democratic society of what? (2011 Bar Question)
A: Public confidence in its judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of its judiciary.
The six (6) canons under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
1. Independence
2. Integrity
3. Impartiality
4. Propriety
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence
Duties of a magistrate that will bolster the public’s confidence to our judicial system
1. Duty to be above reproach and to appear above reproach (NCJC, Sec.1, Canon 2)
2. Duty to be impartial (NCJC, Canon 3)
3. Duty to avoid improprieties and appearance of improprieties (NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon 4)
4. Duty of Financial Transparency and duty to avoid financial conflicts of interest (NCJC, Sec. 7,
Canon 4)
5. Duty to be efficient, fair and prompt (NCJC, Sec. 5, Canon 6)
6. Duty to be free from favor, bias, or prejudice (NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon 3).
2. Code of Judicial Conduct
Applicability
This code applies suppletorily.
Q: A complaint was filed against Judge Grageda for the delay in the resolution of motions relative to
Civil Case No. 54-2001, entitled Pio Angelia v. Arnold Oghayan. Plaintiff Angelia averred that the
case was filed way back on August 8, 2001. After numerous postponements, pre-trial was finally set
on December 6, 2007. On December 20, 2007, counsel for complainant received an order dated
December 6, 2007 dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On December 28, 2007, Angelia filed
a motion for reconsideration reasoning out that the failure to prosecute could not be attributed to him.
On July 28, 2008, he filed his Urgent Motion for the Early Resolution of said December 2007
Motion for Reconsideration. He claimed that despite the lapse of a considerably long period of time,
no action was taken by Judge Grageda. Is respondent Judge Gragela GUILTY of undue delay in
resolving a motion in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct?
Page 101 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A: Yes. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.
Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency. As a trial judge, Judge Grageda was a frontline official of the judiciary and should have
at all times acted with efficiency and with probity.
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
RULE 1.03. - A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the independence of the
judiciary and should forthwith resist any pressure from whatever source intended to influence the
performance of official functions.
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL ACTIVITIES
RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
Q: Judge Canoy was charged with several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures,
grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety (CJC, Canon 2) for granting bail to
Melgazo, the accused in a criminal case, without any application or petition for the grant of bail filed
before his court or any court. He verbally ordered the branch clerk of court to accept the cash deposit
as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. He did not
require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule
114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Thus, Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to release
Melgazo without any written order of release. Should respondent Judge Canoy be held
administratively liable for violating of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9,
Rule 140, RRC (as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC)?
A: Yes. Granting of bail without any application or petition to grant bail is a clear deviation from the
procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may
be considered as “constructive bail,” there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the
noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of
the rights of another. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice
and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. In this case, the
reason of Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules (Pantilo III v. Canoy,
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, Feb. 9, 2011)
RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.
RULE 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
Page 102 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Q: Judge Belen was charged with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. He
filed a complaint for Estafa against complainant’s father. However such was dismissed by the city
prosecutor for lack of probable cause. After the dismissal of the complaint, Judge Belen started
harassing and threatening the complainant with filing of several cases against the latter. He also
wrote using his personal stationary, several letters addressed to certain local government authorities
and employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business and advising
them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain
environmental laws. An administrative complaint was filed against the judge for violation of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct on the ground that by using the letter head indicating his position as
the Presiding Judge he was trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own personal
interest. Is the judge liable?
A: Yes. While the use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has
earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While
the title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to
use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary
interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge JC, Canon 2, Rule 2.03). To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of
impropriety (Belen v. Belen,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139, Aug. 9, 2010).
CANON 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Q: Plaintiff Conquilla was charged for direct assault after respondent Judge B conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the said
crime. Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-
SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Is the
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything
less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law
and jurisprudence.
It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary
investigation himself upon amendment of the law stripping the power of first level court judges to
conduct preliminary
investigation (Conquilla v. Bernando, A.M. No.MTJ-09-1737, Feb. 9, 2011).
RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable
law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
Page 103 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
RULE 3.03 - A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.
RULE 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the
courts for the litigants.
Q: How would you characterize the relationship between the judge and a lawyer? Explain (1996 Bar
Question)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe and maintain respect for
judicial officers (CPR, Canon 11). On the other hand, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges
to be patient, attentive and courteous to lawyers (CJC, Rule 3.03). In a word, lawyers and judges owe
each other mutual respect and courtesy.
RULE 3.05 - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases with dispatch. Delay
does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and
brings it into disrepute (Office of the Court Administrator v. Quilatan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, Sept.
27, 2010).
RULE 3.06 - While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth.
RULE 3.07 - A judge should abstain from making public comments on any pending or impending
case and should require similar restraint on the part of court personnel.
RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative
functions or other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
RULE 3.10 - A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
RULE 3.11 - A judge should appoint commissioners, receivers, trustees, guardians, administrators
and others strictly on the basis of merit and qualifications, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. Unless
otherwise allowed by law, the same criteria should be observed in recommending appointment of
court personnel. Where the payment of compensation is allowed, it should be reasonable and
commensurate with the fair value of services rendered.
RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
Page 104 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Q: In a hearing before the Court of Tax Appeals, Atty. G was invited to appear as amicus curiae. One
of the Judges hearing the tax case is the father of Atty. G. The counsel for the respondent moved for
the inhibition of the judge in view of the father-son relationship. Is there merit to the motion?
Decide. (1996 Bar Question)
A: There is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12 of the CJC provides that “a judge should take no part
where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Among the instances for the
disqualification of a judge is that he is related to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity. But this refers to counsel of the parties. As
amicus, he represents no party to the case. There is, therefore, no ground to fear the loss of the
judge’s impartiality in this case if his son is appointed amicus curiae.
RULE 3.13 - A judge disqualified by the terms of rule 3.12 may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. If, bases on such disclosure, the
parties and lawyers independently of judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the
inhibition is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
CANON 5
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE THE
RISK
OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIESADVOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE
ACTIVITIES (1995,1997,1999,2000,2002 BAR)
RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere with
the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:
(a) write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

(b) engage in the arts, sports, and other special recreational activities;
(c) participate in civic and charitable activities;
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.
RULE 5.02 - A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to reflect adversely
on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage
investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualifications.
Rule regarding financial activities
Page 105 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to:
1. Reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality;
2. Interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities; or
3. Increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of
cases giving grounds for disqualification. (Rule 5.02)
RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any
business except as director of a family business of the judge.
Rule on judges having investments

GR: A judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve as:
1. An officer
2. Director
3. Manager
4. Advisor
5. Employee of any business
XPN: As director of a family business of the judge. (Rule 5.03)
RULE 5.04 - A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, factor
or loan from any one except as may be allowed by law.
RULE 5.05 - No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be sued or disclosed by a judge in
any financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial activities.
RULE 5.06 - A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other
fiduciary, except for the estate, trusts, or person of a member of the immediate family, and then only
if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. "Member of
immediate family" shall be limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity. As a family, a judge shall not:
(a) serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or
(b) act as such contrary to rules 5.02 to 5.05.
RULE 5.07 - A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the
Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.
RULE 5.08 - A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.
RULE 5.09 - A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
RULE 5.10 - A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.
B. Qualities
Page 106 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
1. Independence
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a

fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
Judicial Independence
An independent Judiciary is one free from inappropriate outside influence.
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.
A judge shall, therefore, uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and
institutional aspects (NCJC, Canon 1).
Individual Judicial Independence focuses on each particular case and seeks to insure his or her
ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law while Institutional Judicial
Independence focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects
judges as a class (In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P.
Macasaet Published in Malaya dated Sept. 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007).
NOTE: The treatment of independence as a single Canon is the primary difference between the new
Canon 1 and the Canon 1 of the 1989 Code.
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of
any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason.
Judges should inspire public confidence in the judiciary which can be attained only if judges are
perceived by the public to be fair, honest, competent, principled, dignified and honorable.
Accordingly, the first duty of judges is to conduct themselves at all times in a manner that is beyond
reproach.
Judges must reject pressure by maintaining independence from, but not limited to the following:
1. Independence from public officials – the public laid their confidence on the fact that the official is
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied intentions.
2. Independence from government as a whole – avoid inappropriate connections, as well as any
situation that would give rise to the impression of the existence of such inappropriate connections.
3. Independence from family, social, or other relationships –Do not sit in litigation where a near
relative is a part of or counsel; be independent from judicial colleagues (Sec. 2) and avoid such
actions as may reasonably tend to wake the suspicion that his social or business relations constitute
an element in determining his judicial course.
4. Independence from public opinion –only guide is the mandate of law.
Q: In a civil case submitted for a decision, Judge Corpuz-Macandog acted on it based on a telephone
call from a government official telling her to decide the case in favor of the defendant, otherwise she
will be removed. The judge explained that she did so under pressure considering that the country was
under a revolutionary government at that time. Did the judge commit an act of misconduct?
A: Yes. A judge must decide a case based on its merits. For this reason, a judge is expected to be
fearless in the pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power, and
Page 107 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist temptation lurking in her office. Here, it is
improper for a judge to have decided a case based only on a directive from a government official and
not on the judge’s own ascertainment of facts and applicable law (Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog
A.M. No. R-351-RJT,Sept.26,1986)
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Degree of independence
The highest degree of independence is required of judges. He must be independent in decision-
making. He cannot consult with staff and court officials. However, he can ask colleagues purely
academic or hypothetical questions but not to the extent of asking them to decide a case.
NOTE: It is every judge’s duty to respect the individual independence of fellow judges.
SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
(Principle of Subjudice)
A judge is prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case so as not
to arouse public opinion for or against a party. (2007 Bar Question)
This section affirms that a judge’s restraint from exerting influence over other judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies is required for more than just propriety.
Any attempt, whether successful or not, to influence the decision-making process of another judge,
especially one who is of lower rank and over whom a judge exercises supervisory authority
constitutes serious misconduct.
NOTE: If the consultation is purely on an academic or hypothetical basis, and the judge does not
surrender his or her independent decision making, there can be no breach of Sections 2 and 3 of
Canon 1 of the New Code.
Q: A Judge of the RTC wrote a letter to the judge of the lower court, seeking to influence him to
hear the case and even intimating that he issue an order of acquittal. Is it proper?
A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that a judge who tries to influence the outcome of a case pending
before another court not only subverts the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality. The interference in this decision-making process of
another judge is a breach of conduct so serious as to justify dismissal from service based only on
preponderance of evidence (Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474, Oct. 4 1991).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.
Purpose of Sec. 4, Canon 1 of NCJC

