Peace Review

A Journal of Social Justice

ISSN: 1040-2659 (Print) 1469-9982 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cper20

The GRP-NDFP Peace Process and the Philippine

Church

Jerry D. Imbong

To cite this article: Jerry D. Imbong (2020) The GRP-NDFP Peace Process and the Philippine
Church, Peace Review, 32:2, 228-234, DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2020.1836447

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2020.1836447

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Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 32:228–234, 2020
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1040-2659 print / 1469-9982 online
DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2020.1836447

The GRP-NDFP Peace Process and

the Philippine Church
JERRY D. IMBONG

The civil war between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-
National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP-NPA-NDFP) has
raged for almost five decades. This is, by far, the longest running civil
war in Asia. Prospects [for what?] were high when President Rodrigo
Duterte assumed power in 2016. Since then, peace talks went “on and
off” but they were finally terminated by Proclamation 360 on November
23, 2017.
Religious organizations have always played a crucial role in facilitating
peace processes. The involvement of faith-based groups in conflict resolution
is not new, and and as such, the Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform
(PEPP) has intervened between the GRP and the NDFP to promote peace-
building. As the biggest ecumenical peace advocate in the country, PEPP
has worked unceasingly to bring both parties to the negotiating table. PEPP
works to achieve a just and lasting peace in the country. PEPP’s membership
includes the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), the
National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), the Philippine
Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC), the Ecumenical Bishops Forum
(EBF) and the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the
Philippines (AMRSP).

A ntonio Ledesma, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and co-chairperson

of PEPP, has highlighted four roles for peace for civil society stake-
holders, church groups and lay communities. First, peace advocates must
learn to “articulate values” that can achieve a “culture of peace.” Second,
they should pursue “mediation” and try “to bridge the differences between
the two parties in conflict with the aim of restarting peace talks.” Third,
they must never forget that “dialogue” is the best way to address the roots
of the armed conflict. And fourth, they must strengthen their ranks by
“building their constituency” so that the language of peace permeates
grassroots communities.
228
THE GRP-NDFP PEACE PROCESS AND THE PHILIPPINE CHURCH 229

The struggle against foreign domination and class oppression and

exploitation in the Philippines dates from the Spanish colonial period up
through the American colonization. The Filipino people’s experience of
hunger, poverty, unemployment, and landlessness pushed a group of
young revolutionaries, led by Jose Maria Sison, to reestablished the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1969. In turn, the CPP
formed the New People’s Army as its armed wing. Peace talks didn’t
begin, however, until 1986, when the dictator, President Ferdinand
Marcos, was ousted. Those talks were designed to address the root-causes
and social problems that fueled the armed rebellion.
More than two decades of painstaking dialogue resulted in the signing
of some landmark peace documents, such as the Hague Declaration, which
identified the substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations; the Joint
Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), which ensures the
continuity of the peace process by providing protection and immunity to peace
consultants from both the GRP and the NDFP; and the Comprehensive
Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
(CARHRIHL), which seeks to humanize the armed conflict.
Under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, the parties con-
ducted three successful peace talks abroad, which produced an indefinite
ceasefire agreement in August 26, 2016—something never previously
achieved. Hopes were so high that Jose Maria Sison, the NDFP political
consultant, projected that, at the rate the negotiations had been going, the
Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms could be
signed by the end of 2017.

B ut on July 22, 2017, Duterte announced the abandonment of the peace

negotiations and he ordered the arrest of NDFP consultants. On
November 23, Duterte signed Proclamation No. 360, which formally declared
the end of the peace talks. This was followed by Proclamation No. 374,
which labeled the CPP-NPA as a terrorist group. Both proclamations embold-
ened the security forces to arrest and even murder NDFP consultants. On
December 22, 2018, Duterte signed Executive Order No. 70, establishing a
“whole-of-nation approach” to defeating the problem of insurgency in the
country. This approach enables major government agencies as well as local
government units to be involved in the government’s counterinsurgency pro-
gram. It likewise paved the way for a “localized peace talks,” which seek to
engage CPP-NPA-NDFP unit commanders in the regional level.
With the signing of EO 70, the Duterte government pledged to end
the communist insurgency by 2022. Experience on the ground, however,
confirmed that whenever the formal talks were stalled or canceled, a sig-
nificant increase in armed encounters between the Philippine military and
230 JERRY D. IMBONG

the New People's Army (NPA) occurs, producing an increase in human

rights violations against civilian communities. Those violations include
the bombing of communities in Lianga, Surigao del Sur, which forced
mass evacuations of indigenous peoples. Incidents of peasant and Lumad
killings were also reported across Mindanao. Peasants as well as a human
rights lawyer were also killed in the island of Negros. And in March
2019, peasant communities from Northern and Eastern Samar were forced
to evacuate from their communities because of military encampment in
their area.

