Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.

2198 Filed 07/21/23 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ST. VINCENT CATHOLIC CHARITIES,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 1:19-CV-1050
v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
INGHAM COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant.
__________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

This First Amendment dispute is before the Court on parties’ briefing on remedy. The

Court previously ruled that Defendant Ingham County Board of Commissioner violated the First

Amendment by denying a Community Agency Grant to Plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities

because of its religious beliefs and by retaliating against St. Vincent for its protected activity in

Buck v. Gordon. By way of remedy St. Vincent seeks a total of $60,803.28 in compensatory

damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 75.) The Board argues that St. Vincent

is entitled to $4,620 in compensatory damages and no declaratory or injunctive relief. (ECF No.

76.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff St. Vincent Catholic Charities (“St Vincent”) is a Michigan non-profit corporation

with charitable and religious purposes. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4.) St. Vincent provides refugee

services programs in Ingham County, Michigan and has done so under “annually renewed

contracts with Ingham County for at least the past twenty years.” (Id., PageID.10-11.) Defendant
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2199 Filed 07/21/23 Page 2 of 15

Ingham County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”) governs Ingham County, exercising

legislative and administrative functions. (Id., PageID.5-6.) The Board controls the County budget

and is responsible for authorizing County contracts and grants. (Id., PageID.6.)

1) Community Agency Grant

St. Vincent has been applying for grants through Ingham County’s Community Agency

Grant Program since 2006 and has received a grant every time it has applied until its denial in

2019. On May 28, 2019, the Board passed Resolution #19-243, which further described the

Board’s budgetary policy for 2020 grants. (ECF No. 58, PageID.1220.) It restated that priority

should be given to “proposals that directly contribute to addressing the Community’s overarching

long-term objective of ‘Meeting Basic Needs,’ such as food, clothing, and shelter . . . . ” (Id.) The

Resolution added that “priority [be] given to those agencies that comply with the County’s non-

discrimination policies.” (Id.)

St. Vincent’s 2019 grant application was the same it had used for the previous year, which

satisfied the “basic needs” criteria and was granted. (ECF No. 59-1, PageID.1472.) St. Vincent

requested funding for its “Living in America” program, which provides classes to refugees on

home purchasing and maintenance, small business development, English, and computer literacy.

(ECF No. 59-13, PageID.1612.) This time, though, the Board denied the grant. The Board claims

the reason for the denial was St. Vincent’s failure to satisfy the long-standing “basic needs”

criteria, even though earlier applications for the same program passed muster. Moreover, though

the Board added the non-discrimination prong in Resolution #19-243 – the only change from

earlier years – the Board does not claim that St. Vincent failed to meet this requirement. Nor could

the Board make such a claim considering the record establishes that St. Vincent serves all refugees

regardless of sexual orientation.

2
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2200 Filed 07/21/23 Page 3 of 15

On November 18, 2019, the HSC met to discuss community agency grants. (ECF No.

59-1, PageID.1477.) St. Vincent’s application for a $4,500 community agency grant came up

before the HSC at the meeting. (Id.) Ultimately, the HSC voted against awarding a grant to St.

Vincent. On November 21, 2019, the full Board accepted the HSC’s recommendation to deny St.

Vincent’s grant application. (ECF No. 58, PageID.1222.) The Board reasoned that St. Vincent’s

application did not comply with the Board’s 2020 Policy for appropriation of limited discretionary

funds. (Id., PageID.1220.) The Board approved the applications of all the other thirty-one

community agencies seeking grants. (Id.)

2) Summary Judgment Motions

St. Vincent and the Board filed cross summary judgment motion. St. Vincent contended

that the Board’s rejection of St. Vincent’s grant application violates the Free Exercise Clause, and

the Board retaliated against St. Vincent for activity protected by the First Amendment. The Board

argued that its action was constitutional as the application was denied only because it did not meet

neutral criteria. The Court granted St. Vincent’s motion and denied the Board’s motion, finding

that the Board violated the First Amendment by withholding the grant and retaliating against St.

Vincent for its protected activity.

The Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the issue of remedy. St.

Vincent seeks declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, actual and nominal damages, litigation

costs and attorneys’ fees, and any other equitable relief appropriate. The Board opposes some of

the claimed relief. Now before the Court are parties’ briefs on the issues.