It is intended to ensure that judges are spared from potential influence of family members by
disqualifying them even before any opportunity for impropriety presents itself.
The term “judge’s family” include:
Page 108 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
1. Judge’s spouse
2. Son
3. Daughter
4. Son-in-law
5. Daughter-in-law
6. Other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or
7. Person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household
(NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-Annotated, February 2007).
When the judge is related to one of the parties within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, a
judge’s disqualification to sit in a case is mandatory.
NOTE: Judges should ensure that their family members, friends and associates refrain from creating
the impression that they are in a position to influence the judge. Judges should, therefore, at all times
remind themselves that they are not in the judiciary to give out favors but to dispense justice. They
should also make it clear to the members of their family, friends and associates that they will neither
be influenced by anyone, nor would they allow anyone to interfere in their work.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
This section affirms the independence of the judiciary from the two other branches of government.
Judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusively to the Court the authority to deal with
internal personnel issues, even if the court employees in question are funded by the local government
(Bagatsing v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-34952,July 25, 1975).
Q: Several employees of the city government of Quezon City were appointed and assigned at the
office of the Clerk of Court-MeTC QC to assist the organic staff of the Judiciary. However, the
executive judge of MeTC QC, in view of a reorganization plan, returned those employees to different
offices of QC government saying that the court is already overstaffed. The judge also requested the
QC Mayor to re-employ the laid off employees. Did the judge commit any improper conduct?
A: Yes. An executive judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees as the
jurisdiction to do so is lodge solely upon the SC through the Office of the Court Administrator. This
is so because of the need to maintain judicial independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from
inappropriate connections with and influence from the executive and legislative branch. Here, the
judge did not act independently of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re-employ the
displaced employees instead of informing the SC through the OCA of the need to streamline her
court of its personal needs (Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, Sept. 5, 2002).
SEC. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
SEC. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in
order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
SEC. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.
Page 109 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1 are intended to serve as catch-all provisions for all other acts that would
guarantee the independence of the judiciary.
There can be no sure guarantee of judicial independence than the character of those appointed to the
Bench. Judges must remain conscious of their character and reputation as judges and should avoid
anything which will not dignify their public positions and demean the institution to which they
belong, in whatever atmosphere or environment they may happen to be.
2. Integrity
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
A judge should act with integrity and behave with integrity at all times so as to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
Integrity is required not only in the discharge of judicial duties but also to the personal
demeanor of judges
The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also
upon the perception and confidence of the community that people who run the system have done
justice. Justice must not be merely done but must also be seen to be done. (Panaligan v. Judge Ibay,
A.M. No. TJ-06-1972, June 21, 2006)
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity (Pascual v. Bonifacio,
AM No. RTJ-01-1625, Mar. 10, 2003). Judges must be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty
(Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc v. Cartagena, A.M. No. 707-MJ, July 21, 1978).
NOTE: Under the 1989 Code, the values of INTEGRITY and INDEPENDENCE were grouped
together, but the New Code of Judicial Conduct separated them to emphasize the need to maintain a
life of PERSONAL and PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY in order to properly carry out their judicial
functions.
Presumption regarding judges

Judges are presumed honest and, are men of integrity, unless proven otherwise.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
The maintenance of the court’s integrity is not the sole duty of the judge. It is also the duty of court
personnel to see to it that its integrity is unblemished.
NOTE: A judge’s personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, must
be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
Judges must always wear a robe at hearings
Page 110 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and integrity his
robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place (Chan v. Majaducan A.M. No. RTJ-02-
1697, Oct. 15, 2003).
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
A judge has the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge’s
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can completely construe
and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality (Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, A.M.
No. RTJ-00-1601, Nov. 13, 2001).
Q: Justice Mariano Del Castillo was charged with plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect in connection with the decision he wrote for the court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo. Petitioners, members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration of the
decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed the said complaint. Petitioners claim that
the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the
Philippines. Should the respondent justice be held guilty for plagiarism?
A: No. A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a
legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus, judges are
free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of
reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the
judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to
resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.
Although as a rule, practicing lawyers receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in
court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in
their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as
they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the
administration of justice (In matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc.. Against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011).
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
A judge may summarily punish any person including lawyers and court personnel, for direct
contempt for misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or a judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same (RRC, Rule 71).
He may also punish any person for indirect contempt after appropriate charge and hearing, for acts
enumerated under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Judge’s duty with respect to court employees

A judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his employees. His constant
scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter in the
exercise of their duties (Buenaventura v. Benedicto, A.C. No. 137-5, Mar. 27, 1971).
Page 111 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A judge cannot dismiss a court personnel. The power to dismiss a court employee is vested in the
Supreme Court (Dailay-Papa v. Almora, A.M. Nos. 543-MC and 1525-MJ, Dec. 19, 1981).
NOTE: Judges should not be lenient in the administrative supervision of employees. As an

administrator, the judge must ensure that all court personnel perform efficiently and promptly in the
administration of justice (Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, Sept. 26, 1986).
All court personnel, from the lowliest employees to the clerks of court, are involved in the
dispensation of justice like judges and justices, and parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon them also as part of the judiciary. In performing their duties and
responsibilities, court personnel serve as sentinels of justice, that any act of impropriety they commit
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the people's confidence in the
judiciary. They are, therefore, expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor
and dignity of the judiciary, if only to maintain the people’s confidence in the judiciary (Guerrero
v.Ong, A.M. No. P-09-2676, Dec. 16, 2009).
Q: While Judge Tuparin was in his chambers dictating an order to a stenographer, two lawyers who
were in the courtroom waiting for the start of the session almost came to blows as a result of a heated
argument. Tuparin came out of his chambers and after identifying the lawyers involved in the
commotion promptly declared them in contempt of court. Was the action of Judge Tuparin proper?
A: No. The act committed by the two lawyers was indirect contempt violative of the rule punishing
“any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice”, since the judge was then engaged in dictating an order before the morning
session was called. The act of the two lawyers constituted obstruction of the administration of
justice, which was indirect contempt. Accordingly, they could only be punished after notice and
hearing.
3. Impartiality
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made (NCJC, Canon 3).
Principle of cold neutrality of an impartial judge

A judge should not only render just, correct, and impartial decision but should do so in a manner free
from suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. This is an indispensable requisite of due
process (Rallos v. Gako, A.M. No.RTJ-98-1484, Mar. 17, 2000).
NOTE: A judge has both: the duty of rendering a just decision; and, doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.
SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial.
Page 112 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Degree of proof required to prove bias on the part of the judge

The complainant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence since allegations of bias are
quite serious. Mere allegations are not sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule.
Q: A filed an action for specific performance with the RTC of Quezon City, presided by Judge
Santiago, against X Corporation asking for the delivery of the title of 1 subdivision lot in Batangas
which lot was given to him in payment for his services as geodetic surveyor. Meanwhile X
Corporation filed with MTC of Batangas an action for an unlawful detainer against certain lot buyers
on motion of A. Judge Santiago issued TRO against X Corporation and Judge of MTC and enjoining
the latter from proceeding with the case. X Corporation now filed a motion to inhibit the judge on the
ground that he arbitrarily issued such TRO, but without presenting evidence showing partiality on
the part of the judge. Should the judge be inhibited?
A: No. For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of partiality and pre-judgment must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Here, mere allegation that the judge arbitrarily issued the TRO
without presenting evidence showing bias on his part is not sufficient. While Judge Santiago acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the TRO for such should only be enforceable within his
territorial jurisdiction, such error may not necessarily warrant inhibition at most it is correctible by
certiorari (Dimo Realty &Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, Mar. 11, 2004).
Extra-judicial source rule

It means that the decision is based on some influence other than the facts and law presented in the
courtroom.
Q: A motion to inhibit Judge Dicdican was filed on the ground of partiality and bias on his part for
allegedly denying a motion to hear affirmative defenses thereby denying the movant the opportunity
to be heard. Should the judge be inhibited?
A: No. Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality, merely on the basis of his decision
not to grant a motion for a preliminary hearing. Allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere
tenor and language of a judge are insufficient to show pre-judgment. Moreover, as long as opinions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct
observed by the judge, such opinion – even if later found to be erroneous on appeal or made with
grave abuse of discretion on certiorari –will not necessarily prove personal bias or prejudice on the
part of the judge. To allow inhibition for such reason would open floodgates to abuse. Here, the
denial of the motion to hear affirmative defenses is based on the Rules of Court which provides that
preliminary hearing of defenses is discretionary, hence the judge cannot be charged with partiality on
the basis of such decision (Gochan v. Gochan,G.R. No. 143089, Feb. 27, 2003).
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.
Rationale: No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be
susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion
of improbity or preconceived interest. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the faith and
confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation (Urbanes, Jr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 117964,
Mar.28, 2001).
There is undue interference where the judge’s participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build
or to bolster a case of one of the parties (Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, CA and
Hon. Tac-an G.R. Nos. 149797-98, Feb. 13, 2004).
Page 113 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A trial judge can ask questions from witnesses. In every examination of a witness, the court shall
take active part in examining him to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and
to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Sec. 7).
NOTE: In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either
party. It is also improper for the judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of
the complainant. A judge’s unwelcome persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of
favoritism (Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.,A.M. No.MTJ-04-1535, Mar. 12, 2004).
SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
Meaning of “duty to sit”
It means that a judge must ensure that he will not be unnecessarily disqualified from a case.
A judge cannot inhibit himself as he pleases. A decision to inhibit must be based on good, sound or
ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a party cast some tenuous
allegations of partiality at the judge.
Rule of necessity
It states that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case where there is no other judge available to hear
and decide the case. Furthermore, when all judges will be disqualified as a result, it will not be
permitted to destroy the only tribunal with the power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the
principle that a basic judge is better than no judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge to
hear and decide the case regardless of objections or disagreements (Parayno v.Meneses, G.R. No.
112684, Apr. 26, 1994).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
A judge’s language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued (Fecundo v. Berjamen,G.R. No. 88105, Dec. 18, 1989).
Reason for the rule

This Section warns judges against making any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect
the outcome of the proceedings before them; or those that the judge may later decide but not yet
before him; or "impair the manifest fairness of the process.”
Q: Justice Antonio Carpio penned a decision regarding the invalidity of the amended joint venture
agreement between Public Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation saying that the agreement is unconstitutional as PEA cannot transfer ownership of a
reclaimed land to a private corporation. Amari now filed a motion to inhibit Justice Carpio on the
ground of bias and pre-judgment allegedly because he had previously wrote in his column in Manila
Times a statement to the effect that the law requires public bidding of reclaimed projects and that the
PEA-Amari contract is flawed for it was not bid by the PEA. Decide on the motion.
A: The motion to inhibit must be denied for three reasons:
1. The motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of the court had already rendered his
opinion on the merits of the case. Here, the motion was filed after Justice Carpio had already
Page 114 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
rendered a decision;
2. The ratio decidendi of the decision was not based on his statements on the column. Here, the
decision was based on constitutional grounds and not in the absence of public bidding; and
3. Judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because they have written
legal articles on the law involved in the case (Chavez v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003).
No absolute prohibition against judges from making comments

Not all comments are impermissible. Judges may express their open-mindedness regarding a pending
issue in cases where the judges’ comments do not necessarily favor one side over the other.
However, judges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements or gratuitous
utterances that suggest they are prejudging a case. Judges should be aware that the media might
consider them a good and credible source of opinion or ideas, and therefore should refrain from
making any comment on a pending case. Not only is there danger of being misquoted, but also of
compromising the rights of the litigants in the case.
SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not
limited to, instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings;
Q: When Atty. Rojas was appointed as a judge, he inherited a criminal case in which he acted as
prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presiding on that case was because
it was only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes that he remembered that he
handled that case. He also says that the counsels did not object and he never held “full-blown”
hearings anyway. Should Judge Rojas be reprimanded?
A: Yes. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where they acted as counsel “without”
Page 115 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. Here, the judge should not have taken part in the proceeding as
his impartiality will naturally be questioned considering that he previously handled the case as
prosecutor. He should administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only
cover hearings but all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which, Judge Rojas did make
(Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC, Oct. 30, 1998).
Q: Judge Mijares was charged with grave misconduct for taking cognizance and deciding a special
proceeding for correction of entry in the record of her grandson, notwithstanding such relationship. It
was also alleged that the judge dispensed with the publication requirement in said proceeding. In her
answer, Judge Mijares contended that the prohibition provided for under the Code does not apply to
special proceeding which is not controversial in nature and since she does not have any pecuniary
interest in the case. Is the contention correct?
A: No. A judge who is related to a party within the 6th degree of consanguinity is mandated to
inhibit himself from hearing the case “notwithstanding lack of pecuniary interest in the case”. This is
so because lack of such interest does not mean that she can already be free from bias and partiality in
resolving the case by reason of her close blood relationship as evident from the fact that here, she
waived the publication requirement in order to save the petitioner from the payment of publication
fee. Thus, the judge’s taking cognizance of the petition is improper (Villaluz v.Mijares, A.M. No.
RTJ -98-1402 288, Apr. 3, 1998).
Degree of compliance required by the rule under Canon 3, Section 5 of NCJC

