POLITICAL LAW 2020 CASE DIGEST

Prepared by: Atty. Tiffany Grace P. Maderal-Albano

EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 223195, January 29, 2020

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, AS TRANSFEREE-IN--
INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.
SPOUSES MARIANO S. TAGLAO AND CORAZON M. TAGLAO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
INTING, J.:

Facts: The National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) is the transferee-in-

interest of the NPC. To carry out its purpose, NPC was given authority by Republic
Act No. (RA) 6395 to enter and acquire private properties.

To enable it to construct and maintain its Tayabas-Dasmariñas 500 KV

Transmission Line Project, the NPC, on November 24, 1995, filed before the RTC
a Complaint for Eminent Domain[6] against the Spouses Taglao. The Spouses
Taglao are the owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 5,143 square meters
(sq.m.) situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas. The NPC sought to acquire
an easement of right of way over the 3,573-sq.m. portion (subject portion) of
Spouses Taglao's property.

Spouses Taglao moved to dismiss the eminent domain case filed by the NPC. [7]
Meanwhile, the NPC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession[8] over the subject property.

In the Order[9] dated September 18, 1996, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
of Spouses Taglao and granted the NPC's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession over the subject portion of Spouses Taglao's property. In another
Order[10] dated June 23, 1999, the RTC thereafter declared as condemned the
subject property.

On June 19 2001, the NPC's recommended commissioner, Engr. Abcejo, submitted

a Commissioner's Report recommending the amount of P156,690.44 as just
compensation for the subject portion, broken down as follows: a) P4,490.44 as
easement fee (10% of the fair market value of the subject portion based on Tax
Declaration); b) P151,570.00 as the value of damaged improvements; and c)
P300.00 as tower occupancy fee for two legs.

On the other hand, the commissioner for Spouses Taglao, Atty. Zaballero,
submitted a Report recommending the amount of P12,858,000.00 as just
compensation. The value was pegged at P2,500.00 per sq.m., the market value of
the subject property as of August 15, 2000.

The Court's Ruling

The TRANSCO imputes grave error on the part of the CA when it affirmed the
RTC's ruling, which fixed the market value of the subject property at P1,000.00
per sq.m. It avers that just compensation must be determined as of the date of
the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

We cannot uphold the valuations made by the respective commissioners as they

were not based on the market value of the property at the time of the filing of
NPC's complaint for eminent domain on November 24, 1995. As could be gleaned
from the RTC's disquisition, there is nothing in the RTC Decision which would show
how it arrived at such valuation. The valuation at P1,000.00 per sq.m. was not
also supported by any documentary evidence. Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the
RTC's Decision and justified its P1,000 per sq.m. valuation in this wise:

If in the year 2000, the value of the subject property was between Php2,000.00
to Php2,500 per square meter, it could safely be inferred that the amount of
Php1,000.00 per square meter, as pegged by the court a quo, was the fair market
value in the year 1995, when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

A simple reading of the CA's Decision would signify that its conclusion was highly
speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. Although the determination
of just compensation indeed lies within the trial court's discretion, it should not be
done arbitrarily or capriciously. The valuation of courts must be based on all
established rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The courts are
proscribed from basing their judgments on speculations and surmises. The findings
of both the RTC and the CA not being based on well-grounded data, it is incumbent
upon the Court to disregard them.

Furthermore, not only that the market value fixed by the RTC was speculative, the
computation by the trial court of the property's just compensation was also
improperly made. According to the RTC, since the NPC was not seeking to acquire
the subject property, but merely intends to establish an easement of right of way
thereon, the NPC should only pay Spouses Taglao 10% of the market value of the
subject portion in accordance to Section 3A of RA 6395, as amended by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 938.

The RTC and the CA computed the just compensation using the following formula:
= Market Value x Area
Just
Affected x 10%
Compensation
Total Area

We disagree. The just compensation should not only be 10% of the market value
of the subject property.

In several cases, the Court struck down reliance on Section 3A of RA 6395, as

amended by PD No. 938. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights
except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the
property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The
limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive
its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land taken.

In view of the foregoing, the computation by the RTC of the just compensation
should be done using the following formula:
= Total Market Value x
Just
Area Affected
Compensation
Total Area[34]

= Total Market Value x

3,573 sq.m.
5,143 sq.m.

The subject property's market value should be fixed by the RTC taking into
consideration the cost of acquisition of the land involved, the current value of like
properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon, at the
time of the filing of the NPC's complaint.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

G.R. No. 223429, January 29, 2020

DELILAH L. SOLIVA, PETITIONER, V. DR. SUKARNO D. TANGGOL, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHANCELLOR OF MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY - ILIGAN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MSU-IIT), RESPONDENT, CARANDANG, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision[2] dated October 2, 2015 and Resolution[3] dated February 9,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137277. The CA affirmed the
Decision[4] dated February 13, 2014 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
petitioner Delilah L. Soliva (petitioner) guilty of Serious Dishonesty and imposed
upon her the penalty of dismissal from service with all accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits (except terminal leave
benefits and personal contribution to the GSIS), perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.

Facts of the Case

Petitioner, a faculty member of the School of Computer Studies of the Mindanao

State University - Iligan Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT), together with the other
members of the Board of Canvassers (BOC), was charged with Gross Dishonesty
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Services for rigging the result
of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (VCAA) straw poll.

It was alleged that on October 6, 2010, when the votes were canvassed, petitioner
was added as member of the BOC.[5] She was tasked to read the ballots. There
were eight members of the BOC present at the canvassing. On petitioner's left side
was Meles Castillano (Castillano), who wrote the count on the tally sheet; on her
right were Sittie Sultan (Sultan) and Mosmera Ampa (Ampa), watchers; standing
behind her were Irene Estrada (Estrada) and Soraida Zaman (Zaman); in charge
of the tally board was Michael Almazan (Almazan); and sitting beside Almazan was
Ombos Ariong (Ariong), whose function was to repeat the name being read out by
petitioner. The canvassing of ballots was done by sector. First to be canvassed
was the students' ballot box, followed by the administrative staff ballot box, and
last was the faculty ballot box.

Issue

Stripped of non-essentials, the pivotal issue to be resolved herein is whether there

is substantial evidence to sustain the guilt of petitioner for serious dishonesty
warranting her dismissal from the service.

Ruling
Petitioner Should Only Be Held
Liable For Simple Dishonesty

The above discussions notwithstanding, We find the petition partially meritorious

because the penalty of dismissal from service is not proportionate to the
dishonesty committed by petitioner. We find the penalty of dismissal from
government service with forfeiture of benefits too severe under the circumstances
of petitioner's case.

Petitioner posits that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh for her who is a widow,
sickly, has served the MSU-IIT for more than 40 years and has followed the order
of the Chair of BOC to canvass the ballots.

As an administrative offense, dishonesty is defined as the concealment or

distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the
performance of his duties. It is disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.[58]

Although dishonesty covers a broad spectrum of conduct, CSC Resolution No. 06-
0538[59] set the criteria for determining the severity of dishonest acts. CSC
Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave offense generally
punishable by dismissal from service. Nonetheless, some acts of dishonesty are
not constitutive of offenses so grave that they warrant the ultimate penalty of
dismissal. Thus, the CSC issued parameters "in order to guide the disciplining
authority in charging the proper offense" and in imposing the correct penalty. [60]

Under Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious, less serious and
simple dishonesty comprise the following acts:

Sec. 3. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious
Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the
government.
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest
act.
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly
involves property, accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable
and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption.
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the
commission of the dishonest act related to his/her employment.
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil
Service eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of
crib sheets.
h. Other analogous circumstances.

Sec. 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the
commission of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Less Serious
Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not
so serious as to qualify under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the
dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances.

Sec. 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the

commission of the dishonest act constitutes the offense of Simple Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and
responsibilities of the respondent.
c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not
related to his/her employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances.

On February 13, 2014, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Serious Dishonesty but
it did not specify her act which classifies it to serious dishonesty under CSC
Resolution No. 06-0538. The 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, Rule 10, Section 53 provides for mitigating or aggravating circumstances
which may be appreciated in the determination of penalties to be imposed, such
as length of service in the government, first offense and other analogous
circumstances.

Considering that petitioner's dishonest act was not shown to fall under serious or
less serious dishonesty, it did not cause damage or prejudice to the government
or result in any gain or benefit to her, and petitioner has been in the service for
more than 40 years, petitioner should only be liable of simple dishonesty, which
may be punished by suspension of six months.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. 170867, January 21, 2020

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY RAPHAEL P.M.
LOTILLA, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), MARGARITO B.
TEVES, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), AND ROMULO L.
NERI, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
(DBM), PETITIONERS, V. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN,
REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA,
RESPONDENT, LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

For this Court's resolution are the Motion for Reconsideration[1] and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration[2] filed by respondents in G.R. No. 170867, as well as
the Motion for Reconsideration[3] of petitioners in G.R. No. 185941. The parties ask
this Court to reconsider its December 4, 2018 Decision[4] in which it declared,
among others, that the Province of Palawan was not entitled to an equitable share
in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project (Natural Gas
Project).

To recall, the Republic, through the Department of Energy, entered into Service
Contract No. 38 dated December 11, 1990 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
and Occidental Philippines. The 20-year contract was made for the drilling of the
natural gas reservoirs in the Camago-Malampaya area, about 80 kilometers from
mainland Palawan.[5]

Service Contract No. 38 provided a 60-40 production sharing scheme for the sale
of petroleum, where the national government would receive 60% of the net
proceeds, while Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, as
service contractors, would receive 40%. Later, the service contractors were
replaced by a consortium of Shell B.V., Shell Philippines LLC, Chevron Malampaya
LLC, and PNOC Exploration Corporation (Shell Consortium).[6]

On February 17, 1998, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued
Administrative Order No. 381,[7] which provided that per the Local Government
Code, part of the national government's 60% share would be given to the
concerned local government units.[8] It further provided that the Province of
Palawan was "expected to receive about US$2.1 billion from the total government
share of US$8.1 billion"[9] throughout the contract's 20-year period.[10]

On December 1, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President

Macapagal-Arroyo) issued Executive Order No. 683, which authorized the release
of funds pursuant to the Provisional Implementation Agreement. Notably, it
provided that the funds' release would be without prejudice to
this Court's final resolution in G.R. No. 170867.

Issue:

The Province of Palawan insists that the Camago-Malampaya gas reservoirs are
within its territorial jurisdiction. This is because, it argues, the area is located within
the continental shelf of the Municipality of Kalayaan, over which the province
exercises territorial jurisdiction under Presidential Decree No. 1596. [51] The
Province of Palawan also maintains that the State can be estopped when it
promulgated issuances recognizing Camago-Malampaya as part of the Province of
Palawan and granting it its 40% share in the proceeds of the Natural Gas Project.
The Province of Palawan likewise adds that it is entitled to its 40% share on the
basis of equity, since it is the nearest local government unit that "is capable of
rendering the necessary and immediate assistance and services regarding any
issue or concern within the area.

Ruling:

ARTICLE X
Local Government
General Provisions
....
SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their
respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with
the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

While "territorial jurisdiction" does not appear in the Constitution, it is inscribed in

the Local Government Code, the law meant to implement the constitutional
mandate under Article X, Section 7. The Local Government Code provides that
local government units shall be entitled to a 40% share in the gross collection the
State derives from the utilization and development of these natural resources
"within their territorial jurisdiction."
Section 290 of the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 290. Amount of Share of Local Government Units. - Local government

units shall, in addition to the internal revenue allotment, have a share of forty
percent (40%) of the gross collection derived by the national government from
the preceding fiscal year from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery charges,
and such other taxes, fees, or charges, including related surcharges, interests, or
fines, and from its share in any co-production, joint venture or production sharing
agreement in the utilization and development of the national wealth within their
territorial jurisdiction.

