All At Sea

India and Amphibious Operations

Indian Ocean is the third-largest body of water in the world dominated geographically by
India like no other nation dominates an ocean area with the great Indian peninsula projecting
over 2400 kilometers “into” the Ocean giving India with its 7,517 kilometers of coastline the
ability to dominate not only the Arabian Sea to the West and Bay of Bengal to the East but
the Indian Ocean in the South as well. India has over 1,000 islands and atolls that along with
its long coastline give her a huge Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 2,305,143 square
kilometers. Around 95 percent of India’s external trade passes through the sea. It is not
surprising that it is important for India to dominate the seas around her and see it as ‘her’
Ocean. This view had been propounded even before independence when KM Pannikar had
argued that “while to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic
areas, to India it is the vital sea. The Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian,” i.e.
India’s Ocean.1

The view was echoed after independence when Keshav Vaidya hoped that “even if we do not
rule the waves of all the five oceans of the world, we must at least rule the waves of the
Indian Ocean.”2 With such views it would have been expected of India to have focused on
building its Navy after 1947 to take its rightful place as the dominant maritime force in the
India Ocean but the continental view inhibited its growth. The official view was that “we
have to concentrate more on the other defence arms. The navy should be small but highly
trained and capable of expansion when the time comes for it.”3

The 1950’s and 60’s saw the Navy manage with less than 10 percent of the defence budget as
its share, partly because of the land centric strategic vision of the establishment and the fault
was partly of senior Army officers who believed that navy expansion and projection into the
Indian Ocean was an “outmoded Imperial concept”.4 The long period of neglect meant that
Indian Navy did not play any meaningful role during the India Pakistan War of 1965. It was
only during the Bangladesh War of 1971 that the Navy played an important role with
successful blockades and bombardments carried out on both flanks and the sea lines of
communication between the two wings of Pakistan also being cut. While India’s naval
missile attacks on Karachi were spectacularly successful but Operation Beaver, the
amphibious operation carried out in East Pakistan ‘got into serious trouble’ as the official
history of the India Pakistan War or 1971 notes. 5 It was ironic considering that Indian Navy
had carried out a successful amphibious operation as early as October 1947 when the (then)
Royal Indian Navy carried out its first operation after independence code named Exercise
1
K. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean. An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1945, p 12
2
K. Vaidya, The Naval Defence of India, Thacker, Bombay, 1949, p 91.
3
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. 2nd ser. Vol.14 Part 2, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial
Fund, New Delhi, 1993, p 283.
4
D. Palit, “Outmoded Imperial Concepts,” Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 29 December 1969
5
Prasad, SN and Thapliyal, UP, The India Pakistan War of 1971 A History, Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2014,
p 394
Peace. The main phase was launched on 5 October it landed 14 Army officers, 251 Other
Ranks, three tanks and 13 vehicles at Porbandar. The naval force for the operation consisted
of two frigates—HMIS Kistna (Commander R.D. Katari, RIN, Senior Officer) and Cauvery,
two minesweepers HMIS Konkan and Madras, three Landing Craft (Tanks)—LCTs 1310,
1358 and 1360 and one motor launch ML 420. This was followed by landings at Jaffarabad
on 17 October and Magnrol on 1 November 1947.6

Exercise Peace was not only the first major naval operation undertaken by independent
India's Navy but also the first amphibious operation post-independence. Admiring the Navy’s
performance an Army officer had said “the navy had everything buttoned up to a fine edge
and one got the impression that their officers Were an efficient, well-tempered and honed
bunch.”7 This was however not the first amphibious operation undertaken by the (then)
Royal Indian Navy as it had earlier carried out a joint operation in May 1941 during the
reoccupation of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden.8

Decades of neglect had however blunted the combat edge and the Indian Navy was devoid of
any real capability to project power in the 1970’s, the successes during the 1971 war
notwithstanding. It was only in the 1980’s that the Indian Navy saw a modest expansion with
the second aircraft carrier joining the Indian Navy in 1987. The mid 1980’s also saw the
Polish Landing Ship Tank (LST) joining the fleet and LST(Large) being built in India giving
India a limited capability to carry out amphibious operations and power projection. Operation
Pawan in 1987 and Operation Cactus in 1988 saw an assertive use of maritime power as a
result. An all too familiar neglect followed though in the early 1990’s the naval commanders
had started flagging this state of affairs asking for a “clear-cut and assertive maritime
policy”.9 The new government in 1998 gave a push to naval expansion that was continued
even after the change of government in 2004. As Navy expanded, an important step to lay
down the broad framework for the fundamental concepts to guide the and application of the
emerging maritime power was the release of Indian Maritime Doctrine in 2004.