Strict compliance of the rule is required so as to protect the rights of the parties and assure an
impartial administration of justice, as well as to prevent erosion of the people's confidence in the
judiciary (Marfil v. Cuachon, A.M. No. 2360-MJ ,Aug. 31, 1981). The grounds for disqualification of
a judge enumerated under Sec. 5 of Canon 3 are not exclusive. The provision provides that it is not
limited to the grounds therein provided.
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for
the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the
proceedings.
Types of disqualification
1. Mandatory or compulsory disqualification
2. Voluntary disqualification or inhibition
Inhibition
An act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cognizance of the case. This is made
through a written petition to inhibit which shall state the grounds for the same. The explanation of
the judge whether or not to take cognizance of the case must also be in writing.
If the judge inhibits himself from taking cognizance of the case, the same cannot be appealed.
However, the judge should not immediately inhibit himself. He should make a careful examination
by first taking into consideration the following:
1. General consideration – whether or not people’s faith in the judicial system will be impaired
2. Special consideration –He must reflect on the probability that the losing party will nurture at the
back of his mind that he tilted the scale of justice
Page 116 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Disqualification v. Inhibition
DISQUALIFICATION- There are specific grounds enumerated under the rules of court for
disqualification. The judge has no discretion; mandatory.
INHIBITION-The rule only provides broad basis for inhibition. The rule leaves the matter to the
judge’s sound discretion.
Grounds for mandatory disqualification

1. When he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise;
2. When he is related to either party within the 6th degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel
within the 4th civil degree;
3. When he has been an executor, guardian, administrator, trustee, or counsel; or
4. When he has presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to review, without
the written consent of the parties. (Rule 137, RRC)
Voluntary inhibition of a judge

The judge may in his discretion inhibit himself, for just and valid reasons other than the grounds for
mandatory disqualification. The rule on voluntary disqualification or inhibition is discretionary upon
the judge on the basis of his conscience.
This leaves the discretion to the judge to decide for himself questions as to whether he will desist
from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him, unless he
cannot discern for himself his inability to meet the test of cold neutrality required of him, in which
event the appellate court will see to it that he disqualifies himself.
A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive and his competency may be determined on
application for mandamus to compel him to act. Judge’s decision to continue hearing a case in which
he is not legally prohibited from trying notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity may not
constitute reversible error.
The filing of an administrative case against a judge disqualify does not automatically disqualify him
from sitting in a case. It must be shown that there are other acts or conducts by the judge which
constitute a ground for his disqualification.
A judge may by mandamus be compelled to act on questions regarding his disqualification from
sitting in a case.
Time to file the petition to disqualify a judge

It must be filed before rendition of the judgment, and cannot be raised on appeal. Otherwise, the
parties are deemed to have waived any objection regarding the impartiality of the judge.
Q: A judge rendered a decision in a criminal case finding the accused guilty of estafa. Counsel for
the accused filed a motion for reconsideration which was submitted without arguments. Later,
another lawyer entered his appearance for the accused. The judge issued an order inhibiting himself
from further sitting in the case because the latter lawyer had been among those who recommended
him to the bench. Can the judge’s voluntary inhibition be sustained?
A: The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself by the mere fact that a lawyer recommended him to
the bench. In fact, the appearance of said lawyer is a test as to whether the judge can act
independently and courageously in deciding the case according to his conscience. “Inhibition is not
allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears
before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. ‘Utang na loob’, per se, should not be a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine society
prevent the performance of one’s duties as judge.” However, in order to avoid any suspicion of
Page 117 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
partiality, it is better for the judge to voluntarily inhibit himself (Query of Executive Judge Estrella
T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, on the Conflicting Views of Regional Trial
Court – Judges Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC,
Oct. 26, 1987).
Q: Does a judge’s active participation during the hearing of the writ of preliminary injunction
amount to an evident display of his bias and partiality in favor of the private respondents and should
he therefore disqualify himself from further hearing the civil case?
A: No. Mere intervention of the respondent judge during the hearing of preliminary injunction by
simply asking the materiality of a question directed upon the witness and ruling against the
petitioners are within the prerogatives and powers of the judge. The fact that the judge asked
questions in the course of the trial does not make him a biased judge (Hizon v. Dela Fuente,G.R. No.
152328, Mar. 23, 2004).
Remittal of disqualification
A judge disqualified may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose in the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the
judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
insubstantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties
and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings. (NCJC, Sec. 6, Canon 3)
Requirements for a judge to continue hearing a case despite the existence of reasons for
disqualifications
1. The bona fide disclosure to the parties in litigation; and
2. The express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material or substantial.
4. Propriety
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
NOTE: The judge’s own perception of motives is not relevant when considering appearance of
impropriety.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
NOTE: The public holds judges to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than lawyers and
other persons not invested with public trust.
Prohibition provided by the Code

It prohibits not only actual impropriety but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
Appearance of impropriety
When the conduct of a judge would create unreasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to
carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.
Page 118 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: Acts done by a judge which are not illegal may still constitute a violation of this rule.
Q: After the prosecution cross-examined Sheila, a witness for the accused, Judge Pedro asked her ten
additional questions that were so intense, they made her cry. One question forced Sheila to admit that
her mother was living with another man, a fact that weighed against the accused. This prompted the
latter’s counsel to move to move to expunge the judge’s questions for building on the prosecution’s
case. Judge Pedro denied the motion, insisting that bolstering a party’s case is incidental to the
court’s desire to be clarified. Did Judge Pedro commit an impropriety? (2011 Bar Question)
A: Yes, because he effectively deprived the defense of its right to due process when he acted both as
prosecutor and judge.
Examples of acts of a judge which are not illegal but will constitute a violation of this rule
1. The act of a judge of hearing cases on a day when he is supposed to be on official leave (Re:
Anonymous complaint Against Judge Edmundo Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005).
2. Photograph showing the judge and a subordinate coming out of a hotel together even if there was
no clear evidence of sexual congress between them is enough to give rise to the appearance of
impropriety that the code strongly warns against (Liwanag v. Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, Apr.
21 1999).
3. Joking remark made by a judge to a litigant suggesting that the litigant prove he harbored no ill
feelings towards the judge (Co v. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501,Mar. 14, 2005).
Q: During the hearing of an election protest filed by the brother of Judge Dojillo, the latter sat beside
the counsel of his brother allegedly to give moral support. Did the judge commit any improper
conduct?
A: Yes. The judge violated the rule on impropriety under Sec 1, Canon 4, NCJC for even if he did
not intend to use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of his brother’s election protest, it
cannot be denied that his presence in the courtroom during the hearing of his brother’s case would
immediately give cause for the community to suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary
would influence the judge trying the case to favor his brother (Vidal v. Judge Dojillo Jr., A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005).
NOTE: The Judge’s act in riding in defendant’s car deserves the stern probation of the Court. By
such act, he openly exposed himself and the office he holds to suspicion, thus impairing the trust and
faith of the people in the administration of justice. A judge’s official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and his personal conduct and behavior should be beyond reproach
(Spouses Cabreana v. Avelino A.M. No. 1733 CFI, Sept. 30, 1981).
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s personal conduct and imposes upon him certain
restrictions, the faithful observance of which, is the price one has to pay for holding such a
distinguished position. Accordingly, a magistrate of the law must comport himself in a manner that
his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his
official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His conduct must
be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system lest
Page 119 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent
conduct of judges (Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, Jan. 29, 2009).
Dignified conduct
It is best described as conduct befitting men and women possessed of temperance and respect for the
law and for others.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give
rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
This section is directed at bolstering the principle of cold neutrality of an impartial judge as it
requires judges to scrupulously guard against any act that may be construed as an expression of bias
in favor of a litigant.
NOTE: Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that
favors in the future may be asked from the judge which he may find it hard to resist. If a judge is
seen eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in his or her sala,
public suspicion may be aroused, thus tending to erode the trust of litigants in the impartiality of the
judge (Padilla v. Zantua, G.R. No. 110990, Oct. 23, 1994).
Q: Complainant Prosecutor filed an administrative complaint against respondent Sandiganbayan

Justices for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
interest of the service. Allegedly, during a hearing, Justice Ong uttered words like “We are playing
Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen
thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.”
Also, he often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired
whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated
was better than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the query was
manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong,
and the UP College of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools. On another
occasion in that hearing in Cebu City, Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor
Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then observing trial from the gallery and said “You are better
than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your
office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing”. Finally, Justice Hernandez berated
Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, and uttered words such as
“Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that! Do
not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother.” Should the respondent
justices be held liable for conduct unbecoming?
A: Yes. Publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from
certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong
and Justice Hernandez, shows their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. Judges should be dignified in
demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or
prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential
that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their
language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard,
Page 120 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates
judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties (Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No.
08-19-SB-J, Aug. 24, 2010).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of
their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
This rule rests on the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which the judge is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to
receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
The reason is that judges are required to always exhibit cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
NOTE: It was inappropriate for a judge to have entertained a litigant in his house particularly when
the case is still pending before his sala (J. King and Sons. v. Hontanosas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-
1802, Sept. 21, 2004).
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence
of the judiciary.
While judges are not expected to live a hermit-like existence or cease functioning as citizens of the
Republic, they should remember that they do not disrobe themselves of their judicial office upon
leaving their salas. In the exercise of their civil liberties, they should be circumspect and ever
mindful that their continuing commitment to upholding the judiciary and its values places upon them
certain implied restraints to their freedom.
Q: In an anonymous letter sent to the OCA, Judge Acuña was charged with improper conduct for
allegedly making humiliating statements such as “putris,” and “putang-ina”. In his comment, Judge
Acuña explained that those words are only his favorite expressions and they are not directed to any
particular person. He also explained that his behavior is justified by the fact that he is still mourning
the sudden demise of his eldest son. Is the Judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: Yes. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in the conduct and
language. Indeed, judges should so behave at all times because having accepted the esteemed
position of a judge he ought to have known that more is expected of him than ordinary citizen. Here,
the judge’s use of humiliating and insensitive expressions like “putris” and ”putang-ina” is improper
as such intemperate language detracts from how he should conduct himself. Moreover, it does not
matter whether such expressions were directed to a particular person or not, as they give the
impression of a person’s ill manners (Re: Anonymous complaint Against Judge Acuña, A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005).
NOTE: Judges in the exercise of their civil liberties, should be circumspect and ever mindful of their
continuing commitment to uphold the judiciary and its value places upon them certain implied
restraints to their freedom. A judge was admonished for the appearance of engaging in partisan
politics when he participated in a political rally sponsored by one party, even though he only
Page 121 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
explained the mechanics of block voting to the audience (Macias v. Arula, A.M. No. 1895-CFI, July
20, 1982).
SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests
and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of
their family.
A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
Prohibited acts by the rule

