WORKING OF THE CENTRAL

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Sub Topic: A look at the operation of the Tribunal
Appellate structure with special emphasis on L
Chandra Kumar v. Union on India
A PROJECT
submitted in the course of study in the
5th Semester
at
Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law

Submitted By: Jotsaroop Singh

(Group No. 19- 19103)
Submitted To: Dr Jaswinder Kaur
(Assistant Professor of Law)

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my special thanks to Professor (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, Vice-
Chancellor and Professor (Dr.) Naresh Kumar Vats, Officiating Registrar, Rajiv
Gandhi National University of Law, for giving me the opportunity to deal with the topic
“WORKING OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL” in detail
and presenting in the form of this project.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and ineffable indebtedness to my

Administrative Law Professor Asst. Professor (Dr) Jaswinder Kaur, who guided me
throughout the project. It was my privilege to work under their guidance.

At last, I would also like to thank my friends for helping me and motivating me to
complete this project on time.

Jotsaroop Singh
Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law Punjab
Third Year
19103

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 INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 4
2. L. CHANDRA KUMAR JUDGEMENT .............................................................. 6
2.1 Overview ......................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Criticisms ........................................................................................................ 8
3. SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ...................................................... 10
3.1 MBA Judgement ........................................................................................... 10
3.2 Rojer Mathew ................................................................................................ 10
4. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 12

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 1. INTRODUCTION
Independent and in no way subject to administrative or political interference as to how
they decide any particular case, tribunals exist in order to provide simpler, speedier,
cheaper, and more accessible justice than do the ordinary courts and supply essential
minimum of fairness in administration and adjudication alike.1 They are thus, ideal
mechanisms of relief for traditional judicial systems, existing as specialized quasi-
judicial organs, which can provide the ideal remedies for disputes which may benefit
from resolution with the help of experts in that particular domain.
In India, Tribunals have historically been envisioned as a method of relief for the
Courts, created to relieve their burden by instituting specialized judicial relief
mechanisms for specific domains. But, ever since the adoption of Article 323A and
323B in 1977,2 and the passing of the Administrative Tribunals Act,3 there have been
significant hurdles to the effective operation of these quasi-judicial forums. Several
judgements of the Supreme Court, especially in the last 25 years in this regard, have
attempted to provide corrective measures to rectify systemic issues that exist in the
operation of Tribunals. In this project, the author aims to provide a clear summary of
the Supreme Court’s stance on the status of Tribunals in the Indian Judiciary, and to
critically analyze the same, to understand the burdens that prevent the effective
operation of quasi-judicial mechanisms, with a special emphasis on the Central
Administrative Tribunal, since it plays a critical role in the operation of the
administration of this country.
The Indian Judiciary, as it stands today, is one of the most overworked judicial systems
in the world. With 59,867 matters on the docket before only the Supreme Court by
October 2019,4 one would presume the quasi-judicial mechanisms such as Tribunals as
instituted under Articles 323A and 323B would provide the ideal relief mechanism.
Currently, India has a diverse range of Tribunals, such as Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Customs, Excise and Service
Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), National Green Tribunal (NGT), Competition
Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT), Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) and others.

1
Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law 906-10 (Oxford, New Delhi, 9th edn., 2007).
2
Articles 323A and 323B, Constitution of India, 1950.
3
Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985.
4
Supreme Court of India, Indian Judiciary: Annual Report 2018-19.

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However, ineffective administration of these tribunals has meant that historically, most
of these tribunals have not functioned in the most ideal of manners. While one reason
could be seen as the lack of a central administration authority for tribunals, as was noted
by the Supreme Court in the L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India judgement
(hereinafter L. Chandra Kumar),5 stating that “ It has been brought to our notice that
one reason why these Tribunals have been functioning inefficiently is because there is
no authority charged with supervising and fulfilling their administrative
requirements,”6 the story of operation of Tribunals in India is far more complex, and
the scenario is a direct result of L. Chandra Kumar.

The administration of tribunals is a point of law and governance that has failed to find
resolution in a manner beneficial to the efficient operation of the judiciary till now. To
understand the present scenario, we must understand structure of administrative
tribunals and the judicial precedents on this subject.

5
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
6
Ibid., at p. 310.

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 2. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
The term 'tribunal' is used in Administrative Law in a specific meaning, referring only
to adjudicatory bodies that are not part of the regular court system. Technically, the
judicial powers in India are vested in the Courts, which are responsible for safeguarding
individual rights and promoting justice. As a result, in order to create a more efficient
court system with fewer complications, judicial powers are assigned to administrative
authorities, giving rise to administrative tribunals or administrative adjudicatory bodies
with quasi-judicial functions.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was established in India before the country's
independence, establishing the notion of tribunalization. Following independence, there
was a demand for more flexibility and quickness in settling administrative problems.
The main goal of tribunalization was to provide individuals with specialized and timely
justice.

