Carmack 1

Peter Carmack
Brandeis University
5/01/18
Is Spinoza an Atheist?

Introduction1

In the early modern period, many philosophers in the Western world were often

concerned about two developing phenomena: the effects of materialism and the seemingly

related worry of atheism that the former might produce.2 In a time of drastic change, the

scientific revolution, the religious reformation, and the discovery and colonization of a ‘new’

world all coalesced into a frightening pattern of transformation. Fascinatingly, some of the

prominent figures in philosophy and science may have even contributed to these sweeping

alterations (perhaps for some inadvertently).3 Many naturally feared what effects these would

have on one’s way of life. Of paramount concern was religious orthodoxy and practice.

Predominantly Christian, the West often took drastic measures to protect monotheistic

conceptions of deity and its methods of worship. As such, many groups, individuals, and whole

philosophical systems were routinely branded ‘Atheists.’4 Baruch Spinoza was one such

philosopher.

Thesis

It would be an almost impossible task to define—with the appropriate scope—the

concepts of theism and atheism as they do or do not apply to religious practice. Either it would

1
All references from Spinoza are taken from: Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Hackett, 1992.
2
This is especially true of philosophers such as Berkeley and Conway. There is a milder concern for Atheism in
Descartes and Locke but not so much for materialism. Hume could be seen as a philosopher not really concerned
with either.
3
Some examples might be Descartes, Locke, Boyle, Galileo, Leibniz, Newton, and Hume.
4
Of course, this did not have the same connotation that it has contemporarily.
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be too wide (include things that are clearly not religious for example) or too narrow (include

things that are commonly held not to be in this classification). Hence it is not my aim to provide

such a definition. Nevertheless, I will employ basic or intuitive definitions throughout, but I am

not claiming they hold across all frameworks, contexts, or possible worlds. However, my

intention is to claim that one could in some meaningful ways assert that Spinoza is an atheist

while another could claim in other meaningful contexts5 that he is not. Hence, I argue, Spinoza is

both a theist and an atheist.6

Section 1: The Types of Theism and Atheism7

In common discourse, if someone were to say, “I am an atheist,” this would typically be

taken to mean, “I do not believe in God.”8 Theism would be the opposite statement. This

account in no way necessarily reflects particular doctrines, creeds, or religious attitudes of

worship and reverence. Nor is it a statement about the rational evidence and argumentation for or

against the existence of God. It is merely a belief. However, this belief comes in two varieties:

strong or weak. (Note: Throughout this essay, I will predominately only focus my analysis upon

the strong portion of each view. Therefore, if I do not give an explicit reference whether it is of

the weak or strong variety, assume it to be the strong.) In the strong cases, this belief in God is

important to one’s overall perspective of the world. Irrespectively of its strength or weakness, I

term this view as the Common-Theism/Atheism-View. On the other hand, the Philosophical-

Position of atheism is the general claim that there is no evidence for God (or if there is some that

it is sufficiently lacking to rationally hold). Again, philosophical theism would be the inverse of
5
I am in no way suggesting the philosophical position of Contextualism here.
6
I do not take this to be paradoxical in nature. Rather it is because the range and scope of this essay does not allow
for such a lengthy project. Additionally, perhaps it might also be attributed to the difficulty of coherently defining all
of these interrelated notions discussed in this essay.
7
I intentionally leave out agnosticism. I adopt William James view that agnosticism is not a tenable-practical state
of belief to hold. I also leave it out because there is not much to say about the position.
8
Pantheism will be addressed in the next section.
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this claim. Regarding the philosophical-position of theism, it is important to note that God is

significant in some way (explanatory perhaps) especially in their metaphysical and

epistemological commitments. Subsequently, thus far we have two kinds of theism/atheism: the

common and the philosophical, both of which have strong and weak varieties.