1. Judge’s act of using judicial office to advance private interests
2. Judge’s act of giving impression that he can be influenced to use the judicial office to advance the
private interests of others.
NOTE: Another common violation of this rule is using judicial power to exact personal vengeance.
Ticket fixing
It is misconduct in which judges impermissibly take advantage of their public position to avoid
punishment for traffic violations.
SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used
or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.
Rationale: The prohibition will discourage, if not stop judges from making business speculations in
some business ventures, the secrets of which they learned by reason of their position as judges.
Q: Judge Lilagam was charged with improper conduct for allowing his wife to have access to court
records. In his answer, the judge admitted that he requested his wife who was previously a legal
researcher, to go over the records and pinpoint problem areas and to suggest measures to rectify the
same and to improve the system of case monitoring. Is the judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: Yes. Records of cases are necessarily confidential, and to preserve their integrity and
confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the judge, the parties or their counsel and
the appropriate court personnel in charge of the custody of said records. Here, since Mrs. Lilagam is
not a court employee specifically in charge of the custody of said records, the judge’s act of allowing
her to have access thereto is improper as such would convey the impression that she is the one who
can influence the judge’s official function (Gordon v. Lilagam, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564, July 26,
2001).
Violation of the rule which constitutes criminal offense

The following , under Sec. 3[k] of R.A. 3019, and under Art. 229 and 230 of the RPC, are violation
of the rule which also constitute criminal offense:
1. Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on
account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of
its authorized release date (R.A. 3019, Sec. 3[k]).
Page 122 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
2. Revelation of secrets by an officer –Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him
by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he
may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer imprisonment (RPC, Art.229) .
3. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual –Any public officer to whom the secrets of
any private individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets,
shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine (RPC, Art.230).
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the
law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial
office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
This section allows the judge to participate in legal academia and public discourse on legal matters
with the proviso that there shall be no interference in the performance of the judge’s primary
functions with respect to his or her jurisdiction. In dealing with the media however, the Philippine
Judicial Academy suggests that a judge or court should avoid acrimonious debate with reporters and
the public, for a knee jerk reaction from the court or judge may only provoke negative follow-up
reports and articles.
This section’s tolerance of judicially-related activities is limited by Sec. 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits judges from being “designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions”.
Judge cannot be a member of Provincial Committee on Justice

Such membership would violate the constitutional provision on the discharge by members of the
judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-judicial or administrative agencies. This does not mean,
however, that judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
the Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Even as non-members, Judges should render assistance to said Committees to help
promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. (In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo
U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, Oct. 5, 1988)
NOTE: Under Sec. 10(c), Section 10, Canon 4, a judge may engage in private business without the
written permission of the Supreme Court (Borre v. Moya,A.M. No. 1765-CFI, Oct. 17, 1980).
SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
This prohibition is based on the inherent incompatibility of the rights, duties and functions of the
office of an attorney with the powers, duties and functions of a judge.
NOTE: Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court prohibits judges from engaging in the practice of
law or giving professional advice to clients. Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from overtly
representing clients as counsel of record, but also from acting more subtly in a way more befitting an
advocate than a judge.
Page 123 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil
of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of the litigation where
he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges
are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are
representing the interests of party litigant (Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, A.M. No. 177-MTJ, Nov. 27,
1975)
Q: Judge Malanyaon was present in the hearing of her daughter to advise her on what to do and say
during the hearing, to the point of coaching her. Was the act of the judge considered contrary to
Section 11, Canon 4 of the NCJC, prohibiting judges from engaging in the private practice of law or
giving professional advice to clients?
A: Yes. The Court held that the judge engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter
at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions
to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter (Decena vs.
Malanyaon A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013).
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Juan Mayaman, the heirs requested Judge
Maawain, a family friend, to go over the document prepared by a new lawyer before they signed it.
Judge Maawain agreed and even acted as an instrumental witness. Did Judge Maawain engage in the
unauthorized practice of law? Why? (2002 Bar Question)
A: No. In the case of de Castro v. Capulong, 118SCRA 5 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a
judge who merely acted as a witness to a document and who explained to the party waiving his rights
of redemption over mortgaged properties the consequences thereof, does not engage himself in the
practice of law. This appears to be more applicable to the case of Judge Maawain. He did not give
professional advice in anticipation of litigation. He was just asked to review a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate. He signed merely as an instrumental witness and not as a legal counsel. Besides,
his act was an isolated act.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.
This rule recognizes the difference between membership in associations of judges and membership
in associations of other legal professionals. While attendance at lavish events hosted by lawyers
might create an appearance of impropriety, participation in judges-only organizations does not.
Rules relating to prohibition against accepting gifts, bequests, or loans

GR: Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
XPN: Section 15 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
This section is intended to assure that what the judge cannot do directly (soliciting gifts), may not be
done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members.
Page 124 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: Section 13 should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public officials and Employee) which provides that, public officials and
employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of money value from any person in the course of their official duties or in
connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office.
Q: X was charged with grave threat before the sala of Judge Elias Lelina. During the pendency of
the case, X offered a business partnership to the daughter of Judge Lelina who then accepted the
same. Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. Judges should not allow members of their family to accept gifts nor favor in relation to
anything done, to be done, or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of
his official duties. Here, the judge’s act of allowing his daughter to accept the business offer of X
despite knowledge of the possible intention of the latter who has pending case in his sala is improper
(Dulay v. Lelina Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516, July 14, 2005).
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive
a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the
judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.
Judges are allowed to accept token gifts, awards, or benefits when given as a consequence of a
special occasion.
Gifts and grants allowed from foreign countries

1. The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered
and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
2. The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or
fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
3. The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place
entirely outside the Philippines (such as allowances, transportation, food and lodging) of more than
nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and
permitted by the head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs (Sec. 7[d], R.A. 6713).
Indirect and direct bribery of judges

Acceptance of gifts given by reason of the office of the judge is indirect bribery (RPC, Art. 211) Acts
punishable in direct bribery are as follows:
a) By agreeing to perform an act which constitute a crime in connection with his official duties for a
consideration.
b) By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime in
consideration with the performance of his official duty.
c) By refraining, from doing something which it is his official duty to do, in consideration of gift or
promise (RPC, Art. 210).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Judges receiving gifts or other material benefits
GR: Yes, the judge is liable criminally for directly or indirectly receiving gifts, presents or other
pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another under conditions provided in Section 2, pars.
b and c of the law.
XPN: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of
Page 125 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
gratitude or friendship according to local custom or usage (RA 3019, Section 14)
NOTE: Under Section 16 Article XI of the 1987Constitution “No loan, guarantee or other form of
financial controlled bank or financial institution to members of the Supreme Court during their
tenure.
It is a serious misconduct for a judge to receive money from a litigant in the form of loans which he
never intended to pay back. Even if the judge intends to pay, it is an act of impropriety to take a loan
from a party litigant. The judge could not be wholly free from bias in deciding a case where his
lender is a party. A judge should always strive to be free from suspicion and all forms of
improprieties (Ompoc v. Judge Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11, Sept. 27, 1989).
NOTE: To ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of
the judicial office. As the guardians of justice, courts must adhere to the principle of equality. People
expect the courts to be unaffected by differences in social status, degree of education and even
physical abilities.
5. Equality
CANON 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of
the judicial office.
A judge must be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the judicial
system, by being aware of the diversity in society. With that awareness, a judge should not yield to
first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters (Castillo v. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124).
SEC. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising
from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin,
caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other
like causes.
To render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the judicial system, judges are
expected to be aware of the diversity in society that results from an increased worldwide exchange of
people and ideas.
NOTE: Judges should be mindful of the various international instruments and treaties ratified by the
Philippines, which affirm the equality of all human beings and establish a norm of non-
discrimination without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Judges should not yield to
first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters. They have a duty to ensure that the
minority status of a party plays no part in their decisions.
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest
bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
Magistrates of law must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their conduct, can
withstand the highest level of public scrutiny.
Page 126 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or distasteful jokes that may give even
erroneous impressions of prejudice and lead the public to believe that cases before them are being
prejudged.
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
As arbiters of the law, judges should be conscientious, studious, courteous, patient and punctual in
the discharge of their judicial duties, recognizing that time of litigants, witnesses and counsel is of
value. Judges should act with decorum toward jurors, parties, court staff, spectators, and alike.
Q: Judge Tormis made a comment in a certain case to the effect that the same should be dismissed as
the act complained of was already decriminalized by a special law. Thereafter, Judge Navarro, who
previously handled the case before he was appointed as a judge, barged into the office of Judge
Tormis telling to the staff that their judge does not know her law. Judge Tormis then retaliated by
saying that to her, the office of Judge Navarro does not exist. Are the judges guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge?
A: Yes. Judges, being dispensers of justice should not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order
to preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should so behave to avoid poor public
impression on the judiciary. Here, the judges act of fighting each other by uttering derogatory
remarks against each other is a conduct unbecoming of a judge for which they should be disciplined
as their fight has impaired the image of the judiciary (Navarro v. Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1337,
Apr. 27, 2004).
Q: Atty. Quinto was the defense counsel in a criminal case. In his verified complaint, he alleged that
during the hearing, he manifested that he was waiving the presentation of evidence for the accused.
Judge Vios then allegedly got angry, shouted and scolded him, stating that the defense had no right
to waive the presentation of evidence. He did not even listen to Atty. Quinto’s explanation and,
thereafter, compelled the latter to withdraw his appearance as counsel of the accused, under pain of
contempt. In the presence of the complainant, Judge Vios appointed a counsel deofficio. May Judge
Vios be held administratively liable for compelling the lawyer to withdraw as counsel for the
accused under pain of contempt?
A: Yes. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants. Here, the judge should be held liable
for misconduct when he threatened to punish complainant for contempt of court if he would refuse to
withdraw his appearance, as counsel for the accused, when the latter insisted on waiving the
presentation of the evidence for the defense (Atty. Quinto v. Judge Vios, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1551,
May 21, 2004).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge,
on any irrelevant ground.
Duties of judges under this section

