Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PHIL3
PHIL3
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PHILOSOPHIC SAGACITY
3. ETHNO-PHILOSOPHY
4. IDEALOGICAL PHILOSOPHY
5. PROFFESIONAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
Oruka famously identified what he initially described as four trends of African philosophy. Later
on he was to add two more trends to make six trends of African philosophy. Oruka writes: “A
number of years ago I described four trends in the development of African philosophy:
ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy, nationalist-ideological philosophy, and philosophic
sagacity. To this list, we probably need to add two more: the hermeneutic trend and the artistic
trend” (Oruka: 1998; 101). P.O. Bodunrin has chosen to describe these trends “perhaps more
appropriately [as] approaches” (1984; 1). However one chooses to describe these
trends/approaches it seems fair to opine that the trends or approaches in African philosophy are
still emerging and they cannot be limited to any specific number. Thus Didier Kaphagawani
observes that “…African philosophy is, as accepted by philosophers in Africa, still in its
embryonic stage. As such it has yet to establish not only a tradition, as some scholars in Africa as
well as elsewhere would have us believe, but seemingly several such traditions”.
PHILOSOPHIC SAGACITY
A sage, as defined by the editors of the English Dictionary (2006), is any person who is ―wise
through reflection and experience‖ (p. 368). What this lexicographical analysis of a sage quickly
suggests is that a sage is an individual person; but not all individuals are sagacious. It goes in line
with the position that philosophers are humans but we normally don‘t (at least, in a strict sense)
in which we differentiate between sages and philosophers, for you to note is that sages are
Unwilling philosopher.‘ We say unwilling‘ because sages are, firstly, not career philosophers –
whether in training or in practice – and say or write are quite witty that had you not been told of
their identities, you would regard them as philosophers. Another thing you need to note about
sages is that they are loners‘ in the societies where they live; they usually do not subscribe to the
same philosophical beliefs floating around in their societies. This, even while it is probably true
that a society‘s cultural norms and practices have philosophical imports, sages are those men or
women who are wise enough to be sceptical of these traditions or any new ones in order to
evaluate them in a dispassionate manner. They are able to come up with their own positions on
diverse spheres of their lived experiences – either these are in tandem with the rest of the
members of their societies or not. Now, Henry Odera Oruka, the Kenyan philosopher, was the
first to the popularize this method of doing African philosophy. His main motivation for doing
this derives, in part, from some of the criticisms of ethnophilosophy. The chief criticism here is
that of unanimism; the charge that ethnophilosophy amounts, in reality, to folk or collective
philosophy. To these critics, philosophy qua philosophy is an individual venture. It is also
adversarial and reflective, etc. And, to them, ethnophilosophers failed in all, or at least most, of
their ingredients of a genuinely philosophical work. It was a way of responding to this charge
that exponents of sage philosophy, led by Oruka, sought to show that traditional Africa had her
own fair number of sagacious thinkers. Late professor H. O. Oruka, the first to popularise this
current or trend holds that the task of the literate, Western-educated professional scholar is to go
on field trips to indigenous African communities that are quite free of Western civilization and
development and seek-out these sagacious men and women. These sages are to be interviewed
and their thoughts documented. In adopting this approach, Oruka and co believe that an
authentically African philosophy, that can 57 rival any other world philosophy, will be achieved.
Marcel Griaule‘s works on Dogon (especially, Ogotemmeli) sages of Burkina-Faso also qualifies
as belonging to this genre. J .O. Sodipo and Barry Hallen, his American collaborator, also
worked on some Yoruba onisegun whose insights on the epistemological concepts of knowledge
and belief. Among the several criticisms that have been levelled on Sage philosophy by critics is
the philosophical purity of the thoughts of the so-called sages. It is asked by critics: to what
extent will the interviewer metropolitan scholar not put words into the mouths of his/her
interviewee native sages? And to what extent are these sages immune from metropolitan views in
today‘s ever closer world? The implication of these queries is to cast doubts on the originality of
the thoughts of the sages. Other criticisms of sage philosophy was by P. O. Bodunrin. Bodunrin
suggests that it is one thing to have sages in Africa and it is another matter to insist, as Oruka and
company apparently do, that there were philosophers in traditional Africa who carried out
independent works of philosophy in these societies. Thus, Bodunrin thinks the exponents of sage
philosophy have confused one for the other; and while the first point is hardly contestable, the
other is.
ETHNOPHILOSOPHY
All this was put to stop, even reversal, with the advent of the slave trade, colonialism and
imperialism. Thus, Africans, since the early to the hey days of colonialism, have always sought
to overthrow such inhibitory and unprogressive social orders. The Nationalist-Ideological project
is a way out of the former quagmire. The Nationalist-Ideological project was in several phases,
you need to bear in mind. First, was the phase of political liberation of African states from
colonial rule. This has been largely achieved as virtually all parts of Africa are now under
‗national‘ governments. The anti-colonial phase of the Nationalist-Ideological project was
chiefly driven by early nationalist leaders in the various states of Africa – Julius Nyerere,
Kenneth Kaunda, Kwame Nkrumah, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and several others. According to
Nkrumah, for instance, ―Seek ye first the political kingdom‖ and everything else will fall into
place. Phl 126
PROFFESIONAL PHILOSOPHY
Hountondji (1996, p.viii) describes professional philosophy as “a set of texts, specifically the set
of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by the authors themselves”. This
school consists of that philosophy expounded by western-trained African philosophers such as
Oruka (1987), Bodunrin (1986), Wiredu (1980), Hountondji (1996) and many others involved in
philosophical discussion in and/or on Africa. Some of these African philosophers were of the
conviction that African philosophy did not yet exist (Serequeberhan 1991, 21), or at least that it
was just beginning to exist in their own discourses (Gyekye 1987, 8). For them philosophy is the
handmaid of science and modernization. They assert that philosophy, whether in Africa or the
North, is different from religion, mythology and mysticism. On the one hand, central to
philosophy is the use of reason in critical thinking; on the other, religion, mythology and
mysticism rely on faith. Those who subscribe to the professional philosophy school insist that
while the North has been for long involved with science and philosophy, the two fields of inquiry
are not preserves of the North (Serequeberhan 1991; Hountondji 1996). Thus those who belong
to the professional philosophy school reject the particularistic approach of ethno-philosophy and
take a Universalist view of philosophy instead: they argue that philosophy must have the same
meaning everywhere, so that what should differ are the problems it interrogates, and, in some
cases, the methods of dealing with these problems. The methods can be determined by cultural
biases and the existential situation in the society in which the philosopher operates (Hountondji
1996; Wiredu 1980; Bodunrin 1986). Thus according to adherents of the professional philosophy
school, African and European philosophies are understandably different by virtue of the varying
cultures and environments from which they evolve. However, the difference does not lie in the
use of reason. Indeed, Oruka points out that “reason is a universal human trait” (Oruka 1986, 66).
Hence members of this school argue that philosophy is a conceptual, self-critical discourse that
uses logic. In addition, philosophy is preserved through writing: there are written philosophical
works that the West can point to as their philosophy (Wright 1986). The implication of this
assertion is that since there were no written texts that Africans could point to as their philosophy,
African philosophy could not be said to exist prior to the advent of colonialism.
REFERENCES