T he road to just and lasting peace is never easy. To keep the peace pro-
cess going requires mutual trust and genuine dialogue. Authentic
peace is not merely the absence of war, for peace must not be divorced
from social justice: land for the landless, decent jobs and living wages for
workers, food on the table, access to health and education, decent and
affordable homes for the homeless. Toward these ends, conflicting inter-
ests often clash and sometimes contradictions seem irreconcilable. Not all
parties agree on the terms, conditions and outcomes of the peace process.
In her article, “Reframing the Spoiler in Peace Processes,” Zabar argued
that, “the most powerful answer to the failure of many a peace settlement
points to the emergence of actors who decide to spoil the peace process.”
In the Philippines the peace process gets routinely derailed by the militar-
ization of the bureaucracy. Ever since Duterte assumed power, he’s
appointed retired military officials in key cabinet posts, such as his
Presidential advisor on the peace process, Carlito Galvez, Jr., the former
Armed Forces of the Philippines chief of staff.
Peace advocates have protested Duterte’s increasingly militarist
stand in handling the peace process. Duterte has abandoned the path of
peacebuilding through principled negotiations. It’s also not coincidental
that the peace talks collapsed shortly after both parties were about to sign
the Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER),
which would have provided free land distribution to farmers. The invis-
ible hand of the ruling elite, comprised of big businesses and big land-
lords, fomented this sudden breakdown in the peace talks. Free land
distribution (that is, genuine agrarian reform) and national industrializa-
tion (two pillars of CASER) undermines their interests.
This illustrates what peace researcher, Johan Galtung, has identified
as “structural violence,” deeply embedded in society and the root of
armed conflicts. It’s violence that is “built into” structures, institutions,
ideologies, and histories. Real peace relies on reducing structural violence
by advancing and promoting conventions against repression (political and
civil rights) and exploitation (economic, social and cultural rights).
THE GRP-NDFP PEACE PROCESS AND THE PHILIPPINE CHURCH 231

Accordingly, PEPP members keep in constant touch with grassroots

communities directly affected by the armed conflict. Guided by
Ledesma’s fourfold task of peacebuilding, the only way the peace process
can move forward is to convince both parties to return to the negotiating
table. PEPP has been redoubling its efforts to establish and expand the
peace constituency within and among churches and faith communities,
schools, government institutions, and barangays. It is building and mobi-
lizing international and national support for continuing the formal peace
talks between the GPH and the NDFP. It monitors the integrity of the
peace negotiations in accordance with the bilateral agreements. It serves
as an advocate for a final peace agreement that is just and lasting, and
that addresses the conflict’s root-causes. And it creates venues and oppor-
tunities to articulate and amplify within the talks the Filipino people's
peace agenda.

B y engaging grassroots communities, PEPP can deepen, consolidate

and expand its peace constituency all over the country. To do so,
PEPP implements several programs. First, the Ecumenical Church
Leaders’ Summit on Peace (ECLSP) is an annual gathering of church
leaders (bishops, priests, pastors, religious, lay workers) from all members
of the five federations (CBCP, NCCP, PCEC, EBF, AMRSP). This gath-
ering allows church leaders to share the situation and the peace possibil-
ities in their respective areas, to reflect and formulate plans for common
advocacy, and raise to both parties (GRP, NDFP) the conflict’s underlying
issues and concerns, as well as solutions and plans of action for grassroots
communities.
In these gatherings, marginalized sectors, which are most directly
affected by the armed conflict, are well represented. There they have an
opportunity to articulate their problems, issues and concerns. The three-
day Summit is usually held in different parts of the country to enable
church leaders and members to participate in this big event. It allows ecu-
menical groups to be updated on recent developments in the peace talks
and to ask questions and propose recommendations to the GRP and
NDFP representatives. A foreign or local resource speaker also provides
an expert opinion on conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
Second, PEPP sponsors peace fora, workshops, and seminars. PEPP
has followed the peace negotiations since 2007. It keeps up to date
through regional workshops and similar activities. Anchored to PEPP’s
three-pronged strategy of advocacy, bridge-building and constituency-
building, peace fora is part of PEPP’s peace education initiative, which
emphasizes capability building and networking for improved advocacy on
the national, regional, and provincial levels. National and regional peace
232 JERRY D. IMBONG

