PH.

D (LAW) RESEARCH CENTER, PUNE

Longish Term Paper Clinical Research

ON

POST OF GOVERNOR IN INDIA – AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

SUBMITTED BY

AMOL AJIT RAHATEKAR

ROLL NO - 22

Ist Year LL.M. Sem - II

UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF

ASST. PROF. DR. GEETANJALI PAYGUDE

SUBMITTED TO

SAVITRIBAI PHULE PUNE UNIVERSITY

POST-GRADUATION TEACHING DEPARTMENT OF LAW (2022-2023)

1
 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I declare that the Longish Term Paper submitted by me for the degree of Masters in Law is the
record of work carried out by me during the period from 2022 – 2023 under the guidance of
Asst. Prof. Dr. Geetanjali Paygude and has not formed the basis for award of any other degree,
diploma, associate ship, fellowship, titles in this or any other university or other institution of
higher learning.

I further declare that the material obtained from other sources has been duly acknowledged in
this longish term paper.

PLACE:-PUNE

DATE: 19/5/2023 Signature of candidate

(AMOL AJIT RAHATEKAR)

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 CERTIFICATE

This is to Certify that the work incorporated in this Longish Term Paper submitted by Amol Ajit

Rahatekar was carried out by the candidate under my guidance / supervision. Such material has

been obtained from other sources has been duly acknowledged in this Longish Term Paper.

PLACE:- PUNE

(DR. GEETANJALI PAYGUDE)

(GUIDE)

DATE:

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Firstly, I take this opportunity to express my heart full gratitude to my Hon’ble Principal Dr.
Rashid Shaikh for giving me an opportunity to undertake his research work & successfully
accomplishing the same.

I would also like to thank my Guide Asst. Prof. Dr. Geetanjali Paygude for her valuable guidance
& for being a source of inspiration & encouragement enabling the researcher work & to
complete the research work successfully.

Last but not the least the researcher would like to thank all the background supports who have
spent their valuable time to support me throughout my research work.

Place : Pune Signature of Candidate

Date :

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 INDEX

PARTICULARS Page No.

CHAPTER-1 07

1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
1.4 HYPOTHESIS
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER-2 09
2.1 PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA RELATING TO
APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR
CHAPTER-3 11
3.1 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR
3.2 JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR
3.3 EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR
3.4 DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR
CHAPTER-4 13
4.1 ISSUES RELATED TO THE ROLE OF GOVERNOR
CHAPTER-5 14
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
5.1 BRIEF FACTS ABOUT THE CASE
5.2 ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT
5.3 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER
5.4 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
5.5 REASONING GIVEN BY THE JUDGES
5.6 RATIO DECIDENDI
5.7 SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT
5.8 OVERVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT
CHAPTER-6 23

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 6.1 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
BIBLOGRAPHY 24

CHAPTER-1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Role of Governor of India

The Governor is the head of a state just like the President is the head of the republic. The
Governor is the nominal head of a state, while the Chief Minister is the executive head. All
executive actions of the state are taken in the name of the Governor. However, in reality he
merely gives his consent to the various executive actions. He or she is devoid of taking any
major decisions. The real powers in the executive dealings of a state rest with the Chief Minister
and the Council of Ministers.

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 According to an amendment in the Constitution of India, brought about in 1956, the same person
can be the Governor of two or more states. Apart from the governors in the states, Lieutenant
governors are appointed in Union Territories of Delhi, Andaman Nicobar Island and
Pudducherry. All other union-territories are governed by an Administrative Head (an IAS
officer). The only exception is Chandigarh. The governor of Punjab is also the lieutenant
governor of Chandigarh.

The powers of the Lieutenant Governor of a union-territory are equivalent to the powers of a
Governor of a state in India. Both are appointed by the President of India for a term of 5 years.

Interpreters and politicians of India's politics have been opposing the system of appointment of
Governor. They say that the Governor is appointed by the President, which is detrimental to the
states. The Governor will act only as an agent of the Central Government.

People may think that the post of governor is useless and a financial burden on state governments
but the role played by governor is very important. He serves as a bridge between central
government and state government. The governor has to see that a stable government is formed in
the state and also look into the legal validity of the law passed by state legislature and
recommend president rule in the state if there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery.

