Contested Air Littoral and the Challenges Ahead

Col Mandeep Singh

The way we fight has undergone a rapid transformation in recent years with drones and
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) increasingly being used on the battlefield for a range of
tasks, from tactical air strikes to delivery of supplies and from surveillance to electronic
warfare (EW) attacks. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought to fore the increasing
importance of drones and their impact on the conduct of military operations. Their use in East
Ukraine is only continuation of this trend and is indicative of a transformation taking place in
the use and projection of air power. The unmanned systems provide a capability due which it
is possible to access or exploit the air space without manned aircraft and for a state (and/or a
non-state actor) to have a viable ‘air force’ sans manned aircraft. This has been made possible
by proliferation and easier access to UAS technology and is often cited as the main reason for
the increasing use of drones and UAS in the tactical battlefield though these are not the only
drivers of this change.

With the blue skies becoming more contested, it is not easy to operate without prohibitive
costs which most nations can ill afford. In this, UAS affords an economical option to operate
in the air below the blue skies and this is a major driver for this change. As the manned
aircraft is gradually replaced by the UAS for tactical purposes, a major change that is
expected is the shift of the main battlefield in the air from the blue skies to the air littoral, that
is fast emerging as more challenging and contested for control of the air. This airspace, called
the air littoral is generally located below 10,000 feet, is defined as the “area from the
Coordinating Altitude to the Earth’s surface, which must be controlled to support land and
maritime operations and can be supported and defended from the air and/or the surface.”1

This airspace has seen such an increasing access to and presence of aerial platforms, other
than manned platforms, that their presence presents a threat to air control from below the
altitudes of conventional air superiority.2

A look at the recent conflicts also show that the control of air is not absolute and even the
traditional concepts of air supremacy are being challenged by presence of unmanned systems
in the air littoral. While the analysts have generally focussed on conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh and Syria to understand the impact of drones, the other conflicts may have lessons
of greater import. The campaign in Mosul in 2016 saw the United States concede the control
of the air for the first time in six decades as the Iraqi rebels were able to operate in the air
littoral unimpeded even as the US and coalition aircraft were operating overhead, in the blue
skies. At one time, the rebels were able to operate 70 drones in a 24-hour period and the
threat from these was considered to be so serious that the Iraqi offensive was nearly stalled.

1
Maximilian K. Bremer & Kelly A. Grieco, "The Air Littoral: Another Look," Parameters 51, no. 4 (2021): 67-
80, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss4/7
2
ibid
The coalition forces had claimed complete air superiority at this stage but even then, the
enemy drones were ‘right overhead and underneath (our) air superiority’.3

Air superiority is the second highest level of the control of the air and is said to have been
achieved when a side holds more favourable position than the opponent. It is defined by
NATO as the "degree of dominance in [an] air battle ... that permits the conduct of operations
by [one side] and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by opposing air forces".4 As the experience at Mosul illustrated, the
opposing air force is now capable of effective interference during conditions of air superiority
also. It is this change i.e. a technologically far superior air force while claiming air
superiority cannot prevent its adversary from accessing and exploiting the common air space
albeit separated vertically, that presents the real lesson and needs to be analysed in greater
detail.

The reasons for the change need to be identified first to understand the future trajectory of
this transformation and implications of the same. Proliferation of drone technology and easier
access to non-state actors are the primary reasons. China has exported 220 drones to 16
countries in the last decade. Its customers include Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE, Egypt,
Pakistan and Serbia. The Houthi rebels facing the Saudi Armed Forces have been supplied
drones by Iran while Turkey supplied drones that helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia in last
year’s conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Ukraine uses Turkish drones while Russia has supplied
them to the rebels in East Ukraine. The relatively easy access has resulted in wide spread use
of drones and UAS in almost all conflicts with an increasing number of countries investing in
UAS systems.