Until this Court's December 4, 2018 Decision, "territorial jurisdiction" has not been
defined. Thus, drawing from the provisions of the Local Government Code and
jurisprudence, this Court concluded that territorial jurisdiction referred to "the
[local government unit's] territorial boundaries,"[74] or that jurisdiction "pertaining
to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries":[75]

The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction."
Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's
territorial boundaries.

Unfortunately, none of the maps on record or the relevant laws could conclusively
prove that the Province of Palawan has territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas reservoirs.

In the amicus brief[112] submitted by then Department of Foreign Affairs -

Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat Secretary General Henry S.
Bensurto, Jr. (Secretary General Bensurto), it can be clearly seen that the
reservoirs are not within the scope of the Province of Palawan's territory.

The area is beyond the province's territory when the 15-kilometer boundary of the
Local Government Code and the Philippine Fisheries Code is applied.

Local chief executives, together with representatives of national government, are

tasked with protecting and preserving environmentally critical areas in Palawan.
These duties necessarily include the exercise of jurisdiction beyond the Province
of Palawan's land mass.

However, strictly applying Republic Act No. 7611 to determine the Province of
Palawan's territory poses a problem: it excludes several municipalities that have
always been part of the province, namely Balabac, Cagayancillo, Busuanga, Coron,
Agutaya, Magsaysay, Cuyo, Araceli, Linapacan, and Dumaran.[121] This results in a
substantial alteration of its boundaries, an act that can only be done through a
plebiscite called for that purpose.[122] Thus, Republic Act No. 7611 cannot be the
basis to prove that the Camago-

Malampaya reservoirs are within the Province of Palawan.

For their part, none of the parties have presented maps or statutes that
conclusively prove that the Camago-Malampaya reservoirs are within the Province
of Palawan. This Court is, thus, constrained to uphold the ruling that the area
remains under the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic, unless otherwise provided
by law.

It is to be recalled, however, that Executive Order No. 683 authorized the release
of funds from Natural Gas Project's proceeds to the Province of Palawan, to be
used for development projects for the people of Palawan, without prejudice to the
final outcome of this case.

It was clear with the Executive Order that the national government did not commit
itself to perpetually share the proceeds from the Natural Gas Project. However, it
was also clear that the Province of Palawan was not required to diminish its future
resources in order to reimburse the national government for the funds received
should there be a final ruling in this Resolution.

For this Court, it is a reasonable presumption that the national government wanted
to immediately augment the Province of Palawan's funds for its constituents.
Certainly, at that point when the funds were made available, both the national
government and the Province of Palawan intended to provide for the general
welfare. To require the return of funds now after this Court finally decides not only
undermines public welfare and the presumption of regularity of the actions of
public officials, but it will likewise weaken the very local autonomy envisioned by
the Constitution.

Therefore, the Province of Palawan need not return the P600 million it received
under Executive Order No. 683. Moving forward, any share that Congress will allot
for the province will purely be an act of political discretion. Executive Order No.
683 has, thus, become functus officio.

EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 190453, February 26, 2020

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JORGE CASTILLO,
SOFIA SOLIS-ACHACOSA, ALIPIO FERNANDEZ, SR., EMILIANA
FERNANDEZ, CASIMERA FERNANDEZ, CONCEPCION FERNANDEZ,
JUANA GALVAN, ESTELA CORPUZ FERNANDEZ, GERMANA SUAREZ, AND
BENJAMIN FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.

Hernando, J.:

Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] is the February 27, 2009
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84618, which reversed
and set aside the July 6, 2004 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
44 of Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. D-5217, ordering the lower court to conduct
a trial for the determination of just compensation with the aid of commissioners
and further proceedings in accordance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and
applicable jurisprudence.

The Antecedents

On September 5, 1980, the Solicitor General, acting in behalf of petitioner Republic

of the Philippines (RP), filed a Complaint for Expropriation,[4] which was docketed
as Civil Case No. D-5217, before the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Dagupan
City against respondents Jorge Castillo (Jorge), Sofia SolisAchacoso (Sofia), Alipio
Fernandez, Sr. (Alipio), Emiliana Fernandez, Casimera Fernandez, Concepcion
Fernandez, Benjamin Fernandez (Benjamin), Juana Galvan (Juana), Estela Corpuz
Fernandez (Estela) and Germana Suarez, who are co-owners of the subject
property located in Dagupan City with an area of 11,585 square meters (sqm).

On October 15, 1980, respondents Sofia and Alipio filed an Appearance and
Manifestation[5] stating that Sofia's share in the subject property is Lot No. 4509
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7989 with an area of 204.490
sqm while Alipio's share is likewise Lot No. 4509 covered by the same TCT with an
area of 102.245 sqm. Both Sofia and Alipio opposed the valuation made by
petitioner RP because it was based on the 1974 tax declaration and not on the
current fair market value for the year 1980 when the Complaint for expropriation
was filed.

On November 15, 1980, respondents Benjamin and Estela filed their Answer [6]
conceding that petitioner RP has sovereign political power and authority to
condemn private property for public use but denying that petitioner RP had
possession of the subject property with the right to continue possession thereof.
They further averred that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 76, the basis for
computing just compensation of private property shall be the current and fair
market value declared by the owner.

Issues

1. What is the reckoning date of the computation of just compensation: (a) date
of taking in 1947; (b) date of the filing of the original Complaint in 1980; or (c)
date of filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989?
2. Whether or not the Solicitor General had the authority to file expropriation case
in behalf of the RP.

Ruling

As correctly observed by the CA, other than the testimonial evidence of Perla, no
other evidence was presented by the petitioner RP to establish that the taking of
the subject property was in 1947. On the other hand, the evidence of the
respondents, that is, the tax declaration, clearly shows that until the year 1990,
they religiously paid the real property tax of the subject property which means
that they were not dispossessed of the use thereof. Thus, we find no error in the
appreciation of facts by the CA.

As between the filing of the original Complaint and Amended Complaint, we rule
that the computation of just compensation should be reckoned from the time of
the filing of the original Complaint, that is, on September 5, 1980. Evidently, there
was no actual taking in this case prior to the filing of the Complaint, thus, the time
of taking should be reckoned from the filing of the Complaint. Hence, the value of
the property at the time of filing of the original Complaint on September 5, 1980,
and not the filing of the Amended Complaint in 1989, should be considered in
determining the just compensation due to the respondents.

Relevant herein is our ruling in National Power Corporation (NPC) v. Tiangco,[32]

wherein NPC filed a complaint for expropriation on November 20, 1990 and then
later on amended the said complaint in 1993. We ruled that the landowners should
be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which
is deemed to be the time of taking of the property, to wit:

The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at
its 1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just
compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the
time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking of the
property.
It was certainly unfair for the trial court to have considered a property value several
years behind its worth at the time the complaint in this case was filed on November
20, 1990. The landowners are necessarily shortchanged, considering that, as a
rule, land values enjoy steady upward movement. It was likewise erroneous for
the appellate court to have fixed the value of the property on the basis of a 1993
assessment. NPC would be paying too much. Petitioner corporation is correct in
arguing that the respondents should not profit from an assessment made years
after the taking.

Since the expropriation proceedings in this case was initiated by petitioner RP on

September 5, 1980, property values on such month and year should be the basis
for the proper determination of just compensation.

Lastly, as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the complaint for
expropriation, we hold that, at the time of the institution of this case in 1980,
Section 1(a) of P.D. No. 478, otherwise known as "Defining the Powers and
Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General" provides that the Solicitor General
has the power to represent the government and its officers before this Court and
the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings
in which the government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
Moreover, Section 1(k) of P.D. No. 478 likewise provides that the Solicitor General
can act and represent the RP and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body
or commission in any matter, action or proceedings which, in his opinion, affects
the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.

With the foregoing in mind, we rule that the Solicitor General has the authority to
initiate the present expropriation case against the respondents. Contrary to the
respondents' arguments, the Solicitor General's authority to file the instant
complaint for expropriation on September 5, 1980 emanates from the authority
provided under P.D. No. 478.

EXPROPRIATION/CIV PRO

G.R. No. 214310, February 24, 2020

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER, VS. ESTATE
OF JUAN MARIA POSADAS III, MARIA ELENA POSADAS, AND ESTELA
MARFORI DE POSADAS, RESPONDENTS
REYES, A., JR., J.:

When the State appropriates private property for public use, it must compensate
the owner of the property so taken. For compensation to be just, the government
must not only reimburse the owner with the property's fair value, it must also do
so in a timely manner.

The Factual Antecedents

On July 4, 1990, the Republic flied a complaint[5] for expropriation before the RTC
of Makati against 181 individuals and corporations owning land situated along
Sucat Road in Parañaque. The properties were earmarked by the DPWH for a road-
widening project. However, out of all the named defendants, only Alfonso Cruz
and the respondents, namely: Estela Marfori Posadas, Maria Elena Posadas, and
the Estate of Juan Maria Posadas III (respondents), appeared to oppose the
complaint.[6]

In the complaint, it was stated that the DPWH needed 15,554 square meters of
the respondents' land for the project. The Republic alleged that the property had
an appraised value of P18,664,800.00,[7] but the Estate of Juan Maria Posadas III
contested such valuation in its answer,[8] arguing that the land was worth much
more.[9]

On January 8, 1991, pursuant to Section 7[10] of Executive Order No. 1035, the
Republic deposited with the Escolta Branch of the Philippine National Bank the
amount of P1,866,480.00, representing 10% of the value of the property. It then
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession so that it could take
possession of the land.[11] The record, however, does not show the exact date of
the Republic's entry into the property.

The Issue

The lone issue here is whether the RTC acted correctly in ordering the dismissal
of this case, which was based on the Republic's failure to file an amended
complaint.

The Republic admits that it never filed an amended complaint.[61] However, it

maintains that such omission was justified. It points to the fact that the counsel of
record for the late Maria Elena Posadas did not inform the trial court of her
substitute, and that this was a legal impediment which effectively prevented it
from am ending its complaint.[62]
Thus, the question presented to the Court is:

Whether or not the absence of a substitute for the late Maria Elena Posadas
justified the Republic's failure to amend its complaint.[63]

The Court's Ruling

The answer is in the negative.

At the outset, it bears noting that the RTC based its order of dismissal on Section
3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. - If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The provision contemplates certain instances where the complaint may be

dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he or she fails to appear during a
scheduled hearing, especially on the date for the presentation of his or her
evidence in chief; (2) if he or she fails to prosecute his or her action for an
unreasonable length of time; (3) if he or she fails to comply with the rules; or (4)
if he or she fails to comply with any order of the court.[64] Thus, failure on the part
of the plaintiff, without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of the court
may result in the dismissal of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by
the defendant.[65]

Here, the trial court dismissed the case after Atty. Luis M. Posadas, counsel for the
Estate of Juan M. Posadas III, orally moved for dismissal on the ground that the
Republic had failed to comply with the order directing the filing of an amended
complaint.

As elsewhere noted, the Republic contends that it was unable to amend its
complaint because it was never informed of the substitute for the late Maria Elena
Posadas.[66]
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the
substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of a case, viz.:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure
of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
xxxx

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to

appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order
the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above provision, when a party to a case dies, his or
her counsel is charged with the duty of informing the trial court of, first, the fact
of the litigant's death and, second, the name and address of the litigant's
representative. The court must then issue an order requiring the said
representative to appear and formally be substituted. However, if no
representative is so named or if he or she does not appear, the court may direct
the adverse party to procure an executor or administrator, who will be tasked to
represent the deceased party until the case is terminated.[67]

In this case, the trial court issued an order directing Atty. Antonio Pesigan (Atty.
Pesigan), Maria Elena Posadas's counsel of record, to name his client's substitute.
It appears, however, that a representative was never named in the proceedings a
quo. In accordance with the rules, it thus became incumbent on the trial court to
direct the Republic to procure an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased litigant. Yet, this was never done. The Republic capitalized on this
circumstance, ascribing its failure to file an amended complaint to the fact that a
representative was never named.

For the sake of emphasis, the RTC directed the amendment of the complaint so
that the records of the case would accurately reflect the area expropriated under
the DPWH's new plan. It goes without saying that the Republic did not need the
name of Maria Elena Posadas's representative to show the trial court the new land
area it was going to condemn.

Deposit Requirements

In fine, the trial court must take into account the possibility of various takings
occurring on different dates. It is conceivable that there were portions of the
respondent's property that were taken prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8974,
while there were others taken thereafter. In the event of such a finding, the trial
court must direct the government to comply with the requirements of Rule 67 with
respect to the segment or segments taken before November 26, 2000 and, with
respect to those taken on or after that date, the trial court must order the
immediate payment of the sum provided under R.A. No. 8974 and R.A. No. 10752.

For clarity's sake, the Court reiterates its pronouncement that the deposit
requirement differs from the obligation to pay just compensation. [92] In his
Dissenting Opinion in Sec. of the Dep't. of Public Works and Highways, et al. v.
Sps. Tecson,[93] Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., speaking of an analogous deposit
requirement found in the Local Government Code, elaborated in this wise:

A similar requirement of posting a deposit is likewise demanded under Sec. 19 of

the Local Government Code, with respect to the exercise of a local government
unit's power of eminent domain. The purpose of the deposit is explained in City of
Manila v. Alegar Corporation, thusly:

But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
constitutes an advance payment only in the event the expropriation prospers. Such
deposit also has a dual purpose; as pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and
as indemnity for damages if it is dismissed. This advance payment, a prerequisite
for the issuance of a writ of possession, should not be confused with payment of
just compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a factor in
eventually determining just compensation. If the proceedings fail, the money could
be used to indemnify the owner for damages.

Determination of Just Compensation

But from what point in time must the property's fair market value be reckoned?

Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides the answer, viz.:
Section 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the defenses against
the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no
party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came
first. (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the Court, in National Power Corp. v. Ibrahim,[100] ruled:

Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for
expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation
with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent
with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action
precedes entry to the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint.[101] (Emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)

In other words, just compensation is, as a general rule, based on the price or value
of the property at the time the complaint for expropriation was filed. [102] By way
of exception, National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville Development
Corporation[103] instructs that when the government takes the property before
initiating the expropriation case, the property's value at the time of the prior taking
must be used as the basis for determining just compensation.

To be sure, this is in consonance with the Court's ruling in Ansaldo v. Tantuico,

Jr.,[104] where the Court held:

Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the

taking of the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the
time of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court, the
assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its
deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the
case at bar is quite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the expropriator
more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this Court has ruled that the
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time
of filing of the action of eminent domain.[105] (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

In this case, since the Republic initiated expropriation proceedings before taking
the subject property, it follows that the land's value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, i.e., June 25, 1990, should be used as the basis for just compensation.

As mentioned earlier, the record of the instant case does not disclose the exact
time of taking. Without this date, there is no way to determine the proper amount
of interest due on the condemned property. Hence, before the trial court calculates
interest, the date of entry must be established by competent evidence. Only then
will the trial court be able to reckon the proper sum of interest in accordance with
the Court's ruling in Manalastas.

Taking the foregoing into account and to encapsulate the Court's pronouncements,
upon the remand of the instant case, the trial court shall designate not more than
three commissioners to aid it in determining the fair market value of the
respondents' property back when the complaint was filed in 1990. Then, after it
satisfies itself of the amount of just compensation, it shall ascertain the exact date
of entry into the property. It shall then impose legal interest on the property's
value at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking up to June 30, 2013
and, thereafter, six percent per annum from July 1, 2013 until complete payment.
Lastly, the trial court shall subtract P1,866,480.00 from the sum awarded, since
the Republic had previously paid this amount.

EXPROPRIATION

G.R. No. 211576, February 19, 2020

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER, V. JULIANA
SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE RAMOS, SPOUSES GREGORIA RAMOS AND
ALEJANDRO SANCHEZ, VICTORINO DE LEON, JOSEFINA DE LEON,
DIONISIO DE LEON, FELICITAS DE LEON, PATROCINIA DE LEON, SPS.
ANA MARIA C. DE LEON AND JAIME DE GUZMAN, SPS. EUGENIA DE LEON
AND OSCAR MAGALANG, AND SPS. CONDRADO DE LEON AND BENITA
CORPUZ, RESPONDENTS

CAGUIOA, J:

The Essential Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As culled from the recital of facts in the assailed Decision, the essential facts and
antecedent proceedings are as follows:

In relation to the construction of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) – Harbor

Link Project (Segment 9) from NLEX to MacArthur Highway, Valenzuela City,
petitioner Republic, as represented by the DPWH, sought to acquire the
respondents’ private property located at Brgy. Gen. T. De Leon, Valenzuela City
(subject property). The subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. V-11191 (subject TCT) registered under the names of the respondents.
As indicated in the assailed Decision, the subject property is described as follows:
Zonal Value per square
TCT No. Affected Area Zonal Value
meter (sq. m.)
218 sq. m.
V-11191 P2,100.00 P457,800.00[4]
Petitioner Republic offered to purchase the subject property for an amount based
on the Schedule of Zonal Valuation issued by the Bureau or Internal Revenue
(BIR), i.e., P2,100.00 per square meter or P457,800.00. The offer was rejected by
the respondents.

Hence, on October 20, 2010, petitioner Republic filed an action for expropriation
(Expropriation Complaint) before the RTC to expropriate the subject property by
virtue of Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.[5]

Afterwards, petitioner Republic paid a deposit representing the 100% zonal value
of the subject property to the respondents. The respondents duly acknowledged
the receipt of the said deposit.[6] Subsequently, in an Order[7] dated March 16,
2011, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of petitioner Republic.

Finding that petitioner Republic has a lawful right to take the subject property, on
March 17, 2011, the RTC issued an Order of Expropriation.

Issues

In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic posits two issues: (1) whether the RTC
erred in ruling that the respondents are entitled to legal interest of 6% per annum
on the amount of just compensation; and (2) whether the RTC erred in requiring
petitioner Republic to pay consequential damages.

The Court’s Ruling

The respondents are not entitled to legal
interest on the amount of just compensation.

The Court finds that the RTC erred in ordering petitioner Republic to pay legal
interest on the amount of just compensation. In Evergreen Manufacturing Corp.
v. Republic,[26] citing Apo Fruus Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[27] the
Court explained that “the rationale for imposing interest on just compensation is
to compensate the property owners for the income that they would have made if
they had been properly compensated — meaning if they had been paid the full
amount of just compensation — at the time of taking when they were deprived of
their property.”[28]

In the instant case, however, it is not disputed whatsoever that the respondents
received the amount determined by the RTC as the just, fair, and equitable
compensation for the subject property, i.e., P2,100.00 per sq. m. or P457,800.00,
before petitioner Republic took possession of the subject property. Otherwise
stated, there was full and prompt payment of just compensation at the time of
taking.

Hence, with the respondents having acknowledged the receipt of the full amount
of just compensation even prior to the time of taking, petition Republic is not liable
for the payment of legal interest. The award of legal interest of 6% per annum
must be deleted.

The respondents are not entitled to

consequential damages.

In the assailed Decision, the RTC deemed it fair and equitable to award
consequential damages in favor of the respondents.[29] The consequential
damages awarded by the RTC include the value of the transfer taxes necessary to
transfer the subject property to the name of petitioner Republic.

Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs expropriation proceedings. With respect to

consequential damages, Section 6 of Rule 67 states:

Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon the

performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath
that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be
filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced
by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths
on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent
to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the
property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the
same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the
operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of
the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Republic v. Soriano,[30] the Court deemed the award of consequential damages

improper because “the subject property is being expropriated in its entirety, there
is no remaining portion which may suffer an impairment or decrease in value as a
result of the expropriation.”[31] Petitioner Republic chimes in by asserting that the
award of consequential damages is inapplicable because “the entire area of
respondents’ property was expropriated.”[32]

Petitioner Republic’s position is wrong. Only a portion, and not the entire area, of
the respondents’ property was expropriated.

As borne out by a perusal of the subject TCT, which was attached by petitioner
Republic to the Expropriation Complaint, the subject property is registered in the
name of “JULIANA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE RAMOS, 121 sq. m; GREGORIA RAMOS
m/to Alejandro Sanchez, 56 sq. m.; JOSEFINA DE LEON, DIONISIO DE LEON,
FELICITAS DE LEON, VICTORINO DE LEON and PATROCINIA DE LEON, all single
(sic); and ANAMARIA C. DE LEON m/to Jaime de Guzman and EUGENIA DE LEON
m/to Oscar Magalang, Filipinos, & SPS. CON[D]RADO DE LEON & BENITA CORPUZ,
203 sq. m.”[33] From the foregoing, it is clear that the total area of the subject
property is 380 sq. m.

This is confirmed by Tax Declaration No. C-018-06873 covering the subject

property, which was likewise attached by petitioner Republic to the Expropriation
Complaint. According to the said Tax Declaration, the total area of the subject
property is “380.00.”[34]

As readily admitted by petitioner Republic, however, the affected area of the

expropriation undertaken was only “218 sq. m.”[35] out of the total area of 380 sq.
m. Hence, petitioner Republic’s position that the entire area of the subject property
was expropriated is not correct.
Be that as it may, the Court deems the award of consequential damages in favor
of the respondents erroneous.

The sheer fact that there is a remaining portion of real property after the
expropriation is not enough, by and of itself, to be basis for the award of
consequential damages. To be sure, it must still be proven by sufficient evidence
that the remaining portion suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
In this case, while the award of consequential damages equivalent to the value of
CGT and transfer taxes must be struck down for being without legal basis, the
Court deems it just and equitable to direct petitioner Republic to shoulder such
taxes to preserve the compensation awarded to the respondents as a consequence
of the expropriation. To stress, compensation, to be just, it must be of such value
as to fully rehabilitate the affected owner; it must be sufficient to make the affected
owner whole.

EXPROPRIATION

G.R. No. 223335, March 04, 2020

TEROCEL REALTY, INC. (NOW PECHATEN CORPORATION), PETITIONER,
LEONARDO MEMPIN, RESPONDENT.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Antecedents:

In Civil Case No. 166014 entitled "Terocel Realty, Inc. v. Leonardo Mempin" for
unlawful detainer, MeTC-Branch 28 rendered its Decision dated April 26, 2000,
granting the complaint of petitioner Terocel Realty, Inc. (now Pechaten
Corporation) and requiring respondent Leonardo Mempin to vacate subject
property known as Lot 68, Block 5-E in Sampaloc, Manila.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court - Branch 12, Manila (RTC-Branch 12), by
Decision dated August 10, 2001, affirmed. Following the finality of the RTC
decision, petitioner moved for execution of judgment on September 13, 2001.
Respondent opposed. He claimed that he was one of the prospective beneficiaries
of the complaint for expropriation being then pursued by the City of Manila
pursuant to its Ordinance No. 8012. Among the properties sought to be
expropriated was the lot in question.[3]

By Order dated January 8, 2003, RTC-Branch 12 granted petitioner's motion for

execution and issued the corresponding writ of execution. It also denied
respondent's motion to defer execution under Order dated November 14, 2003.
Per Sheriffs Report dated July 1, 2003, respondent was alleged to have refused to
vacate the property.[4] On this score, respondent called the trial court's attention
to the expropriation complaint filed by the City of Manila sometime in December
2003 against petitioner, Alegar Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda. The
complaint was docketed SP No. 03-108565 and raffled to RTC-Branch 47.[5]

Records showed, however, that RTC-Branch 47 dismissed the complaint for

expropriation. The decree of dismissal was affirmed twice, first by the Court of
Appeals[6] and next, by this Court.[7] This Court's decree became final and
executory per Entry of Judgment dated August 6, 2012. [8]

Thereafter, petitioner went back to MeTC-Branch 28 through another motion for

execution. MeTC-Branch 28 denied the same on the ground that it was filed
beyond the prescribed five-year period for execution by motion. Petitioner's motion
for execution was filed only on February 15, 2013 or twelve (12) years after the
Decision dated August 10, 2001 became final and executory. According to MeTC-
Branch 28, the complaint for expropriation was not a supervening event which
served to toll the five-year prescriptive period. Besides, respondent was not even
a party to the expropriation case.[9] Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied through Order dated July 30, 2013.[10]

Petitioner went to RTC-Manila via a petition for mandamus docketed as SCA No.
13-131042. It sought to compel MeTC-Branch 28 to issue the writ of execution in
the unlawful detainer case. The case was raffled to RTC-Branch 54 which ruled
that mandamus did not lie to direct a lower court on how it should resolve a motion
for execution.[11]

On petitioner's appeal,[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed under Decision dated July
23, 2015. It ruled that the expropriation case was not a supervening event which
had the effect of freezing the five-year period for execution of judgment by motion.
The court emphasized that respondent was only a prospective beneficiary of the
City of Manila's land grant program, thus, his right, if any, was merely inchoate.[13]
Besides, the expropriation case did not have the effect of precluding petitioner
from enforcing its own writ of execution against respondent in the unlawful
detainer case.[14]

Too, it noted that even the ten-year period for execution by action had already
expired as of September 20, 2011.

Issue:
 Did the complaint for expropriation constitute a supervening event which had
the effect of interrupting the five-year period for execution of judgment by
motion in the unlawful detainer case?

Ruling:

Petitioner's motion for execution

is already barred by prescription

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court governs execution of judgment by motion

or by independent action, viz.:

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory

judgment or order may be executed on motion with in five (5) years from the date
of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)

On one hand, a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within
five (5) years from entry of judgment.[18] On the other, execution by independent
action is available in cases where the five-year period had already expired. The
action then must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which
under the Civil Code is ten (10) years from finality of judgment.[19]

Here, it is undisputed that although petitioner filed its first motion for execution in
the unlawful detainer case within the prescribed five-year period, it never pursued
the same and was therefore deemed to have abandoned it. When petitioner,
nonetheless, filed its second motion for execution, twelve (12) years had already
elapsed from entry of judgment (September 20, 2001). Undoubtedly, the second
motion was filed seven (7) years beyond the five-year period. Verily, therefore,
MeTC – Branch 28 correctly denied the second motion.

In petitioner's attempt to take out the case from the five-year prescriptive period,
however, it asserts that the filing of the expropriation case was a supervening
event which served to suspend the five-year period.

The issue is not novel. Republic v. Mangrobang[20] enunciated: "In the ejectment
case, the issue is possession of the disputed property, while in the eminent domain
case, the issue is the taking by the State of the property by virtue of its power of
eminent domain. Note, however, that the decision in one will not necessarily affect
the decision in the other." So must it be.

In any event, while in exceptional cases, the Court had allowed execution by
motion even after the lapse of the five-year period, these cases had one common
denominator: the judicial debtor itself caused or incurred the delay for its personal
benefit or advantage.[21]

This is not the case here. As judicial debtor, respondent did not have any hand in
the filing of the expropriation complaint, the issuance of the writ of execution, or
the supposed pronouncement of the City of Manila that it did not plan to eject the
actual occupants of the affected properties. In fact, respondent himself was not
even a party to the expropriation case nor a recognized beneficiary thereof by the
City of Manila.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

G.R. No. 236050, June 17, 2020

ESTRELLA M. DOMINGO, PETITIONER, V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
AND VICTORINO MAPA MANALO, RESPONDENTS.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

This Petition for Review assails the Decision[1] dated June 1, 2017 and Resolution[2]
dated November 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141408 finding
petitioner Estrella M. Domingo (petitioner) guilty of grave misconduct, serious
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Antecedents

Petitioner is the Chief Archivist of the Archives Preservation Division of the National
Archives of the Philippines (NAP).[3] On February 24, 2014, Mayor Strike B. Revilla
of Bacoor City, Cavite, requested the NAP to provide resource speakers for a three
(3)-day Basic Records Management Seminar Workshop and a two (2)-day Training
on Paper Preservation from March 24-28, 2014 at the Productivity Center, Bacoor
City, Cavite.[4]

In reply, respondent Executive Director Victorino Mapa Manalo (respondent

Manalo) initially confirmed to Josephine F. Austria (Austria), then Chief of the NAP's
Training and Information Division, the availability of four resource persons,
including petitioner, to the City Mayor, but only for the Basic Records Management
Seminar Workshop.[5] Austria prepared the draft conforme letter, draft Travel
Order (the Office Order allowing the attendance of the four resource persons),
schedule of events, and the Document Endorsement Form. Austria forwarded
these documents to respondent Manalo.

In the Document Endorsement Form, however, respondent Manalo wrote his

instruction putting on hold all in-house trainings until after April 1, 2014.[6] He then
returned the documents to Austria to revise the schedule of the attendance of the
resource persons.

Austria did not endorse back the conforme letter, Travel Order, schedule of events,
and the Document Endorsement Form to respondent Manalo, with the latter's
revision. These documents hibernated in Austria's custody. As a result, Bacoor
City's request was left in limbo.

Meantime, on April 10, 2014, petitioner applied for a leave of absence for the dates
April 28-29, 2014. She thereafter personally received on April 26, 2014 a letter
dated April 22, 2014 from Mayor Revilla inviting her to serve as resource speaker
for the City of Bacoor's Basic Records Management Seminar on April 28-29, 2014
at Tagaytay City. Her leave of absence coincided with the seminar. The April 22,
2014 request was expressly stated to be in lieu of the request earlier sent to the
NAP.[7]

On April 23, 2014, the City of Bacoor sent an email to the NAP requesting for its
official seal to be used at the April 28-29, 2014 seminar.

Petitioner, together with Austria and Lara Marie R. Abejuela, attended the April 28-
29, 2014 seminar at Tagaytay City. Petitioner acted as resource speaker for Basic
Records Management. The NAP's handouts were presented and disseminated
during this seminar.[8]

On May 19, 2014, respondent Manalo issued a show cause memorandum relative
to the conduct of the unapproved seminar and unauthorized use and dissemination
of the NAP handouts.[9]

Issue

Is petitioner liable for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service on the basis of the facts enumerated
above?
Ruling

Petitioner's actions, however, do not violate or transgress any rule of conduct. As

observed, the NAP, including the CSC and the Court of Appeals, did not mention
the exact law or office rule that petitioner has violated. We have inferred that the
rule of conduct adverted to in the administrative proceedings are, as stated,
Executive Order No. (EO) 77, series of 2019, Prescribing Rules and Regulations
and Rates of Expenses and Allowances for Official Local and Foreign Travels of
Government Personnel, and its implementing NAP office procedures, as well as
Section 176.1[37] of the Intellectual Property Code.

To be sure, EO 77, series of 2019, requires office approval only for local travels
that are official in nature, which refer to travels outside of official station on official
time. The NAP implementing procedures simply aid in the enforcement of EO 77,
and therefore, cannot require more than what EO 77 demands.

Here, petitioner opted not to avail of an official local travel. She decided instead
to take a leave of absence during the dates of the seminar. There is no allegation
and proof that the NAP denied her leave of absence. Hence, when she attended
the seminar at Tagaytay City, she was not on official time, had no right to claim
for official expenses, and cannot add the seminar to her credentials as an official
work accomplishment. Any risks, legal or physical, she could have faced were for
her own look-out. Nonetheless, she was not barred from attending this activity on
her own personal volition and account as she was on leave of absence.

In Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas v. Castro,[45] the nature of this administrative

offense was explained as follows:

The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the
respondent's official functions. In Pia v. Gervacio, we explained that acts may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they
tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office.

The following acts or omissions have been treated as conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of
office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe-keep public
records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of
court orders; a judge's act of brandishing a gun; and threatening the complainants
during a traffic altercation.[46]
Here, we cannot deduce from the records and circumstances how petitioner's act
amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner's
assailed act did not tarnish the image of her public office, the NAP. Definitely,
when petitioner served as resource speaker at the seminar, she shared her
expertise before another government unit, the City of Bacoor. The records also do
not show that petitioner's failure to inform and secure prior office approval to act
as a resource speaker, needlessly as explained above, tarnished the image and
integrity of his or her public office that would have eroded the public's trust and
confidence in the government. This is evident from the fact that the City of Bacoor
sent the NAP a letter after the seminar thanking it and its employees, petitioner
and Austria, for their invaluable contribution to the professionalization of its basic
records management. Hence, it cannot be said that petitioner is guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Let us be clear about petitioner's acts. She participated at a seminar for the benefit
of the local government unit and people of the City of Bacoor. There is no evidence
that she disseminated the NAP's materials (to which the NAP did not have
proprietary rights to, in any event) at the seminar. She did not materially profit
from her attendance thereat. She did not defraud the government of anything -
she was in fact on leave of absence when she was there. As there was no
perpetration of fraud, there could have been no intent to defraud on her part.

Petitioner Estrella M. Domingo is ABSOLVED of grave misconduct, serious

dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and any
administrative offenses included therein.

EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 229413, June 15, 2020

AGATA MINING VENTURES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF TERESITA
ALAAN, REPRESENTED BY DR. LORENZO ALAAN, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:

The Antecedents

The respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
14.22 hectares located at Payong Payong, Tiningbasan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte
(subject property).
On May 26, 1999, Minimax Mineral Exploration Corporation (Minimax) entered into
a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. 134-99-XIII with the Republic
of the Philippines represented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). On June 20, 2014, Minimax entered into an
Operating Agreement with Agata Mining Ventures, Inc. (petitioner) to explore,
develop and operate the mining area located within the municipalities of Tubay,
Jabonga, and Santiago in the province of Agusan del Norte which included the
subject property. On July 10, 2014, the Operating Agreement was regi stered
before the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. XIII,
Surigao City and was approved by the MGB, Quezon City on September 18, 2014.[4]
Such agreement was further approved by Leo L. Jasareno, Director of the MGB,
by Authority of the DENR Secretary on June 21, 2016.[5]

Petitioner alleged that the subject property is the most conducive location for the
establishment of a sedimentation pond or settling pond needed for the mining
operation. Various negotiations took place between petitioner and the respondents
wherein the former offered to buy the subject property at the rate of P175,000.00
per hectare. The respondents, however, refused such offer.

On December 4, 2014, petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with prayer

for issuance of writ of possession against the respondents before the RTC.

In their Answer, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that petitioner has no authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.

On June 26, 2015, the RTC issued an Omnibus Resolution granting a writ of
possession to petitioner.

The Issue

Whether petitioner may file a complaint to expropriate the subject property.

Petitioner argues that in determining whether a writ of possession should be

issued, the trial court is limited only in determining whether the complaint is
sufficient in form and substance and that the provisional deposit was made in
compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; that under Section 76 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, qualified mining
operators have the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain; and that
under the Mineral Production and Sharing Agreement, Minimax has the right to
transfer and assign its mining rights to petitioner subject to approval of the
Government.

Ruling

In Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. v. Gozun,[13] the Court has

already settled that qualified mining operators have the authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain, viz.:

As shown by the foregoing jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives

the owner of his proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment
for public use amounts to compensable taking. In the case under consideration,
the entry referred to in Section 76 and the easement rights under Section 75 of
Rep. Act No. 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are no
different from the deprivation of proprietary rights in the cases discussed which
this Court considered as taking. Section 75 or the law in question reads:

Easement Rights. - When mining areas are so situated that for purposes of more
convenient mining operations it is necessary to build, construct or install on the
mining areas or lands owned, occupied or leased by other persons, such
infrastructure as roads, railroads, mills, waste dump sites, tailing ponds,
warehouses, staging or storage areas and port facilities, tramways, runways,
airports, electric transmission, telephone or telegraph lines, dams and their normal
flood and catchment areas, sites for water wells, ditches, canals, new river beds,
pipelines, flumes, cuts, shafts, tunnels, or mills, the contractor, upon payment of
just compensation, shall be entitled to enter and occupy said mining areas or lands.

Section 76 provides:

Entry into private lands and concession areas - Subject to prior notification, holders
of mining rights shall not be prevented from entry into private lands and
concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires when
conducting mining operations therein.

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration
Contract Area, the full right or ingress and egress and the right to occupy the
same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private
lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and
exploiting minerals therein.

The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is

ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of
mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such
as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build
mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds,
storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer
systems. On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them
where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads
and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely
oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of
their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence.

Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 is a Taking Provision

Moreover, it would not be amiss to revisit the history or mining laws of this country
which would help us understand Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.

This provision is first found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 which
took effect on 7 November 1936, viz.:

Before entering private lands the prospector shall first apply in writing for written
permission of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of refusal
by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or in case of
disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such privilege of
prospecting therein, the amount of such compensation shall be fixed by agreement
among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines and the surface owner,
and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to the amount of
compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined by the Court of First
Instance.

Similarly, the pertinent provision of Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known
as "The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974," provides:

SEC. 12. Entry to Public and Private Lands. - A person who desires to conduct
prospecting or other mining operations within public lands covered by concessions
or rights other than mining shall first obtain the written permission of the
government official concerned before entering such lands. In the case of private
lands, the written permission of the owner or possessor of the land must be
obtained before entering such lands. In either case, if said permission is denied,
the Director, at the request of the interested person may intercede with the owner
or possessor of the land. If the intercession fails, the interested person may bring
suit in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated. If the
court finds the request justified, it shall issue an order granting the permission
after fixing the amount of compensation and/or rental clue the owner or possessor:
Provided, That pending final adjudication of such amount, the court shall upon
recommendation of the Director permit the interested person to enter, prospect
and/or undertake other mining operations on the disputed land upon posting by
such interested person of a bond with the court which the latter shall consider
adequate to answer for any damage to the owner or possessor of the land resulting
from such entry, prospecting or any other mining operations.

Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface rights for the entry into
private lands for purposes or mining operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated
19 July 1974 was passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral
resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new
system or surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and claimants. Whereas
in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain
may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct or
install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power
of eminent domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry,
acquisition and use or private lands. viz.:

SECTION 1. Mineral prospecting, location, exploration, development and

exploitation is hereby declared or public use and benefit, and for which the power
of eminent domain may be invoked and exercised for the entry, acquisition and
use of private lands. x x x

The evolution of mining laws gives positive indication that mining operators who
are qualified to own lands were granted the authority to exercise eminent domain
for the entry, acquisition, and use of private lands in areas open for mining
operations. This grant of authority extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
512 is not expressly repealed by Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942; and neither are
the former statutes impliedly repealed by the former. These two provisions can
stand together even if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the grant
of the privilege to exercise eminent domain which was present in the old law.

It is an established rule in statutory construction that in order that one law may
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent. The former must
be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. Simply because a latter
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is
not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law
may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. As has been the rule, repeals
by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that
the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the
two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily
from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of
the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
removed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the latter act will not operate as
a repeal of the earlier.

Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified
mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of
authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision. [14]
(Emphases supplied and citations omitted)

From these pronouncements, it can be gleaned that the Legislature, through

Commonwealth Act No. 137, Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 463, P.D. No. 512 and
R.A. No. 7942, granted qualified mining operators the authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain.

The issuance of a writ of possession merely authorizes the petitioner to enter the
property subject of the complaint for expropriation. At this stage, the trial court
does not yet make any final determination as to petitioner's authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain. It must be borne in mind that " [t]here are two (2)
stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint."[19]

Consequently, the Writ of Possession issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
34, Cabadbaran City, in Civil Case No. SC-14-06 is UPHELD. The trial court is
hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in resolving the complaint for
expropriation with particular attention to the determination of whether the
Operating Agreement between petitioner and Minimax was duly approved by the
DENR Secretary.
EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 246565, June 10, 2020

RICARDO S. SCHULZE, SR., SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, ANA MARIA L.
SCHULZE AS PRESIDENT OF ELARIS INVESTMENT CO., INC., JOSE LUIS
S. VALDES, SPOUSES MARIA ELENA S. VALDES AND ANTONIO VALDES,
AND ELARIS INVESTMENT CO., INC., PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2]
dated September 18, 2017 and the Resolution[3] dated February 26, 2019 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03574, which affirmed with modification
the Decision[4] dated January 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 49 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-11529, and (a) fixed the just compensation
for the subject lots at P593.86/square meter (sq. m.); (b) deleted the award of
attorney's fees; (c) remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of any
consequential damages for the remainder of the properties; and (d) ordered the
segregation, transfer and registration of the subject lots after payment of the just
compensation and consequential damages, if any.

The Facts

On September 7, 2001, respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)[5] filed

a complaint[6] for expropriation against petitioner Ricardo S. Schulze, Sr.,[7] in his
capacity as then President of Elaris Investment Co., Inc. and Judicial Guardian of
petitioner Jose Luis S. Valdes, petitioners Spouses Antonio and Maria Elena S.
Valdes (collectively, petitioners), and respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB)[8]
before the RTC, seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over cet1ain
portions of land located in Barangay Granada, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental
(subject lots), with an aggregate area of 23,563 sq. m., for the construction and
maintenance of its 138 KV Bacolod-Cadiz Transmission Line for the Negros IV-
Panay Project.[9] The subject lots each formed part of five (5) large tracts of
land,[10] with an aggregate area of 470,443 sq. m.[11] NAPOCOR asked to pay a
simple easement fee.[12]

In their Answer,[13] petitioners contended that: (a) the assessed and corresponding
market values of their lands have already increased several folds; and (b) apart
from the area sought to be expropriated, the remainder[14] of their lots (affected
lots) will suffer a reduction in value due to the installation of NAPOCOR's posts,
transmission lines, transformers, and other facilities, for which they are entitled to
consequential damages.

The Issue Before the Court

The issues raised in the present petition are: (a) whether the CA erred in
remanding the case to determine the proper amount of consequential damages;
and (b) whether the CA erred in failing to impose legal interest on the award of
just compensation.

Ruling

The Court finds that the CA erred in ruling that the award of consequential
damages was not supported by evidence.[43] Case law provides that the amount
of just compensation an owner is entitled to receive is equivalent to the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated. Nevertheless, where only a portion of a
certain property is to be acquired, the owner is not restricted only to compensation
for the part actually taken, but is likewise entitled to recover consequential
damages for the remainder of the property, which may suffer an impairment or
decrease in value as an incidental result of the expropriation, provided such fact
is proven by sufficient evidence.[44] The award of consequential damages is
recognized under Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 6. Proceedings by Commissioners. - Before entering upon the performance

of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party
before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings
before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the
contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property
sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after
which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners
shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from
such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise
by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed
exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the
actual value of his property so taken. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, records[45] show that the value of the affected lots was impaired on
account of their close proximity to the power posts, transmission lines, and other
facilities installed on the subject lots, which constrained the use of the properties,
and created a perceived fear of radiation, electrocution, and other health risks in
the minds of prospective buyers.[46] Notably, the RTC observed that "given their
nature, high powered transmission lines would necessarily diminish - if not entirely
damage - the value and use of the property as well as endanger lives and
limbs[,]"[47] and "the existence of [NAPOCOR'S] posts and high tension
transmission lines which traversed [petitioners'] properties would impair their
prices or value to some extent."[48] This finds support in the Court Commission's
Report[49] dated October 13, 2008, which was quoted and adopted by the RTC,
viz.:

Based upon an analysis of the prevailing land usage in the neighborhood and the
property itself, we are of the opinion that the following land use would represent
the highest and best use of the property:

Before the taking - the whole property could be developed to a pleasant residential
subdivision with a view of the adjoining properties.

After the taking - portions of the property have been occupied, segregated and
affected by power transmission lines that deprived the property owners from
developing the whole property to a pleasant residential subdivision without any
eye sore or danger of being affected by the radiation emitted by the power lines.
The damage caused to the adjoining area affected by the power lines is due to the
fear in the marketplace or the external obsolescence caused by the proximity to
the power lines and not due to corona ions that can risk causing childhood
leukemia and other illnesses like cancer to both children and adults.[50]
xxxx

x x x [S]everance damage is the decrease in market value of the remaining

property of an owner caused by the taking of the part of his property. In this
exercise, severance damage is noted on the remaining land area.

The severance damage on the remaining land area is based on the reduction of
value in the highest and best use of that portion of the property that has been
segregated from the main parcel of land thus making it less desirable to develop
to a residential subdivision.

The external obsolescence on the adjoining property is based on the fear in the
market place due to the proximity of the power transmission lines. This is
depreciation on property values similar to the effect of the presence of a squatter
colony, sidewalk vendors, railroad tracks, airport runway, noise or polluting factory
or heavy traffic.[51]

In previous cases, the Court has recognized the payment of consequential

damages to compensate property owners - as petitioners in this case - for the
adverse effect caused by power transmission lines to "the market value of the land
x x x [considering that] potential buyers x x x would shy away from building their
houses in the proximity of such high voltage transmission lines."[52] Accordingly,
the payment of consequential damages in favor of petitioners is in order.

This notwithstanding, the Court agrees with the CA in holding that the
consequential damages in an amount equivalent to 10% of the fair market value
of the affected lots are speculative and without basis. As the CA correctly held,
there appears to be no reliable and actual data supporting the estimated valuation
fixed by the RTC. Thus, the award of consequential damages in the amount of
P26,538,415.68 must be set aside.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to order the remand of the case to
determine the proper amount of consequential damages since jurisprudence has
already provided for a reasonable basis to compute the same in similar cases. In
NAPOCOR v. Marasigan[53] (Marasigan), the Court had fixed the amount of
consequential damages at the rate of 50% of the BIR zonal valuation of the
affected property. Notably, Marasigan similarly involved the expropriation of an
easement of right of way brought about by the installation of transmission lines,
as in this case. As observed by the Court, the said amount was derived from the
recommendation of the appraisal committee which, after ocular inspection, had
evaluated the effects of installing transmission lines to the value of the properties,
i.e., that they may no longer be used either for commercial or residential purposes,
viz.:

Respondents in this case claim consequential damages for the areas in between
the transmission lines which were rendered unfit for use. "Dangling" areas, as
defined under National Power Board Resolution No. 94-313, refer to those
remaining small portions of the land not traversed by the transmission line project
but which are nevertheless rendered useless in view of the presence of the
transmission lines. The appraisal committee determined the total dangling area to
be 41,867 square meters and consequently recommended the payment of
consequential damages equivalent to 50% of the BIR zonal value per square meter
or for a total amount of P22,227,800.
In arriving at its recommendation to pay consequential damages, the appraisal
committee conducted an ocular inspection of the properties and observed that the
areas before and behind the transmission lines could no longer be used either for
commercial or residential purposes. Despite this determination, NPC insists that
the affected areas cannot be considered as "dangling" as these may still be used
for agricultural purposes. In so arguing, NPC loses sight of the undisputed fact that
the transmission lines conveying high-tension current posed danger to the lives
and limbs of respondents and to potential farm workers, making the affected areas
no longer suitable even for agricultural production. Thus, the Court finds no reason
to depart from the assessment of the appraisal committee, as affirmed and
adopted by the RTC.[54]

The foregoing formula was then adopted in the fairly recent case of National
Transmission Corporation v. Lacson-De Leon[55] (Lacson-De Leon), wherein it was
held that "the in ore reasonable computation is the one laid down in NAPOCOR v.
Marasigan, which is 50% of the BIR zonal valuation of the affected property,"[56]
viz.:

The award of consequential damages is limited to 50% of the BIR zonal

valuation of the property segregated by the electric transmission lines

In the case of Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[66] the Court
relaxed the doctrine of immutability of judgment and ordered the imposition of
legal interest on the just compensation award. The Court reasoned that despite
the immutability doctrine, the award of legal interest remains warranted in
deference to the constitutional right of owners to receive the fair and full amount
of "just" compensation for property taken by the State, viz.:

Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair
and reasonable, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" if the
property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.

xxxx

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals [433 Phil. 106 (2002)] the need for
prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for
any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in
this case that:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation
must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment,
legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but
not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

Respondent National Power Corporation is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners

Ricardo S. Schulze, Sr.

The amount of P3,798,480.00 representing the consequential damages equivalent

to 50% of the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation of the affected lots, with
a net area of 446,880 sq. m., as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and
Legal Interest on the total amount of just compensation, i.e., the unpaid balance
plus consequential damages, at the rate of 12% per annum (p.a.) from the time
of actual taking on December 19, 2003, up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at
6% p.a. until full payment.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION) AND LEONARDO B. ROMAN,
RESPONDENTS.

LEONEN, J.:

While the Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to speedy disposition
of cases, this constitutional right is not a magical invocation which can be cunningly
used by the accused for his or her advantage. This right is not a last line of remedy
when accused find themselves on the losing end of the proceedings. The State's
duty to prosecute cases is just as equally important and cannot be disregarded at
the whim of the accused, especially when it appears that the alleged violation was
raised as a mere afterthought.
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by the People of the Philippines
assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions in Criminal Case No. SC-15-CRM-0100,
which granted the Urgent Motion to Quash Information[2] filed by Leonardo B.
Roman (Roman). The Sandiganbayan ruled that Roman's right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated.

Ruling

This Court finds that there was no violation of private respondent's right to speedy
disposition of cases.

Based on the records, below is the timeline of the events leading to the filing of
this case:
September 1, Date of the complaint.[95]
2004
January 18, The complaint was received by the Office of the Ombudsman.[96]
2005
February 10, The Office of the Ombudsman ordered the October 17, 2016
2005 respondents to submit a counter-affidavit.[97]
March 1, 2005 Roman filed his first motion for extension of time. Other
respondents Capistrano and Mendiola filed motions for extension
of time as well.[98]
March 22, Roman filed another motion for additional time to submit his
2005 counter-affidavit until April 5, 2005.[99]
April 15, 2005 Roman filed a motion to consolidate two (2) complaints filed
against him.[100]
April 18, 2005 Roman filed his counter-affidavit dated April 15, 2005. The rest
of the respondents have submitted their counter-affidavits
earlier.[101]
April 27, 2005 Garcia filed a motion for extension of time to file his reply-
affidavit.[102]
June 2, 2005 Garcia filed another motion for extension of time.[103]
June 24, 2005 Garcia filed his third motion for extension of time.[104]
June 29, 2005 The consolidated reply-affidavit of private complainant Garcia was
received by the Office of the Ombudsman.[105]
May 30, 2006 The resolution was issued.[106]
June 23, 2008 The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman.[107]
August 29, Private complainant Garcia filed his motion for
2008 reconsideration.[108]
October 20, Private complainant Garcia filed a supplemental motion for
2008 reconsideration.[109]
October 9, The Office of the Ombudsman denied the Garcia's motions.[110]
2009
July 22, 2011 Garcia filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court.[111]
November 19, This Court ruled on the Petition for Certiorari.[112]
2014
January 26, Roman filed his motion for reconsideration on this Court's
2015 decision.[113]
February 13, The Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan.[114]
2015
August 3, This Court denied Roman's motion for reconsideration.[115]
2016
October 17, Roman filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information before the
2016 Sandiganbayan.[116]
December 14, The Sandiganbayan granted Roman's motion.[117]
2016
January 11, The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration.[118]
2017
March 2, 2017 The Sandiganbayan denied the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration.[119]

In cases filed before quasi-judicial agencies, there is no law providing for the period
to be observed in terms of disposition of the case. In cases before the Office of
the Ombudsman, the Constitution only mandates it to act promptly on cases. As
observed in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan:[86]

The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding

investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman
since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution.
The Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly"
on complaints filed before it.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.

As if to underscore the importance of its mandate, this constitutional command is

repeated in Republic Act No. 6770, which provides:

Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people.

Neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a specific period
within which to measure promptness. Neither do they provide for criteria within
which to determine what could already be considered as delay in the disposition
of complaints. Thus, judicial interpretation became necessary to determine what
could be considered "prompt" and what length of time could amount to
unreasonable or "inordinate delay."[87] (Citations omitted)

Cagang clarified that in cases before the Office of the Ombudsman, the fact-finding
investigation is not deemed included in the preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of inordinate delay, because the
investigations are not yet adversarial proceedings against the accused. Thus, in
evaluating cases invoking the right to speedy disposition of cases, "a case is
deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the
subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation."

The Ombudsman ought to provide a reasonable period based on: (1) its
experience; (2) the number of the accused; (3) the complexity of the evidence;
and (4) the issues involved. However, the burden of proving that there was
violation of the right to speedy disposition lies with the defense. It must be able
to show that the proceedings were prolonged longer than what is reasonably
necessary.[89]

Moreover, the defense must show that it exerted efforts to protect its constitutional
rights. Failure to timely raise the alleged violation of its right operates against the
defendant because sleeping on the right indicates his or her acquiescence to the
delay.[90] As held in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan:

While the Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to speedy disposition
of cases, this right is not a magical invocation which can be cunningly used by the
accused for his or her advantage. This right is not a last line of remedy when
accused find themselves at the losing end of the proceedings. The State's duty to
prosecute cases is equally as important, and this cannot be disregarded at the
whim of the accused, especially when it appears that the contention was raised as
a mere afterthought.

In any case, this Court finds that the period from the filing of the Complaint, to
the conduct of the preliminary investigation, and up to the filing of the Information,
was not attended or characterized by inordinate delay. There was nothing
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive which would warrant the outright dismissal
of the case.

RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

G.R. Nos. 217592-93, July 13, 2020

BENITO T. KEH AND GAUDENCIO S. QUIBALLO, PETITIONERS, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

PERALTA, C.J.:

Petitioners Benito T. Keh and Gaudencio S. Quiballo assail the April 28, 2014
Decision[1] and the March 23, 2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 116798[3] and CA-G.R. CR No. 34411.[4] The assailed decision affirmed the
August 25, 2011 Order[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City,
Branch 269, which directed to quash the subject criminal information. As the
consequent dismissal is without prejudice, this petition for review on certiorari[6]
now seeks the penultimate dismissal of the underlying criminal case – one for
violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code.

Petitioners Keh and Quiballo, respectively the chairman/president and the

corporate secretary of Ferrotech Steel Corporation, were charged before the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Valenzuela City with violation of Section 74, in
relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code, allegedly for their unjustified
refusal to open the corporate books and records to one of their stockholders,
Ireneo C. Qudon.[7] The OCP found probable cause, and resolved[8] to file the
Information[9] before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Ruling

The criminal information filed by the OCP with the trial court alleged that
petitioners – being the Chairman/President and Corporate Secretary of Ferrotech
Steel Corporation xxx, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse, without showing any
justifiable cause[,] to open to inspection to IRENEO C. QUIZON, a stockholder of
said corporation[,] the [corporate] books and records of said corporation. [28]

In its August 25, 2011 Order, the trial court perceived the above allegations to be
insufficient to support the charge for which petitioners have thus far been
prosecuted. It note the absence in the subject indictment of the first and fourth
elements of the offense, and held the same to be a fatal defect that inevitably
should void the criminal information.[29] This pronouncement was validated in the
assailed April 28, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, where the appellate court
went on to say that the information was not merely defective, but rather, it did
not charge any offense at all.[30] We differ.

It is, indeed, fundamental that for purposes of a valid indictment, every element
of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the information. [31] Be that
as it may the criminal information is not meant to contain a detailed resumé of the
elements of the charge in verbatim. Section 6,[32] Rule 110 of the Revised Rule of
Court only requires, among others, that it must state the acts or omissions so
complained of as constitutive of the offense. Thus, the fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an information is whether
or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential element of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic of the information are not be considered.

Scrutinizing the subject information, the Court finds the allegations therein to be
sufficient to propel a prosecution for the crime defined and punished under Section
74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code. First, that the first element
of the offense is missing on its face is belied by the specific employment of the
phrase "refuse, without showing any justifiable cause[,] to open to inspection x x
x the corporate books and records," which reasonably implies that a prior request
for access to information has been made upon petitioners. To be sure, refusal is
understood quite simply as the act of refusing or denying; a rejection of something
demanded, solicited, or offered for acceptance.[34] In some case, refusal is meant
as a neglect to perform a duty which the party is required by law or his agreement
to do.[35]
Second, that the information, in order to validly charge petitioners, should have
alleged as well the fourth element of the offense is, to our mind, an undue exaction
on the prosecutor to include extraneous matters that must be properly addressed
during the trial proper. The fourth element of the offense unmistakably pertains
to a matter of defense – specifically, a justifying circumstance – that must be
pleaded by petitioners at the trial in open court rather than at the indictment stage.
Thus, as a justifying circumstance which could potentially exonerate the accused
from liability, its function is to merely take the burden of proof from the
shareholder and place it on the corporation.[36] It suffices to say that these matters
have already been put forth before and addressed by the OCP in the resolution
from which the subject information took off.[37]

Indeed, the sufficiency of the allegations in the information serves the fundamental
right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charge and to enable him
to suitably and adequately prepare his defense, as he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[38] In the instant
petition, we find that petitioners, by the subject information, have been fully
informed of the offense with which they have been charged and to which they
have pleaded and have thus far been tried. Given the undue termination of
petitioners' prosecution before the trial court, however, a remand for fmiher
proceedings is in order.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ABS-CBN Corporation vs. National Telecommunications Commission,

G.R. No. 252119, August 25, 2020, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts: On March 30, 1995, petitioner ABS-CBN was granted a legislative franchise
to "construct, operate and maintain, for commercial purposes and in the public
interest, television and radio broadcasting stations in and throughout the
Philippines" under RA 7966. The franchise was valid for a term of twenty-five (25)
years from the law's effectivity on May 4, 1995, or until May 4, 2020.

Several bills were later filed seeking the amendment of Section 1 of RA 7966 to
extend the term of ABS-CBN's franchise while Congress is still deliberating on the
issue of franchise renewal. These were never passed into law.

On May 4, 2020, ABS-CBN's franchise expired. Hence, on May 5, 2020, the NTC
issued the CDO directing ABS-CBN to "immediately CEASE and DESIST from
operating [the enumerated] radio and television stations." The CDO was based
solely on the "expiration of RA 7966." Consequently, on even date, ABS-CBN
complied with the CDO and went off-air.

On May 7, 2020, ABS-CBN filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(With Urgent Applications for the Issuance of a [TRO] and/or a [WPI]) before the
Court, claiming that the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
CDO.