Thus the post of governor is essential for the healthy functioning of democracy though it is true
that this post has been reduced to becoming a retirement package for politicians.
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
 To study the Post of Governor in India under Indian Constitution.
 To analyze the provisions relating to appointment of Governor.
 To evaluate the powers of the Governor.
 To analyze the role of Governor and discuss the issues relating to appointment of the Governor.
 To analyze and evaluate the judicial role as well as judgment passed by Supreme Court and High
Court.
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Researcher wishes to study the Post of Governor in India under Indian Constitution The
researcher wishes to explore following points-
 To study the Post of Governor in India under Indian Constitution.

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 To analyze the judicial decisions with reference to the Post of Governor in India.

For the detailed study on the topic researchers would explore the following-
1. Provisions related to Post of Governor in India under Indian constitution
2. Supreme Court and High Court decisions.
1.4 HYPOTHESIS
Effective provisions are present in the Indian Constitution for safeguarding the Post of Governor
in India.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1. TYPE OF STUDY-
The doctrinal methodology of study is used by the researcher to verify the hypothesis by
referring difference sources.

2. SOURCES OF DATA
The Supreme Court and High Court decisions.
CHAPTER-2
2.1 PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA RELATING TO
APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR
Eligibility Criteria

As per the Constitution of India, the following are the eligibility criteria for the appointment of
the Governor in a particular state:

He or she must be a citizen of India.

He or she must have completed 35 years of age.

He or she must not hold any other office of profit.

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He or she must not be a member of the Legislature of the Union or of any other state. There is no
bar to the selection of a Governor from amongst the members of the Legislature, provided that
on appointment, he or she immediately ceases to be a Member of the Legislature.

Salary of the Governor

The monthly salary of a Governor is Rs 1,10,000, as specified in the Governor’s (Emoluments,

Allowances and Privileges) Act of 1982. The Governor is also entitled to certain benefits and
allowances, which shall not be diminished during his office term of five years.

Facilities for the Governor

In addition to the monthly salary, the Governor is entitled to a number of special facilities such
as medical facilities, residence facilities, traveling facilities, reimbursement of phone and
electricity bills, and many other allowances.

The Governor is provided an official residence free of rent. The Governor and his or her family
is also provided free medical attendance for life. A fixed amount of money is also allotted as the
Governor’s traveling expenses across the country.

Selection Process of the Governor

The Governor is not elected by the process of direct or indirect voting (like the Chief Minister,
the Prime Minister or the President). The Governor of a particular state is appointed directly by
the President of India, for a period of five years. The Governor must meet all the eligibility
criteria enumerated above, to be appointed by the President.

Duty Term of the Governor

A governor of a state in India holds office for a period of five years, but it is subject to
termination earlier if:

The Governor is dismissed by the President, at whose pleasure he holds the office. In reality, the
President is advised by the Prime Minister of the country, who decides the dismissal of the

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Governor of a state, usually on the grounds of gross delinquency namely corruption, bribery and
violation of the Constitution.

The Governor resigns from his post. There is no retirement age of the Governor, as he or she
stays in office for a fixed term. There is no provision for a Governor to be impeached from
office, unlike that of a President.

Pension of the Governor

A Governor of a particular state is entitled to a fixed pension, as per the Constitution of India. In
August 2013, a Bill for hike in pension for the Governor was initiated. Besides a fixed pension, a
Governor is also entitled to emoluments such as secretarial allowances and medical benefits for
life.

The Residence of the Governor

As the Governor is the nominal head of a particular state in India, he or she is entitled to reside in
the Raj Bhavan of that state, during his or her term of office. Like the President of India who
resides in the Rashtrapati Bhavan in Delhi, each state has a Raj Bhavan, which is allotted to the
Governor and his family. The Governor must vacate the Raj Bhavan on the expiry of his or her
term of office.

CHAPTER-3
3.1 LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR

As the Governor is said to be a part of the State Legislature, he has the right of addressing and
sending messages, summoning, deferring and dissolving the State Legislature, just like the
President has, in respect to the Parliament. Although these are formal powers, in reality, the
Governor must be guided by the Chief Minister and his Council of Ministers before making such
decisions.

The Governor inaugurates the state legislature and the first session of each year, by addressing
the Assembly, outlining the new administrative policies of the ruling government.

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The Governor lays before the State Legislature, the annual financial statement and also makes
demands for grants and recommendation of ‘Money Bills’.

The Governor constitutes the State Finance Commission. He also holds the power to make
advances out of the Contingency Fund of the State in the case of any unforeseen circumstances.

All bills passed by the Legislative Assembly become a law, only after the Governor approves
them. In case it is not a money bill, the Governor holds the right to send it back to the Vidhan
Sabha for reconsideration. But if the Vidhan Sabha sends back the Bill to the Governor the
second time, then he has to sign it.