1. To ensure that court personnel under their supervision do not discriminate by dispensing special
favors or disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized person, regardless of whether such
information came from authorized or unauthorized sources; and
2. To organize their courts to ensure the prompt and convenient dispatch of business and should not
Page 127 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
tolerate misconduct by clerks, sheriffs and other assistants who are sometimes prone to expect favors
or special treatment due to their professional relationship with the judge.
NOTE: All personnel involved in the dispensation of justice should conduct themselves with a high
degree of responsibility (Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No.MTJ-03-1488, Oct. 13, 2004).
SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such
as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Judges should conduct proceedings in court with dignity and in a manner that reflects the importance
and seriousness of proceedings. They should maintain order and proper decorum in the court (1989
Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.03, Canon 3).
Judges have the duty to prevent lawyers from abusing witnesses with unfair treatment.
As courts are expected to ensure equality, any lawyer who makes an insensitive or demeaning
comment in court should be admonished.
Q: During the hearing of a case for statutory rape filed against X, the lawyer is asking the 6-year-old
victim to relate exactly and step by step the sexual intercourse between her and the accused. The
lawyer is also asking questions whether at the time of the alleged rape, the accused’s penis was hard,
and whether at the time they were caught, the accused was still pushing and pulling his penis inside
her vagina. Should the judge allow such questions?
A: No. The judge shall require lawyers to refrain from making abusive and uncalled for queries.
Here, the fact that the victim of rape is a child of tender years, there is more reason to require the
lawyer to be tactful. No woman especially child of tender years would exactly remember step by step
the sexual intercourse in the hands of the maniacal beast. Hence, all the questions asked are
excessive (People v. Boras, G.R. No. 127495, Dec. 22, 2000).
6. Competence and diligence
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
A judge upon assumption to office, becomes the visible representation of law and of justice, hence,
the Constitution (Section 7 (3), Article VIII), prescribes that he must be a person of proven
competence as a requisite of his membership in the judiciary.
A judge should be the epitome of competence, integrity and independence to be able to render justice
and uphold public confidence in the legal system. He must be conversant with basic legal principles
and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with passion (Rino v.
Judge Cawaling, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1391, June 7, 2004).
NOTE: As members of the judiciary, judges ought to know the fundamental legal principles;
otherwise, they are susceptible to administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law (Heirs of
Piedad v.Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, Dec. 16, 2009).
Page 128 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
SEC. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
Duties of a judge under this section

1. A judge must perform his judicial duties with regard to a case where he is not disqualified to do so
and, may not divest himself of such case if he is not so disqualified; and
2. A judge shall not inhibit himself simply to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial cases.
Q: An administrative case against Judge Calderon was filed for incurring leaves of absence for
almost a straight period of 3 years. In his comment, he claimed that he was suffering from a lingering
illness of malignant hypertension which claim was supported by medical certificates prepared by his
personal doctor. However, when the court physician conducted some tests, the same contradicted the
diagnosis given by the judge’s personal doctor. Is Judge Calderon guilty of gross misconduct?
A: Yes. A judge shall be cautious of his court duties. Here, the judge should have been aware that, in
frequently leaving his station, he has caused great disservice to many litigants and has denied them
speedy justice (Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric Calderon, Municipal Trial
Court Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan, A.M. No. 98-8-105-MTC, Jan. 26, 1999).
SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only
the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions,
but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.
Violations of this section often involve a failure to keep records or handle funds in compliance with
court rules.
Q: Judge Daguman was charged with neglect of duty in failing to retain a copy and to register with
the Local Civil Registrar a marriage contract. In his comment, the judge explained that his failure to
do so was occasioned by circumstances beyond his control. He averred that after the wedding
ceremony, the copies of the marriage contract were left on top of his desk in his private office where
the ceremony was held but after few days, when he gathered all the documents relating to the
marriage, the copies were already missing. He also explained that he was not able to inform the
parties about the fact of loss as they were already out of the country. Should the judge be
disciplined?
A: Yes. A judge is charged with extra care in ensuring that records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. Moreover, judges must adopt a system of record management,
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. Here, the
circumstances show that the loss of the documents was occasioned by the carelessness on the part of
the judge. The judge should not have left such important documents in his table to be gathered only
after few days, instead, he should have devised a filing system in his court so as to avoid such
incident (Beso v.Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, Jan. 28, 2000).
Judges should return records upon retirement

Since the proper and efficient management of the court is the responsibility of the judge, he is the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of official functions. Thus, a judge is obliged to
return to the court the records of the cases filed in his sala upon his retirement (Office of the Court
Administrator v. Retired Judge Carteciano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1664, Feb. 18, 2008).
SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage
for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under
judicial control, to judges.
Page 129 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end.
Judges are regarded as persons learned in the law. “Ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges.
Though good faith and absence of malice or corruption are sufficient defenses, such does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margin of error (Corpus v.Ochotoresa, A.M. No. RTJ 04-1861, July 30, 2004).
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the
duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice (Villanueva v.Judge Buaya,
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, Nov. 22, 2010).
Q: Judge Gacott Jr. dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of docket fees,
although the case had been previously admitted and was deemed properly filed by the original Judge
(who inhibited himself due to relationship to one of the parties). Judge Gacott issued the dismissal
order relying on a case (Manchester v.CA) which states that - a case is deemed commenced only
upon the payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion, the required fees in this case were not
yet paid by the protestant. Enojas charged him with gross ignorance of the law. Is Judge Gacott Jr.
guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. A judge is duty bound to adhere to, and apply the recent jurisprudence, and he cannot feign
ignorance thereof, because he is required to be an embodiment of, among other things, judicial
competence. Here, the ruling relied upon by the judge does not apply to election cases as in the latter
case the filing fee is fixed and the claim for damages, to which the docket fess shall be made to
apply, is merely ancillary to the main cause of action and is not even determinative of the court’s
jurisdiction. It must also be noted that in this case, the original judge already made an order that from
the deposit given by the protestant for the expenses of reopening the questioned ballots, an amount
shall be allocated for the payment of the required fees. Thus, the election protest was already
properly filed (Enojas v. Judge Gacott, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513, Jan. 19, 2000).
SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international
law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.
Norms of international law has become the concern of judges because they form part of legal
standards by which their competence and diligence required by the New Code of Judicial Conduct
are to be measured.
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
A judge may be subject to an administrative fine for inefficiency, neglect, and unreasonable delay in
elevating the records of a civil case to the Court of Appeals. A delay of three years in the
transmission of court records to the appellate court, where a period of 30 days is required, is
inexcusable (Pataleon v. Guidez,A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525, Jan. 25, 2000).
Q: The records disclose that on February 21, 1994, Cabasares filed a Complaint for Malicious
Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8864 and
Page 130 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
subsequently assigned to the branch of respondent Judge. As early as February 27, 2002, the case
had been submitted for decision, but respondent judge did not pen a decision. He was charged with
violation of Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The judge contend that it have escaped his mind.
A: Judges should meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases
because failure to comply with the said period transgresses the parties’ constitutional right to speedy
disposition of their cases. Thus, failure to decide cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary
period may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the erring judge. However, the Court is
not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to
judges. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is needed
is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options. Since the judge retired
from service he was only fined (Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, 8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793,
Oct. 19, 2011).
Flag lawyer
Refers to a lawyer of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs) who
by the nature of his work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants. (BAR
MATTER No. 2012,Feb. 10, 2009, Section 4a(iii))
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge
(Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, Nov. 6, 2000).
Q: Judge Belen was charged with conduct unbecoming of a judge allegedly for humiliating,
demeaning and berating a young lawyer who appeared in his sala. It was alleged that when the judge
learned that the lawyer was an alumnus of MCQU and not of UP, the judge made the following
statement “you’re not from UP”. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying
and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all
lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being stated that we all are created equal in His
form and substance.” Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. The judge’s sarcastic, humiliating, threatening and boastful remarks to a young lawyer are
improper. A judge must be aware that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of
knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing
of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties
as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to
determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an
engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. As a judge, he must address the merits of the case and
not on the person of the counsel. Judges must be that even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers
of the court (Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen, A.M. No.RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008).
Q: Judge Ante Jr. was charged with conduct unbecoming of a judge. It was alleged that when the
court employee placed the docket book on top of the filing cabinet, the same fell on the floor causing
Page 131 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
loud sound. Unexpectedly, the judge shouted saying “why did you throw the docket book? You get
out of here, punyeta, we don’t need you!” The judge also threw a monobloc chair at the court
employee. Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. The judge, for shouting invectives and hitting complainant with a chair displayed a
predisposition to use physical violence and intemperate language which reveals a marked lack of
judicial temperament and self-restraint - traits which, aside from the basic equipment of learning in
the law - are indispensable qualities of every judge (Briones v. Judge Ante Jr., A.M. No.MTJ-02-
1411, Apr. 11, 2002).
SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial
duties.
Duty of the judge under this section

A judge shall not accept duties that will interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper
administration of his official functions
NOTE: When a judge, along with two other people, acted as real estate agents for the sale of a parcel
of land for which he agreed to give a commission of P100,000 to each of his companions, and after
the transaction was completed only gave the complainants P25,000 each, the high Court held that the
judge violated the section of the prior Code of Judicial Conduct (Catbagan v. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-
02-1452, Apr. 6, 2005).
C. Discipline of members of the Judiciary
Power to discipline members of the bench

The Supreme Court shall have the administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel (1987
Consitution, Section 6, Art. VIII).
The Court en banc has the power to discipline all judges of lower courts including justices of the
Court of Appeals (1987 Constiution, Section 11, Art. VIII).
Disbarment of judges and justices

Judges and justices, being lawyers, may also be disbarred, if found guilty of certain crimes and/or
other causes for disbarment under the Rules of Court.
Justices of the Supreme Court however may not be disbarred unless and until they shall have
been first impeached in accordance with the Constitution.
NOTE: While it is the duty of the court to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in
complaints against judges and other court personnel, it is also their duty to see to it that they are
protected and exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The Court will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it hesitate to shield them
from unfounded suits that serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice
(Ocenar v. Judge Mabutin, A.M. No. MTJ 05- 1582, Feb. 28, 2005).
A judge may be disciplined for acts committed before his appointment to the judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the
judiciary. In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary (Heinz Heck
vs. Judge Anthony E. Santos, regional trial court, branch 19, Cagayan De Oro City A.M. No. Rtj-01-
Page 132 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
1657, 23 February 2004, en banc).
1. Members of the Supreme Court
a) Impeachment
Impeachment
It is a constitutional process of removing public servants from office as an assurance against abusive
officials in the country (Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
Object of impeachment
The object of impeachment is solely to determine whether or not the official is worthy of the trust
conferred upon him/her. It is not determination of criminal guilt or innocence as in criminal case
(Ibid.).
The nature of impeachment proceedings against SC justices is “Sui Generis” or “a class of its own”
Grounds for impeachment

1. Treason
2. Bribery
3. Other High Crimes
4. Graft and Corruption
5. Betrayal of Public Trust (1987 Constitution, Sec. 2 Art. XI)
Impeachable officers
1. The President
2. Vice-President
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
5. Ombudsman
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment (1987 Constitution, Sec. 2 Art. XI).
The Philippine Congress holds the sole power in impeachment process.
1. House of Representatives - initiates all cases of impeachment.
2. Senate – tries and decides on all the cases.
Who can file an impeachment complaint

1. Any member of the House of Representatives
2. Any citizen with an endorsement of any member of the House of Representatives.
NOTE: When the President of the Philippines is impeached, the Chief Justice presides over the
impeachment trial; in all other cases of impeachment, the Senate President presides.
Procedure of impeachment
1. Initiate impeachment through filing of a verified complaint
2. Include in Order of Business within 10 session days
3. Referred to the proper committee within 3 session days
4. Committee conducts hearing
5. Committee votes
Page 133 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
6. If YES, the matter will be referred to the Plenary within 60 days.