Section 2: Polytheism, Deism, and Religion

In the 17th century there were many different view-points about deity in the world (as

there are today). It is well beyond the scope and intent of this essay to give a satisfactory

interpretation of each account. However, in this section I will give a brief remark about

polytheism, deism, and religion. To fit with my above framework of common-theism/atheism

and or philosophical-theism/atheism, I claim the following about polytheism: insofar as it is a

view that has divine beings, these beings must produce some form of cosmology or creation story

in order to be classified generally ‘theistic.’ I take it to be a central characteristic of any form of

theism that it involves some basic notions of creation and cosmology. Otherwise, following

Hume, I would say that some polytheists are not theists at all, but rather ‘poly-atheists.’9

Among the ancient Greeks, a commonly held belief regarding the divine was called

deism. At the time of the 17th century, it was commonly considered to be unfashionable. Deism is

the general view that God10 created the world, but now is no longer actively engaged with his

creations. It is as if God set things in motion and then left it (creation) to its own devices. Thus,

mankind is on its own. From what I can tell, there are two possible kinds of deism: Intellectual

and Theistic. Intellectual-Deism has the following characteristics—they can (and often do) have

admiration and reference for deity, primarily arising from contemplating God’s creative act(s).

However, they do not have a love for deity. Theistic-Deism is the view that is entailed minimally
9
Hume, David. "That Polytheism Was the Primary Religion of Men." In The Natural History Of Religion. 1757.
10
Of course, you can have more than one god or pantheistic views that are compatible with deism.
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by the Weak-Common-Theism view (but not Philosophical, although one can be both). They also

share the attitudes of adoration, respect, and reference for deity like their Intellectual

counterparts. However, genuine love is not credible or probable under the deistic framework—

Love requires the possibility of a relationship. This is precisely the defining tenet of all forms of

deism: God is unavailable.11 Consequently, there are no forms of worship or particular religious

practices or doctrines found within any form of deism.

Like all religiously minded people, there are the devout, consistent, and orthodox groups

contrasted with the casual or traditionally motivated individuals who are not devout in their

religious practice. Therefore, there are strong and weak religious views. When one says, “I am

religious,” the strong view entails the ‘common-view of theism’ (but not necessarily the

‘philosophical-position’) with the added nuances—(i) a ‘set of beliefs’ (systems of thought, set

of doctrines and creeds), (ii) specific ‘behaviors/attitudes’(adoration, reverence, and love for the

divine, and definite actions or behaviors that derive out of their particular religion), and (iii) a

‘world-view’ (how one views the world as a result of the two prior categories). Being religious

of the strong kind typically means one’s belief in God plays more of a central role in one’s

overall practical and theoretical life. Subsequently, being a theist in the common-view, one’s

belief in God could be merely peripheral to their metaphysical, epistemological, and moral

assessments. Lastly, a crucial difference between being religious and deism or merely theistic is

that religion12 normally contains specified methods for worship which is accompanied commonly

by a sense of reverence and love by the practitioners for deity. Engagement with the divine on a

personal and collective level is characteristic of strong-religious devotion. In fact, the religious

11
Temporarily or permanently. Either way, it is almost impossible to determine the length (if any) of God’s
inaccessibility.
12
Throughout, it is important to note that I am only talking about ‘organized religion.’ I am not choosing to address
what some have termed ‘spiritualism.’
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practice of worship is perhaps its most unique feature. Theism on the other hand, both of the

philosophical or common variety does not contain these norms. In sum, there are three forms of

theism/atheism: common, philosophical, and religious, with the accompanying strong or weak

versions of each.

Summary of Views: I thought it advantageous to produce a table outlining each view for ease of

reference and general intelligibility.

Theism

Strong-Common 1) A belief, 2) Not about evidence/rationality, 3) No doctrine or religion, 4) In Non-

Evidentialist terms (because of 2) informs the basic ideas about metaphysical,
epistemological, and moral commitments.
Weak-Common 1) A belief, 2) Not about evidence/rationality, 3) No doctrine or religion, 4) Does
not inform any metaphysical, epistemological, or moral commitments.
Strong-Philosophical 1) There is evidence for God, 2) Informs one's metaphysical, epistemological, and
moral commitments.
Weak-Philosophical 1) There is evidence for God, 2) In a loose sense can inform Informs one's
metaphysical commitments, (epistemology and morality are not included).
Atheism

Strong-Common The direct inverse of Strong-Common-Theism.