Ukraine has effectively used drones in its operations against Russia in recent times. 5 On the
other side, after lagging the West for years in use of drones, Russia has well appreciated the
importance of military drones and Russia and the rebels backed by it have used them
effectively in Eastern Ukraine.6 Russia plans to add 300 short range drones every year as it
aims to have ‘hundreds of new drones’ for its military.7

China is already in leader in use of military drones and is now the world’s leading exporter of
armed drones.8 It has invested heavily in developing drone swarms and loitering munitions.
China has integrated smaller, tactical drones into their tactical firepower targeting and

3
David Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones Were 2016’s ‘Most Daunting Problem’,” Defense
News, May 16, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic/2017/05/16/socom-commander -
armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem/.

4
"AAP-06 Edition 2013: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions" (PDF). NATO. Archived from the original
(PDF) on 3 March 2012. Retrieved 19 May 2013.
5
“Why Ukraine's use of a Turkish-made drone has rattled Russia”, Washington Post, 15 January 2022
6
Phillip A. Karber, “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal Observations,” Historical
Lessons Learned Workshop, sponsored by Johns Hopkins Applied Physical Laboratory & US Army Capabilities
Center (July 8, 2015), 12–16
7
“Russia to Receive Hundreds of New Drones Over Next Decade”, TASS, 18 May 2015
damage assessments.9 India already has a large UAS inventory and as the standoff against
China continues, more UAS are being procured for a range of tasks.10

The airpower scarcity is another reason for the shift towards UAS. This scarcity is more in
terms of manned systems as the high end manned aircraft are getting costlier to procure,
maintain and operate. The training of pilots is a long and costly process while the munitions
and ordnance, logistic and support infrastructure add on to the cost of maintain the air
forces.11 With increased costs, maintaining a large high end air force is something that only
select countries can afford with the advanced air forces also having to do with limited
inventory that may be much less than what is their minimum desired force level.

In such a scenario, the need of maintaining a viable air deterrence thus becomes an obvious
reason for looking at the unmanned systems as alternates to manned aircraft. In case of less
advanced nations, the choice is clearly in favour of greater reliance on unmanned systems
like drones and cruise missiles to meet their defence requirements.

With increased use of UAS has come the advancements in UAS platform technologies. The
weapon loads are getting smaller- but more effective. Raytheon’s Pyros is a 6 kilogram glide
bombs with GPS, inertial, and laser guidance options for deployment from small UAVs with
a programmable fuse for airburst, delay, or point detonation. 12 The intelligence and electronic
warfare (EW) payloads are also getting smaller. While drones can now carry additional
intelligence payloads beyond imagery sensors, small UAS are now capable of carrying
electro-optical or infrared sensors to support intelligence collection.13 Harpy and Harop may
be the two well known loitering munitions but Turkey and Iran have built some very lethal
loitering munitions like the Kargu-2 and Ra’ad-85. 14 Realizing their potential, 16 countries

8
“Combat Drones Made in China Are Coming to a Conflict Near You”, Bloomberg Businessweek, 18 March
2021 and “China has become a major exporter of armed drones”, The Print, 23 Nov 2020

9
Elsa Kania, The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems: New Capabilities for a “New Era” of Chinese Military
Power (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018), 3–16

10
“As stand-off with China continues, Army orders more India-made drones for LAC surveillance”, The Print,
24 January 2022
11
Maj Jules “Jay” Hurst, USAR, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Air Control, Air & Space Power
Journal, Spring 2019, pp 21-24

12
Berenice Baker, “Small Bombs, Big Effect: Arming Small UAVs with Guided Weapons,” Air Force
Technology, 16 December 2014, https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/featuresmall-bombs-big -effect-
arming-small-uavs-with-guided-weapons-4467893