In 2005 as the tsunami affected eleven Indian Ocean littoral countries, Indian Navy resources
were pressed into humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations earning
kudos for its relief work. Indian Navy deployed 32 ships in all during the five rescue, relief
and reconstruction missions making it the second largest deployment of naval forces in the
Indian Ocean, after United States, but was needed most was major amphibious ships to
transport men and relief material to the spread out islands.10

6
Singh, Rear Admiral Satyindra, Under Two Ensigns: Indian Navy 1945-1950, Oxford & IBH Publishing
House, New Delhi, pp 142-47
7
ibid
8
Prasad, Bisheshwar (Ed.), Indian Navy: Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War,
Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India & Pakistan), New Delhi, 1964, pp 48-49
9
S. Chopra, “Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Laws of the Sea,”Chandra et al., eds., The Indian
Ocean and Its Islands, Sage, New Delhi, 1993, p 84
10
Sakhuja, Vijay, Indian Naval Diplomacy: Post Tsunami, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 8
February 2005
As a logical corollary to the experience gained was the procurement of INS Jalashwa, the
former US amphibious assault ship USS Trenton in 2005 that gave India a modest
amphibious operations and power-projection capability. 11 As Admiral Arun Prakash, the then
Chief of Naval Staff believed that “as the pre-eminent maritime power in the Indian Ocean,
we must possess and maintain a capability for sustained operations in our area of interest,
including power projection”.12

With INS Jalshwa, three Shardul class and the eight Kumbhir-class medium landing ships
India now seemed to be on the path of acquiring a capability to match its doctrine.

United States Department of Defence in its annual report on China Military Power for 2020
acknowledged that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the world’s
largest navy and is ‘developing the capabilities and operational concepts to conduct offensive
operations within the Second Island Chain, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in some cases,
globally.’13 In recent years, one of the areas of increased interest for China and its navy has been
the Indian Ocean region with speculations that China may even have an Indian Ocean fleet in the
not so distant future.14
China already has a military base at the facility in Djibouti which has a small but constant
presence of the PLAN. There have been regular intrusion of Indian Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) by Chinese vessels including its submarine and research vessels. China and Pakistan
carry out joint naval exercises ‘Sea Guardians’ while

Recent exercises

In October 1949, as United States armed forces was still reorienting itself for its role and
missions amidst large scale dismantling in the new world order, United States Marine Corps
found itself in the crosshairs once again as it was singled out for being largely redundant.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, said, “large-scale amphibious operations
. . . will never occur again.”15
It is a different matter that United States managed to turn the tide during the Korean War with
a bold and brilliantly executed landing at Inchon. Not only during the war in Korea, United
11
INS Jalashwa was commissioned in 2007.
12
Scott, David. “India's Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Vision,” Asia
Pacific Review (Vol 13, No 2, November 2006). p.97.
13
‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’, Annual Report to
Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 2020 pp vii-viii
14
Colley, Christopher, “A Future Chinese Indian Ocean Fleet? “, War on the Rocks, 2 April 2021 accessed on
10 November 2021 at https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean-fleet/
15
U.S. Marine Corps, Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 154, September 29, 1995 accessed on 8 Nov
2021 at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-1995-09-29/html/CREC-1995-09-29-pt1-PgS14629-2.htm
States carried out amphibious operations successfully to achieve significant objectives in
Vietnam, Cambodia and Kuwait. Between 1991 and 2011, United States has carried out 137
missions during 116 amphibious operations ranging from amphibious assault and air strikes
to evacuation and humanitarian missions.16

One key factor to note was the increased reliance on assault and amphibious crafts to respond
to crises in the post-cold war era.

Defining Amphibious Operations

Without a uniform understanding of the meaning of amphibious operations, it is commonly

defined as “military operations characterized by attacks launched from the sea by naval and
landing forces against hostile shores” while the Joint Operations 3-02 Amphibious
Operations manual issued by the defines as

An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by an

amphibious force (AF) to conduct landing force (LF) operations within the littorals.
The littorals include those land areas (and their adjacent sea and associated air
space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea.

The Joint doctrine issued by Integrated Defence Staff defines it as17

Amphibious Operations are launched from the sea by maritime forces for landing
troops against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious Operations integrate
virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, special operations forces and combat
forces in a concerted joint military effort.

The Indian Maritime Doctrine issued in 2016 refers to amphibious operations as a means for
of power projections and mentions that “as a form of maritime power projection, amphibious
operations are joint military operations wherein land power is projected ashore from the
sea.”18

There are four recognised types of amphibious operations:

16
“Why Do We Need Amphibious Forces”, United States marine Corps, accessed on 8 Nov 2021 at
https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Command%20Briefs/Why%20Do%20We%20Need
%20Amphibious%20Forces.pdf

17
“Joint Doctrine for Air-Land Operations JP-10”, Issued by Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence,
New Delhi March 2010 pp 40-41
Indian Maritime Doctrine, Naval Strategic Publication 1.1, Integrated Headquarters
18

Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, 2016, p 82

Amphibious demonstration. An amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of
deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the adversary into
an unfavourable course of action.

Amphibious raid. An amphibious operation involving the swift incursion into or temporary
occupation of, an objective area followed by a planned withdrawal.

Amphibious assault. The principal type of amphibious operation, which involves

establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious withdrawal. An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea

in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

 Relevance of amphibious operations.

     

Threat/ possibility in our context.