7. Plenary votes – at least 1/3 vote is required
8. If at least 1/3 vote is attained, Resolution and Articles of Impeachment are referred to Senate
9. House elects its prosecutors
10. Senate as plenary body adopts its rules on impeachment
11. Senate convenes as impeachment court
12. Senate issues summons to respondent
13. Respondent appears and files answer
14. Senate receives testimonial and documentary evidence
15. Senator-judges interpose questions
16. Submission for voting (Convict or Acquit)
Fast track procedure for impeachment

If an impeachment complaint or resolution is filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all members of the
House, the Articles of Impeachment shall be sent to Senate for trial.
Determination for conviction or acquittal

Senators are expected to vote according to their conscience. The standard of proof required is NOT
“proof beyond reasonable doubt” because it is not a criminal trial. Rather, it is a political process
(Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
Votes needed for conviction
A vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all members of the Senate for any one article of impeachment.
NOTE: 16 votes are required to convict on any article while 8 Negative votes can prevent conviction
on any article.
Result of conviction
Removal from office. The Senate can additionally impose penalty of disqualification from holding
any office in the Philippine government.
However, the party convicted shall nevertheless be subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law. Criminal liability must be established by criminal trial (Impeachment Primer,
Official Gazette, 2012).
b) Ethical Lessons from Former Chief Justice Corona’s Impeachment
Grounds for impeachment against former Chief Justice Renato Corona

1. Betrayal of public trust through:
a. Track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration
from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a
midnight chief justice to the present. (Article I)
b. Wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res judicata in the
cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.
(Article V)
c. Arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to
improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such
authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the Constitution in the House of Representatives via
impeachment. (Article VI)
d. Partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former president Gloria
Page 134 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to
escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the supreme court decision
on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme
Court own TRO. (Article VII)
e. Commission of graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the judiciary
development fund (JDF) and special allowance for the judiciary (SAJ) collections. (Article VIII)
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution through:

a. Failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under
Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution (Article II)
b. Failure to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the
Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence _in allowing the Supreme court to act on mere letters filed by
a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in
creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office;
and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court. (Article III)
c. Blatant disregard of the principle of separation of powers by issuing a status quo ante order against
the House of Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman
Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez (Article IV).
Reason for CJ Corona’s Impeachment

He was convicted under Article II of the Articles of impeachment, which is the failure to disclose to
the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under sec. 17, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, by a vote of 20-3.
NOTE: It is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right
to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests. Hence, a
court interpreter who failed to include in her SALN rental payments she received from a market stall
was dismissed from service (Rabe v. Flores, A.M. No. P-97-1247, May 14, 1997). The Senator
judges ruled that the law applies to all, including the Chief Justice of the Philippines, thus, his failure
to include his dollar accounts in his SALN warrants his impeachment from office.
Q: Is the Law on Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposit Account (FCDA) a defense in failing to
include a dollar deposit in a SALN?
A: No. The issue is not the conflict between the FCDA requiring secrecy of foreign currency
deposits and the disclosure required by the SALN law, but the Constitution which requires public
officials to declare their assets and does not distinguish between peso and foreign accounts (Senator
Judge Pangilinan).
The Supreme Court in one case said that the FCDA cannot be used as a haven for the corrupt and the
criminals. To interpret it in the manner that the Chief Justice would want … is to say that the law
could be used as a haven to hide proceeds of criminal acts (Senator Judge Drilon).
Mandate of the Chief Justice to disclose his statement of assets and Lliabilities
1. 1987 Constitution - Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and
as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed
to the public in the manner provided by law.
Page 135 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
2. R.A. 6713 - Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,
their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees,
except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file
under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections shall be filed by:
xxx
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.
Basis for the public’s right to inquire upon the statement of assets and liabilities of public
officers
The postulate of public office is a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied.
The right to information (Section 7, Article III of Constitution) goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264, February 13 1989).
Established limitations to the right to information, with its companion right of access to official
records
1. National security matters and intelligence information
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters
4. Other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to
public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well
as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house
of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
Probity
It is the uncompromising adherence to the highest principles and ideals or impeachable integrity
(Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary).
Importance of probity as a quality of a magistrate

Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate, respectively, that “judges shall ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of the
reasonable observer” and that “judges shall avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.” These very stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates
and employees of the courts. As such, those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and
judges, must not only know the law but must also possess the highest degree of integrity and probity,
and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and private lives (Veloso vs. Caminade,
A.M. No. RTJ- 01-1655, July 8, 2004).
Page 136 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Integrity
It is a steadfast adherence to a strict moral or ethical code. It is honesty and honorableness put into
one.
Observance of integrity in the judiciary

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the
law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law
and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself (Lachica vs Tormis, A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1609, September 20, 2005).
Importance of maintaining the confidence of the people upon the judiciary
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also
upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have
administered justice. In order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural
aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only then can the
people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system (Tan vs. Pacuribot, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982, December 14,
2007).
2. Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan (Rule 140)
The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. In the absence of
fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the assailed decision or order, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.
However, an inquiry into a judge’s civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made after
the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality (Republic v. Caguioa, A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2063, June 26, 2009).
Institution of proceedings for the discipline of judges

Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted:
1. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
2. Upon a verified complaint filed before the Supreme Court supported by:
a. Affidavit of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein; or
b. Documents which may substantiate said allegations.
3. Anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity filed with the Supreme
Court.
Form and content of the complaint

The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by law, the Rules of Court, or
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. Grounds
Page 137 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Grounds for discipline of judges

1. Serious Misconduct – implies malice or wrongful intent, not mere error of judgment. Judicial acts
complained of:
a. Must be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law; or
b. Were in persistent disregard for well-known legal rules.
NOTE: There is misconduct when there is reliable evidence showing that judicial actions are corrupt
or inspired by intent to violate the law or in persistent disregard of legal rules.
2. Inefficiency – implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be

inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence
and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.
Q: Should a judge be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law for granting bail to an
accused in a criminal case without the requisite bail hearing, and despite the fact that there was an
eyewitness to the murder who made a positive identification of the accused?
A: Yes. It is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required
bail hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. When a judge displays an utter
unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge
owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of
laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring
of injustice (Grageda v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526, Feb. 2, 2004).
Q: Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an injunction case and failed to follow the
procedural requirements in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction as he issued them
without prior notice to the defendant and without a hearing. Is he liable for gross ignorance of the
law?
A: Yes. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be
aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is
expected to keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action. However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly
established law or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with (Sps. Lago v. Judge Abul, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, Jan. 17, 2011).
Q: Santiago and Sanchez were complainants in two different criminal cases before the MTC of
Bulacan and the RTC of Pampanga respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal cases were
caught and detained by authorities. However, both suspects were released by order of Judge
Jovellanos of MCTC Pangasinan. The complainants questioned both Orders for Release, alleging
that the requirements for the bail bond had not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no
jurisdiction to order the release. Is Judge Jovellanos guilty of gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and
procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. He must have the
basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all
Page 138 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
times. Here, there are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jovellanos. First, in both
cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. One may not be given provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registered with the proper
office. Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the release of the detainees as
the cases were not pending in his court and the suspects were not arrested within his jurisdiction
(Santiago v. Judge Jovellanos, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289, Aug. 1, 2000).
NOTE: Judges are not expected to be infallible; not every error or irregularity committed by judges
in the performance of official duties is subject to administrative sanction. In the absence of bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice, incorrect rulings do not constitute misconduct
and may give rise to a charge of gross ignorance of the law (Cruz v. Iturralde, A.M. No. MTJ-03-
1775, Apr. 30, 2003).
Q: Cruz was the defendant in an ejectment case filed by the Province of Bulacan involving a parcel
of land owned by the said province. A decision was rendered against Cruz. He then filed an appeal
and several motions for reconsideration but Justice Alino-Hormachuelos before whom the motions
were filed subsequently denied all. Consequently, Cruz charged all the judges and justices with grave
misconduct, gross inexcusable negligence, and rendering a void judgment. Should the judges be held
liable for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law?
A: No. The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere
errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on
their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party.
To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable. Here, the fact that the judge or justices rendered a decision not favorable to Cruz is not
enough to make them liable for grave misconduct (Cruz v. Justice Alino- Hormachuelos et. al., A.M.
No. CA-04-38, Mar. 31, 2004).
Disciplinary and criminal actions not a substitute for judicial remedy

Disciplinary and criminal actions against a judge, are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of
judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges
concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality that the door to
an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed
(Maquiran v. Grageda, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888, Feb. 11, 2005).
Q: Santiago’s Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title was granted
by the Quezon City RTC. The Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals the case of which was raffled to the Division where
Justice Enriquez was Chairperson. The special division reversed and set aside the Decision of the
Quezon City RTC. Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, complainant filed the present
complaint before the SC. Pending the decision of the SC, an
administrative charge of Gross Ignorance of the law/Gross Incompetence was filed against
respondent Associate Enriquez. Is the filing of the administrative complaint against him proper?
A: No. The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the
judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. An
administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such
as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.
Page 139 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily
render a judge administratively liable.
A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of
his judicial function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, “it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This concept of judicial immunity rests
upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial officers
from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court (Santiago III v.
Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, Feb. 13, 2009).
Classifications of administrative charges

1. Serious
2. Less serious
3. Light
NOTE: Administrative penalties imposed on judges are both punitive and corrective (2011 Bar
Question).
Serious charges
1. Bribery, direct or indirect
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. 3019)
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court
8. Immorality
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure
10. Partisan political activities
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits
Less serious charges

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness
3. Unauthorized practice of law
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service
7. Simple misconduct
Light charges
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct
2. Gambling in public
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports
Page 140 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Confidentiality of proceedings
Proceedings against judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the Court
shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator (RRC, Sec
12, Rule 140).
Resignation or retirement pending administrative case

The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he should still be answerable. Also, the withdrawal or recantation of
the complaint does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the case (Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz,
A.M. No. RTJ -01-1638, Dec. 8, 2003).
NOTE: The acceptance by the President of the resignation does not necessarily render the case moot
or deprive the SC of the authority to investigate the charges. The court retains its jurisdiction either
to pronounce the respondent officially innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule will be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications
(Pesole v. Rodriguez A.M. No. 755-MTJ, Jan. 31, 1978).
Quantum of evidence required

The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is
the rule where the charge on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials
apply.
Q: May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on a complaint filed by the
complainant and the answer of respondent judge? If so, in what circumstances? What is the rationale
behind this power of the Supreme Court? (1996 Bar Question)
A: A judge may be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on the basis of the complaint filed
by the complainant and the answer of the respondent judge, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
The Supreme Court has held that when the facts alleged in the complaint are admitted or are already
shown on the record, and no credible explanation that would negate the strong inference of evil
intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish such facts to support a
judgment as to culpability of the respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for dismissal of Judge
Dizon).
NOTE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not and cannot dispense with the twin requirements of
due process, notice and the opportunity to be heard. It merely dispenses with the procedure laid down
in Rule 140, RRC (Rule 140: Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan).
Q: In Administrative Circular No. 1 addressed to all lower courts dated January 28, 1988, the
Supreme Court stressed that all judges are reminded that the Supreme Court has applied the Res Ipsa
Loquitor rule in the removal of judges even without any formal investigation whenever a decision,
on its face, indicates gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct (Cathay
Pacific Airways v. Romillo, G.R. No. 64276, 12 August 1986). The application of the res ipsa
loquitor rule in the removal of judges is assailed in various quarters as inconsistent with due process
and fair play. Is there any basis for such a reaction? Explain.
A:
1. First view - there is a basis for the reaction against the res ipsa loquitor rule on removing judges.
According to the position taken by the Philippine Bar Association, the res ipsa loquitor rule might
Page 141 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
violate the principle of due process that is the right to be heard before one is condemned.
Moreover, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure for the removal of judges.
Upon service of the complaint against him, he is entitled to file an answer. If the answer merits a
hearing, it is referred to a justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, the report of the
investigation is submitted to the Supreme Court for proper disposition.
The danger in applying the res ipsa loquitor rule is that the judge may have committed only an error
of judgment. His outright dismissal does violence to the jurisprudence set in (In Re Horilleno, 43
Phil. 212, March 20, 1922).
2. Second view- According to the Supreme Court the lawyer or a judge can be suspended or
dismissed based on his activities or decision, as long as he has been given an opportunity to explain
his side. No investigation is necessary.
Suspension pendente lite not applicable to judges