13
Maj Jules “Jay” Hurst, USAR, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Air Control
14
Paul Iddon, “Turkey, Israel And Iran Have Built Some Very Lethal Loitering Munitions”, Forbes, 19 July
2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/07/19/turkey-israel-and-iran-have-built-some-very-lethal-
loitering-munitions/?sh=1d5adb9b59de
have undertaken programmes to develop them; the countries with indigenous programs
include Austarlia, Belarus, China, Taiwan, Russia and the United States.15

Cruise missiles have long been under the radar but the threat posed by their proliferation is
far too serious to be overlooked. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes
them an attractive option over manned systems. For the countries ( and non-state actors) that
lack modern air forces the cruise missiles offer the capability to carry out deep strikes. 16 Most
importantly cruise missiles challenge the traditional air superiority and have the potential of
carrying out more than just effective interference. This implies that unmanned aerial systems
have the potential to not only meet most of the demands of a traditional air power but also
provide a deterrence value. A look at recent conflicts is

The implications of this change of greater reliance on unmanned platforms are far reaching
and are of great import. For air forces seeking to establish their control over the air,
countering the adversary ‘air force’ will become more difficult. The traditional method used
by air forces to gain control is by responsive presence, and localised occupation in way of
combat air patrols. There is no persistent presence, given the limitations of aircraft unless the
ground-based air defence systems (GBADWS) are counted in as the means to gain control of
the skies. In this also the GBADWS have serious limitations in detecting and tracking low
profile and small UAS. Compounding this will be sheer numbers of UAS that will saturate
the GBADWS. Countering the UAS with manned aircraft is simply cost-prohibitive besides
some analysts believe that the mere threat of collision would be enough to deny the contested
air littoral to the new-gen aircraft, giving free access to the adversary and allowing him to
carry out strikes against targets in the battlefield.17

With limited capabilities of both the manned aircraft and GBADWS to counter the emerging
threat, the concept of conventional air superiority may no longer be applicable as an air force
will have limited capability to dominate the air space vertically and will not be able to deny
its use to the adversary. The limitations of GBADWS were particularly exposed in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.18 Even the advanced Russian GBADWS were found to be
inadequate in countering the drone threat19 though the Russians were able to counter the
drones during the attack on Khmeimem Air Base and Tartus Naval Facility in Latakia
Governate in 2018 using a combination of hard and soft kill systems.20

15
Mark Voskuijl,,Performance analysis and design of loitering munitions: A comprehensive technical survey of
recent developments, Defence Technology, 2021
16
“Cruise Missiles in the Middle East”, IISS, 3 September 2021
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/09/cruise-missiles-in-the-middle-east
17
J. Noel Williams, “Killing Sanctuary: The Coming Era of Small, Smart, Pervasive Lethality,” War on the
Rocks, September 8, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/killing-sanctuary-the-coming-era-of-small -
smart-pervasive-lethality/.
18
“Azerbaijan's drones owned the battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Washington Post, 11 Nov 2020
https://www.washingtonpost.com › europe › 2020/11/11
19
John V. Parachini and Peter A. Wilson, Drone-Era Warfare Shows the Operational Limits of Air Defense
Systems, RAND, 2 July 2020
20
David Reid, “A swarm of armed drones attacked a Russian military base in Syria”, CNBC, 11 January 2018
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/11/swarm-of-armed-diy-drones-attacks-russian-military-base-in-syria.html
There is thus a need to have a relook at the way the air defence is provided and investments
be made in soft kill weapon systems that are more capable of countering the UAS. Another
option is to target the adversary’s support network and communications so as to disrupt his
drone operations, as was tried out by the US during the Mosul campaign.21

The means and methods to counter the emergent threats in the air littoral will be found in the
days to come, and new tactics adopted to operate in the contested air space but it will be
possible without any mishaps only if the implications of the change are well understood and
course corrections is carried out. This correction is required not only in the inventory
management but also in concepts and doctrines of war fighting.

21
Larter, David B., “SOCOM commander: Armed ISIS drones were 2016’s 'most daunting problem', Defense
News, 17 May 2017