    

Power Projection
Amphibious operations are

Humanitarian Aid

According to the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces, amphibious operations are aimed
at19

“capture or re-capture territories, obtain a site for an advance naval base or air base, deny
the use of an area or facilities like a port to the enemy, further land operations from
ashore, or to show presence.”

 Indian and Chinese capabilities 

    
Indian

19
“Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces”, HQ Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi
accessed on 8 Nov 2020 at
https://www.ids.nic.in/IDSAdmin/upload_images/doctrine/JointDoctrineIndianArmedForces2017.pdf
The Amphex series of exercises to hone the amphibious assault capabilities started in 2001
while
“EXERCISE TROPEX-2009” at Madhavpur beach in Gujarat in February 2009 in what was
the largest ever such exercise and the first after the joint doctrine on amphibious warfare had
been put into practice with its full scope. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and Infantry
troops of 91 Infantry Brigade of the Sudarshan Chakra Corps participated in both stand-off
and hard beaching modes.

China

China has been ramping up its ability to project power by sea, including its amphibious
assault capability in recent years. The first of multiple 40,000-ton Type 075 landing
helicopter dock (LHD) ships was commissioned on 23 April 2021, with a second due to enter
service imminently and a third under construction. The Type 075 is a flat-top vessel able to
carry between 20 and 30 helicopters of undisclosed types, although naval variants of the new
Z-20 are possible. It also has a well deck that can be flooded to allow landing craft,
hovercraft and amphibious assault vehicles to disembark.

China already has eight Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD) in service.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-future-of-chinas-amphibious-assault-fleet/

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/6/25/china-building-formidable-
amphibious-fleet

https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/a-future-chinese-indian-ocean-fleet/

https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-pakistan-naval-drills-more-than-just-symbolism-
60138/

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/interview-with-chief-of-the-naval-staff-admiral-
karambir-singh/article37396255.ece

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/03/what-is-happening-in-indian-ocean-pub-83948

https://chanakyaforum.com/expansionist-china-upgrading-amphibious-capabilities/

https://www.ajaishukla.com/2020/05/building-indias-amphibious-capability.html

https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/strategic-capabilities-for-power-projection-
indian-context-2/

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0006297.A2.pdf
http://www.cassindia.com/amphibious-operations

https://www.orfonline.org/research/militarising-andamans-the-costs-and-the-benefits/

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/03/what-is-happening-in-indian-ocean-pub-83948

https://carnegieindia.org/2018/03/01/maritime-security-in-bay-of-bengal-pub-75754

http://docplayer.net/185134524-The-united-states-marine-corps.html

https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=322

https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/
TsunamiRevealsIndianMilitarysHumanitarianResponseCapability_CUBhaskar_080105

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-indias-growth/

https://carnegieindia.org/2018/03/01/maritime-security-in-bay-of-bengal-pub-75754

https://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/Command%20Briefs/Why
%20Do%20We%20Need%20Amphibious%20Forces.pdf

Implications of disparity in capabilities.

Both India and China do not have the capability, as yet, for a credible (military) amphibious
operation. The modest capacity and the
China appears to be focussed on Taiwan
As regards India, salami-slicing seems more in favour than a direct offensive whether in the
high Himalayas or the high seas

Power Projection
Amphibious capability also presents a credible threat-in-being, which can act as a powerful
deterrent and can be exploited as an instrument of strategic/operational leverage.

be deployed for posturing, even if not actually employed

Areas of concern
     
Budgetary constraints.
Lack of vision for joint operations

Land centric approach

JDIAF-2017 notes that, “India’s threats primarily emanate from the disputed land borders
with our neighbors.” This
As Abhijen Rej and Shashank Joshi observed in their paper ‘India’s Joint Doctrine: A Lost
Opportunity’, it is “an army-centric joint doctrine that fails to pay sufficient attention to the
role of the other two services …… there is near-absence of force-projection and other issues
in the joint doctrine.20

Inter-service rivalry
IAF’s opposition to third carrier

Keeping pace with changes and transformation in amphibious operations

The

Road ahead

In August 2021, more than a decade after it was first decided to procure four Landing
Platform Docks (LPDs) the Ministry of Defence once again revived the project that was
scrapped last year.21

For an establishment that believes that Air Force is primarily meant for close support to the
Army and that the naval aviation assets are equally suited for operating from land in high
altitude areas, expecting a clear vision for amphibious operations may be asking for the moon
and more, but then there is no harm in wishful thinking. Maybe

References

Bartlett, Merrill L., Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
1983

Bettwy, Samuel, “Amphibious Warfare since World War II,” SSRN Electronic Journal ·
January 2015

20
Abhijen Rej and Shashank Joshi, India’s Joint Doctrine: A Lost Opportunity, ORF Occasional Paper January
2018, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi accessed on 7 Nov 2021 at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/ORF_Occasional_Paper_Joint_Doctrine.pdf

21
Bhalla, Abhishek, “Indian Navy’s procurement of amphibious ships revived after hitting dead end last year”,
India Today, 26 August 2021