3
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2201 Filed 07/21/23 Page 4 of 15

LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

1) Compensatory Damages

When a plaintiff seeks damages for violations of constitutional rights under § 1983, “the

level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law

of torts.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986). Generally, “damages

in tort cases are designed to provide ‘compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's

breach of duty.’” Id. (quoting 2 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 25.1, p. 490 (2d

ed. 1986) (emphasis in original). “[C]ompensatory damages may include not only out-of-pocket

loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation, . . . personal

humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’” Id. at 307 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,

418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)); see also Ellison v. Balinski, 625

F.3d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he law is clear that compensatory damages under § 1983 may

include noneconomic injuries such as embarrassment, humiliation, or loss of reputation.”).

Damages for non-physical injuries, such as “pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the

like are available to the extent that actual injury has been proved.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

882 F.2d 1101, 1104 (6th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff cannot receive damages “based on a subjective

evaluation of the importance of particular constitutional values.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477

U.S. at 311. If “a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but

difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate.” Id. at 310-

11. Presumed damages roughly approximate the harm and “are a substitute for ordinary

compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury.”

Id. at 310-11. Thus, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered an actual injury in order

to receive compensatory damages for violations of his or her constitutional rights,” and presumed

4
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2202 Filed 07/21/23 Page 5 of 15

damages may be award as long as the award focuses “on the real injury sustained not on either the

abstract value of the constitutional right at issue or the importance of the right in our system of

government.” King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 214 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted)

(emphasis in original).

A plaintiff is not permitted to recover compensatory damages if “the connection between

the claimed loss and the tortious act is speculative or uncertain.” Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of

Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 52 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating

that the claimed damages are the “certain result of the wrong.” Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson

Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 562 (1931). Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant

then bears the risk of uncertainty as to the amount of damages. See id. at 563. If a plaintiff’s “right

to damages is established, his right will not be denied even though a calculation of damages cannot

be accomplished with mathematical exactness.” Burns Bros. Plumbers v. Groves Ventures Co.,

412 F.2d 202, 209 (6th Cir. 1969).

St. Vincent seek three categories of compensatory damages: the value of the grant it was

denied; compensation for staff time and resourced expended in response to the constitutional harm;

and compensation for alleged damages to its reputation. (ECF No. 75, PageID.2113-2122.) The

Board agrees that St. Vincent is entitled to compensation for the grant it was denied but asks that

the Court condition those funds on their being spent on the programming for which the grant was

originally authorized. (ECF No. 76, PageID.2167.) The Board disputes both the diverted staff

time and reputational damages. (Id., PageID.2167-2171.) For the reasons set forth below, the

Court finds that St. Vincent is entitled to the value of the grant without condition. However, St.

Vincent is not entitled to compensation for staff time not fairly traceable to the claim on which this

5
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2203 Filed 07/21/23 Page 6 of 15

Court granted summary judgment. Nor has St. Vincent established an evidentiary basis for

reputational damages.

a) The Value of the Community Agency Grant

Neither party disputes that St. Vincent is entitled to the value of the Community Agency

Grant that it did not receive. The Board ask the Court to condition this award on St. Vincent using

the funds in the manner required by the grant. (ECF No. 76, PageID.2167.) The Board provides

no case law for this request. Nor has the Court’s research uncovered case law either mandating or

suggesting such a condition. Therefore, the Court agrees that St. Vincent is entitled to the $4,500

value of the grant but declines to condition that receipt on how the funds are ultimately used.

b) Expenses Incurred

St. Vincent next asks for $6,303.28 for lost staff time and money spent for a public relations

firm “contending with the Board’s religious discrimination.” (ECF No. 75, PageID.2113.)

i) Diverted Staff Time

First, St. Vincent asks for $1,263.28 in diverted staff time. In a declaration by St. Vincent’s

CEO, she asserts that she and two additional staff members were required to spend a total of 24

hours of time “to respond to the Board’s actions” that would otherwise have been spent providing

direct services. (ECF No. 75-1, PageID.2141-2143.) She further asserts that “[n]one of this time

is related to St. Vincent’s litigation over the grant denial” but rather represents time “spent

responding to the Board’s disparaging statements, reassuring our community partners and donors,

and applying for an unprecedented Request for Proposal on the interpretative services contract that

we have held with the County for years.” (Id.) St. Vincent asserts that the estimate of $1,263.28

is “based on the salary and benefits paid to each employee.” (Id.)