The Governor has the power to promulgate an ordinance when the Legislative Assembly is not in
session, and a law has to be brought into effect immediately. However, the ordinance is
presented in the state legislature in the next session, and remains operative for a total of six
weeks, unless it is approved by the legislature.

3.2 JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR

The Governor can grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remission of punishments. He can also
suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against the law.

The Governor is consulted by the President in the appointment of the Chief Justice to the High
Court of that particular state.

3.3 EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR

In case no political party bags a majority in the Vidhan Sabha of the state, the Governor holds
the power to use his discretion to select the Chief Minister.

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The Governor informs the President in an official report, of a particular emergency arisen in the
state, and imposes ‘President’s Rule’ on the behalf of the President. The Governor, in such
circumstances, overrides the advice or functions of the Council of Ministers, and directs upon
himself, the workings of the state.

3.4 DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR

The governor can use these powers:

When no party gets a clear majority, the governor has discretion to choose a candidate for chief
minister who will put together a majority coalition as soon as possible.

They can impose President's rule.

They submit reports on their own to the president or on the direction of the president regarding
the affairs of the state.

They can withhold their assent to a bill and send it to the president for approval.

During emergency rule per Article 353, the governor can override the advice of the council of
ministers if specifically permitted by the President. The governors of the states of India.

Article 153 to 164 of the Constitution of India

CHAPTER-4
4.1 ISSUES RELATED TO THE ROLE OF GOVERNOR

Abuse of power by the centre: There are numerous examples of the Governor’s position being
abused, usually at the behest of the ruling party at the Centre. The process of appointment has
generally been the cause behind it.

Biased ideology: In several cases, politicians and former bureaucrats identifying with a particular
political ideology have been appointed as the Governors by the central government. This goes
against the constitutionally mandated neutral seat and has resulted in bias, as appears to have
happened in Karnataka and Goa.

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Puppet rulers: Recently, the Governor of Rajasthan has been charged with the violation of the
model code of conduct. His support of the ruling party is against the spirit of non-partisanship
that is expected from the person sitting on constitutional posts.

Due to such incidents, negative terms like an agent of the Centre, Puppet and rubber stamps are
used to describe a governor of the state.

Favouring a particular political party: Governor’s discretionary powers to invite the leader of the
largest party/alliance, post-election, to form the government has often been misused to favour a
particular political party.

Misuse of power: The Governors Committee (1971) laid down the responsibility on the governor
to see that the administration of the state does not breakdown due to political instability and he
must send a regular report about the political situation of the State.

However, the imposition of President’s rule (Article 356) in case of breakdown of constitutional
machinery in a State has been frequently misused by the central government.

CHAPTER-5

JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE

CASE ANALYSIS OF B.P. SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA (2010) 6 SCC 331

5.1 BRIEF FACTS ABOUT THE CASE

On the suggestion of the Council of Ministers, the President of India removed the Governors of
Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh on July 2, 2004. As a result, a writ petition in the form
of a Public Interest Litigation was filed, requesting the reinstatement of the abovementioned
Governors of the States. A Governor of a State is appointed by the President of India and serves
'during the pleasure of the President,' according to Articles 155 and 156 of The Constitution of

13
India, 1949. In most cases, a Governor can stay in office for a maximum of five years. However,
Article 74 requires the President to act on the advice of the Council and the facts that led to the
Governors' removal. Second, a Writ of Certiorari was filed, demanding the quashing of the same
order, as well as a Writ of Mandamus, requesting the removal of Ministers, allowing the
Governor to continue in office in accordance with the wishes of the Central Government in
power. In the current case, the petitioner first demanded the production of papers and then that
the four Governors be permitted to serve out the remainder of their five-year terms. This case
was heard by a four-judge constitutional bench of India's Supreme Court.

5.2 ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT

The following matters were brought to the court's attention:

i. Is the petition that was filed before the Court maintainable?

ii. What does the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' mean in the Indian Constitution?

iii. How does a Governor function under the Indian Constitution?

iv. Are there any specific constraints or limitations on Article 156 clause (1) of the Constitution
of India?

v. What is the scope of judicial review in the event that the President's pleasure is revoked?