The goal of establishing tribunals to the exclusion of the High Courts' jurisdiction was
to reduce case pending times and burdens. As a result, tribunals are set up as part of the
civil and criminal court systems, with the Supreme Court of India as the supreme court.
An administrative tribunal, from a functional standpoint, is neither a solely judicial nor
an entirely administrative entity, but rather a hybrid of the two. Because of this, an
administrative tribunal is also referred to as a "quasi-judicial" entity.

Certain characteristics of Administrative Tribunals are:

i. An administrative tribunal has the same procedural powers as a court,

including the ability to summon witnesses, administer oaths, and force the
production of documents, among other things.
ii. An administrative tribunal has both quasi-judicial and judicial powers and
is required to act in a judicial manner in all circumstances.
iii. They must have some, but not all, of the characteristics of conventional
courts.
iv. They do not follow stringent evidence and procedural norms
v. Administrative tribunals must be statutory in nature, that is, they must have
been established by a law.

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 vi. Administrative tribunals are self-contained and immune from administrative
intervention in the performance of judicial and quasi-judicial powers.
vii. The idea of natural justice must be followed by these tribunals.
viii. Administrative tribunals are required to act in a fair, open, and impartial
manner.
ix. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are also available against
administrative tribunals.

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 3. L. CHANDRA KUMAR JUDGEMENT
3.1 Overview

In this judgement, the question of law in front of the court was the constitutionality of
Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d).7 The similarly worded provisions essentially
eliminated the jurisdiction of all courts, except of the Supreme Court under Article 136.8
While the major holding of this judgement was to render the aforementioned provisions
unconstitutional, effectively overturning the judgement in S.P. Sampath Kumar v.
Union of India (hereinafter Sampath Kumar),9 it was while discussing the role of the
High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 in the administration of Tribunals that the
Supreme Court that the Supreme Court essentially expanded the role of High Courts in
functioning of Tribunals.10
The Supreme Court’s judgement essentially changed the role of a tribunal in the
judiciary, from being a one-stop solution, to merely being the court of first instance,
arguing that the role of Tribunals in this respect is only supplementary and all such
decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the
respective High Courts, as a Tribunal cannot act as a substitute for the High Court or
Supreme Court. This particularly hampers the operation of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, since it created an alternate path for appellants to seek justice.
3.2 Criticisms

The decision was criticized on various grounds. According to the 162nd Report of the
Law Commission of India, it led to the orders of the administrative tribunals being
routinely appealed against in high courts, a noticeable shift in the status quo.11 The
status of the tribunal also underwent a radical change, with the tribunal no longer being
an alternative to the High Court but rather subject to their supervisory jurisdiction in
each individual matter.
The judgement was based on the principle that judicial review of the High Courts under
Article 226 was part of the basic structure of the Constitution. However, the power of

7
Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d), Constitution of India, 1950.
8
Article 136, Constitution of India, 1950.
9 S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124.
10
Articles 226 and 227, Constitution of India, 1950.
11
The Law Commission of India, One Hundred and Sixty Second Report on the ‘Review of
Functioning of Central Administrative Tribunal’ (1998).

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judicial review of the High Courts under Article 226 is not as inviolable as that of the
Supreme Court under Article 32, because while Article 32(4) preserves the Supreme
Court’s supremacy of judicial review, there is no such equivalent saving provision
under Article 226.12 Establishment of tribunals as substitutes and not supplements to
the High Courts as held by the Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar’s case is perfectly in
tune with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.13 The Law Commission of India also
authored a report in 2008, specifically recommending that the L. Chandra Kumar be
revisited by a larger bench of the Supreme Court.14

12
Article 32 ad 226, Constitution of India, 1950.
13
V. Nageswara Rao and G. B. Reddy, Doctrine of Judicial Review and Tribunals: Speed Breakers
Ahead, 39 JILI 411 (1997).
14
The Law Commission of India, Two Hundred and Fifteenth Report on ‘L. Chandra Kumar be
Revisited by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court’ (2008).