6
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2204 Filed 07/21/23 Page 7 of 15

The Board points out that St. Vincent provides no time records, whether contemporaneous

or reconstructed, nor any description of how the figure was calculated. (ECF No. 76,

PageID.2164.) In fact, St. Vincent does not provide any information at all about the actual salaries

and benefits of the three employees whose time is at issue. Nor has St. Vincent disclosed how the

24 hours of time is distributed among those employees. The Board also notes that St. Vincent is

attempting to claim compensation for time spent applying for the interpretative services contract,

a claim that was ultimately dismissed. 1 (ECF No. 76, PageID.2165; ECF No. 36, PageID.945)

St. Vincent is not entitled to compensatory damages for claims that were dismissed on the

merits. See Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining

that in an attorney fee order, “[w]ork on an unsuccessful claim cannot be considered to have been

expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved where the plaintiff has presented distinctly

different claims for relief based on different facts and legal theories.” (internal quotation and

citation omitted)). St. Vincent does not link time in the interpretative services contract to the

Community Agency Grant, on which it prevailed, nor is there an evidentiary record to support the

hours and amounts claimed in any event. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages

for these hours is denied.

ii) Public Relations Firm

Secondly, St. Vincent spent $5,040 on a public relations firm “to address the reputational

harm caused by the Board’s actions.” (ECF No. 75-1, PageID.2141.) St. Vincent’s CEO asserts

that the firm spent a total of 21 hours “assisting St. Vincent in preparing to discuss this issue with

1
The Court referenced comments made during that grant discussion as part of its ruling on the
Community Agency Grant but made clear that history is provided as “additional context,” (ECF
No. 74, PageID.2085), and that interpretive services contract is “no longer an issue in this case.”
(Id., PageID.2083).
7
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2205 Filed 07/21/23 Page 8 of 15

Board Commissioners, providing strategic planning and counsel to St. Vincent regarding how to

rebuild St. Vincent’s reputation in the Ingham County community, and promoting St. Vincent’s

ministry to agency partners and community leaders.” (Id., PageID.2142.) The declaration asserts

that the public relations firm billed at a rate of $240/hour and attaches an invoice from the firm.

(Id.) That invoice does not include hourly rates or any dollar figures at all but does include billing

descriptions and dates for the work conducted. (ECF No. 75-2, PageID.2148.) The Board argues

that much of the work billed to the public relations firm predates the Community Agency Grant’s

denial, and so relates to claims that were dismissed on the merits. (ECF No. 76, PageID.2166). In

fact, only half an hour of time was billed after the Community Agency Grant was denied, so the

Board say a maximum of $120 is compensable as fairly traceable to that denial.

The Court first notes that “promoting St. Vincent’s ministry” is not an expense fairly

traceable to any damages in this case. Secondly, the Court has reviewed the invoice carefully.

The invoice includes entries billed from October 31, 2019, through November 21, 2019. The Court

observes that some of the entries are extremely general, making it very difficult to discern whether

the work actually relates to this matter. See, e.g., ECF No. 75-2, PageID.2148 (“11/11/2019

Strategic Planning & Counsel – Conference call .75”). What’s more, not only does the majority

of that time precede the Community Agency Grant’s initial denial on November 18, it includes at

least five days before the Refugee Services Contract was initially discussed. (ECF No. 74,

PageID.2083-2086.) For example, on October 31, 2019, .25 hours was billed for “Strategic

Planning & Counsel – Review of appeals update, exchange re: AG approach/prep.” (ECF No. 75-

2, PageID.2149.) The most reasonable interpretation of that entry is that it related not to this action,

but to the Buck litigation. That is not within the scope of this case. In fact, almost all the time

billed is between November 4 and November 13, for 19.25 of the 21 hours. (ECF No. 75-2,

8
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2206 Filed 07/21/23 Page 9 of 15

PageID.2148-49.) The Refugee Services Grant, which St. Vincent received, and which is not a

subject of this matter, was initially discussed on November 4 and was awarded on November 12.

(ECF No. 74, PageID.2083-2084.) On November 13, .75 hours was billed for “Strategic Planning

& Counsel – Debrief/notes from commissioner meeting.” (ECF No. 75-2, PageID.2148.) The

only commissioner meeting that could be “debriefed” at that point in time is the one awarding

Refugee Services Grant – which is not part of this case.

Only two entries clearly relate to the core issues of this case. On November 21, one

individual billed .25 hours to “Ingham County Board Meeting monitoring” and another billed .25

to “Call w/ Ali – County Commission Strategy.” (ECF No. 75-2, PageID.2148.) These facially

relate to the meeting on November 21 where St. Vincent’s application for the Community Agency

Grant was denied. An .75-hour entry for November 14 is a much closer call, saying only that it is

for “Team update call; follow up recommendations and steps.” (Id., PageID.2149.) Because this

call took place after the Refugee Services Grant was received and mentions recommendations and

steps, one can reasonably read it to involve work to prepare for the upcoming hearing on the