5.3 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER

(i)The petitioner argued that a Governor has a high constitutional post that comes with several
important constitutional responsibilities. As a result, just though the Governor is selected by the
President and continues to serve under the Doctrine of Pleasure does not make him a servant of
the Union Government. As a result, a Governor should be permitted to serve for the required
term and should only be removed from office in exceptional circumstances. The petitioner went
on to say that rather than granting a Governor an indestructible term or placing him in continual
fear of losing his job by providing him unfettered authority, a middle ground should be chosen.
As a result, the petitioner proposed that specific constitutional rules be followed before a

14
petitioner is asked to resign. The following are the constitutional norms proposed by the
petitioner before a Governor is removed from office:

(a)Removing the petitioner should only be done in extraordinary and rare circumstances,
including physical or mental incapacity, corruption, Constitutional violations, or misbehaviour.
The Governor's removal cannot be based on the ideology or preferences with which she or he is
associated.

(b)Even if a formal notice of termination of the Governor's term is not given, the Governor
should be notified of the reasons for their departure.

(c)In a democratic democracy like India, no public authority possesses unrestrained or unbridled
power, no matter how far up the hierarchy they are. To maintain true democracy, any premature
removals should be subject to judicial scrutiny.

(ii) The petitioner also claimed that the Doctrine of Pleasure could not be applied in an arbitrary,
capricious, irrational, or malicious manner. It should only be used when there is sufficient
evidence of incapacity, impropriety, or wrongdoing, and it is absolutely necessary to remove the
Governor from office to address these issues.

(iii)The petitioner further contended that when a Governor is facing a premature removal from
office, he or she should be informed of the reasons for the removal and given an opportunity to
be heard on the matter.

(iv) The petitioner also recommended that natural justice principles be considered and that the
Governor be served with a show-cause notice outlining the basis for his or her dismissal.

(v) It was also claimed that the Doctrine of Pleasure's adoption could only be justified following
judicial examination.

5.4 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

(i) The respondent submitted that removal of Governor is not justifiable by putting forth two
arguments:

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(a) First, under Article 156(1) of the Indian constitution, the President has unconstrained and
absolute power to remove any Governor. Article 156 (3) of the Constitution of India, 1949,
which allows for a five-year term, is subject to Article 156 (4) of the Constitution of India, 1949.
(1). As a result, because the Doctrine of Pleasure is unrestricted under The Constitution of India,
1949, any attempt to limit it would be unconstitutional.

(b) Second, by taking the aid of Article 74(2) of The Constitution of India, 1949, which
disallows any court to interfere with any advice provided by the Union of ministers.

(ii) He further claimed that the Governors who were dismissed from office by the President's
order dated 02/07/2004 had no objection to it, making it impossible for any member of the
general public to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to restore them to their positions.

(iii) It was also argued that a Governor might serve at the discretion of the President, allowing
the President or the Union Government to remove him at any moment during his five-year term
without giving any cause or explanation.

(iv) It was also said that the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution gave the President the
flexibility to remove a Governor if he lost trust in him.

(v) The learned attorney general noted that while the removal should be done for a purpose, it
was not necessary to inform the Governor of that reason.

(vi) It was further maintained that the 'Doctrine of Pleasure' need not be used in response to any
fault committed by the Governor, but rather if the President thinks the Governor is unable to
continue in his position for whatever reason.

(vii)The respondent also argued that in a democratic society like India, it is vital for the
government in power to remove a Governor who is out of step with the policies and ideas shared
by the government's political party's constituents.

5.5 REASONING GIVEN BY THE JUDGES

The honourable judges of the Supreme Court held that:

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(i) The petition could be allowed on the grounds of it being of importance to the public as to the
scope of Article 156(1) but not because of the reason to provide relief to the individual
Governors of the states, namely Goa, Gujarat, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh which were removed
by the President.