In its petition, ABS-CBN mainly argues that instead of issuing the CDO, the NTC
should have allowed ABS-CBN to continue its operations pending Congress'
determination of whether or not to renew its legislative franchise based on the bills
already filed therefor. In this regard, ABS-CBN posits that "the plenary power of
Congress to grant or renew a franchise necessarily includes the corollary power to
define and preserve rights and obligations pending its final determination of the
matter." Therefore, by disregarding the pending bills for the renewal of ABS-CBN's
franchise, the NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed CDO.

Also, ABS-CBN asserts that the CDO violated its right to equal protection of the
laws, pointing out that the NTC deviated from its past practice to allow
broadcasting entities to continue operating pending Congress' action on the
renewal or extension of their franchises.

Furthermore, ABS-CBN decries a transgression of its right to due process since the
NTC issued the CDO without any prior notice or hearing and by ignoring the serious
and irreparable damage that the CDO will inflict on it and its employees.

Finally, ABS-CBN maintains that the CDO compromised the right to public
information, especially in this time of public health emergency where it plays a
significant role, and that it necessarily amounts to a limitation, if not, curtailment,
of the freedom of speech and of the press with prior restraint.

Issue: The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the NTC
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed CDO against ABS-CBN.

Ruling: At the onset, it is imperative to point out that based on our Constitution
and laws, a legislative franchise is both a pre-requisite and a continuing
requirement for broadcasting entities to broadcast their programs through
television and radio stations in the country.

Broadly speaking, "a franchise is defined to be a special privilege to, do certain

things conferred by government on an individual or corporation, and which does
not belong to citizens generally of common right." Insofar as the great powers of
government are concerned, "[a] franchise is basically a legislative grant of
a special privilege to a person." In Associated Communications & Wireless Services
v. NTC (Associated Communications), the Court defined a "franchise [as] the
privilege granted by the State through its legislative body x x x subject to
regulation by the State itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative
agencies." On this score, Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution further
states that "for the operation of a public utility," no "such franchise or right [shall]
be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

With respect to the broadcast industry, Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended,
clearly provides that "[n]o person, firm, company, association or corporation shall
construct, install, establish, or operate a radio station within the Philippine
Islands without having first obtained a franchise therefor from the Philippine
Legislature x x x." It has also been clarified in Associated Communications that a
congressional franchise is required to operate radio, as well as television stations,
in light of the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 576-A.

In this relation, Section 6 of PD 576-A further imposes, as an additional

requirement to operate a radio or television station, an "authority" coming from
"the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications or their successors [(i.e., the NTC)] who have the right and
authority to assign to qualified parties frequencies, channels or other means of
identifying broadcasting systems." In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting
System, Inc. (Divinagracia), citing Associated Communications, this Court ruled
that the legislative franchise requirement under Act No. 3846, as amended, was
not repealed by the additional requirement imposed in PD 576-A. Instead, they
coexist. Thus, in Divinagracia, it was explained that:

Broadcast and television stations are required to obtain a legislative franchise, a

requirement imposed by the Radio Control Act and affirmed by our ruling
in Associated Broadcasting. After securing their legislative franchises, stations are
required to obtain CPCs from the NTC before they can operate their radio or
television broadcasting systems. Such requirement while traceable also to the
Radio Control Act, currently finds its basis in E.O. No. 546, the law establishing the
NTC. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, ABS-CBN seeks that the Court annul and set aside the CDO issued by
the NTC ordering it to cease and desist from operating its radio and television
stations enumerated therein. The core of ABS-CBN's petition rests on its argument
that the NTC should not have pre-empted the will of Congress by directing it (ABS-
CBN) to halt its broadcasting operations through said stations pending the
determination of Congress on the renewal of its legislative franchise based on the
bills specifically filed therefor. In other words, ABS-CBN banks on the fact that
since Congress has yet to act on these pending bills, there is still a possibility that
its legislative franchise would be renewed; hence, the NTC should not have
overtaken Congress' action on these pending bills by issuing the assailed CDO. In
this regard, ABS-CBN claims that Congress has the "corollary power" to define and
preserve rights and obligations pending its final determination on the matter.
Notably, ABS-CBN's position is echoed in the "guidance" issued by the DOJ
Secretary, which submits that the plenary power of Congress includes the auxiliary
power to define and preserve the rights of the franchise applicant pending final
determination of the renewal of the franchise.

However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that on July 10, 2020, the
House Committee on Legislative Franchises had adopted the recommendation of
the Technical Working Group (TWG) to "deny the application of ABS-CBN
Corporation for a franchise to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain
radio and broadcasting stations in the Philippines" by an overwhelming 70
affirmative votes from the 85 voting members present.

Indeed, the adoption of the TWG's recommendation by the House Committee on

Legislative Franchises is considered as the official expression of the legislative will
that has dispelled any previous uncertainty regarding ABS-CBN's franchise status
insofar as the pending franchise renewal bills are concerned. Hence, the
supervening denial of these bills means that ABS-CBN cannot any more invoke the
same as basis for continuing the operation of the radio and television networks
covered by the CDO issued by the NTC. Accordingly, the issue on the
"corollary/auxiliary" powers of Congress pending the renewal of these bills had
already been rendered moot.

To expound, "[a] case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful
purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot
be enforced."
Because of the aforementioned supervening event, there is no actual substantial
relief which petitioner ABS-CBN would be entitled to regardless of this Court's
disposition on the merits of the present petition. To demonstrate, should the Court
dismiss the petition on the merits, the dismissal would only validate and sustain
respondent NTC's CDO and hence, accord ABS-CBN no relief at all. On the other
hand, should the Court grant the petition on the merits, the nullification of the
CDO will be of no practical consequence since based on our Constitution and laws,
a legislative franchise is necessary for a broadcasting entity to legally operate its
radio and television stations. Thus, even if the CDO is annulled as prayed for, ABS-
CBN cannot altogether resume its broadcast operations through its radio and
television stations because its legislative franchise therefor bad already expired
and that, considering the denial of the House Committee on Legislative Franchises,
has not been renewed.

EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 217656, November 16, 2020

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, PETITIONER, VS.

EDDIE MANALO, RODRIGO MEDIANISTA, CRISTAN A. ACOSTA et al.

LEONEN, J.:

The mandate of our Constitution is clear: "Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not
be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner."[1]
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] assailing the
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Order[4] denying the Department of Public Works and Highways' motion to dismiss
a Complaint seeking just compensation for their properties.

Manalo, et al. are owners of residential structures on a parcel of land on Luzon

Avenue, Quezon City, owned by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System.
This parcel of land is directly affected by the Department of Public Works and
Highways' C-5 extension project,[5] an endeavor that would link the South Luzon
Expressway and the North Luzon Expressway.[6]
On September 13, 2010, Manalo, et al. filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the determination and payment of just
compensation from the Department of Public Works and Highways.[7]

In their Complaint, Manalo, et al. alleged that despite its expropriation power, the
Department of Public Works and Highways neglected to initiate an expropriation
proceeding. They averred that the Department was "cutting corners to hasten the
completion of the project."[8]

Moreover, Manalo, et al. claimed that while the Department of Public Works and
Highways made a voluntary offer of financial assistance to them, the amount was
"notoriously small"[9] that they had to turn down the offer.[10]

Manalo, et al. also asserted that they should be paid the replacement costs of their
houses, as what happened with the informal settlers of Barangay UP
Campus.[11] Citing an August 6, 2008 Memorandum of Agreement, which the
Department of Public Works and Highways had entered into with the Quezon City
government, Manalo, et al. claimed that the parties had acknowledged that they
were informal settlers.

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

Whether or not petitioner can extrajudicially and summarily evict respondents and
demolish their structures; and

Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for their structures.

Ruling

Judicial economy aims "to have cases prosecuted with the least cost to the
parties,"[57] requiring that "unnecessary or frivolous reviews of orders by the trial
court, which facilitate the resolution of the main merits of the case, be reviewed
together with the main merits of the case."[58]

In the interest of judicial economy, this Court proceeds to determine the other
issues raised by the parties.

Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution mandates that "[p]rivate property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation." The State's inherent right to
condemn private property is the power of eminent domain or expropriation, which
must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must
be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.[59] (Citation omitted)

Expropriation may be judicially claimed by filing either: (a) a complaint for

expropriation by the expropriator; or (b) a complaint, or a counterclaim, for
compensation by the deprived landowner, which is referred to as inverse
expropriation.[60]

Here, respondents admit that they are informal settlers, not lot owners. They claim
to be residents and owners of the residential structures on Luzon Avenue in
Quezon City, along the path of the C-5 extension project.[61] Thus, the source of
respondents' rights in the Constitution is not Article III, Section 9, but rather,
Article XIII, Section 10.

Article XIII, Section 10 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings
demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

In relation, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8974, or An Act to Facilitate the

Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes, states:

SECTION 9. Squatter Relocation. — The government through the National Housing

Authority, in coordination with the local government units and implementing
agencies concerned, shall establish and develop squatter relocation sites, including
the provision of adequate utilities and services, in anticipation of squatters that
have to be removed from the right-of-way or site of future infrastructure projects.
Whenever applicable, the concerned local government units shall provide and
administer the relocation sites.

In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue the
necessary writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling any and all structures
found within the subject property. The implementing agency shall take into
account and observe diligently the procedure provided for in Sections 28 and 29
of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992.

Funds for the relocation sites shall come from appropriations for the purpose under
the General Appropriations Act, as well as from appropriate infrastructure projects
funds of the implementing agency concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 8974, the court shall issue a writ of demolition to dismantle
the structures found in the property. The implementing agency shall diligently
observe the procedure provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279,
or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, for when the expropriated
land is occupied by informal settlers. The relevant provisions of Republic Act No.
7279 states:

SECTION 27. Action Against Professional Squatters and Squatting Syndicates. —

The local government units, in cooperation with the Philippine National Police, the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), and the PCUP-accredited
urban poor organization in the area, shall adopt measures to identify and
effectively curtail the nefarious and illegal activities of professional squatters and
squatting syndicates, as herein defined.

Any person or group identified as such shall be summarily evicted and their
dwellings or structures demolished, and shall be disqualified to avail of the benefits
of the Program. A public official who tolerates or abets the commission of the
abovementioned acts shall be dealt with in accordance with existing laws.

For purposes of this Act, professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates

shall be imposed the penalty of six (6) years imprisonment or a fine of not less
than Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000), or both, at the discretion of the court.

SECTION 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall

be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
(b)
be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to
(1)
the date of eviction or demolition;
(2)Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in
the areas where they are to be relocated;
Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction
(3)
or demolition;
(4)Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5)Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from
Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families
consent otherwise;
No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are
(6)
permanent and of concrete materials;
(7)Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy
the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control
procedures; and
(8)Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however,
That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order
involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken
by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority
with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days
from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the
said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be
possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to
the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be
extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out the above provision.

SECTION 29. Resettlement. — Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act,
the local government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority,
shall implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and in other public places as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.
The local government unit, in coordination with the National Housing Authority,
shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and
access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic
needs of the affected families.[62] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, there is no allegation that a writ of demolition was procured from the court,
or that the procedures provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279
were observed, as mandated by Republic Act No. 8974. Instead, petitioner admits
having offered financial assistance to respondents, pursuant to Section 28(8) of
Republic Act No. 7279. By doing this, petitioner acknowledges that respondents
are underprivileged and homeless citizens, entitled to due process of law, prior to
their eviction and the demolition of their structures.

Thus, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
respondents had been prejudiced by the eviction and demolition of their
structures, and if properly substantiated, whether they are entitled to damages.
Petitioner, however, insists that respondents are professional squatters who may
be summarily evicted and their structures demolished under Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 7279. Section 3(m) of the law defines professional squatters as:

. . . individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent of the
landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall
also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing
units by the Government but who sold, leased or transferred the same to settle
illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants
and intruders of lands reserved for socialized housing. The term shall not apply to
individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from professional squatters
or squatting syndicates[.]

Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate this allegation.

Finally, this Court notes that the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System,
the owner of the land on which respondents' structures were built, was not
impleaded here. Hence, this Court cannot rule on the issue of respondents' rights
as builders in bad faith under the Civil Code.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROTEST

PET Case No. 005, November 17, 2020

FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., PROTESTANT, VS. MARIA
LEONOR "LENI DAANG MATUWID" G. ROBREDO, PROTESTEE.
PER CURIAM:

For resolution of this Tribunal is protestant's Strong Manifestation with Extremely

Urgent Omnibus Motion for the: I. Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F.
Leonen; II. Re-raffle of this Election Protest; III. Resolution of all the Pending
Incidents in the Above Entitled Case and the Office of the Solicitor General's
Omnibus Motion (Motion for Inhibition of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
and Reraffle).

Ruling

I.
"This Court will not require a judge to inhibit himself in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that he will dispense justice in
accordance with law and evidence."

Rule 8, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court[48] is clear:

Inhibition and Substitution of Members of the Court

SECTION 1. Grounds for Inhibition. — A Member of the Court shall inhibit himself
or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any of these and
similar reasons:
(a) the Member of the Court was the ponente of the decision or participated in the
proceedings in the appellate or trial court;
(b) the Member of the Court was counsel, partner or member of a law firm that is
or was the counsel in the case subject to Section 3(c) of this rule;
(c) the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or child is pecuniarily
interested in the case;
(d) the Member of the Court is related to either party in the case within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member, of a law firm
who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity;
(e) the Member of the Court was executor, administrator, guardian or trustee in
the case; and
(f) the Member of the Court was an official or is the spouse of an official or former
official of a government agency or private entity that is a party to the case, and
the Justice or his or her spouse has reviewed or acted on any matter relating to
the case.
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, inhibit
himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any of those mentioned
above.

The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.

None of protestant and the Solicitor General's arguments cited a clear ground to
warrant Justice Leonen's inhibition under the Rules. There were no prior
proceedings where he may have participated. He had no professional engagement
with, pecuniary interest relative to, or relation within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsels.

Protestant urges Justice Leonen to voluntarily inhibit. However, a movant seeking

the inhibition of a magistrate is duty-bound to present clear and convincing
evidence of bias to justify such request.[49]

Protestant failed to do so.

II.

The Solicitor General insists that Justice Leonen exhibited lack of competence and
probity when he penned the Third Division's decision in Chavez v. Marcos.[63] In
effect, what he wants this Tribunal to accept is that Former Chief Justice Lucas
Bersamin, Associate Justices Presbitero Velasco, Jr., Samuel Martires, Francis H.
Jardeleza, and Leonen were all incompetent and lacking in probity because
in Chavez, the then Third Division rendered the decision and merely spoke through
Justice Leonen.

When the Supreme Court resolves a case in division, it is not a separate entity
from the Supreme Court en banc. The Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate
court where decisions by its divisions may be appealed. Thus, the Solicitor
General's imputation of incompetence and lack of probity extends to all the
members of the Supreme Court when Chavez was promulgated.

When sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, all Justices of the Supreme
Court act as one body. The order asking the Commission on Elections and the
Solicitor General to comment was not Justice Leonen's directive. Rather, it was
this Tribunal's. When protestant and the Solicitor General argue that Justice
Leonen was grossly ignorant in issuing these Orders, in effect, what they are
saying is that this Tribunal was grossly ignorant of the law.[64] This is disrespectful
and discourteous to this Tribunal.
III. A.

Protestant and the Solicitor General misconstrue what bias and impartiality mean.
Bias means a preconceived notion, which may be favorable or unfavorable to a
party. Bias does not pertain to an instance when this Tribunal does not rule
however you wish it to.

In the same manner, protestant and the Solicitor General mistakenly equate
impartiality with "tabula rasa" or the theory that people are born as blank slates,
with our knowledge only formed along the way through our experiences and
perceptions. Impartiality does not entail tabula rasa.

The absence of relationships or lack of opinion on any subject is not what makes
a person impartial. Rather, it is the acknowledgment of initial or existing
impressions, and the ability to be humble and open enough to rule in favor of
where evidence may lie.

Protestant's claims that Justice Leonen lobbied for the dismissal of his protest is
belied by this Tribunal's October 15, 2019 Resolution[66] which released the results
of the revision and appreciation of ballots from protestant's pilot provinces. The
final tally showed an increase of protestee's lead over protestant:

Thus, based on the final tally after revision and appreciation of the votes in the
pilot provinces, protestee Robredo maintained, as in fact she increased, her lead
with 14,436,337 votes over protestant Marcos who obtained 14,157,771 votes.
After the revision and appreciation, the lead of protestee Robredo increased from
263,473 to 278,566. Despite the results of the revision and appreciation process,
Justice Leonen did not vote for the immediate dismissal of this protest. Instead,
he joined the majority in directing the parties to file their respective memoranda
on the results and on protestant's Third Cause of Action to protect the parties'
right to due process.

III.B.

Protestant and the Solicitor General's ground to inhibit Justice Leonen for
dissenting in Ocampo v. Enriquez[69] fails to persuade.
First, protestant is not President Marcos. They are two different people. All the
quoted portions of Justice Leonen's opinion which are allegedly biased against
President Marcos are irrelevant here.

Second, when Justice Leonen analyzed the arguments, weighed the evidence, and
arrived at a conclusion in that case, he was not exhibiting bias. Rather, he was
exercising his judicial function. To put in elementary terms, he was simply doing
his job.

In particular, protestant and the Solicitor General take exception to Justice

Leonen's explanation on why former President Marcos should not have been buried
in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, namely: that he was not a hero;[70] that he invented
his supposed medals of honor;[71] that he allowed his family, associates, and
cronies to plunder the Philippine coffers;[72] that even the Supreme Court,
throughout the decades, has identified him to be an authoritarian and dictator,
and held that Swiss deposits in the amount of US$658,175,373.60 under the name
of the Marcoses had been ill-gotten wealth, to be forfeited in favor of the
government;[73] and that the abuses during his regime caused suffering for millions
of Filipinos.[74] Both protestant and the Solicitor General also claim that Justice
Leonen's prejudice against protestant is apparent because his dissenting opinion
mentioned the accountability of President Marcos' relatives for certain offenses
committed during his regime.[75]

Justice Leonen's description of President Marcos' regime and its effect on the
nation was based on law, history, and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly described the Marcos regime as authoritarian, referred to "the Marcoses
and their cronies"; acknowledged the illegal wealth the Marcoses stashed away
which the government has been attempting to recover; and noted the suffering
the Marcos regime had wrought on the Filipino people.

Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion did not introduce in this jurisdiction the
terminology and concepts objected to in the Motions for Inhibition.

III.C.

We are deeply disturbed that the Solicitor General gravely imputes gross ignorance
of the law to the Supreme Court when it ruled in Chavez v. Marcos.[87]
To recall, Chavez involved 33 consolidated criminal cases filed against Imelda R.
Marcos (Imelda), among others, for violations of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, or the Central Bank Act.
It was decided in Imelda's favor, who was acquitted of the charges.

This favorable ruling notwithstanding, the Solicitor General claims that Justice
Leonen's "partiality against the Marcoses has led to a Decision in Francisco I.
Chavez v. Imelda R. Marcos which exhibits lack of competence and probity."[88] It
is unclear how Chavez lacked competence and probity and why it solely falls on
Justice Leonen's shoulders.

Further, the Solicitor General assails "why and how the acquittal led to a full-blown
Supreme Court case." He also asserts that the issues resolved in Chavez were
"unexpected," but allegedly did not discuss a number of issues raised in Imelda's
favor. However, he failed to elaborate on these points.

Finally, despite Chavez having been decided in Imelda's favor, the Solicitor General
asserts that she ultimately lost because she had to re-litigate the case for more
than ten (10) years. No legal or factual basis is cited to substantiate this claim, nor
was there any ground to find Justice Leonen responsible for the alleged 10-year
"re-litigation".

III.D.

Drafts yet to be voted on are confidential because they merely form part of the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court, and may later change. They may be
adopted by the Member-in-Charge, ripen to a concurring or dissenting opinion, or
withdrawn altogether. Until the members of the Court vote on a matter, a position
in a draft is temporary. Therefore, drafts for the Court's deliberations should not
be taken against any Justice who, again, is simply doing his or her job.

The deliberative process privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary and is enjoyed
by any agency or body whose functions involve deliberations or candid discussions
before arriving at a final policy or resolution.[96] Aside from allowing an unfettered
exchange of ideas, Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corp[97] also
explained that the deliberative process privilege is necessary to prevent "public
confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency
establishes final policy."[98]
We note that unauthorized disclosure, sharing, publication, or use of confidential
documents or any of its contents is classified as a grave offense. The Tribunal
could have proceeded to the issuance of show cause orders against the Solicitor
General and Canlas for procuring, aiding and encouraging the leakage of sensitive
and confidential materials. However, in order that this Tribunal may be in a better
position to focus on the merits of the issues raised by the parties in this already
contentious case, the Tribunal for now sees fit to remind the parties that the
deliberative process privilege enjoys absolute confidentiality and exhorts them to
accord it respect.

IV

The standing asserted by the Solicitor General should be reviewed. "People's

Tribune" is not to be hoisted wantonly in big ticket cases involving private parties.

People's Tribune has been defined as:

[A]n instance when the Solicitor takes a position adverse and contrary to the
Government's because it is incumbent upon him to present to the Court what he
considers would legally uphold government's best interest, although the position
may run counter to a client's position.[99]

The Office of the Solicitor General is the law office of the government. Its default
client is the Republic of the Philippines, but ultimately, "the distinguished client of
the Office of the Solicitor General is the people themselves."[100] Its status as
People's Tribune is properly invoked only if the Republic of the Philippines is a
party litigant to the case.

Here, the Republic of the Philippines is not a party litigant. Protests ac filed this
election protest in his bid to oust the elected Vice President. Simply, this involves
private individuals only. Yet the Solicitor General comes to this Tribunal without,
at the very least, asking for leave of court as courtesy to this Tribunal.

Basic procedure dictates that parties must move for leave if they seek any action
from this Tribunal. With more reason should a nonparty file the appropriate motion
to intervene in a case not concerning them.This Tribunal reminds the Office of the
Solicitor General that it has been previously admonished that "[i]n future cases,
however, the Office of the Solicitor General should be more cautious in entering
its appearance to this Court as the People's Tribune to prevent further confusion
as to its standing."[

The resolution of the electoral protest is of utmost importance. Thus, the member-
in-charge urged the Tribunal to focus on the merits of the case and suggested that
matters not directly related to the issues in the electoral protest, such as the Office
of the Solicitor General's statement that it is acting as the People's Tribune and its
breach of confidentiality, may be addressed separately at a much later time.

For now, the Tribunal recognizes that forgiveness and toleration may be the most
decent response to misguided acts done due to counsel's and the Solicitor
General's misunderstandings. The parties, their counsels, and all others acting for
and on their behalf are all put on notice to be more circumspect in their pleadings
and in their public pronouncements. All counsels including the Solicitor General are
reminded to attend to their cases with the objectivity and dignity demanded by
our profession and keep their passions and excitement in check.

Tribunal resolves to DENY protestant's Strong Manifestation with Extremely

Urgent Omnibus Motion for the: I. Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F.
Leonen; II. Re-raffle of this Election Protest; III. Resolution of all the Pending
Incidents in the Above Entitled Case dated November 9, 2020.

The Office of the Solicitor General's Omnibus Motion (Motion for Inhibition of
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Reraffle) also dated November 9, 2020
is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.