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Reforms, Revolutions, and The Loosening Bloc, The 1950s and 1960s
Reforms, Revolutions, and The Loosening Bloc, The 1950s and 1960s
Stalinist Central and Eastern European socialism, in a few years after its
introduction, declined into a deep crisis. The reasons for this were an
overly expensive military build-up and an irrational and extremely rapid
industrialization drive accompanied by declining standards of living.
The turbulent and ruthless collectivization effort in the countryside,
with its devastating impact on food supplies, led to deep desperation.
The severe shortage of food, housing, and practically every kind of
consumer good, which coincided with unrelenting propaganda boasting
of untold successes, undermined the system's credibility. The paranoid
terror and search for enemies permeated the entire society with fear.
The overpoliticization of every sphere of life, including culture, art, and
even the private domain of everyday life, alienated the people. A
hypocritical "internationalism" assured the interest of an expansionist,
interventionist Soviet Union, which dictated to and dominated her
vassals. In a Kafkaesque Central and Eastern Europe, everything cried
for a change.
The struggle against Stalinism and for reform began almost immediately
with the introduction of Soviet socialism and a bloc-policy in the region,
and the different variations, at distinctive stages, accompanied its
existence until its collapse. In the region as a whole, there was continuity
of struggle. The first revolt against Stalinism and Soviet domination
emerged in Yugoslavia as early as 1948, when a "disobedient" Tito was
excommunicated from the socialist camp. The Soviet-Yugoslav confron-
tation had a dual importance: it led to the formation of an independent,
national road toward socialism, which was coupled with comprehensive,
pioneering reforms that offered an alternative to Soviet state socialism.
The Yugoslav revolt gained decisive momentum in the 1950s, but arrived
at new stages in the 1960s.
In the midst of this process, and in close interrelationship with it, the
death of Stalin in the spring of 1953 generated a "thaw," a liberalization,
and certain moderate reforms and policy changes, guided by the new
Soviet leadership and dictated to others as well. The controversial years
94
On March 5, 1953 a few years after Tito's revolt, Stalin died. He was
buried next to Lenin, and spontaneous mourning followed. An exalted
crowd crushed to death hundreds of people to get a last chance to see him.
The death of a mythic semi-god, as he had been presented, became the
source of a crisis.
The revision of his policy began immediately. His closest and most
obedient aids, his hand-picked heirs, declared a "New Course." The
primus inter pares in the "collective leadership," prime minister Georgi
Malenkov, in his speech on August 8, 1953, declared the important new
principles, among them the possibility of "peaceful coexistence of the two
systems." Regarding the most important domestic policy issues, Malenkov
focused on the "measures to further increase the well-being of the
population." The content of the "New Course" was accomplished by a
new agricultural policy, which aimed at radically improving the food
supply, as well as strictly limiting the drive to industrialization.
The principle of "collective leadership" was declared. Stalin's posts,
which were inherited by Malenkov, who became first secretary of the
party and prime minister, were soon separated. Malenkov kept the
premiership, while the party was directed by Nikita Khrushchev, who
became first secretary only in September. In the first months, Lavrenti
Beria, the head of the secret police, joined the leading troika as minister of
the interior and deputy prime minister. The "collective leadership,"
however, did not remain for long.
The first short chapter of the struggle for absolute power was ended in
July 1953, when Beria was arrested and executed as a traitor. The second
chapter was not very much longer: in February 1955, Malenkov was
removed from the premiership. Although that post was given to Marshal
Bulganin, it was taken over by Nikita Khrushchev, thereby ending the
power struggle with the restoration of absolute power.
Nevertheless, after Stalin's death the principle of collective leadership
and later the accusation of the Stalinist "cult of personality" both became
inseparable parts of the "New Course," which generated a cautious
de-Stalinization process. International tensions, East-West confrontation,
and domestic political extremism and terror were all equally challenged,
and the ice of the Cold War and frozen Stalinism began to melt. As
Soviet writer Ilya Erenburg remarked, the spring of 1953 set in with a
political "thaw."
Malenkov's "thaw," based paradoxically on Stalin's empire-building
traditions, was designed for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. The
Soviet leadership realized that the irrational war preparations, extreme
industrialization and forced collectivization, caused tremendous economic-
Imre Nagy
The New Course, designed and ordered by the Soviet party, gained great
momentum in Hungary, since this was the only country in the region
where the reform attempt had a charismatic leader, Prime Minister Imre
Nagy. Nagy was selected by Malenkov to achieve the new political will in
Hungary. According to certain unproven assumptions, Malenkov knew
Nagy quite well, because Nagy had worked as a personal secretary to
Malenkov during some of his years in Moscow (1930-44). Information