Strong-Philosophical The direct inverse of Strong-Philosophical-Theism.

Polytheism 1) Multiple divine beings, 2) Must include some kind of cosmology or creation
story.
Deism

Intellectual 1) Can have adoration and reference for God creating the world, but no love.

Theistic 1) Entails at least Weak Common-Theism (but not Philosophical although one can
be both). 2) Has adoration and reverence for deity, but not necessarily love.
Religious

Strong-Religious 1) Entails Strong or Weak Common-Theism (but not Philosophical), 2) Set of

beliefs, doctrines, creeds, 3) Particular behavior associated with 2) most
importantly being 'worship', love/adoration for deity, 4) World-view-practical in
nature, (although they can inherit any version of the 'theistic' views here to enter
the realm of theoretical considerations).
Weak-Religious 1) Entails Strong or Weak Common-Theism (but not Philosophical), 2) Set of
 Carmack 6

beliefs, doctrines, creeds, 3) typically not 'practicing' particular behaviors, does not
'worship', has adoration/reverence but not necessary love for deity, 4) world-view
is narrow or not influential in practical and theoretical life.

As it should be obvious by now, a person could hold a combination of these positions at any

given time and be wholly consistent. For instance, Renee Descartes is the following under this

framework: Strong-Common-Theism (He does believe in God), Strong-Philosophical-Theism

(God is central to his metaphysical/epistemological commitments), and Weak-Religious (he is

not particularly devout in his religious practice, although he does not have criterion 4) because of

his strong-philosophical-theism). Immanuel Kant would be: Strong-Common-Theism, Weak-

Philosophical-Theism (God does not play an important role in his epistemological, metaphysical,

or moral commitments), and Weak-Religious. David Hume would be: Strong-Common-Atheism,

Strong-Philosophical-Atheism, Strong-Atheist-Religious. In contrast, George Berkeley would be:

Strong-Common-Theism, Strong-Philosophical-Theism, and Strong-Religious. The central

question we need to elucidate now is—What is Spinoza? (I will provide my answer to this

question in the conclusion). These combinations just begin to scratch the surface in illuminating

the nuances that are possible regarding God, belief in deity, and the role of the divine in the

world.

Section 3: Spinoza’s Pantheism and Religious Practice

One of the major concerns Spinoza’s contemporaries had with his philosophy was its

unapologetic assertion of pantheism. Spinoza states in his Ethics:

“By Substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself…” (P1D3, pg. 31).
“By God I mean an absolutely infinite being; that is substance consisting of infinite attributes…”
(P1D 6, pg. 31).
“Existence belongs to the nature of substance,” (P1Pr7, pg. 34).
“There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God,” (P1Pr14, pg. 39).
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From these (and many other statements) we begin to see clearly Spinoza’s picture: the only thing

that exists is God. Everything is either an attribute or mode of the ‘absolutely infinite being.’

Therefore, plants, animals, and humanity are all just modes of God. Thus, the ‘Many’ are in

actuality the ‘One.’ Furthermore, the ontological totality of existence is necessarily this way

according to Spinoza (P1Pr29, pg. 51). Life could not be through any other means. Hence,

everything that is possible is actual, or (equivalently) everything that isn’t actual is impossible.13

Or put in another way: every state-of-affairs in the world occurred out of necessity.

In the Ethics, Spinoza explicitly rejects a primary philosophical-theological notion

prevalent in the 17th Century—that God’s creations were fashioned for a purpose or end. I think

this is one of the principle reasons why his philosophy was especially repugnant to religious

thinkers. Christianity had its own form of teleology prior to the work of Aristotle resurfacing in

the Western world immediately following the Crusades. It was the momentous task of the

Scholastics to rectify and harmonize the philosophical teleology with the theological. Saint

Thomas Aquinas was particularly successful in this endeavor (thus his sainthood). This

combined teleological nature of the universe permeated philosophical, theistic-religious, and

cultural underpinning at the time of the publication of the Ethics for well over four hundred

years. Spinoza severed this long standing purposeful relationship between creation and creator.