Community Agency Grant. Therefore, the Court finds that 1.25 hours of work shown on the

invoice is compensable. Therefore, the Court finds that St. Vincent is entitled to $300 on this

claim.

c) Reputational Harm

St. Vincent seeks $50,000 for damage to its reputation. It contends that the Board

denigrated its religious beliefs at two public meetings, which are recorded and available on the

Board’s website. St. Vincent argues that the Board’s disparaging statements were well-known in

Ingham County, and it was required to communicate with the public and reassure donors that it is

committed to serving all refugees. (ECF No. 75-1, PageID.2144-45.) It estimates that

9
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2207 Filed 07/21/23 Page 10 of 15

compensation for the reputational damage amounts to $50,000, which represents less than 1% of

St. Vincent’s annual revenue for 2020. (Id. at PageID.2146.) The Board argues that St. Vincent

is not entitled to any damages for reputational harm because the damages are speculative and

$50,000 is a random number.

St. Vincent does not provide an evidentiary basis for any reputational harm. In fact, the

only example of claimed reputational harm that St. Vincent provided was that they had to “reassure

several donors” and “other community partners” of its commitment to serve all refugees. (ECF

No. 75-1, PageID.2145.) St Vincent suggests that staff having to “expend additional time and

legal review when preparing grant applications, government contracts, and interactions with

government officials” is a result of the Board’s actions and complains that other cities have

expressed “concern” about similar issues. (ECF No. 75, PageID.2121.) However, St. Vincent

provides no evidence to suggest any action by the other cities is because of reputational harm

stemming from the actions in this case.

It is also relevant that throughout this process, members of the Board repeatedly

acknowledged that St. Vincent “has been essential to refugee resettlement in Ingham County” and

“excels at serving refugees, and . . . has developed expertise and programs that no other agency in

Ingham County can provide.” (ECF No. 74, PageID.2082.) The Board ultimately denied the grant

application because of disagreement with some of St. Vincent’s religious views, and not because

of any complaint about poor service. In fact, St. Vincent’s own public relations firm’s invoice

shows no work after the Community Agency Grant was denied. (ECF No. 75-2, PageID.2148.)

This suggests the lack of any need to rehabilitate a damaged reputation for public service. St.

Vincent also provides no evidentiary basis to support $50,000, as compared to any other possible

10
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2208 Filed 07/21/23 Page 11 of 15

number. Attempting to quantify any reputational harm would be purely speculative. St. Vincent’s

request for reputational damages is therefore denied.

2) Declaratory Relief

St. Vincent argues that it is entitled to declaratory relief and asks the Court to declare that

the Board violated St. Vincent’s First Amendment rights. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides

that a district court, in a case of actual controversy, “may declare the rights and other legal relations

of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). To get a declaratory judgment, “a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘an actual injury

traceable to the defendant [that is] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Larry

E. Parrish. P.C. v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 456–57 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)). Therefore, courts “are not in the business of

pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.”

Id. (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18).

Once a court is satisfied that the jurisdictional prerequisites are met, it considers five factors

to determine whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate:

(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2)
whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in
clarifying the legal relations in issue; (3) whether the declaratory
remedy is being used merely for the purpose of ‘procedural fencing’
or ‘to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;’ (4) whether the
use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our
federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state
jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is
better or more effective.

Grand Trunk W. Rail Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984).

Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has divided the fourth factor into three sub-factors:

11
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2209 Filed 07/21/23 Page 12 of 15

(1) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an

informed resolution of the case;
(2) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate
those factual issues than is the federal court; and
(3) whether there is a close nexus between underlying factual and
legal issues and state law and/or public policy, or whether federal
common or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory
judgment action.

United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole's Place, Inc., 936 F.3d 386, 396 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation

omitted).

Here, the factors do not favor a declaratory judgment. There is no additional legal

controversy to settle—the Court’s summary judgment order clearly states that the Board violated

St. Vincent’s rights when it denied its Community Agency Grant Application. (ECF No. 74.) The

Court’s previous ruling explains that St. Vincent could not bring similar claims regarding the

interpretative services contract. (ECF No. 36). Nor would a declaratory judgment clarify anything

in the case not already addressed by those two orders. What’s more, there is clearly a better or

more effective remedy—the order issued by this Court clearly stating that St. Vincent’s rights were

violated, and the compensatory damages awarded. Therefore, the Court declines to issue a

declaratory judgment in this case.

3) Permanent Injunction

St. Vincent also seeks a permanent injunction. “Where the plaintiff establishes a constitutional

violation. . . on the merits, the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief upon showing 1)

a continuing irreparable injury if the court fails to issue the injunction and 2) the lack of an adequate

remedy at law.” Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir.1998). A plaintiff

seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy

12
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2210 Filed 07/21/23 Page 13 of 15

in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010) (internal quotation omitted).