While it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the
rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court,
are amorphous at best.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be
examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal,
such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As
aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and
may in the long run create adverse consequences (Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, Jan. 31, 2008).
Grievance procedure in the rules of court is not applicable to justices and judges
Complaints against justices and judges are filed with the Supreme Court which has exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof pursuant to Section 6 Art. VIII,
Constitution. The Court en banc has the power to discipline all judges of lower courts including
justices of the Court of Appeals (1987 Constitution, Section 11, Art. VII).
As a matter of practice, the Supreme Court has assigned complaints against Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Judges to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court and complaints against
judges of Regional Trial Courts to a justice of the Court of Appeals, while a complaint against a
member of the Court of Appeals would probably be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court for
investigation, report and recommendation. Retired SC Justices are now tasked for this purpose.
Rules on the liability of judges

GR: A judge is not liable administratively, civilly, or criminally, when he acts within his legal
powers and jurisdiction, even though such acts are erroneous so long as he acts in good faith. In such
a case, the remedy of aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but
to elevate the error to a higher court for review and correction.
NOTE: The reason behind such rule is to free the judge from apprehension of personal consequences
to himself and to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
XPN: Where an error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or is incurred with evident bad
faith; or when there is fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.
Civil liabilities under the New Civil Code

1. Article 27 – refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant to perform his official duty
Page 142 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
2. Article 32 – directly or indirectly obstructing, defeating, violating or in any manner impeding or

impairing civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
This responsibility for damages is not, however, demandable of judges except when his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Disabilities/restrictions under the New Civil Code

1. Article 1491 (5) – Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court of superior and inferior
courts and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights that may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession (1996 Bar Question).
2. Article 739 – Donations made to a judge, his wife, descendants and ascendants by reason of his
office are void.
Criminal Liabilities under the RPC and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
1. Misfeasance
a. Article 204 – Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
b. Manifestly Unjust Judgment – one which is so patently against the law, public order, public policy
and good morals that a person of ordinary discernment can easily sense its invalidity and injustice.
NOTE: It must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by evidence and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice
(In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, January 21, 1974). If the decision rendered by the judge is still on
appeal, the judge cannot be disqualified on the ground of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
(Abad v. Bleza, A.M. No. R-227-RTJ, October 13, 1986).
2. Article 205 – Judgment rendered through negligence – committed by reason of inexcusable

negligence or ignorance.
NOTE: Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice, which cannot
be explained by reasonable interpretation (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, January 21, 1974).
3. Article 206– Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; and
4. Maliciously delaying the administration of justice.
NOTE: The act must be committed maliciously with deliberate intent to prejudice a party in a case.
4. Impeachment (ethical aspects)
Constitutional provisions on the accountability of public officers

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives
(1987 Constitution, Sec. 1, Article XI).
Nature of public office
Page 143 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A public office is a public trust. It is not to be understood as a position of honor, prestige and power
but a position of rendering service to the public.
Principle of accountability
It sets down the mandate that all government officials and employees, whether they be the highest in
the land or the lowliest public servants, shall at all times be answerable for their misconduct to the
people from whom the government derives its powers.
Purpose of impeachment in relation the accountability of public officers

Its purpose is to protect the people from official delinquencies or malfeasances. It is therefore
primarily intended for the protection of the State, not for the punishment of the offender.
Importance of maintaining public trust in public offices

It is essential that responsible and competent public officers be chosen for public office to maintain
the faith and confidence of the people to the government otherwise it becomes ineffective. No
popular government can survive without the confidence of the people. It is the lone guarantee and
justification of its existence.
5. Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the Judiciary
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a serious charge

Any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a less serious charge

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a light charge

Any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure
3. Reprimand
4. Admonition with warning
Propriety of reinstatement
Reinstatement is proper when there is no indication that the judge is inspired by corrupt motives or
reprehensive purpose in the performance of his functions.
Factors to be considered in reinstatement

1. Unsullied name and service of record prior to dismissal
2. Commitment to avoid situation that spur suspicion of arbitrary conditions
3. Complainant mellowed down in pushing from his removal
Page 144 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
4. Length of time separated from service
D. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
1. Compulsory
Section 1 of Rule 317 provides that a judge is mandated by law to be disqualified if any of the
following instance, is present:
1. The judge, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise
2. The judge is related to either party of the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
or to the counsel within the fourth degree (computed according to the rule of civil law)
3. The judge has been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel
4. The judge has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review
Rationale
There is a conclusive presumption that the judge cannot objectively or impartially try the case. The
law expressly prohibits him and strikes at the judge’s authority to hear and decide the case.
Exception to compulsory/voluntary disqualification

The same rule also provides that the judge may hear and decide the case despite the presence of a
disqualification provided the interested parties both give a written consent, signed by them and
entered upon the record. It has been decided by the Supreme Court that oral consent is not valid,
even though both parties have agreed (Lazo v. Judge Tiong, 300 SCRA 173, 1998).
2. Voluntary
Voluntary Inhibition according to the Rules of Court states that a judge through the exercise of
sound discretion may, for just or valid reasons to inhibit himself.
NOTE: A presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He
must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very sign of lack of faith and trust in his
actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from
the case (Gutang v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 76). The self-examination of the judge is necessary.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that people’s faith in the courts of justice will not be
impaired. His decision, as to whether to hear the case or not should be based and dependent to giving
importance to the confidence in the impartiality of a judge.
E. Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)
When pleading/motion for trial of cases/ other pleadings may be filed

Section 1, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “Courts always open; justice to be promptly and
impartially administered.” Courts of justice shall always be open, except on legal holidays, for the
filing of any pleading, motion or other papers, for the trial of cases, hearing of motions, and for the
issuance of orders or rendition of judgments. Justice shall be impartially administered without
unnecessary delay.
GR: Courts of justice shall always be open; Justice to be promptly and impartially administered.
XPN: Legal holidays
Page 145 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
NOTE: Upon the request of the local government unit concerned, the Executive Judges of the
MeTCs or the MTCCs of the cities and municipalities comprising Metro Manila and of the cities of
Baguio, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao and Iloilo may assign all judges to hold night court
sessions daily from Monday to Friday and on official holidays and special days, from four-thirty
o’clock in the afternoon to eleven o’clock in the evening, on rotation basis, and in pairs of two (Sec.
15, A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC).
Exclusion of the public from the proceedings

Section 2, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “Publicity of proceedings and records-- The sitting
of every court of justice shall be public, but any court may, in its discretion, exclude the public when
the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their exclusion in the interest of morality or
decency. xxx”
GR: The sitting of every court of justice shall be public

XPN: When the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their exclusion in the interest
of morality or decency.
Records of a court of justice is NOT always public

Section 2, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “The records of every court of justice shall be public
records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours,
under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any
special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.”
GR: The records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection
of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having
custody of such records.
XPN: Unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of
morality or decency.
Enforceability of the processes in inferior courts

GR: Within the province where the municipality or city lies.
XPN: Outside its boundary, provided it is with the approval of judge of first instance of said
province.
Criminal processes served outside judge’s jurisdiction is allowed

When the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion the
interests of justice require such service.
Section 4 of Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: The process of inferior courts shall be enforceable
within the province where the municipality or city lies. It shall not be served outside the boundaries
of the province in which they are comprised except with the approval of the judge of first instance of
said province, and only in the following cases:
a. When an order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is to be complied
with;
b. When an attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is to be made;
c. When the action is against two or more defendants residing in different provinces;
d. When the place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract in writing between
the parties, or is the place of the execution of such contract as appears therefrom.
Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of the Philippines without
Page 146 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
any previous approval of the judge of first instance.

Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, to be served outside
his province, when the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his
opinion the interests of justice require such service.
Instances in which Superior Court processes are enforceable in any part of the Philippines
1. A case is pending to bring in a defendant
2. For the arrest of an accused person
3. Execution of any order or judgment of the court
Cases where the judge of the first instance of a particular province can approve the service of
process of inferior courts outside the boundaries of province in which they are comprised
1. When an order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is to be complied
with;
2. When an attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is to be made;
3. When the action is against two or more defendants residing in different provinces;
4. When the place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract in writing between
the parties, or is the place of the execution of such contract as appears therefrom
Inherent powers of the courts

Section 5, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides:
Inherent powers of courts-- Every court shall have power:
a. To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
b. To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a
judicial investigation under its authority;
c. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the lawful orders of a judge
out of court, in a case pending therein;
d. To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons
in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;
e. To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;
f. To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein, and in all other cases
where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
g. to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law and justice;
h. To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead of
the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings.
Carrying jurisdiction into effect

All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry jurisdiction into effect may be
employed by court or officer.
Section 6, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides:
Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. -- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Instances where the hearings may be had at any place in the judicial district which the judge
shall deem convenient
Page 147 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
1. On the filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus

2. For release upon bail or reduction of bail in any Court of First Instance (Section 8, Rule 135 of
Rules of Court)
Supreme Court can authorize the judge to continue hearing and to decide said case
notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction
1. If a case has been heard only in part.
2. If no other judge had heard the case in part.
F. Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)
SEC. 4. Issuance by clerk of process. - The clerk of a superior court shall issue under the seal of
the court all ordinary writs and process incident to pending cases, the issuance of which does not
involve the exercise of functions appertaining to the court or judge only; and may, under the
direction of the court or judge, make out and sign letters of administration, appointments of
guardians, trustees and receivers, and all writs and process issuing from the court.
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the absence of the
judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions,
inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under
these rules, and may also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts off executors,
administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or receiverships, and
forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with the findings in
relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report.
SEC. 6. Clerk shall receive papers and prepare minutes. - The clerk of each superior court shall
receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly presented, endorsing on each such paper the
time when it was filed, and shall attend all of the sessions of the court and enter its proceedings for
each day in a minute book to be kept by him.
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. - The clerk shall safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits
and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seal and
furniture belonging to his office.
SEC. 14. Taking of record from the clerk’s office. - No record shall be taken from the clerk’s
office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules. However, the
Solicitor General or any of his assistants, the provincial fiscal or his deputy, and the attorneys de
officio shall be permitted, upon proper receipt, to withdraw from the clerk’s office the record of any
case in which they are interested.
SEC. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a
court either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the
close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of
the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with
said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which notes are received by him. When such
notes are transcribed, the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each page
thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (See Administrative Circular No. 24-90 (July 12,
1990) Re: Revised Rules on Transcription of Stenographic Notes and Their Transmission to
Appellate Courts).
Whenever requested by a party, any statement made by a judge of first instance, or by a

commissioner, with reference to a case being tried by him, or to any of the parties thereto, or to any
witness or attorney, during the hearing of such case, shall be made of record in the stenographic
notes.
Page 148 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
G. Legal Fees (Rule 141)
1. Manner of payment
Payment shall be made upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action
or proceeding. The fees prescribed shall be paid in full upon filing of the pleading or application.
2. Fees in lien
Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more
than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien.
3. Persons authorized to collect legal fees
Except as otherwise provided, these officers and persons, together with their assistants and deputies,
may demand, receive, and take the several fees hereinafter mentioned and allowed for any business
by them respectively done by virtue of their several offices, and no more:
1. Clerks of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals
2. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts
3. Clerks of Court of the First Level Courts
4. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes
5. Notaries
6. Other officers taking depositions
The following persons are also entitled to receive fees/ compensation under rule 141:
1. Stenographers
2. Witnesses
3. Appraisers
4. Commissioners in eminent domain proceedings
5. Commissioners in the proceedings for partition of real estate
NOTE: The persons herein authorized to collect legal fees shall be accountable officers and shall be
required to post bond in such amount as prescribed by the law.
Basis of the amount of fee in filing an action or proceeding with the Court of Tax Appeals
1. In an action or proceeding, including petition for intervention, and for all services in the same –
amount of fee would be based on the:
a. Sum claimed or amount of disputed tax or customs assessment, inclusive of interest, penalties and
surcharges, damages of whatever kind and attorney’s fees
b. Value of the article of property in seizure cases.
If the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated – P 5,000.
2. Petition for review from a decision of the RTC or of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or a
special civil action with the CTA or an appeal from a decision of a CTA Division to the CTA En
Banc – P3,000.00.
Consequences if fees are not paid

