Land Acquisition: Need for a Shift in Discourse?

Author(s): DHANMANJIRI SATHE

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 51, No. 51 (DECEMBER 17, 2016), pp. 52-58
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 Land Acquisition
Need fora Shift in Discourse?

DHANMANJIRI SATHE

Empirical work by researchers increasingly f

tish condemned him as fatalistic in nature. It was
that farmers are willing to sell their land if t
The believed tish Indian condemned that farmerthat
believed he did has himhe
not beendid
as respondnot
fatalistic thrice to cursed. changes in to
respond nature. First, in economic the It wasin
changes Bri- economic
price-compensation package is "acceptable
incentives, and hence, he is doomed to failure and to a life of
takes introductory anreview
poverty in of
perpetuity (Hatekar different
2003: 138). Later at the time of fr
launching the green revolution inpolitical
accumulation by dispossession, the mid-1960s doubts weresocie
society, of raised
the with respect to his ability and
reversal
effects of willingness to absorb new
primitive
technology and rise to the occasion. However, it has been
and double movement in the context of land
pointed out that these perceptions were wrong. In reality it
With farmers wanting
was found to move
that Indian farmers tookout of agricu
to new technology and
way and looking their profile
for was no different from any other
alternatives, economic agent
there is a
accept the (Subramaniam 1979: 48-50).
farmers' willingness to be partne
Of late, the farmer has been accused of not willing to sell his
developmental processes. At the same tim
land and becoming an impediment to the process of develop-
to the protest movements and
ment. This is due to the unrest that thethe
process of concom
acquisition
violence, the statehasis becoming
elicited, more
especially in the post-liberalisation period. It isacco
be-

the demands for lieved that the farmer

better is not willing to sell his land for theIn
compensation. pur- su
poses of industrialisation, urbanisation and development of infra-
situation, a covenant between the state an
structure, that is, non-agricultural purposes and the impression
to emerge. being created that the farmer is unfair in withholding his land.
A number of politicians from across parties have expressed
opinions which show that they feel the farmers are being emo-
tional about their land and that the delays are being caused
due to this aspect.
Many researchers and journalists have found that farmers
are willing to sell their land if the price-compensation pack-
age is acceptable. The television channel cnn-ibn in a pro-
gramme on land acquisition in the village Shendri, near Au-
rangabad, Maharashtra found that the farmers interviewed
were happy with the compensation package. Sudha Pai (2010)
says that the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority
(gnida) has worked out "a transparent and workable land
acquisition policy which has ensured the absence of farmers'
protests in regions with high demand for land for industries."
It has been claimed by various authors that land acquisition
faced much less resistance in states like Haryana, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat (Jenkins, Kennedy
and Mukhopadhyay 2014). There are some examples of a shift
towards developing individual models for industrial development
(Sathe 200 7). As per the National Sample Survey Office (nsso)
report 2005 (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implemen-
tation 2005: i), 40% of farmers do not want to engage in farm-
ing and this percentage could have been expected to rise (and
Dhanmanjiri Sathe (dhan.sathe@gmail.com) teaches at the Savitribai not fall) over the last 10 years in the face of agrarian distress.
Phule University, Pune.
So, a large number of farmers should be willing to accept a

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viable alternative. The key word here is 'Viable." Second, re-
versing the causality one could argue that, where ever industri-
alisation (manufacturing and services) and urbanisation, etc,
have taken place at high rates and without any problems, some
land acquisition has also occurred "peacefully" before. We
find that it is mainly in the southern and western states that in-
dustrialisation, etc, and, by inference, land acquisition has oc-
curred in a big way (though it has also occurred in pockets in
Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh (up)). There have been agi-
tations in the states in southern and western India too but by and
large, the process has been peaceful. These states are quite ad-
vanced with a vibrant press and electronic media so one cannot
really claim that the government apparatus was repressive in
these states and which could be the reason thereby making the
cases of peaceful acquisitions (Sathe 2015).
Against this backdrop, I hypothesise that the discourse on
land acquisition has been stagnant for a while; and that in view of
the emerging evidence it needs to be shifted. The discourse or
the received wisdom in this area has held farmers to be passive
and eternally at the receiving end. This perception was certainly
true for a few decades after independence. In the heyday of
planning, land was acquired by the government for develop-
mental purposes; and most of the times a pittance was paid to
the farmer. They were expected to sacrifice in the interests of
nation-building, and this was stated quite explicitly. This has
been called the "traditional phase" in land acquisition (Sathe
2011: 152). However, the situation underwent a change since
the late 1980s and the change definitely gathered momentum
since the reforms of the 1990s. One can discern a second phase,
the "civil society phase" in the history of land acquisition. This
phase has been marked by larger number of agitations, more
activism on the part of non-governmental organisations
(ngos), proactive role of media (Sathe 2011: 153) and so on.
There is more and more evidence to support the view that the
farmer is not an inert agent, rather he is willing to partake the
benefits of development, industrialisation and urbanisation, if
an "acceptable compensation" package is paid (I do not define
acceptable compensation here).
Improved Compensation
Of course, in the civil society phase the acquisition has been
happening at a heightened pace and there is, in fact, a tremen-
dous amount of variety in the experience. At one extreme we
have the Nandigram-Singur case, where there was lot of
violence from both sides; and acquisition had to be abandoned.
At another end we have the Pushpak Nagar case - wherein the
Maharashtra government went to great lengths to keep the
farmers content and see the project through. In May 2015, the
farmers who were to lose their lands (for the proposed airport)
were given the transfer of development rights (tdr) - said to
be a first by any state government in the country - to over-
come the problem that would arise due to height restrictions
imposed on the areas close to an airport (Indian Express 2015a).
Another example of an improved compensation is the package
that has been agreed upon for the farmers who are going to
lose land for Amravati, the new capital of the bifurcated state
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of Andhra Pradesh. In this case, the entire land has been
pooled and instead of a one-off deal, the state promises to
give them 30% of the developed land back. Additionally, the
farmers will also get ^50,000 per acre for 10 years which more
or less covers their income from agriculture ( Indian Express
2015b). If this model is successful, it could become a bench-
mark for all future large-scale acquisitions. One can see that this
great variety has its seeds in the unequal growth and develop-
ment of various regions in India. In the relatively advanced
regions of India like the south and west (Tamil Nadu, Gujarat);
and also some parts of the north (Haryana, west up), the farm-
ers are more willing to part with land but at an acceptable
compensation level. Haryana is especially interesting as the
farmers are willing to part with "even" irrigated land and the
state government has supported this view. In the backward re-
gions of eastern India (like Odisha) with many areas that are
tribal dominated, the unwillingness to part with land is much
more severe and has led to great amounts of bloodshed. In
fact, the texture of the entire land acquisition process in these
two broad geographical areas is quite different and this dichotomy
needs a separate analysis. It is, of course, a sad commentary on
the economic development of eastern up, Bihar and also West
Bengal that the interest in any acquisition is very low, espe-
cially for the purposes of industrialisation.
Is willingness to sell at acceptable compensation rates a
trend? It definitely seems to be so in the relatively advanced
regions of India, where in any case a large number of acquisi-
tions are occurring.
Acquisition in India has been explained in terms of the
"inevitable story of primitive accumulation" in the Marxist
tradition (Ruparelia et al 2011: 5). Marx's analysis of British
enclosures looked at the loss of land and to quote him
The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the
labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise
their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on their own legs,
it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continu-
ally extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for
the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes
away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a
process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of sub-
sistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate
producers into wage-labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation,
therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the
producer from the means of production. (Marx, as quoted in Patnaik
(ed) 2007: 56-57)
Following Marx's analysis, Harvey (2005: 159) has argued
that primitive accumulation practices (which Marx treated as
"primitive" or "original" during the rise of capitalism) contin-
ue and proliferate even in capitalist economies and he calls it
"accumulation by dispossession" that is, abd. Surprisingly, he
gives an example that does not belong to advanced economies -
"These include the commodification of land and the forceful
expulsion of peasant populations (compare the cases of Mexico
and of China, where 70 million peasants are thought to have
been displaced in recent times" says Harvey (2005: 159). All the
same, abd thinks of primitive accumulation as a continuous
process, something that is occurring even today in advanced
capitalist economies. Here, there seems to be some kind of
subtle binary between primitive accumulation concept to be
used for agricultural, backward economies; and abd to be
used for developed, capitalist economies. This neat classifica-
tion needs to be looked into further, as the development pro-
cess had led to "messy" developing economies, where some parts
are agrarian and some have become more capitalist. In any
case, abd has been used for interpreting the land "grabs" in
India (Menon and Nigam 2007; Banerjee-Guha 2010), making
the framework accessible for developing economies too.1
Harvey articulates the function of abd as "What accumula-
tion by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (includ-
ing labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero)
cost. Over-accumulated capital can seize hold of such assets
and immediately turn them into profitable use" (Harvey 2003:
149). This is an interesting definition and refreshingly accurate
(it needs to be pointed out that Harvey dpes not focus much on
land issues and even less on India). However, what if the price
paid is acceptable - in this case to the farmers for their land?
That is, the release of the assets (land here) is not at low cost or
at zero cost, but is the cost that the farmers accept and some-
thing that has been increasing? Further, what if the farmers
are going to be partners in the "capitalistic" growth that is ex-
pected to be-taking place on the acquired land, for example,
when they are given back a part of the developed land or if
they rent out the land to the capitalist? Additionally, what if a
large percentage of farmers (as mentioned earlier) do not want
to engage in agriculture? What if the farmers are becoming
increasingly market-sawy on one hand; and on the other, the
government/politicians have realised that the time to ask for
any sacrifices is past and are willing to co-opt the farmers in
the development process to avoid instability?
There is growing evidence that answers to these questions
would point towards the trend that increasingly the farmers are
not against losing their land per se; rather what they want is an
"acceptable" compensation; with the proviso that the notion of
acceptable is not stagnant and keeps on changing. This is my
interpretation of the trends that we are observing over the last
couple of years in many parts of India; and that what is unfolding
now is qualitatively different from what could be subsumed under
the notion of primitive accumulation and/or abd. As Partha
Chatteijee (2008: 60) remarks "... despite the use of old rhetoric
of peasant solidarity, there are clearly significant sections of the
people of these villages that do not join these agitations because
they feel they stand to gain from government policy."
With this understanding of the situation, we look into the
framework developed by Chatteijee. Chatteijee (2008: 53) first
reasons that "it has become important to revisit the question of
basic structures of power in Indian society, especially the posi-
tion of peasantry, under conditions of postcolonial democracy"
and that a new conceptual framework is required to that end.
Interestingly, he starts with referring to the violent agitations
in different regions of India, especially in West Bengal and
Odisha against land acquisition for industry. He says that if
these incidents had taken place 25 years ago they would have
been interpreted as classic signs of peasant insurgency. One
would have then discussed the dissolution of peasantry as a
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result of the process of primitive accumulation of capital,
Lenin's debates, Mao's analysis of the role of the peasantry in
the Chinese Revolution, etc. Chatterjee (2008: 54) then adds
that "I believe that analysis would be inappropriate today."
This is because, as he points out, the relationship between the
government and the peasants/farmers has undergone a sea-
change. The change has arisen because, first of all, the govern-
ment agencies are distributing education, health services, food,
water, railways and dozens of other welfare services. The peas-
ants not only depend on the state for these services; they have
also acquired considerable skills in manipulating the govern-
mental agencies in delivering these services. Second, due to land
reforms (however inadequate they might have been) peasants
owning small amounts of land are not directly confronting the
feudal classes. Third, since land tax or tax on agri-produce is
not a significant source of revenue for the government, the
relationship has stopped being extractive. Fourth, the peasants
are interested in shifting to the urban centres (due to new opp-
ortunities, etc) and not always "forced" out of a village due to
pauperisation. Finally, due to a revolution of aspirations
brought about by education, media and advertising, the younger
peasants are desirous of moving into towns and cities. He adds
that this may be truer of the poorer sections and the Dalits.
Peasantry and Government
The first reason for the change for the relationship between the
peasantry and the government, mentioned above, has come
about because, as Sanyal (2007 in Chatterjee 2008: 55) has ar-
gued there is a transformation in the understanding about the
minimum functions that a government should carry out and
also the technologies that are available to the government. It is
accepted that all people must have a minimum quality of life -
and that could be provided by the national or local govern-
ments; or even international agencies. Chatterjee (2008: 55)
applies this analysis to land acquisition and says that the peas-
ants losing their land and then facing complete loss of their
livelihood is considered unacceptable under the present glob-
ally prevailing normative ideas. Hence, using armed repres-
sion to put down peasant resistance is not going to gain much
legitimacy in today's world. He then moves on to other exam-
ples of reverse movement by citing poverty eradication
schemes, employment guarantee schemes, microcredit move-
ment and says that all these are direct interventions to reverse
the effects of primitive accumulation.
At this stage, it may be pertinent to note that Karl Polanyi
(2001 edition: 136) had earlier observed and put forth a similar
kind of a change and called it the "double movement." Polanyi
says (2001 ed: 136), "For a century, the dynamics of modern
society was governed by double movement: the market expanded
continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement
checking the expansion in definite directions." Further, he
(2001 ed: 138) elucidates that double movement can be personi-
fied as the action of two organising principles in society. The
first one is that of economic liberalism aiming at establishment
of self-regulating market; the other was the principal of social
protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature and
that this movement would be supported by those most affected farmers/tribals do not constitute political society, because they
by it. Blyth (2011: 4) says that Polanyi's great insight with do not want to part with an asset they own, whatever may be
respect to double movement was that "Those dislocated by the the compensation. Typically, the members of political society
market will use the state to protect themselves, the consequences negotiate and manipulate with the state, but they do not have
of which is large-scale institutional change." Corbridge et al any assets to offer in return. However, in a personal conversa-
(2011: 2) say that double movement is a situation in which the tion with Suhas Palshikar of the Politics and Public Adminis-
attempt to create a market-oriented society from above compels tration Department of the Savitribai Phule Pune University, he
a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating opined that even with the dimension of an asset, the farmers
effects. All in all, the double movement strives to make capital- would constitute political society as there continues to be a
ism more acceptable socially and politically, by mitigating "political relationship" between the state and the farmers.
some of its severe debilitating effects (if not all). It is surprising that Chatterjee (2008) starts his essay with
It needs to be mentioned here that both Chatterjee and land acquisition but this example is not built on further (as he
Sanyal do not refer to the concept of the double movement. moves on to urban examples) giving the impression that the
Are "reversal of primitive accumulation" and "double move- farmers who are not wanting to give up their land belong to
ment" exactly the same or is there some difference between political society. I argue that this is not the case and take the
them, is a moot question. However, we will not engage in this example of land acquisition further, arguing that the relation-
question now and revert to Chatterjee's particular analysis of ship comes closer to a market relationship, though it is definitely
India. After having introduced the idea of "reversal of primi- not fully so. It is market to the extent the farmers want a fair value
tive accumulation," Chatterjee (2008), then leads us to his ear- for the asset that they own. It is an exchange and not a largesse
lier, extremely insightful formulation of the civil society and given to the farmers. Even when they do not want to give up
the political society put forth in Chatterjee (2004). He argues their land at all, as mentioned above, there is an asset involved.
that it is via negotiations, manipulations, agitations, etc, that Farmers willing to sell their land for an acceptable compen-
the political society gets a certain amount of access to basic sation can be taken as a structural change in the history of land
services and welfare that is the reversal effect. But how does acquisition in India. This comes closer to the workers negotiating
he define the political society? He (2004: 37) says with the capitalist to pay him higher and higher wages; and
better and better benefits. And wages, etc, have improved as the
We have therefore described two sets of conceptual connections. One
socially held notions of what should be the standard of living of
is the line connecting civil society to the nation-state founded on popular
sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the linea "worker" has undergone a change (the state comes into the
connecting populations to governmental agencies pursuing multiple
picture when it fixes the minimum wages, safety standards,
policies of security and welfare. The first line points to a domain of politics
described in great detail in democratic political theory in the last two
etc). The same phenomenon seems to be unfolding in the case
centuries. Does the second line point to a different domain of politics? of
I land acquisition. The farmers are comprehending the <4value"
of their land and are getting organised in order to bargain for
believe it does. To distinguish it from the classic associational forms of
civil society, I am calling it political society (italics in the original). better returns. As the state is an economic agent when it is tak-
He then goes on to explain that inhabitants of political soci-
ing the land, the state has had to respond to this change.
ety are "only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and con-
Eminent Domain
textually, rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the
The transaction between the state and the farmer is not com-
constitution" (p 38). Often the members of the political society
form associations which transgress the strict lines of legality pletely
in a market transaction because the Indian state, like most
others elsewhere in the world, has the power of eminent domain
struggling to live and work. The agencies of the government deal
with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as con- and one sees no reason to grudge it to the Indian state, in par-
venient instruments for administration of welfare to marginal
ticular. In fact, the word "acquisition" clearly shows that it is not
and underprivileged population groups (Chatterjee 2004: necessarily
40). out of free will that the farmer is giving up his land.
Thus, the state can acquire land by coercion. To that extent, this
This being the definition of the political society, can we think
of the farmers agitating to get acceptable compensation as exchange
part goes out of the domain of market exchange. In a typi-
cal market exchange, buyer and the seller will come together
of political society? And are they asking for welfare and basic
public services? In this case, it seems that the relationship and
be- will either reach an agreement with respect to price or part
tween the state and the farmers is not similar to that between
ways. When the government acquires land using eminent do-
the state and political society; wherein the latter negotiatesmain,
for the seller (farmer) does not have a choice to say no. What
basic services and welfare. Here the farmers are asking forheancan do is to ask for a better compensation package than what
acceptable compensation for an asset that they own and
theingovernment is offering. To that end he will and has been en-
gaging in protest movements and/or approaching to the courts.
which the state is interested in acquisition. The farmers wanting
better compensation and agitating for it do not become part So,
of we could call this relationship a "quasi-market" one.
the political society as defined by Chatterjee. NegotiatingThere
for is another manner in which the market will have a cru-
cial bearing on the acquisition process as such. A price deter-
better resettlement and rehabilitation is also in lieu of giving
mined by the market compresses a whole lot of information
up the land - so an exchange is occurring. What if the farmers/
tribais do not want to sell their land, at all? Even then and
the scarcities. The market priçe for a commodity shows its

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scarcity, and it also reveals what is the future expected apprecia-
tion of the commodity. A farmer when he wants "market" price,
is wanting the price which has taken both these into account. He
could also ask for other things like getting a portion of the devel-
oped land back, etc, that is, acceptable compensation package;
but all these are built upon the market price as the base. The state
would also have to pay the market price or an amount based on
that, because the law requires it to be so (laa 1894, state-level
laws based on laa 1894, or larr 2013 require that) and also
because that is the correct way to go - at least in principal. Mar-
ket price is the base on which the ultimate compensation pack-
age, that is, the acceptable compensation, would be decided.
It is here that the land markets become relevant. The gov-
ernment, perforce, will have to go by some signals that come
out of the land markets. So, the dire need to have developed
land markets becomes immediately clear. Since the land mar-
kets are underdeveloped in India, both the government and
the farmers grope for the appropriate compensation-price. It is
easy to see that, even with good intentions the government
tends to underestimate the price of land (as any buyer does)
and the farmer tends to overestimate the price (as any seller
does). In a country like, say, the us, the land markets are well
developed and hence it becomes easier for the government
and for the courts to decide upon the price of land and the
compensation to be paid.
The State and the Capitalist
What about the relationship between the state and the capital-
ist? The capitalist will, of course, want to buy the land at the
cheapest rates. To that end s/he will try to manipulate the gov-
ernment and the relationship between the state and the capi-
talist is crucial in this regard. In India, the capitalists had got
used to buying the land at cheap rates from the government
for a long period of time especially in the traditional phase of
acquisition. But, on the other hand, it is not clear if the land
rates turned out to be as low as they looked on paper as the
capitalist also has had to support the political parties by mak-
ing monetary donations for the elections. It is alleged that
these were made out of the black money, that is, the earnings
on which tax is not paid. So, apparently it was a kind of a com-
plex interweaving of interests between the capitalists and gov-
ernment and political parties. But, none the less, what is cer-
tain is that under this kind of an arrangement the farmers
were definitely short-charged. Then we also see that there are
two additional issues. First is the compensation package that
the state offers to the farmers; the second is the price that the
government charges to the capitalist for the "developed" land.
We are rather more concerned with what the farmers get.
Whether the state sells to the capitalist at concessionary rate
or inflated rate is an important but entirely another matter. For
example, in Sanand taluka, the Government of Gujarat took
the land from the farmers in 2008 at four times the prevailing
market rate, namely, ^1,200 per square metre and sold to Tata
Motors (since they had to move out of Nandigram) at ^999
per square metre ( Business Standard 2011). The difference
was borne by the government which, of course, means the
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taxpayers. There is evidence (from the newspapers, interviews
and lack of agitations, etc) which shows that the farmers were
happy with the amount which was four times the market price
that was paid to them. (As an aside, if this kind of an acquisi-
tion was to be done in 2015, the farmers would definitely ask
for more, that is, like getting back the developed land showing
the dynamic nature of the issue.)
The government of course gave concessions in terms of lower
land price to the Tata Motors but giving such concessions for
the sake of larger gains, namely, industrialisation is the stuffa
public policy is made of. One cannot grudge any government
this policy freedom. What one can do is to find out if any kind
of favouritism, corruption, etc, exists. On the other hand, there
have been many cases where the government has taken the land
from the farmers at a lower price and then sold to the capitalist
at a higher price, after making some infrastructural additions.
Or, it has bought land from the farmers and then handed it
over to the developer to turn it into a special economic zone
(sez) or an industrial estate. In all such cases, the crucial issue
is if the farmer has got an acceptable compensation package?
In fact, after some of the problems that the capitalists have
faced with respect to land acquisition, the capitalist as a class
may not be averse to paying a higher price for land. What an
investor would be interested in is a speedy closing of deal and
with "no headache later." As has been pointed out the capital
cost of land for new corporate projects worked out to 1.8% of
gross fixed asset value in 2004, and it increased to 2.9% in
2008 (Kakani et al 2008). This does not seem very high and
the capitalist can definitely pay more than this share. The
higher cost of land would have an impact on the overall costs,
but they could be passed on to the consumers, at least in the
case of the domestic market. Otherwise, the capitalists could
shift to backward areas where the land prices are low, bringing
about a better spread of the economic activity (Sathe 2014: 74).
Levian (2011: 461) argues that the state has become a "land
broker state" acting in the interests of the capitalists. It would be
too simplistic to accuse the Indian state of being pro-capitalist
"all-the-time" and "come-what-may." Undoubtedly, the capitalists
have been used to and still look for patronage from the state.
But this relationship has undergone an alteration over a period
of time. Governments (at the central and state levels) have
come under pressure from the other involved parties too (and
not just capitalists). In a democracy, the political parties have had
to cater to the demands made by the farmers and the larger
civil society. As the election results after Nandigram-Singur
showed, the ruling party (Communist Party of India-Marxist)
which tried to take the land in a coercive manner lost the elec-
tions. Later, the larr 2013 was passed before general elections
in 2014, supposedly to show that the ruling party at the centre
(that is, the Congress) is pro-farmer. The then opposition party
the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) supported the law precisely for
this reason. After the bjp won the elections in 2014, it tried to
make amendments in the law, as post-elections it was felt that
it is difficult to implement in terms of the timeline and in terms
of the compensation to be paid. Many of the Congress-led state
governments were also inclined to agree. But the amendments
could not be passed in the Parliament, so an Ordinance was its compensation package if under pressure. To cite one exam-
promulgated in December 2014. Later, as the amendments ple, in case of the Mahindra World City sez, which was set up
could not be passed even in the succeeding sessions of Parlia- between 2005 and 2008, the Rajasthan government had first
ment, the Ordinance was repromulgated three times. Finally, offered the option of receiving 15% of the original land area as
it was allowed to lapse on 31 August 2015. This was done pur- developed land to the farmers and this was raised to 25% after
portedly with an eye on the Bihar assembly elections that were opposition (Levian 2011: 464). Levian calls it a "clever" policy,
to be held in October-November 2015. The bjp did not want to but it can also be interpreted as moves by a "learning" state. As
be accused of being "anti-farmer" during the Bihar elections. events have unfolded, the state may want to give a better deal
All this goes on to show that there is a counterweight to the to the farmers as the passing of the larr 2013 shows. Passing
power of the capitalist and it exists in the form of democracy. of larr 2013 is evidence that the government/party-in-power
Additionally, what we can discern from the cases like, say, perceived that "something" needs to be done to make land
Nandigram-Singur, Goa sez, Maha-Mumbai sez, etc, is that acquisitions easier, and to that end give better compensation to
the government may/can give up the idea of land acquisition if the farmer whatever be the merits or demerits of the particular
the protests are too severe. It is because of the Nandigram- law as such. It wanted to be and also to be seen as pro-farmer
Singur episodes that the government-political parties may be and if that meant better compensation package, then so be it.
in the process of becoming more and more sensitive to the de-
mands of the farmers. Both these cases occurred around 2007 A 'Learning State'
and since then that kind of violence has certainly decreased. As has been argued (Sathe 2011) in the civil society phase, the
To illustrate with another case, the acquisition for the Maha- drama of land acquisition in India has been unfolding in front
Mumbai sez started in 2006. This sez was a particularly high of the media, especially, the electronic media which played a
profile one as the Ambani group was involved and the number key role. One could argue about the limitations of the media
of villages to be acquired were 45. However, more than eight but undoubtedly it highlighted the issue and made it pertinent
organisations started protest agitations against the acquisi- to the political discourse. With the addition of social media to
tion. There was also a referendum that was taken in which out the repertoire of communication and information technologies, it
of 30,057 landholders 6,199 participated. This low share could would be easier for the farmers to put forth their stories and
be due to some of them abstaining from voting and also due to more difficult for the state to repress such accounts. Thankfully, it
one owning more than one piece of land, the break-up is not seems that the kind of repression that occurred in Nandigram-
known. Out of the 6,199, 95% said that they did not want to Singur may be difficult to replicate anywhere else in India now
part with their land and 5% were willing to sell only if their and is definitely not advisable.
conditions were met (Mujumdar and Menezes 2014). But it is From all that has been put forth above, can we say that
interesting to note that there was hardly any violence used Indian state is increasingly becoming a "learning state"? By
against the agitating farmers. this phrase we mean a state that is not static. It keeps on learn-
The SEZVSSS (sez Virodhi Shetkari Sangharsh Samiti) claimed ing from experience, adapts and changes its course. It under-
that the land price that was being paid to the farmers was stands that what it could do in a certain era may not be possible
much less than the market price in the adjacent area. It also now; or alternately what was not possible earlier could be
said that the land need not be acquired as the farmers could achieved in later periods. In this it could learn from many
lease the land to the developer and it proposed that the farm- quarters, including its own people and international experi-
ers could themselves "develop" the land for industrial use. All ences too. Even technological change can make the state
these arguments point towards willingness to part with the change itself (Aadhaar cards and mobile banking). A learning
land, under various conditions. Nowhere does it state that the state changes itself by changing political and economic institu-
farmers would like to continue with farming. Ultimately, the tions. And it is with this background that we can introduce
sez was de-notified in 2009 as the land could not be acquired Acemoglou-Robinson's (a-r) framework of extractive-inclusive
by then; and in 2011 the government of Maharashtra said that political-economic institutions (a-r 2012). Looking at the land
the farmers could use their land as they deemed fit (Reflec- acquisition process through the institutional lens, we find that
tions of Rebel in revolutionarynucleus. blogspot.in/2008/02). earlier the process was extractive in economic sense, as the
From all this, one can discern that the Indian state is moving farmers were not paid acceptable compensation. Over the years,
towards a situation where it will avoid using repression and it has become less and less extractive, as farmers made use of
violence, though it may not be completely abandoned, especially the political institutions that allowed them to protest. It is be-
in the remote areas. Violence will be less acceptable and it coming more and more inclusive - definitely in principle and
certainly has been showing a decreasing trend. Even though also to a large extent, in practice. Over the years, it is the interests
the state would use the power of eminent domain, it will of the farmers that have become more dominating and the land
become less and less coercive. This seems to be a "learning acquirer has had to pay more, a-r argue that countries like Great
state" wherein the state has moved from asking for sacrifices, Britain and the us became rich because their citizens overthrew
to understanding that such kind of violence will not work in the elites who controlled power and created a government which
"repeated games" of acquisitions. This definitely is the trend, was accountable and responsive to citizens and where great
whatever may be the exceptions. The state will also upgrade mass of people could take advantage of economic opportunities.

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How does one improve the inclusiveness of the institutions or put on board some changes that seem to be occurring repe-
decrease the extractiveness of the institutions? It is by the small atedly. What will actually happen in the future will, of course,
steps that any institutional change occurs in a democratic depend on the politics of it. Can the politicians in India under a
framework. We are tracing a few such steps. The process of democratic regime afford to ignore the demands made by the
moving away from extractive institutions is fraught with diffi- farmers? India's democracy may be flawed, all the same, there
culties. There can be slippages at any stage, so continuous vigi- has also been "the slow burning but significant deepening of
lance is required and is important. But as a-r (p 309) argues in- India's democracy" (Ruparelia et al 2011: 2). Additionally, it is
clusive political institutions tend to support inclusive economic well accepted that even in a dictatorship, the dictator cannot
institutions. Thus, the challenge is to keep and deepen the rule unless he has a certain amount of legitimacy and he tries
inclusiveness of political institutions in India. Consequently, to attain it by different ways. If this issue is resolved amicably,
the incentive to move towards extractive economic institutions India's industrialisation and urbanisation will not face a prob-
should be minimised. We argue that in case of land acquisition, lem on this account. As of now we are inclined to take a more
the movement has been towards more inclusive economic sanguine view of the situation.
institutions over a period of time. As a parallel case, we Let
canus not bequeath eternal victimhood to the farmer. The
farmer is an economic agent albeit with less power in the
quote Heller (2011: 11) who provides strong reasons for believing
market place. Of course, it has to be accepted without any
that citizens are participating more meaningfully and effec-
caveat
tively in political life than 20 years ago, in the context of the that if the protests and agitations had not occurred the
panchayati raj institutions. Further, he adds that whilefarmers
rural would not have got a better and improving compensa-
tion package. But it also needs to be accepted that at least in
power structures remain intact, "what has undeniably changed
is in post-independence India has been the slow but increas-
the face of resistance, the state has been changing. It did not
continue with repression unabated and seems to be willing to
ing capacity of subordinate groups to voice their grievances"
(2011: 170). We share this optimistic mood with caution. engage. The crucial point now is to what extent is it willing to
Will this trend continue? We in no way want to implychange
that itself, how does it change itself and what is going to be
the speed of that change. Clearly a covenant between the state
things will occur with a mathematical precision, in a perfectly
clean manner as in an economics textbook. Rather, we wantand to
land needs to emerge.

NOTE
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Transfor-
N and A Nigam (2007): Power and Contes-
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19 April, Vol 43, No 16, pp 53-62. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implement-
somewhat different way. He defines ABD as the
use of extra-economic coercion to expropriate ation (2005):
Glassman, J (2006): "Primitive Accumulation, Acc- NSSO 59th Round (January-
means of subsistence, production or common December
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Farmers, NSSO, July, New Delhi: Govern-
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