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 4. SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
However, in the contemporaneous paradigm, the Supreme Court has, rather than revisit
the judgement in L. Chandra Kumar, instead doubled down on the principles
established therein.
4.1 MBA Judgement
L. Chandra Kumar essentially relegated tribunals to a mere supplementary position in
the dispute resolution paradigm, but this led to petitions arguing that there cannot be a
“wholesale transfer of powers” to judicial mechanisms. In Union of India v. Madras
Bar Assn. (hereinafter the MBA judgement),15 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify
this dichotomy that existed in their stance on the powers and ambit of tribunals.
The judgement contended that the very argument that there cannot be a “wholesale
transfer of power” is misconceived, as “It is an inevitable consequence of creation of a
tribunal for such disputes and will no way affect the validity of the law creating the
tribunal.”16 But, simultaneously, it upheld that the judicial review of decisions of a
tribunal was an essential part of the basic structure of the constitution.
4.2 Rojer Mathew
Similarly, in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (hereinafter Rojer Mathew),17 the
Supreme Court assessed the constitutional validity of the Finance Act, 2017, with
particular emphasis on the provisions of the Act which pertained to the structure and
organization of tribunals, specifically Section 184 of the Act,18 which empowered the
Central Government to notify the Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities
(Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017
(2017 Rules), with the main contention being the passing of this Act as a Money Bill.19
The Court struck down the 2017 Rules, on the grounds that the rules equated the
positions on tribunals to that of the Judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court, and
that such an equation was violative of the constitutional scheme, and recommended the
question of the Finance Act being a Money Bill to a larger bench.
But it was in discussing Issue VII as delineated by the Supreme Court in the judgment,
on the matter of whether direct statutory appeals to the Supreme Court ought to be

15
Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. (2010) 11 SCC 1.
16
Ibid., at p.50.
17
Rojer Mathew v. Union of India, (2020) 6 SCC 1
18
Section 184 of the Finance Act of 2017.
19
Appellate Tribunal and Other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and Other Conditions of
Service of Members) Rules, 2017.

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detoured, that we find that Supreme Court once again upheld the position in L. Chandra
Kumar, and in fact recommended that existing statutory provisions that allow for direct
appeals to the Supreme Court be in fact altered, to redirect said appeals to first the High
Courts, also arguing that such appeals were essential to the development of High Court
Judges, to provide them with diverse judicial experiences.
We thus see that while the Supreme Court recognizes the role of tribunals in the
judiciary, there is still a lack of acceptance in the shift in their role instituted by the L.
Chandra Kumar judgement, which effectively reduced their status, by reducing the
authority of the decision of a tribunal.

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 5. CONCLUSION
Denunciation of tribunal discretion due a to very harsh and disproportionate
punishment has provoked displeasure among the writers on administrative law, who
hold the view that the jurisdiction and powers of the tribunals should not be confined
to examine questions of law and jurisdictional error.20
While it becomes clear that the intent of the Supreme Court is merely to preserve the
power and authority of writ jurisdiction as envisioned under Article 226 and
implementing the basic structure doctrine, the effect was that it reiterated the anomalous
position that while Tribunals are the court of first instance, and possess the full
competence and authority to undertake trials, all of their decisions are still subject to
individual review by the High Courts, creating a scenario wherein a defendant who
earlier would simply have approached the High Court for relief, now must go through
the additional step of approaching the tribunal first, and in case the resolution is not
satisfactory, again end up at the High Court’s doorstep.
The Law Commission’s 215th Report, highlights an example of this, in the case of the
Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal, which was abolished by 2006, as disposals
were minimal and not satisfactory and expensive.21 This led to an interesting scenario,
wherein Central Government Employees residing in Tamil Nadu could avail
themselves of relief via the Central Administrative Tribunal, or approach to the court
for direct relief, while State Government Employees could only approach the High
Court directly under Article 226, denying them of speedy justice, thus furthering the
very problem that the tribunals were created to resolve.
The problems and effects of the L. Chandra Kumar judgement thus become clear in
retrospect, as it led to a noted decrease in the authority of tribunals, which were at the
time of the judgement, still mostly in their infancy, which had led to a systematic lack
of confidence in most tribunals. This, along with administrative concerns due to the
absence of a central authority for administration of Tribunals as recommended by the
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar and the MBA judgement, and reaffirmed in Rojer
Mathew specifically, has meant that Tribunals in India have failed to live up to their

20
P. Leelakrishnan, Reviewing Decisions of Administrative Tribunal: Paternalistic Approach of the
Indian Supreme Court and Need for Institutional Reforms, 54 JILI 1 (2012).
21
Supra note 14, para 5.18 at p. 53.

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expectations, unlike their counterparts, a fact which has specifically been highlighted
in all of these judgements.
While a revisiting of L. Chandra Kumar by a larger bench would certainly be a step in
the right direction, it becomes clear that there is need for a wider reform in the
administration of tribunals, to ensure quick and speedy justice for all petitioners, and
for Tribunals to become the one stop solution they were envisioned to be, which
becomes especially critical when considering the role that Administrative Tribunals
play in the administration of this nation.

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