A court has equitable discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief. Id. A permanent

injunction is a powerful remedy, and “‘[t]here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate,

which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful

case, than the issuing an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended

unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate

remedy in damages.’” Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union No.

18, Int'l Typographical Union, 471 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff,

Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Ed.) § 1431). A court must exercise caution when

enjoining a public entity from making particular decisions on how to spend public funds. See

Brown v. Neeb, 523 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d 644 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1981)

(“Obviously, neither practically nor in law does this Court have the jurisdiction or the power to

order the City, or its officers, to increase taxes, or to spend its money in particular ways. The Court

cannot determine the priorities that the City Council, or the City Manager, should establish for

various activities.”)

St. Vincent argues that it is entitled to a permanent injunction and requests that the

injunction prevent the Board from “(1) unconstitutionally discriminating against St. Vincent when

awarding contracts or grants and (2) require the Board to adopt a statement giving the reasons why

it denied any such funding to St. Vincent.” (ECF No. 75, PageID.2128.) The Board argues that a

permanent injunction is inappropriate because there is no continuing irreparable harm.

A permanent injunction is inappropriate. It is a remedy that requires the Court to exercise

caution. While it is well-settled law that First Amendment violations constitute irreparable injury,

13
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2211 Filed 07/21/23 Page 14 of 15

see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976), St. Vincent fails to establish continuing harm. There

is no other violation of St. Vincent’s rights prior or subsequent to the denial of the 2020

Community Agency Grant Application described in the briefing. Unlike in other First Amendment

cases where the plaintiff is responding to a particular policy or regulation, this dispute is ultimately

about a single grant denial. St. Vincent acknowledges that it has received grant funding from the

Board since the 2020 Community Agency Grant. (ECF No. 75, PageID.2121.) The Board is no

longer comprised of the same individuals as it was when this matter began. In fact, Commissioner

Morgan, whose negative comments were highlighted throughout this Court’s summary judgment

order, has not been a member of the board for more than two years. (ECF No. 76, PageID.2173.)

Both parties have also acknowledged that the Board has “learned a lesson.” (ECF No. 75,

PageID.2126 and ECF No. 76, PageID.2173.) “‘[C]essation of the allegedly illegal conduct by

government officials has been treated with more solicitude by the courts than similar action by

private parties’ and that ‘[the government's] self-correction provides a secure foundation for a

dismissal based on mootness so long as it appears genuine.’” Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939

F.3d 756, 767 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 675 F.3d 974,

981 (6th Cir. 2012). In general, courts assume the government acts in “good faith” and that “the

same allegedly wrongful conduct by the government is unlikely to recur.” Speech First, 939 F.3d

at 767. That is all the more true here, where the Court has the benefit of multiple intervening years

of that conduct not recurring.

Finally, this Court already expressed that “enjoining a public entity from making particular

decision on how to spend taxpayer money” is a step that must be approached with caution. (ECF

No. 74, PageID.2102) (citing Brown v. Neeb, 523 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d, 664 F.2d

551 (6th Cir. 1981)). Deciding how to spend public funds is one of the core legislative powers. A

14
Case 1:19-cv-01050-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PageID.2212 Filed 07/21/23 Page 15 of 15

permanent injunction that essentially directs the Board to fund St. Vincent in perpetuity is clearly

inappropriate. Nor can the Court automatically conclude that any future decision not to fund a

particular St. Vincent request must be motivated by inappropriate animus. 2 Should the Board

reoffend, St. Vincent already has the appropriate remedy for that future conduct – filing a lawsuit

in the appropriate court and presenting the evidence pertinent to any such decision.

Where another remedy will adequately address the harm, a permanent injunction should

not be issued. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Pro. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 616 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“Because. . . the procedural due process violation can be remedies by allowing… a hearing, we

vacate the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction.”). Here, the Court the Court is confident

that a permanent injunction is not required to adequately redress the harm here, which is more than

adequately addressed by the compensatory damages ordered here.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:

1. St. Vincent shall be award $4,800 in compensatory damages.

2. St. Vincent’s request for a declaratory judgment is DENIED.

3. St. Vincent’s request for a permanent injunction is DENIED.

A separate judgment shall issue.

Dated: July 21, 2023 /s/ Robert J. Jonker

ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2
Because the Court finds that a permanent injunction is unnecessary, it will not delve further into
the potential legal issues with St. Vincent’s proposed injunction.
15