Parallel to the concept of teleology, free will was a central tenet to most theistic or

religious systems of belief.14 It played a key role in concepts of divine judgement, the after-life,

reasons for our existence here on earth (to choose for ourselves God and his goodness for

example). Furthermore, free will was (and still is) a vital postulation in many theologies

13
This sentence can be credited to Jennifer Marusic. Thank you for this nice concise way of phrasing this concept.
14
There are always exceptions. Calvinism’s theological-determinism is one such prominent example.
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constructing a robust theodicy against the problem of evil. Subsequently, when Spinoza

emphatically declared free will nothing more than an illustrious illusion, individuals felt the

carpet was being pulled from underneath them. Consequently, this double denial of significant

accepted religious and theistic dogmas was unforgivable—the mark of Atheism was all to easy to

be pronounced. Today, we might feel Spinoza was unjustly treated or perhaps his contemporaries

were too close minded to see that he was not in fact an atheist. However, it is uncontroversial

that Spinoza did not make it easy for his fellow countrymen. Even if we were to grant him the

position of theism, for many it would have been difficult to see him as anything other than a

recalcitrant radical revolutionary regarding God and man.

Interestingly, Spinoza seems well aware of the negative reaction his work might receive

overall. Albeit the following quote was in reference to his views about the mind and the body, I

suggest he might conceivably been equally apprehensive about the reception of his view of God.

After making a particularly trying claim, Spinoza states:

“[My] readers will no doubt find themselves in some difficulty and will think of many things that
will give them pause. So I ask them to proceed slowly step by step with me, and postpone
judgment until they have read to the end.” (P2Pr11Sch, pg.71)

Sadly, I do not think most suspended judgment ‘till the end.’ His radical view of the world,

mankind, and God clashed too sharply with the scientific and religious establishment of the time.

Lastly, Spinoza’s conception of God does not seem conducive to a robust form of

religious practice outlining methods of worship. Although it is true that there are some forms of

pantheistic religions in the world, Spinoza’s conception was more philosophical and explanatory

than religious or spiritual. His philosophy and postulates about God were never intended to be

available for religious worship. He did not conceive of God for the purpose to develop (or be

consistent with) a rich religious practice in which covenants and ordinances are performed to
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bring creatures in line with the creator. As stated previously, most (if not all) religions have some

form of defined method of communication by which human beings attempt to connect with the

divine. For Spinoza, it is good to reflect and contemplate upon the attributes of the ‘eternal and

infinite essence,’ (P1D6 pg. 31); but oddly this might not be that out of the ordinary—seeing that

all things are God. Thus, it would be hard to attribute the possibility of meaningful, particular,

religious-worship to Spinoza.

Conclusion

A lot has been said to this point, all of which was aimed at giving me the proper tools to

answer the question of this essay: Is Spinoza an atheist? The answer is both yes and no. As was

demonstrated previously, an individual could hold any number of these differing positions

simultaneously while remaining coherent. Therefore, specifically, Spinoza could be seen as a:

Strong-Common-Theist, Strong-Philosophical-Theist, and a Strong-Atheist-Religious. The key

to understanding Spinoza’s atheism is that religion and its accompanying unique characteristic of

specified methods of worship are not to be found within Spinoza’s philosophy.

Notwithstanding this religious form of atheism, I believe it is important to see that Spinoza is

both a common and philosophical-position-theist: God is significant (in his case central) to his

ontological and epistemological commitments about the world. Therefore, I contend that Spinoza

is both a bonafide atheist and theist.15

15
There are many issues that I was not able to address in this short essay. For instance, what if Spinoza called God
in his philosophy “The Infinite Being,” or “the higher power,” or even “Scooby-Doo.” Either way, it seems to me
that in ‘function’ Spinoza’s conception of what he terms as ‘God’ does most of all his metaphysical and
epistemological work in his theory. Consequently, I do not see this possible criticism as especially salient.