If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or proceedings.
Page 149 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Basis of the amount of fee in filing permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-

CLAIM, money claim against an estate not based on judgment, third-party, fourth-party, etc.
complaint, complaint-in-intervention in the RTC
TOTAL SUM CLAIMED, Inclusive of Interests, Penalties, Surcharges, Damages of whatever kind,
and Attorney’s Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs
In cases involving REAL property in litigation it is based on the fair market value as:
1. stated in the current tax declaration or
2. current zonal valuation of the bureau of internal revenue, whichever is higher,
3. if there is none, the stated value of the property in litigation
In case of PERSONAL property, the FAIR MARKET value of the property in litigation as alleged
by the claimant.
Basis for determining amount of fees in personal actions in first level courts
The value of the subject matter involved, or the amount of the demand, inclusive of interests,
PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
Basis for determining amount of fees in real actions

The FAIR MARKET value of the property:
1. Stated in the current tax declaration or
2. Current zonal valuation of the bureau of internal revenue, whichever is higher, or,
If not declared for taxation purposes, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and
shall be the basis in computing the fees.
Exemptions to fees to real actions

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the amount of fees would depend on whether damages or
costs are prayed for.
Witnesses are entitled to fees

Witnesses in the Supreme Court, in the Court of Appeals and in the Regional Trial Courts and in the
1st level courts, either in actions or special proceedings, shall be entitled to P200.00 per day,
inclusive of ALL EXPENSES;
Fees to which witnesses may be entitled in a civil action shall be allowed on the certification of the
clerk of court or judge of his appearance in the case.
Limitations
1. A witness shall not be allowed compensation for his attendance in more than one case or more
than one side of the same case at the same time, but may elect in which of several cases or on which
side of a case, when he is summoned by both sides, to claim his attendance.
2. A person who is compelled to attend court on other business shall not be paid as a witness.
Sheriff’s expense is NOT the same as Sheriff’s fees

Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they are the amount
deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of
the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and
other court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. . It is not the same as
sheriff’s fees under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed by the
court for services rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it (Re: Letter dated April 18,
Page 150 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta Requesting Exemption From the Payment Of
Sheriff’s Expenses, A.M. No. 11-10-03-0, July 30, 2013).
Persons exempt from payment of legal fees

1. Indigent litigants
2. Republic of the Philippines
NOTE: The clients of PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal.
(R.A. No. 9406, Section 6)
Rule with regard to indigent litigants

Indigent litigants are exempt from payment of legal fees. However, the legal fees shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise
provides.
Requisites for the indigents to be able to enjoy exemption

He must execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned,
supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred. (Sec. 19)
Rule as to Republic of the Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal
fees provided in the rule.
Exemption to the rule that the Republic is exempt from paying legal fees
Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent
charters are not exempt from paying such fees. However, all court actions, criminal or civil,
instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees.
Purpose of mediation fund

The Fund shall be utilized for the promotion of court-annexed mediation and other relevant modes of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), training of mediators, payment of mediator’s fees, and
operating expenses of the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) units including expenses for technical
assistance and organizations/individuals, transportation/communication expenses, photocopying,
supplies and equipment, expense allowance and miscellaneous expenses, whenever necessary,
subject to auditing rules and regulations.
Fees do NOT form part of the Judiciary Development Fund

The mediation fees shall not form part of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) under P.D. No.
1949 nor of the special allowances granted to justices and judges under Republic Act No. 9227.
The amount collected shall be receipted and separated as part of a special fund to be known as the
“Mediation Fund” and shall accrue to the SC-PHILJA-PMC Fund, disbursements from which are
and shall be pursuant to guidelines approved by the Supreme Court.
Exceptions in paying mediation fees
Page 151 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
The following are exempt from contributing to the mediation fund:

1. Pauper litigant.
NOTE: However, the court shall provide that the unpaid contribution to the Mediation Fund shall be
considered a lien on any monetary award in a judgment favorable to the pauper litigant.
2. Accused-appellant
H. Costs
1. Recovery of costs (Rule 142)
a) Prevailing party
Costs allowed to a prevailing party

Costs shall be allowed to a prevailing party as a matter of course. However, the court shall have
power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the
same be divided, as may be equitable (RRC, Sec. 1, Rule 142)
Costs shall not be allowed to the Republic of the Philippines. (RRC, Sec. 1, Rule 142)
Q: Is the Land bank of the Philippines liable to the cost of suit in the performance of a governmental
function such as disbursement of agrarian funds to satisfy awards of just compensation?
A: No, the Land Bank of the Philippines is in the performance of a Governmental function in an
agrarian reform proceeding, hence, according to Rule 142, it is exempt from the payment of Cost of
Suit (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, G.R. No. 182431, Nov. 17, 2010).
b) Dismissed appeal or action
Power of the court to render judgment for costs even if an Appeal has been dismissed
If an Action or Appeal is dismissed, for want of Jurisdiction or otherwise, the Court retains the
power to render judgment for Costs, as justice may require (RRC, Sec. 2, Rule 142).
c) Frivolous appeal
If an appeal is deemed frivolous, double or treble costs shall be imposed on the plaintiff or
appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the Court (RRC, Sec. 3, Rule 142).
Q: A vehicular accident between a Fuso truck owned by Maglana Rice and Corn Mill and a Honda
Accord owned by Sps. Tan occurred on Aug. 28, 1996. Sps. Tan filed a complaint in the MTCC
which was favored. The petitioners appealed, but RTC upheld the MTCC. Petitioners further
appealed to the CA, which was denied for lack of merit. The MR being also denied, hence the appeal
to the Supreme Court. The issue is whether or not the appeal is frivolous.
A: Yes, the rejection by CA indicated that the three lower courts with legal capacity and official
function to resolve issues, all found the same set of facts. In this recourse, the petitioners presented
no ground sufficient to persuade the court to warrant a review of the uniform findings of fact. Given
the frivolousness of the appeal, the court imposes treble costs of suit on the petitioners under Rule
142 (Maglana Rice and Corn Mill Inc. vs. Annie L. Tan, G.R. No. 159051, Sept. 21, 2011).
d) False allegations
Page 152 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
A false allegation made without reasonable cause and found untrue shall subject the offending party
to the reasonable expenses as may have been necessarily incurred by the other part by reason of
such untrue pleading. The amount fixed by the Judge and taxed as costs (RRC, Sec. 4, Rule 142).
e) Non-appearance of witness
If a Witness fails to appear at the time and place specified in the subpoena issued by any inferior
court, the costs of the warrant of arrest and of the arrest of the witness shall be borne by him, if the
court determines that his failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without excuse (RRC, Sec.
12, Rule 142).
IMPORTANT NOTES:
1. This listing of covered topics is not intended and should not be used by the law schools as a
course outline. This was drawn up for the limited purpose of ensuring that Bar candidates are
guided on the coverage of the 2015 Bar Examinations.
2. All Supreme Court decisions – pertinent to a given Bar subject and its listed topics, and
promulgated up to March 31, 2015 – are examinable materials within the coverage of the 2015
Bar Examinations.
***Read recent jurisprudence.
Prayer to St. Jude Thaddeus
St. Jude, glorious Apostle and

faithful servant the Son of God,
the church honors and invokes
you universally as patron of
hopeless cases. I place before
you my problems, sure that you
will not turn a deaf ear to my
request.
Come to my assistance in this

great moment of need, that may
receive strength and
perseverance and that I may
ultimately accept God’s Holy
will, (that I may be able to
retain and understand all that I
have studied and be able to give
my best so that I may be able to
pass the bar examinations).
I promise you O glorious Apostle

that I will forever be mindful for
this great favor and never cease
to honor you as my special
patron. May the holy will of God
be in all things done forever.
Amen.
Page 153 of 154

SCHOOL OF LAW
Page 154 of 154

Legal Ethics Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Legal Ethics Reviewer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Legal Ethics Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PALAWAN STATE UNIVERSITY

A. Practice of law (Rule 138)

Note: It becomes a PROPERTY RIGHT if there is a contract for ATTORNEY’S FEES.

b) Profession, not business

LAW IS A PROFESSION NOT A TRADE.

a) Law student practice (Rule 138-A)

Party-litigant representing himself.

Limits on the appearance of non-lawyers

c) Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals

NOTE: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees.

c) Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing

2. Proceedings before the KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY- During the pre-trial

4. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

a) Lawyers without authority

(see above discussion)

b) Persons not lawyers

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW BY PERSONS NOT

NOTE: A disbarred lawyer still appearing in court is guilty of indirect contempt.

TWO-FOLD ASPECT OF CONTEMPT POWER (1998 BAR)

5. Public officials and practice of law

PROHIBITED ACYS OR OMISSIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

a) Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys

THEORIES RELATING TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT

1. ADVERSE-INTEREST-CONFLICT- A former government lawyer is enjoined from representing

2. CONGRUENT-INTEREST-REPRESENTATION CONFLICT- The lawyer is prohibited from

b) Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions

NOT ALLOWED TO PRACTICE

1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court

RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS (1992, 2000

6. Lawyers authorized to represent the government

DUTIES OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

DUTY OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL TO REPRESENT THE OTHER PARTY WHEREBY

IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYER’S OATH

B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer

DUTIES OF AN ATTORNEY UNDER THE RULES OF COURT (2006 BAR)

a) Respect for law and legal processes

CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

TWO-FOLD DUTY UNDER CANON 1

1. Obey the laws and legal processes.

CANON 1- RULE 1.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST,

INSTANCES OF GROSS IMMORALITY AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES

1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED.

ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING GROSS IMMORALITY

1. Stealing a kiss from a client

BARRATRY VS. AMBULANCE CHASING (1993 BAR)

b) Efficient and convenient legal services

CANON 2- A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN

RA No. 9999 FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010

1. Encourage lawyers and professional partnerships to provide free legal assistance.

RATIONALE BEHINDTHE RULE THAT THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS NOT

1. Relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough

NOTE: A general professional partnership with a non-lawyer is VOID. In the formation of

1. Reputable law lists

RATIONALE FOR THE PROHIBITION

1. The profession is primarily for public service

c) True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services

CANON 3- A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE