Power and International Law

Author(s): Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 64-87
Published by: American Society of International Law
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 LAW
POWERANDINTERNATIONAL

and onathanM. Zasloff*

ByRichardH. Steinberg

A hundred years ago, the AmericanJournal ofInternational Law (AJIL) was founded by a
group of publicists who believed that international law could abolish (or at least substantially
diminish) the role of power in world affairs.So deep was this belief that it often servedas a back-
ground operating assumption in international legal scholarship and did not even require dis-
cussion. But since 1940, dozens of articles in the Journal have focused on the relationship
between law and power. Indeed, many AJIL articles have been written by scholars and prac-
titioners whose life work has focused on power and international law- how power constrains
international law (or dooms it to irrelevance),how the powerful can harness international law
to their ends, and how international law may autonomously reconfigurepower in its own right.
This essay elaborates and analyzes the range of stances on the relationship between power
and international law that have appearedin theJ ournalin the last century. While views of the
relationship between power and international law are diverse, and many approaches straddle
heuristic lines, they can be grouped into four intellectual movements. Each major intellectual
movement may be seen as a reaction to the ideas that preceded it, and each may be better under-
stood in the context of international developments contemporaneous with their emergence.
While most of the intellectual movements born since 1980 originated in political science, eco-
nomics, or sociology, all have eventually found their way into the pages of theJournal. In recent
years,each majormovement has evolved to employ elements from earliertheoretical traditions.
Part I distills "classicallegal thought." Classicistsgenerallybelieved that power and coercion
could become farless prominent in world affairsthrough the development of international law.
The early twentieth-century classical legal thinkers who founded the Journal, and some con-
temporary thinkers, including many legal positivists, consider law and politics to be intrinsi-
cally and appropriatelyseparate realms of inquiry.
Part II analyzesrealistreactions to classicism.With Fascist aggressionin the late 1930s, real-
ism emerged to launch an epistemological, heuristic, and normative attack on the classical
approach.While realismgenerallyviews international law as a reflection of the interestsofpow-
erful states, and structuralrealism-at its core- denies that international law is consequential,
realists display a range of views, from those who find international law meaningless to those
who find it crucial to understanding state behavior.
The structural realist position (and oversimplifications of other versions of realism)-sug-
gesting that law is little more than a reflection of power- catalyzed decades of reaction, which
attempted to show how international law affects behavior. Part III distills the elements of this
reaction: early efforts to use sociology or the social sciences more broadly; rationalist institu-
tionalism's demonstration that international law is plausibly autonomous; and the application
of liberal theory, usually in conjunction with institutionalism, to show how law affects the
behavior of states, rulers, groups, and individuals.
* Richard
Steinbergis a memberof the Boardof Editors;andJonathanZasloffis Professorof Law,University
of Californiaat LosAngelesSchoolof Law.The authorsthankDavid Caron,JudithGoldstein,PeterGourevitch,
Joel Handler,and KalRaustialafor theirusefulsuggestions.
64

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 65

PartIV considersconstructivistapproachesto the relationshipbetweenpowerandinterna-

tional law, an ontologicalrevolutionthat has challengeda centralassumptionof the move-
ments that precededit: that, for analyticpurposes,the interestsand identitiesof individuals
may be takenas given. Constructivistssee interestsand identitiesas intrinsicallyinseparable
from socialgroups.Internationallaw both reflectsand reinforcesidentitiesand interests.
The conclusionidentifiesandevaluatestrendsin the treatmentof powerand international
law in theJournal'sfirstcentury.In sharpcontrastto the focus of its firstthirtyyears,much
work in theJournalnow consciouslyconsidersthe relationshipbetweenpowerand interna-
tionallaw.A rangeof metatheories-theoriesof firstprinciplesthatguideandsubsumea host
of lower-orderexplanations- hasemergedin thelasthalfcenturyto explainthe autonomyand
limitsof internationallaw,yet the literatureusingtheseapproachesis now so extensivethatno
one hasdeepexpertisein allof them.Increasingly, articleson the topicfocuslesson establishing
the primacyofa singlemetatheory,andmoreon usingtheheuristicsandmethodsof morethan
one approachto understandthe relationshipbetweenpowerand law in a particularlegalor
policycontext.Ismsarein decline,andhybridizedheuristicsin ascendance.Yetwe shouldsee
thistrendasa triumphforinternationallaw,not a failure,forit demonstratesthatinternational
lawyersand legal scholarsareadjustingto the limits of metatheory,bringingorderto our
discipline by embracingcomplexityand resistingthe temptationto valueparsimonyover
explanation.

I. CLASSICISM: YEARS
EARLY
THEJOURNAL'S

The foundersof the AmericanSocietyof InternationalLawcould not have imaginedin

1906 that subsequentgenerationsof internationallaw scholarsand practitionerswould
becometransfixedby power.The United Stateshademergedat the turnof the twentiethcen-
of any
turyasa playerin great-powerpolitics,yet it couldboastno foreignpolicyinfrastructure
kind-no professionalforeignservice,no experienceddiplomaticcorps,no universitystudyof
internationalrelations,no think tanksor studygroups.Policymakershad to searchfor some
sort of paradigmto makethis new world clearand coherent.
They foundthatparadigmin law.' The era'sdominantframeworkof legalideology,some-
legalthought,"explainedwhylawwaseffectiveandhow it wasenforced.2
timescalled"classical
And it carriedmassiveimplicationsfor internationallaw and foreignpolicy, for it suggested
thatlegalrulesandinstitutionsdid not ariseout of the powerof the coercivestatebut, rather,
out of custom,consensus,and privateordering.Lawwas built upon norms.In this sense,the
distinctionbetweeninternationalandmunicipallawmeltedawayandneitherneededthe state
1 Formore
backgroundon the legalideologyof Americanforeignpolicybetween1900 and 1933, seeJonathan
Zasloff,Lawand theShapingofAmericanForeignPolicy:Fromthe GildedAgeto theNew Era,78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
239 (2003) [hereinafterZasloff,GildedAge];JonathanZasloff,LawandtheShapingofAmerican ForeignPolicy:The
TwentyYears'Crisis,77 S. CAL.L. REV.583 (2004) [hereinafterZasloff, TwentyYears'Crisis].
2
Classicallegalprinciplesformeda coherentandworkableideologybecausethey legitimatedlawyers'workto
lawyersthemselves.And this ideologyrepresenteda congenialworldviewforelite lawyersbecauseit suggestedthat
lawcreatedorderwithoutcoercion,andmaintainedorderwithoutnecessaryconflict.It thusassuredelitelawyers-
all of whom werewealthy,and manyof whom exercisedpoliticalpower--of the essentialjustnessof theirsocial
positionandthe worthinessof theirprofession.But aswith all ideologies,suchservicehardlymeantthatits adher-
entsusedit forobfuscation.Asone prominentcommentatorhasnoted,"Itisdifficultto read[their]correspondence
TO
... without feeling they believed what they espoused." RICHARDL. MCCORMICK,FROM REALIGNMENT
REFORM: POLITICAL CHANGEIN NEWYORKSTATE,1893-1910, at 112 (1981). A prominentanalystof the
careerof CharlesEvansHughesalsonoteshow closelyhis privatelettersandnotesmatchhis publicstatementsand
actions. See BETTYGLAD, CHARLESEVANSHUGHESAND THE ILLUSIONSOF INNOCENCE3 (1966).

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66 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 100:64

to be effective.But if lawwasnot the instrumentof statepower,thenwhatwasit andhow did

it becomeeffective?
First,law and legalinstitutionsservedas neutral,apoliticalinstitutionsand principlesthat
couldresolveconflictswhilegivinggroupsandindividualscompletelibertywithintheirrespec-
tive spheresof action.Classicallegalthinkersobviouslydid not denythe existenceof conflict.
But they believedthat it resultedeitherfrom failureto provideproperinstitutionalmecha-
nisms,3or froma misconceptionof problemsthatobscureda morebasicharmony.4Lawwas
a science,and thus could be divorcedsharplyfrompolitics.
Second, law servedas the expressionof communitycustom.5The emphasison custom
reflectedclassicism'sassumptionthat conflictswere more apparentthan real, for custom
derivedfromthe senseof a unifiedcommunity.6As a result,customwaslinkednot withstifling
conformity,but with democraticnormssuitablefor freesocieties-or a freesocietyof states.
Third,lawevolvedandgrewin both strengthand effectivenessthrougha voluntaryprocess
of arbitrationandinformalmechanisms.The evolutionarycharacterof classicallegalthought
lentpowerfulsupportto the beliefthattheweaknessesof internationalinstitutionsdid not sig-
nifyfundamentalproblemsbut, rather,temporarydifficultieson the wayto morerobustinsti-
tutions.Legalevolutionarythoughtwas not Darwinian:it advancedno unifiedtheoryof the
evolutionarymechanism.This gapallowedclassicallegalthinkersto believethat institutions
would becomestrongerwithout havingto pay too much attentionto potentialobstacles.
U.S. foreign-policymakers knewaboutclassicallegalthought(althoughtheywould not have
calledit that)becauseso manyof themwerelawyers-particularly in the RepublicanParty,the
nation'smajoritypartyfrom1896to 1932.EveryAmericansecretary of statefrom1889 to 1945
wasa lawyer;the samecouldbe saidof onlyone Britishforeignsecretary duringthe sameperiod.
Thus, classicism both provided intellectualunderpinningfor internationallegalschol-
the
arshipand guidedactualAmericanpolicy. Both trendscametogetherin the personof Elihu
Root, theeminencegriseof GOP foreignpolicy,the leaderof theAmericanbar,anda founder
of the Society.7Fittingly,Root authoredthe firstarticlein the AJIL,and clearlyset forththe
most basicof classicalpremises:
[T]he true basisof the peace and orderin which we live is not fearof the policeman;
it is the self-restraintof the thousandsof peoplewho makeup the communityand their
willingnessto obeythelawandregardtherightsof others.The truebasisof businessis notthe
sheriffwithawritofexecution;it isvoluntary observance ofbusiness
oftherulesandobligations
lifewhichareuniversally as
recognized essential
to business
success.8

3 JamesBrownScott, TheWorkoftheSecondHague PeaceConference,2 AJIL1, 21-22 (1908) (celebratingneutral

internationalprizecourt).
4 SeeRichardOlney, TheDevelopment ofInternationalLaw, 1AJIL418, 422 (1907) (remarking aboutthe "East-
ernquestion,"thatthe "collectivewill of all civilizedstatesoverridesthe will of anyrecalcitrant
state"and that"the
underlyingandjustifyingprincipleis ... the bestinterestsof Europeas a whole as comparedwith thoseof a single
stateor of a few states").
5 Olney, supranote 4, at 420; Scott,supranote 3, at 3; AlpheusHenrySnow, LawofNations,6 AJIL890, 893
(1912) (statingthat the lawgiveris "society,"not the stateapparatus).
6
Scott,supranote 3, at4; Snow,supranote 5, at 898 (arguingthatnationalexecutivesenforcethe lawof nations
and do not act solelyin the nationalself-interest).
7 Root servedassecretary of warfrom 1899 to 1904, secretaryof statefrom 1905 to 1909, andU.S. senatorfrom
New Yorkfrom 1909 to 1915. His nonpoliticalresumeis hardlylessdistinguished:presidentof theAmericanSoci-
ety of InternationalLaw(ASIL)from 1906 to 1924, a founderof thisJournal,andalsothe founderof theAmerican
LawInstitute,the thinktankofAmericanelitelawyers.LittlewonderthatAmericanLawyerlistedhim asone of the
hundredmost influentialattorneysof the twentiethcentury.
8 ElihuRoot, TheNeedofPopularUnderstanding oflnternationalLaw,1AJIL1, 2 (1907). Root'sprotege,James
BrownScott, the formerdeanof the Universityof SouthernCaliforniaand Illinoislaw schools,and professorof
law at ColumbiaUniversity,becametheAJIL'sfirsteditorin chief. Root had hiredScott as solicitorof the State

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 67

Thus, "thedifferencebetweenmunicipaland internationallaw,in respectof the existenceof

forcescompellingobedience,is moreapparentthan real,and . .. therearesanctionsfor the
enforcementof internationallawno lessrealandsubstantialthanthosewhichsecureobedience
to municipallaw."'
Root'sviewsechoedthroughoutthe firstthreedecadesof the century.In theAJIL,authorsfre-
quentlymadeanalogies betweenmunicipalandinternational insti-
law,1oarguedthatinternational
tutionsfosteredagreementbecausetheyallowedfor discoveryof essentialharmony,I'and con-
tendedthatinternational lawwas- oratleastcouldsoonbe-a neutral,apoliticalvenuein which
to settleinternational Legalevolutionwasworkingaswell:formersecretary
disputes.12 ofstateRich-
ardOlneyexplainedthatnew conceptionsof sovereignty weretakinghold because"[s]tateinde-
pendence .... hasbecome radicallyqualifiedby stateinterdependence."'3
In the sameway that distinguishedpractitionersdominatedmuch earlyAJILscholarship,
concreteU.S. foreignpoliciesformedthe contextforthedevelopmentof classicalinternational
lawtheory.Forexample,PresidentTaft'ssecretary of statePhilanderKnox,a corporateattorney
deeplyinfluenced stunnedthepowersinlate1909byproposing
byclassicism,'" theinternationalization

Department,a positionhe held at the time of theJournal'sfounding.Fordetailson the Root-Scottrelationship,

and the organizationof conservativelegalismthroughoutthe firstthree decadesof the twentiethcentury,see
CHARLES DEBENEDETTI, ORIGINS OFTHEMODERN AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT, 1915-1929, at 46-58
(1978); WARREN F. KUEHL,SEEKING WORLDORDER:THEUNITEDSTATES ANDINTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATION TO 1920, at 105, 116, 158, 161, 209 (1969).
9 ElihuRoot, TheSanctionofInternational Law,2 AJIL451 (1908);seealsoEditorialComment,ElihuRoot,3
AJIL423 (1909) (extensivelyquotingRoot'sspeech,"Causesof War,"which madesimilararguments).
10Scott,
supranote 3, at 4; Snow,supranote 5, at 890, 894, 896, 897;JamesBrownScott, TheLegalNatureof
International Law, 1 AJIL831 (1907).
11Olney,supranote4, at427. Codificationbredcooperationin theclassicalworldviewbecauseit enabledparties
to knowtheirobligationsandalsoto knowwho hadviolatedthem.And this cooperation,in turn,wouldpromote
the "voluntaryobservanceof... rulesandobligations"becausethe alternativewasbeingshunnedby the restof the
community.Root, supranote 8, at 2. This contentionunderlaythe drivefor the codificationof internationallaw,
whichoccupiedhundredsofAJILpagesthroughouttheperiod.SeeL.Oppenheim,TheScienceoflnternationalLaw:
Its TaskandMethod,2 AJIL313, 320 (1908) ("[O]nlycodification... can createagreementand unanimity,and
therebyuniversallyrecognizedrulesof law.");seegenerallyElihuRoot, TheFunctionofPrivateCodification oflnter-
nationalLaw, 5 AJIL577 (1911); ErnestNys, Codification ofInternationalLaw, 5 AJIL877; HenryG. Crocker,
Codification ofInternational Law, 18 AJIL38 (1924); ElihuRoot, Codification ofInternationalLaw, 19 AJIL675
(1925); ManleyO. Hudson, TheProgressive CodificationofInternationalLaw,20 AJIL655 (1926);JamesBrown
Scott, TheGradualandProgressive CodificationoflnternationalLaw, 21 AJIL417 (1927); JesseS. Reeves, The
Hague Conferenceon the CodificationofInternationalLaw, 24 AJIL52 (1930); Manley O. Hudson, TheFirst
Conference for the CodificationofInternationalLaw, 24 AJIL447; Philip MarshallBrown, TheCodificationof
InternationalLaw,29 AJIL25 (1935). Societiesbuilt on reciprocitycan, of course,be highlyviolent and unsta-
ble, escalating instability. See ROBERTO. KEOHANE,Reciprocityin InternationalRelations,in INTERNA-
TIONALINSTITUTIONS AND STATEPOWER132, 138-39 (1989). This is why the underlyingharmonyof
interests,or at leasta preponderanceof common interest,wascrucialforclassicismin makingreciprocitydesir-
able: reciprocitywould not spin out of control becauseat the end of the day interestswere aligned. But this
belief did lead internationallegalscholarsto view things as cleareven when they werenot. The Root-Takahira
Agreementof 1908, which concernedthe Japanesesphereof influencein Manchuria,is famouslyvague. See,
e.g., RaymondA. Esthus, TheChangingConceptofthe OpenDoor, 1899-1910, 46 MISS.VALLEY HIST.REV.
435, 444-51 (1959) (detailinghistoriographicaldebateand arguingfor a new interpretation).But the editors
of theAJILclaimedthat the Agreementwas so clearas not even to requirecomment. EditorialComment, The
UnitedStatesandJapan in theFar East,3 AJIL168 (1909). One of us has written at greaterlength about the
classicists'connection of clearrules, reciprocity,and social peace.JonathanZasloff,AbolishingCoercion:The
JurisprudenceofAmericanForeignPolicyin the 1920's, 102 YALEL.J. 1689, 1695-98 (1993).
12Oppenheim,supranote 11, at322-23; 18AJIL260,
JamesBrownScott, TheCodification ofInternationalLaw,
267, 269 (1924) (emphasizingthat internationallaw formeda partof Langdellianlegalscience).
13 Olney, supranote 4, at 429; seealsoEditorialComment, Knoxand InternationalUnity,4 AJIL180
Secretary
(1910) (makingthe sameargument);Oppenheim,supranote 11, at 317 (claiming"theultimatevictoryof inter-
nationallaw overinternationalanarchy").
14SeeLetterfrom(Britishambassador to U.S.)JamesBryceto (foreignsecretary)SirEdwardGrey(Jan.5, 1909),
FO 371/706, PublicRecordOffice,London,quotedinMICHAEL H. HUNT,FRONTIER DEFENSE ANDTHEOPEN

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68 THEAMERICAN LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL [Vol. 100:64

of Manchurianrailways,a step thatwould destroyJapaneseand Russianspheresof influence

in the richprovince.Fortraditionaldiplomats,sucha movewasshockinglynaive:whywould
a power give up a dominant position?But for Americanclassicists,the move made sense
becauseit would bringthe railways"underan economic,scientific,and impartialadministra-
tion."" AJILeditorialsfirmlybackedKnox,insistingthat neutralizationwould actuallyhelp
Russiaand Japan"to shift theironerousduties, responsibilitiesand expensesin connection
with theserailwaysto the shouldersof the combinedpowers"and thusthe proposal"isto the
interestof allalike."16If TokyoandSt. Petersburgcouldnot see thatit wouldbe bestforthem
to relinquishtheiradvantages-andin facttheproposalwasridiculedin foreigncapitals-then
so be it: as Knoxtold PresidentTaft, "[I]twould be much betterfor us to standconsistently
by ourprincipleseventhoughwe failin gettingthemgenerallyadopted."17 Establishingprin-
ciples was crucial
because only that could lead to the spreadof law.
This storyis somewhatfamiliarto studentsof nineteenth-centurybeliefsin progressand
humanperfectibility,but theAmericanoutlookwasdifferentbecauseit persistedin American
legalthoughtandin thisJournalbeyond WorldWarI.18Throughoutthe 1920s-when Euro-
pean thoughtslid into pessimismand cynicism-American legal thinkerspublishingin the
Journalremained committedto evolutionarythought,the popular,customarybasisof law,the
ideaof the harmonyof basicinterests,law'sabilityto removepoliticsfrompublicaffairs,and
perhapsmost important,a continuingdenialof coercionas the basisfor legalefficacy.19
Classicismbecamethe centralhallmarkof Americanforeignpolicy in the 1920s. No less
a figure than PresidentCoolidge arguedthat Republicanpublic policy "represent[s]the

RELATIONS,1895-1911, at 181 & n.2 (1973) (stating that Knox

DOOR: MANCHURIAIN CHINESE-AMERICAN
is "'first,last,andall the time'a lawyer,with the characteristichabitsof mindwhichbelongto thatprofession,and
disposed to look at the questionsprimarilyfrom the legalside");Letterfrom (Britishambassadorto U.S.) Mitchell
Innesto Grey(Nov. 11, 1910), FO 371/85, quotedin id. at 224 ("To [Knox]a treatyis a contract,diplomacyis
litigation,and the countriesinterestedpartiesto a suit.").
15 Telegramfrom PhilanderKnox to (U.S. ambassador to Britain)WhitelawReid (Nov. 6, 1909), Dep't St.
NumericalFile 5315/559, NationalArchives,quotedin Zasloff,GildedAge,supranote 1, at 319.
16 EditorialComment,
Railwaysin China,4 AJIL687,689 (1910);andEditorialComment,TheChineseRailway
and Currency Loans,5 AJIL705, 707 (1911), respectively.
17 Letterfrom Knoxto Taft (Jan. 7, 1911), PhilanderH. Knox Papers,Library of Congress,quotedin Zasloff,
GildedAge,supranote 1, at 320.
18 Scott,supranote 12, at 262-63 (arguing thatWorldWarI wouldyieldincreasingstringencyandeffectiveness
of internationallaw, "whichrestrainseven sovereignnations,in the exerciseof theirsovereignty").
19 On
evolutionarythought,seeGordonE. Sherman,TheNatureandSources ofInternationalLaw, 15AJIL349,
356-57 (1921); PitmanB. Potter,Is theEstablishment ofPeaceandDisarmament DependentuponthePerfectionof
International Lawand Organization? 27 AJIL125, 128 (1933) (observingthat "peopleand nationsat largecome
to the conclusion,moreorlesssubconsciously,thatco6perationandnon-violencearemorebeneficialwaysof living
thancompetition outranceandthe useofviolence,"andtheydo so "longbeforetheyarewillingto bindthemselves
,
by lawto suchforebearance andco6perationandlongbeforetheyarewillingto establishcommonsanctionsto com-
pel such co6peration").
On the customarybasisof law, see Sherman,supra,at 351, 357.
On harmonyof basic interests,see id. at 359; GeorgeA. Finch, TheDawes Reporton GermanReparation
Payments,18 AJIL419, 434-35 (1924) (hoping that "the universalconscience"will agreethat the reportis
based " 'upon ... principlesof justice, fairness,and mutual interest'")(latterquotation from letter of trans-
mittal of Dawes Report to ReparationCommission).
On law,politics,and publicaffairs,see id. at 432 ("Theplan is not consideredto be in the natureof a political
compromise. . .").
On coercionand legalefficacy,see PhilipMarshallBrown,EditorialComment, TheGenevaProtocol,19 AJIL
338, 339-40 (1925); Potter,supra,at 128 ("Inour most civilizedcommunitiestoday,wherethe artsof law and
governmentaremost advanced,socialpeaceandco6perationdependmoreupon spontaneousindividualbehavior
thanuponorganizedcoercion.");EdwinM. Borchard,The"Enforcement"ofPeace "27AJIL518, 524
by "Sanctions,
(1933) ("Toengenderpeaceby the threatof forceis inherentlyincongruous,forit arouses,whenappliedto groups,
fearand resentment."); John BassettMoore, TheNew Isolation,27 AJIL607.

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2006] CENTENNIALESSAYS 69

processesof reducingour domesticand foreignrelationsto a systemof law."20In the inter-

nationalsphere,it wasquiteclearwhatthis frameworkrequired:the United Statesmust "put
[its]trustnot on forcebut on a reignof law and the administrationof justice"21in order"to
see alltheworldrelievedfromstrifeandconflictandbroughtunderthe humanizinginfluence
of a reignoflaw. ... We wishto discardthe elementof forceandcompulsionin international
agreementsand conductand relyon reasonand law."22
The 1920ssawa newemphasison the classicalideaof "science"asyieldingnoncoercivesolu-
tionsto the problemof "ruinouscompetition,"an old commonlawdoctrinereinvigoratedin
a seriesof U.S.domesticandforeignpolicies.23 Cooperative armedwithtechnical
institutions
expertise couldderivemutuallybeneficial solutionsforpartiesthathadhithertobelievedtheir
interests lawdidnotcoerceso muchaseducateand
to beinimical.In thisview,international
benefitallparties.Gainswereseenasabsolute,not relative.24
Theera'sdiplomatic giantwasSecretary of StateCharlesEvansHughes,a onceandfuture
Supreme Court Brilliant
Justice. and Hughescrafteda foreignpolicycommitted
disciplined,
to classical
premises,rarelydoubtingthatinternational peopledwithmenof thehighest
institutions
integritycouldfindand apply rules
clear thatwould harmonize seeminglyirreconcilable
conflicts.25
20
CALVINCOOLIDGE,Government and Business, in FOUNDATIONSOF THE REPUBLIC:SPEECHESAND
ADDRESSES 317, 330 (photo. reprint1968) (1926).
21
Waysto Peace,MemorialDay AddressDeliveredMay 31, 1926, in id. at 429, 432.
22
CoolidgeDeclaresObservance ofLaw Is BasisofPeace,N.Y. TIMES,May 31, 1927, at 1.
23 For detailson the
relationshipbetweenruinouscompetitiontheoryand world politics,see Zasloff, Twenty
Years'Crisis,supranote 1, at 589-97. Ruinouscompetitiontheoryheld that firmswould overinvestin capital
becauseof a lackof knowledgeof otherfirms'behavior,incurringhigh fixedcosts,andcontinueto operatebecause
theirmarginalprofitstillexceededtheirmarginalcost, untiltheyeventuallycollapsed.Mergerandcooperativemar-
keting arrangements werethe bestsolutions.
Ruinouscompetitiontheoryheldenormousmeaningforclassicalinternational legalthinkers,forit impliedthatcoop-
erationbetweensupposedlycompetitivefirmscouldgiveeachthe market"security" it craved.In the sameway,states'
battlingforrelativepositionwasdestructive andunnecessary becauseallcouldbenefitfromcooperation. EdwinM. Bor-
chardservedas the primaryexponentof thisapproach.SeeEDWINM. BORCHARD, THEDISTINCTION BETWEEN
LEGAL ANDPOLITICAL QUESTIONS, S. DOC.NO. 68-118, at 5 (1st Sess.1924);EdwinM. Borchard,TheProblem of
BackwardAreas andColonies, in THELEAGUE OFNATIONS: THEPRINCIPLE ANDTHEPRACTICE 201, 211 (Stephen
PierceDugganed., 1919);LetterfromEdwinM. Borchard toJohnBassettMoore(Jan.11, 1926),EdwinM. Borchard
Papers,SterlingMemorialLibrary, YaleUniversity. ButPresidentCoolidgesuggestedasimilarapproach. Waysto Peace,
in COOLIDGE, supranote20, at429, 432-33; CalvinCoolidge,PressBriefing(Jan.9, 1925),inTHETALKATIVE PRES-
IDENT: THEOFF-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCES OFCALVIN COOLIDGE 157 (HowardH. Quint& RobertH.
Ferrelleds., 1964);CalvinCoolidge,PressBriefing(Feb.23, 1926), in id. at 162.
24 A relativegain, as the term suggests,denotesa gain relativeto otherstatesin the internationalsystem.The
structuralrealistKennethWaltz explainsthe fundamentaldistinctionbetweenabsoluteand relativegains,and
arguesfor the primacyof the latterin an anarchicalstatesystem:
When facedwith the possibilityof cooperatingformutualgain,statesthatfeelinsecuremustaskhow the gain
will be divided.They arecompelledto asknot "Willboth of us gain?"but "Whowill gainmore?"... Even
the prospectof largeabsolutegainsforboth partiesdoes not elicittheircooperationso long aseachfearshow
the otherwill use its increasedcapabilities.... [T]heconditionof insecurity--atthe least,the uncertaintyof
eachaboutthe other'sfutureintentionsand actions--worksagainsttheircooperation.
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OFINTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 (1979). Classicismrejectedthiskindof real-
ist thinkingin partbecauseit rejectedthe primacyof relativegainsoverabsoluteones.
25 Not surprisingly, thesemen of high integrityweremost oftenlawyers:Hughesfrequentlyarguedthatlawyers
madethe bestAmericandiplomaticrepresentatives. SeeLetterfrom FrankB. Kelloggto CordenioA. Severance
(Sept. 19, 1924), reel 14/frame61, FrankB. KelloggPapers,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety.Kellogg,Hughes'ssuc-
cessor,concurredwith this assessment:
Hughesevidentlyhasthe ideathatlawyersmakethe bestAmbassadors. SinceI havebeenhere[asambassador
to GreatBritain]I havebeenparticularly impressedwith the advantageof a wide legalexperiencein the Dip-
lomaticService.Asyou knowmanyof thequestionswhichcomeup involveinternationallaw,andmanytimes
domesticlawsof the countries,especiallyof one'sown country,andit wouldseemto me exceedinglydifficult
for an Ambassadorto handlethem unlesshe had a legaleducation....

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70 THEAMERICAN
JOURNAL LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL [Vol. 100:64

A hostof hispolicyinitiatives-theNine-PowerTreatyon China,theDawesCommissionon rep-

arations,U.S. adherenceto theWorldCourt,the U.S.-MexicoMixedClaimsCommissions,just
to namesomeof themostsignificant-reflectHughes'sandclassicism's ideology.26Politicscould
be evadedthroughimpartialadjudication andhonestlegalreasoning.27
Hughes'ssuccessors,FrankB. Kelloggand HenryL. Stimson,followedin his path,but the
GreatDepression'sannihilationof theglobaleconomyblewaparttheweboflegalrelationships
createdin the classicalmode.Stimson,a Rootproteg6who attendedHarvardLawSchooldur-
ing theclassicalheydayandhiredelitelawyersashisfavoredsubordinates,foundhimselftrying
to applyold rulesin a newworld,andfailedmiserablyin theattempt.WhentheJapaneseArmy
forciblyoccupiedManchuriain September1931, Stimson'smostwell-knownresponsewasa
piousdeclarationthatthe United Stateswould not recognizesuchterritorialgains,whichdid
little to raisefearin Tokyo. Stimson'sattemptto redrawtheJapaneseinto the classicalworld-
viewwassimilarlyineffective:he explainedthatattemptsto achieverelativepowergainswould
simplyresultin ruinouscompetition.28ButJapanhad alreadygone down a differentroad,as
would Germany.
Not surprisingly,then, internationallegal theorydisintegratedduringthe 1930s. Some
maintainedtheold classicistfaith,nowbecomingmoreandmoreobsolete;29 otherssettledinto

Id., quotedinZasloff,TwentyYears'Crisis, supranote 1, at608 n.77;seealsoLetterfromFrankB. Kelloggto Herbert

Hoover(Sept.11, 1925), reel17/frame1, FrankB. KelloggPapers,MinnesotaHistoricalSociety(notingthatsome-
one wasappointedto a sensitivediplomaticpost primarilybecause"heis an ablelawyer"),quotedin Zasloff,supra,
at 608 n.77.
This was a commonopinion in the internationallaw community.See,e.g.,EditorialComment,Lawyer-Secre-
tariesofForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates,3 AJIL942 (1909) (arguingthatlawyerswerethe mostcompetentto
serveas secretaryof state,even abovethosewith diplomaticexperience).
26 A fulleraccountof
Hughes'spoliciesandtheirrelationshipsto classicismcanbe foundin Zasloff,TwentyYears'
Crisis,supranote 1, at 603-11, 617-26, 629-39.
Hughes'spolicyon postwarGermanreparations exemplifiedhis entireapproach.Francestruggledto enforcethe
Versaillessettlement,fearinga resurgenceof Germanpower;for its part,Berlinwasjustas eagerto show thatthe
treatywasa "scrapof paper,"andto reassumeits great-powerstatus.ForHughes,however,the reparations struggle
wasa technicalmatter:thekeyto resolvingit, Hughestold HenryCabotLodge,was"toendeavorto getthequestion
out of politics."LetterfromCharlesEvansHughesto HenryCabotLodge(Feb. 1, 1923), CharlesEvansHughes
Papers,Libraryof Congress.The secretary's solution:an independent,impartialcommission,madeup of men of
"prestige,experience,andhonor,"to determinethe "mostauthoritative" answerto the problem"insuch circum-
stancesof freedomaswill insurea replypromptedonlybyknowledgeandconscience."CHARLES E. HUGHES, THE
PATHWAY OFPEACE 57 (1925); seeEditorialComment,JointResolutiontoAuthorizetheAppointment ofa Com-
missionin Relationto UniversalPeace,5 AJIL433, 435-36 (1911).
27
Hughesprivatelytold AmbassadorJeanJusserandof France:
If a professionalman,or a man of highestauthorityin financeandbusiness,wereapproachedforhis opinion
upon a questionrelatingto his professionor to the spherein whichhe wasan authorityhis answerwould be
as clearas crystal.He couldnot by virtueof his own integrityand prestigegive anyanswerexceptthatwhich
correspondedto his intellectualconvictionbasedupon his experienceand knowledge.
Memorandumof interviewwith the Frenchambassador(Dec. 14, 1922), CharlesEvansHughesPapers,Library
of Congress,quotedin Zasloff,TwentyYears'Crisis, supranote 1, at 620. This wasa typicalviewof legalclassicism.
RobertW. Gordon,LegalThoughtand LegalPracticein theAgeofAmericanEnterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFES-
IDEOLOGIESIN AMERICA70, 98 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
SIONSAND PROFESSIONAL
28
See,e.g.,HenryL. StimsonDiary,Feb.27, 1933, SterlingMemorialLibrary,YaleUniversity.Stimsonbegan
to see the collapseof classicismby the end of his termin office.Seeid., Feb. 14, 1933 ("Iam tryingto makeup my
mind ... what the ultimateobjectivewill be with regardto sanctionsfor ... treaties... afterwe reachthe point
wherepublicopinionwill not be effective.").
29 See,
e.g.,ManleyO. Hudson, TheReportoftheAssembly oftheLeagueofNationson theSino-Japanese Dispute,
27 AJIL300, 300 (1933) (arguingthatthe LyttonCommissionreportis an "epoch-makingdocument.... [that]
marksa triumphforthe collectivesystemof handlinginternationaldisputes"(footnoteomitted));id. at 305 ("[I]ts
recommendationsmayhavea far-reachinginfluenceon futuredevelopments."); seealsoJohn BassettMoore, The
New Isolation,27 AJIL607, 622 (decryingthe ideathatprewarinternationallaw was outdatedand condemning
"[t]hetendencyto confusewarand peaceand to magnifythe partwhich forcemayplayin internationalaffairs");

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 71

morehighlytechnicalstudiesandavoidedthe biggerquestions.But asDavidBedermanpoints

out in his essayin this issue,30despairbecamethe leadingtrope,particularly by 1936. When
AJILauthorsconsideredthe riseof fascism,theyrecognizedthe implicationsthatsucha chal-
lengeheldfortraditionalconcepts,31andtheyoftenobjectedto Americanisolation,protesting
the NeutralityActsof the 1930s.32Theirlives'workhadbeeninternationallaw,andthatwork
was disintegrating.
Yet theywereunableto conceptualizean approachto internationallaw that relatedprac-
ticallyto the realitiesof worldpolitics,or held out any hope of preservingworld stabilityor
democraticvalues.EvenprotestsagainstHitlerseemedto comefromleftfield.QuincyWright
vehementlyobjectedto the Munich accords,correctlynoting that they were made under
Hitler'sduress.Butinsteadof reconsidering whethertheentireprojectof a legallyboundworld
mightneedto be abandoned,Wrightstrangelyinsistedthat"[t]hefundamentallegalcriticism
of the settlementrestson the factthatthe statesmenresponsiblefor it placedthe substanceof
the settlementaheadof the procedureby whichit wasachieved."Wrightdid not explainwhy
the bestwayto viewthe Nazi threatwasthroughthe prismof substanceandprocedure,saying
simplythat "[u]ntilthe peopleof the worldare. .. determinedto placeproceduresaheadof
substance,we mayexpectthe worldto alternatebetweendictatesof Versaillesand dictatesof
Munich, with little respitefromwarsand rumorsof wars."33Essentially,internationallegal
scholarshiphadbecomean exhortationformoralregeneration.Classicismhadcollapsed,and
no new paradigmhad arisento takeits place.

II. THREEFACESOFREALISM

In 1940, in the pagesof thisJournal,HansMorgenthaulauncheda broadepistemological,

heuristic,andnormativeattackon classicallegalthoughtin internationallaw.34Epistemolog-
ically,he arguedthatinternationallawhadmissedthe behavioralist aswellasthe
revolution,35
relatedtransformations ofAmericanandEuropeanlegalthoughtsincethelatenineteenthcen-
tury. Classicallegalthought,he argued,ignoredobservablerelationshipsbetweenpower,inter-
nationallaw,andstatebehavior.Internationallawthatdid not enjoycompliancewasnot law-
like. By the time Morgenthau'sarticleappearedin print,generalwarhad eruptedin Europe.

CharlesCheney Hyde, LegalAspectsoftheJapanesePronouncement in Relationto China,28 AJIL431 (1934);

Manley O. Hudson, TheUnitedStatesand the WorldCourt,29 AJIL301 (1935); Brown,supranote 11, at 25;
Philip MarshallBrown,MalevolentNeutrality,30 AJIL88 (1936); Denys P. Myers, TheBasesoflnternational
Relations,31 AJIL431 (1937); Quincy Wright, TheEnd ofa Periodof Transition,31 AJIL604. Readersmay
also consult virtuallyany of the articlesby Edwin M. Borchard,who maintainedhis classicistbeliefseven after
World War II.
30 DavidJ. Bederman,Appraisinga CenturyofScholarship in theAmerican JournalofInternationalLaw,100AJIL
20 (2006).
31 VirginiaGott, forexample,arguedthatNazi theoriesof international lawwere"nevercompletelyunderstand-
able."VirginiaL. Gott, TheNationalSocialistTheoryofInternationalLaw,32 AJIL704, 718 (1938); seealso,e.g.,
JamesW. Garner,RecentGermanNationalityLegislation, 30 AJIL96 (1936);ElleryC. Stowell,Intercession
Against
thePersecution ofthe ews,30 AJIL102 (condemningdiscriminatorylaws,albeitin the most polite terms).
32
See,e.g.,PhilipC. Jessup,TheNew NeutralityLegislation, 29 AJIL665 (1935);ElleryC. Stowell,TheFallacies
ofNeutrality,30 AJIL256 (1936).
33 QuincyWright, TheMunichSettlement and InternationalLaw,33 AJIL12, 31-32 (1939).
34 HansJ. Morgenthau,Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34 AJIL260 (1940).
3 While the definitionof"behavioralism" is contested,we usethetermto meanthestudyofactionsandreactions
of individuals,groups,states,and internationalorganizationsthroughobservationaland experimentalmethods.
This standsin contrastwith "formalism," which studiesrulesand usuallyassumesthat behavioris in accordwith
them. David Truman,in POLITICAL SCIENCE INAMERICA: ORALHISTORIES OFA DISCIPLINE 135 (Michael
A. Baer,MalcolmE. Jewell,& Lee Sigelmaneds., 1991).

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72 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 100:64

Nazi Germanyhad dismemberedCzechoslovakia,annexedDanzig, and attackedPoland,

Denmark,andNorway;Britainhaddeclaredwar.The idealismof the Leagueof Nationssys-
temhadbeenexposed,andstatebehaviorclearlydid not accordwith internationallaw.In con-
trastto the prewardominanceof classicallegalthoughtin U.S. foreignpolicy,realismbecame
the modalpositionamongU.S. foreignpolicy officialsin the postwarperiod.36
Normatively, adviceto economizeon violenceandE. H. Carr'scondem-
echoingMachiavelli's
nationof policiesbasedon a fatalinconsistencybetweenstrongwordsand weakaction,Mor-
genthau warned of the dangersinherent in a relianceon internationallaw that ignored
underlyingpower realities.37For example,it would be foolish to relyon a peace treatyfor
securityin the face of a grosspowerimbalanceor vacuum;doing so would probablycause
unnecessarybloodshed.38
It certainlycameasno coincidencethatrealism'sappearance in internationallegaldiscourse
occurredshortlyafterthe emergenceof legalrealism,forthe connectionsbetweenthe twowere
deep. Both emphasizedthe role of powerand coercion:for legalrealists,legalruleswerenot
neutralprinciplesarisingfromcommunityconsentbut, rather,politicsby othermeans.They
relisheddemonstratingthe incoherenceof theserulesandsawthe stateas a necessaryenforcer
of socialpeace.39In similarfashion,internationalrealistsviewedinternationaloutcomesas a

36 The classichistoricalsurveyon postwarAmericanforeignpolicy,which suggestsrealismas a drivingfactor,

remainsJOHN LEWISGADDIS,STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INTHECOLDWAR(rev.ed. 2005). An excellentbriefpiecedemonstratingtheper-
sistenceof realismin U.S. foreignpolicy is Gideon Rose, Op-Ed, GetReal,N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 18, 2005, at A25
(notingthatrealismis "American foreignpolicy'sperennialhangovercure").Forexamplesof recentrealistanalyses
of U.S. foreignpolicyand theirrelationshipto internationallaw, seeJohnYoo, International Lawand the Warin
Iraq,97 AJIL563, esp. 575-76 (2003);MichaelJ. Glennon,WhytheSecurityCouncilFailed, FOREIGN AFF.,May/
June2003, at 16. On the U.S. refusalto join the InternationalCriminalCourt,seeJackLandmanGoldsmith,The
Self-Defeating InternationalCriminalCourt,70 U. CHI.L. REV.89 (2004). Fora recentcritiqueof a realiststance
on the legalityof the secondIraqwar,and an analysisof the legalityof U.S. actionsin both Kosovoand Iraq,see
ThomasFranck'sessayin thisissue,ThomasM. Franck,ThePowerofLegitimacy andtheLegitimacyofPower:Inter-
nationalLaw in an AgeofPowerDisequilibrium,100 AJIL88 (2006).
We do not claimthat the shift to realismas the modalpositionin U.S. foreignpolicyderivedwhollyfromthe
shiftto realismin internationallawscholarship,orfromtheshiftto legalrealisminAmericanjurisprudence. Indeed,
althoughlawyersmaintaineda positionof highinfluenceinAmericandiplomacy,awholeseriesofotherinstitutions
aroseafterWorldWarII thatdiminishedtheprewarprimacyof lawastheorganizingparadigmforAmericanforeign
relations.Think tanks fosteringthe professionalstudy of internationalrelations,and the growth of the U.S.
militaryestablishment,createdtwo centralloci for thinkingabout nationalsecurity.SeeMELVYN P. LEFFLER,
A PREPONDERANCE OFPOWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THETRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, ANDTHECOLD
WAR(1992) (demonstratingbroadconsensusof a varietyof groupsconcerningthe necessityof geopolitical
thinking). For the continuing role of lawyersin the developmentof postwarU.S. foreignpolicy, seeJonathan
Zasloff, Some More RealismAbout Realism:Dean Acheson and the Jurisprudenceof Cold War Diplomacy
(drafton file with authors).
37Morgenthau, supranote34;seeNICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THEPRINCE, chs.XV,XVII;DISCOURSES, bk.I, chs.
XXI,LIX,& bk.III,ch.XLII(NewYork:EarlyModernLibrary, 1978);EDWARD HALLETT CARR, BRITAIN:A STUDY
OFFOREIGN POLICY FROM THEVERSAILLES TREATY TOTHEOUTBREAK OFWAR(1939);RobertB. Stewart,Book
Review,35 AJIL742 (1941) (reviewing id.);seealsoEDWARD HALLETT CARR, THETWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-
1939:AN INTRODUCTION TOTHESTUDYOFINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2d ed. 1946).
38 HedleyBull, TheGrotianConception in DIPLOMATIC
oflnternationalSociety, INVESTIGATIONS 51 (Herbert
Butterfield& MartinWight eds., 1966).
39The literatureon legalrealismisvast,andcontentiousaboutwhatlegalrealismactuallymeant.We believethat
the anthologyand interpretationspresentedin AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (WilliamW. FisherIII, MortonJ.
Horwitz,& ThomasA. Reededs., 1993) representthe bestset of definitions.Anothergood treatmentis foundin
JosephWilliamSinger,LegalRealism Now,76 CAL.L. REV.465 (1988) (reviewingLAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REAL-
ISMATYALE,1927-1960 (1986)). Two importantarticlesthatreflectsomeof the mostspecificwaysin whichlegal
realismrelatedto powerareRobertL. Hale, CoercionandDistributionin a Supposedly Non-CoerciveState,38 POL.
SCI.Q. 470 (1923); MorrisR. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Our interpretation
of realismis not uncontested:for otherviews,see KALMAN, supra;BryanR. Leiter,"IsTherean American'Juris-
prudence? 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.367 (1997) (reviewingNEILDUXBURY, PATTERNS OFAMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1995)).

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 73

productof the globalbalanceof power.40Without the stateto enforceorder,conflictis inev-

the strongdo whattheymay,andtheweakdo whattheymust.41
itableandthe resultpredictable:
Realistsof stripes42generallyshareMorgenthau'spositiveand normativeorientation,
all
treatthe stateasthe fundamentalactorin internationallaw(a stancethatresonateswith inter-
nationallawyersbecauseof its Westphalianroots),43and arguethat internationallaw reflects
the interestsof powerfulstates,but from thererealistapproachesdivergeinto threeschools.

Traditional
Realism

ForfortyyearsafterthepublicationofMorgenthau'sAJIL article,traditionalrealism44dom-
inated politicalscientists'and diplomats'understandingsof internationallaw, and infused
muchinternationallegalscholarship.45 ForMorgenthauandothertraditionalrealists,the key
to analyzinginternationallawwasto seeit asa reflectionof boththe interestsof powerfulstates
andnormsheldin commonacrossstates.Hence,abetterscientificunderstanding of how inter-
nationalpoliticsandsocietyworkwasneededto ascertainwhatis meaningfulinternationallaw.
Morgenthau'sapproachsignaleda shiftin thinkingaboutinternationallawthatseemednew
at the time it appearedand hasrunthroughtheJournalsinceits publication.In point of fact,
asAlfredand DetlevVagtswould latershow,consciousattentionto the relationshipbetween
balanceof power and internationallaw was as old as the Westphaliansystem;moreover,
throughoutmuch of the 1648-1914 period,many juristssaw the internationalbalanceof
powereitheras "anintegralpartof the systemof rulesof the lawof nations"or as a "necessary
preconditionto the existenceof such a law."46Yet noticeof that relationshipseemedto have
40 Such a view appearedin the pagesof the
Journal.See,e.g.,JosefL. Kunz, TheUnitedNationsand theRuleof
Law,46 AJIL504, 504 (1952) ("Thereis no doubt thatwe arein the presentepochlivingin a climateof so-called
'realism';power,not internationallaw, prevailsin the thinkingof many .. .").
41 Thereare,of course,importantdifferencesbetween(American)legalrealismand internationalrealism.For
example,the Americanlegalrealismmovement,which was directedto municipallaw, concentratedon the rela-
tionshipbetweenlawmediatedthroughthe courtsandthe valuesand functioningof relevanteconomicandsocial
communities;whereasinternationalrealismhastendedto concentrateon lawmediatedthroughthepoliticalorgans
of the statewith less interest--until recently--in internationallaw mediatedthroughmunicipalor international
courts.
42 Unlessotherwisenoted,we speakfromnow on only of international realists,andwill specificallyreferto legal
realismif necessary.
43SeeLeoGross,ThePeaceof Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AJIL20, 40 (1948) (notingthatthe Westphaliansys-
tem wasone of "ruggedindividualismof territorialand heterogeneousstates,balanceof power,equalityof states,
and toleration").
44 Many referto the traditionof realismpriorto the structuralrealistformulationas "classical," "modern,"or
"neoclassical" realism.See Theoryof WorldPolitics:StructuralRealismand Beyond,in KEOHANE, supranote 11, at
35, 42-43. In the contextof this essay,however,we adhereto "traditional" realismout of concernthatsomeother
termscouldcauseconfusionwith our discussionof classicallegalthought.For two excellentaccountsof prestruc-
tural realism, see JONATHANHASLAM,NO VIRTUELIKENECESSITY:REALISTTHOUGHT IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONSSINCE MACHIAVELLI (2002); MICHAELJOSEPHSMITH, REALISTTHOUGHT FROMWEBERTO
KISSINGER(1986).
Lawand theControl
45Forpoliticalscientistsanddiplomats,see, for example,StanleyHoffmann,International
ofForce, in THE RELEVANCE LAW21 (Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1971). See
OF INTERNATIONAL
also GEORGEKENNAN,AMERICANDIPLOMACY,1900-1950 (1951); Clyde Eagleton, InternationalLaw and the
Charterofthe UnitedNations,39 AJIL751, 751 (1945) ("Itwould be gratifyingto be ableto saythatthe Charter
ofthe UnitedNationsestablished,orassured,the reignof lawamongnations;butthe Charterdoesverylittletoward
strengtheningthe law of nations.").
Morerecently,echoesof traditionalrealismby internationallawyersmaybe seen,for example,in FrederickM.
Abbott, TheWTOMedicinesDecision:WorldPharmaceutical TradeandtheProtectionofPublicHealth,99 AJIL317
(2005);MichaelByers,TheSingleSuperpower andtheFutureofInternationalLaw,94 ASILPROC.64 (2000); Ber-
nardH. Oxman, TheFutureofthe UnitedNationsConventionon theLawof theSea,88 AJIL488, 493 (1994).
46AlfredVagts& Detlev F. Vagts, TheBalanceofPowerin InternationalLaw:A Historyofan Idea,73 AJIL555
(1979). The Framerswereacutelyconsciousof the relationshipbetweeninternationallaw and balance-of-power

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74 THEAMERICAN OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL LAW [Vol. 100:64

beenlost in Americanlegalthoughtduringthe firsthalfof the twentiethcentury,so thatJosef

Kunzcould properlyreferto the renewedattentionto powerand interestas a "great"change
in the scienceof internationallaw.47
That did not meanthat the shiftwas universallyaccepted.Normatively,severalcommen-
tatorsobjectedto it, as manywereconcernedaboutan approachthatfocusedon the interests
of powerfulstates;they suggested,for example,that it would be dangerousor morallywrong
to reconceptualizeinternational
lawstrictlyin termsof advancinga hegemon'snationalinterest.48

Structural
Realism

As realistthought evolved,the elementof powerbecameincreasinglydominantand the

identificationandunderstandingof normslost ground.Afterall,the powerelementgavereal-
ism its distinctiveness,andpowerconsiderationscould be seenas drivingforcesin worldpol-
itics in the earlyand middleCold Warperiods.By 1980, a second,moreparsimonious,and
harderversionof realism-which has sincecome to be known as "structural realism"-had
emerged,andthisstrandbecamethe conceptualcoreof the movement.Structuralrealism,and
institutionalistreactionsto it, originatedin politicalscienceliterature,49
buttheyslowlyseeped
into the internationallawliteratureandby the 1990sstructuralrealismhadfounditswayinto
theJournal.Structuralrealistsarguedthatveryfew, if any, normsaresharedacrossstates,so
that normsdid not offera reliablebasisfor internationallaw, as Morgenthauhad suggested.
Moreover,Morgenthau'sframeworkfailedto givepriorityto powerovernorms:if the norms
of most statesdivergefromthe interestsof powerfulstates,then traditionalrealismcouldnot
explainwhich prevailsin internationallaw.
Structuralrealistssimplifiedthe argument:internationallawcouldbe explainedbyknowing
only the interestsof powerfulstates.KennethWaltzgeneratedpurestructuralrealisttheory,
using deductive-axiomaticlogic to argue that the theory of internationalpolitics cannot
dependupon stateintereststhatarederivedfroma "reductionist" domesticpoliticalanalysis;
instead,somefundamentalstateinterests(suchassurvival)maybe assumedto be predominant
and characteristic of the state,which he identifiedas the fundamentalunit of analysisin an
anarchicsystem.5oIn an anarchicself-helpstate system,securitydependson relativestate
power,whichmeansthatinternationaloutcomesarezero-sum;in theinternationalsystem,rel-
ativegainspredominate.
Buildingon thatwork,StephenKrasnerdistilleda purestructuralrealistview of interna-
tionallawandorganizations: statebehaviorandassociatedinternationaloutcomesmayappear
to be shapedby international law,butbecauseinternational lawmirrorsthe interestsof powerful
states,internationallawis merelyanepiphenomenonof underlyingpower.51Internationaldis-
agreementsaboutthe contentof internationalregimesarezero-sumbattleson the Paretofron-
tier-they usuallyconcernthe distributiveconsequencesofagreements-and thosebattlesare
concepts.SeeDANIEL G. LANG,FOREIGN POLICY INTHEEARLY REPUBLIC: THELAWOFNATIONS ANDTHE
BALANCE OFPOWER(1985).
47 JosefL. Kunz, TheChangingScienceofInternational Law, 56 AJIL488, 499 (1962).
48 See,e.g.,ClydeEagleton,InternationalLaworNationalInterest,45 AJIL719 (1951); Detlev F. Vagts,Hege-
monicInternationalLaw,95 AJIL843 (2001).
49 Structuralrealism'surtextisKENNETH N. WALTZ,THEORY OFINTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supranote24.
Earlyreactionsto Waltz'swork,andhisresponse,arefoundin NEOREALISM ANDITSCRITICS (RobertO. Keohane
ed., 1986).
50WALTZ,supranote 24.
51 StephenD. Krasner, StructuralCausesand RegimeConsequences: in INTER-
Regimesas InterveningVariables,
NATIONAL REGIMES 1 (StephenD. Krasnered., 1983).

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2006] CENTENNIAL
ESSAYS 75

won by powerfulstates.52Hence, internationallaw may explainthe detailsof process,but it

has no autonomouspowerto explaininternationaloutcomes.
Somepoliticalscientists53andinternationallawyers54adoptedthisstructural realiststanceand
somehaveperpetuated it. Forexample,twenty-five
yearsafterKrasner distilledthistheoryof inter-
nationallawin thepoliticalscienceliterature,
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner importeda modified
versionof it into internationallawscholarship.Theyacknowledged thatinternational lawmight
facilitatecooperation butarguedthatinternationallawreflectinggenuinemultilateral cooperation
is unlikelyto emerge;muchof internationallawresultsfroma coincidenceof stateinterestsorcoer-
cion by powerfulstates,theyclaim,andsomefromthe needforsimplecoordination.55
The structuralrealiststancemakesa nice conceptualcontrast-a null hypothesisback-
drop-for argumentsabouthow internationallaw does matter.And manyinternationallaw
articlesperpetuatethe common misunderstanding that all realistssharethis view that inter-
nationallawhasno autonomousexplanatory power.56In fact,otherthanstructuralrealists,few
makethis claim.57

TheRealist-Institutionalist
Hybrid
Not all thosewho call themselves"realist"believethat law is inconsequential.Traditional
realistsdid not go thatfar.And for most theoristsof powerandinternationallaw- including
mostcontemporary mainstreamrealists,suchasKrasner-the purestructuralrealiststancewas
short-lived.58Indeed, in the verysamevolume in which the purestructuralrealiststanceon
internationallawwaspresented,a competingapproachto internationallawwasintroduced,"
suggestingthat internationallaw could facilitatecooperationby statesand that international
law is thereforeconsequential.This approachchartednew paths,one of which has becomea
third,hybridizedline of realistthought.

52 StephenD. Krasner,GlobalCommunications andNationalPower: LifeontheParetoFrontier,43 WORLDPOL.

336 (1991).
53See,e.g.,John Mearsheimer,TheFalsePromiseoflnternationalInstitutions,INT'LSECURITY, Winter 1994/
1995, at 5.
54 See,e.g.,EdwinD. Williamson,RealismVersus 96 ASILPROC.262 (2002).
Legalismin InternationalRelations,
55 JACKL. GOLDSMITH& ERICA. POSNER,THE LIMITSOF INTERNATIONAL
LAW36-37, 118,225 (2005).
56 See,e.g.,Anne-MarieSlaughterBurley,International
LawandInternational A DualAgenda,
RelationsTheory:
87 AJIL205, 206 (1993); KennethW. Abbott,International RelationsTheory,International Law,and theRegime
Governing Atrocitiesin InternalConflicts,93 AJIL361, 365 (1999).
57 DuringGeorgeW. Bush'spresidency,some U.S. governmentofficialsand commentatorscallingthemselves
"realists"havearguedthatlawdoesnot andshouldnot constrainpursuitof the U.S. nationalinterest.In supporting
variousforeignpolicies,definitionsof the "nationalinterest"havesometimesbeen basedon an ideologicalcom-
mitmentto the proprietyof democratizingthe world,or partsof it. MahmoudAbbas,then the Palestinianprime
minister,recountshow PresidentBush told him: "I havea moraland religiousobligation.I must get you a Pal-
estinianstate.And I will."EwenMacAskill,GeorgeBush:'GodToldMe to End the Tyrannyin Iraq,'GUARDIAN,
Oct. 7, 2005, Home Pages,at 1. Thisstancediffersfromthatof structuralrealists,who definethecorenationalinterest
assurvival,advancingpoliciesthatmaximizetheprospectsfornationalsurvival.
WALTZ, supranote24, at91. Italsodiffers
fromthatof mostotherrealists, whoseea foreignpolicythatis basedon ideologyandconsumesvastnationaleconomic,
diplomatic,andmilitaryresources asanimprudentluxuryavailable onlyto a hegemonicstatefora limitedhistorical peri-
od--until pursuitof that policy underminesits hegemonicposition.STEPHEN D. KRASNER, DEFENDING THE
NATIONALINTEREST:
RAWMATERIALS AND U.S. FOREIGNPOLICY(1978). Indeed, effortsto stretch
INVESTMENTS
therealistparadigm to advanceaparticular ideologymaybeseenbysomeasa rootofmiscalculations in Iraq-which may
be catalyzinga returnto realism,evidenced(atthetimeof thiswriting)by suggestions of disengagementfromIraqcon-
currentlywith attemptsto curryfavorwith disgruntled Europeanallies.
58 As suggested by the analysishere,it is incorrectto claimthatrealismseesinternationallawas inconsequential;
only thatstructuralrealismand its progenydeem internationallaw inconsequential.
5 RobertO. Keohane,TheDemandfor International Regimes,in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supranote 51, at
141;StephenD. Krasner,RegimesandtheLimitsofRealism:Regimes asAutonomous in INTERNATIONAL
Variables,
REGIMES, supranote 51, at 355.

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76 THEAMERICAN LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL [Vol. 100:64

This versionof realism,in contrastto structuralrealism,doesnot seepoliticsasa purezero-

sumconflictbetweenstates.Positive-sumpossibilitiesexistandcooperative,Pareto-improving
outcomesmaybe facilitatedby internationallaw.However,likeotherrealists,adherentsof this
approachbelievethattherelativepowerofstatesshapesinternationallaw:bothcooperativeand
coercedoutcomesaredistributedasymmetrically, reflectingthe relativepowerof states.60
In thisview,whichmaybe seenasa hybridbetweenrealismandrationalistinstitutionalism
(describedbelow),internationallawis consequential:evenif it facilitatesoutcomesfavoredby
powerfulstates,it maysimultaneouslyfacilitatepositive-sumoutcomesthatwould not oth-
erwiseemerge.Forexample,internationallawmayfacilitatecooperationby powerfulstatesin
their relationswith weakerstates;61generateinformationflows that are usefulto powerful
states;62establishlegitimateinternationaljudicialprocessesthatproducea patternof outcomes
constrainedand favoredby powerfulstates;63constitute incentivesand opportunitiesfor
weakerstatesto adoptparticular policiesandchangethestructureof theirdomesticinstitutions
in waysfavoredby powerfulstates;64 and legitimatethe actionsof powerfulstates--or legit-
imatethe veryexistenceof the statesystem.65

LAWMATTERS:
III. INTERNATIONAL RATIONALIST-
SOCIOLOGICAL,
AND LIBERAL
INSTITUTIONALIST, RESPONSES

Beginningin the 1950s,realismsetintomotionaseriesof intellectual

responses thatadoptedthe
socialscientificshiftadvocatedby Morgenthau,but consciouslyattemptedto distillanddemon-
stratehowinternational outcomes(usually,coop-
institutionsandlawmayfacilitateinternational
eration,order,orjustice)thatwouldnototherwiseoccur.Intheseviews,international lawisusually
an independentvariableor a meaningfulinterveningvariablethat affects behavior, defining
opportunitiesand incentives that rechannelor reconfigurethe behaviorof powerfulactors.
Threelinesof rules-based argumentation developed,basedlargelyon sociology,rationalistlogic
(which became the coreof the to
rebuttal purerealism),andliberalanalysis,respectively.

andInternational
Sociology Law

Rules-basedapproacheslaunchedin the firstthirtypostwaryearswereanchoredin process66

and a sociologicalexplorationof factorsthat might make internationallaw consequential.

60LLOYD THEWORLD:POWER
RULING
GRUBER, INSTITU-
ANDTHERISEOFSUPRANATIONAL
POLITICS
TIONS
(2001);Richard
H. Steinberg,
IntheShadow
ofLaworPower?
Consensus-Based
Bargaining in
andOutcomes
the GATT/WTO,
56 INT'LORG.339 (2002).
H. Steinberg,
61 Richard TheProspects
forPartnership: to Transatlantic
Obstacles
Overcoming PolicyCooperation
in Asia, in PARTNERS
ORCOMPETITORS? THEPROSPECTS ON ASIAN
COOPERATION
FORU.S.-EUROPEAN
TRADE213 (RichardH. Steinberg& BruceStokeseds., 1999).
62Steinberg,
supranote60.
63 Geoffrey R.DanielKelemen,
Garrett, & HeinerSchulz,TheEuropean
Courtof NationalGovernments,
ustice,
in theEuropeanUnion,52 INT'LORG.149 (1998);RichardH. Steinberg,JudicialLawmaking
andLegalIntegration
at theWTO:Discursive, 98 AJIL247 (2004);HeinerSchulz,ThePolitical
andPoliticalConstraints,
Constitutional,
Foundations MakingbytheEuropean
ofDecision 99ASILPROC.
Courtofjustice, 132(2005).Foracompetingview,
seeLaurenceHelfer& Anne-Marie TowardaTheory
Slaughter, 107YALE
SupranationalAdjudication,
ofEffective
L.J.273(1997);Laurence
R.Helfer&Anne-Marie WhyStatesCreate
Slaughter, International Response
Tribunalh:A
toProfessors andYoo,93 CAL.L. REV.899 (2005).
Posner
64 STEPHEN
D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: 73-219 (1999); RichardH. Steinberg,
HYPOCRISY
ORGANIZED
TheTransformation
ofEuropean TradingStates,in THESTATE AFTER STATISM (JonahLevyed.,forthcoming
2006).
supranote64,at14-20;Richard
65 KRASNER, WhoIsSovereign?
H. Steinberg, 40 STAN.J.INT'L L.329 (2004).
66 DavidKennedy
arguesthatinternational
lawbecameobsessivelyprocessorientedduringthisperiod.David
Kennedy,A NewStream LawScholarship,
oflnternational 7 WIS.INT'LL.J.1 (1988).

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 77

Theseapproacheshadfaithin the abilityof lawto affectthe behaviorevenof powerfulstates,

but theydifferedfromclassicismby offeringan explicitlogicby whichlawcoulddo so. While
they reliedon sociologicalprocessesby which law could shapebehavior,and by which indi-
vidualsand groupsreactedto law, the authorsof theseapproachesgenerallystartedfrom an
assumptionthat law mattersand then offeredan explanationas to why. They rarely,if ever,
rigorouslytestedor confirmedthat theirtheorieswereright.
Harold Lasswelland Myres McDougal shared Morgenthau'scritique that American
thoughtaboutinternationallawhadignoredthe behavioralist revolutionandchangesin think-
ing about domestic law. Moreover, like Morgenthau,they were acutelyawareof the dominant
position of the United Statesin the postwarworld. In that context,they soughtto developa
jurisprudencethat could help U.S. lawyersand policymakersmeet theirnewfoundresponsi-
bilities,advancinga just and democraticimage.Hence, powerwas not irrelevantto Lasswell
and McDougal, but it took a historicallyunique, enlightened,and unfamiliarform:they
wantedtheUnitedStatesto maintaina positionofpowerso asto leadtheprocessesandadvance
theoutcomestheyprescribed.67 Yetmuchliketheclassicists,LasswellandMcDougalhadfaith
in theabilityof decisionmakers,notjustcourts,to developa bodyof lawthatreflectsthe global
commoninterestin approximating a worldpublicorderof humandignity,whichtheydefined
as a "socialprocessin whichvaluesarewidely. .. shared,and in which privatechoice,rather
than coercion,is emphasizedas the predominantmodalityof power.""68
In the sameway that earlytwentieth-centuryinternationallegaltheorydrewdeeplyfrom
classicallegalthought,andforeignpolicyrealismparallelslegalrealism,LaswellandMcDougal
reliedon currentsin Americanlegalthought,in theircaseProgressive-era "sociologicaljuris-
69
prudence.""Basing themselves largely psychology,sociology,anthropology,and classic
on
worksof politicaltheory,Lasswelland McDougalassertedthateverypersonseeksfulfillment
of eightvalues:security,wealth,respect,well-being,skills,enlightenment,rectitude,andaffec-
tion.70 Like scholarsof sociologicaljurisprudencesuch as Roscoe Pound, Lasswelland
McDougalreliedheavilyupon intensivefactinvestigation:theywantedsocialproblemsto be
"mapped" throughdeepcasestudies,employingthebestsocialsciencemethodsof theday,and
appropriate legalrulesandprocedureswereto be prescribedthoughspecific"principlesof pro-
cedure"that would help realizethosevalues.71
This policy-orientedjurisprudence, which becameknown as the New HavenSchool,was
not a wholly satisfyinganswerto realism.The success of policy-orientedjurisprudence
depended,interalia,on identicalweightingof competingvaluesacrosssocieties,as well as a
powerfulgovernment'swillingnessto pursuethe realizationof thosevaluesin foreignstates
67 Kunz,supranote 47, at 495.
68 Myres S. McDougal & HaroldD. Lasswell,TheIdentification andAppraisal ofDiverseSystemsofPublicOrder,
53 AJIL1, 11 (1959); seealsoMyresS. McDougal& W. MichaelReisman,ThePrescribing Functionin the World
Constitutive Process:How InternationalLawIsMade,in INTERNATIONAL LAWESSAYS 355 (MyresS. McDougal
& W. MichaelReismaneds., 1981).
69 Two excellentsourceson this movementare G. EdwardWhite, FromSociologicalJurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence andSocialChangein EarlyTwentieth-Century America,58 VA.L. REV.999 (1972);ThomasC. Grey,
ModernAmericanLegalThought,106 YALEL.J.493, 495-500 (1996) (reviewingDUXBURY, supranote 39).
70 In so were a similareffort Pound severaldecadesearlier.Roscoe Pound,Interestsof
doing, they following by
Personality,28 HARV.L. REV.343, 445 (1914-1915). Importantly,McDougal and Lasswell'sscientifictem-
plates-the behavioralsciences-resembled less those usedby adherentsof sociologicaljurisprudencethan those
usedby realists.SeeWhite,supranote69, at 1013 (notingthatrealistsreliedmoreon behavioralsciences,andadher-
ents of sociologicaljurisprudencereliedmoreon economicsandstatistics).Nevertheless,McDougaland Lasswell
usedbehaviorialismfor sociologicalpurposes.
71 For a morecontemporary applicationof policy-orientedjurisprudence,see SiegfriedWiessner& AndrewR.
Willard,Policy-OrientedJurisprudence andHumanRightsAbuses in InternalConflict:TowardaWorldPublicOrder
ofHumanDignity,93 AJIL316 (1999).

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78 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 100:64

with the samevigor that those valueswere pursueddomestically.Moreover,the prescribed

mappingexerciseimpliedthatforeachsocialproblem,therewasa discoverablecorrecttheory
to explainits causeand a solution;in practice,it has not been easyto discoverthe "correct"
theoriesthat explainand solve many globalsocialproblems.More broadly,policy-oriented
jurisprudenceis a methodand broadframeworkfor analysiswith faithin its capacityto pre-
scribeinternationallawthatwill advancehumandignityandworldorder,but asa mereframe-
workandmethod,it doesnot offertestabletheoriesandcannotsystematically showthatinter-
nationallaw can reliablyand consistentlyadvance"worldorder."
Likethe New HavenSchool,internationallegalprocess,whichemergedin the early1970s,
is sociologicalin orientationand trustsinternationallaw'scapacityto shapestate behavior.
Internationallegalprocesstriesto understandhow judicialand nonjudicialdecisionmakers
operatein the worldof law.72The movement'spositivesociologicalanalysesaremorecircum-
scribedthan the New HavenSchool's,focusingnot on how societyas a whole works,but on
specificlegalprocesses.Operationally,the approachhas been used mainlyto build midlevel
theoriesasto how discreteareasof lawor processmaybe modifiedto achievethe goalsof their
framers.Used in thisway,internationallegalprocesshasnot rebuttedrealistclaimsaboutthe
limitsof internationallaw:it hasprimarilybeena frameworkandmethodthatdoesnot purport
to constitutea testablemetatheoryof the consequencesof internationallaw.
These descriptionsdemonstratejust how much both the New HavenSchooland interna-
tional legalprocessowe to Henry Hart and AlbertSacks'slegalprocesstheory.73Hart and
Sacks'semphasison law'sdynamicpurposivenessas a meanstowardsatisfyinghumanwants
foundobviousechoesin New Haven;theirfocuson the coordinationof institutionseachoper-
atingwithin its fieldsof competence,and the legitimatingroleof procedure,clearlyresonates
with the internationallegalprocessapproach.74 Yetrevealingthe pedigreesof the New Haven
Schooland internationallegalprocessdemonstratesthe difficultyof translatinglegalprocess
theoryto the internationalsphere.Whateverthestrengthsandweaknessof theirjurisprudence,
comparedto internationalists HartandSackshadlessreasonto grapplewith questionsof effec-
tiveness,for they were dealing solely with the domestic sphere,which enjoys centralized
enforcementbythestate.Anyinternationalapplicationof thisjurisprudence neededto grapple
seriouslywith effectiveness--butfor decadesit did not.
Eventually,AbramandAntoniaChayesusedinternationallegalprocessto explaincompli-
ancewith internationalregulatoryagreements,and to prescribebetterwaysto achievecom-
pliance,offeringa "managerial" theoryasto how internationallawmightconstrainevenpow-
erfulstates.75Nonetheless,theirtheorywasbuiltto explainthe expressassumption,borrowing
fromLouisHenkin,that "almostall nationsobservealmostallprinciplesof internationallaw
and almostall of theirobligationsalmostall of the time."It hasnot beenclearhow to testthe
extentto which the managerialtheoryexplainscompliance,in practice.76
72ABRAMCHAYES,THOMAS EHRLICH,& ANDREASF. LOWENFELD,INTERNATIONAL
LEGALPROCESS
(1968); MaryEllen O'Connell,New International LegalProcess,93 AJIL334 (1999).
on Hartand Sacksis largeand growing.The beginning,of course,is HENRYM. HARTJR.&
73 The literature
OF LAW(Wil-
IN THEMAKINGAND APPLICATION
ALBERTM. SACKS,THE LEGALPROCESS:BASICPROBLEMS
liam N. EskridgeJr. & PhilipP. Frickeyeds., 1994) (tentativedraft1958).
74 Our descriptionof the centralthemesof legalprocesstheorycomesfromEskridge
and Frickey'soutstanding
introductionto theHartandSacksmaterials.WilliamN. EskridgeJr.& PhilipP. Frickey,AnHistoricalandCritical
Introductionto TheLegalProcess,in HART& SACKS, supranote 73, at li, liii.
75ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THENEWSOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITHINTER-
NATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1998).
76 SeeGeorgeW. Downs, DavidM. Rocke,& PeterN. Barsoom,Is theGoodNewsAbout Compliance GoodNews
AboutCooperation? 50 INT'LORG.379 (1996) (demonstratingthatmost compliancewould haveoccurredin the

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2006] CENTENNIAL
ESSAYS 79

RationalistInstitutionalism

Rationalist institutionalism may be considered the core of the "rules matter" reaction to
structuralrealism. This approach emerged in the political science literaturein the early 1980s
but found its way into the international law literature only at the end of that decade. Using a
structural realist approach, some international relations theorists had interpreted history to
arguethat hegemons createworld order through international institutions, but that those insti-
tutions and order collapse as power diffuses in the international system.77By the 1980s, evi-
dence of diffusion of power in the contemporary world system had surfaced:in contrast to the
earlypostwaryears, now the United States increasinglyhad to sharepower with Europe in gov-
erning the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade and the InternationalMonetary Fund, and
in containing the Soviet Union. Yet international institutions and order were not collapsing.
The strongest counterpunch to the pure realist claim that international institutions and
international law were inconsequential came from Robert Keohane's explanatiornwhy inter-
national institutions were not collapsing, even as U.S. power was declining. Keohane used a
rationalist logic that built on the same assumptions employed by structuralrealism:states are
the fundamental units of analysis in an international system characterizedby anarchy. Under
those conditions, international institutions could facilitate cooperative, positive-sum out-
comes that would not otherwise emerge. Keohane's paradigm was the prisoners' dilemma,
which he (and others following him) argued was a metaphor for much of international life.
Robert Axelrod had shown that the prisoners'dilemma could be solved by iteration:repetition
of the game led to cooperation.78 Keohane argued that international organizations, creatures
of international law, could provide venues for the repeatedinteraction that would yield a coop-
erativesolution. More generally, international institutions could reduce transaction and infor-
mation costs. Such information sharing favors cooperation, reduces uncertainty about inten-
tions, and facilitates international stability.79
In making that argument, Keohane never used the word "law,"but it is hard to overestimate
the impact of his rationalist insight on subsequent analyses of the relationship between inter-
national law and power. Political scientists began using rationalism to identify means by which
international law could facilitatecooperation that would otherwise not occur. Some earlywork
showed how simple games could be used as metaphors for the kinds of cooperation problems
that could be solved by international organizations and international law.
In 1989 KennethAbbott imported these argumentsinto internationallaw discourse,80 setting
off a chain reactionof rationalistanalysesby internationallaw scholars.Others expresslyshowed
how economics could be usedto understandinternationallaw.81Dozens of internationallegalrules
and institutionswere subsequentlyexplainedby games in internationallaw journals.82

absenceof internationalagreementsand distinguishingcompliancefrom effectiveness);seealsoKal Raustiala&

Anne-MarieSlaughter,InternationalLaw,International Relations,and Compliance,in HANDBOOK OFINTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 538, 543 (WalterCarlsnaeset al. eds., 2002) (describingDowns'sarticleas "trenchant").
77See, e.g., ROBERTGILPIN,WARAND CHANGEINWORLDPOLITICS(1981); Stephen D. Krasner,StatePower
and theStructureofInternationalTrade,28 WORLDPOL. 317 (1976).
78 ROBERTAXELROD,THE EVOLUTIONOF COOPERATION(1984).
79 ROBERTO. KEOHANE,AFTERHEGEMONY:COOPERATIONAND DISCORDIN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY(1984).
80 KennethW. Abbott,ModernInternational A Prospectus
RelationsTheory: for InternationalLawyers,14 YALE
J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
81 JeffreyL. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,TheLawand Economics ofHumanitarianLaw Violationsin Internal
Conflict,93 AJIL394 (1999).
82 Forexamplesof analyses usingthe prisoners'dilemma,see KennethW. Abbott, Trustbut Verify:TheProduc-
tion oflnformationin ArmsControlTreatiesand OtherInternational Agreements,26 CORNELL INT'LL.J.(1993);

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80 THEAMERICAN LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL [Vol. 100:64

Politicalscienceandlawscholarshipthendevelopedan arsenalof concepts,rationalistargu-

mentation,and formalmodelsthatexplainedthe consequencesof law.Lawandlegalinstitu-
tions could makethe transgressionof a clearruletransparent,83serveas a sourceof credible
commitmentby powerfulstates,84and establishfocal points for coordination."85 Rationalist
logicandformalmodelswereusedto explaina rangeof legalphenomena,includingsuchthings
asthe conditionsunderwhich"softlaw"mayemerge,the emergenceof the lawmerchantand
champagnefairsin late medievalFrance,and why some internationalagreementsareinfor-
mal.86Ultimately,in thisJournalrationalism wasusedto rebutthe structuralrealistsuggestion
that internationallaw is epiphenomenal,formallymodelingthe possibilitythat customary
internationallawcanfacilitatecooperation87-althoughthe extentto whichthatpossibilityis
realizedin practicewas not examined.
Recently,this rationalistscholarshiphasshiftedfrominquiringinto how internationallaw
mattersto askingwhytreatydesignvaries.88Forexample,rationalistargumentsorformalmod-
els havebeen usedto explainthe conditionsunderwhich treatiescontainescapeclauses,the
extentto which disputesettlementprovisionsarelegalized,and how treatydesigncan affect
compliance.89A centralcritiqueof this approachhas been that it fails to considerinformal
meansthat statesmight adopt (and anticipateadopting)to defeator circumventparticular
aspectsof treatydesign.

Liberalism

In the 1980s, at roughlythe sametime that rationalistargumentsaboutthe consequences

of internationallaw emerged,so did a groupof internationallaw and internationalrelations
scholarswho haveusedliberalanalysis,usuallyalongsideinstitutionalconsiderations,to show
how internationalanddomesticlawcanfavoroutcomesthatwouldnot otherwiseoccur.Much
rationalistwork in internationallaw-particularly the earlywork-treats statesas unitary

John Setear,An IterativePerspectiveon Treaties:

A SynthesisofInternationalRelationsTheoryandInternational Law,
37 HARV.INT'LL.J. 139 (1996).
rationalefor codification.See,e.g.,
83 The notion of clarityas an importantlaw functionechoesthe classicists'
JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONGNATIONS23 (1990) (noting"consensusthat internationalcoop-
erationcannot be separatedfrom rule-governedstatebehaviorand that rulesmay in fact be the most important
elementof internationalregimesor institutions").The ideaof this law functionappliesto the domesticcontextas
well. See,e.g.,RobertAxelrod,An EvolutionaryApproachtoNorms,80 AM.POL.SCI.REV.1095, 1106-07 (1986)
("Thelawtendsto defineobligationsmuchmoreclearlythandoesan informalnorm.A socialnormmightsaythat
a landlordshouldprovidesafehousingfortenants,but a housingcode is morelikelyto definesafetyin termsof fire
escapes.");CarolM. Rose, Crystals andMud in PropertyLaw,40 STAN.L. REV.577, 608 (1988) (observingthat
clearrules"enhancesociabilityand facilitateongoing socialinteractions").
84LISAL. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES ANDINTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
(2002); JamesD. Fearon,SignalingForeignPolicyInterests:TyingHands VersusSinkingCosts,41 J. CONFLICT
RESOL.68 -90 (1997); AndrewT. Guzman,A Compliance-Based TheoryofInternationalLaw, 90 CAL.L. REV.
1823 (2002).
85 RobertCooter,Expressive Lawand Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.585 (1998).
86 See, respectively,KennethW. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,Hardand SoftLaw in InternationalGovernance,
54 INT'LORG. 421 (2000); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, & BarryR. Weingast, The Role ofIn-
stitutionsin the Revivalof Trade:TheMedievalLaw Merchant,PrivateJudges,and the ChampagneFairs, 2
ECON.& POL.1 (1990); andCharlesLipson, WhyAreSomeInternationalAgreementsInformal?45 INT'LORG.
495 (1991).
87 GeorgeNorman & Joel P. Trachtman,TheCustomary InternationalLaw Game,99 AJIL541 (2005).
88
BarbaraKoremenos,CharlesLipson,& Duncan Snidal, TheRationalDesignoflnternationalInstitutions,55
INT'LORG.761, 761-80 (2001).
89 See,respectively,BarbaraKoremenos,Loosening the TiesThatBind:A LearningModel ofAgreement Flexibility,
55 INT'LORG.289 (2001);JamesMcCallSmith, ThePoliticsofDisputeSettlement Design:ExplainingLegalismin
RegionalTradePacts,54 INT'LORG.137 (2000); andRonaldB. Mitchell,RegimeDesignMatters:InternationalOil
Pollutionand TreatyCompliance, 48 INT'LORG.425 (1994).

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2006] CENTENNIALESSAYS 81

actorswith intereststhat areexogenousto the model.This approachsweptunderthe carpet

a crucialquestion:wheredo stateinterestscomefrom?Liberalismofferedananswer:stateinter-
estsarebest understoodas an aggregationand intermediationof individualinterests.Sources
of powerand interestsarefoundwithin and betweenstates.Internationallaw is drivenfrom
the bottom up. Domesticand internationalrulesreaggregate and reconfigureindividualand
groupinterestsinto new blocs of powerand interests.
By the early1990s, this approachseemedsensibleto manyin light of variousinternational
developments.Nonbusinessnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs) werevisiblyactivein
lobbyingseveralinternationalorganizationsand theirconstituentgovernments.The Soviet
Union had collapsedfromwithin: internalbottom-uppoliticaldemands(not external,sys-
temicpressuresor war,as realismhad suggested)seemedto havemost proximatelycatalyzed
its downfall.Andwith the fallof the SovietUnion, somesawthe possibilitythatinternational
lawwould gain greaterhold.9"
Fewhavebeen moreinfluentialin applyingliberaltheoryto internationallaw thanAnne-
MarieSlaughter,formerASILpresident.Slaughterdefinesthe liberalparadigmaccordingto
threebasicassumptions:the fundamentalactorsin politicsaremembersof domesticsociety,
understoodasindividualsandprivatelyconstitutedgroupsseekingto promotetheirindepen-
dentinterests;allgovernmentsrepresentsomesegmentof domesticsociety,whoseinterestsare
reflectedin statepolicy;andthe behaviorof states- hencelevelsof internationalconflictand
cooperation-reflectsthenatureandconfigurationof statepreferences. In itspureform,liberal
theoryexplainsinternationallawasa functionof whatstateswant:"thestrengthandintensity
of a particularpreferencewill determinehow muchthestateiswillingto concedeto obtainthat
preference,which in turnwill determineits likelihoodof successin achievingthe bargaining
outcomesit desires."91 Statewill is pivotalin internationalnegotiations;statepower-in the
materialsense-is not centralto the equation.This liberalframework,Slaughterargues,can
explainmuchof the developmentoftransnationallaw,publicinternationallaw,andEuropean
Union law,and canprovidea normativebasisfor prescriptionsthatfavorjusticeandorder.92
Severalscholarshaveexplainedor critiquedinternationallegaldevelopmentsby meansof this
approach.93
Liberalanalysishasalsobeenusedto explainparticularinternationallegalphenomenaasan
interactionbetweeninstitutionsandpureliberaltheory.Forexample,domesticlegalarrange-
mentsmayinteractwith internationallaw to configurea government'sand civil society'scal-
culationsof opportunitiesand incentivesin waysthat favorthe successfulconclusionof trea-
ties94and compliancewith them.95In the judicialcontext,the accretionof authorityby the
EuropeanCourtofJusticehasbeenexplainedby itsstrategicmaneuversgivenEuropeanCom-
munityinstitutionalincentivesand opportunitiesavailableto Europeanlawyers,judges,and

90 See,e.g.,Anne-MarieSlaughter,Towardan AgeofLiberalNations,33 HARV.INT'LL.J.393 (1992); seealso

FRANCISFUKUYAMA,THE END OF HISTORY(1992).
91 SlaughterBurley,supranote 56, at 228.
92 Slaughter
Burley, note Anne-Marie AndrewS.Tulumello,& StepanWood,InternationalLaw
supra 56; Slaughter,
andInternational Relations
Theory:A New Generation Scholarship,
oflnterdisciplinary 92 AJIL367 (1998);seealsoAndrew
Moravscik,TakingPreferences A LiberalTheory
Seriously: Politics,51 INT'LORG.513 (1997).
oflnternational
FormandSubstance
93 See,e.g.,KalRaustiala, inInternationalAgreements,99 AJIL581 (2005);DanielM. Bodan-
sky, TheLegitimacy ofInternational A
Governance: ComingChallenge for Environmental
International Law?93 AJIL
596, esp. 617-19 (1999).
94 MichaelA. Bailey,JudithGoldstein,& BarryR. Weingast,TheOriginsofAmericanTradePolicy:Rules,Coa-
litions,and InternationalPolitics,49 WORLDPOL.309 (1997).
95 MARTIN, supranote 84;JudithGoldstein& LisaL. Martin,Legalization,TradeLiberalization, andDomestic
Politics:A Cautionary Note, 54 INT'LORG.219 (2000).

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82 THEAMERICAN LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL [Vol. 100:64

civil society.96More broadly,the expansivenessof law generatedby an internationaldispute

settlementsystemdependsuponthebehaviorof civilsocietyandgovernmentalactors,butthat
behaviormust be understoodin the contextof particularinstitutionalmechanisms:judicial
independence,accessiblestandingrules,anddirecteffectfavorexpansiveness.9Indeed,some
considerthisintersectionbetweenliberalismandinstitutionalismthe coreof the international
law/internationalrelationsmovement.98

IV. CONSTRUCTIVISM:
IDENTITIES, RELATIONSHIP
AND THERECIPROCAL
INTERESTS,
LAW
BETWEENPOWERAND INTERNATIONAL

In the analyticalapproachesabove,interests-whether those of individuals,the group,or

the state-are takento be real,solid, and usuallydrivenby materialconsiderations.And the
actorsthat are privilegedin varioustheories-whether individuals,interestgroups,or the
state-are presumedto matterbecausetheyhavepowerbasedon variousmaterialassets.At its
core,constructivismoffersa revolutionary,ontologicalchallengeto thatstance,claimingthat
neitherpowernor interestsexist independentlyof the group.Interestsand identityarecon-
structedsocially;they areplasticand maybe redefined.Internationallaw maybe understood
as both a reflectionof identitiesandinterestsof the powerful,and as a socialartifactthatrein-
forcesidentities,interests,and power.While constructivistapproacheshavepermeatedsoci-
ology,politicalscience,and internationallawliterature,only a few self-consciouslyconstruc-
tivistarticleshaveappearedin theJournal.
Thereis a rangeof constructiviststances."Hard"99 socialconstructivismseesthe most fun-
damentalelementsof the internationallegalsystem-the state,sovereignty,consent-as social
constructsthat reflectand patternbehavior.This view is manifestin FriedrichKratochwil's
applicationof postmodernconstructivismto internationallegal theory.100For Kratochwil,
internationalrelationsis internationallawbecauseinternationallawactuallyconstitutesstates
througha discursiveprocessguidedby intersubjectively sharedideas,norms,andvalues.Only
throughthe processof internationalsocializationcan statescome to understandand even
definethemselves:to speakof stateinterests(asdiplomatsmight)or even of an international
systemstructure(asstructuralrealistsmight)begsthe questionof how anystateor systemcame
to be. Ontologythustrumpsepistemology: lawis aboutdefining,not regulating. As Kratochwil
puts it, "theinternational legalorderexistssimplyby virtueof its rolein definingthe gameof
internationalrelations."'01 And becausethese discursivepracticesare plasticand malleable,
anarchydoes not createan internationalsystem. Rather,in AlexanderWendt's felicitous
phrase,"anarchyis what statesmakeof it."102Poweris not material,but ideational,and the

96 EricStein,Lawyers, Judges,andtheMakingofa EuropeanConstitution, 75 AJIL1 (1981);Anne-Marie[Slaugh-

ter] Burley& WalterMattli, EuropeBeforethe Court:A PoliticalTheoryof LegalIntegration,47 INT'LORG.41
(1993); JosephH. H. Weiler, TheTransformation ofEurope,100 YALEL.J.2403 (1991).
97 RobertO. Keohane,AndrewMoravscik,& Anne-MarieSlaughter,LegalizedDispute Resolution: and
Interstate
Transnational, 54 INT'LORG.73 (2000).
98 SlaughterBurley,supranote 56; Slaughter,Tulumello,& Wood, supranote 92.
99"Critical"(i.e., postmodern)constructivisttheoryis referredto hereas "hard,"and moderntheoryas "soft,"
to avoidconfusionwith laterreferencesto criticallegalstudies,whichincludesmodernistsandpostmodernists.See
MARKKELMAN,A GUIDE TO CRITICALLEGALSTUDIES(1987); Critical Legal Studies Symposium,36 STAN. L.
REV.,Nos. 1 & 2 (1984).
100FRIEDRICHV. KRATOCHWIL,
RULES,NORMS,AND DECISIONS:ON THE CONDITIONSOF PRACTICAL
AND LEGALREASONINGIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND DOMESTICAFFAIRS(1989).
101 Id. at
251.
ofPowerPolitics,46 INT'LORG.
Wendt,AnarchyIs WhatStatesMakeoflt: TheSocialConstruction
'02 Alexander
391 (1992).

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2006] CENTENNIAL
ESSAYS 83

importance of power in the material sense depends critically on the social milieu in which the
state exists. It is all ideas, all the way down.
Wendt himself does not go so far, instead advancinga "softer,"modern constructivist theory
that accepts the powerful influence of objective material forces in world politics and holds that
states exist prior to international discursive praxis.103This researchprogram has brought him
criticism from hard constructivists'?4 but has had a significant impact on international rela-
tions theory.'05 Wendt concedes that states are real entities, but-instead of merely claiming
that ideas are more fundamental than material interests in constituting states' behavior-he
argues that ideas construct the very material interests upon which neorealist theory hinges.
Depending upon whether Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian ideas predominate, identical
groups of state formations can produce widely divergent results. There is no internal logic
underlying the system:what matters is international culture. Although Wendt does not explic-
itly say so, his theory implies that international law helps determine the nature of this culture.
Whether of the modern or postmodern variety, constructivism connects deeply with sophis-
ticated critical legal studies (CLS) theorists. Many CLS theorists contend that a central role of
lawyerslies in the productionof ideology,106therebyadvancinga significantrolefor interna-
tionallawyersin creatingthebasicframeworkof the internationalsystem.Yetthelinksbetween
constructivismand criticallegalstudiesrun more deeply,for both systemsof thoughtreflect
a profoundhostilityto the ideathat "laws"(i.e., assumed"natural"orderingprinciples)drive
a system.Constructivism'sattackon such lawsof the internationalsystemcloselyresembles
CLS'scontemptfor the lawsof the market.The moreradicalstrainin eachschoolarguesthat
referenceto suchlawsobscuresthe essentiallyideologicalnatureof beliefin them, and holds
out hope of a thoroughgoingtransformationof social life, whether domestic or international."'7
haveuseddiscourseanalysisto dissectthelanguageof internationallaw
Someconstructivists
in orderto understandits internalsystemsof signification(e.g., the relationshipsand binary
oppositions between signs), the ways it is productive or reproductive of things defined by the
discourse(e.g., who is authorizedto speakand act, what practicesarelogicallyand properly
implemented),andthe wayit changesandinteractswith otheroverlappingdiscourses.'o8 For
example,David Kennedy'sanalysis of law
international discoursesuggeststhat international

'03 ALEXANDER POLITICS(1999); seealsoAlexander Wendt,

WENDT, SOCIALTHEORYOF INTERNATIONAL
RelationsTheory,41 INT'LORG.335 (1987). A superbcriticalreview
Problemin International
TheAgent-Structure
of Wendt's book from a neorealist perspective is Dale C. Copeland, The ConstructivistChallengeto StructuralReal-
ism, INT'L SECURITY,Fall 2000, at 187. 52 INT'L ORG., No. 4 (1998), is entirely devoted to the rationalist-con-
structivistdebate.
104 SeeFriedrich a New Orthodoxy? Politics'and
Kratochwil,Constructing Wendt's'SocialTheoryoflnternational
the Constructivist
Challenge,29 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'LSTUD.73 (2000).
105 Examples of the vast and rapidly growing constructivist literature in international relations theory generally
include MICHAELBARNETT& MARTHAFINNEMORE,RULESFORTHE WORLD:INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONSIN GLOBALPOLITICS(2005); JOHN GERARDRUGGIE,CONSTRUCTINGTHEWORLD POLITY,ch. 1
in WorldPolitics,3 EUR.J. INT'LREL.319
(1998); EmanuelAdler,SeizingtheMiddle Ground:Constructivism
(1997); Ted Hopf, ThePromiseofConstructivismin InternationalRelations Theory,INT'LSECURITY,Summer 1998,
at 171;andChristianReus-Smit,TheConstitutional SocietyandtheNatureofFundamental
StructureofInternational
Institutions, 51 INT'L ORG. 555 (1997).
106 SeeGordon,
supranote 27; Robert W. Gordon, 'TheIdealand theActualin theLaw.-FantasiesandPractices
ofNew YorkCity Lawyers,1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:LAWYERS IN POST-CIVILWAR AMERICA
51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
107A powerful (albeit somewhat prolix) statement of this position in CLS is found in ROBERTOMANGABEIRA
UNGER, POLITICS:VOL. 1, FALSENECESSITY:ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIALTHEORYIN THE SERVICEOF
RADICALDEMOCRACY(rev. ed. 2004); VOL. 2, SOCIALTHEORY:ITS SITUATIONAND TASK (2004); VOL. 3,
PLASTICITY INTO POWER(2004).
108JenniferMilliken,TheStudyofDiscoursein International andMethods,5 EUR.
A CritiqueofResearch
Relations:
J. INT'L REL. 225 (1999); Kennedy, supra note 66.

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84 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 100:64

law is intrinsicallyindeterminate.'09 In their analysisof internationallaw discourse,Hilary

Charlesworth,ChristineChinkin, and ShelleyWright have developeda feministtheoryof
internationallaw, arguingthat the private/publicdistinctionsilencesinternationallaw from
more fullyaddressingabuseand repressionof women, which is generallytreatedas a private
matter.110 In hismoreflexibleanalysisoflanguage,BenedictKingsburyarguesthatthe concept
of"indigenouspeoples"is not sharplydefined;it is insteada dynamicabstraction,continuously
drawingfromand shapingthe diversecategoriesand circumstancesof differentsocietiesand
institutions.111
Some internationallaw scholarshave theorizedthe processesby which internationallaw
reshapespreexistingnationalinterestsand identities.Harold Koh'stheoryof transnational
judicialprocessstemsfrominteractionsbetweengoverningandjudicialelites,generatingrules
for futureinteractionsthat areeventuallyinternalized.112 Buildingon MaxWeber'sconcep-
tion of thelegitimatingeffectsoflaw,ThomasFranck(whomconstructivists generallyconsider
a constructivist,even thoughhe does not think of himselfas such) developeda theoryof the
sociologicalmicroprocesses thatlendlegitimacyto internationallaw,whichexplainswhatmay
giveinternationallawits "pullpower,"enhancingcompliancewithinternationalrulesandpro-
cedures,eventhosethatwouldotherwisebe seenascontradictingthe interestsof powerfulrul-
ersor states."13 Othershaveoffereda moregeneraltheoryof sociologicalmicroprocesses that
could explainhow internationallaw affectsidentitiesand interests.14
At the soft end of the continuum,someconstructivists havefocusedon bottom-uppolitics
reminiscentof liberalism,empiricallytracingthe socialprocessesby which particularareasof
internationallaw havedeveloped,and then distillingwaysthat law has cognitivelyand nor-
mativelyreinforcedthe ideasthat gaveriseto it.11"Some earlyworkin this genreconceptu-
alized "transnational epistemiccommunities"that may redefineglobal policy debatesover
issuessuch as the regulationof chloroflourocarbons.' 16More recently,KathrynSikkinkand
othershave developedideas about how transnationaladvocacynetworksredefinethinking
abouta rangeof internationalissues,arguing,forexample,thatsuchnetworksset off a "norms
cascade"in supportof humanrightsin LatinAmerica,catalyzingthe developmentof human
rightslawthere,whichhasin turnreinforcedtheverynormsandideationalcategoriesthatgave
109Kennedy,supranote 66; seealsoDAVIDKENNEDY, THEDARKSIDESOFVIRTUE: REASSESSINGINTER-
NATIONALHUMANITARIANISM (2004).
110HilaryCharlesworth,ChristineChinkin,& ShelleyWright,Feminist toInternational
Approaches Law,85
AJIL613 (1991);seealsoHilaryCharlesworth,
FeministMethodsin International
Law,93 AJIL379 (1999).
111BenedictKingsbury, Peoples
Indigenous Law:A Constructivist
in International ApproachtotheAsianContro-
92 AJIL414 (1998).
versy,
112 Harold
HongjuKoh,TransnationalPublic 100YALE
LawLitigation, L.J.2347(1991);HaroldHongjuKoh,
HowIsInternationalHumanRights LawEnforced?74 IND.L.J.1397(1999).
113 NATIONS(1990); Thomas M. Franck,Legit-
THOMASM. FRANCK,THE POWEROF LEGITIMACYAMONG
imacyin theInternational
System,82AJIL704 (1988)[hereinafter Franck, LikeLouisHenkin,Franck
Legitimacy].
lawis followedalmostallof thetime,andhistheoryis offeredasa posthoc
assumesthatalmostallinternational
explanationof whythatmightbe.Franck, supranote36;seealsoThomasM. Franck,TheEmerging RighttoDem-
ocraticGovernance,86 AJIL46 (1992)(arguing thatanemerging legalnormrequiring
international democratic
governance haslegitimated
democratic governments andprocesses andundermined nondemocratic ones).
114RyanGoodman & DerekJinks,International
LawandStateSocialization: Empirical,
Conceptual, andNor-
mativeChallenges,54 DUKEL.J.983 (2005);seealsoMichaelByers,Custom, Power,andthePowerofRules: Cus-
tomaryInternationalLawfrom an Interdisciplinary 17 MICH.J. INT'LL. 109 (1995).
Perspective,
E. KECK& KATHRYNSIKKINK,ACTIVISTSBEYONDBORDERS:ADVOCACYNETWORKSIN
115 MARGARET
INTERNATIONAL LAW(1998);seealsoSteveCharnovitz, andInternational
Organizations
Nongovernmental Law,
100AJIL(forthcoming
2006).
PeterHaas, Introduction:
116"' 46
and InternationalPolicyCoordination,
EpistemicCommunities INT'LORG. 1
(1992).

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2006] CENTENNIAL
ESSAYS 85

rise to the movement.117Similarly, this approach has been used to explain how a network of
lawyers in New York, Washington, and a few European capitals developed the international
system of private commercial arbitrationand replicate that system's practices."18 Used in this
way, constructivism may accessibly explain many recent developments in international law,
particularlythose that can be seen as advanced through the norm entrepreneurshipof NGOs.

V. CONCLUSION:POWER,LAW,ANDTHEDECLINEOFISMS

When thisJournalwas founded a century ago, power was not accounted for in international
law analysis.Now it cannot be ignored. World War II and the rise ofbehavioralism confronted
international lawyerswith discord between the mandates of international law and the behavior
of states. In its pure form, realism taunted international lawyers with the claim that interna-
tional law was inconsequential. Since the appearanceof the realistchallenge, no positive claim
about international law- e.g., how it has developed or will develop, or the extent to which it
is effective- could be made safelyunless it accounts for power, and no meaningful prescription
could be offered unless it meets a standard of political feasibility and sustainability. Consid-
erations of power are here to stay.
At the same time, today, unlike a century ago, there is an understanding of the conditions
and mechanisms that may enable international law to affect behavior autonomously. Most
commentators areconfident that international law has at least some autonomous power. Struc-
tural realism engendered a reaction that has distilled precise mechanisms by which interna-
tional law can cause outcomes that would not otherwise occur. Rationalist analyseshave iden-
tified several functions performed by international law that facilitate cooperation, such as
reducing information and transaction costs, establishing focal points for state behavior, and
constituting credible commitments. Liberalanalyseshave been combined with institutionalist
arguments to show how individual and group incentives and opportunities may be trans-
formed by alternative institutional structures and processes. Sociology, psychology, and lin-
guistics explain how international law may cognitively and normatively reinforce views about
the identity of appropriateactors, the nature of appropriatebehavior, and the identities of those
who act and do not act in international affairs.At the same time, we now command a range
of quantitative methods and modeling techniques for understanding the relationshipsbetween
law and power. In short, there is now a heterogeneous set of metatheories and tools for under-
standing the autonomy and limits of international law.19
In her essay in this issue, Lori Damrosch examines what is uniquely "American"about the
AJIL'sfirstcentury.120To some extent, the mix of theoretical orientations found in theJournal
is uniquelyAmerican. In jurisprudence,the theoretical movements identified here clearlydrew
from domestic legal theories (although each has its foreign and international counterpart):clas-
sicism in American law and international law; legal realism and international realism; socio-
logical jurisprudence and the New Haven School; legal process theory and both the New
Haven School and international legal process; critical legal studies and constructivism. While

HumanRightsLawandPracticein LatinAmerica,54 INT'L

117 EllenL. Lutz& KathrynSikkink,International
ORG.249 (2000).
118 YVESDEZALAY& BRYANTGARTH, DEALINGIN VIRTUE:INTERNATIONALCOMMERCIAL
ARBITRA-
TION AND THE CONSTRUCTIONOF A TRANSNATIONALLEGALORDER (1996).
119 Formoreevidenceofthis heterogeneity,
seeStevenR. Ratner& Anne-MarieSlaughter,SymposiumonMethod
in InternationalLaw,93 AJIL291 (1999).
120 LoriFislerDamrosch,The'American theAmericanJournalof InternationalLaw,
"andthe "International"in
100 AJIL2 (2006).

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86 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 100:64

rationalisttheoreticalstrains-structuralrealism,rationalistinstitutionalism,formalmodel-
ing, and quantitativeanalysis-may be found in workdone in othercountries,thesestrains
havefaredparticularly wellin theUnitedStates,perhapsbecauseneoclassicaleconomicsis seen
by manyin the UnitedStatesasthe mostsuccessfulbranchof the socialsciences.121 Construc-
tivismseemsto havebeenembracedmorewidelyin Europethanin the United States.122 And
classicallegalthoughthas neverlost its currencyoutsidethe United States.
In the United States,classicismmaybe gone, but it is not forgotten:manyrationalistinsti-
tutionalistandliberalargumentsechothe classicists'confidencein internationallaw.Contem-
porarypublicistswith faithin the autonomyof internationallegalinstitutionscommonlypro-
claim that interdependencehas transformedthe internationalsystem,123that absolutegains
predominateover relativeones,124that internationalcommunitynormscan transcendcon-
flictsof interestsandvalues,125andthatthe failureof internationalinstitutionssimplyreflects
incompleteevolutionratherthana fundamentalmismatchin an anarchicsystem.126While in
manywaystheseargumentsechothepast,clearlogicsnowstandbehindmanyof theclassicists'
intuitionsand often convincingempiricalstudiesillustratethose logics.
The plethoraof approachesfor understandinghow internationallaw mattersis comple-
mentedby the diversityof analystsconsideringthe relationshipsbetweenpowerand interna-
tionallaw.In theJournal'sfirstthirtyyears,mostof itscontributorswerewhiteAmericanmen,
mostlypractitioners. In thelastfewdecades,theAJILhasopenedup to authorswitha substantially
greaterrangeof experiences, to includea substantially
diversifying higherproportionthanbefore
of women,foreignnationals,andscholars.As Damroschdocumentsin heressay,127the rangeof
insightsandviewsappearing in theJournalhasbeenbroadenedby thisdiversity.
This heterogeneityof heuristics,contributors,methods,andtechniqueshasfundamentally
shiftedthe waymost observersarenow tryingto understandthe relationshipsbetweenpower
andinternationallaw.A halfcenturyof effortsto buildmetatheoriesthatexplaintheautonomy
and limits of internationallaw have paid off, and continuedeffort to build such theories
remainsimportantandultimatelycentralto understanding internationallaw.Yetmetatheories
havetheirlimits. Few believethat internationalrelationsareactuallydefinedby an anarchic,
ideal-typicalstateof natureruledby rawpowerandviolence.And no one believesthatwe live
in a purelycooperativeworldcharacterized by internationallawandorder.None of the meta-
theoriesof the lastcenturyhavebeen ableto deliverthe knockoutblow that some mayhave
once thoughtpossible.No one tryingto understandinternationalrelationscanignorepower,
orlaw,orthe state,orcivilsociety,ornorms,orlanguage.Increasingly,the greatmetatheories
eitheroperatein the background,or lend themselvesto a consciousengagementacrossisms,
with a focuson midlevelanalysisof internationallegalandpoliticaldevelopmentsusinghybrid
theories.
Hence, as suggestedabove,each of the main orientationsidentifiedabovenow has a sub-
stantial- or dominant- campthat uses a combinationof heuristicsto understandinterna-
tionallaw. It is increasinglythe modalpositionof today'srealiststo use elementsfromboth
realismand rationalistinstitutionalism,althoughboth traditionaland structuralrealismstill
121
StanleyHoffmann,An AmericanSocialScience:InternationalRelations,DAEDALUS, Summer1977, at 41.
122
PhilippeC. Schmitter,Seven(Disputable)ThesesConcerningthe Futureof"Transatlanticized" or "Glob-
alized"PoliticalScience(rev.Oct. 2001) (unpublishedessay,IstitutoUniversitarioEuropeo,on filewith authors).
123
ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE,POWER ANDINTERDEPENDENCE (2d ed. 1989).
124
KEOHANE, supranote79.
125Franck,
Legitimacy,supranote 113.
126CHAYES & CHAYES, supranote 75.
127Damrosch,
supranote 120.

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2006] ESSAYS
CENTENNIAL 87

pervade many international law analyses pertaining to security matters.128 Similarly, as sug-
gested above, it is increasinglycommon to see hybridized arguments employing liberalismand
institutionalism, particularlyto explain developments in international economic and human
rightslaw. Constructivists arealso using hybridized approaches,some blending a constructivist
orientation with liberal analysis (described above), and others blending it with realist analy-
sis.129 Some commentators vary the theoretical tradition they employ depending on the prob-
lem being addressed,130 and others employ complex frameworkswith a myriad ofvariables that
echo the approaches of sociological jurisprudence or early postwar frameworks. Quantitative
analyses of the development and effect of international law, which demand controlling for
alternativeexplanations, also reflect this complexity.'31 Metatheory is necessaryto our under-
standing of the social forces that shape international law and behavior, but with only meta-
theory we would miss the complexity of international phenomena, risk forsaking their expla-
nation, and limit the effectiveness of associated prescriptions.
If all this seems to suggest limits on international law as science, it signals the forceful return
of international law as law, that is to say, as a disciplined craft requiring practicalwisdom and
sophisticated judgment.132 The finest practitioners of international law have less resembled
chemists with equations than decision makersglimpsing through a glassdarklyto guide human
affairsagainst the brute fact of conflict and a fierce desire for cooperation. They have all oper-
ated with a keen consciousness of the primacy ofpower and the inevitability ofconflict, yet have
also skillfully developed cooperative institutions for the betterment of humanity. Dean Lang-
dell, after all, was wrong: law is not a science; the lawyer'smaterialsare not all found in printed
books; and law cannot divorce itself from politics.133 World politics is not a mere struggle of
all against all; neither is it gliding toward progressive cooperation.'34

128 Thisis notto suggest thatrationalist institutionalism is unusedin thesecurity field.See,e.g.,JamesD. Mor-
row,TheLawsof War,Common Conjectures, andLegalSystems Politics,31 J. LEGAL
in International STUD.41
(2002).
129 See,e.g.,NicoKrisch, International Lawin TimesofHegemony: Unequal PowerandtheShaping oftheInter-
national LegalOrder,16 EUR.J. INT'LL.369 (2005).
130Compare, e.g.,DavidD. Caron,WarandInternationalAdjudication: onthe1899PeaceConference,
Reflections
94 AJIL4 (2000),withDavidD. Caron,TheInternational Whaling Commission andtheNorthAtlanticMarine
MammalCommission: TheInstitutional Risksof Coercion in Consensual 89 AJIL154 (1995).
Structures,
131
See,e.g.,OonaHathaway, DoHumanRightsTreaties Makea Difference? 111YALE L.J.1935(2002);BethA.
Simmons,TheLegalization oflnternational Monetary Affairs,54 INT'LORG.189 (2000).
132
Cf C. WilfredJenks,Craftsmanship in International Law,50 AJIL32 (1956).Ournotionof international
legalcraftsmanship differssomewhat fromthatofJenks: hedistinguished sharplybetweenoffering opinionstojus-
tifythenationalinterestandbuildinga solidfoundation forinternational law,forthrightly arguing thatthe"com-
pleat"international lawyershoulddothelatter.Wecontend,on thecontrary, thatinternational lawyers mustlook
to developcooperative international institutions withoutdoingviolenceto theinterestsof powerfulstates:the
WorldTradeOrganization, theMontreal Protocol, andtheWorldBankmightserveasusefulexamples. Ignoring
nationalinterestin deference to universalism is a recipeforinternational legalfailure.
133 Thisalludes to a famousLangdellian catechism:
[A]lltheavailable materials of thatscience[law]arecontained in printedbooks.... [T]helibrary is ... to us
allthatthelaboratories of theuniversity aretothechemists andphysicists,allthatthemuseumofnatural his-
toryis to thezoologists, allthatthebotanical gardenis to thebotanists.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address to theHarvard LawSchoolAssociation (Nov.1886),quoted inARTHUR
E. SUTHERLAND,THE LAWAT HARVARD175 (1967).
134"[I]tis themarkof aneducated
manto lookfor in eachclassof thingsjustso farasthenatureof
precision
thesubject it isevidently
admits; foolishtoacceptprobable
equally reasoningfromamathematician andtodemand
froma rhetoricianscientificproofs."ARISTOTLE, ETHICS,bk. I, ch. 3 (W. D. Rosstrans.,Clar-
NICOMACHEAN
endonPress1908).

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