(ii) The court states that the Doctrine of Pleasure cannot be applied as an unrestricted or absolute
provision of law. The court referred to article 310 (2) and article 311, clause (1) and clause (2) of
The Constitution of India, 1949, and it was condemned that even in these articles of The Indian
Constitution, the application of the doctrine is not wholly unrestricted. Furthermore, a reference
was made to three different case scenarios where, (i) offices are held during the pleasure of
President, (ii) office is held during the pleasure of the President but subject to certain restrictions
and, (iii) office is held by the officeholders without being subject to Doctrine of Pleasure but for
a specified term with immunity against removal, except by impeachment. Thus, pinpointing the
variation in the application of the ‘Doctrine of pleasure’ to different jobs. The court then went on
to list such offices as follows: (i) those offices where the doctrine of pleasure was applied
absolutely and without any restrictions. These include offices of ministers, Governors, Attorney
general and Advocate general, (ii) those offices where the doctrine of pleasure was applicable
with restrictions. These types of offices included members of civil service of the Union, member
of Defense services, members of Defense service, holders of post connected to Defense and civil
post under the Union, members of an All-India service. (iii) Lastly, those offices were mentioned
by the court, wherein the doctrine of pleasure is not applicable at all. These included the offices
of the President, Judges of the Supreme Court, Judges of the High court, controller and Auditor
General of India, and Election Commissioners. Therefore, keeping in mind the constitutional
schemes of India, the extent of protection against removal cannot be mixed for different offices
as it is different for different offices based on the above-mentioned categories. In a constitutional
set-up, when the Doctrine of Pleasure is provided in certain scenarios without any restrictions of
any sort, it should be used responsibly and not be confused to be an instrument or means
providing any unchecked discretion to act arbitrarily capriciously or unreasonably in any case.
Even though it is not made mandatory by the court to provide reasons for the removal of the
Governor, the removal can only be done for valid reasons and not because of any personal
prejudice or invalid reasons.

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(iii) A Governor cannot be removed for ulterior motives as to make way for another Governor or
merely because his personal ideologies don’t fall in sync with the Union of Ministers or because
of the President losing confidence in him. These three reasons are considered to be invalid
grounds for the removal of the Governor from their post.

(iv) The court referred to article 156 (1), 156 (3), 310 and 311 of The Constitution of India,
1949. The court then went on to proceed to explain the meaning of article 156 of The
Constitution, which shows that the Governor is appointed by the President and shall continue to
remain in the office during the pleasure of the President. The court then laid down a nexus
between article 156 clause (1) and 156 clause (3) of The Indian Constitution, 1949, and stated
that clause (3) doesn’t place any restrictions upon clause (1) of the same provision. It only
specifies the tenure of the Governor for which he is to remain in office, which, as specified, is
five years if he or she doesn’t resign or is removed from his or her office. Then the court made
comparisons to these provisions to articles 310 and 311, where Doctrine of Pleasure is subject to
certain restrictions. Article 311(2) states that no employee can be removed from service except
after an inquiry that informs him about the charges put against him. Thus, this express provisions
place a restriction on the Doctrine of Pleasure for the removal of an employee. However, article
156 (3) only specifies the tenure of the government and places no such restriction on the scope of
Doctrine of Pleasure provided under article 156 (1).

(v) The court then went on to explain that even though article 156(1) provides that a Governor
should hold office during the pleasure of the President and article 74 binds a President to follow
the advice of the Union of Ministers. The removal of the Governor, even if comes without the
compulsion of disclosing the reasons for such removal, requires that the removal should be done
based on justifiable and valid reasons in a reasonable manner. So, therefore, the burden of proof
would lie upon the aggrieved to proof that his removal was a prima facie instance of arbitrariness
and mala fide, as the court, upon the withdrawal of the pleasure, would automatically go on to
assume that it was done on the basis of compelling reasons. Therefore, only in a case when there
is prima facie evidence of capriciousness and mala fide made out can the court direct for the
production of records and material to decide whether the withdrawal was really for compelling
reasons or not. Therefore, only in cases of existence of very strong evidence can the judicial
review be resorted to which really narrows down the scope of judicial reviews.

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5.6 RATIO DECIDENDI

"Power under Article 156(1) cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable

manner and only in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons." "Court
can call upon the Union Government to disclose, the material upon which the President had
taken the decision to withdraw the pleasure if prima facie the removal was either arbitrary,
malafide, capricious or whimsical."

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5.7 SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENT

The constitution bench, while summarizing the Judgment put the following points forward:

(i) A Governor can be removed by the President at any time, without the President presenting a
reason, under article 156(1) of the Indian constitution, 1949, because the Governor is meant to
hold and run his or her office under the pleasure of the President.

(ii) While the President is not obligated to give a justification for withdrawing his pleasure at any
time, the Governor's removal cannot be based on arbitrary, capricious, or irrational grounds, as
stated in Article 156 clause (1). Only in rare and extraordinary circumstances and under legal and
justifiable reasons and grounds can the removal be carried out. The court went on to say that the
breadth of these compelling reasons isn't limited to incapacity, corruption, or wrongdoing, but
rather is far broader, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.

(iii) A Governor cannot be dismissed from office just because the Central Government has
changed and a new government has taken power that does not agree with the Governor in power,
and so the incumbent Governor is removed from office to make room for a more favourable
candidate. A Governor can't be dismissed because he doesn't agree with the central government's
ideology and policies, and he can't be removed because the Union of ministers has lost faith in
him.

(iv) As the reasons aren’t required to be conveyed to the Governors for any removals that are
made, the withdrawal of pleasure would be assumed to be valid and well-grounded. This, in turn,
would also limit the scope of the judicial review to a great extent, making the passage for the
review too narrow. In any case, for that matter only and only if the aggrieved party is able to
establish a prima facie evidence of the fact that his or her removal which was so made was
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and/or mala fide, will the court(s) have the authority to direct the
production of materials which might have formed the basis of the decision to withdraw Doctrine
of Pleasure by the President, under the direction of the Union Government or not, be taken. On
the off chance that the Union Government doesn't uncover any explanation, or if the reasons
unveiled are seen as insignificant, subjective, eccentric, or mala fide, the Court will have the
right to intervene. This, if broken down into easy terms, only means that in any case, the Court

20
won't intervene simply on the grounds that an alternate perspective is conceivable or that the
material or reasons are inadequate.

21
5.8 OVERVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT

Before passing judgment, the constitution bench weighed the advantages and disadvantages of
both parties. Both sides were given an equal opportunity to present their cases before the court.
The bench, on the other hand, failed to recognise that the judgment rendered in the case was
"sub-silentio" on multiple points, implying that the decision left room for future generations to
interpret the laws differently and left several problems unanswered. The court also makes it
optional for the President to communicate the reasons for his dismissal, but it makes it
mandatory for the President to have a justification for his removal. This paradox is vague in and
of itself, allowing the President to have any explanation he wants and get away with it because
he isn't compelled to inform the Governor whose position is at stake. This also puts a lot of
pressure on the Governor to always remember to please the President while performing his
duties, or he will be removed from his position. Furthermore, any misunderstandings that led to
the Governor's removal may not be explained, and some grey areas may be handled without
providing the Governor with a fair chance to be heard. Furthermore, granting judicial review
without providing the Governor with a chance to be heard in regard to the grounds that may have
led to his removal places an otherwise unwarranted burden on the courts to settle a subject that
could have been resolved between the parties. The court also put the burden of proof on the
aggrieved, rather than the President, to show that the President's withdrawal of the Doctrine of
Pleasure was founded on compelling reasons and not to advance his own or the changing
government's political agendas. As a result, the Governor must now establish prima facie
evidence that the President's removal was arbitrary, capricious, and malafide, first and foremost,
without even knowing the reasons for such removal because the President is not required to share
such information with them, and secondly, despite the risk that if he fails, he will be impeached.
This also makes it difficult for the Governor to show that his removal was presumptively
malafide and arbitrary without even knowing the reasons for his removal. Furthermore, this
encourages and facilitates political manoeuvring in the administration since, with a change in
government, the Governor may be subjected to scrutiny that he or she is not used to, and any
opposing government may find or resort to fabricating reasons for the Governor's dismissal.
Instead, the Governor's removal should be decided by the State legislature, not the President's
pleasure. If that is accomplished, the Governor will be able to carry out his or her duties without
fear.

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 CHAPTER-6

6.1 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Way forward

For the smooth functioning of a democratic government, it is equally important that the governor
must act judiciously, impartially and efficiently while exercising his discretion and personal
judgment.

There is a need for proper checks and balances to streamline the functioning of this office.

Recommendations of Sarkaria commission and Punchhi Commission can be followed in true

spirit.

The 'procedure for appointment of governors should be clearly laid down' and conditions of
appointment must also be laid down and must assure a fixed tenure for the governor so that the
governor is not under the constant threat of removal by the central government.

It is necessary to invest in the office of the Governor with the requisite independence of action
and to rid them of the bane of ‘instructions’ from the Central Government.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the office of the governor is not subordinate to the central
government and is an independent constitutional office.

However there are numerous cases seen since independence showing the governor making
biased decisions in favour of the centre instead of discharging duties in accordance with the spirit
of the constitution.

The role of the governor is indispensable for the successful working of the constitutional
democracy. However, there is a strong need for reforms so that the virtue of discharging one’s
duty impartially is withheld to ensure a free and fair working of Democracy.

BIBLOGRAPHY

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 BOOKS REFERRED
1. Myneni S.R,Legal Research Methodology
2. M.P.Jain, Indian Constitution
3. J. N.Pandey, Indian Constitution
4. V.N.Shukla, Indian constitution

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