fora and workshop-seminars enable PEPP to organize and sustain pressure

groups and peace catalysts from the churches in various regions all over
the country. Peace fora also convey the public’s needs and aspirations to
each side in the conflict and to the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG)
in its role as third party facilitator.
Third, part of PEPP’s prophetic role is to amplify the voice of the
church through statements, pronouncements, and actions by PEPP or by
each of the individual federations. This is part of PEPP’s education efforts
and its advocacy, among its constituents, to become pressure groups/peace
catalysts. Statements normally contain calls to push the GRP and the
NDFP to go back to the negotiation table, to resume the peace talks, and
to generate a final peace agreement. These pronouncements are circulated
in both mainstream and social media.

F ourth, PEPP facilitates the release of Prisoners of War (POWs) held

captive by the NPA. Their release has created a more promising
atmosphere for both parties to continue the peace talks. It is part of an
NPA confidence-building measure to show the GRP that the CPP-NPA-
NDFP is sincere in the peace talks. PEPP serves as a third party facilitator
in the POW releases. It serves as a conduit between the NDFP, the mili-
tary and the local peace and order council to facilitate a safe, orderly and
successful release. Several successful POW releases have been accom-
plished. Bishop Felixberto Calang of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente
(IFI), facilitated the release of Police Officer 2 Anthony Natividad in
Barangay Dominorog, Talakag, Buikdnon on April 27, 2017. Mayor
Oscar Moreno, chair of the Regional Peace and Order Council for the
Northern Mindanao region (comprising Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis
Oriental, Misamis Occidental and Lanao del Norte) described the “safe
release of Natividad is a victory for peace.”
On March 24, 2017 the Compostela Valley–Davao Gulf Sub-
Regional Command of the NPA safely released CAFGU members Rene
C. Doller and Carl Mark L. Nucos. PEPP served as third party facilitator.
Pfc. Adonis Jess M. Lupiba was released in a remote village in Misamis
Oriental on November 20, 2015. The NDFP Negotiating Panel released
Pfc Lupiba in response to the appeal of the wife and parents of the afore-
said POW. Senior Police Officer 4 Renie Rombo was released by the
NPA’s custodial force to PEPP, in Barangay Banglay, Lagonglong town
in Misamis Oriental on May 2, 2016. The following day, Private First
Class Diven Tawide and Private First Class Glenn Austria of the 23rd
Infantry Battalion, Corporal Jawad Awadi and militiaman Roy Perez were
released in San Luis, Agusan del Sur. Warren Hansel Conales and PO3
Edwin Panis Castor were released through the efforts of third party
THE GRP-NDFP PEACE PROCESS AND THE PHILIPPINE CHURCH 233

facilitator PEPP Bishop Felixberto Calang, IFI. The release of the captives
was made possible through the initiatives of third party facilitators led by
church leaders from PEPP and local government officials.

T he quest for peace in the decades-old Filipino armed conflict has become
elusive again. The peace talks between the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (NDFP) have stalled. Since June 2018, significant increases in
armed encounters between the AFP and the NPA have occurred and many
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
As the largest ecumenical peace movement in the country, PEPP has
a broad constituency. It persists in its call for the resumption of the peace
talks and an enduring agreement. Using its broad church-based logistics,
PEPP has effectively raised awareness on the grassroots level about the
critical importance of the peace process. Inspired by people’s persistent
clamor for a just and lasting peace, church leaders come together to pur-
sue that end. Convinced that a just and lasting peace can be attained only
through principled negotiations, which examine the root-causes of the
armed conflict, PEPP plays a vital role in forging a coherent, theologically
relevant, spiritually enlivening, and practical approach to the task of
peacebuilding.

FUNDING
This work was funded by the Letran Research Center.

RECOMMENDED READINGS
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Galtung, Johan. 2000. Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (The Transcend
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Galtung, Johan. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research
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Jerry D. Imbong is finishing his PhD in Philosophy at De La Salle University, Manila. He finished
M.A. in Philosophical Research at the same university. He’s a past faculty researcher at Colegio de
San Juan de Letran, Intramuros, Manila, Philippines and currently a faculty researcher at Samar
State University, Calbayog City, Philippines. He is also actively involved in the work of peacebuild-
ing in his capacity as core group member of PEPP. E-mail: jerry.imbong@usu.edu.ph